«Tree of Life»
Traditional Bosnian *Kilim* pattern

Scientific, spiritual, and practical factors predict success for realization of a Nonkilling Balkans. Most humans who have ever lived have not killed anyone. By nature humans are not compelled to kill. Religions, faiths, humanist philosophies, and folk traditions, teach nonkilling principles that can be combined into a powerful Global Nonkilling Ethic. Basic components of nonkilling societies already have been demonstrated somewhere in human experience. If combined and creatively adapted in any cultural context they can assist nonkilling change. The power of creative initiatives to bring about previously unthinkable and impossible change has been demonstrated throughout history in every field of human endeavor.

Glenn D. Paige
Founder, Center for Global Nonkilling

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Center for Global NONKILLING
Measurable, Inspirational, Transformative

Bahtijaragić & Evans

NONKILLING BALKANS

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Rifet Bahtijaragić and
Joám Evans Pim, Eds.

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NONKILLING BALKANS БАЛКАНС

Edited by
Rifet Bahtijaragić
and Joám Evans Pim


Center *for* Global **Nonkilling**


University of Sarajevo
Faculty of Philosophy

Sarajevo and Honolulu
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Foreword

Glenn D. Paige
Center for Global Nonkilling

Readers of this book are invited to engage their spirit, critical intellect, and creativity to bring about a Nonkilling Balkans to benefit all people of the region. From their example people everywhere can learn and join in advancing toward a killing-free world.

It is an honor to introduce this book and to have the opportunity to express profound respect for the creative initiatives of professor and writer Rifet Bahtijaragić and to all who have joined in them. These initiatives have led to founding the Balkans Nonkilling Forum, to the historic August 2014 *Sarajevo Declaration for a Nonkilling Balkans*, to award of the Nonkilling Communities Flag to the Municipality of Bosanski Petrovac, and to this book.

Scientific, spiritual, and practical factors predict success for realization of a Nonkilling Balkans. Most humans who have ever lived have not killed anyone. By nature humans are not compelled to kill. Religions, faiths, humanist philosophies, and folk traditions, teach nonkilling principles that can be combined into a powerful Global Nonkilling Ethic. Basic components of nonkilling societies already have been demonstrated somewhere in human experience. If combined and creatively adapted in any cultural context they can assist nonkilling change. The power of creative initiatives to bring about previously unthinkable and impossible change has been demonstrated throughout history in every field of human endeavor.

The *Sarajevo Declaration* is especially constructive because it seeks to establish three institutions needed to advance knowledge and skills for nonkilling change. The Center for Nonkilling Balkans will encourage research, education-training, and policy development. The Nonkilling Balkans Observatory will measure nonkilling change. The Nonkilling Balkans Academy will offer opportunities to advance nonkilling knowledge and skills among leaders in all sectors of society.

The Nonkilling Balkans initiative will receive respect and encourage emulation throughout the world. It will profoundly reverse the image and reality of the Balkans as one of its most bloody and long-suffering regions.

May all who contribute to its success now and in future share joy in affirming universal reverence for life.

Sarajevo Declaration for a Nonkilling Balkans

Nonkilling Balkans Exploratory Forum
Sarajevo, August 28-29, 2014

1. Gathered in the convergence of commemorations of WWI and WWII, two of Europe's most dreadful wars, we abhor the vision of the Balkans as a place of bloodshed. On the contrary, we seek to reinstate and celebrate our Common Nonkilling History and Balkan contributions to a peaceful killing-free world: from Bogomil pacifist spirituality to early peace research; from centuries of peaceful multicultural coexistence to the first calls for unconditional nuclear disarmament; from daring antiwar activism in the midst of battle to applied nonviolent civil disobedience.
2. This Common Nonkilling Legacy and the fact that during the entire history of this region the vast majority of people, even in the course of war, have not killed and would not kill, leads us to uphold the principle of the right of every single person not to be killed and the right and responsibility of everyone not to kill. History teaches us that killing only leads to more killing through creation of hatred and desire for retaliation. The examples of multi-ethnic communities that renounced killing each other during wartime or were able to achieve true reconciliation in times of peace reinforce this view.
3. The positive media attention and public responses to the publication of the translation of *Nonkilling Global Political Science* into Central South Slavic (*Svjetska Politička Nauka Neubijanja*), to the celebration of the 2014 Nonkilling Balkans Exploratory Forum, and to presentation of the first Nonkilling Communities Flag and Award to the municipality of Bosanski Petrovac, provide additional encouragement for receptivity of the nonkilling approach to problem-solving and community-building across the Balkans. At the same time, these actions resonate with many other initiatives that are currently being developed throughout the region.

4. Considering that the time is ripe and building from the momentum of recent success and attention, the undersigned participants call for the establishment of a permanent nonkilling structure involving local scholars, activists, public institutions, and others. We suggest that this structure be incorporated as a nonprofit "Center for a Nonkilling Balkans", with an associated "Nonkilling Balkans Observatory" to monitor killing and nonkilling initiatives throughout the region, and a "Nonkilling Balkans Academy" to train young leaders for building future nonkilling communities in the Balkans.
5. Following discussions of the Nonkilling Balkans Exploratory Forum, the participants have agreed to publish a joint collective volume under the title *Nonkilling Balkans* that will further disseminate its findings and promote the consideration of its nonkilling thesis among decision-makers, civil movements and the general public. The key findings from this book will be summarized and presented in a Nonkilling Policy and Research Recommendations Report.
6. We hope that our findings in the fields of education, psychology, anthropology, politics, philosophy, sociology, peace and conflict studies, futures studies, gender studies, history and the media will provide useful insights for review of the 1914-2014 period from a nonkilling perspective and will help transition from a Century that has been ostensibly marked by a Culture of Killing to a future based on a Nonkilling Culture in tune with the Common Nonkilling Legacy of the Balkans.

THEREFORE:

In remembrance of all who have been killed, of all the killers, of all who have not killed, and all who have worked to end killing, guided by the scientific, historical and cultural premise of the universal value of human life, we[1] –participants of the "Nonkilling Balkans Exploratory Forum" held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on August 28-19, 2014– present this Declaration and call upon all people of the Balkans and the world to join in support.

[1] Over100 individuals became signatories. For an updated list, see <nonkilling.org>.

Nonkilling Civilizational Change in the Balkans

Rehabilitation of Humanity—Investment in Dignity

Rifet Bahtijaragić
Founder, Nonkilling Balkans Forum

Geographically, the Balkan Peninsula is a semi-island in Southeast Europe, recognizable by mountain ranges, rippling and raising to the sky, ever since the formation of the Earth's crust; inland bays and canyons, random fertile plains and rockeries widespread along the shores; barren due to hot and dry summer seasons and centuries of deforestation to heat homes, build ships and sell cheap timber products across the region. In the global civilization frame, the Balkans is one of the most used overland routes for both peaceful and aggressive commute between Europe and Asia. In peaceful times, with dominating economic interests in the region, the Balkans has always been the natural bond between European and Asian nations.

Historically, in the period of the establishment of huge social-political and economic powers in Europe and Asia, as well as in the period of aggressive military campaigns, the Balkans has always been an area of great strategic importance for all its conquerors. Various armies spent considerable periods of time in the region, regularly inflicting violence on the local population and their economic and social-political achievements. They perpetrated mass executions and prosecutions, divided and confronted Balkan nations and held them in a long-term suspense, fragmentation and fear for existence. Under such circumstances, Balkan nations have, mostly by force, built their spirituality, changing affiliations regarding dominant regions and built their ethics and cultures. The history of the region has been characterised mostly as a history of crimes, but that history is also comprised of gigantic cases of change from killing to nonkilling.

However, in Ancient history the people of the Balkans, especially Greek civilization, contributed with an abundance of attainments in art, sports, architecture, democratic politics, etc., highlighting the highest values of humanity and life. In the second half of the 20th century Slavic peoples in the

Balkans have realised values of humane social communities made of different national and cultural specificities, socially oriented towards development of brotherhood and religious tolerance, and laying foundations for social relations without mutual economic exploitation. This orientation created the foundation for the development of philosophy, way of life and policy based on nonkilling. On the international level, for example, the development of international relations based on peaceful co-existence of different political systems, economic powers, traditions, religious beliefs… created a solid base for resolving interstate and international problems without violence, without the use of force and without killing. At the very end of the 20th century, these accomplishments were destroyed by nationalistic-oriented leaders who left a vehement trail in the history of the region.

What is the Balkans? The Balkans is not made up of one nation, one state, one religion, one culture, or one tradition. The Balkans is a particle of civilization. A conglomerate of different nationalities and ethnicities lives in a rather small area of the Balkan Peninsula (some 700,000 km^2). It is distributed in dozen states that are spiritually jammed within three main world religions. For centuries and millennia, it has hosted nations whose roots have been forcibly uprooted from different regions and replanted into the Balkans' soil. Throughout the history of human kind, whole groups of people have completely disappeared, or have been transformed into the nations that were imposed by the states.

Across history, the peoples of the Balkans have been in danger of mass destruction, by different methods and different justifications for such threat, such as conquering plans, so-called national interests, economic circumstances, defence reasons, expansion of religion, etc. The people were, most of the time, huddled into ethnic boundaries of their national states, politically and pathologically mobilized due to the fear of servitude, destruction, national and religious division, prosecution and genocide.

The Causes of the Creation of and Culture and Ethics of Killing

Successive conquests of the Balkans region implied violence, mass killings and population movements. Even during the periods of social-political and economic revolutions and changes of social systems, violence and mass executions were the main tools for 'conflict resolution.' In the formation of alliances of states and their subsequent desintegration to form independent countries, lethality continued to serve as an operational principle.

During the 20th century alone, the peoples of the Balkans suffered five large wars: two Balkan wars at the beginning of the century, the First World War and Second World War, and the Serbo-Croatian-Bosnian war. More than 10 million people were killed in those wars. The majority of them were civil victims. In these circumstances, fragmented national identities have been used by invaders and warring factions to foster permanent social-political and economic instability in the region to their own benefit.

Balkan peoples have formed specific multi-loyalties: toward the ethnic group, state, religion, ideology, family, etc. These loyalties were created under the pressure of fear for existence, as a cohesive factor in the conscience of human beings. But they also hinder the commitment to individual opinion, individual attitudes and social determinations. They prevent the breaking of boundaries of collective consciousness, as attacks on the unity are peceived as attacks on the community's safety. Such relations keep people in fear and permanent mistrust and often in animosity for anything strange or different from what they are familiar with.

The past of the Balkans is in many ways an accumulation of unsolved problems and confrontations due to such overlapping loyalties. Instead of solving such conflicts, problems have continued to build up, with lethal violence only aggravating feelings of animosity and desire for revenge, causing new violence and killing where and whenever circumstances allowed on the basis of threat and fear. We will use two extreme cases as examples.

At the beginning of the last Bosnian war, one of the most aggressively nationalistic Bosnian Serb leaders, Radovan Karadžić, warned Bosnian Muslims that, in case they refused to remain within the boundaries of the already broken Yugoslavia, their nation would dissapear. The rejection of such a view by Bosnian Muslim leaders led to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the beginning of the fulfillment of Karadžić's threat. Serbian troops, under the command of General Mladic, commited genocide on the male population from the Bosnian town Srebrenica—in a couple of days about 8,000 Muslims were executed. In the west of Bosnia, towns such as Bosanski Petrovac, and in many areas of Bosanska Krajina, Serbian troops commited other atrocities and banished all Muslim citizens out of their country. However, towards the end of the war, powered by revenge, armed Bosnian troops—mostly made up of Muslim citizens—had also committed crimes on Bosnian Serbs. But essentially it does not matter which ethnic group had been committing atrocities; what matters is that human beings were victims.

Those wars and murders in the Balkans are also the negation of humane values of human beings and their societies, ideologies, theologies and political orientations. Instead of endlessly repeating the cycles of war and violence, Nobel Laureate Máiread Maguire argues that: "We must learn that our common humanism and human dignity are more important than diversities in tradition. We must understand that our lives and lives of other people, are sacred and that we have to resolve our problems without killing each other".

One obstacle for the realization of this understanding has been the manipulation of peoples by pathological leaders. Political and religious leaders have often used patriotism and faith to increase their power and further their interests through the use of fear. Spreading fear of others generates irrationality, such as the last Bosnian war illustrates. And history, written without a nonkilling perspective, becomes the teaching material to strengthen hatred and aggressive revanchist behaviours.

In many parts of the world, including the Balkans, museums, streets and squares, picnic sites and national parks are full of symbols of war and other aggressive types of human behaviour: statues of armed soldiers, tanks and cannons on pedestals, streets named after war commanders, national war heroes and names of battles, all celebrating war and aggression. From TV screens, intact minds of children have been bombarded with commercials for violent video games celebrating weapons and killing. Such communities are following the old Latin saying: "*Si vis pacem, para bellum*".

Such symbols have served to mobilize masses and develop a national homogenization based on a nationalistic ideology of violence and aggression. States established on these national foundations have grown into instruments of nationalist power and patriotism, well-kept and used in times of crisis. On the road to create conditions for the transformation of the Balkans into a nonkilling region, it is necessary to develop an awareness of people connecting national affiliation with a membership in a global nonkilling community. The same States that built the ethics of killing should incorporate the obligation of transforming the ethics and culture of killing into the ethics and culture of nonkilling. They must imbed into their constitutions and policies the principle of nonkilling resolution of conflicts.

A Nonkilling Philosophy of Life in the Balkans

Considering the context that has been discussed, is it possible to build nonkilling Balkan societies, a Balkans that could move beyond the ethic and culture of killing? Is it possible to establish the ethics and culture of nonkilling

in Balkan societies? Is it possible to construct nonkilling relations among the people of the Balkans and with other regions of the world?

Yes, it is! Even a superficial analysis of the nature and the creative possibilities of human beings have proven that it is possible. The human mind is an extremely powerful tool for building positive relations among people. A nonkilling civilization is attainable because of the capability of the human mind to control emotions, to seek the best interest of humankind and to perceive pathways taking us to the happiness of each human being.

In the struggle for survival, which is also the struggle to build dignity on the basis of humanity, we must invest much more than a hope and desire to develop an ethics and culture of nonkilling. Every person can do it only if he wants to. A person can decide not to kill, but must strive to reach for the unlimited treasury of nonkilling tools and methods, in order to enable the nonlethal resolution of every problem and conflict in any inter-personal or international relation. As Jean-Marie Muller points out:

> the imperative "Thou shalt not kill" is not a commandment that comes from the outside or from above, and is imposed on consciences by an external constraint; it is a commandment given to man by an internal requirement of his own conscience. It is the autonomous man—that is to say the free man—who asserts the ethical affirmation not to kill (2014: 60-61).

Society must reject the ideology of killing and develop a philosophy and strategy of nonkilling. Because, there is no doubt, killing is a negation of man's humanity and generator of hatred. Nonkilling is the natural frame of humanity, mutual respect, understanding, cooperation and dignity.

It is certain that the development of nonkilling ethics will not be a quick and easy process. It requires a strong will and determination to raise awareness. People must understand the urgent necessity to build a different world in which the paradigm of lethality is replaced with that of nonkilling.

In the Balkans action must start with nonkilling education. Everyone must have a possibility to be educated on the basis of a nonkilling way of life and the nonkilling way to solve problems: children, students on every level, teachers on all levels, politicians, judges, etc. Educational systems must embrace the introduction of nonkilling philosophy and nonkilling political science into their school programs. Legal systems must be compatible with nonkilling principles. The international community must find effective ways of preventing and stopping the spirals of war, creating neutral and powerful arbitration mechanisms for nonkilling problem solving.

Importance of Building a Nonkilling Culture

The history of the Balkans has exceptional examples of social and religious movements advocating nonviolence, nonkilling and fraternity. One of such movements is the Bogomils, founded at the beginning of the second millennium in the then Bulgarian empire, later spread all over the Balkans and other parts of Southern Europe. In addition to their historical significance for bringing back the early Christian teachings, shifting away from the accumulation of wealth and fight for power, for several hundred years Bogomils provided the foundations for humane relations, struggling against death sentences and every type of exploitation and killing of people.

Furthermore, the unwritten history of the Balkans is a history of the vast majority of people not killing other people throughout their lives, even in times of widespread violence and unrest. In such obvious but untold history lies the foundation for the development of a nonkilling culture. If amplified through the education systems and enriched with the notion of a nonkilling paradigm shift, social communities will have a firm basis for building such a culture in the Balkans. Although the ideals of fraternity, equality and self-government had already been introduced during the Yugoslav period during the second half of the 20th century, the recognition of nonkilling human legacy had been absent, and eventually this failure eroded such ideals, falling back to the ideologies of nationalistic and religious divisiveness.

To contribute to building a culture of nonviolence and nonkilling, explains Jean-Marie Muller, "a school must delete the culture of killing from the mind of youth." This is crucial as nonkilling culture implies not only a refusal to kill, but as Paige argues, also "an inner constructive engagement for social transformation into the nonviolent civilization based on safety and happiness of all human beings." Developing an educational system based on the principles of nonkilling is thus a crucial step.

Education is a fundamental part in the period from the culture of killing to a culture of nonkilling. But what actions are to be taken in situations when a community with a strong nonkilling ethic is attacked or brutalized by some military force, with the aim of killing and persecuting its people? Paige argues that among the tasks of political science in a transitional period is:

> providing credible security alternatives against lethal aggression at the individual, local, national and international levels. (...) The role of political science in transition from lethal to nonlethal security is to help develop theory and practice to provide credible alternatives to threat or use of lethal

> force—including preventive nonlethal transformation of the will to kill among potential adversaries.

The Balkans countries can learn from the nonkilling civilian defence arrangements, albeit as a complement to conventional military means, of Sweden, Lithuania, Switzerland and Austria, for example. They can also learn from the 27 countries in the world that have no standing armies, including Costa Rica or Iceland. Or even from the new developments in nonlethal weapon for police and military use.

We live in the time when more and more countries in the world are concentrating attention on nonkilling as a unique alternative to social lethality. This includes the growing number of countries that have abolished the death penalty (including those in the Balkans), that have recognized conscientious objection, and that are pursuing specific policies to prevent violence at the individual, relationship, community and societal levels.

The task that the 2014 Nonkilling Balkans Forum set out to develop is to promote such a civilizational shift, starting at the heart of the Balkans, in Sarajevo. To realize this shift, every human being can become a center for global nonkilling and spread this idea in his or her sphere of influence, from the smallest village to the world community. The Forum also promoted the adoption and institutionalization of nonkilling, a process that was initiated in 2014 with the declaration of the town of Bosanski Petrovac as a nonkilling community. It was in fact the first municipality to be distinguished with the "Nonkilling Flag" ensign by the Center for Global Nonkilling.

The Nonkilling Balkans Forum will try to take the example of Bosanski Petrovac throughout the region and indentify and promote other good practices. The "Sarajevo Declaration for a Nonkilling Balkans" includes other commitments that seek to introduce nonkilling into the school curricula, universities, legislation, business, and social and cultural life. To do this, it must also address many of the questions and possibilities raised during the gathering, and that are developed in this collective volume. These include the ones offered by Professor Glenn D. Paige in his opening message to the participants of the 2014 Nonkilling Balkans Forum held in Sarajevo:

> What then would a Nonkilling Balkans be like? People living on the Balkans peninsula, who have developed a strong nonkilling ethic in each of their loyalties/identities and share a common Nonkilling Balkans Ethic. Nonkilling unity among nonkilling diversity. This common Nonkilling Balkans ethic would serve the unifying function of Nonkilling Balkans Community. The common Ethic would encourage nonkilling identities within and relations among the diverse social formations/loyalties in the Balkans area seeking

creatively to satisfy human and environmental needs for the well-being of each and all. A Nonkilling Balkans could become a transforming leader for killing-free world.

Survival does not imply the extortion and killing of other people. People must lean on each other and share good times and bad times. We are tiny creatures and our bodies are extremely fragile. The only way to ensure the future of humanity is to shift human conscience to develop a more inclusive and peaceful future for our children and upcoming generations. This is only possible if we merge on the basis of our humanity, if we stop killing each other and if we focus the power of our minds on developing nonkilling relations between people and creating a basis for human dignity.

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Looking 100 Years Back and 100 Years Forward

Peacebuilding in the Balkans Region[1]

Ivana Milojević
University of the Sunshine Coast

> *In order to change an existing paradigm … do not struggle to try and change the problematic model. [Instead,]… create a new model and make the old one obsolete.*
>
> Quote attributed to Buckminster Fuller.

Introduction: Theorising Balkans

> *Who controls the past … controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.*
>
> George Orwell

Courtesy of both European colonialist discourses and the 1990s Yugoslav wars, the term Balkans has become a signifier of disunity, a synonym for 'dividing into small warring/hostile states' and even for genocidal ethnic cleansing. Within the region of the former Yugoslavia, the internalisation of balkanism created narratives such as that 'no generation in the Balkans could live their whole lives without experiencing war at least once', that war is somehow entrenched in 'our hotter blood and temperament', or that '*all* previous transitions between different systems of government were violent'. Even though none of those statements is empirically true (has anybody actually measured the difference in blood temperature between various European people?), nonetheless, this internalised balkanism has proved popular and resilient. Most importantly, it has created cycles of self-fulfilling prophecies wherein these discourses have finally found some validation in reality. Other past-oriented narratives propose Balkan states such as Serbia as responsible for starting at least one world war—this narrative is often repeated in Serbia itself, and not uncommonly with pride.

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[1] This chapter contains sections from Milojević, Ivana (2013). *Breathing: Violence In, Peace Out*. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Another powerful, and detrimental, discourse in the region has been that of nationalism. The imagination of pure ethnic nation states has cost the people of the region dearly. Forceful separation of ethnicities perceived as disparate—based on 'narcissism of minor difference' and inspired by the cognitive discourse of primordial ethnicism—has resulted in deaths, poverty and the overall diminished well-being of most people in the region. Primordial ethnicism has solidified within an idea of pure ethnic state and despite its detrimental outcomes it has been almost universally accepted as the solution to the imagined/constructed ethnic hatreds in the Balkans.

Challenging such cognitive templates and discourses, that is, of balkanism and ethnic nationalism, is crucial for long-term peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in the region. The existence of nonkilling presents and the imagination of nonkilling futures are firmly linked with the investigation into the nonkilling pasts. Alternative interpretation of history is thus one of the keys to creating alternative (nonviolent) presents and futures. And so is alternative reading of dominant discourses that, most commonly, lead to killings and violence.

The following sections investigate the dangers that lie within the current discourses of balkanism and nationalism and propose the alternative readings into the region's past, present and future.

Balkan's "Lesser People"

"Ja sam Balkan boy i smrdim na znoj" [I'm a Balkan Boy and I stink of sweat]

Rambo Amadeus

The idea of 'lesser' and 'higher/more advanced' people was central to the doctrines of imperialism, Eurocentrism and social Darwinism. It has been used for centuries; it reached its peak in fascism and Nazism. Sadly, racism, ethno-nationalism and imperialism-based politics have not influenced only fascism and Nazism. Rather, these ideologies have significantly impacted the whole contemporary world. The arena of international politics, in particular, is built on hierarchical relations between lesser/higher people, of which the latter have not only more wealth/power in general, but also more influence in political decision-making processes locally and globally.

Within the boundaries of Europe [prior to as well as concurrent with the 20th c. immigration wave from the 'Third Countries' (another 'lesser people' lot)] it has been the area of the Balkans that has, by and large, been inhabited by the lesser people. "A specter is haunting Western culture—the

specter of the Balkans," begins Maria Todorova's seminal text *Imagining the Balkans* (1997: 3). What she means by this is that, especially in the 1990s:

> All the powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter: politicians and journalists, conservative academics and radical intellectuals, moralists of all kind, gender, and fashion. Where is the adversarial group that has not been decried as 'Balkan' and 'balkanizing' by its opponents? Where the accused that have not hurled back the branding reproach of 'balkanism'? (1997).

