Nonkilling Political Science:
A Critical Evaluation

Papers Presented at the
21st World Congress of Political Science
in Santiago, Chile, 12-16 July, 2009

3 • 2010

Center *for* Global **Nonkilling**

Nonkilling Research Committees (partial list)

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Nonkilling Political Science: A Critical Evaluation (IPSA World Congress Panel Report)

Balwant (Bill) Bhaneja
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Summary

The theory of a Nonkilling Political Science was proposed some ten years ago in a book of the same title by Glenn Paige of the University of Hawai'i. The book is now published in 20 languages and has been translated into 34 languages. It is a serious, empirically based critique of political science that, as a discipline, implicitly accepts the necessity of war as a trait of human behaviour. This session solicits papers to take a critical look at Paige's thesis not only to decide whether political science is guilty as charged but, more fundamentally, whether nonkilling behaviour is a reasonable possibility and how this should be perceived from the point of view of political history and philosophy, national security policies and international relations.

The Panel "Nonkilling Political Science: A Critical Evaluation" was held at the International Political Science Association World Congress in Santiago, Chile, 12-16 July, 2009. The papers were presented by Dr. Piki Ish-Shalom from Israel, Doctoral Candidate Joám Evans Pim from Brazil/Galiza, and Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand from Thailand. Dr. Yoon-Jae Chung at the last minute had to cancel his trip to Santiago. The Discussants of the Panel were Prof. Michael Stein from Toronto and Dr. Bill Bhaneja from Ottawa, Canada.

The panel was attended by academics from various countries including political scientists from South Africa (Johannesburg), United Kingdom (Oxford), and Belgium (Flemish Institute of Peace) who along with discussants made active interventions seeking clarifications from the authors on a varied range of points. These included:

- Is the Nonkilling paradigm shift a re-hash of liberalism;
- a critique of Instrumentality of violence as a foundation of current political science;
- the relevance and adequacy of applying Thomas Kuhn's paradigm shift to social sciences;
- the validity of Hannah Arendt's theory on Violence as Antipolitics as she is not a pacifist philosopher;
- the need for more information on the use of the nonkilling approach as a measurable tool;
- the need to shift from the focus on needs of a State to needs of a people in a geographic and cultural region; and
- how can nonkilling prevent genocides and atrocities, and especially stop them in process?

The presenter in discussion to each of the above interventions gave substantive responses. In conclusion, the need for further research and theoretical development of a Nonkilling Political Science as a priority task was placed on the IPSA agenda for urgent consideration in partnership with all other fields of inquiry. This was to promote change toward the measurable goal of a killing free world open to infinite human creativity. Synergy with the conclusion of the 2002 World Health Organization Report on Violence and Health that human violence (homicide, suicide, and collective violence) is a "preventable disease" was underscored.

The IPSA has a membership of 3,600 political scientists and 50 political science associations. Participation in the Congress proved an excellent venue for informing the IPSA membership in attendance and those on distribution of the congress documentation about the Nonkilling Political Science concept and the Center's website and projects listed therein.

Interdisciplinary Perspectives
Toward a Nonkilling Paradigm

Joám Evans Pim
Center for Global Nonkilling

Summary

Nonkilling, as presented by Paige (2002; 2009), refers to a form of society where killing, threats to kill and conditions conductive to killing are absent. This framework describes a deep transformation away from long held societal premises and presumptions rooted in the widespread acceptance of lethality (in all of its forms), and a refutation of mainstream killing-accepting science in all disciplines from the biological sciences to the social sciences. Nonkilling proposes a complete paradigm shift (following Kuhn, 1962), with new principles, new language, new values, new methodological criteria, and a set of new tools for analysis of problems, political and other. This paper describes this new perspective and the basis for this normative and empirical shift of paradigm.

Introduction

The underlying ideas behind "nonkilling" are certainly not new. As Marvin Harris (1990: 438) explains, "Zoroastrianism, the religion of ancient Iran, is the oldest nonkilling faith of which any historical record exists," dating back to sometime between the 11th and the 7th centuries BCE. According to Harris, Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Christianity would also be described as "nonkilling religions," each having a common background of state failure to

deliver "worldly benefits" (1990: 444)[1]. Principles of nonkilling are also present in other spiritual traditions such as Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, Judaism, Voodoo, Cheyenne, etc. (see Smith-Christopher, 2007; Paige; Evans, 2008). Nevertheless, nonkilling enters the 21st century not simply as a normative principle but as an approach to global problem solving based on practical applications and empirical findings.

In fact, history also provides many examples of grounded nonkilling action. Individual leaders such as Emperor Ashoka of India, who included the notion of nonkilling in his *Edicts* (approx. 238 BCE), Māori leader Te Whiti (c. 1815-1907), Sheik Ahmadou Bamba in Senegal (1853-1927), and other relatively well known figures such as Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Martin Luther King, Jr., all have embraced the principles of nonkilling in a variety of cultures. But, as Antony Adolf and Isarel Sanmartín (2009) argue, nonkilling is also about what did not happen: individuals and communities systematically not killing each other for thousands of years, making our current existence possible.

> **nonkilling enters the 21st century not simply as a normative principle but as an approach to global problem solving based on practical applications and empirical findings**

Even though the word has not appeared as frequently as would be expected, nonkilling has an increasing presence in academia, moving beyond the discussion of oriental philosophy. The introduction of nonkilling as a wider worldview and strategy for social change occurred together with nonviolence, especially after its success in India. Nevertheless, it appears that nonviolence has had a relatively greater presence, perhaps because it is better suited to the Western intellectual taste for more abstract concepts. As Collyer reminds us, the "familiar word, nonviolence, is almost comforting in its generality" while nonkilling "confronts and startles us with its specificity" (2003: 371).

Both concepts have deep similarities and share a common background. In his 1963 essay *Disciplines of the Spirit*, civil rights leader and scholar Howard Thurman explains how

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[1] Following a cultural materialism approach, Harris explains how nonkilling religions emerged, in a confluence of brutal and costly wars, environmental depletion, population growth and rise of cities, food shortages, widespread poverty and rigidified social distinctions (1990: 444). A scenario that certainly resembles our own.

"[n]onviolence and nonkilling mean … essentially the same thing" as in effect they both oppose the "logic of hate [which] is to kill":

> It is to translate the willing of the nonexistence of another into the literal deed of his extermination. Men who war against each other, if they are to be effective in their undertaking, must hate. They must will the nonexistence of each other. (1963: 115)

Recently, the term has gained increasing usage, notably with the publication in 2002 of the book *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, authored by Glenn D. Paige, Professor Emeritus, University of Hawai'i. Olivier Urbain (2009) points out that Paige is obviously not the "inventor" of nonkilling, an idea so old and deeply rooted that can only be attributed to the collective consciousness of humankind, but provided "a way to think about the issue in a systematic way," through a simple but far reaching set of questions: "Is a nonkilling society possible? If no, why not? If yes, why?" Significantly, translations of this book have been published in 19 languages,[2] leading to numerous projects and initiatives in the countries where released and beyond.[3]

> "[n]onviolence and nonkilling mean … essentially the same thing"

For the purposes of introducing this volume, a concise definition is offered, where nonkilling refers to the absence of killing, threats to kill, and conditions conducive to killing in human society (2009 [2002]: 1). In analysis of its causes, nonkilling encompasses the concepts of peace (absence of war and conditions conducive to war), nonviolence (psychological, physical, and structural), and *ahimsa* (noninjury in thought,

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[2] A full list of translations is available at: <http://www.nonkilling.org/node/18>.
[3] Recent examples are the Brazilian Institute for Nonkilling / Instituto Brasileiro do Não matar (<http://www.naomatar.org>), the German Center for the Advancement of Nonkilling / *Zentrum zur Förderung des Nichttötens* (<http://www.nonkilling.de/>), the Citizens Initiative for a Nonkilling India presented by the Indian Council of Gandhian Studies or the Movement for a Nonkilling Philippines and its associated Philippine Institute for Global Nonkilling at Kalayaan College (<http://www.kalayaan.edu.ph/>). Other initiatives include *Centre Caraibéen pour la Non-Violence Globale et le Développement Durable* in Haiti (<http://www.ccngd.org/>) and the Center for Global Nonviolence Nigeria (<http://cgnv.edublogs.org/>). The publication of *Towards a Nonkilling Filipino Society* (2004), a collection of eighteen essays by prominent Filipino scholars and leaders, is also a significant off spring.

word and deed) (Paige, 2005). In spite of its negative "appearance," in actuality, it is killing that uses a negation principle, as it means taking the life of another person, fulfilling the will of the nonexistence of another using Thurman's terms. Nonkilling, using fundamental ancient syllogisms, is the affirmation of the act of not taking the life of another person. This shift in point of view is dramatic and often uncomfortable.

The perspective of nonkilling offered by Paige provides a distinct approach, characterized by the measurability of its goals and the open-ended nature of its realization. While the usage of other terms such as "nonviolence" and "peace" usually follows a classical form of argument through abstract ideas that often leads to passivity (see Drago, 2009), killing (and its opposite, nonkilling), can be quantified and related to specific causes by following an approach similar to that of the public health model: prevention, intervention and post-traumatic transformation (see World Health Organization, 2002).

> Nonkilling, using fundamental ancient syllogisms, is the affirmation of the act of not taking the life of another person

On the other hand, as presented by Paige, nonkilling does not set any predetermined path for the achievement of a killing-free society in the same way some ideologies and spiritual traditions that foster the restraint from the taking of life do. As an open-ended generative systems approach it appeals to infinite human creativity and variability, encouraging continuous explorations in the fields of education, research, social action and policy making, by developing a broad range of scientific, institutional, educational, political, economic and spiritual alternatives to human killing (Paige, 2005).

In spite of its specific focus, nonkilling also tackles broader issues that account for structural killing and nonkilling. In relation to psychological aggression, physical assault, and torture intended to terrorize by manifest or latent threat to life, nonkilling implies the removal of their psychosocial causes. As Paige suggests, it is the possibility of directly killing humans that supports all forms of nonlethal and pre-lethal violence. In relation to killing of humans by socioeconomic structural conditions that are the product of direct lethal reinforcement as well as the result of diversion of resources for purposes of killing, nonkilling implies removal of lethality-linked deprivations. In relation to threats to the viability of the biosphere, nonkilling implies absence of direct attacks upon life-sustaining

resources as well as cessation of indirect degradation associated with lethality. In relation to forms of corporate, economic or accidental killing, nonkilling implies creation of social and technological conditions conducive to their elimination (Paige, 2005; also see Perkins, 2004).

In the same year Paige published *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, John Kavanaugh also pointed out how "[t]he principle of nonkilling is not a recommendation of passivity," as the "primary commitment to the inherent dignity of personal life requires us to intervene on behalf of the defenceless or the victim" with the only moral limit of "the direct intended killing of the aggressor" (2002: 123). Moving beyond, Paige argues that nonkilling is not only about the rejection of killing, but also implies constructive engagement in societal transformation:

> This means unequivocal engagement in abolition of war and its weapons, abolition of poverty, nonkilling expression of human rights and responsibilities, proactive promotion of environmental sustainability, and contribution to problem-solving processes that respond to human needs and evoke infinite creative potential in individuals and in humankind as a whole. (2009: 102)

Such a deep transformation […], trespasses the limits of an ideology for social change entailing a new scientific model based on the refutation of killing-accepting science

Such a deep transformation of those societal premises rooted in the widespread acceptance of lethality (in all of its forms) and lethal intent, trespasses the limits of an ideology for social change entailing a new scientific model based on the refutation of killing-accepting science. Certainly, all theories that were the catalysts for significant paradigm shifts were previously dismissed as "utopian," "idealistic," and "unrealistic" (Kuhn, 1962), in this case by the institutionalized lethality-accepting scholarly communities that challenge nonkilling's scientific status, credibility and viability.

As Ibáñez explains, "majority science" always operates as a selective filter of reality, in such a way that "only the portion that dominant ideology provides goes through" (1985: 33). Alternative approaches such as nonkilling tend to be considered deviant, if not simply unnoticed. Following this logic,

Ibáñez distinguishes between dogmatic, sedentary or majority science and critical, nomadic or minority science.

While the first assumes the mainstream position of power and unity; the latter adopts the multiple views of those who resist from the base of the hierarchical system; While the first approach does not challenge the existing reality; the latter seeks its transformation; While the first is responsible for reproducing and maintaining the knowledge that has been previously generated; the latter constantly creates alternatives on the fringes of sedentary science; While the first considers the latter "prescientific," "subscientific" or "parascientific," the latter considers the first as "meta-scientific" and hylomorphic, as "all passivity is on the side of matter" and "no production exists beyond reproduction" (1985: 38-39).

Following society's general orientation toward the belief that affirms the inevitability and legitimacy of killing in human relations, most scientists could be accordingly labelled as "killing-" or "lethality-accepting." Using the gradual taxonomy suggested by Paige, the following perspective would describe a possible spectrum of orientations: e

"you cannot understand or achieve something by ignoring it"

> *prokilling*—consider killing positively beneficial for self or civilization; *killing-prone*—inclined to kill or to support killing when advantageous; *ambikilling*—equally inclined to kill or not to kill, and to support or oppose it; *killing-avoiding*—predisposed not to kill or to support it but prepared to do so; *nonkilling*—committed not to kill and to change conditions conducive to lethality. (2009: 77)

But as Sponsel (1996: 113-114) points out, the "natural and social sciences may be on the verge of a *paradigm shift*— to include nonviolence and peace as well as violence and war as legitimate subjects for research," countering the "historic and current systemic bias of the disproportionate amount of attention given to violence and war." Sponsel calls for considering nonkilling and nonviolence seriously, systematically and intensively: "you cannot understand or achieve something by ignoring it" (1996: 14).

This paper focuses on the current development of this emerging nonkilling paradigm. First, applicability of the theoretical framework for paradigm shifts and scientific revolutions

as portrayed by Kuhn (1962) is noted. Secondly, the nature of a nonkilling paradigm shift following the notions brought forward by Paige (2009 [2002]) is described. Thirdly, some of the inter-disciplinary findings (that can be explored in detail in Evans Pim, Ed., 2009) regarding cumulative evidence and applicability of nonkilling theory are explored, supporting the case for such a shift. Finally, the current status of what commentators, activists and scholars see as a transformational shift is discussed and a variety of future perspectives are offered.

On Paradigm Shifts

The concept of paradigm shift was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in *The Scientific Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) as a theory to explain epistemological change through history. In spite of its flaws and setbacks, successive debates and modifica-tions have led to a widely accepted model on the mechanisms that shape scientific revolution (Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970; Kordig, 1973; Fuller, 2000), which, in Kuhn's terms, is "a noncumulative developmental episode in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (1962: 91).