The discourse of balkanism makes politics within the region, within Europe and globally, further argued Todorova (1999), "significantly and organically intertwined" with a construction/invention/imagination of the Balkans as lesser. From an innocuous geographical term—denoting the area surrounding the Balkan Mountains, or the Balkan Peninsula in Southeast Europe—the construction of the Balkans at the beginning of the twentieth century meant that:

> Europe had added to its repertoire of *Schimpfwörter*, or disparagements, a new one that, although recently coined, turned out to be more persistent over time than others with centuries-old tradition . . . That the Balkans have been described as the 'other' of Europe does not need special proof. What has been emphasized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized world. As with any generalization, this one is based on reductionism, but the reductionism and stereotyping of the Balkans has been of such degree and intensity that the discourse merits and requires special analysis (Todorova, 1997: 3).

This special analysis is pertinent for two reasons. First, orientalism manifested as Islamophobia is gaining ground in Europe and in the rest of the western world. Not surprisingly, problematisation of Muslims currently on the rise in Europe follows a very similar pattern that 'lesser people' of the Balkans discourse did. We can thus hopefully learn from previous mistakes and their bad consequence and create more helpful and peace promoting discourses. Understanding detrimental effects of discourses that categorise people according to higher/lower value is necessary, as perhaps a first step towards abandoning them. Second, the analysis pertinent to the area of peace and conflict studies because the conceptualisation that Todorova critiques is still widely present within the field. One example is *The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace* (2010), where there are no less than 23

entries in some way directly related to the 'Balkans'. To start with, the term 'Balkan Conflicts' is defined in the following way:

> In the 1990s Yugoslavia witnessed the worst violence Europe had seen since 1945 in a series of wars that devastated large parts of the broken federation. Several hundred thousand people—mostly civilians—died. Millions fled abroad or were displaced internally. Chauvinism, fuelled by the conflict between Serbia and Croatia, the two longstanding South Slav rivals, engulfed Bosnia. Eventually, after years of equivocation, the West intervened to prevent the wholesale deportation of the Albanians of Kosovo. The scale and intensity of the crisis *forced* the Atlantic democracies to base much of their security strategy after 2000 on the integration of the Balkans into common Euro-Atlantic structures with the European Union (EU) increasingly taking the lead in shaping policy (Gallagher, 2010: 168, italics added).

Not only is this entry written by a non-Yugoslav, non-Balkans-based author, but also none of the bibliographical entries accompanying it (with titles such *The Balkans* [twice], *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy*, *The Balkans in the New Millennium*, *The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism* and *The Balkans in World History*) is by a Yugoslav or Balkan's based author. And while Balkan-based authors may also be guilty of balkanism, it is still less likely that they will theorise themselves as 'inferior'/'uniquely problematic'. Barash and Webel's *Peace and Conflict Studies*, an influential text, is likewise full of references to Balkanisation and 'the Balkans'. For example, "Following the establishment of nation-states in Western Europe" low levels of various kinds of violence existed, "at least until the resurgence of genocidal ethnic cleansing and xenophobia during the 1990s in the Balkans" (2002: 177). Also here they state, "Furthermore, it is not clear that further *Balkanization*—of Africa, India, or anywhere else—will necessarily further the cause of peace. Certainly, the Balkans peninsula, known as the 'tinderbox of Europe'" (2002: 169). The implication, even most likely not intended, is clear: without its 'tinderbox', (western) Europe would have been fine, peaceful and tolerant, so it is obvious here who the problem is! The claims of 'primordialism' and 'perennialism', long abandoned when explaining the behaviours of western European and other 'developed' states, continue to be used for the Balkan ones. Incidentally, Todorova's argumentation and writing, as well as that of many other authors, have been published within the context of *Slavic*, rather than political or peace/conflict, studies. But to better understand a whole range of issues within this region, cross-pollination is necessary.

Foucault's observation about power-knowledge systems that determine how reality is perceived and defined is apparent in the discursive construction of the Balkans. For example, the *Popularna Enciklopedija* (*Popular Encyclopaedia*) published in 1976 by BIGZ, Beograd defines Balkan as:

> BALKAN (Turkish 'mountain'), mountain system in eastern Serbia and Bulgaria, composed from various mountain ranges, 530 km long, 21–45 kilometres wide; it can be divided between Western one (see *Stara Planina*), Middle one (see *Shipka*) and Eastern one (up to the Black sea); highest mountain tops: Botev (2376 m), Vezen (2198), Midzor (2169). Sheep raising is developed and there are coal, copper and gold deposits.

The Hutchinson, Softback Encyclopedia's (published in Oxfordshire in 1994) definition, on the other hand, is:

> BALKANS (Turkish 'mountains') peninsula of SE Europe, stretching into the Mediterranean Sea between the Adriatic and Aegean seas, comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey-in-Europe, Macedonia and Yugoslavia. It is joined to the rest of Europe by an isthmus 1,200 km/750 mi wide between Rijeka on the west and the mouth of the Danube on the Black Sea to the east. The great ethnic diversity resulting from successive waves of invasion has made the Balkans a byword for political dissension. The Balkans' economy developed comparatively slowly until after World War II, largely because of the predominantly mountainous terrain, apart from the plain of the Save-Danube basin in the north. Political differences have remained strong—for example, the confrontation of Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and the differing types of communism prevailing in the rest—but in the later years of the 20th century a tendency to regional union emerged. To 'Balkanize' is to divide into small warring states.

Despite some tendencies towards regional union then, the term Balkans remains a signifier of disunity. Further, the question could be raised as to how confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus differs from confrontations over other parts of greater Europe (that is, dispute over Alsace-Lorraine between France and Germany, 1871–1945 or Northern Ireland between Ireland and the United Kingdom, 1920–1999). Nor is there mention of the fact that the colonisation of the region by various European (Austro-Hungarian, Nazi German) and non-European (Ottoman) empires contributed to the 'Balkans economy developing comparatively slowly' until after Second World War (when the area was largely decolonised). Instead, geographical ('eternal' as in 'mountainous terrain') conditions are presented as the main reason for the region's economic 'backwardness'.

The Hutchinson is significant both for what it says and also for what it does not. Given that it defines the Balkans in political as well as geographical terms it could be expected that it would provide some additional information and interpretations such as: that the poverty of the Balkan region occurred largely because of colonisation by the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires; that people living at the Balkans experienced invasion and brutality by Nazis during the Second World War; and that the eighteenth-century Balkan question actually refers to the competition and struggle between western European nations to get territories and spheres of influence on the peninsula during the decline of Ottoman empire, etc. However, the cognitive template of balkanism overrides such alternative discourses. Interestingly enough, the cognitive template of the colonised (nation-states within the region) focuses predominantly on the blaming of imperialist policies for its own political or economic difficulties. Both cognitive templates—of balkanism as well as anti-imperialism—are a result of imperialist and nationalist practices that have contributed to the various forms in which violence took place in the region. And both templates continue to underlie policies and politics still impacting upon millions of people living there.

One example of this can be seen in the way *the construction of the Balkans*—that is, being defined not only in geographical but also in cultural and political terms—impacted on both the practices as well as perceptions of violence that took place in twentieth-century Europe. The definition or understanding of the Balkans geographically is not very precise and correct; for example, in the case of Yugoslavia, none of the three Yugoslavias that have existed thus far was completely within 'the Balkans'. The mountains in Slovenia are part of the Alps mountain chain; Slavonija and Vojvodina are north of the Danube and Sava, in Panonska nizija (the middle European Pannonia depression). Thus neither area, strictly and geographically speaking, belongs to the Balkans. Most importantly, the common understanding of balkanism forgets about not only the peaceful coexistence of many ethnicities in the region but also about various political projects of the twentieth century that aimed at regional unification. Within the discourse of balkanism there is, for example, no mention of *Pan-Slavism*, an historical movement that attempted to *unify* all Slavs within one nation-state (within the Balkans in particular and Europe in general). Nor is there mention of the Balkan Leagues (I in the1860s, II in the 1912–1913) that temporarily unified Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in their efforts to overthrow the Ottoman occupation. Other alliances and treaties that deserve but rarely receive a mention include The Balkan Pact (1934), a treaty signed by Greece,

Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia, wherein signatories agreed to suspend all territorial claims, and the Balkan Bled Agreement (1954), an agreement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria recognising distinct Macedonian ethnicity and language. The idea of a Balkan Federation manifested on and off from the late nineteenth century up until 1948. Other shorter- or longer-lived organisations and projects such as the League for the Balkan Confederation (1894), the Balkan Socialist Federation (or Socialist-democratic Conference) (1910), the Revolutionary Balkan Social Democratic Labour Federation (1915), and the Balkan Communist Federation (1920–1933) all involved Balkan people working together and cooperating on a range of issues.

The area, like the rest of the Europe or indeed the rest of the world, has therefore seen both diversifying and unifying political movements. It has been moulded in particular political units and formations in accordance with the political climate and the mainstream discourse of the time. And, these units, formations, movements, ideologies and politics were changing through time and space. They are thus neither 'eternal' nor 'primordial' but socially, politically, culturally and historically constructed. However, the mainstream discourse has captured the notion of the Balkans within particular interpretations, according to the needs of those that help promote it. Balkanism and its subjects were:

> imprisoned in a field of discourse in which 'Balkans' is paired in opposition to 'West' and 'Europe', while 'Balkanism' is the dark other of 'western civilization'. When the Balkans were part of the scatter pattern of invective aimed at the east and 'Orientalism' was the other necessary for the self-essentializing 'West' and 'Europe', there existed the prospect of their rediscovery in a positive fashion. With the rediscovery of the east and orientalism as independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall, anti-civilization, *alter ego*, the dark side within (Todorova, 1994: 482).

The term has become useful in conveniently exempting 'the west' from:

> charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance: the Balkans, after all, are in Europe, they are white and they are predominately Christian (1994: 455) . . . Balkanization not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian. In its latest hypostasis, particularly in American academe, it has been completely decontextualized and paradigmatically related to a variety of problems (1994: 453)

The violent conflicts of the 1990s in *one* (now former) country *partially* geographically based in the Balkans have brought this discourse to the front of mind, transforming it into "one of the most powerful and widespread pejorative designations in modern history" (Todorova, 1997: cover). This is because, as Todorova once again astutely remarks: 'The Balkans are usually reported to the outside world only in time of terror and trouble; the rest of the time they are scornfully ignored' (1997: 184). This allows for this region —"geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as 'the other'"—to continue to serve as "a repository of negative characteristics upon which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' has been built" (1997: cover). Even though ethnic homogenisation within nation-state has been one of the basic themes of European history overall, and conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as Todorova has argued, the "ultimate Europeanization of the peninsula" (Stokes, 1997), the discourse on balkanisation won. In other words, considering the "extent of the devastation that Europeans have wrought on each other, to say nothing of the rest of the world, in . . . 'the century of expulsions' . . . the rhetorical . . . attempts to distinguish 'the Balkans' from 'Europe' . . . are suspect" (Hayden, 1996: 797) and should thus be rejected.

Nonetheless, the balkanism discourse influenced not only Europe's relationship with the region, but also debates within the former Yugoslavia. That is, Balkans/Europe dualism has been "central to much of the political discourse over the legitimacy or necessity of political acts concerning Yugoslavia's collapse and subsequent wars, both by Yugoslav politicians and by those on the world stage who have had to deal with them" (1996). Within the former Yugoslavia and its successor states, "the designation of the 'other' has been appropriated and manipulated by those who have themselves been designated as such in orientalist discourse" (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 922). Accompanying socialist and multicultural Yugoslavia's collapse was not only the questioning of the "common-identity-through-common-communist-state but, led by their political and intellectual elites", the restoration of "'original' identities that predated the common state" (1995). These original or 'real' identities were not only to be found in the pre-Yugoslav past, their (re)construction also followed "the familiar orientalist pattern of 'unchanging truths' . . . exhibit[ing] a curious mixture of culture and politics" (1995: 926).

The portrayal of Yugoslav peoples as a whole or some particular groups of subject-victims within western media as "powerless victim of circumstances, deprived of all political identity, reduced to bare suffering", argues Slavoj Žižek represented "a certain naturalization, a purely racist perception

of what went on in Yugoslavia, treating things there as a kind of almost natural catastrophe, as if a kind of primal ethnic hatred exploded there, tribal war, everywhere against everyone else" (Žižek 1999). Instead, a more accurate perception is that even a "subject-victim to whose aid NATO intervene[d] [was] a political subject with a clear agenda" (1999). However, many Yugoslav people were actively participating in the dismantling of Yugoslavia. In doing so they too utilised the discourses of superior/inferior peoples. Concretely, early in the 1990s the battle to locate oneself high(er) on the 'hegemonic western scale' and geographically and/or culturally closer to 'the centre' or western Europe started:

> From the standpoint of the 'northern republics', Slovenia and Croatia, centuries under Habsburg rule have qualified them to 'join Europe' at the present [post Yugoslavia] time. Historical circumstances which led to industrial development in western Europe have been appropriated by Slovenes and Croats as the product of their superior qualities, and western-like participation in the cultural circles of mittel Europa is stressed, without consideration of *how* they participated—as equal actors or otherwise (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 924).

These republics proclaimed that they 'belong' to Europe; simultaneously, however, there was a strengthening of the "popular perception in the north and west of Yugoslavia that there is a southern, 'Balkan burden', which has slowed if not prevented entirely the non-Balkan parts of the country from [being] what they 'really are'—European" (1995). Further to the east/south, Serbs and Montenegrins tried to position themselves as historical defenders of Europe, European civilisation and culture from the invasion of oriental barbarians: 'the last barrier to the ongoing onslaught and aggression of Islam' (Šarić, 1990: 68). Therefore "Serbs, Montenegrins and, to a lesser extent, Macedonians . . . felt compelled to defend their 'other' Europeaness by stressing their complementary contribution to the European cultural heritage and the cultural discontinuity created by the Ottoman conquest of their part of Europe" (Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 924-25). Yugoslav Muslims also needed to position themselves within the overarching narrative of balkanism. While Serbia reinvented the Kosovo myth as the historical proof of its ties to Europe, Kosovo Albanians (the majority of whom follow the Islamic faith) reiterated the myth of Balkan indigeneity, or the national myth[2] about Illyrian descent.

[2] Myth is here understood in Jungian terms and as further supported by the work of Joseph Campbell: as a collective story that gives meaning (rather than as 'a false story').

Further to this they positioned themselves as victims of Slavic occupiers—the non-Slavic people imprisoned in South Slavic States (that is, Yugoslavia, Serbia). This enabled them to create effective political strategies that eventually also led to secession and the formation of the independent state. Especially efficacious in this process were the nonviolent methods of civil disobedience Kosovo Albanians implemented under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova (1944–2006). Their ten-year, nonviolent campaign, which took place during most of Slobodan Milošević's reign, earned them respect and sympathy internationally, paving diplomatic paths for achieving secessionist political goals. Muslims in Bosnia found themselves in the ambivalent situation of having to simultaneously confirm and denounce their own balkanism. Geographically closer to the European 'centre' (than Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians) and yet culturally (via religion) connected with the Islamic 'orient', their main hope was in contrasting their unique culture against the barbaric Serbs (and occasionally even Croats)—for which Serbs provided plenty of empirical evidence. Their somewhat closer (but also highly ambivalent) ties to Croatians were partially connected with what Muhamed Filipović terms "tutorial, patronage relationship towards Muslims and Islam . . . into the national corpus of Croatian people" (cf. Bakić-Hayden, 1995: 927).

Due to the strength of the Kosovo myth and the 'defenders of European civilisation' narrative, Serbian attitudes towards Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) were more negative. Often pejoratively called 'the Turks', they have most commonly been perceived by Serbs as "traitors . . . converts . . . whose weakness and opportunism deprived them of the religious and cultural identity bequeathed to them by their forefathers in Kosovo" (1995). Lastly, all these groups could position themselves as higher than the true 'untouchables' of Yugoslavia, 'Gypsies' or Roma people. If all else failed, victimised and voiceless, Roma people could always be used as a reference point denoting the superiority of other, more 'European' ethnicities.

After these narratives of 'nesting orientalisms' (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) collided in the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and later Serbia and Montenegro, Europe's lack of enthusiasm to provide unequivocal support for the 'defenders of its civilisation' confused Serbian nationalists. To explain what was perceived as unequivocal support by western European nations towards Slovenia and Croatia, narratives stressing divisions between Catholic-Protestant and Eastern Orthodox European Christians were evoked in Serbia. Due to the promotion of these narratives, after a while large sections of the Serbian population started to believe that salvation from the (real and perceived) injustices committed by their immediate neighbours

was no longer coming from western Europe but from their Eastern-Orthodox ally, Russia. True to the CGT (*Chosenness–Glory–Trauma*) syndrome (Galtung, 2002), the rumour went around that conflicts over the former Yugoslav territory *have always* caused world wars, and large sections of the population expected Russian involvement against NATO, which was, apparently, to trigger yet another larger European war. Milošević's regime waited for nearly three months while NATO bombed Serbia and Montenegro, but the Slavic brothers did not come to the rescue. The political leadership around Milošević was most likely truly surprised that neither the narrative of 'Europe's defenders' nor of the 'eternal brotherhood with Russians' yielded the expected results. In the end, Milošević's regime proclaimed 'victory', a proclamation that most likely the regime itself—like the majority of the population—failed to believe in. To this day, Serbia is confused, even split down to the middle, in terms of which narrative to tap into when envisioning its desired future.

Slovenia, on the other hand, quickly benefited from positioning itself as part of Europe, the furthest northwest, the most economically developed and the least 'polluted' by the heritage of the Balkan and balkanism. Given that Slovenia was ethnically the most homogeneous Yugoslav republic (population around 90 per cent Slovene at the time), and unburdened by 'other inferior people', it was relatively free to go. The Yugoslav army threw a tantrum, possibly more out of a habit of repressing dissent rather than out of attachment to Slovenia itself. The Yugoslav army command's closest ties were with Belgrade, which had no claims to parts of Slovenian territory. One of the rare quick wars took place, of low duration (ten days) and intensity. Still, around 60 people were killed and more than 300 wounded.

Another legacy of this war was the further disintegration of the Yugoslav army, Yugoslav communist party and the Yugoslav state. Slovenes and Croats left all these institutions, even though at the time the president of the rotating Yugoslav presidency (Stjepan Mesić) as well as the Prime Minister (Ante Marković) were of Croatian descent. Mesić's alleged statement that he would be 'the last president of Yugoslavia' was widely circulated in Serbia. The motion by then president of the presidency Borisav Jović (from Serbia) to block Mesić's becoming a new president based on constitutional automatic rotation rule was not circulated at all. Neither was Jović's discussion with the Yugoslav defence minister-commander of Yugoslav army (1988–1992) Veljko Kadijević and President of Serbia Slobodan Milošević (1989–1997) about redrawing of boundaries after Slovenia's and Croatia's secession. The public was never to hear that the military option was proposed to both quench

opposition to Milošević's rule within Serbia as well as to 'push out' Slovenes and Croats while retaining sections of Croatian territory wherein Serbian people were in a majority. The careful choosing of narratives also did not include reports on Milošević's meeting with Croatian president Franjo Tuđman in which they agreed to divide Bosnian territory between Serbia and Croatia (the Karađorđevo agreement, 1991).

So, instead of transparency about political processes and the competing visions for the future by multitude of players and actors, the Yugoslav public was pulled between the trinity of CGT syndrome—chosenness, glory, trauma—for the multiplicity of particular needs or issues. Packaging and repackaging of narratives became a full-time occupation for government officials, and for the intellectuals and journalists who were close to regimes. Underlying narratives of 'belonging', 'victimhood', 'rightful place', and so on, were always present, albeit in different guises. It was not uncommon that a new narrative was formed almost overnight, even if it was contradictory to the previous one (that is, retention of Yugoslavia versus creation of ethnic-nation state, or alliance with Europe versus alliance with Russia). Relentlessly promoted, the old–new narrative would almost completely obliterate the previous one. This testifies that despite the Euro-centric cliché, "according to which people in the Balkans have this very long memory, [that] they never learn anything new, they never forget anything old", the reality of the ground confirmed that, on the contrary, "the Balkans, if anything, is the area where people forget extremely quickly extremely fast" (Žižek, 1999).

This last sentence is also an example of essentialising because like in any other geographical place in the Balkans some people have longer, and others shorter, memories. Most often people identify with narratives that they receive in families, schools, from governments, or through media and other cultural means (for example, literature) and then filter (remember or forget) new information through those narratives. Underlying cognitive frames, paradigms or worldviews play a critical role in this process. Europe–Balkan dualism, long present as a method of ascertaining superior/inferior or lesser people, was an archetypal narrative that experienced its logical consequence during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The choice of narratives is important because "even if something is a purely manipulative ideological invention, nonetheless it produces certain material effects" (1999). In other words, the imaginations of superior/lesser people, coupled with a nationalistic imagination of homogenous communities, facilitated a process that produced 'real victims' (Hayden, 1996: 783). Killings, tortures, wounding and abuse of real people followed, with the well-publicised 'summit' of genocidal ethnic cleansing.

Within this process of ethnic cleansing one group disappeared with the most ferocity and velocity—the 'Yugoslavs'. Imaginations of allegedly primordial, homogenous and 'pure' communities made the existing heterogeneous, intertwined, intermingled and diverse multicultural Yugoslav community unimaginable (Hayden, 1996: 783). Especially in the areas where the mixing of people (with the exception of Vojvodina) was high, "where the intermingling of the populations was most complete . . . forced unmixing of peoples" (1996: 790) took place. In the end it was the multicultural Yugoslav community that had existed in real life in many parts of the country that became first part of the lesser and then 'nonexistent' people. Where the mixing was greatest, where boundaries between people were the most blurred, as they represented a "living disproof of the nationalist ideologies" (1996), the violence had to be at its most ferocious:

> To reverse Benedict Anderson's evocative phrase (1983), the disintegration of Yugoslavia into its warring components in 1991–2 marked the failure of the imagination of a Yugoslav community. This failure of the imagination, however, had real and tragic consequences: the Yugoslav community that could not be maintained, and thus has become unimaginable, had actually existed in many parts of the country . . . In a political situation premised on the incompatibility of its components, these mixed territories were both anomalous and threatening . . . For this reasons, the mixed regions could not be permitted to survive as such, and their populations, which were mixing voluntarily, had to be separated militarily (Hayden, 1996: 788).

The disappearance of the Yugoslavs as a national minority, as a consequence of the wars of the 1990s, is only partially due to balkanism. In fact, the continuation of these multiethnic, multicultural Yugoslav identities was made impossible by the long-standing historical processes of 'Europeanisation'—denoting homogenising into nation-states prior to potentially entering larger unions. As these processes are not limited to Europe or its lesser cousin the Balkans; a better term for them is 'state ethnicisation'. Ethnicisation here is understood as "a dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to socio-cultural signifiers of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which reproduces itself biologically, culturally and economically" (Miles and Brown, 2003: 99). Ethnicisation occurs within states, across states and even globally, so it is important to stress that state ethnicisation denotes efforts to homogenise within the territory of a (new or old) state, impacting on all its instruments as well as on the overall mindset within it. State ethnicisation therefore

stands in direct opposition to efforts to envision particular states as multi-ethnic, multicultural, intercultural or diverse.

While state ethnicisation has also been a reaction to the imperialism and colonialism of previous eras and is in itself perhaps 'positive' in reinforcing local identities, it is simultaneously an anti-thesis of more global and universal notions of human identity, as, for example, proposed during the European Enlightenment period. Such anti-thesis is, by and large, detrimental for the maintenance and continuation of peace for two reasons. First, state ethnicisation goes against the voluntary mixing of people, as its primary goal is to maintain 'pure' boundaries. In that sense, state ethnicisation goes against empirical reality and human history marked by the constant movement of people. Arresting these movements is then only possibly through more or less violent measures. And second, the narrow frameworks of ethnically pure states will always make sections of its population somehow 'inferior'. This is a particular form of violence, wherein inferior peoples are constructed as having lesser quality and thus being ontologically of a lesser value. Such demarcations and rankings of people make perfect sense within nationalistic, imperialist and militaristic discourses. However, these practices are in direct opposition to building positive and more lasting peace. Consequently, if positive and lasting peace is a goal, practices of homogenising ethnicities within nation–states go directly against it. Instead, more inclusive identity markers within states—perceived not as bearers of nationhood but as bearers of citizenship; that is, in their purely administrative function—are needed.