According to this approach, normal science is based on the unprecedented and open-ended scientific achievements that are acknowledged by a scientific community, constituting a paradigm (1962: 10). Paradigms determine which issues are subject to inquiry, what are the appropriate questions, and what methodology must be applied to solve them. Paradigms also serve as instruments for endo-culturalization and doctrinal training within the scientific community. Acceptance of defined doctrine by students is required as part of their initiation thus creating consensus on the basic rules and standards. These standards are consecrated through a series of institu-tional instruments as professional societies or academic jour-nals, and—eventually—the general understanding that the bases of the paradigm no longer need to be discussed (as they are already enshrined in textbooks).

As a paradigm reaches its position as normal science it will focus its efforts on the reinforcement of its theoretical and experimental foundations, leaving no space for the analysis of

> Paradigms determine which issues are subject to inquiry, what are the appropriate questions, and what methodology must be applied to solve them

anomalies or the development of new theories, as it is "directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies" (1962:24). But anomalies that cannot be understood within an existing scientific framework still appear, creating discrepancies between theory and facts. Kuhn assumes that anomalies exist in all paradigms, even though they tend to be considered as acceptable margins of error or, more often, simply ignored and excluded from the focus of debate (1962: 64). In the history of science there have always been points in which the excess of significant anomalies have jeopardized the prevailing scientific paradigms, bringing them into a state of crisis (see Kuhn, ch. 7).

These inexorable anomalies, together with changes in socially constructed knowledge and belief systems and growing academic criticism, seed the ground for scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts (transition from normal to extraordinary science). A paradigm is not limited to dominant theories but encompasses the worldview of the scientific community at a certain point in time. Understandably, the change of the scientists' worldview is not a simple consequence of the accumulation of adverse anomalies within a discipline, but, moreover, a result of deep alterations of social, historic and cultural conditions and possibilities.

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A paradigm shift is thus a long social process that implies significant changes in how disciplines function, slowly modifying views on what is thinkable or unthinkable, altering intellectual strategies for problem-solving and modifying terminology usage and conceptual frameworks in a changing universe of discourse. When anomalies become more generally acknowledged, explicit discontent, new articulations of the paradigm and new discoveries proliferate. As Kuhn expresses it, "a scientist's world is qualitatively transformed as well as quantitatively enriched by fundamental novelties of either fact or theory" (1962: 7). At this stage new ideas or those who had previously been consigned to the margins of academic thought are brought forward and engage the previously accepted theoretical framework in an epistemological challenge.

Followers of the institutionalized paradigm that has started to be questioned will close ranks until a new alternative emerges and gains acceptance. Conversion from one paradigm to another is not necessarily immediate or spontaneous and, according to Max Planck, can be more the result of a generational turnover: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it" (in Kuhn, 1962: 151). On the contrary, Kuhn does believe in conversions, that "occur not despite the fact that scientists are human but because they are" (1962: 152). When a paradigm reaches its crisis and consensus within the established framework of "normal science" ceases to exist, a period of "revolutionary science" arises, as the bolder members of the scientific community start to point out weaknesses and explore alternatives for the previously unchallenged assumptions. Challenging a paradigm certainly requires audacity, as desertion will initially be framed as the exclusion from scientific practice, as defined by the dominant paradigm (1962: 34).

Any scientific community will encompass both conservative and more "daring" individuals. The first will harshly resist any theoretical change brought forward by the latter elements, and a period in which both paradigms co-exist—in a troubled relation—will occur. During this initial period the emerging paradigm (still precarious and incomplete) will be highly criticized for being unable to solve apparent anomalies, only replacing the previous one (and thus completing the shift) when it has overcome its inconsistencies and gained unity. The result of this process is not simply a different or improved theoretical model or, in other words, "handling the same bundle of data as before, but placing them in a new system of relations with one another by giving them a different framework" (1962: 85), but a completely altered worldview (thus the incommensurability of old and new paradigms presented in the Kuhnian approach). Allegiance to a new paradigm is not based exclusively on its past achievements (usually still immature) but rather on "which paradigm should in the future guide research on problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim to resolve completely" (1962: 157).

> When a paradigm reaches its crisis and consensus within the established framework of "normal science" ceases to exist, a period of "revolutionary science" arises

As Kuhn believed problem-solving is the basis of science, the success of a new paradigm ultimately depends on its ability to "resolve some outstanding and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way" (1962: 168). Or, summarizing, being able to resolve more problems and resolve them better than its predecessor. A new paradigm implies a redefinition of science itself as problems that were previously considered trivial or nonexistent become focal points of scientific development (1962: 103).

The emerging paradigm will initially have a small number of supporters (disqualified and considered suspect by the mainstream scientific community) who are ultimately responsible for improving their proposal, exploring its possibilities and persuading others to join. As the number of aligned scientists increases so will the quantity of books, articles, instruments and experiments. If successful and appealing, a spiral process will be unleashed through which the emerging paradigm will enter its phase of normal science. In this sense, paradigm shifts share parallels with the diffusion of innovation theories where new inventions and discoveries are described on an innovation curve ranging from initial resistance, innovators, then early adapters, late majority, and finally laggards (Rogers, 1995).

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A Nonkilling Paradigm Shift

In *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (2009 [2002]), Glenn D. Paige envisions what kind of science would emerge if the scientific community would replace the assumption of lethal inescapability with the premise of nonkilling potentiality or, in other words, if it would shift from the predominant killing-accepting perspective to a nonkilling perspective (2009: 73):

> What values would inspire and guide our work? What facts would we seek? What explanatory and predictive theories would we explore? What uses of knowledge would we facilitate? How would we educate and train ourselves and others? What institutions would we build? And how would we engage with others in processes of discovery, creation, sharing, and use of knowledge to

In a "disciplinary shift to nonkilling creativity," Paige argues, the acceptance of killing as a social, cultural, political, economic, biological, technological, etc. imperative becomes unthinkable or, at the very least problematical, as both approaches are, using Kuhnian terms, incompatible and incommensurable. Certainly, if killing is considered inevitable or acceptable within the scientific community little effort will be devoted to deepening our understanding of killing and possible alternatives that will remove the conditions behind lethality. As the criteria for determining legitimate problems and solutions also change, Paige calls for a greater emphasis on the understanding of killing within the framework of a four-part logic of analysis. This focus is on the causes of killing; causes of nonkilling; causes of transition between killing and nonkilling; and the characteristics of killing-free societies (2009: 73).

This causational approach is crucial, as each case of killing and nonkilling must be analysed seeking to understand the underlying "processes of cause and effect, however complex and interdependent" (2009: 74). Not only is it necessary to know "who kills whom, how, where, when, why and with what antecedents, contextual conditions, individual and social meanings, and consequences," but also why and how so many in human history have chosen life over lethality when confronted with the most adverse circumstances, and why and how collective or individual transitions and oscillations from killing to nonkilling and vice-versa have occurred (an irreversible linear progression is not assumed), taking into account every variable from individual decision-making to structural killing and nonkilling determinant factors (idem).

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Interestingly, the fourth item in this framework implies the need to understand existing killing-free societies. Recalling Kenneth Boulding's 1st Law ("Anything that exists is possible"), Paige (and contemporary anthropological evidence) reminds us that nonkilling societies do exist in spite of having passed largely unnoticed to most in the scientific community. Following its open-ended nature, no specific model is proposed but rather a call to human inventiveness and infinite variability, appealing to "progressive explorations of ethically acceptable, potentially achievable, and

sometimes hypothetically envisioned conditions of individual, social, and global life" (2009: 75). Empirical demonstrations of historical and contemporary experiences "need to be extended in explorations of 'pure theory' to identify desirable characteristics of killing-free societies and plausible processes of realizing them from present conditions" (idem).

Figure 1. Unfolding fan of nonkilling alternatives

In his proposal, Paige also identifies five zones (portrayed as a "funnel of killing" and a "unfolding fan of nonkilling alternatives") in which practical transformative alternatives must be developed in the process of applying the theoretical knowledge derived from nonkilling analysis:[4] the killing zone (the place of bloodshed); the socialization zone (where people learn to kill); the cultural conditioning zone (where acceptance of killing as unavoidable and legitimate is predisposed); the structural reinforcement zone (providing socioeconomic relations, institutions, and material means predisposing and supporting killing); and the neuro-biochemical capability zone (comprising physical and neurological factors that contribute to both killing and nonkilling behaviors). The focal point of nonkilling scientific research resides on the need for effective transformative applications in the scope of this "funnel of killing."

> The focal point of nonkilling scientific research resides on the need for ef-fective transformative applications in the scope of this "funnel of killing."

For the emergence of these alternatives a normative and empirical shift from the killing imperative to the imperative

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[4] "Such changes can range from spiritual and nonlethal high technology interventions in the killing zone, through nonkilling socialization and cultural conditioning, to restructuring socioeconomic conditions so that they neither produce nor require lethality for maintenance or change, and to clinical, pharmacological, physical, and self-transformative meditative and biofeedback interventions that liberate from bio-propensity to kill" (Paige, 2009: 76).

not to kill must occur through a cumulative process of interacting ethical and empirical discoveries. As Kuhn stated, a scientific revolution does not come about simply through accumulation, but rather through transformation, altering the foundational theoretical generalizations (1962: 85). Paige points out that this inevitably requires normative, factual, theoretical, applied, educational, institutional and methodological nonkilling revolutions. Normative ethical progression would have to move from "killing is imperative," to "killing is questionable," to "killing is unacceptable," to "nonkilling is imperative." In parallel, an empirical progression should shift from "nonkilling is impossible," to "nonkilling is problematic," to "nonkilling is explorable," to "nonkilling is possible." [see Figure 2] (2009: 75-79).

As a *factual shift*, nonkilling deepens into the gathering of evidence for nonkilling human propensities and capabilities, usually discarded or ignored by killing-accepting "normal science" that sees them as trivial or nonexistent anomalies, but that are extremely significant in the context of nonkilling fact-gathering. As a *theoretical shift*, nonkilling faces the challenge of articulating normative and empirical theories that can effectively tackle the problems from the range of phenomena it confronts. As an *applied shift*, nonkilling must assist global transformation toward killing-free societies, designing ways where theoretical knowledge can relate to the problem-solving needs of the "unfolding fan of nonkilling alternatives." As an *educational shift*, nonkilling has to challenge the authority of killing-accepting academic traditions; unless the horizon of rules and standards within the scientific community is widened to include nonkilling alternatives and competencies for research, teaching, consultancy, leadership, civic action and critical reflection, disagreement over lethality is not likely to occur. As a *methodological shift*, nonkilling must overcome not only the conceptual and theoretical framework that limit the understanding of nonkilling capabilities but also instrumental and methodological impediments that condition selection, evaluation, criticism and analysis of necessary data on killing and nonkilling. Finally, an *institutional shift* foresees the establishment of nonkilling as normal science, designing new organizational outlines for disciplines, subdisciplines and interdiscipli-

> an empirical progression should shift from "nonkilling is impossible," to "nonkilling is problematic," to "nonkilling is explorable," to "nonkilling is possible."

nary relations, not only focusing on the academic arena but moreover on the field of social practice (Paige, 2009: 79-85).

Figure 2. Process of Normative-Empirical Nonkilling Paradigm Shift

Normative shift	Interaction Process	Empirical shift
Killing is imperative	↔	Nonkilling is impossible
↓		↓
Killing is questionable	↔	Nonkilling is problematic
↓		↓
Killing is unacceptable	↔	Nonkilling is explorable
↓		↓
Nonkilling is imperative	↔	Nonkilling is possible

Interdisciplinary Bases for a Nonkilling Shift

In 1986 twenty scientists from a range of disciplines gathered in Seville to produce what would be known as the *Statement on Violence* [5]. This document, formally adopted by UNESCO's General Conference two years later, firmly refuted "the notion that organized human violence is biologically determined." Criticising "violent pessimism," the document labelled common beliefs as those that affirm that humans have an instinctive tendency to war, a "violent brain," or that violent behaviour is genetically programmed into human nature are "scientifically incorrect." Piero P. Giorgi (2009) expands this notion, showing consistent evidence that rejects nature as a primary determinant and shaper of aggression.

For example, studies among the pygmy chimpanzees (the bonobos), one of the animal species closest to humans, revealed that levels of aggression both in the wild and in captivity are not even comparable with current levels of violence among humans. Among the bonobos, sexual behaviour would

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[5] Available at <http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Seville_Statement_on_Violence>.

operate as a form to avoid and reduce group tensions. Other notable primatologists have systematically challenged the "man the hunter" and "man the warrior" myths, offering counter-arguments for alleged human biological propensity to violence and killing (see Sussman, 1999; Hart; Sussman, 2009). As the "Seville Statement" suggests, violence would rather be a product of the human mind. But is it?

Psychologist Rachel MacNair (2002) coined the term "Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress" (PITS) to describe a subcategory of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder that expresses the common symptoms of those who have been active participants in causing trauma, including soldiers, executioners, police officers, and abortion or euthanasia practitioners. Facing early arguments that defended the existence of natural aggression instincts, the findings behind PITS suggest "that the human mind, contrary to certain political ideologies, is not only not well suited for killing, but that the mind tends to find it repulsive" (MacNair, 2009: 345). As this author points out, "[n]onkilling is not merely a good ethical idea" but it "is necessary for mental health" (idem). Curiously, this view is widely shared by scholars in the military establishment, where human resistance to killing can be rather problematic and has been studied in great detail. As Lt. Col. Grossman explains, one of the military's most challenging tasks is to train recruits "to overcome the average individual's deep-seated-resistance to killing" (1995: 295).

> "the human mind, contrary to certain political ideologies, is not only not well suited for killing, but that the mind tends to find it repulsive"

As Giorgi (2009: 120) suggests, the global transition from nonkilling to killing societies would have been a "purely cultural accident happen[ing] about 8,000 years ago." Killing of fellow human beings would have supposed an interruption of "90,000 years of a well established nonkilling human tradition," a contradiction that has tried to be solved "by convincing ourselves that human being are violent by nature and have been killing each other from the very beginning." Following a biocultural evolution approach, our brain would still be suited for a hunter-gathering culture that, as Sponsel (2009: 38) suggests, would "epitomize Paige's attributes of a nonkilling society."

In contrast with the alleged biological imperative that would confirm the Hobbesian view of human nature, new anthropological findings seem to be more inclined to support Rousseau's idea

of the peaceful "noble savage." Hunter-gatherer societies not only tend to have relatively nonhierarchical and egalitarian social structures but are also "grounded in an ethos of routine cooperation, reciprocity, and nonviolent conflict resolution," as the San, Mbuti or Semai illustrate (see Sponsel, 2009; also visit the online *Encyclopaedia of Peaceful Societies*).[6] Considering humans lived exclusively as hunter-gatherers for roughly 99% of their existence (Hart; Sussman, 2009), Margaret Mead's claim (1940) for the relatively recent appearance of warfare (during the Neolithic period) and the even more recent establishment of military-like institutions (jointly with the state, approximately 5,000 years ago), seem to support Rousseau's point.[7]

This is certainly not to say that humans should return to hunter-gathering, but it supports the bases for nonkilling human capabilities through revised socio-cultural heuristic models. As Sponsel explains, on many occasions "peace appears to be elusive not because relatively nonviolent and peaceful societies are so rare—they are not—but instead because so rarely have nonviolence and peace been the focus of research in anthropology and other disciplines" (1996: 114). This same bias also affects other disciplines across the social sciences and humanities.

> Hunter-gatherer societies not only tend to have relatively nonhierarchical and egalitarian social structures but are also "grounded in an ethos of routine cooperation, reciprocity, and nonviolent conflict resolution"

Challenges to the "self-fulfilling prophecy" have also emerged from the field of humanities. Comins Mingol and Paris Albert, for example, make the case for a "nonkilling philosophy," that should be "committed to the recuperation of and the recognition of human potential for peace," both "working to construct and reconstruct discourses that legitimize and promote nonkilling" and "visibilizing and removing the veil of cultural killing, with its discourses that marginalize, exclude and ultimately serve to legitimize structural and cul-

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[6] Available at: <http:// www.peacefulsocieties.org/>.

[7] It is also worth noting that weapons specifically designed for warfare or archaeological records of regular warfare only appear relatively late in human prehistory (Sponsel, 2009). Practice of nonkilling warfare has also been studied among North American Indian societies (Sioux, for example) who practiced the "counting coup," where "[t]o touch an enemy, to enter battle unarmed and take an opponent's weapon or horse was the highest feat of bravery one could accomplish" (in Mayton, 2009: 131).

tural killing." (2009: 285) Friedrich and Gomes de Matos (2009: 222) defend the development of "nonkilling linguistics," arguing how in "a nonkilling society, language must play a pivotal role as a tool for peace as it needs to be widely engaged."

In the field of Geography, Tyner points out how "innumerable geographies underlie the actual human behavior of killing," holding the potential to rationalize and legitimate both killing and nonkilling (2009: 183). The situation parallels that of sociology, as Feltey (2009) explores how the theoretical foundations of sthis discipline can contribute to the development of nonkilling societies.

In similar terms, D'Ambrosio emphasizes the nature of mathematics as "an instrument to deal with the human pulses of survival and transcendence." In the model he proposes, a critically and historically grounded "nonkilling mathematics" would need to favour semantics over syntax as a means to "resist cooptation and be prone to be used for humanitarian and dignifying purposes." (2009: 266) In the realm of physics, Drago counters some violence-prone logic associated with Newtonian mechanics through L. Carnot's notion of greatest efficiency by acting in a reversible manner ("never perform an action that cannot be subsequently reversed without loss of work"). The application of this notion resulted not only in the development of thermodynamics, where the greatest efficiency means the minimum of entropy change ($\Delta S = min$), but also in various offsprings in the fields of conflict resolution and defence (for example, the concept of alternative defence or *Soziale Verteidigung*), with special significance for nonkilling, as "the death of a human being is the most irreversible process" (Drago, 2009: 317). Its practical application is envisioned by Haws, who argues that "the extreme boundaries of killing (intentional) and letting-die (accidental) encompass a well-distributed continuum of possibilities," that must be assumed and integrated in the professional ethics of engineering.

"the death of a human being is the most irreversible process"

Another field with a huge responsibility and that has made great progress in the shift toward nonkilling is certainly that of public health. Significantly the *World Report on Violence and Health*, published in 2002 by the World Health Organization, labelled violence as a "preventable disease" (Krug et al., eds., 2002). The *Report* not only documents the nature and scope of violent deaths (including homicides, suicides and war-related

killings) but also analyses the economic costs of the loss of human life in fields such as health care, law enforcement and judicial services, and reduced productivity (Brauer and Marlin, 2009). This document also offers a wide range of primary prevention strategies (preventing killing before it occurs) following the social-ecological model. As DeGue and Mercy (2009) explain, killing is a multifaceted problem "resulting from the complex interaction of biological, psychological, environmental, and social factors" and requires a wide "array of interventions targeting potent risk and protective factors at each level of the social ecology" for its effective reduction. Nevertheless, "the creation of nonkilling communities is the ultimate goal of the public health approach." (2009: 189)[8]

A Paradigm Moves Forward

Kuhn presented an analogy between the framework of scientific revolutions leading to paradigm shifts and political revolutions that bring about social transformation (see Kuhn, ch. 9). Considering both imply an alteration of the worldview held by communities, it is not odd to see how political and scientific revolutions are sometimes closely linked in human history. Nonkilling is probably not an exception, as its implications clearly go beyond the sphere of politics or academic research, questioning and potentially transforming (or perhaps rehabilitating) human relations. A movement toward nonkilling (either expressed using this term or simply embracing the idea behind it) is already happening in the fields of civil action, education, politics and science.

its implications clearly go beyond the sphere of politics or academic research, questioning and potentially transforming (or perhaps rehabilitating) human relations

It will be interesting to see how it evolves and interacts, even though, as Kuhn pointed out, paradigm shifts are usually invisible processes (see Chapter 11), sometimes viewed not as

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[8] In the health sciences and other disciplines efforts have been increasing to reframe fundamental premises by starting with health rather than disease, function rather than dysfunction, strengths/assets emphasized initially rather than weaknesses/deficits, nonlethal weapons rather than killing technologies. In addition, research on the iatrogenic nature of disease and illness where the doctor/healer actually exacerbates a problem may be akin to the variety of effects any researcher and her medical model has on scientific analysis, diagnosis and prognosis.

dramatic changes but as gradual additions and revisions of scientific knowledge, as those expressed in the previous sections of this paper. Kuhn argued that textbooks and reference works, as pedagogic vehicles, are somehow an "acid test" for the emergence of a paradigm (1962: 136). Significantly, in the past five years, entries on nonkilling have made it into UNESCO's *Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems* (2004), the *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict* (2008) and OUP's *International Encyclopedia of Peace* (2009). The popular online *Wikipedia* includes entries for nonkilling in more than thirty languages[9] and so does its sister-project *Wiktionary*, offering over forty translations for the term.[10]

Also recently, the 8th World Summit of Nobel Peace Laureates included the term in its historical *Charter for a World without Violence*, that "call[s] upon all to work together toward a just, killing-free world in which everyone has the right not to be killed and responsibility not to kill others." In its closing paragraph, the *Charter* states:

> To address all forms of violence we encourage scientific research in the fields of human interaction and dialogue, and we invite participation from the academic, scientific and religious communities to aid us in the transition to nonviolent, and nonkilling societies.

"call[s] upon all to work together toward a just, killing-free world in which everyone has the right not to be killed and responsibility not to kill others."

An unpublished survey conducted by the Center for Global Nonkilling on doctoral dissertations related to nonkilling and nonviolence listed over 1,300 works produced between 1940 and 2009, including contributions to the fields of criminology, history, education, social psychology, political science or communication, among many others. On the other hand, the Center for Global Nonkilling has recently established a network of Nonkilling Research Committees covering 20 disciplines and engaging over 300 scholars.[11] A related initiative is an Exploratory Colloquium on Nonkilling and Neu-

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[9] See the English entry at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nonkilling>.
[10] Available at: <http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/nonkilling>.
[11] See: <http://www.nonkilling.org/node/7>.

roscience (Philadelphia, July 2009) where prominent neuroscientists explored questions related to nonkilling human capabilities. A pilot two-week Global Nonkilling Leadership Academy designed to introduce younger leaders from a dozen countries to nonkilling knowledge and experience was also planned for October 2009 in Honolulu.

In spite of notable progress and important moves in areas such as public health, nonkilling applied sciences still have a great challenge ahead. This challenge is further complicated by the unavailability of funds and institutional support for the extensive research that needs to be conduced in the field of violent death prevention. In the same way the UN Assembly Session on Disarmament (1978) criticized the "colossal waste" of resources associated with killing; the amount of resources dedicated to research activities associated with lethality (not simply killing-accepting) is truly shocking, especially if compared to the practically nonexistent resources drawn toward nonkilling research. The military R&D budget in the United States for 2009 alone amounts up to US$79.6 billion, from a total defence budget of US$651.2 billion.[12] Approximately half a million scientists over the world are exclusively dedicated to military related R&D, hoarding 30% of global R&D resources (5 times more than what is assigned to medical research and 10 times more than what agricultural R&D receives; see Campaña por la paz [2005] and SIPRI's *Annual Yearbook*).

Hope does come from the global movement to establish ministries and departments of peace in governments across the world, from the national to the local levels. The success stories from countries as Costa Rica, Nepal, Solomon Islands or Catalonia, where ministries and departments for peace have been created and are starting to develop associated agendas in the field of R&D, are definitely examples for others to follow and, in fact, active campaigns exist in 30 countries.[13] Symbolic steps, such as the *Nonkilling Clause of Scientific Conscientious Objection*, conceived as a form of "embedded demonstration" to be

> **Approximately half a million scientists over the world are exclusively dedicated to military related R&D, hoarding 30% of global R&D resources**

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[12] See: <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/budget/defense.pdf>.
[13] Visit the Global Alliance at <http://www.mfp-dop.org/>.

applied in academic works, are also in development process, fostering ethical commitment among the scientific community:

> It is strictly prohibited to use, develop or apply, either directly or indirectly, any of the author's scientific contributions contained in this work for purposes that can result in killing, threats to kill, conditions conductive to killing or justifications of killing in human society, including threats to the viability of the biosphere and other life-sustaining resources, socioeconomic structural conditions leading to killing, or the creation or omission of social and technological conditions that could lead to avoidable forms of accidental killing. This clause can only be revoked providing written consent from every person in the world has been obtained.

Paradigm shifts are inevitable, open-ended, and impermanent

To summarize, we believe that the arguments offered in this paper, however brief and exploratory, provide grounds for confidence in possibilities for a major shift from lethality-accepting science to an ethically-orientated nonkilling paradigm empowering social and cultural transitions toward killing-free societies. This process is currently underway. But it will require much greater commitment not only by the scientific community but by society as a whole.

Paradigm shifts are inevitable, open-ended, and impermanent. Nonkilling will certainly not be the final phase in scientific development. But it will surely be a crucial contribution to the advancement of knowledge and action for continuation of human and planetary life.

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Nonkilling Political Science in the Killing Fields of International Relations

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Summary   *It is by now a philosophical truism that neutrality works in favor of the more powerful party in a conflict. I will argue that although praiseworthy and well-intended, Glenn Paige's unwavering and holistic commitment to Nonkilling Political Science exposes him to the analogous criticism that, under certain circumstances (quite common in international relations), Nonkilling may work in favor of those who are willing to kill. We need a more nuanced and pragmatic commitment to Nonkilling to face the killing fields of International Relations.*

Introduction

Something goes terribly wrong when moral discourse is applied publicly. Just War Theory (JWT) goes through plastic surgery to fit immediate public, political, and organizational objectives. Although the aim and purpose of JWT is to proscribe impermissible killing, its public, political, and organizational applications essentially *prescribe* permissible killing. But this apparently tiny semantic change actually conceals a massive functional reversal as well as a content sea change. JWT is about 'do nots,', while the military applications of JWT are about 'dos'—a directive change which could produce increased tolerance towards killing. What is so terribly off the mark in terms of this transformation is that we—the theorists—offer military polemics with the intellectual foundation of prescribing

avoidable killings, and with an instrument to secure public atmosphere which tolerates killing. I believe that correcting this sorry state should be the immediate goal of any political science committed to nonkilling. Moreover, the aims promoted here are both more achievable *and* more commendable, though more modest as well, than the aims of Glenn Paige's proposal for a political science advocating global nonkilling.

It is important to note from the outset that I find Paige's arguments thought-provoking in the good sense and praiseworthy. Paige asks us to think differently about the world and ourselves, trying to carve out a new path: a road not taken. This is a laudable goal in its own right and one we should all strive to follow. I do have some misgivings about this road, however, especially when it reaches the killing fields of international relations. Some stretches of Paige's road, as will be shown, are demanding and totalistic and call for a holistic perspective not shared by many. This paper briefly summarizes Paige's arguments and analyzes some of their merits and shortcomings, before proceeding to suggest a more modest proposal for a Nonkilling Political Science aimed at eliminating our contribution to impermissible killings.

I

Paige's aims are noble, but more so, they soar very high. He aims at no less than a society free from all forms of killing. He (2007: 1) defines Nonkilling Society as 'a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society dependent upon threat or use of killing force for maintenance or change.' This would be a radically new kind of society, unprecedented in human history. For this novel society to exist, a new and noble form of politics would be needed. Indeed Paige offers us a new definition of politics. Shedding the conventional concept of politics as a form of public conflict over the allocation of resources, he offers a more harmonious understanding of politics. Borrowing from the Korean political philosopher Hwang, Jang Yop, Paige (2007: 91-92) argues that 'Politics means the harmonization of the interests of all members of society on the basis of

correcting this sorry state should be the immediate goal of any political science committed to nonkilling

love and equality.' It is not the management of conflicts that is the main function of politics, he says, but the bringing together of people in loving association. It would probably be more correct to call this kind of association a community, not a society; a communal association of human beings joined together by feelings of empathy and love.

Yet, it is also important to note that this community is a community of individuals whose interactions establish communal bonds and a commitment to mutual nonkilling. As Paige (2007: 96) asserts, 'The basic unit of nonkilling political analysis is the individual human being. Organizations, structures, and processes are the product of aggregated individual behavior. World politics is the politics of world individuals.' Although it would have been easier for Paige to take a communitarian perspective, he is committed wholeheartedly to the liberal tradition. His form of liberalism is vigorously augmented by non-Western traditions, yet liberalism it is nonetheless. On analyzing Paige's argument, we find that liberalism is essential to achieving a Nonkilling Society and is reflected in several elements of his vision. Paige (2007: 78-79; 117-119) is anxious to stress, for example, that Nonkilling is a value along other values and principles such as freedom, equality, justice, democracy, human rights, and responsibility. To achieve a Nonkilling Society, Paige believes we must have a sincere and absolute commitment to liberal values and principles. Additionally, a Nonkilling Society can flourish only in a fully consolidated local or global democracy.