Understanding processes in the former Yugoslavia through these (state ethnicisation) notions rather than through lenses of balkanism is important. Minor differences in interpretation count. For example, in the 1990s both Croatia and Serbia wished to retain their territories where other ethnic minorities (Serbs in the former, Kosovo Albanians in the latter case) lived, minus these ethnic minorities. Serbia also wished to broaden its administrative territory to include 'their' people living within administrative territories of Croatia and Bosnia. Unlike the previous two republics that interpreted the Yugoslav constitution's allowance for 'self-determination' of people to mean the self-determination of republics, the Serbian regime interpreted this clause to mean the self-determination of the 'constitutive people' who created Yugoslavia. This 'minor difference' in interpretation influenced the processes that resulted in several hundred thousand deaths, millions of individual displacements and migrations, economic collapse, environmental destruction, massive mental health costs, an increase in ethno-nationalism and chauvinism, and even the increase in local fascism.

Likewise, whether the former Yugoslav peoples were seen as rational, political actors or irrational 'Balkans people' influenced the type of strategies used to address past violence in the region. The consequences of this minor difference in political imagination were also many. It was crucially important when in the eternal battle between the civilised and the barbaric (some time post-cold war) that the category of Eastern Europe and communism was replaced by the notion of inferior, dangerous Balkans. True to other European traditions, that is, of militarism, the barbaric other was seen to be in a need of strategic discipline. In the new post-cold war climate, "post-communist societies have been roundly represented as 'younger' siblings of the West' and nowhere was this more pronounced than 'during the secessionist and political conflicts in the post-multicultural society of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s" (Murawska-Muthesius, 2006: 305). As "the notion of political immaturity and moral baseness had been fixed and historicized as an essential feature of the Balkans, and the legacy of both Ottoman and Byzantine absolutisms" (2006), disciplinary interventions by the civilised were apparently required.

Once again, deep cultural stories of superior and lesser people manifested behind the mask of rational and political decision-making processes. But behind this alleged rationality an unconscious fear existed: that unless the Balkan is 'disowned', the discourse of 'democratic' and 'developed' states of Europe no longer fighting each other post Second World War would have been weakened. Perhaps if a narrative similar to the one of democratic and developed states not fighting any other state could have equally been invented for the territory of both the former Yugoslavia as well as the Balkans, this too would have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such an invention does not have to gather inspiration from the realm of fantasy because it can easily gather information from the realm of empirical reality. For example, a narrative highlighting the duration of *actual peaceful cohabitation* of the multitude of ethnic players in the Balkans, as well as within the former Yugoslavia, could have been offered. Not only would this narrative have been more accurate, more in line with the historical and empirical realities of the region, it could have provided strong support for maintaining peace. Stressing the long periods of history within which Balkan people have collaborated, unified, created treaties, cooperated and above all lived peacefully together would have significantly undermined narratives of primordialism and perennialism of the 'Balkan conflict'. Sadly, within the context of a highly militarised continent these alternative narratives would have redirected attention away from bellicose and militarised politics; another reason why, to slightly paraphrase Hermann Keyserling, if "the Balkans did not exist it would have to be invented" (cf. Todorova, 1997: 133).

Alternative, peace-promoting narratives would have also dramatically disturbed the often unconscious beliefs about the superiority/inferiority of European (and world's) peoples. This would have prevented the 'civilised' from justifying their own violence while simultaneously denouncing the violence of others. And, perhaps, it would have prevented western democracies from justifying their alleged superiority of culture, civilisation, and even violence. As pointed out by Jan Oberg in response to 'human-rights' based interventions at the turn of the century:

> When democracies fight wars and make interventions they legitimate it with reference to highly civilized norms such as peace, human rights, minority protection, democracy or freedom—and they do it as a sacrifice, not out of fear. In contrast, 'the others' start wars for lower motives such as money, territory, power, drugs, personal gain, because they have less education, less civil society, less democracy and are intolerant, lack humanity or are downright evil (Oberg, 2001).

Whatever the reasons behind the de-politicised 'militaristic humanism' of the 1990s (Beck, 2006: 127), in which violence was again justified on the grounds of higher civilised goals (in this instance, of 'universal human rights'), in the case of former Yugoslavia it was ultimately the deep story of balkanism that made such humanism possible. As well, it was the internalised balkanism that influenced the detrimental behaviours of a number of Balkan and non-Balkan (former) Yugoslav peoples and their governments. Avoiding the discourse of balkanism, in all its forms and guises, in the future thus remains crucial for avoiding further violence in the region. Coupled with alternative narratives that put forward the 'radical' proposition of all people being of equal value and narratives that highlight the Balkan's peaceful histories and presents such discursive practices remain the best guarantors of the region's peaceful futures.

Nonkilling Nations and Killing Nationalisms

"Nonkilling nations are not unthinkable", argues Glenn Paige (2009: 54). As further support for this claim he provides a list of 27 countries without an army, 53 countries that recognise conscientious objection to military service (including all six former Yugoslav republics—now independent states; that is, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro) and 93 countries without a death penalty (in addition to all former Yugoslav republics/new states, the list includes other Balkan countries such as Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania—it may be worth mentioning that the newly

independent but not universally recognised Republic of Kosovo also prohibits the death penalty in its 2008 constitution). Further, throughout history a number of nation-states have come into existence via negotiation and a nonviolent transition from previous political entities—most commonly cited examples include the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1989, and the dissolution of the Norway-Sweden Union in 1905. Less commonly cited is the *peaceful* separation between two *Balkan* states in 2006 (Serbia and Montenegro)—this is perhaps due to the event being fairly recent. In any case, these examples convincingly show that violence is not *inherently* linked with either the coming into being nor subsequent maintenance of nation-states. Further, most international or inter-state interactions are "cooperative rather than competitive in nature" (Kelly, 2010: 100). Yet, at the same time, the development of nation-states has so far most often gone hand in hand with both violence and ethnic nationalism—"a doctrine that sustains and legitimizes the modern notion of nationhood" (Mikula, 2008: 134).

There are currently around 2000 'nations' in the world today, estimated Johan Galtung in 2002 (Galtung et al., 2002: 126). Within these nations people share values, norms, culture, language, religion and territory. Within the current global system these nations are organised into 200 states, of which only about 10 per cent, or 20, of them are nation-states, 'inhabited by (almost only) one nation'. The other 180 are multinational countries but only one (Switzerland) of those 180 states has managed a symmetric cohabitation of nations residing within it. In all other 179 states there is one dominant nation, 'more equal than the others' (2002). In other words, even though "90 percent of states in the early twenty-first century are 'constructed' and multinational, such as the United States or Brazil, and often multicultural as well . . . most [also] have a dominant nationality group" (Kelly, 2010: 100). Rather than being purely administrative units, these nation-states and multinational countries usually engage in discursive practices by which some groups of people (that is, dominant national group) are served better than others (national minorities). In practice this manifests as discrimination against minority groups as far as the satisfaction of their basic needs is concerned. Sometimes that means that even their basic need for survival is jeopardised. Most often, however, discrimination against minorities impacts on the needs crucial for their good quality of life; that is, their overall wellbeing, identity and freedom needs may be endangered.

Nationalism generally goes hand in hand with the hierarchical 'ranking of people'. This ranking takes the form of ethnocentrism, "the belief that one's own ethnic group is in some way superior to other groups" (Mikula, 2008: 64).

In other words, and to paraphrase George Barnard Shaw, ethnocentrism (as well as nationalism and patriotism) signifies a belief that this group (nation, country) is superior to all others because one was born into it! Ethnocentrism therefore not only goes "against the grain of the liberal worldview based on Enlightenment ideals, which attempts to downplay differences by appealing to a universal humanity", it is also dangerous because its concrete expressions often involve "proselytizing, discrimination, hostility and violence" (2008).

But perhaps distinctions could be made between: 'ethnic' (common descent) and 'civic' (agreed principles and values) nationalisms nationalism and patriotism (a milder form simply denoting 'love of one's own country') 'benevolent' and 'extreme' nationalisms?

Nationalisms could be "democratic, forward-looking, and generous"—Kamenka (1993: 85) summarises the positive sides of nationalism, as well as the negatives, "authoritarian, backward-looking, and chauvinist". Nationalism could also be "secular or religious" and "socialist or conservative" (1993). There are positive sides of 'benevolent nationalism' and ethnic solidarity, conclude Barash and Webel (2002: 183) in their "final note on nationalism and ethnocentrism". The positive sides of nationalism may include transcending the parochialism of other divisions, such as religion, class, gender, and so on. By appealing to a sense of national identity, unity and community, and by including all within borders of this unity/community people could also be motivated to be less selfish and work for the common good. Nationalism can then 'sometimes'

> evoke compassion, love, and community pride and can even serve as a positive force for human cooperation and ecological awareness. Love of the land, the people, the culture, and the ecosystem can contribute to dignity, caring, altruism, and some of the finer emotions of which human beings are capable (2002: 183).

However, Barash and Webel also contend that while nationalism can "in theory, be limited to one's nation in practice, however, it is often combined with antagonism toward other nations" (2002: 160). Especially when nationalism is activated to support war efforts, attempts to calm bellicose attitudes, engage in rational debates and mobilise for peace commonly become extremely difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, "one of the great challenges to students and practitioners of peace and conflict resolution is accordingly to channel the benevolent aspects of nationalism and ethnic solidarity while guarding against their horrors" (2002: 183).

Whether this is where energies are best directed is far from certain. A number of theorists ask the question related to the *practice* of nationhood and the nation "as a practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame" (Brubaker, 1996: 16) rather than questions about its ontological 'is-ness'. "We should not ask 'what is a nation'," writes Brubaker but "how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalized within and among states?" (1996). This type of question moves away from understanding nations through the lenses of primordialism (nations as primeval and natural aspects of the human condition), perennialism (nations eternal existence throughout the history), and even ethno-symbolism (focuses on the expression of symbols, myths, traditions and values within pre-modern ethnic communities) (Mikula, 2008: 135) and towards a socio-constructionist perspective. Homi Bhaba, for example, argues that "nations are imaginary constructs that depend for their existence on an apparatus of cultural fictions" (1994: 49). Nation is therefore "constituted through narration, which entails the conversion of a particular territorial space into a place of historical experience" (Mikula, 2008: 135-36). The best-known proponent of the socio-constructionist perspective, Benedict Anderson, famously proposed "the following definition of the nation":

> it is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. . . . [As Gellner writes] "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it *invents* nations where they do not exist" (Anderson, 1991: 5-7).

Further, the nation is always imagined as *limited* because:

> even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet (1991).

It is also imagined as *sovereign* because:

> the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution [of the 18th and 19th centuries] were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion

> were inescapably confronted with the living *pluralism* of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state (1991).

And, finally, nation is imagined as a *community*, because:

> regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings (1991).

Anderson's brilliant analysis suggests that violence is not an unexpected or accidental result that comes from the way nations are commonly imagined and conceptualised. Bhabha reminds us that "national culture is not unitary, but rather, ambivalent and disruptive" (Mikula, 2008: 135). In practice, this ambivalence and disruption is most often seen—by nationalists—as a threat to the common, national identity. Within the nationalistic discourse, differences (ideological, political) within their ethnic states are rarely perceived as something positive or even neutral. The likelihood for them to use accusatory labels such as traitors, fifth columnists, and foreign conspirators—against other nation-state citizens 'not sufficiently loyal' that they perceive as such—is therefore always on the horizon. Especially during times of violence and conflict (with others), dissent within nation-state is discouraged, often ferociously and violently. As the governments of both nation and multinational states attach and indeed are expected to "attach priority to the interests of [their] own state, even if its policies are damaging to other nation-states" (Kelly, 2010: 101) this prepares fertile ground for interstate conflict. As these governments, even democratically elected ones, attach and are expected to attach higher value to the interest of the dominant social group (most often dominant by ethnicity, but also by gender, race, class, and so on), minority viewpoints and groups are more commonly excluded or pseudo included (that is, tokenism, marginalisation via invisibility, etc.). In practice nations are conceptualised even more by whom they exclude than whom they include, which means that the very category assumes exclusionary practices.

This imbalance/exclusion most often goes hand in hand with the existence of structural, cultural and epistemic violence that is, in turn, common preconditions for the explicit, unmediated use of direct violence. "Born in iniquity and conceived in sin, the spirit of nationalism has never ceased to bend human institutions to the service of dissension and distress", Thorstein

Veblen (2009: 38) wrote powerfully nearly hundred years ago. The material effects of nationalism are, he continued, both 'sinister and imbecile' wherein the 'national mob-mind' mentality of vanity, fear, contempt, and servility' continues to design the 'loyal citizen' (2009). Nationalism, which is above all, "a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state" (Kohn quoted in Farnen, 2004: 45) has thus been linked "conceptually and empirically to militarism . . . ethnocentrism, dogmatism, stereotyping, and lack of cosmopolitan views" (2004: 57). There is no shortage of theorists who expressed negative views towards nationalism. Nationalism is a "great menace" and an "epidemic of evil" wrote Tagore (1916: 9). For George Orwell nationalism has been "inseparable from the desire for power", or, in other words it is about "power-hunger tempered by self-deception" (Orwell and Angus, 1968: 362-63). For Eric Fromm nationalism "is our form of incest, is our idolatry, is our insanity" with 'patriotism' as its cult (1955: 58). Even in milder forms, patriotism sets up a moral hierarchy and threatens the peaceful alternatives of egalitarianism, universalism and cosmopolitanism. Any person aiming to lead a moral life must thus abandon it, was Tolstoy's conclusion (Nathanson, 1993: 8). Albert Einstein called nationalism "an infantile disease" or "the measles of mankind" (1993: 187). William Ralph Inge defined a nation as a "society united by a delusion about its ancestry and a common fear of its neighbours" (1949). Yet another link between nationalism and violence has been proposed by Norman Angell:

> The root of the problem is very simply stated: if there were no sovereign independent states, if the states of the civilized world were organized in some sort of federalism, as the states of the American Union, for instance, are organized, there would be no international war as we know it . . . The main obstacle is nationalism (quoted in Chitkara ,1998: 79).

Despite this intense critique nationalism remains the "omnipresent thought in politics, in the minds of ordinary people, politicians and observers in politics, and in international relations" (Harris, 2009: vi). The current practices of nationalism and ethnocentrism also remain a major reason for violent inter-state and inter-ethnic conflict. Imagined ethnic communities too often break up "actually existing communities" (Hayden, 1996: 793) and create 'real victims'. The mechanism of *how* this is done is brilliantly summarised by Goering's often-quoted explanation at the Nuremberg trials. Whether nation-state such as Russia, England or Germany, whether:

> a democracy, or fascist dictatorship, or a parliament or a communist dictatorship, the people could always be brought to the bidding of the leaders [and into the war] . . . All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country (cf. Pilgrim, 1992: 114-15).

This statement was widely circulated via digital social media at the beginning of 'the war on terror', however, the majority of United States and other western nation-state citizens bought into the bellicose post-September 11 propaganda, at least in the initial stages (see Gallup, 2003: 69; Gareau, 2004: 205; Kashmeri, 2007: 35; Kinder and Kam, 2009: 77).

The role of manipulative elites, who "act to construct extreme and polarizing identities that are used to consolidate their power and, in the course, to justify the dehumanization and destruction of specific target groups" (Jenkins, 2010: 96) notwithstanding, the process described by Goering is usually enthusiastically embraced, even actively constructed, by the majority (within a dominant national-ethnic group). As this construction is about a particular practice—not essence—it is possible to identify common routes along which the process takes place. In other words, engendering violence via collective participation in practices of denial, marginalisation and justification—within the narratives of nationalism and ethnocentrism—most often follows eight basic steps. This *collective violence pedagogy* seems to be a commonly and easily applied recipe by which nationalisms bring about violence. My own observations in a number of nation-states within which I have resided are that these eight basic steps could be described and summarised as follows:

1. Creation-solidification of the category of 'the other' (even if that other was until recently part of 'us').
2. Differences (that is, along ethnic, religious or ideological lines) between 'one' and the 'other' are potentiated and similarities are minimised or obliterated.
3. The attribute of 'the lesser' is attached to the other, who has also been construed commonly as 'weird', 'wrong', 'evil' and even 'subhuman'; that is, everything not liked about the self is projected onto the other.
4. A sense of threat of 'them' coming after us is created; the other is constructed as nothing but 'dangerous'—the derogatory images of potential (or long-standing) 'enemy/enemies' are also almost exclusively used.

5. Social militarism dominates; heroic fighting and sacrifice for ones' own people/land, is *glorified*—historical discourses are devised with the emphasis placed on data that shows why liberation is necessary and why only the use of weapons will 'work'.
6. Active prosecution of opinions/ideologies that are trying to *resist* the above processes (one to four) among 'our own' (ethnic, religious, ideological) group—some useful phrases (depending on the society) include 'traitors', 'enemy collaborators', 'servants of foreign intelligence agencies', 'pacifists empower terrorism', 'pacifism is objectively pro-Fascist', 'the venal pacifism of the politically correct has been shown for the profitable cowardice it has always been', 'bleeding hearts/flower-picking peace mongers', and the like.
7. When confronted with our own violent deeds, these are *denied* or *justified*; for example, the harsh facts are met with insistence on us (always) being right and them (always and totally) being wrong—there are many justifications for the violence that can be used and the most potent and powerful ones have so far included 'others are also doing it' and 'it's a war'; numerous other useful phrases are 'they (she/he) deserved it', 'God/morality/justice is on our side', 'in the name of the freedom, democracy', 'sometimes you have to sacrifice the lives of few for the benefit of many', 'they are even worse', 'they are the ones that are evil/demons/devil's advocates/satans', 'they would do (did) the same to us' and (my favourite) 'boys will be boys'.
8. The whole process is repeated.

The steps have also been used independently, although the whole process is the most potent (and poisonous) when utilised as a package. It is also helpful, and very important, *not* to focus on the future, as this is where more creative nonviolent solutions could be invented. Better to focus on the past, and engage in selective remembering and biased interpreting of all the instances of previous violence between the groups involved.

While more 'universal', this process has been followed to the letter on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and has been liberally used within a number of western nations that have been waging war 'against terror' (outside and within their own territories, as per Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* proposal). Going back to the former case study, the package was extensively utilised, both within the former Yugoslav more multicultural nation-state, as well as within the ethnic nation-state that preceded and succeeded this political-

cultural entity. Further, another specific internal nationalistic logic was developed during the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in order to justify territorial claims. This too is perhaps a more universal process, that like the above-described collective violence pedagogy needs to be resisted if more lasting peace between different people is to result. David C. Pugh expressed this process eloquently in terms of the 'seven rules of nationalism':

> If an area was ours for 500 years and yours for 50 years, it should belong to us—you are merely occupiers.
> If an area was yours for 500 years and ours for 50 years, it should belong to us—borders must not be changed.
> If an area belonged to us 500 years ago but never since then, it should belong to us—it is the Cradle of our Nation.
> If a majority of our people live there, it must belong to us—they must enjoy the right of self-determination.
> If a minority of our people live there, it must belong to us—they must be protected against your oppression.
> All the above rules apply to us but not to you.
> Our dream of greatness is Historical Necessity, yours is Fascism (quoted in Biro, 2011: 294-95).

The two 'recipes' or processes have been prescriptions for the wholescale disasters that have repeatedly plagued Yugoslav peoples, the Balkans, Europe and the world. The imagined nation-state communities have too often unleashed unimaginable and unspeakable horrors that were avoidable, unnecessary and most often counter-productive. Collective group delusions, fears, narcissistic injury and rage, exclusionary practices, ethnocentrism, competitive sentiments and arrangements, discourses of superiority/inferiority, and so on, while perhaps not inherently linked to nation-states are still most often *practiced* within them. Nationalisms, of all kinds, have been notorious for fuelling inter-state and intra-state grievances and conflicts, including 'mildly' or 'extremely' violent ones. The imposition of nationalistic worldviews and aspects of culture is so often used to justify direct and structural violence that it is hard to support the view by which nationalism could be viewed as potentially 'benevolent'. Further, the practice of nationalism actively works against and prevents practicing of the other, more promising alternative.

One day, perhaps, the alternative of "the highest form of patriotism" being defined not by the "boundaries of one's country", but by a duty to humankind (Strauss, 1918: 390) will become the dominant social discourse globally. One day, states may become purely administrative units, without being attached to harmful imaginings of nationalism and ethno-centrism. One day, the recogni-

tion of a nation-state as a purely imagined, socially constructed rather than 'real', perennial and 'ahistorical' community, may motivate citizens of civic nation-states to carefully craft those imaginings to promote peace rather than violence. Whether this will materialise largely depends on the strength with which the *real global community* perceives nationalism as neither inevitable nor desirable. It also depends on the strength with which this real global community puts into operation a whole range of alternative discourses that imagine various unification processes, focus on similarities among differences, and devise strategies for satisfying the basic human needs of all Earth's inhabitants.

All of us have indeed inherited certain histories. Most of those, as well as our presents, are the results of human-made political and cultural processes. Given that they are human-made they could be human-remade now and in the future, irrespective of how long these historical practices have lasted. Even those longest-lasting structures-processes are neither eternal nor natural but only as strong as the belief in their eternal-natural quality. In other words, the previous practices of militarism, othering, ethnocentrism, imperialism, and nationalism, frequently utilised within inter-group and intra-group interactions, eventually became embedded in the social structures of nation-states. These structures appear more solid than the practices-behaviours that created them in the first place, but in effect, these structures still rely on the same practices to survive. They are maintained by constant efforts to keep them as they 'are' or by efforts to enforce their 'essence'. So to undo these violent social structures—of militarism, imperialism and nationalism—different discursive practices, such as, for example, of globalism, interculturalism, humanism, neohumanism or social inclusion, are needed. In other words, militarism, imperialism and nationalism are only as real as the frequency and intensity of actions and discourses manifested by their enthusiastic promoters, and rely on the inaction of detached bystanders. Alternatively, the power of militarism, imperialism and nationalism is weakened by the number and the enthusiasm of those who ignore it, choose not to participate in it, critique it, and engage in different ways of being and thinking.

Despite its promoters' desire to convince about the inevitability of 'the holy trinity of militarism, imperialism and nationalism', alternatives to these systems and worldviews already exist and have always existed parallel to them. Just in the context of Serbia, for example, one can find multitude of peaceful initiatives and movements in the past: from early antiwar political program by the Social democratic party in 1903 (Stojković, 2011), through globally inspired peace youth movement of the late 1960s and civil society's peace oriented initiatives in the 1990s. Examples include *Žene u crnom*

[Women in Black], *Centar za antiratnu akciju* [Center for Antiwar Action], and *Beogradski krug* [Belgrade Circle]. Numerous organisations in Serbia currently participate in peacebuilding activities, such as: *Centar za nenasilnu akciju* [Centre for Nonviolent Action], *Autonomni ženski centar* [Autonomous Women Center], *Centar za ratnu trauma* [War Trauma Center], *Fond za humanitarno pravo* [Humanitarian Law Center], *Viktimološko društvo Srbije* [Victimology Society of Serbia], *Festival o ljudskim pravima VIVISECT fest* [VIVISECTfest, travelling festivals] and *DAH Teatar* [DAH Theatre]. In the context of the former Yugoslavia examples include 1959 founding of Yugoslav League for Peace, Freedom and Equality of People (*Jugoslovenska liga za mir, slobodu i ravnopravnost naroda*) and the first alternative peace action which took place in Ljubljana in 1983 (Paunović, 1995). Currently, a number of previously mentioned organisations working in Serbia operate within the region as well (for example, Center for Nonviolent Action is based in Sarajevo *and* Belgrade). Further, many regional projects and initiatives that focus on peacebuilding exist (for example, peace education program *Povjerenje za Mir* [Trust for Peace] and *postjugoslavenska mirovna akademija* [Post Yugoslav Peace Academy]. In fact, there is a plethora of peace-oriented activities in the region, some of which work towards peace, nonviolence and nonkilling explicitly and others more implicitly (i.e. a number of human rights initiatives, women's and feminists' organisations, ecumenical organisation, etc.). Schools in the region too have incorporated various micro and meso-level initiatives with the goal of combating violence, for example, initiatives that focus on intercultural communication, inclusion, anti-bullying and nonviolence in general.

Enhancing those alternative peace-promoting discourses, instead of enhancing nationalism, is not only realistically possible but also infinitely preferable. All that prevents us from doing so, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson, are our own limited imaginings.

Conclusion

Despite the strength of described and analysed narratives of balkanism and nationalism it is important to recognise that these narratives are created and then re-created in daily, weekly and yearly rituals, both by individuals and societies. In other words, both narratives only exists once they are put in practice, once they are evoked and used to inform actions in the present. So to create and maintain nonkilling and nonviolence principles in the region of South East Europe it is crucial to challenge these outdated and

detrimental narratives. In addition to challenging such old yet still dominant narratives, a robust and inspiring imagination of new political models for the future is also required. This too is already taking place in the region. In that context, it is important to remember that the region of "Balkans" has also been a region where peace was the norm for large parts of its history and where people lived and cooperated mostly peacefully, despite skirmishes and disruptions due to wars. The duration of the actual peaceful cohabitation of the multitude of ethnic groups in the South East Europe, within the former Yugoslavia and beyond, has been much longer than the duration of violent conflicts. In other words, throughout long periods of history people of the region also collaborated, unified, assimilated, created treaties cooperated and above all lived peacefully together with all their differences. And they continue to do so. Remembering nonviolent pasts and imagining peaceful futures has to be done in the present—this minute, and the very next. One place where one can begin this process is to focus mind on everything that people of the region have in common, which includes not only a similar genetic mark-up but also the common peaceful pasts/presents and the shared imagination of peaceful futures.

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Humans as Conflict Managers

Anthropological Overview of a Bosnian Muslim Community in Närpes, Finland

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Sponsel (1994) points out that within anthropology and related fields much more attention has been paid to conflict, violence, and war than to conflict resolution, nonviolence, and peacemaking. Barash and Webel (2009) highlight that only very recently have peace and peace studies started to receive serious academic attention. Sahlins (2008) adds on that the Western Civilization from the time of the ancient Greeks onward reflects a view of humanity as inherently aggressive. Anthropologists such as Ferguson (2013), Fry (2006, 2007), Sahlins (2008), Sponsel (2010), and Sussman (2013) have pointed out how such views have permeated scholarly writings (Pinker, 2011; Konner, 2006; Washburn and Lancaster, 1968; Wilson, 1975; Wilson, 2013; Wrangham and Peterson 1996). As Horgan (2012) clarifies, people with pessimistic views about the prospects of humanity prevailing over war and militarism have accepted that war and violence are inevitable, ancient, and therefore that peace is unobtainable).

To challenge such views about aggressive human nature, in 2012-13 a study on Bosnian Muslims in Närpes, Finland was conducted. The goal of the research was to focus on this relatively neglected side of the aggression-peacefulness coin in order to potentially elucidate attitudes about nonviolence and peace in human behavior. This study addressed humans as conflict managers and examined the Bosnian culture and traditions within the Islamic community in the Närpes context. For this purpose, triangulation of research methods—ethnographic participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and conflict style survey—was employed to gather the relevant data.

Theories and Views on Peace, Conflict, and Human Nature

Peace is an essential concern of the contemporary world and will affect our future conditions and even survival. Human nature has been perceived to be violent and aggressive. However, recent studies of nonhuman pri-

mates, archeological sites, and cross-cultural anthropology represent the dominance of nonviolence over violence (Sponsel and Gregor, 1994). The nature of humanity does not have a predisposition to make war, violent behavior is not rigidly genetically programmed, during human evolution aggressive behavior did not dominate peaceful behavior, humans do not have a violent brain, and a war is not driven by instinct (Adams et al.,1986). Humanity does have a great capability for care, cooperation, democratic decision-making, and nonviolence, and exhibits a potentiality to manage social life peacefully. Many societies possess a culture of peace (Kurtz, 2008).

Consequentially, humans have the potential to live peacefully; they typically choose nonviolence over violence in daily interactions (Baszarkiewicz and Fry, 2008; Kurtz, 2008; Sponsel and Gregor, 1994). A conceptualization of a cross-cultural peacefulness-aggressiveness continuum implies not only that there is variability of the amount of physical aggression evident across cultures but also that some societies can be very peaceful (Fry, 2006; Ross, 1993a, 1993b). The existence of peaceful societies is evident among geographically diverse regions (Bonta, 2013; Dentan, 1968, 1978, 2004; Endicott, 2013; Endicott and Endicott, 2008; *Peaceful Societies*, 2013). Sponsel and Gregor (1994) note that these societies highlight interpersonal harmony and deal with nearly all differences and conflicts nonviolently (Fry, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007; Gardner, 2010, 2013; Howell and Willis, 1989, Kemp and Fry, 2004; Montagu, 1978; Robarchek, 1981, 1997).

Thus, it is emphasized that peaceful societies likely possess values, attitudes, socialization methods (Butovskaya, 2013) and conflict management practices (Howard, 2004; Schlegel, 2004; Tonkinson, 2013) that highlight nonviolence in dealing with conflicts and differences. Fry (2006) has noted, based on comparative studies, that great variability in physical aggression can be seen from one society to another, over time and in different contexts. Realistically, one society cannot be either absolutely aggressive or peaceful. Each culture occupies a position on a continuum ranging from physical aggression at one end and peacefulness at the other end. Most cultures fall somewhere in between these extreme points (Fry, 2006; Ross, 1993a, 1993b). According to the ranking of internal conflict for 90 societies worldwide, cultures are positioned rather evenly across the spectrum. It is important to note that even the cultures with high violence levels are not violent all the time, and there are more societies at the peaceful end of the spectrum than at the aggressive end (Ross, 1993a, 1993b).

We, humans, encounter conflict situations on a daily basis; it is a part of day-to-day communication (Furlong, 2005). Conflict situations occur among

parties that are linked and interdependent, which can work as a force contributing to constructive resolution. Thus, interpersonal relations are filled with emotions that impact the way people react to conflicts and the way they approach it (Katz and Lawyer, 1992). To keep in mind, people are able to handle conflict nonviolently through a variety of different approaches (Avruch et al., 1991; Black, 1993; Fry, 2000, 2006; Fry and Björkqvist, 1997; Nader and Todd, 1978). For example, one model isolates five different approaches to conflict: accommodating, collaborating, compromising, avoiding, or controlling modes (Rubin et al., 1994; Katz and Lawyer, 1992). Researchers such as Koch (1974), Nader and Todd (1978), Black (1993), Fry (2000, 2006), and Strijbosch, (1992) discuss variations of a conflict management typology that includes avoidance, toleration, negotiation, self-redress, and trilateral settlement approaches such as friendly peacemaking, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, and repressive peacemaking. The point is that different conflict management approaches are utilized to various degrees in different cultural settings (Ury, 1999).

The first section of this paper provides information about Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina prior to war and about they living in Närpes, Finland. The next sections indicate the patterns of harmonic livelihood in the Bosnian community. It does not show that Närpes Bosnians are an exceptionally passive and extremely peaceful society, but collected information signifies that people seek to manage their daily lives in a peaceful and harmonious manner with as few disturbances as possible since interdependence and social relationship play an important role.

An Overview of Multinational Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Muslims in a Multinational Community

Tone Bringa (1995) writes that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a long historical blend of diverse civilizations and cultures that left their enriching imprint on the region. In Bosnia, cultural-religious affiliation for Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Sunni Muslims was established over the centuries when the ancestors of today's people linked themselves to one of the dominant religious communities. During the 15th and 16th centuries, the majority of Bosnians accepted Islam as a result of the Ottoman invasion. Hence, today's Bosnian Muslims embody something new and distinguishing, as elements from both cultures created a historically unique society with Islamic and non-Islamic elements (Lockwood, 1979).

Prior to 1992, the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina were settled

throughout the country among the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats. Ethnic diversity varied in accordance to municipalities. In some areas Bosnian Muslims lived among the Serb or Croat majorities, and whereas in other areas they represented half or more-than-half of the community (Bringa, 1995). All three main cultural groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina were accustomed to the diversity even though they shaped their identities in terms of religious affiliation—"*nacija*". The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisting of six republics defined identity in terms of nationalities, nations, and people, whereas the citizens grouped themselves in religious groups—"*nacijas*" (Bax, 1995; Bringa, 1995; Lockwood, 1975). This concept described not only religious identity but also involved social, cultural, and ethnic characteristics. The main differentiation among Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Sunni Muslims was based on customs and traditions that were critical in social life; even though everything else was changing, customs remained the same and represented continuity (Bringa, 1995).

To illustrate the concept of ethno-religious identity, two examples from the field observations in 2012 are exhibited. With an interviewee in her forties we talked about expression of culture and customs through religion. She explained that the religious culture and customs within the former Yugoslavia were very important since religion had to be practiced in secret. Religion was always there but it did not rule people's lives. Sacred symbols were not supposed to affect the daily lives and duties of the citizens. The interviewee said that it is different nowadays. First, people have greater faith in Allah because they were shattered due to their beliefs. Second, people, who grew up in post war Bosnia, have much stronger religious identity than those who fled the country. This is a struggle situation because they do not understand each other. They all experienced the same war but behave differently (field observations, October 14, 2012). Alihbašić (2011), focusing on Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also stated that Bosnian Muslims have to gain knowledge of how to subsist with their own in-group differences before learning how to live with others from very different ethno-religious backgrounds.

Another female interviewee also described the importance of ethno-religious identity: "who you really are—your identity—plays an important role in Bosnian refugee lives". This woman, a mother of two children, illustrated identity as a pizza. She said that pizza slices consist of your language, religion and culture, education, friends, society, and behavior patterns that show the way your parents raised you. When this person came to Finland, she did not have anything physical, which could prove who she truly was. There was nothing she could relate to: "I could not understand the music, I

could not listen to the radio, and I could not connect with any experiences". This is why her "pizza" split into two parts—ethno-religion and language. This was all she had and if she had not been aware of it, she could have lost it. Usually people turn to the religion to save their identity. However, there are great differences in its practices; there are people who are very outwardly religious, there are those who do not believe at all, and there are those who follow their faith in their own way. Differences in awareness levels in Bosnian Muslim identity are the biggest problem in the community nowadays. Finnish society sees all Muslims as homogenous group, but they are not (field observations, October 1, 2012).

Tone Bringa (1995) affirms that there have always been differences in the levels of believing among the Muslim community. Thus, there have always been differentiation among religious groups, namely among Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. However, due to the last war (1992-1995), mutually accepted differences among communities were no longer the basis of interaction; instead they became an obstacle to the consistency and formation of a collective identity. Cultural supremacy was redefined by transforming Muslims within the village from social insiders to people who did not belong to the settlement anymore. They were culturally squeezed out of the community and excluded from the dominant culture. Based on this institutionalized discrimination, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and mass rape took place in Northern and Easter Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims were forced to leave their homes and establish new residences in central Bosnia around major cities such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica or throughout Europe, the United States, Australia, or the Middle East (Bringa, 1995).

Bosnian Muslims within Närpes Social Climate

Närpes is a small bilingual coastal town in Western Finland. Its first available records date from 1331. In 2013 this town had a population of 9 335; 7915 were Swedish-speaking Finns, 530 were Finnish-speaking Finns, and 890 persons spoke a language other than Swedish or Finnish (Nissen 2014a, b). Statistically an amount of inhabitants is increasing every year and in 2014 the number grew up to 9,398 (Närpes stad, 2014).

In 1988 Närpes received the first refugees in the country (Närpes Stad, 2012). There were 69 persons who entered the town from Vietnam (Harald, 2012). For a rather long period of time the city has pursued population policies. It is a continuous process to create new jobs and actively help the emigrants to feel at home. Nowadays approximately 35 different nationali-

ties reside in Närpes (Harald, 2012). In November 2014, Närpes received twenty Sudanese refugees that entered Finland from Egypt (Närpes info, 2014). Based on the collected statistics from the year 2010 to 2013, out of the 304 municipalities, Närpes was ranked the 11th safest place to live in Finland (*Syd-Österbotten*, 2014).

In 1992, twenty eight Bosnians came to Närpes as war refugees (*Syd-Österbotten*, 2012). Of the foreign population approximately six hundred are Bosnians. However, it is complicated to count exact number of the Bosnian inhabitants (as well as other cultural groups) in the municipality due to the different residency statuses. Only those persons who have A-status are officially registered (Lillian Ivars, personal communication, October 12, 2012).

In 1995, the Bosnian Association (*Bosnisk förening*), that gathers together Bosnians from Närpes and from other municipalities, was founded. This association organizes social gatherings and festivities and makes sure that during the feasts everybody is together. They also manage Friday evening get-togethers and Bosnian orchestra rehearsals for male members. During these evenings, older and younger men and boys play, talk, and socialize, which is very important in Bosnian culture. It is essential to meet, be together, and visit each other (Harald, 2012).

In March 2012, the Bosnian Islamic Association (*Bosnisk Islamisk förening*) that currently consists of approximately 70 members was established. In recent years, the Islamic community grew in Närpes. During an interview, a middle age woman explained that for many Bosnian believers it is important to have an organization, which can help them to practice their faith and provide an opportunity to fulfill their religious duties. The main responsibilities of the Bosnian Islamic Association are to educate children and adults about Islam, provide a common place to gather, organize religious celebrations, arrange the Imam's travel to Finland, and help to preserve their own identity. This woman pointed out the importance of belonging and clarified that "religion gives the grounds for identity to flourish". She hopes that this organization will help her to find a home; she feels that she does not belong in Närpes and that she does not belong in Bosnia. She is somewhere in the middle. It is very hard, especially for the young people, to know who they really are and "how to think and behave right in Närpes context" (field observations, October 14, 2012).

Närpesians generally perceive Bosnians as people who integrate and behave well within the community. On October 9, 2012, in a conversation with the senior constable who works as a police officer in the Närpes area, the officer highlighted that the first wave of the Bosnian refugees integrated into the society much better than the ones who came recently for the work opportu-

nities. One factor for this remark is the language; it is much harder to learn the language for the newcomers since they do not have very close contact with the local community. This decreases the chances of learning Swedish and slows down the whole process of integration. Therefore, it becomes harder to understand the rules, regulations, and customs of Finnish and Närpes society. This leads to newcomers breaking the law more often than the ones who have lived in the town for a longer time. Refugee Bosnians try to instruct the fresh arrivals on how to behave, but "they do not listen that much", "they want to try new things", and "they believe that the authority does not see what is happening" (P. Knös, personal communication, October 9, 2012).

For the most part, officer Knös explained that local police authorities do not have big problems with the Bosnian community. Bosnians get along within the society and follow the law much better than, for example, Asians or Baltic and Eastern European peoples. Bosnians, at least the ones who came with the first wave, want to get acquainted with local people and are friendly and open towards others. There are no special offences that occur only among the Bosnian people. Occasionally, members of all subgroups within the community violate the law. If we compare the local Swedish-speaking Finns and the Bosnians, the latter would report offences to the authority much less than the locals would do (P. Knös, personal communication, October 9, 2012).

The police officer mentioned that honesty is an issue that brings out the differences between the two cultures rather clearly. For example, if the traffic police catch a drunk driver, a Finn usually tells the truth about the quantity of alcohol he had consumed. In contrast, a Bosnian (and the town foreigners in general) would likely minimize the quantity, might lie about the circumstances, could try to bribe an authority, etc. In this senior constable's opinion, it is not so easy for the strangers to be honest and follow the general principles of the Finnish law.

Besides the difficulties in valuing honesty and equality in the same sense as Finns do, privacy is another factor of importance. A pattern emerges that the more violent breaches occur during the wintertime when more people gather inside the restaurants. An officer pointed out that everybody is so close to each other and this close friction does not satisfy the natural being of Finns. Usually there are newcomers that get involved in violent behavior with the locals due to the lack of language skills. Rather typical reasons for disagreement are over women; locals believe that "Bosnian men want to take their women". Also gossiping is relatively common among the Bosnian men and women. Sometimes this creates problems if it seriously breaches the privacy shield of the Finns (P. Knös, personal communication, October 9, 2012).

Behavior and Personality of Bosnian Muslims in Närpes

Many Bosnians in Bosnia and Herzegovina have lived among the other ethno-religious communities such as Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodoxies. They had household-to-household or/and individual-to-individual relationships based on the common respect and social exchange. Close friends communicated with each other through frequent coffee visits, and more distant friends or neighbors saw one another on different occasions related to the life cycle. The majority acknowledged the biggest celebrations as Christmas, Easter, *Ramadan Bajram*, or *Kurban Bajram*. Even though people from different religious groups did not celebrate others' festivities, they paid a visit to pass along holiday greetings. Therefore, such happenings as weddings, births of children, or funerals were important and recognized by the neighbors, friends, and family members.

The pattern of friendship and acceptance of differences can be noticed in the lives of Närpes Bosnian Muslims as well. An interviewed woman in her early twenties, who arrived in Finland from the city of Banja Luka, explained an approach of integration to culturally diverse society. She said that it is easier to live among multi-cultural communities for those Bosnians who come from more culturally mixed villages and towns. If they have shared close contacts with other religions back in Bosnia, it is easier for them to pass traditions and behavior patterns in Finland too. Most of the Bosnians, at least those who arrived as refugees in the beginning of 1990s, are used to visiting closest friends on holidays such as Christmas or Easter, and of course they casually get together for a child's birth, birthdays, graduation ceremonies, and other occasions. People invite each other for coffee and sweets on a daily basis. These visits are reciprocal: "I would think that there is something very wrong if my closest neighbor, family member, or a friend would not visit". No special invitations are needed for any type of visit; through visiting, a person expresses respect and shows the gratitude. Moreover, it is crucial to visit those who are ill and need help.

Visiting and socializing with other people in Närpes played an important role in integration. It made it easier for the Bosnians to learn the local language, which led to the possibilities to receive higher education and better employment opportunities. Most of the Bosnian families built the houses and became fully integrated Närpesians ("*Närpesbor*" org. Swedish).

Family Relations, Values, and Attitudes

Family plays an important role in the Bosnian context, and all family members are very much interrelated through friendship and unquestionable help to each other. Family represents a very wide kinship network: everybody is somehow related to each other, at least the ones coming from the same or neighboring villages. They show respect to one another through participation in reunions, through the balance in giving and getting, through regular contact, and through frequent visits, especially during the annual celebrations such as Bajram or birthdays. The elders of the family, typically the parents of a husband, work as the binders of the whole extended family. Also they are the ones influencing major decisions within the family unit. Their suggestions and advice are respected without questioning. All interviewed persons highlighted that they have the "best parents in the world" whose marriage is based on the respect. Firm and hugely respected family relationship is essential. In comparison to Finnish youth, Bosnian children try to live with their parents as long as possible, especially daughters. Generally, it is appreciated to live close to the parents and/or in the neighborhood close to other extended family members.

An enormous amount of admiration should be given to parents and elders: "parents give life" and "have to behave respectively towards them no matter what", said a 26-year-old man. Elders of the community, even nonrelatives, have to be visited and helped whenever it is possible; "It is not about giving service, it is about giving care", said a woman from Kozarac. She added that people should act as good citizens of the community. All have to be productive and work hard; laziness is not appreciated—mentioned several interviewees. Therefore, people should be socially responsible. The same woman from Kozarac also clarified that she works for everybody: "If I have it good, so others have it good also". This way there is a great opportunity to support and help others who are in need. Another 29-year-old man believes that work gives a chance to socialize, expand the circle of people one knows, and maintain relationships with acquaintances at work. It is valued if a person is positive, gentle, kind, and reasonable. It is expected that an individual is polite and respectful towards others all the time. One has to be extra good during the Ramadam month since it is a time to reconcile and cherish harmonious and altruistic behavior within the family and acquaintances.

In the Bosnian Muslim context, tolerance and respect for all is much valued. It is interesting to observe where, when, and to whom it is directed. For example, a 26-year-old man from Tuzla has lived in Germany for seven years, after he has spent quite a few years in Bosnia, and then came to Finland six

years ago. Nowadays he lives together with a local Finnish girl, and Muslim society sees him as a strong believer. During the discussion in September 2012, he talked much about the importance of respect. On the 10th of November 2012, the Bosnian community celebrated 20 years anniversary in Finland. This celebration involved a lot of cultural and traditional activities. All, Bosnians, locals, and some other nationalities, were participating in the event. In the middle of the celebration an Iranian lady, who visited this event with her husband and a child, performed a national Iranian dance. People were clapping and cheering. Meanwhile, an interviewee and his peers were whistling and shouting out loud mild obscenities. A 43-year-old Bosnian lady explained that young Bosnian boys do not respect the local Finnish girls because they are too independent and too liberal. They mistreat them and have strong negative attitudes; only a few Bosnians have relationships with persons from other religious background. Another interviewee, a 26-year-old girl from Banja Luka, talked about her Vietnamese neighbors. She explained that they are "jungle people who do not know how to behave, how to be a decent neighbor and they sell spring rolls that are stuffed with the cat meat". Similar attitudes exist towards people that came from Ecuador. During the living with and among the Bosnian community, the author of this work has noticed that the more unfamiliar cultural group it is, the greater negative attitude is shown towards them. Bosnians refer to people who misbehave as "village people". The degree and the type of misbehavior correlate with the personality and acceptability behavior of the person who makes judgments.

Preservation of Identity

Finding a balance between the preservation of own ethnicity and integration to the new culture is a struggle that the Bosnian Muslims of Närpes go through. A thirty one year old woman highlighted an importance of identity preservation through the family. She moved to Finland at age of 11 and encountered difficulty in reconciling different values of her own family and the values of her local friends. Her family had difficulty accepting it when she spent more time with the local kids than with the ones from her own country. Nowadays she is a mother of three children, and she thinks that this conflict is centered on freedom; it is about "how much really a 15-year-old girl can decide on her own and how much freedom she should have". Many times she heard her parents telling that certain things just simply do not belong to their home, and this is not a way they behave. The three participants, who have been raised in Finland, agreed that they always had to switch between the two codes of behavior while growing up. First, they

had to satisfy expectations of their parents and family, and second, they had to act in the same way as their friends in school in order to blend in. A 19-year-old boy, who has gone to a Finnish school for four years, admitted that it is easier to get new friends and integrate if he behaves in the same way as others. By contrast, it is harder for those who are different. He also mentioned that his behavior changes once he is on a holiday in Bosnia since "it is more relaxed atmosphere there". Other interviewees noted the changes in a behavior as well. They said that they all behave differently if "nobody is watching" or if they are in another city. There are huge differences on how one behaves within and outside the own household and the community. Especially the great difference is noticed among the girls who try to be "good girls" (*fina cura*) within the family setting and sometimes find it difficult to control the freedom, which is received in Finland.

A woman, mother, is a moral and cultural guardian of a household and Muslim society in general. She is the one responsible for passing on and reinforcing the cultural values and providing the younger generations the guidelines for the behavior. Many of the married women believe that all mothers-in-law want to raise their grandchildren and this is an issue that causes a lot of disagreement within the families. The older generation wishes their grandchildren to be the same good Muslims that they are. For many parents religion plays an important role in life. But in a Finnish context, same parents are not that concerned about religion and want their offspring to choose a faith themselves. A mother with two daughters recalled a story that illustrates a clash of opinions between the two generations. At that time her daughter was a 13-year-old girl. During Easter she dressed up as a witch and together with her local friends participated in the Finnish Easter activities. After the events, she went to tell about the happenings of the day to her grandparents. This led to a big disappointment. The grandparents stated that "this does not belong to our home and she cannot do it anymore". In the eyes of the mother, this event had nothing to do with the religion. But the grandmother had made her daughter feel like a "traitor" of the family. A mother remembered how upset her daughter was when she came back home and cried out: "Mama is it really ok to be an Easter witch?"