But Paige's vision does not stop at those liberal and democratic ideals. In a sense, it is a totalistic program which forces us to address and solve several different problems at once. In order to achieve a Nonkilling Society, no less than four other discrete global problems must be all solved, 'we can engage five problems that are now globally salient: continued killing and the need for disarmament; the holocaust of poverty and the need for economic equity; violations of human dignity and needs for mutual respect of human rights; destructions of the biosphere and the need for planetary life-support; and other-denying divisiveness that impedes problem-solving cooperation' (Paige, 2007: 111). For Paige, these problems, discrete as they are, interact and produce the background circumstances of killing. Each problem contributes to the maintenance of

a nonkilling society can flourish only in a fully consolidated local or global democracy

contemporary society, which, due to lack of empathy and to socialization and indoctrination processes creates the circumstances and conditions of killing. Human beings must eliminate the circumstances and conditions of killing in order to clear the way to a Nonkilling Society. Paige paints a holistic picture of reality, and demands a holistic understanding of it, and holistic action to change it. The failure to address any of these problems will result in failure to achieve a Nonkilling Society. As will become clear this is a high standard indeed.

Paige suggests many indications as to why a Nonkilling Society is possible. He does not argue that change is necessary or easy. But he does say that with great effort and despite laboring under the dark shadow of skepticism a Nonkilling Society can be achieved. As he writes (2007: 69), 'To assert possibility, of course, is not to guarantee certainty but to make problematical the previously unthinkable and to strengthen confidence that we humans are capable of nonkilling global transformation." And elsewhere (2007: 20), "It's not possible, but it's possible to become possible.'

Paige argues that such efforts would involve many actors, including political science as a discipline. Political scientists, he says, have a crucial role in producing a Nonkilling Society; they should help to problematize the existing commonsense that killing is an unavoidable and inevitable human phenomenon. It is they who can further the understanding of the possibility of change. To make this possibility reality, Paige gives political scientists four scholarly missions: 'We need to know the causes of killing; the causes of nonkilling; the causes of transition between killing and nonkilling; and the characteristics of completely killing-free societies (Paige, 2007: 72).' At first glance, this does not seem a very radical demand of political science. Allegedly, what political scientists must do is simply add four interesting new research questions to their host of routine research questions. However, this superficial reading would be completely off the mark as Paige rightly and forcefully points out. The requirement from political science is radical on two related two accounts. First, political science must be fully committed to the task of producing a Nonkilling Society, 'nonkilling political science engages in efforts to end behavioral

> **Human beings must eliminate the circumstances and conditions of killing in order to clear the way to a nonkilling society**

violence, to change conditions of structural violence, and to solve problems of both in interaction. It seeks to remove support for lethality, to assist existing institutions for nonkilling service, and to create new nonkilling policies and institutions' (Paige, 2007: 100). Reading these lines it is quite clear that the scientific study of the causes of killing and nonkilling and the shift from the one to the other is not something incidental to other 'routine' tasks missions. Paige wants political science to become Nonkilling Political Science—political science that is wholly committed to furthering a Nonkilling Society. This mission is so worthy, so urgent, and so demanding, that it should supersede all other political science avenues. In other words, the Nonkilling Political Science project should revolutionize political science by transforming its research agenda completely.

According to Paige and here lies the second radical aspect of Paige's program, in order for this revolution to take place political scientists must be morally committed. Political science should not embrace the positivist philosophy of social science. Rather, neutrality and objectivity should be set aside for normative commitments. More precisely, the false positivist belief that science is committed to neutrality and objectivity should be replaced by an understanding that social science, including political science, is and should always be morally committed, 'Political scientists cannot evade this responsibility by objecting to value-bias and claiming 'realistic' scientific neutrality that in truth translates into readiness to kill. Such neutrality has never been true' (Paige, 2007: 155). This is clearly a non-positivist form of political science. Therefore, along with a new[1] comprehension of society as Nonkilling, and politics as achieving harmony and love, Paige advances a new[1] conception and practice of political science—a normative approach committed to moral values and principles and presided over by the principle of Nonkilling.

Paige's proposal has many merits. The first is that it challenges what we take for granted. We tend not to think of our society as a killing society. Of course, we are aware that people are being killed and at times we are saddened by their killing and

> the false positivist belief that science is committed to neutrality and objectivity should be replaced by an understanding that social science, including political science, is and should always be morally committed

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[1] Though by all mean he is not alone in it, non-positivism is by now quite common.

mourn for it. But because we tend to think of killing as given, we fail to challenge it and do not see it as a problem to be solved. Thus, killing is bound to continue. Paige's account of society is an alarming wake up call. By insisting that we must not take killing for granted, that it is not inevitable, Paige shatters our serenity and even the servitude with which we accept killing. His ideas shock and awe us intellectually, urging us to define killing as a real social problem, and, moreover, a solvable problem that should and must be a paramount human priority that exceeds others. Essentially, Paige takes a first and necessary step toward emancipation from the shackles and burdens of killing.

Second, and similarly, his novel definition of politics re-minds us that politics need not adhere to the same form over time. Few will accept Paige's definition of politics as resem-bling contemporary politics in any way; on the other hand, few will reject it as an ideal. But, the question remains whether politics has an inherent quality that stops it from being a locus of love and harmony? I can think of one decisive objection to Paige's definition of politics: that politics is the locus of contestation and conflict *by definition*, and that any alternative definition can only be appropriate to a different sort of public coordination activity—but not to politics. I agree with this objection, but to some extent it is merely semantic and requires only a slight reformulation of Paige's account. Perhaps what we should say is that Paige offers is a new kind of activity, let's call it dialectics (a term that includes dialogue and reasoning, and according to Hegel, the resolution of opposites through synthesis). More important than the semantic question is the expectation that this new and noble kind of activity would replace politics and become the main coordinatory public activity for managing our public affairs. Paige's account should serve as a signpost, showing us how to achieve this higher state of public affairs where societies are ruled by dialectics—not politics.

Paige's proposal wins another gold for understanding that in order to realize the possibility of a Nonkilling Society based on dialectics we should complement their depictions with a new, morally committed variety of political science. Rather than sup-porting a positivist political science committed to neutrality and

> **Paige's account should serve as a signpost, showing us how to achieve this higher state of public affairs where societies are ruled by dialectics—not politics**

objectivity, we should strive for a morally committed political science which aims to shape the society it studies. Only by re-shaping society, politics, and political science at the same time can we hope to realize the allegedly unrealizable: a Nonkilling Society.

II

But there are also certain difficulties with Paige's proposal. First, it demands too much of the political scientist and calls to solve too much at the same time. Second, it does not prioritize the different problems and values. Third, as it stands, Paige's proposal might unwittingly favor wrong-doers. In this section, I will critically examine these three weaknesses in his argument.

As noted before, Paige offers a holistic view of social and political reality. By definition, all problems are linked together as are their solutions. No problem is an island, and in order to solve one problem, say the existence of killing in society (i.e., the problem of a killing society), we must aim to solve all other major problems, including global poverty, violations of human rights, and ecological degradation. Naturally, there is no denying the acuteness of these problems and that a world without them would be a much better place—and a closer proximity to utopia! Moreover, solving all these problems would indeed remove most of the reasons for killing. But, as I will show in a moment, it would not eliminate all causes of killing. Economic equity,[2] mutual respect for human rights and dignity, and a healthy biosphere can contribute to a healthy society in which people will not find reasons to resort to killing. First, there would be less need for killing since redistributing resources would abolish extreme global poverty (Pogge, 2005: 1) and render the struggle for survival of individuals and collectives less acute. Secondly, killing would not be considered appropriate for achieving goals since people would respect each other lives and rights, and (remember dialectics) find reasoned dialogue useful for further individual and common aims.

However, it should be clear that the harmony between the solutions for the different problems can only exist in the final

> Only by reshaping society, politics, and political science at the same time can we hope to realize the allegedly unrealizable

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[2] Economic equity which, we should better add, would not be based on equity of scarcity!

stage. It is only when all those problems would no longer exist that we will be able to see their solutions as complementing each other and establishing a secured Nonkilling Society. Unfortunately though, the solution for some problems en route to a Nonkilling Society might clash with the solution of others. The reason for this is that in some situations, progress on one front (solving one problem) might mean a temporary regression in another. For example, in order to safeguard the biosphere, strict restrictions may well be necessary that impinge on people's lives in the developed world. We will have to restrict their culture of consumption. That could rightly be considered as interfering with and curtailing their individual freedoms. Limitations on the development of developing countries and their societies might also be necessary, which would limit their chances of prosperity. Of course, we could then redistribute global resources and technologies more justly and equally. But still, the measures would involve significant interference in personal freedom and collective sovereignty. Would such interference be just? Probably yes. But it is interference nonetheless, and hence, we can reasonably forecast that saving the biosphere would contradict respecting individual and collective human rights.

> in some situations, progress on one front (solving one problem) might mean a temporary regression in another

Similarly, of course, advancing equity can damage individual freedom by restricting (and in some cases even confiscating) property. Once again, this act can be just, but we must realize that not everyone would be willing to embrace it and not everyone would accept such restrictions of their free will. This is not to say that restricting property ownership would have to be violently imposed. And it need not involve resorting to killing. But if not everyone agrees to this imperative voluntarily we would need to accept certain violations of human rights (as they are accepted today), on the way to equity.

Considered thus Paige's holism seems an obstacle to achieving a Nonkilling Society. But the holism is also evident in another aspect of Paige's proposal. His definition of Nonkilling Society is at once too loose and too broad. It is difficult to understand what Paige actually means when he refers to "killing". In one instance, he (Paige, 2007: 145) explicitly refers to deliberate or intentional killing, but in the rest of the book even this restriction on the form of killing becomes less clear.

Would negligent killing fall under the premises of Nonkilling Society? What about reckless killing? Of course we do not want such killings; we even try to fight these phenomena in our own regular killing society. But can we expect a society to be totally free of such forms of killing? Can we really expect the high degree of responsibility from, say, teenagers? A case in point is, of course, road accidents which kill hundreds of thousands of people across the world each year. Again, we should not accept road accidents and we should not despair of attempting to reduce them. But, can we really equate negligent killing by an inexperienced teenager driver to the intentional killing that plagues our societies? I believe the answer is definitely no and that we should learn to unhappily tolerate some scale of unintentional killing in our future Nonkilling Society.

What about behaviors that we know have death as their side effect? Would smoking and selling tobacco be considered killing? Personally, I would be happy to consider them such, but can we achieve a broad consensus on that? But even intentionality does not solve all problems. What about reasoned suicides? Say, due to terminal illness.[3] Should we tolerate that? And how about euthanasia? Should that be acceptable? These are all open questions that cast doubt on the utility and practicality of an excessively broad and loose definition of Nonkilling Society. So, the definition must be more stringent.

> Agreement on this and other issues might be impossible as it involves basic and fundamental belief systems; belief system that result in different values, norms, and understandings

Paige's definition raises other questions too. At one point, he (2007: 10) refers to abortion as killing. This of course is an unsettled question. It is also a contested question, and as such it highlights another shortcoming of Paige's proposal: whether it is in fact possible to reach a consensus on the definition of killing? Abortion, which some see as killing and even murder, is seen by others as a woman exercising her rights over her own body. Agreement on this and other issues might be impossible as it involves basic and fundamental belief systems; belief system that result in different values, norms, and understandings. These beliefs might prove bridgeable under the dialectic sort of

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[3] Paige (2007: 10) does count suicide as killing. I find that odd, especially in cases of terminal illness where suicide can be considered reasoned.

coordination of public affairs. Yet, they might also be un-bridgeable. If so, dialectics would not do, and a resort to old-fashioned politics (not necessarily violent) could be needed to force one party to accept another party's beliefs, leading to disrespect for others' rights and dignity. In other words, al-though we should aim at a dialectical collective management, occasions and cases could arise when politics might prove too resilient, along the mutual disrespect it entails.

Let us turn to the second drawback of Paige's proposal for Nonkilling Society. As mentioned above, Paige (2007: 78-79) calls 'to place nonkilling along with questions of freedom, equality, justice, and democracy, at the normative-empirical and empirical-normative core of the discipline.' It seems there is no prioritization of those values, and, as we saw above, some values may be at odds with others, especially in the critical moments of trying to realize them. But if indeed there is no prioritization, how can we deal with the clashes and conflicts between the different goals and values described above? This is an open question that Paige does not answer. Moreover, I am not sure he is even aware of the problem. One cannot list several values, especially conflicting ones, without prioritizing them, or by at least offering some guide-lines as to how to prioritize them in different situations.

Elsewhere, though, Paige (2007: 155) implies that at the present time, nonkilling is more fundamental and crucial than other values, 'Nonkilling is at least of equal importance because humanity has arrived at a condition where all of these values are threatened without a powerful commitment to a nonkilling ethic in political science and political life.' So we are faced here with two possible problems. If indeed the values are equally important we will experience unsolved dilemmas on how to proceed in scenarios involving conflicting values. But if, alternatively, Paige does place Nonkilling above the other values, a third kind of weakness arises. If political scientists are to be committed to Nonkilling over and above other values, we would be exposed to a powerful charge: that we favor the wrong-doers, those who intentionally and systematically harm the weak. In other words, an excessively strong commitment to Nonkilling may

> If political scientists are to be committed to nonkilling over and above other values, we would be exposed to a powerful charge: that we favor the wrong-doers, those who intentionally and systematically harm the weak

favor evil. It is the same objection that Leszek Kolakowski (1975) raised against neutrality—that it actually favors the powerful. If one insists on not trying to influence the outcome of a conflict, one actually supports the parties with the most resources. It is the weak who need the help of the bystander and the third party, and if those deny help for the sake of neutrality, the odds will further lean towards the most powerful. The same is true with regard to the value of Nonkilling. If one is predominantly committed to Nonkilling, he will retain only weak enforcement tools for combating evil. Moreover, he will not have violent means at his disposal, not even as deterrence.