The Attributes of Positive Peace within the Bosnian Community

Features of Peaceful Behavior

To Bosnians, hospitality, visiting, altruism, voluntary help, and gift giving strengthens and extends the social networks not only within the Muslim

community, but also with the outside community as well. Mutual obligations and reciprocity enhance friendships, reinforce social bonds, and restore deteriorated relationships. Bosnians want to maintain valuable social relationships, which gives more motivation to reconcile.

Social exchange provides the feeling of togetherness. This is especially implemented by women, who are the hostesses and the ones who mainly link the families through coffee visits. It is an obligation to be an excellent host, seeing to the needs of a guest and given attention, providing food and beverages. In contrast to the Finnish culture, the more casual Bosnian manner of treating guests seems extra nice to the Finns. The interviewed police officer and other local people perceive this hospitality as a willingness to be acquainted and interrelated. The coffee visits (*posjetimo ten a kahvu*), conducted mostly within the Bosnian circles, maintain the relationships between friends and especially between the closest neighbors. An expression "*idemo na kafu*" (let's go for a coffee) is one of the most common things to say among the girls and the women. It does not only mean that they will be drinking coffee, but it also expresses reassurance of friendship, which is further extended to the parents, men, and the children of the respected families. These coffee visits show the care and importance of relationships as well as reflect on openness for cooperation. In addition, refusing to invite or to give would be considered as a refusal of a friendship and bonding, bringing shame to the whole family. Generous behavior sets continuous future accountabilities among kin and acquaintances.

In the Bosnian community it is impolite and rude not to help others. Helping others is essential in everyday life, "you always have to help because you will need help back someday yourself", which is an agreement, affirmed by all the interviewees. Helping is enacted through financial support, advice giving, and voluntary assistance. Giving money to the poor and helping others with all sorts of issues without any expectations to get paid back in return is seen as a good deed—"*sevap*". Money, donations, and charity should be given in a humble manner to avoid pride. For every Muslim it is obligatory to give at least 2,5% of their income every year to charity. This is called "*zakat*"—sharing what God has given you, and it is associated with purification and appreciation. According to the interviewees, a person should be "friendly, generous, good natured, and positive". This means that one should give more than they take, and this could be expressed through voluntary and charitable actions to family, friends as well as strangers. If one is refusing to give, it is perceived as a refusing to accept. Giving gifts and being responsible in actions of hospitality and helping pro-

vide the grounds for further future cooperation: the giving leads to receiving, which constantly keeps the Bosnians bonded with fellow Bosnians and the other members of the community.

Peace Promotion through Ethno-Religious Values

Islam as a practiced and lived religion has to be understood in terms of its specific role among Bosnian Muslims who live in Närpes. Islam is very much incorporated in the total culture; people's identity is represented by the mix of culture and religion. Islam plays an important role even to those people who see themselves as nonbelievers. For the most and most obviously, people promote Islam through restraint against smoking cigarettes during Ramadam, eating pork, or alcohol consumption for instance. Several male and female interviewees have stated that consumption of other drugs, such as cannabis for example, is seen more acceptable than consumption of alcohol since "an effect of marijuana does not make you do bad things such as stealing or fighting".

Such attributes as a respect and tolerance are incorporated into the daily lives of the Bosnians. Respect and tolerance are the two strongest religious ideas. They promote nonviolence and peace, and are the guidelines for being a good Muslim in the Bosnian Närpes way and a good person in the multicultural community among Närpesians and other town foreigners. Based on the things interviewees have told, respect directs people's actions: "whatever we do, we have to do it with a respect to all". By putting together the words and expressions that interviewed people have described, respect to the Bosnians means "treating other's kindly [this is something that only women said], and actually valuing and considering other people's feelings and thoughts". An interviewed male has told that he "grew up with neighbors who belonged to a Catholic Church in Bosnia, and went to school together with Lutherans and Buddhists in Närpes; there is no other way to act than to respect all the other religions, cultures, and races". Others have similar thoughts about respect and tolerance. Most of the Bosnians who are living in Närpes have been sharing the town with neighbors who have different religious and cultural backgrounds. A young man from Tuzla explained that "if someone behaves disrespectfully towards him, it is not a reason to respond disrespectfully in return". When it comes to dealing with people, the great concern is not to make others angry, frustrated, or to feel mistreated. Niceness is appreciated. Commonly, the Bosnians reduce their own self-interests and follow the norms of the community.

Furthermore, the interviewed Muslims suggested that a harmonious life together is possible because "we tolerate the differences by accepting

them", and a man from Tuzla highlighted that "this is what Islam teaches us". During fieldwork it was noticed that there are great differences between believers and nonbelievers to the degree that they practice Islam. Sometimes even the strongest believers can misrepresent their own values if what they say is compared with actual practice. Clearly, there is a gap between the expected behavior and reality. Nevertheless, according to the thoughts of many Bosnians, opinions from the local residents, and own observations, the Bosnian Muslims in Närpes seek to live modestly by appreciating tolerance, accepting differences, and reducing the amount of hostility. They also believe that the amount of aggression is reduced by the avoidance of alcohol, which generates from Islamic teachings. "It is not normal to be very drunk" and the restriction of alcohol consumption limits the angriness, irritation, violence and conflict situations. "Sober people can control [their] own actions [and they] do not regret their behavior after". It is evident that most of Närpes Bosnian Muslims consume alcohol, but they all have a sense of moderation. Excessive alcohol consumption, especially among females, is not accepted in Bosnian Muslim society; those people bring shame not only to themselves but also to the whole family.

Author has observed that the community of Bosnian Muslims has beliefs favoring avoidance and direct verbal confrontation over physical violence to resolve disputes. The applicability of these styles very much depends on the social context and the degree of relationship between the conflicting parties. No matter with whom one has disagreement, if it occurs in public, the conflict should be avoided totally or at least this is the expected and typical way to behave. Interviewees said that "it is shameful to argue when other people see it". If the conflict issue is significant enough and the relationship is valued, the resolution of problem starts at home or in the place where the disputants can ideally be left alone. When the relation with the other party is not that important, Bosnians try to stay away from the situation by just simply ignoring or listening to other party without a response. For example, some interviewees told that when they do not care about the other person, they listen and agree to what s/he has to say just to "escape" from the situation faster. Also when there is little or no concern about the other party, the men interviewees told that they want to avoid the issue by actually avoiding the other person or avoiding the troublesome matter. They say that sometimes it is better to be "wiser" by avoiding a "stupid" conflict with the "impossible to agree person". Despite some patterns of avoidance, all the Bosnians themselves agree that they have a great tendency for free, open, heated, and extended discussion. Disputants seek to compromise

through discussion in order to restore the normal relationship and to minimize hard feelings. A Banja Luka woman said that the problem has to be solved directly, so the relationship can move on. It is not the right way to get drunk and start solving problems then, "like Finnish people normally do". The propensity to avoid a long debate occurs for minor issues, for example, regarding which TV program should be watched on Friday evening. Direct confrontation, with more feelings, is employed when the issue is bigger, for example, if there is a disagreement about what values children have to be taught at home. A woman in her forties from Kozaraz mainly discusses with her husband whether their girls should live according to the Bosnian Islamic or the Närpes Lutheran religious traditions. "This is a long and hard work to reach the consensus that takes several years". To the outsider it might seem that the Bosnians would never engage in prolonged and loud debate. However, they are a temperamental people who have a lot of patience for discussing and persuading another party until disagreements are worked through sooner or later. Strong cooperation among relatives and a wish to maintain friendly relationships with the entire social group is highly valued. The value of the relationship "melts" all the differences, especially among kin. The Bosnians have extremely strong bonds and unquestionable love within the family. They say that "we are a family" (mi smo famelija), and "we will always help and care about each other no matter what". Thus, even the strongest argument or disagreement rarely breaks the strong connection. Despite existing arguments, it is necessary to be friendly and polite to each other. During the fieldwork it has been observed that people might really dislike one another, but they would still politely interact during social contact, and they would definitely visit each other and exchange gifts during the holiday season.

Social Context of Problem Solving and Interaction of a Third Party

During the interviews, participants opened up and told that typically the Bosnian families quarrel about work, household matters, planning family affairs, or raising children. A 19-year-old boy from Olovo said that his parents usually quarrel about the TV programs: they wrangle till the one, who has more energy to argue, wins. Sometimes his parents attempt to find common solutions. If it does not happen, they stop talking until the anger goes away. A 27-year-old boy from Kozarac told that arguments within the family are normal—this is what every family does. Once the tension rises among his family members, everybody starts to raise their voices—"a little bit of screaming is needed since it shows that you care". He, himself,

screams during conflicting situations until the one who has been wrong gives up. Arguing parties usually are temperamental; the discussion of issues is rather emotional and this continues until nobody has anything left to say and everybody gets quiet when the compromise is reached. However, in some situations, when there is no patience to quarrel, it is just better to be quiet and allow the other party to get his/her way. The interviewee pointed out that naturally things are back to normal after a while, and they talk again like nothing has happened because "they are all loving family". All the family members (including relatives) have a strong bond. He says that even though we argue, we will always be there for each other during critical situations. A boy from Tuzla told that he has never seen his parents screaming at each other. He thinks that to raise one's voice does not help. He likes to keep the tension low and sit down and talk things over.

Participants stated that discussion is appreciated. It is good to say things directly instead of gossiping behind another person's back. Compromise has to be reached through discussion. When the 24-year-old girl from Banja Luka gets into the argument with her friends, she wants to resolve the problem right away. First she gets angry, "so it is boiling inside", then little by little tension goes away and the situation is solved by exchanging an "I love you" (*volim te*) phrase. This girl admitted that Balkan people have more power in their discussions and arguments than Finnish people, for instance. Frankness and directness is a way argument has to be determined. Despite the gratitude towards direct address, there is a difference depending on where the conflict occurs. Male interviewees more strongly than the females declared that family members cannot argue in public places, or more precisely when outsiders are watching. It brings shame to the whole family and therefore, it is not nice for other people to encounter the problems of others, said several respondents. In addition, it is not polite to get involved in somebody else's quarrel. Everyone has to solve their own problems. Help is offered only when it is asked for. It two families are in conflict, they try to solve it amongst themselves. According to male Bosnians, it is not normal to allow somebody else to be involved in a personal relationship. It is not the same "as it used to be hundred years ago" when the eldest were the decision makers of the whole family, said a 27-year-old.

About four years ago there was a "Bosian party" in a local restaurant, with many members of the community in attendance. Sometime in the middle of the festivities, two middle aged men got into the argument and started to push each other around, which led to a fist fight. To the author, it did not seem to be a huge fight; it was more like going around in a circle

and trying to push rather than actually hit each other. The closer family members, both women and men, tried to calm them down by talk. Meanwhile a bit more distant men did not show much interest in the beginning, but later they tried to distract the brothers-in-law when they were told by their women: "go and do something about it". The men who went to break up the argument used humor to distract the opponents, allowing their tempers to cool. Then, they all went for a smoke and when they came back, the brothers-in-law were hugging each other and maintaining the conversation for the rest of the evening. The women explained that their men did not want to get involved because those two persons usually misbehave and they drink more than they should. People, who do not have kinship connection with the trouble makers, mostly do not get involved in awkward and aggressive situations just simply to avoid shame.

A young man from Tuzla said that he always tries to avoid all conflict situations and never show his anger in public. This he has noticed in his parents' behavior and he has learned it from them. They never argue verbally in front of outsiders. If there happens to occur unpleasant circumstances during the social gathering, his parents would express their angry feelings via eye contact or body language. He tries to pick up the same pattern, which is to stay calm in front of the others. Mostly he has disagreements with the younger brother. It is his responsibility to take care of a younger sibling, and he tries to restrain his brother's reckless actions through special gestures if they are in the public areas. The direct solving of the problem happens at home, where the real emotions can be expressed freely. If a conflict situation such as a fight (only one fight was observed in four years) or an argument occurs in public, it seems that often a woman asks a man in her family to go and distract the disputants. This has to be done especially if the outsiders (other people than Bosnians) are watching to avoid embarrassment and shame. Commonly, men do not care much if somebody gets into conflict: "it's not my business, let them solve it on their own", they say. The men are not ready to interfere in other people's arguments. However, the women are the ones who push a man to get involved in the role of "friendly peacemaker" if a conflict seems to be developing and becoming serious. "It is not nice to see other people arguing or fighting", declared a girl in her twenties.

The police officer for the Närpes area has mentioned that they get involved only in the very impossible and difficult situations, because if it is not extremely serious, Bosnians do not contact the police authorities. It is a rather rare way to handle the dispute, since Bosnians seek to manage their own troubles. The authorities get involved only when it is impossible for

the Bosnians to settle a dispute in a friendly way themselves and when ongoing situation gets out of control, or when the conflicting parties do not value their relationship that much.

Informal Social Control Mechanisms and Value of Interdependence

The temperamental and chatty Bosnians are very quick to gossip about community happenings, especially when negative news are involved. The gossiping is not appreciated and even a bit feared; people try to avoid being the subject of gossip of the town. Despite the negative perception of a gossip, it is common among the both genders. Usually, the Bosnian men associate it with women's behavior, but it has been observed that many times men tend to gossip more than the women do. For instance, men bring home most of the rumors after attending their get-togethers for pleasure or praying purposes. People like to talk about other's businesses, and somebody who has been acting against the norms of the society becomes the main topic of gossip and shaming. Typically, it does not involve only the person in question; rather, the whole family is in the center of attention. Perhaps, the fear of being shamed and becoming the focus of gossip restrains people's actions within the home community. It is ok to behave in violation of a norm, if it is done in another town or city. The Bosnians say that transgression is not shameful anymore, if nobody knows about it.

Once somebody sees or hears about a wrongdoing, criticism is spread within the community. This not only takes the form of talking behind one's back, but it is also saying things straight to the face, mostly by teasing or ridiculing. Direct mocking has been noticed in Bosnian society mainly when outsiders are absent; they do not act as freely when interacting with people from other cultures, unless it is a very close family friend. Ridicule involves jokes that may seem to be hurtful and offensive to the outsiders since the target person always becomes a "dummy". To the Bosnians, it is a part of communication and it is their social method to judge the other person and to exert informal social control. The joking seems to be very effective at reducing inappropriate behavior.

During the four-year period of living within the Bosnian community, I witnessed only one fight described earlier and heard about only two cases of wife beating. One beating occurred within a Bosnian family, and the other between a Bosnian man and his Finnish spouse. Both of these men brought shame to their families, and people still talk disrespectfully not only about the men, but also about their families. Mostly they are mocked in a joking manner, as the members of the Bosnian community are very quick to

criticize the breaking of social norms. Thus, the men in question and their close family members are not visited that much anymore and they are not welcome (informally discouraged) to the Bosnian social gatherings. Simply, people do not want to be friends with them anymore.

A very common expression to hear among the Bosnian community is "village people" (*narod iz sela*). This describes the persons who misbehave by getting into various troubles, causing disturbances, getting into the fights, and generally doing anything that brings shame to the rest of the society. People have to act in a consideration of others since they represent all the Bosnians in Närpes. Individuals, who are seen as "village people" are rarely visited by others. People try to avoid them, so the rest of the local community would not assume they are alike. The tendency to avoid visiting, exhibits the refusal to link and be interdependent. The Bosnians are a collectivistic society and strive for a sense of belonging. Being rejected by one's own group is a bigger punishment than to be rejected by outsiders, as by the local Närpes inhabitants, for instance. Informally, the Bosnian community puts pressure on all its members to be good representatives of Bosnian society; otherwise they will be excluded from the social group and informally judged through gossip, shame, and ridicule.

Socialization and Gender Differences

The mother/wife is a moral guardian of the household, and she is responsible for raising good children, especially good girls, who fulfill the expectations of the society and carry on the ethno-religious traditions. Girls have more duties and responsibilities than do boys, and they are raised to be good daughters, wives, and mothers. The boys are responsible for protecting and providing for the family. They also have rules to follow and expectations to meet from the society, but their duties are much easier to accomplish than those of the opposite gender. Despite the gender differences, every child has to be taught to be honest, know how to treat others, avoid alcohol consumption especially in places where other people are watching, understand importance of school, and think about the consequences of their own behavior. Parents are not supposed to set strict rules for the children because there should always be mutual trust between them. The parents, especially the fathers, who are harsh on their teenage daughters, are perceived negatively within the community. People say that in those cases when daughters do bad things like staying out late, have boyfriends, drink, or smoke because their fathers are too strict; the daughters are lying and fathers become stricter because there is no mutual respect between them.

The Bosnian parents do not force children to do things and so children have a great deal of autonomy. The girls can also live independently and still follow the social norm of being a "nice girl" (*fina cura*). Often they say to the children "it is all up to you" (*sve do tebe*) to give them a chance to choose the right way. The parents' requests can be ignored without consequences, which is the opposite to Finnish or Western standards. The interviewed local Swedish-speaking informant has mentioned that she has heard that "the Bosnian parents do not set rules for their children when they are small", which is why in schools there are clashes between the local and the Bosnian kids. She adds that her teenage daughter often is angry at the Bosnian kids because "they do not know what is right and what is wrong". To the Bosnians, giving their children a chance to behave independently shows trust between them.

Based on the stories of the interviewed young Bosnian people, the oldest child in the family has the most responsibilities; meanwhile the younger ones are involved in the small voluntary tasks at home. Usually boys spent their childhood and teenage years playing football and engaging in other fun activities while girls get more preoccupied with household chores instead of being able to extend their free time outside home. A 25-year-old man said that the Bosnian girls have to learn how to manage the work at home early in their lives because one day they will become wives and have to know how to take care of their own families. However, the men, with whom discussions were conducted, do not think that there is any difference in a way girls and boys are treated, neither earlier nor later in their lives. All the interviewees agreed that both girls and boys have to be taught moral values and behavioral patterns early in life while they still care and listen. Boys have told that parents do not force them to behave in accordance to their instructions: "they never say you must do it", it is enough to listen to their advice because "parents allow children to be themselves". The boys also think that the most of the things they have learned is by observing other children and friends. Moreover, they did not recall receiving any harsh punishment from their parents for any type of wrongdoing.

A 29-year-old male interviewee told a story, which illustrates his parent's attitudes towards child rearing and discipline. By the age of 13, he started to take money from his parents saving box. Over a couple of years he took approximately 1,500 dollars, which he spent on gambling and things he bought for himself. He planned to return the money before parents could notice the missing amount. Unfortunately, they noticed the theft before he could put the money back. First, his parents were worried that he was in some sort of trouble and needed help. Of course, said the inter-

viewee, he was ashamed. Once his parents observed his shame, they explained calmly to him the importance of being honest. According to the storyteller, everybody knows that "boys are boys and they are bigger trouble makers than the girls are". He believes that if his sister had done the same type of thing, she would have received a serious punishment. It is because girls are supposed to be nice and represent respectable values at home and within the society. All in all, "a good girl would never even think of doing such a thing", explained the man.

While growing up, physical punishment is largely absent for Bosnian children. A 29-year-old man explained that a couple of times his parents, when put out of temper, spanked him slightly, so he would get scared and start to obey the rules. Most of the times parents only attempt to spank the children to stop their reckless behavior. A 24-year-old girl in a joking manner said that, here in Finland, the Bosnian parents are afraid to punish their children because corporal punishment is illegal. Parents tend to employ verbal means of discipline; they advise them and give them guidelines for correct behavior. While growing up, Bosnian children do not witness much physical aggression since Bosnian adults rarely engage in serious violent acts. The offspring observe how their parents use prolonged discussion or avoidance to resolve the conflicts and come to use similar approaches.

Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution Strategies among the Bosnian Muslims

When it comes to conflict management processes, it is important to highlight that the Bosnians confront conflict situations for the most part only when the conflict occurs at home or among very close family members. They avoid or tolerate conflict if it happens in public or among strangers since it is shameful to show anger and frustration to others. They use body language and facial expressions more than a speech when it comes to situations that involve outsiders due to their fear of "what the others might think about you and your family if you quarrel in public". Thus, desire and willingness to be a good community member among the Närpesians make people employ avoidance and toleration not only in conflict situations but in every day communication as well. If the conflict actually occurs in public, friendly peacemaking strategies may take place.

There are seen sex differences in terms of conflict management. Generally, Bosnian men prefer more direct ways of dealing with conflict while women tend to employ more indirect approaches, which correlates with

findings of Björkqvist et al. (1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1994) and Österman et al. (1998) concerning preferences in choosing direct and indirect modes of aggression. To women, indirect modes are applied not only in conflict situations, but in every day communication as well. Women seek to obtain satisfying outcomes through refusing to cooperate, gossiping, and dominating, which develops along with increasing social status over the lifetime. Thus, women have their own "smart" ways to express themselves in a male dominant society to achieve influence and control.

A cross-sectional survey designed by Katz and Lawyer (1992) was used to find out conflict resolution styles. The quantitative survey study (see Figure 1) showed that the two conflict resolution styles that figured most strongly in the participant's responses were collaborator and compromiser. Collaborators are concerned with both their own self-interests and those of the other party. This style sustains the interpersonal relationship between the disputants as well as attempts to arrive at a solution wherein the needs of both parties are satisfied. The compromiser style involves giving and taking as a type of negotiation. However, the compromiser assumes that a win-win solution is impossible and therefore accepts less than what is desired (Katz and Lawyer, 1992). When considering fieldwork observations, Bosnians use collaboration when continuation of a good relationship is valued a lot and when own as well as other party's opinions are important to make the relationship work in the future. For example this style is employed when parents aim to come up with appropriate rearing guidelines and upbringing values for their children. Compromising takes place when own aspirations and desires are not that important in a particular case and partial satisfaction is acceptable, for example when choosing a TV program on Saturday evening.

Females have slightly higher scores than men on collaboration and compromise (Figure 1). However, it was found that males tend to use the controller style significantly more than females. According to Katz and Lawyer (1992), the controller style involves a high self-focused goal orientation and a very low goal orientation toward the mutual relationship. Conflict is viewed by the controller as a win or lose proposition, wherein the controller wants to win (Katz and Lawyer, 1992). Hand (2010), Low (2004), Owens et al. (2005), Woehrle and Engelmann (2008), and Österman et al. (1997) acknowledge that women choose more peaceful settlements, constructive techniques, and compromise to conflict over the competitive approaches where winning is important. Quantitative data has showed that the level of conflict avoidance is almost the same for both genders. Observations show that avoidance of conflict is employed when conflict occurs in public places when strangers are present.



Figure 1. Conflict handling styles by gender. The styles of collaborator, compromiser, accommodator, and avoider were more used among the females than males.

Additionally, the number of the years spent in Närpes was found to have a positive influence on collaborating (*rtau*=.27, *p*=.009) and compromising styles (*rtau*=.29, *p*=.021) for the female population. The number of years spent in Närpes does not affect any conflict resolution style for males. A negative correlation between the conflict resolution style of controlling and the age was found (*rtau*=-.23, *p*=.002). The younger people tend to employ more controlling style to resolve their conflicts. The older the persons are, the more likely they will employ collaboration and compromising styles—the styles that involve constructive problem solving. This links with the research done by Laursen et al. (2005), Owens et al. (2005), and Österman et al. (1997) stating the greater use of compromise in adolescents than in childhood. It is interesting that these correlations between the collaboration (*rtau*=.41, *p*=.000) and compromising (*rtau*=.27, *p*=.027) styles and age were found only for the Bosnian males. In other words, females were collaborating and compromising about the same amount across their lifespans, but male collaboration and compromising increased with age. Interviewees have been explaining that boys at the young age are allowed to do everything they like and act independently. Later on in lives, adult men have to communicate and collaborate more to deal with every day issues within the workplace environment and also within the household setting.