> Under extreme circumstances, mostly where a national leadership commits atrocities against its own citizenry, the international community may assume responsibility for the defenseless

This is not just a problem of dealing with 'hitlers', as Paige calls them. Evil has many faces and many degrees. And a commitment to Nonkilling may involve abandoning those who are in danger. Today, it is quite acceptable to speak of the responsibility to protect (R2P).[4] Under extreme circumstances, mostly where a national leadership commits atrocities against its own citizenry, the international community may assume responsibility for the defenseless citizenry. Now, we may wish these atrocities would never happen, and we can subscribe to Paige's optimism that in future we might reach this blissful state. But I will again refer to the convulsing nature of the process of getting to this state of affairs. These processes are very much processes of destabilization in which violence is expected. As described above it is reasonable to expect some discontent among those who feel they have lost in the process—mostly dictators facing democratization and wealthy people facing redistribution. It is reasonable to expect some outbursts of violence, and the international community, along with political scientists, must be prepared to meet them with resolve. To eschew violent responses (or the threat of their use), including resort to the extremity of killing, means abandoning the weak to their fate and tantamount to favoring the powerful forces of evil who *are* willing to kill.

Let me stress, my pessimism is not intrinsic. Nonkilling Society may in fact be a realizable goal. I certainly hope it is. But the means of achieving it may result in some killing, and a rig-

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[4] See for example Etzioni 2007.

idly holistic and strict commitment to Nonkilling from the outset may be ill equipped to deal with the concomitant risks. Ironically, we may sacrifice the possibility of achieving a Nonkilling Society by our rigid commitment to it. This is doubly true in the killing fields of international relations.

III

Where does all this leave us? We have not yet reached the phase in which as Paige (2007: 2) wishes, 'Intellectuals do not apologize for it [killing].' And we still need the tradition of Just War Theory (JWT) as a moral theory which tries to regulate institutional violence, and probably by moving to the realization of a Nonkilling Society, we will need it even more. This is not a dismissive, Stalin-type remark, that 'When you chop wood the chips fly.' It is an argument that springs from a feeling of compassion for human life, from the real and tragic understanding that at times we must resort to killing to save people's lives and that the same will hold true while progressing towards Nonkilling Society. War, including humanitarian intervention under the parameters of R2P, is a social institution that involves killing essentially. We can try to develop as many non-lethal weapons as possible but there will always be occasions in war when we must resort to killing. We should constantly bear this in mind and treat the capacity to kill as a last resort resource only in a necessary war. Otherwise the killing fields of international relations will destroy us all together with our hopes of achieving Nonkilling Society.

The true purpose of JWT is not to apologize for killing but rather the crea-tion of a framework for curbing killing as much as possible

The true purpose of JWT is not to apologize for killing but rather the creation of a framework for curbing killing as much as possible. This is a crucial point which brings us back to my opening remarks in the introduction. As explained in a moment, although the purpose of JWT is to curb killing it can easily serve as to justify killing. Moreover, the danger of justifying killing can also be adduced from Paige's dismissive remark about intellectuals who apologize for killing. JWT can, if politicized and perverted, supply forceful arguments for impermissible killing. Stated differently, in the wrong hands, JWT can lead to more not less killing. In what follows, I analyze this danger, briefly

demonstrate it, and indicate how we should approach it under the parameters of Nonkilling Political Science.

Elsewhere, I develop the concept of rhetorical capital, defined as the aggregate persuasive resources inherent in entities (Ish-Shalom, 2008a). This theoretical concept offers insights into what attracts politicians and ideologues to rhetorically use, misuse, and abuse certain entities (material objects and idea constructs), and how this rhetorical use, misuse, and abuse is being carried out. Examining the internal features of moral theory in general and JWT in particular will help us understand why and how they are rhetorically used, misused, and abused. For purposes of our current analysis, several points should be stressed. First, as their name implies, moral theories carry moral weight and stature. They are equipped to serve as moral guidance to those who wish to act morally (or at least pretend to act morally). Second, and closely related, moral theories generally address and conform to our moral intuitions. Accordingly, if correctly stated, they concur with our deepest intuitions and this concurrence bestows them with a familiarity which helps to establish them as moral guidance. Third, moral theories, especially in their modern academic incarnation, seek to build on and refine our intuitions. As such they are complex, composite, and subtle sets of arguments, mostly couched in academic jargon. Accordingly, despite the aforementioned intuitive familiarity, moral theories are difficult to comprehend fully. Thus, they are relatively sensitive to misunderstanding, and sometimes to intentional misrepresentation. Fourth, moral theories are generally universal, which lends them additional normative weight as their dicta are intended to transcend particularist interests and viewpoints. In other words, moral theories provide lofty standards to which we can appeal in partisan political disputes. Supposedly, a party would then not be serving its own particularist interests, but protecting the sensibilities of humanity as a whole.

> moral theories provide lofty standards to which we can appeal in partisan political disputes

Fifth and closely related to the last point, even though moral theories lay claims to universal validity, to be applicable in the real world, they must be supplemented by additional information. Knowing the theory will not suffice when applying moral judgment. The factual environment of the situation-to-be-judged must also be considered. For example, one must know the sequence of events and causal chain leading to the

events, and the intentions of the actors involved. Expressed more concretely, we need to know which party initiated hostilities, with what intentions, and how that initial act escalated into the use of lethal weapons and war. Those are real world facts, and they do not order themselves neutrally into an objective description of reality. Consequently, to be able to apply a moral theory in the real world, a narrative must be accepted, usually one narrative out of several conflicting ones. Because of the crucial role of narratives when applying moral theory, moral theory is more elastic than its adherents would normally grant. More importantly, it makes the theory's application more amenable to the political cherry picking of facts in line with partisan interests. Thus, while assuming a universal scope and standard of application moral theory can become a political sectarian instrument. Accordingly, moral theory can provide justification (honest and dishonest) for different, even conflicting, acts. When this point, along with the first four points, is understood it becomes quite understandable that moral theory abounds with rhetorical capital and that this rhetorical capital is ripe to be used, misused, and abused rhetorically.

Additionally, JWT, which is a particular kind of moral theory, has two additional features that add to its rhetorical capital. First, it has a long and prestigious tradition. JWT goes back as far as the Church fathers, to prominent figures like St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Thus, it is deeply ingrained not only in our moral intuitions, but in our cultural connotations as well. Second, JWT, especially its Jus in Bello dimension, essentially aims and functions to curb wartime killing as far as possible. It identifies the few people whose killing might be permissible under very restricted conditions. All those that do not fall under this category, cannot be legitimately killed. Their killing is impermissible and proscribed. What is important to our discussion on the rhetorical capital of JWT is that the quite sound outcome of pointing the impermissibility of killing some individuals, can amounts to pointing the permissibility of killing the others. In other words, it is quite easy to turn the effect of the theory on its head and stress the permissibility of killing rather than its impermissibility; the prescription rather than the proscription of killing. This is especially true when we combine

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this feature of JWT with the features of the rhetorical capital of moral theory in general. First, identifying the category of those that their killing is permissible is far from straightforward as this category itself is not precisely demarcated. There is a continuous and unresolved discussion regarding the definition of those that are protected from killing. Are they civilians, non-combatants, uninvolved parties, or whoever comes under the heading of "innocents"?[5] Each definition involves a somewhat different population. Moreover, the content of the category is not constant. It depends on many criteria and conditions, some quite fuzzy. For example, one of the most important criteria in the justification of killing is proportionality, but there are no generally-applicable guidelines for proportionality: is sacrificing the lives of ten of our soldiers to protect the life of one enemy citizen proportional? Or is a ratio of 5 to 1, or 200 to 1 acceptable? And what is proportional if we consider risking our soldiers' lives to save an enemy soldier? And how many enemy citizens is it proportional to risk when trying to destroy a legitimate military target, say an ammunition factory in a crowded neighborhood? 10? 100? 1000? The question is really whether a ready-made equation exists that will fit all scenarios. Proportionality is a crucial yet fuzzy requirement (See also Hurka, 2005).

> JWT is rich with rhetorical capital and becomes very attractive to people who wish to convince others in the permissiveness of the killing they inflict on others

The demarcation of permissible killing also changes according to the circumstances involved, for example: Is this an all out war? Is it really a last resort? Who was the aggressor? Circumstances depend on interpretations, which are determined by the narrative adopted. As mentioned above, each side can adopt the narrative that politically suits it. In other words, it is far from simple to categorically determine which killing is permissible and which is not. Taking all these features together, we see that JWT is rich with rhetorical capital and becomes very attractive to people who wish to convince others in the permissiveness of the killing they inflict on others.

We have witnessed this inverted use of JWT and its dependency on interpretations and narratives in many of the recent armed conflicts and wars. The 1999 NATO air cam-

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[5] See for example McMahan (2006).

paign against former Yugoslavia, code-named Operation Allied Force, would be a case in point. While its aim was to protect the beleaguered Kosovo Albanians and its cause was humanitarian, it resulted in killing about 500 Serbian civilians. NATO claimed them to be collateral damage in the necessary pursuit of a just cause, and hence, regretful, but permissible killings. This claim is very dubious as the air sorties were conducted at very high altitude to avoid risking the lives of the NATO air crews. The high altitude made it difficult to correctly identify the targets and take accurate aim. Civilian lives were sacrificed wholesale to save military lives.[6] In other words, the discrimination principle was not upheld. NATO, however, argued for the principle of double effect, insisting that according to JWT it had acted justly and that the killings were all permissible. Rather than curbing killing, the theory was misused for justifying it.

The American war against Iraq is another instance of the misuse of JWT and the inversion of its aim. There were several declared causes for the Iraq War, including (wrong) accusations of cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda, and (again misguided) assumptions that Iraq had an arsenal of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Additionally, the war was justified as a humanitarian intervention to end the atrocities routinely carried out by Hussein's regime, and as part of a campaign of democratization: hence its code-name Operation Iraqi Freedom. But, even though these two reasons were extremely noble and moral this war has been full of pain and suffering. We don't know the numbers of Iraqi civilian victims but they are assumed to be in the hundreds of thousands. Civil order is non-existent, and generally speaking the Iraqi state exists in name only. Surely by any moral standards these results are unacceptable. Yet JWT has been repeatedly *and* successfully marshaled to justify the US and its coalition's conduct. Something is evidently amiss.

> **The American war against Iraq is another instance of the misuse of JWT and the inversion of its aim**

And we again witnessed the rhetorical capital of JWT and its public uses in Israel's Cast Lead operation in Gaza in 2009. More than 1,300 Palestinians were killed, many of them non-combatants, in an operation that used heavy fire power caus-

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[6] Neta Crawford (2007) cites this air operation as an example of what she calls "Systemic Military Atrocity".

ing enormous destruction to life and civic infrastructure (including some UN installations). This is not the place to evaluate the justness of the operation or the permissibility or impermissibility of its killing. It is obvious, though, that this scale of killing and destruction cannot be easily justified. However, all the fighting of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was conducted, supervised, and guided by the Military Advocates General (MAG), responsible for imposing the rules of warring conduct. But here we see JWT turned on its head. The main function of the MAG was to justify killing, not ban it; it was to provide the IDF with legal and moral justification for the large scale killing and destruction inflicted on the Palestinians. And the way the MAG justified this killing was through interpreting the circumstances of the fighting so that the scale of killing could be judged permissible. It should be emphasized that the Palestinian fighting forces amply supported the MAG efforts, by constantly bombarding Israeli civilian cities and towns, and by hiding and fighting from the cover of the Palestinian civil population. Again, I have no desire to analyze here whether the MAG interpretation was reasonable or not. What does matter is the reversed application of JWT from trying to curb killing to condoning its escalation.

political and moral theorists can unintentionally supply practitioners with a powerful weapon: a supposedly moral and universal justification for impermissible killing on a vast scale

In other words, political and moral theorists can unintentionally supply practitioners with a powerful weapon: a supposedly moral and universal justification for impermissible killing on a vast scale. When we discuss Nonkilling Political Science in an era when killing is sometime necessary—this is what we should be paying attention to. This is what we should be committed to—to not allowing ourselves to be used, misused, and abused politically. We should concentrate on avoiding providing potential evildoers with weapon of killing and destruction. We should be alert to the rhetorical capital embedded in our creations, namely theories; rhetorical capital that is waiting to be politically misused and abused with immoral outcomes, such as to further the actions of wrong-doers and spread evil and death.

The question of how to discharge this responsibility in the case of JWT should probably be the subject of a sequel paper. However, as a first take I would recommend the need to be sensitive to the complexity of our moral arguments and to

realize how ambiguous and open to interpretation they are. We must also be aware of cases where theories are abused or misinterpreted, and be willing, in such cases, to take a stand as public intellectuals, or better still, theoretician-citizens (Ish-Shalom, 2008b) and proffer our academic inputs. We should try to enrich the public debate with our theoretical insights and not sell their richness and intricacy short by oversimplifying them for public consumption. We must not fall into the attractive trap of trivializing our theories and instrumentally exploit their rhetorical capital. This might be convenient and uncomplicated in the short term but it would be destructive to our academic and public stature in the longer term and limit our ability to contribute effectively and positively to our society, and to its moral constitution and chances of evolving into a Nonkilling Society.

We must also be receptive to the need to contextualize our universal theories. It is here where politics is ready to jump in and kidnap our theories as its needs dictate. We must be prepared to be involved in studying the context of a theory's application and contribute our judgment in a concerned and impartial manner—concerned for everyone involved in the conflict and impartial in the sense of employing general rules, independently of any particular case and partisan interests (Kolakowski, 1975: 72). The combined measures will allow better control over the public fate of our theories and help us to contribute to the progress of society towards a Nonkilling Society.

> **We must also be aware of cases where theories are abused or misinterpreted, and be willing, in such cases, to take a stand as public intellectuals, or better still, theoretician-citizens**

Conclusions

This paper examines Glenn Paige's proposal for a Global Nonkilling Political Science and explore both the merits and drawbacks of Paige's proposition. On the positive side, he highlights killing as a real and acute yet solvable social problem and suggests novel and desirable understandings of society, politics (which I prefer to term dialectics), and social science. I have also identified certain drawbacks in Paige's proposal, mainly his excessively loose definition of what constitutes killing, and his holistic view of social reality, its problems, and their assumed

solutions. I also point out that an excessively rigid commitment to Nonkilling in our times might result in abandoning the weak to the mercy of evildoers. Especially in the killing fields of international relations this abandonment might breach our responsibility to protect the victims of atrocities.

Accordingly, I argue here for a more nuanced and modest approach to a Nonkilling Political Science compared to Paige's holistic one. As we strive for a Nonkilling Society we should be aware that the actual process may generate killing and violence. To deal with this we require an arsenal of moral theories and in particular Just War Theories; theories which aim to curb killing as much as possible. However, we must also recognize the rhetorical capital that is embedded in those theories and the possibility that it might result in justifying and prescribing killing far more than required. We must be ready and willing to act against the political and rhetorical misuse and abuse of our theories. The only way political science can equip itself to further the evolution of a Nonkilling Society is by taking a nuanced approach. Moreover, only political scientists who are resolved can morally orient their theories to the benefit of society and achieve Paige's vision of Global Nonkilling Political Science and Nonkilling Society.

Thankful Remarks

I would like to thank Glenn D. Paige for the opportunity to address his enlightened vision for a Nonkilling Global Political Science. I would also like to thank Katty Ish-Shalom and Michael Stein for their useful comments.

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Nonkilling Political Science and Democratic Leadership: The Korean Experiences

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Summary   *Nonkilling political science posits that nonkilling society is possible and attempts to find ideas or strategies which are useful for minimizing or eliminating killing or any source of killing in human society. From the theoretical perspectives of nonkilling political science, the Korean experiences of democratization will be critically reviewed focusing upon three Presidents' leadership initiatives to challenge the sources of killing or violence, structural, and external. President Kim Young Sam dissolved the* hanahoe*, a private unlawful faction within the army, and President Kim Dae Jung dared to push his "sunshine policy" for a peaceful North-South relations in the Korean peninsula. The paper examines those Korean experiences of nonviolent leadership initiatives for a democratic Korea would be evaluated from the nonkilling viewpoints.*

Introduction

Nonkilling political scientists argue that nonkilling society is possible, and they attempt to find alternative ideas or strategies which are useful for minimizing or eliminating killings or any source of killing in human society. They criticize that modern political theories from Machiavelli to Hobbes, Locke, Marx and Weber accepted killing as inevitable. The founder of nonkilling political science, professor Glenn D. Paige insightfully indicates that Plato's inclusion

of the military class in his ideal state of *The Republic* was due to a lack of imagination, and criticizes the typical modern political ideologies, liberalism and socialism, for not questioning killings both in theory and practice. He diagnoses that "until now, we have thought that violence and killing are human nature; we have lived in a culture that promotes this assumption as common sense and justifies it; as a result, what we have now is a cruel, horrible modern civilization with war, poverty, oppression and killing," He finally suggests that "to achieve a truly 'postmodern' civilisation, we must realize that we have been living in a violent and violence-accepting civilization and we must try to construct a nonviolent one."

Korea is one of typical cases of successful modernization, especially with her economic development, and political democratization. However, Korea still has a "not short" way to go for the democratic consolidation. To make Korean democracy work healthier and more efficiently, some critical reflections of its developmental experiences need to be taken. Thus, from the nonkilling points of view, the political leadership initiatives, taken by two former presidents for more democratic and peaceful Korea, will be critically reviewed: the one is President Kim Young Sam's purge of illegal military faction, *hanahoe*, and the other is President Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy toward North Korea. The conclusion summarizes some nonkilling evaluations of the democratic leadership initiatives.

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Kim Young Sam's Purge of an Illegal Army Faction as the Source of Internal Violence

By the end of president Roh Tae Woo's tenure, the military was largely under government control and showed no negative reaction to the election of the first civilian president in 31 years. Indeed, because president-elect Kim Young Sam was not from the opposition but from the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), it was natural that the armed forces, in favor of the government side, remained calm. During the government transition period, an expectation of continuity rather than drastic change was dominant within the power establishments, because the governing DLP, in which former

authoritarian DJP (Democratic Justice Party) elements re-mained, continued to wield the power.

However, the first civilian president, Kim Young Sam, who had been a life-long opposition leader under military dictator-ships, had a different idea. He thought the 1992 election gave him the mandate to deepen the democratic reform in every sector of state and society, which, from a popular viewpoint, had been considerably slowed and stalled during the waning years of the Roh era. As a popularly elected president who could distance himself from the unpopular governing party, Kim wanted to differentiate himself from the unpopular gov-erning party, Kim wanted to differentiate himself from the continuing elements of the ruling party and hoped to consoli-date power by a series of democratic reforms.

upon his inauguration the new president launched a drastic reshuffle of the military leadership

To do so, one of the first things Kim had to accomplish was to ensure the military's loyalty. He was not certain whether he could obtain the loyalty of the military leaders, who had once been part of the very regimes against which he had struggled. The fact that the leading military officers who replaced Chun Doo Hwan's men under president Roh came from the formerly politically attentive *Hanahoe* association made it likely that their loyalty to the civilian regime could attenuate in case things took a negative turn.

In addition, Kim Young Sam, who had won the winner-take-all game of the presidential election, especially by concentrated regional support, wanted to distribute the spoils to his loyal constituents, including military officers from Pusan and the South Kyongsang province. Interestingly, although Kim's predecessors since Park Chung Hee had favoured officers from the Kyongsang region-that included both the TK (Taegu and North Kyongsang province) and PK (Pusan and South Kyongsang province)-TK officers close to Chun Doo Hwan or Roh Tae Woo had enjoyed more privileges than PK officers. Hence, there was a regionally grounded grievance within the PK officer corps. By replacing TK officers with PK officers, Kim could consolidate loyalty among the military hierarchy as well as distribute benefits to his local people. Therefore, upon his inauguration the new president launched a drastic reshuffle of the military leadership.

President Kim Young Sam's first purge was targeted at Roh Tae Woo's men within the military leadership, just as president

Roh had purged Chun Doo Hwan's men. However, because government control over the military had already been well developed by his predecessor, Kim did not have to arouse a corruption campaign to discredit the preceding government or to postpone the reshuffle until the political momentum was ripe. On March 8, 1993, only 11 days after his inauguration, president Kim surprised the people by announcing a change in the two most important military leadership posts: the Army chief of staff and the Military Security Commander. Appointed in December 1991, both dismissed commanders had more than 6 months left of their tenures. However, the military acquiesced to the dismissal by the civilian commander in chief with no audible complaint. One month later, the Kim government reshuffled other high military offices. Among seven four-star generals (the highest rank in the Korean military), three were retired and two were transferred to different posts. Heads of politically important commands, such as the Capital Defense Command and the Special War Command, were changed.

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Once the highest military leadership had been safely replaced, along with his successful populist reform drive in other sectors of society, president Kim Young Sam initiated the next round of purges, which were targeted at the "political" officers, mainly those from the *Hanahoe* background, and at corrupt officers in relation to the weapons modernization project executed under his predecessor. About a month after the first large-scale reshuffle, the government on May 24 surprised the public with the announcement that what happened on December 12, 1979, had been "a kind of military coup staged by officers against their superior," and quickly started to replace officers who had been involved in the incident. Because of charges of "breaking the line of command" by their actions in the 1979 incident, a number of officers, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and three other senior generals, were forced to retire. Following this action, the government forced the retirement of a number of officers who were members of the *Hanahoe*. As of late 1993, no *Hanahoe* officers remained among the country's generals.

In the meantime, the anti-corruption campaign aroused by the Kim Young Sam government had spread into the military (since late April) and revealed deeply rooted bribery for pro-

motion within the military. Thirteen generals and admirals were arrested on charges of accepting large amounts of money in return for promotion, a customary practice within the Korean officer corps under the previous regimes. The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI), which is under the direct control of the president, launched a special investigation on the former government's execution of the weapons modernization project. This investigation, which lasted several months, culminated in a report on July 9 and led to the removal or discipline of several military officers. By July 1993, the military shakeup (for the first 4 months) under president Kim included replacements in 5 of the top 8 offices at the defense ministry and 9 of 11 senior posts within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Replaced in the Army were 11 of 14 senior positions, 5 of 11 corps commanders, and 9 of 22 division-level commanders. Seven of the Navy's 11 most senior officers were dismissed. Four of the top 10 officers together with 6 of 7 fighter-wing and training-wing commanders were purged from the Air Force as well.

the Kim Young Sam government also tried to deepen the institutional reform of the armed forces toward depoliticization and professionalization

The first year of the Kim Young Sam administration was marked by a purge of more than 1,000 military officers. The honors of displaced military officers were tainted either by corruption charges or by breach-of-hierarchy charges over past indiscretions. Interestingly, disgruntled as they were, no visible reactions against the purge were observed, in part because of the overwhelming popular support for president Kim's reform drive. Also responsible for this acquiescence was the prior success in subordinating the military under Roh Tae Woo.

Together with the purge drive, the Kim Young Sam government also tried to deepen the institutional reform of the armed forces toward depoliticization and professionalization, which had begun under president Roh. Distinctive among his reforms were the consolidation of civilian supremacy over the military and the reduction of military intelligence. First, the relative powers of the civilian government's defense minister vis-a-vis the active military chief was greatly strengthened under president Kim. Since the inception in 1948 of the Korean military, even during president Roh's rule, the defense minister was one of the many competitors for access to the president. The Army chief of staff of Defense Security Commander, how-

ever, retained a direct communication line to the president and normally exercised a significant influence on the president's military appointments. One of the core reform goals prepared by the new defense minister, Kwon Yŏng Hae, a retired Army lieutenant general and former defense undersecretary in the Roh government, was to stop the confusion in the military command and establish a clear hierarchy between the defense minister and the armed forces. In large part because of the need for secrecy that was necessary to implement the purge of high military leaders, minister Kwon was able to build an unmatchable trust from president Kim and to accomplish the defense minister's supremacy over the active armed services.

Minister Kwon's rise to the ultimate military power was all the more significant (in terms of establishing the civilian government's hierarchy over the military) given the fact that Kwon had finished his active service only as major general. The appointment of such a low-ranking retired general as defense minister was unprecedented in South Korea. The appointment of Kwon's successor, Defense Minister Lee Pyŏng Tae, who had retired the Army as lieutenant general, carried the same implication. Deeply influenced by American military culture, he was known to possess more civilian character than his predecessor and emphasized the development of military professionalism. The appointment of Lee's successor in December 1994 was also unusual. Disregarding the conventional pattern of appointing a retired Army general as defense minister in charge of all three military services, president Kim chose a retired Air Force general, Lee Yang Ho. The three successive appointments of defense minister were all instrumental in consolidating governmental control over the armed services. Now, the appointment of military positions exercised by the head of the government, the president, was considerably free from the internal norms of the military.

Second, beginning in April 1993 the Kim Young Sam government accelerated the previous government's efforts to reform the Military Security Command (MSC) to the extent that it was "almost born again." The MSC, which had been the most powerful military sector under previous presidents,

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underwent a great deal of restructuring and reduction in organization and power. The rank of MSC commander was downgraded from three-star to two-star general. Scores of high officers, including 3 generals and 47 colonels, were transferred to other military units. About one thousand MSC agents were fired or transferred to other parts of the military. Most of the remaining agents were also unearthed via internal transference. Most important of all were measures intended to completely cut the MSC off from the political and civilian domain. The MSC's Intelligence Bureau in charge of the civilian sector was finally terminated. Local branches previously stationed in the civilian area were all withdrawn back into the military camps. Thus, throughout president Kim Young Sam's rule, there occurred few substantially damaging claims of the MSC's involvement in political matters.

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In a sense, the military reform under president Kim Young Sam was finally completed by the successful prosecution in late 1995 of former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo. The safe execution of the "trials of the century," as they were called in Korea, itself can be considered a clear sign of how far the country had advanced toward democracy from the era of non-democratic rule. It is important to note that during the trials, no audible voices were detected from the military against the extremely popular government measures. Rather, sympathy among army officers was slim for the two ex-presidents at trial. Reporters at the time found that while they viewed the ongoing process of enacting legal justice as apparently disgraceful to the military as institution, they attributed this disgrace to the great misdeeds of the two ex-presidents and their associates representing the politically motivated non-hierarchical military faction, *Hanahoe*. The sitting commanders, generals and colonels alike, of the Korean troops in 1995 were hardly in favor of that faction. Their promotions to the positions were the products of the Kim Young Sam government's extensive purge of the *Hanahoe* officers in 1993.

President Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy for a Peaceful Coexistence

On September 30, 1994, Kim Dae-jung, who was then a

defeated presidential candidate, delivered an interesting speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. While praising highly Jimmy Carter's visit to North Korea and the subsequent defusing of the North Korean nuclear crisis through negotiations with Kim Il Sung, Kim noted that "America must be patient and stick to the 'sunshine policy' which proved to be the only effective way to deal with isolated countries like North Korea." Citing a well-known Aesop's fable on 'wind and sunshine,' Kim argued that sunshine is more effective than strong wind in making North Korea come out of isolation and confrontation.

Kim Dae-jung initially used the analogy of sunshine in order to persuade the American government to purse a soft-landing policy in dealing with North Korea. But when he was elected president, the sunshine policy became the official North Korean policy of the South Korean government. In a speech delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, on April 4, 1998, Kim described the sunshine policy as follows:

> *its objective is crystal clear: to lay the foundation for peaceful Korean unification by severing the vicious cycle of negative and hostile actions and reactions through peaceful co-existence and peaceful exchanges and cooperation*

> The Republic is now able to push a North Korean policy with self-confidence arising from firm public support. I have been steadfast in advocating what I call a 'sunshine policy' which seeks to lead North Korea down a path toward peace, reform and openness through reconciliation, interaction and cooperation with the South. As President, I will carry out such ideas step by step.

The sunshine policy can be seen as a proactive policy to induce incremental and voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, opening, and reforms through a patient pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation. But as shall be discussed below, the sunshine policy goes beyond simple engagement. It comprises several components such as military deterrence, international collaboration, and domestic consensus. Nevertheless, its objective is crystal clear: to lay the foundation for peaceful Korean unification by severing the vicious cycle of negative and hostile actions and reactions through peaceful co-existence and peaceful exchanges and cooperation.

The DJ doctrine, which serves as the foundation for the sunshine policy, is framed on three fundamental principles as outlined by president Kim's inaugural speech. First is the principle of non-tolerance of military threat or armed provocation by North Korea. Second is the official abandonment of the idea of unification by absorption and the negation of any other measures to undermine or threaten North Korea. And the third is the promotion of exchanges and cooperation through resumption of the 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges, and Cooperation.

A close examination of the DJ doctrine reveals at least six major operating principles. The most pronounced component is strategic offensive. The sunshine policy is often accused of being a fragile appeasement policy or the policy of the weak. In actuality, however, it is an extremely offensive and proactive policy. In the past, Seoul's policy on North Korea was mostly reactive, often resulting in inconsistent, incoherent, and even erratic policy outcomes. In other words, South Korea's behavior was conditioned and even dictated by the North. The Kim Dae-jung government wants to overhaul this passive and reactive policy by taking its own initiatives. It is dedicated to the pursuit of engagement through exchanges and cooperation despite North Korea's initial negative response. Such policy might sound like an appeasement, but as the analogy of sunshine implies, it is penetrative and comprehensive. No clouds can perpetually block the penetration of sunshine since the latter is constant, while the former is temporal. With a little more patience and endurance, the Kim government believes, active engagement will eventually thaw the frozen mind of the North Korean leadership, yielding to peaceful co-existence as well as economic opening and reforms.