Potentiality for Peacefulness within the Bosnian Community

Bosnians in Närpes live mostly in the absence of violence and prefer to deal with conflicts in a constructive manner. Bosnians are an example of how a society can manage daily interactions without violence and aggression. They internalize certain attitudes, beliefs, and ethno-religious values that control the level of aggression and contribute to the overall peacefulness of the community. The basis for peaceful interactions derives from social exchange, reinforcement of positive behavior, and the strong connections with kin. Nonviolent behavior is also promoted through respect and tolerance for all, through "shunning of alcohol" (Fry, 2004), and the favoring of avoidance in some circumstances and direct verbal confrontation of a problem in other circumstances over the use of physical violence. Bosnians often deny the existence of conflicts and avoid conflict situations. These practices help to guarantee that the people of the Bosnian community are peaceful and this illustrates that they maintain an ethic of tolerance and respect. Respect and tolerance towards others made it possible to live among the multicultural societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and it makes it possible to live among approximately 35 different nationalities in Närpes.

Realistically, Bosnians encounter a great variety of conflict situations on a daily basis. There is also a variation of behavior at a personal level; Finnish society sees all Muslims as a homogenous group, but they are not. Bosnians use different conflict management approaches to various degrees depending on social and cultural setting. Generally, Bosnians emphasize restrained behavior over violence, and they highlight the necessity of reducing and handling conflicts without the force. If disputants cannot settle a conflict themselves, a third party as a friendly peacemaker will get involved. Rarely do situations involve authorities in repressive peacemaker roles since the people place great value on interpersonal relationships. It is the interdependence in a small community that gives a value to the relationships. In other words, when the relationship is valued, differences tend to melt away. Conflicts among the people who have good relations and who need each other are ideally handled at a low level of intensity by employing collaboration and compromising where prolonged discussions are appreciated.

Informal social control mechanisms also contribute to peaceful daily interactions. People seek to restrain their inappropriate actions so as not to shame themselves and their family in front of the community. Wrongdoers are criticized, ridiculed, and shamed. If one is the subject of joking, mocking, and gossiping, this kind of social chastisement works as a punishment. Physical ag-

gression is not common in Bosnian society of Närpes. During my fieldwork, I have heard only about two cases of wife beating, witnessed only one fistfight that did not lead to any injuries, and none of the respondents have ever heard or remembered any cases of murder. The local police officer, Pia Knös, stated that the Bosnian people follow the law rather well. Bosnians rarely solve problems with force and thus their children witness very little physical aggression and are for the most part are not subject to physical punishment. Bosnian children, especially boys, have a great deal of autonomy and independence. This is due to the mutual trust among the adults and children and due to the respect for all that derives from Islamic teachings.

Table 1. Peaceful patterns to manage daily interactions

Social exchange features that provide the basis for peaceful interactions	– Friendliness and helpfulness – Reinforcements of positive, generous, kind, altruistic and giving behavior – Strong bonds among kin
Ethno-religious values that promote nonviolent behavior	– Respect and tolerance – Shunning and low consumption of alcohol – Avoidance of direct confrontation
Involvement of third parties	– Common friendly peacemaking and rare repressive peacemaking
Informal social control mechanisms and interdependence	– Criticism, ridicule, shaming, joking, teasing, and gossip – Conformity – The value of interdependence
Socialization	– Mutual respect that leads to autonomy and trust – Little existence of physical aggression and physical punishment

When such elements of peace are considered together, it is fair to conclude that the Bosnian Muslims in Närpes fall on the peacefulness end of the peacefulness-aggressiveness continuum. The constructive and nonviolent conflict resolution approaches that Bosnians employ to manage conflicts correspond with the emerging evolutionary perspective that humans have a great potential to handle every day problems in a nonkilling, peaceful, non-

violent manner. They possess values and attitudes that highlight nonkilling and nonviolence over violence and lethality. Bosnian Muslim society in Närpes demonstrates that killing-free societies are obtainable, humans have capacity to move beyond war, and one can co-exist peacefully with people from different ethno-religious backgrounds in a multicultural community. Therefore, as the Bosnians Muslims of Närpes, many other cultures live in the absence of violence and prefer to deal with conflicts in a constructive manner. Humans clearly have capacity to make war, but it cannot be seen as a universal phenomenon across the cultures since war is absent in a large part of the world.

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The Transformation from Holocaustic Intergenerational Trauma to Nonkilling Intergenerational Wisdom

Danica Borkovich Anderson
Kolo: Women's Cross Cultural Collaboration

Introduction

Of all the ills that afflict humankind, the most virulent disease is of our own making: WAR. With neither a cure nor the resolve to stop the spread of this violent virus, historic headlines continue to be written with the blood of innocents. Among those innocents, women and children suffer the most, as evidenced by Julie Mertus (2000: 3) who reported an estimated forty to fifty million refugees globally with approximately seventy five to eighty percent women and children. In their roles as victims of violence amid the intergenerational hatred that feeds war, mothers take center stage as they bury their children in both marked and unmarked graves. Pierce the fragile veneer of a seemingly civilized society and the pent-up poison of past wrongs, real or imagined, spreads throughout the body politic. Once infected, an orgy of savagery begins. In armed conflicts around the world, a new commerce in cruelty has increasingly emerged: Gendercide. The specific targeting of women and children to be murdered, mutilated, raped or recruited as combatants has become a rule, rather than an anomaly, of the brutal lexicon of warfare.

My decade of trauma work with war survivors, war crimes survivors and victims who endured natural disasters is focused on understanding the perpetuation of intergenerational holocaustic trauma. Intergenerational trauma, in short, traces the catastrophic events that occurred in preceding generations to current generation that have universal features of conflict, natural disasters, wars and violence. Findings of a century of war in former Yugoslavs from WWI, WWII to Balkan War provide an example of intergenerational trauma and the climate of hatreds between the violent trauma events. In this pivotal climate of

hate and war, we have a unique opportunity to develop a nonkilling intergenerational wisdom instructing peace and harmony while healing trauma for the entire collective community. As a Psycho-social Victims Gender Expert for the International Criminal Court at The Hague, I bore witness to the women in Africa (Chad, Congo, Sudan and Uganda), Bosnia, India, and Sri Lanka who suffered on the frontlines of genocide, gynocide and crimes against humanity.

My professional work in intergenerational trauma is linked to my own experiences during my childhood as a South Slavic girl. I share a path through life with the Bosnian women who have survived war crimes and with war crimes survivors in general. Sadly, our numbers keep growing: in their study for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Marie Vlachova and Lea Biason explain, "We are confronted with the slaughter of Eve, a systematic gendercide of tragic proportions" (apud Winkler, 2008: 265). I include my sisters in Africa and Sri Lanka in these numbers, my heart growing heavier with yet another reminder of the widespread use of violence against women in contemporary warfare. My own Serbian parents immigrated to the United States after World War II, and the intergenerational trauma I inherited from them inspired me to search for healing practices. As I listened to multitudes of survivors' first person stories, I learned about the South Slavic indigenous native social intelligence and community practices of the kolo, Serbian for round dances. All of these experiences prompted my investigation and research of the most culturally and engendered somatic psychological trauma treatments and advances in neuroscience. This journey has led me to synthesize the archaic knowledge of the structure of the world and how we live within a community, how we incorporate individual and collective intergenerational wisdoms founded on the soma into living body-somatic psychology.

It is true that what happens to me also happens to you and to all mothers and daughters. Without intervention, what happens to me and to you will also happen to future generations. This relationship defines Holocaustic intergenerational trauma in our age of violence. However, if we examine the natural disasters in the Neolithic and Paleolithic ages, if not hundreds of thousands of years previous, we discover a nonkilling culture that developed a responsive human neurological network to ensure the continuation of our species and most other life forms. Essentially, we see the survival of the human race relying on intergenerational wisdom transmitted not by computers, libraries or scientific journals, but by the recording of human life experiences into soma and genetic material. In *Dark Night, Early Dawn*, Christopher Bache explores through the lens of neuroscience and somatic psychology the ways in which

the experiences of our ancestors thousands of generations ago are preserved and carried forward to each individual's life experience (2000: 41).

The soma or living body is genetic fodder through which our neurological network is guided into actions, behaviors and responses. As Joan Marler implores in "The Circle is Unbroken," we should focus deeply and exclusively on the patriarchal military phallocracy to understand the how the repercussions of a single trauma can wound multiple generations (1997: 17). These wounds are rooted in previous life experiences, allowing current generations to heal and become more resilient. When we factor for the inclusion of females and their life experiences, we arrive at a starting point for understanding the role psycho-neurophysiology plays in this process. The biological etiology of birthing and mothering as nonkilling psycho-somatic responses and behaviors set the stage for intergenerational wisdom rather than Holocaustic intergenerational trauma.

Each mother's life experiences are etched onto her child through both the rich genetic double X chromosome and her role as the major figure in the child's development through infancy and early childhood. In *The New Feminine Brain*, Mona Schulz (2005: 64) explains that the mother's life experiences commence the intergenerational transmission of wisdom and genetic coding. For the past five thousand years, the age of violence has twisted the soma-based intergenerational transmission of wisdom into Holocaustic intergenerational trauma. Despite the plethora of studies focused on wars, violence and trauma, very few of them focus on females' roles on the frontlines of this violence or their potential roles in bringing peace to our communities. Additionally, centuries-old practices and rituals are often dismissed as petty ethnic or cultural idioms that are not relevant to the current generation.

Despite this contemporary dismissal of ancient traditions, Riane Eisler's research in *The Chalice and the Blade* shows that in the far past, cultures and civilizations were nonkilling and peaceful (1988: 25). Since March 1999, more than a decade of my *kolo* (folk round dance and/or circle) trauma treatment and outreach accompanied with psycho-educational training in Somatic Psychology, psycho-neurophysiology, has resulted in a deepened understanding of psychosomatic disorders, specifically of trauma and memory disorders. Multi-faceted Kolo Trauma Response protocol is designed to halt intergenerational trauma via a self-sustainable, social, somatic psychological movement facilitated by women in their own communities. The protocol integrates culture and community with social justice mechanisms to provide a space for reconciliation and social reconstruction, allowing peace to flourish in communities at grassroots, micro-movement levels.

Beginning with a serious review of previous cultural and ethnic approaches to treating the trauma of former Yugoslavs suffering from the Balkan War, I entered a Poetic College of intensified learning. Barely enduring the aftermath in the previous millennium, the South Slavs—in particular, survivors of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war—rebuilt their lives by focusing on their South Slavic rituals, practices and customs. For the past decade the marginalized Bosnian women's healing efforts and first-person stories of war crimes have provided insights to what had been an intangible, nonkilling heritage that relied on bio-culinary herbal measures, self-sustaining gardens, embroidery, and folk dances/circles to expand the instructional tools for developing stronger, more prosperous females. Even though the creation of *kolos* in Novi Travnik and Ahmica made significant socio-political economic impacts on the reconciliation and social reconstruction efforts for Bosnia's middle cantons, the only recognition of these efforts exists in derision targeting female culture and female humanity and threatening the evolution of females' presence and peace efforts in the aftermath of war. Still, the trauma healing efforts in local communities have sparked a female-based social movement promoting nonkilling societies.

While humanitarian aid organizations and most western health services rarely cover the long term behaviors of catastrophic trauma, South Slavic peoples, like survivors in Africa, Indonesia and Haiti, have turned to the healing guidance of their own diverse cultures. By including their ancestors' healing practices, they remain untouched by the sterile psychiatric and psychological methodologies that are removed from the archaic, soma-based healing methods.

South Slavic Cultural Origins: A Return to Nonkilling Practices

South Slavic culture has survived three catastrophic wars in one hundred years, with two world wars played out in former Yugoslavia. Yael Danieli (1986: 295-313) explains in "The Treatment and Prevention of Long-Term Effects and Intergenerational Transmission of Victimization" how all of these experiences have etched the society with the neuro-scientific and somatic scars of intergenerational trauma. Though devastating for South Slavic peoples, this holocaustic situation provides researchers with the perfect opportunity to analyze the alignment of neuroscience and folk somatic psychology practices. This landscape of trauma also allows us to explore how South Slavic peoples were infected with holocaustic intergenerational trauma so quickly.

South Slavic Female Humanities, a positive folk psycho-biological appropriate practice, is still very present in the former Yugoslavia (Jankovic, 1934: 5-12). Marler (1997: 310), however, has explained how the millennia-old South Slavic practices that once forged peaceful communities and harmonious life experiences through oral memory traditions are vulnerable to intergenerational trauma transmission. These oral memory traditions incorporate the body's physical interactions with natural and cosmic forces for completing the practical tasks of daily life, initiating recovery from trauma in small acts ranging from child rearing, to completing domestic duties, to sustaining agricultural gardens, to celebrating events at the local level. These comparatively tiny and often overlooked instances of recovery from intergenerational trauma become starting points for healing the local community. They are the ways in which South Slav women initiate and perpetuate a nonkilling society.

More importantly, the intergenerational wisdom transmitted through South Slavic oral memory traditions plant the seeds for nonkilling community in local arenas, which eventually blossom into peaceful civilizations. Classically-trained archeologist Marija Gimbutas identifies in *The Language of the Goddess* the harmonious civilization which she termed 'Old Europe.' According to Gimbutas (1989: xi), from the 7th to 3rd millennia BCE, Neolithic Europe was free of wars, violence or pornography. Any trauma in this period of peace and harmony was borne from catastrophic natural disasters and/or ill health, loss of life, limb and injury. By exploring the ways in which these ancient peoples evolved their peaceful cultures we can see how trauma can be converted into intensified learning events. In Schulz's study (2005: 310), we see that that the oral memory traditions found in South Slavic cultures directly result from these millennia-old lessons mirroring the neurobiological and somatic dance of our brains and neurological network in the body.

According to Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb's study (2005: 84-94), Evolution in *Four Dimension: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life*, life experiences and cultures largely shape DNA code. The body's neurobiological and somatic processes synthesize the rich variety of lived experiences from the past with those of the present generation. Intensified learning is programmed into the DNA and allows the curriculum of life experiences to constantly evolve. The adaptive significance of evolving child-rearing and domestic practices to fit the contemporary environment allows the culture and community to not only survive, but to thrive.

Traumatic experiences offer soma the intense, multi-modal learning opportunities that Schulz (2005: 311) shows both genetically encode the intuitive ways we behave and respond to life's circumstances and provoke our cu-

riosity and the thirst for knowledge. Robert Lickliter's (1996) research on the construction of learning practices reveals that multimodal learning approaches utilize social learning that is successfully transmitted from each generation to the next. Meanwhile, Ernest Rossi's (2002: 107) work on neurogenesis explores how the adult brain continues to learn through physical activity's ability to "optimize neurogenesis: the growth of new neurons and their interconnection throughout the body". The work of multiple additional researchers corroborates that dancing, working the fields and physical activity nourish the social learning aptitudes that promote a nonkilling world.

The most prominent remnant of South Slavic oral memory traditions are the Slavic *kolos*, Serbo-Croatian for being in a circle or folk round dance. Within the context of Gimbutas' archeological research of the peaceful Neolithic Old Europe, of which the former Yugoslav region was center, we can see that the South Slavic oral memory traditions are what Rossi (2002: 475) refers to as "mutually adaptive players involved in a co-evolving replay and resynthesis in privacy and communion on all levels from mind to genes". Holocaustic intergenerational trauma is "gene state affected," meaning that traumatic life experiences etch neurological survival responses onto our genes.

Forging a nonkilling community means converting Holocaustic intergenerational trauma into intergenerational wisdom. South Slavic war survivors have realized how responding with Holocaustic intergenerational trauma only produces another century of wars. In the seemingly apocalyptic aftermath of the third war in one century, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina faced malnutrition, hunger and unemployment. All that remained were the South Slavic oral memory traditions. The *kolo*, with its physical activity and formulaic patterns of movement, has brought together the embodiment of memory from antiquity and of the land on which the peoples were born and died. In *Archaeologies of Landscape: Contemporary Perspectives*, Wendy Ashmore and Bernard Knapp (1999: 13) assert that the kolo symbolically creates collective memory from community identity rather than the debilitating details of individual identities—the particular war crimes participants' experienced, or their experiences of cruelty in the aftermath of war.

Oral Memory Traditions of the South Slavic Life World

Great import is placed upon the South Slavic life world and their oral memory traditions dating back to the Megalithic period. The ancestors' applied wisdom has grown through the oral memory traditions forged by intergenerational practices. Most do not know that the South Slavs did not

have a written alphabet until the late 1800's, further preserving the vestiges of nonkilling peaceful communities. South Slavic traditions are expressed using symbolic representations, as opposed to the limitations of a twenty-six letter alphabet, allowing these oral memory practices to closely mirror the neurobiological process of remembering: the millions, if not billions, of possible symbols in a symbolic alphabet dwarfs the twenty-six letter alphabet.

Holocaustic intergenerational trauma replaces the oral memory practices organizing intergenerational wisdom and haunts the South Slavs through memory disorders like Alzheimer's, amnesia, dementia from stress, and exhausting fear/fright. Despite the innumerable psychological treatments of Post Traumatic Stress (PTSD), none of the methodologies have been shown to heal the condition. Nor have any of the peace treaties erected in the past one hundred years of the most holocaustic violence since the beginning of time provided peace.

A death sentence is handed out for the South Slavic oral memory practices via cultural omissions from the judicial system and humanitarian policies. Witnessing those suffering from trauma led to my applying South Slavic oral memory practices and female humanities in specific trauma treatment circumstances. The results show that cultural social memories and oral memory practices can provide insight and healing when the past is perceived for future generations as a way to evolve and not repeat the violence.

Consequently, as Julie Mertus (2000: xi) has revealed a deliberate and systematic violence against whole populations translating to a death sentence that is handed out for the South Slavic oral memory practices via cultural omissions from the judicial system and humanitarian policies. Witnessing those suffering from trauma led to my applying South Slavic oral memory practices and female humanities in specific trauma treatment circumstances. The *Humanitarianism and War Project* results suggest that cultural social memories and oral memory practices can provide insight and healing when the past is perceived for future generations as a way to evolve and not repeat the violence

The South Slavic mythic narratives' treatment of memory as cultural and their potential for healing trauma are validated by neuroscientist Karmin Nader's current memory research, which was summarized in Kathleen McGowan's August 2009 *Discover* magazine article. However, Nader's breakthrough is still being refuted by the old guard scientists. Archeologist Marija Gimbutas, who deciphered the icons and symbols decorating "Old Europe" (6,500-1,450 BCE) as a mythic narrative based on oral memory practices, also encountered the skeptical nature of neuroscientists. Strangely enough, and contrary to the prevailing disregard of Gimbutas' work, the archeological find-

ings are validated by the staggering implications of discoveries about how memories are inscribed in the brain. With Gimbutas' decipherment of Vinca script of Old Europe which strongly applies to memory and neurobiological process, the very artifacts prove that Neolithic peoples, mostly Proto-Slavs, have applied the memory principles and practices for millennia. Even more compelling is the discovery that ritual of cup readings by the South Slavs embodies the same process of deciphering memory that Marija Gimbutas used to cluster the symbolic representations and iconic alphabet to form meaning.

What is revealed is the plasticity and adaptability of memory, as it allows for infinite diversity among healing approaches and mythic narratives specific to individual life experiences. Intriguingly, culture and community social collectives are encased within the plasticity of a neurobiology and soma-based partnership. Such a partnership helps us to see the inter-relationships between the South Slavic oral memory practices of the kolo, the archeological evidence of ancient civilizations, and the neurobiology of our brains in dealing with the memories of traumatic events. The key here rests in humans' hands as we are the masters of our own mythic narrative paralleling our neurobiological processes of memory. Together, these elements produce the potential for peaceful, nonkilling communities.

Effects of Therapeutic, Political, and Somatic Layering of Memories

What is clear from studying war survivors across the globe is that intergenerational trauma is catastrophically a woman's burden. Julie Mertus' humanitarian research on the Balkan War reveals that 83% of refugees across the world are women and children (2000: 3). The fact that we are all born of a woman and that the overwhelming majority of primary caregivers for children and families are women, women's capacity to propel culture using psychosocial behaviors stands central. The intimate processes of menstruation, child birth and raising children are all biological and neurological behaviors responsible for shaping future generations. As Christopher Knight and Alan Butler (2005: 210-216) show in their work it is through localized female solidarity that cultures and peaceful communities are forged.

In climates of war, however, violence takes place in front of women's hearths, where intergenerational knowledge is most significantly vulnerable. Social scientists have noted that since WWII, military campaigns have been orchestrated in the homes and backyards of civilians. The number of civilian causalities since WWI has risen dramatically alongside the instances of war crimes against the female body such as rape, enforced pregnancy, and mutila-

tion targeting the reproductive organs. The scopes of millions of machine guns are targeting the most intimate realms of the female soma: the prevalence of rape in the Congo and in the aftermath of the Balkan War are all acts of violence against the intimacy of women's own bodies. John Wilson and Terence Keane (1997: 193) point out in *Assessing Psychological Trauma and PTSD* that only recently have that soma and the female body stopped being neglected by both the clinical treatment of trauma and the judicial rule of law. According to Antonio Caseses (2003), rape was only cited as a war crime or a rule of law issue in the late 1990s. At the same time, Wilson and Keane focus on the roles memory plays in South Slavs' experiences of post-traumatic stress reveal that severe personal assault and loss are common for women: "prevalence data in special populations suggest that rates of PTSD in women are appreciable, often exceeding levels found in men" (1997: 198).

In the previous millennia, South Slavic oral memory traditions have offered healing through ritual memory exercises with actions fully encompassing women's life world—nothing was excluded or segmented. Cross-culturally, social memory rituals are proto-typical her/ history recordings, mythical narratives crucial to shaping and reconstructing communal social justice memory. South Slavs and other peoples with oral memory traditions suffer greatly when subjected to judicial and conflict-management approaches. Memory is meant to be layered and developed into a narrative that lends meaning only after having lived through critical life and death scenarios. Memory's mutability allows for multiple and even conflicting versions of what happened to co-exist in its re-creation of social memory. The same mutability heals and diffuses traumatic events, as is shown in mythological accounts of fables, legends and fairy tales that speak of the active memory process as an ongoing intergenerational practice. The intergenerational memory of mythic narratives is ingeniously carried forward into future lives through such "small" acts of reading stories to children.

Memory is, according to South Slavs, a mega library, an archive filled with every single life experience. We use our ever-present past life experiences to adapt to, survive and thrive in the current environment. This mega-library dating back to the Megalithic age is the same as what Carl Jung referred to as the collective consciousness. From the perspective of most South Slavs, trusting peace treaties, legal lingo, and tomes of rules and ramifications created by ruling powers to produce peace is delusional. The erection of overwhelmingly male hero statues and memorials throughout the globe and the celebrations of military domination have replaced the ritual celebrations of everyday life experiences.

The Slavic peoples seem to intuitively know the essential function of memory is to provoke the development of new memories. The South Slavic Megalithic practices are based in a mythic narrative filled with symbolism that is applicable to celebrations of both mundane experiences and ecstatic encounters. Without the mythic narrative, depression throws a cloak of meaninglessness over one's existence. According to McGowan (2009), both PTSD and major depression affect the neurobiology of memory, which impacts the South Slavic oral memory practices and mythic narratives that heal trauma.

PTSD's effects on memory range from the complete lapse of memory to a conscious reluctance to narrate or even think about the traumatic event. Some patients re-experience the events over and over through memories that are often tinged with exaggerated arousal symptoms, fitful sleep and poor concentration (Newport and Nemeroff, 2000). It is commonly said that Bosnians who survived the war in the 1990s don't drink because they want to forget the past, but because there is a tomorrow, the common interpretation being that one should use memory of the past to fuel the pursuit of vengeance in the future. Hence, a century of wars, rather than the intergenerational South Slavic practices used to remember the past within the context of their mythic narratives, overtakes the former Yugoslav region.