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The second operating principle is flexible dualism, which is predicated on major changes in the sequential order of inter-Korean interactions. New terms of engagement with the North under the Kim government can be summarized as in the following: (1) Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later (易　　); (2) Economy first, politics later (　　　　); (3) Non-governmental organizations first, government later (　　　　); (4) Give first, and take later (　　　　). It represents a profound paradigm

shift in managing inter-Korean relations. Past governments failed to overcome the inter-Korean stalemate precisely because of their rigid adherence to the principles of 'government first, civil society later,' 'politics first, economy later' or 'political-economic linkage', and 'the primacy of mechanical reciprocity.' Thus, the DJ doctrine can be characterized as being incremental, pragmatic, and functionalist in dealing with the North.

The core of flexible dualism can be found in the separation of politics and economy. Previous governments were preoccupied with the primacy of politics and its linkage to the economy. However, such attitude forged structural barriers to the promotion of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, not only because of the compartmentalized decision-making structure in the North that separates politics from the economy, but also because of the negative backlash associated with it. Temporal improvements in inter-Korean relations through socio-economic exchanges used to be instantly wiped out by new political bottlenecks or sporadic military provocation by the North, producing an amplified feed-back loop of distrust and hostility. But the Kim government is attempting to sever the mechanism of negative re-enforcement between the two by pledging itself to the promotion of economic exchanges and cooperation even if the North engages in military and political provocation. As a matter of fact, infiltration of North Korean submarines in the South and resumption of negative propaganda campaign by the North have not blocked the continued pursuit of economic exchanges and cooperation. It is this functional flexibility that distinctively differentiates the DJ doctrine from previous governments' North Korean policy.

The third operating principle is a simultaneous pursuit of engagement and security in which credible military deterrence is emphasized. This is the most delicate aspect of the DJ doctrine. The DJ government is keenly aware of acute military threat from the North and is more than willing to deter it through strengthened security posture. It believes that effective engagement policy is plausible only when South Korea remains strong and is well prepared for military deterrence. The credible deterrence is based on two concepts. One is the principle of specific reciprocity. Although North Korea's armed provocation will not be automatically linked to

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the suspension of economic and social exchanges and cooperation, it will not be tolerated either. Such behavior will be immediately balanced out or reciprocated through punitive measures in kind. South Korea's forceful retaliation on North Korea's recent intrusion into the West Coast exemplifies the implementation of the principle of specific reciprocity. The other is to secure a position of strength through the continuation of the ROK-US alliance. The Kim government perceives that ROK-US combined forces will be sufficient to deter any military aggression from the North. In light of this, the DJ doctrine does not presuppose a complete discontinuity from the old policy of military deterrence and alliance management. There are elements of continuity as well.

A renewed emphasis on international collaboration constitutes another important dimension. Although the Korean conflict and unification should be resolved by and for Koreans themselves, the Kim government recognizes the importance of international collaboration with major actors in the region. Maximization of international collaboration is critical not only because it can facilitate conflict management on the Korean peninsula, but also because it can help North Korea manage to land softly. For the management of the Korean conflict, the Kim government has stressed the continuation of the Four-Party Talk.

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It has also proposed the Two plus Four formula and the establishment of a Northeast Asian security cooperation regime in order to shape a new security environment conducive to tension reduction as well as peace and security building on the Korean peninsula. For the soft-landing of North Korea, the Kim government has been calling for two practical measures: North Korea's diplomatic normalization with the United States and Japan on the one hand, and the creation of international milieu favorable to North Korea's economic opening and reform on the other. The second measure could be achieved through lifting existing sanctions on the North and facilitating North Korean access to international capital through its membership to multilateral lending institutions (i.e., the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asia Development Bank) as well as fostering the inflow of private foreign investments in the North.

The fifth component is the centrality of domestic consen-

sus. Seoul's traditional North Korean policy was guided by two implicit operating logic. One is the clandestine management of inter-Korean relations and the other is its domestic political utilization. A breakthrough in inter-Korean relations through the Park Chung-hee's July 4th communiqué, Chun Doo-hwan's near success of the summit meeting with Kim Il Sung, and Roh Hae Woo's *Nordpolitik* and inter-Korean rapprochement were all engineered through clandestine operations behind the curtain. Such elite maneuvers lacking transparency eventually undermined the legitimacy of previous governments' policy initiatives. The inseparable linkage between domestic politics and inter-Korean relations exacerbates this effect. As the Northwind scandal aptly illustrates, ruling regimes in the past contrived military tensions with the North during presidential or general elections, and took advantage of the ensuing insecurity to win conservative votes. Political abuse and misuse of inter-Korean relations considerably weakened the foundation of domestic consensus and marginalized its North Korean policy. Having been a victim of such political maneuvering, president Kim officially declared that his government does not have any intention to politicize inter-Korean relations and that its North Korean policy will be guided solely by transparency and domestic consensus.

de jure unification might not be achieved without first learning how to co-exist peacefully through exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas

Finally, the DJ doctrine is based on the notion of pseudo-unification. It assumes that *de jure* unification through mutual consensus and national referendum could take much longer time. Cognizant of the realistic constraint, the Kim Dae-jung government aims at creating *de facto* or pseudo-unification in which exchanges of personnel as well as goods and services are fully activated, and confidence-building and arms control can be materialized. The pseudo-unification thesis is justified for both its feasibility and immediate humanitarian concerns for the first generation of separated families who could pass away soon. More importantly, *de jure* unification might not be achieved without first learning how to co-exist peacefully through exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas.

Some argue that the DJ doctrine is no different from old soft-line policies under previous governments such as the July 4th joint communiqué under Park Chung-hee, Roh Tae Woo's

Nordpolitik and the July 7th declaration, and even the Kim Young Sam's engagement policy in the first part of his administration. They have all advocated the importance of peaceful co-existence with the North through the promotion of exchanges and cooperation. But the DJ doctrine reveals some profound differences. The most salient difference comes from changes in structural parameters. While previous policies were bound by the Cold War template of confrontation and containment, the DJ doctrine is predicated on its dissolution in terms of ideology, institution, and structure. There is also a divergence in operational mode. The DJ doctrine is much more proactive, offensive, and strategic, while previous policies were reactive, defensive, and tactical. Its scope is far more comprehensive than previous ones by favoring all-out interactions with the North. Its time framework is also substantively different. While previous governments were opting for immediate gains, the Kim Dae-jung government aims at achieving medium-and long-term gains in which patience and endurance are stressed. At the same time, the DJ doctrine rejects an instrumental use of inter-Korean relations for domestic political purposes, while previous policies were inseparably intertwined with domestic political manipulation.

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Conclusion: Some Nonkilling Evaluations

A brief examination of democratic leadership initiatives by two Korean presidents invites some evaluations from the nonkilling political sciece viewpoints as follows:

First, president Kim Young Sam's democratic leadership to purge the *hanahoe* generals was a successful case in challenging the domestic source of violent politics, which restored the tradition of civilian supremacy again in modern Korea. By such initiatives, president Kim Young Sam could have prevented another military intervention into politics. It was not easy for him to have taken such brave reform measures as reshufflings of major military positions and forced retirement of the *hanahoe* generals and his courageous leadership of decision should be acknowledged as an important contribution to democratic consolidation in Korea. However, it should be noted that president Kim Young Sam's

major concern was to control the military under his political leadership, not to make the military itself problematic as the typical structural violence. With the global trend towards a nonkilling peaceful world, political leaders may have to think creatively in search of any means to use nonviolently the violent built-in institutions such as the military.

Second, president Kim Dae Jung's leadership for sunshine policy toward the militant North Korea was to prevent another war threat in the peninsula, and it had been assessed as a historic achievement. His consistent devotion to humanitarian and trust-giving approach to the poverty-stricken but belligerent North Korea could make North Korea to start a series of dialogues with South Korea. However, it should be noted that the domestic base of national consensus of his nonviolent approach to North Korea had been limited and his responses to North Korea's violent behaviours, verbal and nonverbal, were not proper, It follows that considering that North Korea continues to use the military provocations and the production of nuclear weapons, South Korea's nonviolent approach to North Korea may have to be complemented with more principled theories or values. In other words, since North Korea still stick to the traditional "just war theory" for a communist reunification, the South Korean nonviolent leadership for any peaceful coexistence should be more enlightened intellectually by a time-honored Asian saying that "to win over without entering wars is the best" or several kinds of creative strategies and tactics suggested by nonkilling political science.

> **With the global trend towards a nonkilling peaceful world, political leaders may have to think creatively in search of any means to use nonviolently the violent built-in institutions such as the military**

Third, it should be noted that those two presidents' democratic leadership for nonviolent politics in Korea have not been acknowledged enough because they have been morally damaged much due to several bribery scandals of their close aides and their sons. An examination of the two cases reveal that democratic reform leadership would be more persuasive and popular when it is accompanied with the leaders' practice of "modal values" such as honesty, integrity, fairness, the sense of balance, and lawfulness which constitute core elements of effective and successful leadership in modern democracy.

Violence as Anti-Politics:
A Political Philosophy Perspective

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Summary

Half a century ago, the philosopher Hannah Arendt distinguished power from violence. Using her idea as an entry point, this paper argues that the notion of 'political violence' is a contradiction in terms because violence 'kills' politics. The paper begins with a discussion of prevalent use of the term 'political violence' in political science. Then it raises the question what does violence do to politics with some critique of Slovoj Zizek's current understanding of the notion of violence. It then concludes with a re-reading of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue, *generally considered the pillar of realist politics, as an attempt to elucidate how violence could 'kill' politics.*

Introduction

In the summer of 1970, the distinguished political philosopher Hannah Arendt gave an interview with a German writer Adelbert Reif. This interview took place in the context of the cruel war in Vietnam with the US as the aggressor, profound racial prejudices and the struggles of the African American civil rights movement in the US itself, and the May 1968 "revolution" in France two years earlier—that has deeply changed the European intellectual landscape. She talked about the state of the world in the middle of the previous century when it faced "prerequisites" of revolutions which include: the threatened breakdown of the

machinery of government, the loss of confidence in the government on the part of the people, the failure of public services, and various others. The reality was gruesome because the loss of power and authority occurred at a time when accumulation of means of violence in the hands of governments had been immense. She then concluded that, "the increase in weapons cannot compensate for the loss of power" (Arendt, 1972: 205)[1]

Arendt's conclusion is significant because of the uncanny resemblance between the situation in the latter part of the last century and what has transpired in the first decade of the twenty-first century: the terror that claimed thousands on lives in on September 11, 2001, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars that have killed more than a hundred thousand people, the Bush war against terror that has sacrificed human rights for the sake of illusive security, and struggles for and against ideals of contested notions of justice and freedom almost everywhere. More importantly, perhaps, her conclusion almost half a century ago addressed the theoretical issues of violence, power and politics unlike any other theorist in her generation. Some of her students remarked that among all of Arendt's theoretical distinctions, "each of which requires of her readers to undergo a revolution in thought, her distinction between power and violence is perhaps the most challenging" (Young- Bruehl, 2006: 90).

> I would argue that political science vocabulary such as "political violence" is a contradiction in terms because violence kills politics

Relying on Arendt's distinction between power and violence as both an entry point and theoretical platform, I would argue that political science vocabulary such as "political violence" is a contradiction in terms because violence kills politics. This paper begins with a brief survey of the ways in which the term "political violence" has been used in the discipline of political science. Then the question of what violence does to politics will be discussed in light of Arendt's theoretical contributions. Finally, a case of how violence kills politics will be demonstrated using a critical discussion of a most classic realist political science writing of the last two thousand years - Thucydides' *Melian Dialogue*.

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[1] This interview appears under the title: "Thoughts on Politics and Revolution".

The Discipline of Political Science and "Political Violence"

Mainstream political science rests on the philosophical foundations of Thomas Hobbes' fear of violent death among human beings in the state of nature (1588-1679), John Locke's citizens' rights to violently resist or even kill the sovereign when the latter turns tyrant in a political society (1632-1704), and Max Weber's notion of the modern state as a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (1864-1920), as well as prevalent thoughts popular since the 18th century, under the influences of Rousseau's *Social Contract* (1712-1778) , among others, that the state owns the lives of its citizens since a citizen's life is a gift from the state and therefore the state can kill its own citizen under some conditions.[2] Given such foundations, violence can be seen as most germane to the discipline of political science.

Before the middle of the last century, there had been scant studies on the subject of violence. When the US faced numerous forms of violence—assassinations of President Kennedy and other political and religious leaders including Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr.; labor protests which sometimes led to violence, among others, President Lyndon B. Johnson set up the President's Official Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence under the leadership of Ted Robert Gurr and Hugh Davis Graham to " 'go as far as man's knowledge takes' it in searching for the causes of violence and the means of prevention." (Eisenhower, 1969: vi) This official report consists of numerous studies including studies on extreme forms of social action. Under this topic, there was a report on "Assassination and the Continuum of Political Behavior" written by H.L.Nieburg which was later revised and published as *Political Violence*. The author explained that most of the data on assassination had been left out in favor of the model of "political violence" and its impacts on social processes (Nieburg, 1969). Nieburg understands violence as a need to bind together and fairly

> Mainstream political science rests on the philosophical foundations of Thomas Hobbes' fear of violent death among human beings in the state of nature

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[2] See a careful survey of the discipline's philosophical foundation Paige (2007: 3-6).

allocate values in society. This work maintains that every society, no matter how peaceful and docile, will always have its violent potentials and that all institutions and social groups will face the severest test from such potentials.

Nieburg defines "political violence" as "acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system" (1969: 13). More importantly, he points out that for generations the prevalence of social violence has been "overlooked, repressed, or misconstrued. Social sciences, and political science as its subset, have conspicuously omitted to recognize or study the political dynamics and dimensions of political behavior "except to treat it as aberrant and typical, involving only backward nations and demented individuals" (*ibid.*, 5).

But during the last forty years, there has been profound changes in the discipline of political science especially concerning the study of violence. In fact, reaching the end of the first decade of the twenty first century, conflict and violence have turned out to be problems of popular interest among political scientists. It could be argued, with David Laitin's study in 2002, that the topic of violence has become the central problem of political science study together with issues such as democracy, the state, and development of capitalism. It could be said that today political scientists see violence as directly related to the problem of political order, a perennial political problem since the Greco-Roman times. Moreover, the study of political culture has been challenged especially its almost sacred notion of "cultural relativism" that privileges each group's culture as inviolable. The notion of pluralism itself has also been examined as a possible source of violence. On the relationship between violence, the state and democracy, there have been more studies which raise questions on violence as the condition for state power, its production and/or maintenance; or whether violence is a normal element of democracy

the topic of violence has become the central problem of political science study together with issues such as democracy, the state, and development of capitalism

or its anti-thesis; and whether violence can be avoided in the democratization process among new states.[3]

I would argue that changes that have taken place with the study of violence in political science during the almost half a century relate to the question Nieburg used to frame his "political violence" research from the beginning. He saw violence as existing in the behavioral continuum between peaceable and disruptive poles. To deny or ignore the role of violence in the study of politics is to ignore its role in creating and testing political legitimacy and in conditioning the terms of all social bargaining and adjustment. Nieburg asserted that "Violence in all its forms […] is a natural form of political behavior." As a result, disorder engendered by violence is an intrinsic part of the social process (1969: 5).

But to raise questions whether violence is or is not "natural" to politics, "normal" or not in politics, "inevitable" or not in the processes of democratic development among modern states, or "necessary" or not as a basis of political legitimacy under different cultural conditions is to probe into the complex relationship between politics and violence at a time when meanings of important terms such as "nature-natural", "normal-normality", or "legitimacy-legitimation" in all their complexities, have been seriously called into question. The advent of the postmodern turn, with its negation of grand narratives and the language that has made them possible, has resulted in the negation that there exists anything as "natural" or "normal" (Lyotard, 1988). From this perspective, violence has been produced, normalized and/or naturalized by social practices. While this track of questioning violence is important[4], I would argue that an understanding of the theoretical basis of violence itself is more crucial if its effects on politics are to be critically construed.

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The Theoretical Basis of Violence

Slavoj Zizek differentiates between subjective and objective violence. By subjective violence, he means violence with identi-

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[3] See an examination of the state of knowledge of the study of violence and political science in the English speaking world during the last four decades in Prajak Kongkirati (forthcoming).
[4] Arendt herself maintains that neither violence nor power is "natural" but they belong to the political realm of human affairs. See Arendt (1970: 82).

fiable subjects and therefore easily visible. Objective violence consists of two other types: symbolic violence by which he means violence that is inherent in language and its uses; and systemic violence which means almost unrecognizable consequences, generally produced by the normal functioning of economic and political system, with immense impacts on the lives of ordinary people (Zizek, 2008: 1). The situation he finds wanting is when most people choose to concentrate on the easily recognizable violence—subjective violence—with identifiable perpetrators, evil individuals, disciplined state machinery, and wild mobs, among others. As a result, they are then blind to the other two forms of violence, even allowing themselves to contribute to them in some unintentional ways (*ibid.*, 9).

Though Zizek's idea of looking at illusive violence seems intriguing due in parts to his unusual thinking style, it is important to note that in the field of critical peace research influenced by Johan Galtung, these three types of violence Zizek discussed have been critically confronted much earlier. For example, the notion of "structural violence" was first introduced in 1969, while "cultural violence" first appeared in 1990, both in the *Journal of Peace Research*. Acknowledging the visibility/invisibility of different types of violence, Galtung's typology is based on the order of variability of each layer of violence: direct violence with its emphasis on the human perpetrator as identifiable and visible agency, structural violence—economic, political and social structures as sources of violence that have caused much sufferings to ordinary people in the world, and cultural violence (language, history and religion—for example) which serves as legitimation basis of both layers of violence (Zizek, 2008: 3).[5]

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I would argue that Zizek's contribution to the study of violence lies in the way he describes what happens when one looks at violence. He believes that there is something "inherently mystifying" when violence is directly confronted. The horror of violent acts will overwhelm those who dare to directly gaze at it while empathy with the victims will function as

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[5] I have applied Galtung's theory of violence to cases of violence – direct, structural and cultural - against children in Thai society, see Satha-Anand (2006: 49-79) [In Thai].

a lure which prevents its beholders from thinking as taken place in phenomena of extreme violence: atomic bombs used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, and the Nazi genocide which condemned millions Jewish, Roma as well as others to horrifying deaths during World War II. As a result, he argues that there is a need to cast "sideway glances" at violence. "Sideway glances" is an approach aimed at keeping a comfortable distance from the phenomenon under study so that its dynamics can be critically construed while the dignity of victims of violence preserved (Zizek, 2008: 4).

But it is Hannah Arendt's political philosophy in her *On Violence* that dares to gaze into the abyss of "direct violence" - violence with identifiable perpetrators, and returns with a theoretical move that refuses to accept violence as power and thereby elucidates its theoretical platform without suffering from its mystified effects as predicted by Zizek.

It goes without saying that Hannah Arendt's life and philosophy of politics are both intertwined and complex (Young-Bruehl, 2004). As a Jewish woman philosopher who had to flee the Nazi's terror from her native Germany and a university professor, Arendt disagreed with trends of the times including the students' protests. She criticized the demands for including "women's studies" or "Black studies" in the university curriculum since she believed that they would compromise academic excellency of the institutions. Some therefore felt that Arendt did not understand the problems of racial discrimination in American society and the social movements that rose to resist it (Norton, 1995: 247-262). Others criticized her notion of modern politics because she separates the social from the political (Pitkin, 1999).

> it is the way in which Arendt situates the notion of violence in a distinctive theoretical landscape that helps elucidate how violence could be looked at and its destructive effects critically questioned

Such criticisms notwithstanding, I would argue that it is the way in which Arendt situates the notion of violence in a distinctive theoretical landscape that helps elucidate how violence could be looked at and its destructive effects critically questioned. Her understanding of violence is based on a particular understanding of human action and the relationship between ends and means—one of the most daunting problems in political philosophy.

Arendt believes that human action is different from labor and work. A life of human action, *vita activa*, consists in initiative in bringing something uniquely new into the world. Each human being has his/her own purpose of his/her own construction. Such construction exists in each one's narrative and project. Human action is different from work or production because both narrative and project exist in relations to others' plans and meanings. In this sense, it is profoundly social and since it depends on how others' reaction(s) might shape and reshape one's action, human action as a relational reality turns out to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict. As a result, "a rupture of routine" is produced (Young, 2002: 264).

But in the landscape of human action, violence is markedly different. Arendt argues that violence needs to be conceptually understood as tools or instruments that serve some purposes. For example, a pen is an instrument for writing. It exists in order that writing becomes possible. In this sense, the existence of all tools needs justifications. A pen that cannot write loses its meaning as a writing instrument. A car that grew old with its machine no longer running ceases to be a vehicle that can move from one place to another, and becomes but a heap of steel. So is violence. Without justifications, it cannot exist. The question violence needs for its existence to have any meaning in general then is: what is violence used for?

> A car that grew old with its machine no longer running ceases to be a vehicle that can move from one place to another, and becomes but a heap of steel. So is violence. Without justifications, it cannot exist

The political philosopher, Ted Honderich, in an important book on terrorism, tries to explain the morality of terrorism. Instead of regarding terrorism as an act of deranged minds committing senseless violence, he challenges the liberal democrats' bias by showing that it is possible to think about the moral justifications of terrorism. His book's provocative title is *Terrorism for Humanity* (2003). It should be noted that this book was earlier published in 1989 under the title: Violence *for Equality*. I would argue that in attempting to discuss the moral justifications of terrorism, emphasizing equality as a moral justification for violence, Honderich's work could be read as a political philosophy treatise built upon Hannah Arendt's understanding of the instrumentality of terrorism, which he also calls: "political violence", that violence needs justification to exist—in this case "moral justification" (Honderich, 2003: 15).

When one chooses to use violence, he/she needs to answer the question why it is used. The instrumentality of violence demands justifications. For example, one can ask why a country starts a war? An answer could be: war is waged to win so that peace would prevail. Clausewitz himself maintains that as an instrument of foreign policy, war is "only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself" (1994: 337). Or why does a terrorist decide to bomb a bus full of innocent people? According to Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi, one of the founders of Hamas, terror used against the Israelis was seen as a "necessary" moral lesson intended to make innocent Israelis feel the pain that innocent Palestinians had felt so that they can actually experience the violence before they could understand what the Palestinians had gone through (Jurgensmeyer, 2000: 74).[6]

When violence is seen as an instrument, it cannot exist on its own but will always need guidance and justification from the purpose already set by the parties involved. War and the terror acts are instruments that could only exist with its "preferred" end-results serving as justifications. But at the time when violence such as killing is committed, since its effects and the ways in which others respond to violence have yet to be realized, justifications provided for such violent actions are one-dimensional, future-oriented and therefore definite certitude is not to be expected. Arendt maintains that anything that needs something else to serve as its justifications for its very existence cannot be the essence of anything.

> Some believe that power rests on violence while others see violence as an extension of power

It is this blindness to the instrumentality of violence that has led most theorists to their conceptual confusion and mistook violence for power. Some believe that power rests on violence while others see violence as an extension of power. For Arendt, violence as instrument is not power. It cannot be power but its opposite.

Power does not need any justification since it exists in the very being on all political communities. It appears when people bind together, do things together, bring out new and creative treasures into the world. This is because for Arendt, power is a

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[6] I have discussed the problem of "the innocents" in relation to terrorism in Satha-Anand (2006: 189-211).

feature of action and reaction insofar as people understand one another's words and deeds and coordinate with one another to achieve mutually understood ends. Different from power defined as effectiveness of command, which would logically include violence in its repertoire, Arendt's understanding of power emphasizes collective human actions which rests on persuading subjects in the here and now to cooperate (Young, 2002: 266-267). What power needs is not justifications but legitimation. While both "justification" and "legitimation" are relational, the former derives its vitality from instrumental rationality while the latter's comes from acceptance of others, depending on their willingness and choice that often grow out of particular circumstances. As studies on the "power of violence" confuses the notions of power and violence, political science studies that focus their attention on the legitimacy of violence confuses the notions of justifications and legitimations.[7] In a relationship that requires the others to accept one's power, some forms of recognition that it is human beings who are now participating in human action binding people together is needed. Put another way, power requires of those involved their existence as human beings who act.

In Arendt's words: "What makes a man a political being is his faculty of action; it enables him to get together with his peers, to act in concert, and to reach out for goals and enterprises that would never enter his mind, let alone the desire of his heart, had he not been given this gift—to embark on something new." (1972: 82). For a human being to accept the other's power depends on the degree to which words and deeds can be understood. In this sense, power depends on speech and persuasion, it precludes violence. In fact, violence becomes its opposite.

> In this sense, power depends on speech and persuasion, it precludes violence. In fact, violence becomes its opposite

In a 1954 lecture on "The Threat of Conformism", Arendt considered the political organization of mass societies and the political integration of technical power as "the world's central problems" of the time (Young-Bruehl, 2006: 95). The implication of her concern for violence in modern times is clear. The modern battlefields permit no revelations of who an actor is. There is no deed to be judged—great or small. Human beings

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[7] There are some works along this line. See for example, Apter (1997)

engaging in modern warfare turn out to be like meetings of speechless robots, some of whom kill while others are killed (Young- Bruehl, 2006).

Arendt categorically concludes that "Power and violence are opposites, where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance. This implies that it is not correct to think of the opposite of violence as nonviolence; to speak of nonviolent power is already *redundant.* Violence can destroy power; it is ultimately incapable of creating it" (1970: 56).

If violence is understood as opposite of power, and that power is the heart and soul of politics no matter how politics is construed, it could be concluded that violence is anti-politics. In the realm of visible violence, killing humans not only takes away human life, but its curse also transforms humans—both the perpetrators and the victims—into something else without use for words, reasons and power. In this sense, where killing appears, politics vanishes.

Conclusion: The Athenian Support

In the realm of visible violence, killing humans not only takes away human life, but its curse also transforms humans— both the perpetrators and the victims—into something else without use for words, reasons and power

Arendt's love of Greek political philosophy is common knowledge. But the Greek that will be mobilized to support her philosophy that violence is anti-politics here will not be Plato's Socrates arguing against Thrasymacus in the *Republic*, or Aristotle's notion of *polis* and capacity of speech as natural to human beings in his *Politics*, but Thucydides' writing. I choose "The Melian Dialogue" because it is perhaps the best classical political science writing on realism in politics that normally seen as supporting violence as power and war as the continuation of politics by means of destruction.

In the year 16 of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians sent their troops to the island of Melos because the islanders refused to surrender to their power and wanted to be neutral. But before "doing harm to their land", the Athenian sent envoys to persuade engage the Melians in a dialogue to persuade them to submit to Athens so that the Melians "would have the advantage of submit-

ting before suffering the worst" and the Athenians "should gain by not destroying (the Melians)" (Thucydides,1951: 333).

Towards the end of the dialogue after the Athenians had left the room so that the Melians could deliberate among themselves, the latter returned with the resolution that they would not yield and continued to claim neutrality and offer themselves as "friends" to the Athenians. Hearing the Melians' answer, the Athenian envoy's last words were: "Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted most in the Lacedaemonians, your foutune, and your hopes, so will you be most completely deceived"(Thucydides,1951: 336).

Then the Athenians envoy returned to their army and the war began. Finally after summer, the Athenians took over Melos. The last statement of Chapter XVII of *The Peloponnesian War* reads: "(T)he Melians surrendered at discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves" (Thucydides,1951: 337).[8]

> **If human relationship is characterized by power and when power no longer works, power relations come to an abrupt end. It is violence that kills power**

It is interesting to note that the dialogue does not end on the last page of the chapter commonly known as "the Melian Dialogue" but approximately one page before the last sentence. The last page of the "Dialogue" has no dialogue but a description of the invasion and siege of Melos with troops. It ends with the Melians' death and slavery. I would say that dialogue ends when killings commence. If human relationship is characterized by power and when power no longer works, power relations come to an abrupt end. It is violence that kills power.

In this sense the instrumentality of violence dictates human destiny by reducing human rationality of its user to finding justifications for his/her action and robbing those on the receiving end of their humanity, turning them all into objects to be killed when required, and the act of killing oftentimes glorified. Without human beings participating in *vita activa* when

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[8] For a most unique analysis of Thucydides see Strauss (1978: 139-241).

words and reasons are silenced by the sounds of killing weapons, the problem of justification completely dominates discourse of legitimation, politics is nowhere to be seen. In this sense, violence is not a continuation of politics by other means a la Clausewitz, but anti-politics.

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