When the indigenous mythic narrative isn't reinforced, PTSD behaviors spill intergenerationally into the lives of children and are perpetuated by the judicial system. Recapitulations, succinct summaries of events, each retrieved from its original format and context, were the preferred form for expressing memories in both of these contexts. Memories are reconsolidated by layering significant information and symbolism, continually revamping or re-organizing a narrative of the event. Ideally, this narrative memory includes all possible cosmic and microcosmic world views. The reconsolidation process makes memory more functional, allowing us to more easily update wisdom as we collect life experiences, and provides remarkable potential for healing local communities. The recall and recitation that is central to South Slavic oral memory traditions evokes long-buried ancestral memories pertinent to survivors' present life experiences. Similarly, the *kolo* is danced repeatedly throughout the generations in a pattern of body movements describing first person narratives. Variations between how the *kolo* was danced in previous generations (recapitulated) and how the present day generation would dance the same kolo (reconsolidating) allows for each life experience to be recorded in the dance. Within the judicial systems, however, the recall of traumatic events is restricted to only the facts of a particular criminal act. The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal records victims'

recollections into trial transcripts that are remarkably detailed, dated and catalogued line by line. However, the neurobiological process of memory, which according to Eric Kandel's *In Search of Memory*, does not offer a vivid, line-by-line, factual recount of events, is not represented in the rule of law or judicial proceedings. The complicated neurobiological process created by post-traumatic stress and the judicial procedures' dismantling of ancestral memories disrupts the reconsolidation memory process.

For the Muslims who suffered horrendous genocides, the judicial restrictions on the expression of memory and on the classification of which memories are "relevant" to a testimony produce even more confusion. No matter how closely we scrutinize the Clinton Administration's Dayton Accord for the Balkan War (1991-93), we cannot find any sign of South Slavs' collective memory narratives. For instance, within the Dayton Accord, both Tusla and Srebrenica are placed within the dotted lines of the Republic of Serbia, despite their recognition for the last several centuries as Bosnian communities, and despite the Republic of Serbia's army's slaughter and murder of hundreds of Srebrenica men during the Balkan War. Families that claim their Bosnian genealogy in Tusla and Srebrenica are now disenfranchised as they are dislocated from their mythic narratives and cultural memory by the Dayton Accord's geographic dismantling of former Yugoslavia. Because what was Bosnian prior to 1991 is now included in the Republika Srpska, the people inhabiting those areas are considered to be Serbian. Fatima, a Muslim war survivor from Novi Travnik, quipped after the release of three Croatian war criminals responsible for the 2001 crimes in Ahmica/Vittez, "now they have us killing ourselves" through the manipulation of the judicial systems. The same can be said for the Srebrenica war crimes survivors, mostly women and children, who argue that their ages-long Bosnian identities have been twisted so as to erase the fact that Serbs were attacking and killing Bosnian Muslims: according to the Dayton Accord's geographic designations, the Srebrenica massacre consisted of Serbs murdering Serbs.

For more alarming accounts of how the judicial system's assaults on individual memory, we need only examine the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal transcripts for June 8, 1993, which describe the violence of the armed conflict between the military formed by the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Ahmica/Vittez. In "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Memory," Landy Sparr and Douglas Bremner (2005) summarize the testimony: on or about May 15, 1993, Witness A, a female approximately 45 years old and living in Vittez was arrested by the Croatian squad called "Jokers." According to her testimony, she was taken to a holi-

day cottage and placed in a large room with a group of soldiers who held knives to her throat, stomach and inner thigh, threatening to stab her vagina if she did not speak the truth. The defense maintained that Witness A was mistaken due the series of traumatic events she had endured and "the lapse of time since the events." Additionally, the defense attorneys pointed out the psychological treatment at the medical clinic in Zenica, a half-hour ride from Vittez, literally made her memory unreliable.

In this context, thousands of years of oral memory traditions and somatic practices become submerged shadowy PTSD forms due to the cataclysmically traumatic events. South Slavic memories, especially of the mass rapes in Bosnia and the abuse and torture of women, are dismembered from historic annals, judicial systems, and ruling entities hardwired in androcratic perspectives. The rule of law found in the Yugoslav Tribunal courts and other judicial systems continue to exacerbate the victims' PTSD symptoms and disrupt Slavic memory practices.

A more recent example shows the Srebrenica survivors reeling with the September 2009 Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal's decision to destroy any artifacts from the mass graves of their male relatives. The cold logic of the decision demonstrates yet another way in which the judicial system's policies interfere with war crimes survivors' healing processes by retraumatizing them and heightening their PTSD symptoms. In Kristin Deasy and Dzenana Halimovic's (2009) Radio Free Europe report on the decision, a Srebrenica war crimes survivor—a mother—explains that many mothers who lost children don't have photographs of them, and "if you don't have a *mezar* [a Muslim grave], if you don't have photographs, if you don't have anything that belonged to that person, it's like the person never existed. Those things put us in a position to prove that we did have our children". This is understandable since South Slavic Oral memory traditions rely on iconic representations that are intergenerational. Noting Lepenski Vir's six thousand years old symbolic temples and homes structures legacy concerning rituals and burials that were mostly for children offers an example of the long legacy of South Slavic Oral memory traditions. The Lepenski Vir site, not very far from Srebrenica, provides evidence that children both lived and died there in the same pattern as the Srebrenica war crimes survivors. The Female Social Justice and South Slavic female humanities have powerfully displayed mortuary images of the four to six thousand years old artifacts strewn about in the former Yugoslav regions, but with the Tribunal's decision, this archaic wisdom practice has been dismissed. The social memory found in the simple watch localizes images of the past in the specific places

and spaces of their lives. Although fragmentary and provisional, these images of memory heal by reconsolidating the memories into the archeomythological narratives of cataclysmic violence scarring their lives.

The potential for transforming the impacts of holocaustic trauma to intergenerational healing in women's intimate environments is perhaps made most clear when we focus on another specific example found in the Yugoslav Tribunal Courts testimony of the Ahmica/Vittez war crimes. The witness's family faced the memory of a heinous war crime: their infant was baked to death on April 16, 1993. Unable to afford the removal of the nearly 100-year-old wood burning stove from the home, the witness testified that baking breads and preparing food stuff daily helps to layer their horrific memory with memorial practices involving food and warmth. The physical activity of cutting wood, stoking a fire and kneading bread eases the impact of traumatic memories in their daily lives. Rossi (2002: 106) reports that behavioral state-related gene expression has a genomic origin of behavior that is constantly cued by psychosocial input. Intergenerational trauma, intergenerational legacies of hatred, thousands of years of wars, and the mass rapes in Bosnia and the Congo have all impacted the psychosocial behaviors for future generations, thereby increasing the potential of future generations to repeat conflicts and violence. The acts of daily life—the simple preparation of a meal—serve as a continual reminder of what transpired on April 16, 1993, but the Ahmica war survivors were cued by psychosocial behaviors contained in the oral memory traditions. Rossi's neurogenesis therapeutic movement calls for activity-dependent experiences with new variations to be 'replayed' in order to signal a changing psychobiological state (Rossi, 2002: 474). The survivors in Ahmica performed their deeply intuitive replay by tapping into their life experiences for soma behaviors affecting genes that foster intergenerational transmission of wisdom prompting peace (Rossi, 2002: 476)

Features of South Slavic Oral Traditions: Engendered Approaches

The Kolo Trauma Treatment and Training of local women survivors was developed and implemented for engendering trauma treatment approaches in the intimate environment of all-women *kolos*. The oral memory traditions of the Slavs document their prodigious memorization and canting of thousands of lines without written words in a patterned narrative, a formulaic poetry verbalization (Winkler, 2008: 13). The formulaic poetry verbalization is another *kolo* trauma format in which, as Schulz (2005: 310) explains, the

right-brain (amygdala) nonverbal memory narrates past life experiences into the canting of a rhythmic memorized story. South Slavs' prowess for remembering these oral traditions informs the intergenerational wisdom for a nonkilling society. The *kolo*, folkloric circle and memorization are all performed through formulaic patterns of body movements, the earliest known forms of somatic psychology and biological practices.

Kolos are spaces where the landscape lends itself to triggering memory, where women's healing practices involve harmony and curiosity as integral aspects of intensified intergenerational learning. The degree to which all living soma are interconnected is sometimes starling. For example, on Mt. Vlasic, a half hour away from the town of Novi Travnik and pock-marked with a million landmines, we find the site of the 1984 Winter Olympics site, where an estimated more than forty people annually are victims of the land mine ordinances. Here, intergenerational trauma is perpetuated by the landscape itself, which once held memories of spirituality and healing but now triggers memories of danger, warning and death. Despite the foreboding land mines, every May Day celebration leads hundreds of families to the mountain for picnicking and *kolo* dancing. Upon asking the Novi Travnik Bosnian Muslim war survivors why they return there each year, they universally reply that they want to reclaim the mountain with their present day memories, not only those of the war and remaining threat of landmines. Here is evidence of the intergenerational wisdom propelling the community.

The interrelated themes of oral memory traditions and trauma involving the soma account for the theoretical and application realities of the *kolo*. The expression of the formulaic patterned circle themes across the globe include the soma as well as what the Slavs refer to as the Moist Mother Earth, a body just as alive as the human body. By triggering memory via landscapes and *kolos*, we etch genetic materials for intergenerational transmission. Ashmore and Knapp's (1999: 13) study describes the geographical landscape as a "materialization of memory, fixing social and individual histories in space". We have only to look at the lungs of Sherpa living in the thin air of mile high skies in the Himalayan Mountains to understand how the very land can form our bodies.

Ashmore and Knapp also point to cognitive science's claims that the key to the ways humans memorize lies in the construction of memory rather than on the retrieval of it (1999: 13). Both the living earth and living soma construct memory to narrate story, to provide instructive, meaningful lives. Additionally, Kandel's research on memory from a neuroscientist's perspective reveals that memory is layered by life experiences (2006: 210-12). Ac-

cording to South Slavic oral memory tradition as described in Anna Ilieva and Anna Shturbanova's article, "The Circle is Unbroken," the body is the recorder of life experiences; therefore, all movements stories, dances, songs and daily habits comprise the entire her/history of myths, symbols and archaic intangible legacies (1997: 317). Through the *kolos* as living matter, participants "discover the message handed down to us from antiquity, despite the layers of cultural transformation" (1997: 310). The earth as living matter records memory in geological formations, the detritus of past volcanic eruptions and asteroids' impacts millions of years old.

The suffering of survivors of violence across the globe can instruct us about how we can prevent another century of wars. The Kolo Trauma format centers on the marginalized and invisible women as the place and space for creative healing and growth through daily repetition of oral memory traditions. In reality, the *kolos* create space, manifest culture and integrate present day life experiences to pass forward into future generations *through* the body, a living soma that is essentially an eternal communal property. Through sharing women's personal revelations and lessons learned, traumatized local communities heal and focus on building peaceful communities for nonkilling future generations. By nurturing sustainability, vulnerability and truth-telling about war crimes and the economic impacts of catastrophic war, the community can become a place of growth and intensified learning. We are no longer surprised to think that Bosnian circles of women engaged in participatory actions have preserved universal, sustainable ways of dwelling in peace.

This is not to dismiss the gut wrenching laments heard from the *kolo* trauma sites across various geographical landscapes that continuously mirror the patterns of intergenerational trauma within my family of origin. As a Serbian/American daughter whose mother survived concentration camps, when I went to Africa, India and in January 2010, Haiti, I was met with the same universal pattern of intergenerational trauma that I observed in my mother and other Serbian women who had survived WWII. The question at hand is whether the transmission of holocaustic trauma is replacing the South Slavic oral memory practices that utilize memory to involve the soma and mind.

Judith Herman's work on trauma reveals that traumatic memory cannot be encoded as a "normal verbal or linear narrative that is to be assimilated into ongoing life story" (1992: 36). Turning to South Slavic oral memory traditions such as the *kolo* improve witness-bearing capacities by allowing participants to practice the skills of the "witnessing brain" that Rick Hanson

and Richard Mendius report improves lifelong learning approaches by activating positive memory while shading negative directions (2009: 177-91).

The Kolo trauma treatment program is profoundly accomplished in dealing with PTSD when accompanied by participants' intangible heritage through oral memory traditions. Only recently has the clinical field been open to approaching trauma through the compelling memories of women's realities living in a world of violence. The Kolo trauma treatment program has been developing and implementing healing for trauma for over a decade, far ahead of many operating psychological approaches and standards that remain ineffective. The main measurement used for the *kolo* trauma treatment is how the women, themselves, enact and incorporate healing methodologies to become self-sustaining while healing their families and local communities.

Identifying Somatic Folk Psychological Features in the Kolo

For South Slavs, the somatic psychologically-based practice of dancing the *kolo* or being in a circle provides an entrance into states of collective resonance inherent in their oral memory traditions and intangible heritage behaviors. The similarities between synchronized brainwaves among group meditation participants and women experiencing menstrual synchronization are well-noted in scientific research. The physiological states prompt a movement into deeper empathetic resonance with all living soma, resulting in a constant rhythmic pattern in trance, meditation, and the *kolo*. The coalescence of separate individuals into a collective is a psycho-biological and physiological state, and trauma is a psychobiological impact. Reproducing the highly-integrated *kolo* state that is nonkilling in all properties has been complicated by Holocaustic intergenerational trauma, wars and violence. But for the South Slavic war survivors, with their wounded somas and the psychobiological trauma impacts, oral memory traditions and intangible heritage provide access to the states of collective resonance. In Novi Travnik on Friday nights during the summer, the *kolo* is danced at the town's center. The community-wide *kolo* performed in front of the now derelict police station where so many were killed during the Balkan War transforms the stain of Holocaustic intergenerational trauma. With their collective body movements, the *kolo* eradicates intergenerational hatreds with the rhythmic, synchronized dance steps.

Two of the leading researchers in the field of somatic psychology, Pat Ogden and Kekuni Minton, focused their study, "Sensorimotor Psychotherapy: A Method for Processing Traumatic Memory," on how "traditional

psychotherapy addresses the cognitive and emotional elements of trauma, but lacks techniques that work directly with the physiological elements, despite the fact that trauma profoundly affects the body and many symptoms of traumatized individuals are somatically based" (Ogden). An intriguing example of a more embodied approach is the silent dance, or *kolovodja*, of Bosnia's Glamoc Valley, where females are regarded as respected leaders and continually welcome female solidarity. *Kolos* and postures gender-appropriately revere the female body in three salient dimensions. One recognizes females as female humanity able to manifest culture. Secondly, the dances manifest culture with birthing, child rearing and death as female cultural encoded potentials. Thirdly, the meaningful partnership with the Moist Mother Earth is always significantly present. Marler reports in studies completed by mother and daughter researchers Anna Ilieva and Anna Shturbanova for the Bulgarian Institute of Folklore, the *kolo*, or *hora* in Bulgarian, see the chain dance as significant for representing "this huge living body of maidens holding hands, forming the bouenek chain, [with] its own plastic movement, breath and impetus" (Marler, 1997). For nonkilling societies, the inclusion of females and the engendering process at both micro and macro levels is paramount.

Mirka Knaster's (1996) research on the Czech choreographer and dancer Rudolf Laban's creation of a system for creating dance scores similar to those created for musicians has been especially helpful for studies of the continuous nonkilling movements found in the South Slavic people's *kolovodja* and the Bulgarian's *hora*, both performed through somatic movement and actions rather than verbal expressions. The Laban-Bartenieff system of dance or movement psychotherapy has been specifically utilized for assessment, insight and change and is most useful for mapping the *kolo*'s. Laban researched movements from folk dances and martial arts to daily life motions to find universal structure and purpose in movement (1996: 248-249). By tracing the fundamentals, Laban developed a technique for transcribing dance as we do musical scores. Much like the *kolos* and folk movements, the Laban system can record recurring patterns, noting and then correcting dysfunctional movement patterns. The Mesolithic *kolo* most likely originated to propel the collective community in growth while dealing with any dysfunctional affects or when facing traumatic events. For example, the transmission of life and the honoring of both genders is self-evident South Slavic view of Mother Nature—the mythological figure 'Baba Yaga' in the *kolovodja* movement. Because gendercide or gynocide cannot exist in the *kolovodja*, a dynamic movement is prescribed to erase gender violence.

The *vodja* is known as the guide who narrates the ongoing archives of the dance, using bodily cues to introduce step changes and rhythm to ignite new patterns in the *kolovodja*'s form. The leader directs the four physical dimensions of energy, which Rudolf Laban observed as being flow, weighted, timed with spiked movement or sustained, and space as direct or indirect (Knaster, 1996: 249). When mapped, the *kolovodja*'s dance steps are similar to a meandering spiral, which is how Marler described the steps of the Bulgarian bouenek hora (Marler, 1997). The spiral for Slavs and Balkan peoples symbolizes the intergenerational wisdom of the relationship between life and death.

What is perhaps most significant is that the South Slavic *kolo* and oral memory traditions show the body instructing the mind. Neuroscientist Ernest L. Rossi also observed a generalized paradigm for the four-stage creative cycle that is "replayed" in individual or collective arts, using the neuroplasticity found in learning practices to transform the brain and its neurological responses (Rossi, 2002: 267). The communal inclusion of bodies directing the mind results in a nonkilling society. Rossi's creative replaying of the four-stage creative cycle is represented by four concentric circles. The inner circle contains the arts or science, the middle circle belongs to psychotherapy, and the outer circle holds mythology, while social/cultural/political processes (including judicial systems) outline the outer rim (2002: 267). The *kolovodja* or *hora* that Marler describes can be seen as metaphorical while somatically engaging all four concentric circles to foster neurogenesis (Marler, 1997). Whether experienced in cosmological modalities or in psychotherapeutic somatic movement, the *kolovodja* and all folk circle patterns trust the lens through which the universe is experienced in present moment. The *kolovodja's* somatic therapy teaches ethnochoreological movement patterns: while preserving intangible heritage, the *kolo* easily transmits intergenerational wisdom into a conscious community with collective purpose and meaningful somatic experiences. The *kolo* plunges participants into a metaphysical somatic orientation of using the living body to direct the mind. The vodja intertwines the energies within the cosmological fields of regenerative somatic properties each time she dances the *kolovodja*. The somatic experience for each individual is as unique as a fingerprint or snowflake, though it is represented within the collective community. The dance itself applies experiential somatic psychology while forging a deepened, if not psycho-spiritual, dimension for friendship and sisterhood—a nonkilling attribute.

The Slavs struggle to feel safe while immersed in the psychopathology of gynocide and gendercide perpetuated by intergenerational hatreds and trauma. Diane Fosha (2000: 47) explains that feeling unsafe creates fear, alarm and anxiety. In contrast, the Slavic *kolo* provides an eternally dedi-

cated and resilient network when facing life's challenges and traumatic events. The collective circle is healed as women stand shoulder to shoulder by being in a circle, kolo dance or song. Fosha's affective somatic psychology research connects these types of interactions to the honing of our abilities to navigate the relational world (2000: 28).

Handing Down: The Intergenerational Aspects of Space and Somatic Psychology

Consider how 'places' are the landscapes decorated by and comprised of females' common daily experiences, symbols, and their interpretations. In terms of locales and the wider context of the cultural and the earthly landscapes, place and space conspire to speak today of the narratives played out in the lives of our ancestors. The *kolos* are spaces and places which were intentionally manifested for the South Slavs' oral memory practices and are best suited to present the fundamental way that the *kolo* considers actions created, repeated, reproduced and elementally charged through meaningful agency. The weave for the round dances, as much as the weave of geographical landscapes, imparts a sense of place. In Space and Place, Yi-Fu Tuan eloquently explains, "If space allows movement, place is a pause, and body is 'lived body' and space is humanly construed space" (1977: 35).

Place and space require postures. "Postures" can refer to our physical body, but also, to the postures that memories hold. The horizontal and vertical postures found in the round dances of the *kolos* are equally compelling. In the constant reconsolidation and layering of memories, the mass rapes in Bosnia or the Congo sit strongly in the postures of modern females, now targets for sexual abuse and subsequent PTSD memories. One Bosnian middle-aged woman from Buna, near Mostar, expressed relief that her raped sisters did not carry children as a result. I asked why, since children are so sacred for South Slavs. She sucked her cigarette stating that men harbor such secret envy and violent desire to be round like the earth, as expectant mothers naturally become during pregnancy. Was she describing Karen Horney's "womb envy", in accurate Jungian terms for a South Slav? I know she would not have had access to Karen Horney's work nor that of Marija Gimbutas, but, for her, the issues hung on the body, the living soma. A war had been declared against female bodies, and thus all bodies were targeted.

This is where place identifies the thread of a narrative from which women can heal from the vast assortment of violence against them. It is substantially difficult to engage with the South Slavic oral memory practices

amid the slaughter of female worth and lack of honor towards her gender. Phyllis Chesler (2001: 103-120) explores how women have metabolized their worthlessness until female solidarity is eradicated. She describes an eerie silence about the indirect aggression women perform through holding grudges, gossiping, and excluding each other from community. Significantly researched, Chesler's argument that women are sexist towards their own gender and the main purveyor of hatreds towards women is a chilling testament to the loss of female solidarity.

Digging more deeply into the research on female solidarity, we find significant work on menstrual synchrony in humans. The study by Knight and Butler (2005: 14-15) actualizes the female soma by examining menstrual synchronicity's connection to female solidarity. Arguing that culture is a symbolic living organism emerging from females' intimate cycles of equality, social inter-relationships and collective ritualistic traditions, it describes the husband and wife bond as a microcosm of the polarized gender-solidarity or killing society we have today. Furthermore, Knight and Butler claim that the vastly important menstrual cycle is a phenomena that "explains all social life in terms of constraints imposed by 'selfish' self-replicatory interests of genes" (2005: 15). Through menstrual synchrony, reproductive and sexuality behaviors and cycles occur become a barometer of power and collective community inter-relationships (2005: 212). The *kolovodja* with its shoulder to shoulder replaying of a pattern synchronized through the ages becomes a symbolic metaphor of menstrual synchronicity and women's capacity to manifest a nonkilling culture. The *kolo*'s foundation in female solidarity confronts males' killing and sexual assault by establishing a sense of place that promotes egalitarian collective communities.

It is also worthwhile to note that in the abject disaster of a century of wars, the South Slavic women continued to pull together scraps of both Megalithic and modern memories to create a space in which to situate their catastrophic memories. The leader of the *Kolo Sumejja* in Novi Travnik remarked often that women often bonded over stories of sharing the only spoon in the flat of apartments and meager food rations during the war. I asked about the ways in which they bonded out of strength rather than the posture of victims. My question was never answered verbally; instead, I observed the South Slavic oral memory traditions of the *kolo* as a lived sensorimotor psychotherapy response. Igniting female solidarity while dancing or being present in the *kolo* has revived menstrual synchrony and, as most Bosnian-Herzegovina war survivors have remarked, their cycles became one.

Tilley (1997: 16) describes space as where patterns weave intentionally, inviting bodily movement or the perception of movement in contrast to a life-space where memories are etched and where feelings are felt in their entirety. The very name of the round dance, *kolo*, refers to geographical landscapes, and more importantly, the landscapes of our lives are given a living place and space (Jankovic, 1951). Clearly invested with memories that shape meaning and vital significance, the *kolo* is the pause that allows place to manifest. Place, the essence of geography, inscribes memory to transform our understandings of what was experienced in the past. The ritual round dance organizes the age-old wisdom of the Moist Mother Earth, a megalithic geodetic unit, into the present moment.

But how to pass down the memory processes of consolidation and reconstruction, the peace practices, so that they are as memorable for future generations as they are for the present one? Christine Caldwell's "Moving Cycle" declares the spiral of human life experiences as the core to healing, growth and conscious evolution: "To move is to be alive; this principle is echoed in every beat of our heart, every breath of our lungs and every gesture of our hands" (1997: 101).

Treating Holocaustic Trauma in Novi Travnik and Ahmica, Bosnia-Herzegovina

I both treated trauma and learned about trauma from Muslim women who'd survived war crimes in the village of Ahmica and the small town of Novi Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Novi Travnik has been catastrophically targeted for their munitions factory, producing a mass of war and war crimes survivors. The Novi Travnik Bosnian Muslim female war survivors organized a *kolo* called *Sumejja*, named after a martyr in the Koran. The small *kolo* of some thirteen to twenty two women spoke of not being visible to funding entities during and after the war. Faced with the prospects of yet another major clean up from the bloody conflict, the Muslim women war survivors were not only overwhelmed by the ruins of buildings and homes; they cited that hunger, freezing cold winters and reparations effects were among their smallest obstacles when trauma itself pervaded their families. Many of the women reported that while they originally resented the lack of aid, they'd discovered that by tapping into archaic oral memory traditions and practices, their abilities to heal trauma in their local community flourished. On April 16, 1993, 150 Muslims in Ahmica, mostly elderly and children as young as infants were slaughtered by Croatian war criminals during

the early morning call to prayer. The Ahmica Bosnian Muslim grandmothers lament that all they'd once had, their families, had been slaughtered. The survivors of this bloody genocidal war faced economic strife because their very names made procuring work in the mostly Croatian settlement impossible. The women of Ahmica organized their *kolo* and made handicrafts. Since both *kolos* are only two kilometers apart, they maintain close ties of support and peace. During the Balkan War, the throughway that connects the two communities was known as Death Highway, but despite their locations on the frontlines of catastrophic conflict, the women do not speak of intergenerational hatred. Instead, they work to prevent other women from ever experiencing their grief and loss.

The war crimes survivors' intuition is to find meaning in gendercide, gynocide, and genocide by living peaceful existences in their own communities. The aftermath of genocidal war destroys hospitals, schools and mental health institutions. The intangible intergenerational heritages passed through oral memory traditions are all too often eroded and eventually annihilated as well. The exception, however, in this case was a group of South Slavic women with no funding. These survivors' marginalized status made them more aware and attuned to the resources to be found in archaic oral memory traditions.

The intergenerational transmission of oral memory traditions is excavated from the rubble of Holocaustic violence. Though the women war survivors were for the most part unaware of the anthropological and archeological prehistory, they were able to remember both implicitly and explicitly how the sacred *kolo* manifests peaceful culture. In "The Roots of Lepenski Vir Culture," Dragoslav Srejovic describes the *kolo*, danced in the form of a circle, as having an explicit expression of outward behaviors and responses with the rounded houses and temples (Gimbutas, 1989: 284). Interestingly, among the rubble of their homes and buildings, the Muslim women war survivors noted that in the past ages the oral memory traditions were expressed in clay bricks, cement and mortar. In their pursuit of a nonkilling society in the aftermath of war, they literally used the strewn bricks and mortar as foundations for their archaic practices. The building of a *pech* (Serbo-Croatian for fireplace) from the ruins of bombed and mortared homes, became the first priority for survivors, followed closely beginning self-sustaining gardens regardless of how little room one had to farm. Seeds began to sprout on the smallest balconies of flats. These South Slav suggestions of a return to the Moist Mother Earth also suggest a return to the folk somatic psychological movements and formulaic patterns honed in the *kolo*.

The very same technology to rebuild after disasters is shown in the thousand year (6,500 to 5,500 BCE) settlement of Lepenski *Vir*, which is now under water due the building of a dam. *Vir* in Serbo-Croatian translates to whirlpools. The Mesolithic settlement once faced the Danube River where the water flowed into great whirlpools in direct view of fifty temples. Archeologists surmise Lepenski *Vir* as a ritual space for the burial of children. Gimbutas (1989: 284) describes Lepenski *Vir*'s houses as facing the Danube River with one rounded end outward angle of the circle's symbolic 60 degrees, as if to continue the *kolo*'s iconic representations replicated in brick and mortar.

Essentially, the South Slavic women war survivors' daily small acts of rebuilding among the ruins of brick and mortar are actualizing intergenerational wisdom. Not only surviving but thriving in the aftermath of trauma via the *kolo* requires collaboration and solidarity. Through this unification, what is implicit—the visceral, instinctual and emotional states within the South Slavic culture and female humanity—becomes explicit in brick, mortar and agricultural harvests to create peaceful and harmonious community. The truest art form of Lepenski *Vir* and the Neolithic "Old Europe" was the nonkilling society. Death, according to Slavs, was earned and performed with dignity as one aged, faced natural disasters, or drought, not machetes, guns or missiles.

Somatic Folk Psychological Approaches

Big boned with large hands and feet, Fatima, a widow who has buried two husbands and two sons, gazes at her hands and says, "I buried my husbands and sons with these hands." Fatima was known to sleep on her sons' graves in the Muslim graveyard outside Novi Travnik, Bosnia. "I'd walk there with these feet," said Fatima. Her second husband was a Croat, making their entire family a target of intergenerational hatred, especially from her brother-in-law. Fatima described how the Croatian military knocked on her front door of her house, where her family had been imprisoned throughout the Balkan war, to inform her of her son's death. Upon hearing the news, her Croat husband shot and killed himself.

Ethnic hatreds based on religious divides were repressed for fifty years under Tito's communist rule. Fatima spoke of her in-laws' hatred of her and her son. Fatima reported that her husband's son was present when her own son was killed. The army told her that they were playing roulette. However Fatima told me that she knows the intergenerational hatred of Muslims too well. I searched her face for any sign of hatred or malice in re-

turn, but I found only a mother's sorrow for not being able to protect her son and regret for earlier decisions that set the course of fate.

When I was first introduced to Fatima by the leader of *Kolo Sumejja* women, the *kolo* leader spoke of her sleeping on her sons' graves and how depressed she was. I realized that Fatima was triggered by the landscape, the cemetery and stones that marked her son's graves. Coaxing her to become more involved in our *kolo* meetings, I saw Fatima slowly move away from depression. At one point in our *kolo* gatherings with Fatima I told her in no uncertain terms that I could not sleep on the cold graves with her. Fatima said she would never ask me to do so, but I explained to her that if I wanted to visit her at night, I would have to go to the graves where she sleeps. One thing South Slavs cannot bear is shame for failing to be extraordinary hostesses. By finding a way to convert the shame into friendship, we created a space for intergenerational wisdom to flourish in a peaceful community. She stopped sleeping on the graves because she could never know when I would come to visit. Fatima asked in all seriousness, "What would it look like to have an American/Serb woman sleeping on Muslim graves?"

Despite her preservation and guardianship of friendship, Fatima's body screamed of loss and grief: her right leg was in constant pain and she suffered from debilitating back pain. Her sister, years older, was handicapped with a stiff left leg. Fatima was always first to point out her sister's talent for singing South Slavic women's songs, as if the gift was the result of her rigid and useless left leg. Fatima, who did not dance the *kolos* but actively preferred the circle of women, started to prepare extraordinary meals. The abundance of food spread across the table would have me searching for her two husbands and two sons to partake of the feast. When I pointed this out, the moment exploded in a powerful current of suffering and agony over the loss of her family members. Fatima would later tell me that she was subsequently able to absorb their deaths more deeply. Through her solidarity with her sisterhood *kolo*, she recognized that her chronic pain had become the seamless flux of trauma struggling for respite. She discovered that her leg and back pain disappeared while cooking, caring for chickens, or gardening, and later reported that culinary practices, breathing and daily life had replaced her chronic body pain.

Conclusion

The *kolo* and South Slavic oral memory traditions pointed to a method for building female solidarity in the aftermath of a century of wars. The produc-

tion of killing societies has eroded, perhaps radically, females' worth and their contributions towards nonkilling communities. Though often overlooked, the earliest origins of sensorimotor psychotherapy, clearly evolved the human species in eras preceding the catastrophic manmade violence we know today.

The rich totemic rituals and oral memory traditions are derived from and propelled by the intergenerational wisdom filled with peaceful, life-inducing properties that manifest culture. We have been so indoctrinated with the belief that only men can rule the world and bring order to chaos while women are confined to less worthy, subordinate roles that we are sometimes incapable of seeing how the South Slavic and global oral memory traditions are the only lived egalitarian nonkilling practices and somatic behaviors. Riane Eisler's millennium book, *The Chalice and the Blade*, determined that the dehumanized view of women from the pre-biblical era to the "mass of biblical prescriptions and proscriptions" was constructed to invest males' ownership of females as a protective right and entitlement. The result was the erection of a continuing threat to the rigidly male-dominated killing society (1988: 96-97). The Kolo: Women's Cross Cultural Collaboration trauma treatment and training creates a space for the South Slavic oral memory traditions to burst forth in amazing alacrity and somatic depth from the rubble of a male-dominated, organizationally-institutionalized psychology.

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Building Peace

Confronting Representations of the Ethnically Other in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Media Space

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This paper claims that dismantling misconceptions about the ethnic Other is essential to building a civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, coming to terms with the past by acknowledging the crimes committed in the Bosnian War is an important step in the long-term stability of the country. The media has played an important role in shaping national identities and in constructing collective memories in the post-war period. This analysis problematizes identifications based on ethnicity in the broader context of the role of the media in creating stereotypes of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual preference.

Ideologically loaded media representations—obviously not unique to the Balkan region—stereotype places or people as Other, and make polarizations in terms of 'us versus them.' The obvious example is Hollywood film, where the viewers are subtly or directly encouraged to identify only with one side and to reject counter-representations. Ten contributors to the 2013 issue *Nonkilling Media,* published by the Center for Global Nonkilling and Creighton University, argue for the use of new technologies to promote nonkilling and for journalists, filmmakers, or videogame designers to be held responsible for interfering with the viewer's ability to imagine peaceful societies. Evans Pim calls for a more responsible reporting and advocates for reporters to "consciously introduce news items that maximize nonkilling opportunities" (2013: 26). Lee, Hurley and Sweeney focus on the role of cinema in promoting violence. They agree that the possibility to imagine a nonkilling society of the future is impeded by current economic forces operating in the movie industry. There is "a symbiotic relationship between cinema's ability to create fictional narratives and images and its power to create social attitudes, to shape thoughts and beliefs, and to construct prisms through which people view the world and other people" (Lee, 2013: 43). Hurley invites "filmmakers to see past the practices and mindset that focus on killing and create a film about the future based on nonkilling

[as] an act of resistance against the hegemonic forces at work in contemporary society, and within their industry" (2013: 153). The ten authors analyze global media and advocate for major shifts in the role of the media in shaping a nonkilling world. Lee emphasizes the role of cinema in "misportray[ing] and misrepresent[ing] a whole race of people with lethal consequences." As an example, he discusses the representation of Arabs in film and claims that "Hollywood films have spent several decades maligning, caricaturing, and misrepresenting Arabs" (2013: 43). In cultural studies the concept of otherness, that is, defining oneself by demarcating borders, is especially problematic in the context of European integration. Defining cultures by demarcating borders—i.e. placing alien cultures outside—confers the status of exclusivity on the host culture. Insisting on differences and exclusivity, rather than commonalities among various national cultures, undermines economic and political integration not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in the European Union. We are now witnessing the alignment of European nations along national and religious divides with the pretext of defending national security. The line between racism and a legitimate and justified call for increased security measures is blurring because of media fear-mongering. The media coverage of the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis contributes to the dangerous rhetoric of "us" versus "them" and further divides people based on religion and ethnicity. Evans Pim claims that "[e]scalation- orientated and warmongering reporting fosters myths and beliefs that inflame conflict, demonizing the 'other' through a zero-sum game of antagonism using oppositional metaphors ('us' vs. 'them')" (2013: 27). The polarization is amplified on a global level with the help of new technologies. Ethnic conflicts and divisions have become global, and as Carey claims, "Everywhere state and nation are pitted against one another; primordia have been globalized and identity politics is practiced on a world scale" (cf. Evans Pim, 2013: 18).

Although this discussion warrants a broader context of cultural studies and ideological stereotyping, the focus is Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Media Space: its film and TV production. The analysis of selected media texts reveals how media representations based on ethnicity is a destabilizing factor in the region and an obstacle to creating a civil society.

The theoretical framework of the discussion about the ethnic Other is Lacan's concept of the *mirror stage*. Film theorists linked "the cinematic experience to that of Lacan's mirror stage, in which the subject believes itself to attain a mastery of the self and of the visual field that it does not actually have" (McGowan and Kunkle, 2006: xiii). Viewers believe that "their gaze is

freely floating the screen while in fact they are manipulated by the movie camera; all sorts of identifications with film protagonists happened through this manipulation" (id.). Within the framework of the post-psychoanalytical analysis of cultural relations, Lacan's *mirror stage* is extended to film and cultural studies and to different forms of misconceptions. One can also consider ethnic identification as an "imaginistic construction," the status of which is problematic. This dismantling of misconceptions about the ethnic Other is an important form of cultural literacy, especially in the context of building civil society as a precondition for stability and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Television has played a significant role in constructing ethnic divisions. Today the media space in Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided along ethnic lines. News channels in particular contribute to widening ethnic divisions. Each of the three entities favours its own TV news programs, which is one of the viewers' most important sources of information, one that shapes their opinions and their sense of the past. The 2012 Open Society Foundation's *Country Report Mapping Digital Media Bosnia and Herzegovina* confirms significant polarization along ethnic lines of the television and print media markets. According to The Open Society's *Report*, "Given the existing ethnic divides in B&H, there is very little doubt that RTRS is the broadcaster of the Serbs and not of all the citizens living in the Republika Srpska entity. By the same token, Federal Television is mainly perceived as Bosniak, especially when it comes to airing the opinions of Croatian and Serbian politicians" (36-37).

The media space in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided along ethnic lines, while the political structures capitalize on the construction and recreation of distinctive collective identities by controlling media content. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina underwent fragmentation of the collective memory along ethnic lines. Jurica Botic (2012) argues that "different experiences over the last two decades of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and still unresolved basic political problems among these peoples, paralyze the process of transition from a society of three ethnical communities into a civil society". The divided collective in Bosnia has a strong impact on how individual memories are reshaped and constructed, and thus the process of national reconciliation in Bosnia is undermined. The media space is contested and the media in each entity—whether Croatian, Bosnian, or Serbian—promotes its own "national narrative." In her paper "The Competition of National Narratives in the Case of Mostar." Zeljka Ivkovic identifies the key elements of the three narratives: "sacralization of the nation," "divergence/convergence" and "amnesia."

"Sacralization of the nation" means that belonging to a particular religion is identified with belonging to a particular national community; "divergence /convergence" refers to two polarized myths about religious-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the term "amnesia" refers to a discontinuity in collective memory that relates to the termination of relations between national narratives and their shared Yugoslav past. These characteristics are observed in various reinterpretations of Mostar's past.

I would like to focus on discontinuity in collective memories as one of the strongest obstacles to building a civil society. I am aware that the term "collective memories" is problematic, since collective memories consist of individual memories that cannot be unified in one consistent view; that is why Halbwachs contends that collective memory is never a simple sum of individual memories because it never offers "a singular collective view" (cf. Van Dijk, 2007: 9). According to Jeffrey (2004: 10), for trauma to become collective, "social crises must become cultural crises" and the sense of trauma has to became a part "of the collectivity's sense of its own identity".

Van Dijk (2007: 12) prefers the term "cultural memory" over "collective memory" because he believes that the individual cannot be separated from the culture since individual remembering is shaped by culture. Elsaesser (2008: 405) acknowledges the justified criticism of cultural and collective memory, since the diversity and multitude of details cannot be integrated by the subject nor can it be "unified by narrative emplotment". However, he also affirms the value of cultural memory with its insistence on witnessing. Cultural memory may help to bridge the gap between understanding and seeing, and maybe overcome the crisis of perception. Official history can attempt to explain but cannot help to see. That's where "the literature of witnessing " can help (Elsaesser, 2008: 405).

In this context, I would like to mention one recent incident in Sarajevo, on the occasion of the reopening of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the Serbian Army destroyed in the war. In an article for the website <radiosarajevo.ba>, Dino Mustafic, a well known theatre director from Sarajevo, commented on the political pressure exerted by the officials of the Office of the European Commission in Sarajevo on the mayor Ivo Komsic to remove the memoral plaque from the rebuilt National and University Library. The plaque reads:

> On this place Serbian criminals in the night of 25th - 26th August, 1992, set on fire the National and University's Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over 2 million books, periodicals, and documents vanished in the flame.
> Do not forget, remember and warn!

Mustafic emphasizes that remembering helps prevent future disasters and argues that "there is no culture of compassion and empathy without conscientious and responsible confronting of the past". However, Mustafic also recommends that instead of the ethnic term Serbs, the term *Chetniks* be used since the latter comprises only the extreme nationalist and fascist part of the Serb population. Abandoning the ethnic label helps avoid the stereotyping of people based on ethic origin. The question is how to reconcile two opposing attitudes in BiH: One is to keep the memory of the war alive, in order to prevent future disaster; and the other, especially among the younger generation, is to stop talking about the war, and to look to the future. What we often see in the media is not a factual portrayal of the past but a blaming of the other side; what we need is to confront the past by collectively accepting the *facts* of the war and by making them public in all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We need to acknowledge the facts of the war so that we can eventually stop talking about the war. As Nos Aldás (2013: 100) argues "memory put into practice learns from the past in order to be useful to the present. It functions as a way to as a way to help new generations to understand and to learn the lessons of history, either the dangers and suffering of violent events or the benefits of social change good practices".

"Remembering the war" is a prevalent topic in many films made after the Bosnian War ended. The film *Belvedere* (2010) by Ahmed Imamovic tells the story of the (mostly female) survivors of the Srebrenica genocide. This film dramatizes the conflict between remembering and forgetting and fosters remembering in an attempt to document, to procure historical evidence; this really happened, and on a mass scale, the film affirms. The voice-over persistently cites names, dates of births and the deluge of the factual forces the spectator to see, to acknowledge. The camera focuses on the material evidence—bones and skulls. This is what Elsaesser calls the "general pathos of the literal" in cultural memory "with its attachment to detail" (2008: 403). The past is a contested area and the film images refactualize it in the new context of post-war Srebrenica.

The film demonstrates the impossibility of healing in the present social, political, and psychological context of Bosnia. Jeffrey refers to social scientists who emphasize the importance of "restoring collective sociological health by lifting societal repression and restoring memory" and finding "some collective means for undoing repression and allowing the pent-up emotions of loss and mourning to be expressed" (2004: 7). Similarly, Roy Brand argues that expressing the traumatic experience and communicating it by witnessing is necessary: "Communicability is intrinsic to experience in

such a way that its loss implies a loss of experience" (2009: 205). The survivors in Belvedere are silenced. They lack "collective means" or institutional means to communicate the past experience. They are silent with each other, locked in the circle of incommunicable suffering, where they cannot find a way to integrate the past events into their lives, into their autobiographies or into continuity of their lives, or to be able to tell the story and look back at what happened (Kol and Hart, cf. Roth, 1996: 205). They face a wall of deliberate forgetting. Roth claims, "To make the past into a narrative is to confront the past with the forces of forgetting" (1996: 208). Belvedere demonstrates how the impossibility to communicate or to narrate the past perpetuates trauma. The camera mimics this "referentiality of the unconscious," of "things we don't know we know," of things "outside of [the character's] volition or control, but nonetheless there in the apprehension of [their] sudden or unexpected return" (Elsaesser, 2008: 404). The images of the white tombstones that trigger memories on an unconscious level dominate the screen. The film's images are teeming with the absent. The metonymic film signs, the sea of tombstones that stand for the dead, imply unresolved trauma. They stand for the buried but also for the missing, whose bodies are not there, whose story is not told and the memory of those whose existence cannot be evoked.

Imamovic attempts to do what Roth claims Alain Resnais does in *Hiroshima Mon Amour,* only in a different manner. Resnais is "projecting forgetting onto the screen," by "the withdrawal of destroyed Hiroshima from our consciousness" (Roth, 1996: 204). Imamovic saturates the image with the bones and tombstones of the dead to emphasize the paradox of the killed being absent, or forced out of our consciousness. The relatives invoke shadows in place of missing narratives; "How old would Saliha be if she had lived?" asks the father of a murdered child. Imamovic gives voice, or a narrative possibility, to those speaking subjects. He lets their memories "speak through them."

A substantial number of local filmmakers attempt to break the hold of the fascination with ethnicity and to refuse to assign value to the collective ethnic Other. For example, two films made by local directors, *The Perfect Circle* (*Savrseni krug* 1997) by Ademir Kenovic and *Grbavica* (2006) by Jasmila Zbanic expose the imaginary status of the ethnic Other, problematize identification based on ethnicity, and expose the gaze of the other as the source of misconceptions about ethnic Otherness.

In *The Perfect Circle*, the director refuses to threat the ethnic Other as a collective mythical subject. In Kenovic's film, Hamza, a poet, shelters two refugee boys in his house. When they realize that Hamza's next-door-

neighbor is a Serb, they ask Hamza how he can be friend with a "Chetnik". Hamza replies: "'The name does not make a Chetnik.' 'And what does?' asks the child. 'The Killing,' responds Hamza."

Dzevad Karahasan, Bosnian writer and literary theorist, notes that, in typical Sarajevan communication, the presence of the ethnic Other heightens social anxiety. In "normal cities," as Karahasan calls monoreligious cities, one's identity is almost automatic, while in Sarajevo it is always challenged because of the presence of ethnic Others. In Sarajevo "one is always reminded of its identity by juxtaposing it against that of others," which then promotes meaningful, individualized communication and a treatment of the ethnic Other as a unique human being rather than a member of an ethnic collective (Karahasan, 2008: 163). This need for meaningful communication is a way to avoid being part of "the emotionalized crowd" since it is always dangerous to address people as members of ethnic groups. In the constant interaction among ethnically different others, there was, according to Karahasan, a tendency in pre-war Sarajevo communication to avoid generalization about the ethnic Other, but to focus instead on the particularities of each individual. Typical Sarajevo communication becomes, as Karahasan calls it, "the structure of the platonic being of the city of Sarajevo" (2008: 164)[1]. In this type of narration, the object is contemplated from different points of view. Through reflections, images and echoes, the object is reconstructed rather than named. It reflects "the inherent skepticism of the narrator in the possibility of knowing an object" (Karahasan, 2008: 164). This illustrates that there is no tangible psychological reality behind the ethnic Other. It can be classified as part of Lacan's concept of the Imaginary since its status only exists through fantasy. This means that as soon as we engage in real communication with a particular subject, the fantasized ethnic Other becomes a specific person difficult to reduce to the obscure concept of ethnicity.

The imaginary status of the ethnic Other is exposed in Jasmila Zbanic's film *Grabavica*. The film's protagonist Esma, a Muslim woman who was raped by Chetniks in a camp for Muslim prisoners, struggles to raise her daughter, who was born at the camp and fathered by an unknown Serb soldier. Hiding the truth from her teenage daughter, she tries to come to terms with her traumatic past and to make a living for the two of them.

Having found out the secret of her birth, Sara is devastated and her world crumbles into pieces. In an act of shame, she shaves her head and walks to the ruins of a building surrounded by yellow tape. It is in this dan-

[1] It is important to note that his observation is about pre-war Sarajevo.

gerous forbidden space, where only the socially ostracized can venture, that the beginnings of a process of healing takes place for Sara. There she meets her boyfriend Mirza and they kiss. Later she goes on a school trip and while the bus is leaving the city, it passes by Sarajevo's landmark building: the burnt building of the daily newspaper "Oslobodjenje." Sara joins the crowd who sing a song to Sarajevo: "We grew up together, [Sarajevo] you and I; the same blue sky gave us a verse; under [Mount] Trebevic we dreamed our dreams—which of us would grow faster, which would become more beautiful." Sara smiles, and through the love for that imagined Sarajevo she transcends her status of a Chetnik's bastard. After a symbolic act of self-punishment—shaving her head—she transcends the fantasy of the hateful Other in herself by refusing to identify with the gaze of the Other.

The two films testify to the reduced space of individual freedom in the modern polis. Sarajevo is a radical example of that process. Freedom is threatened through the presence of various ideological fantasies. The value of the selected films is in their attempt to explore the ways of breaking the hold of fantasies. The films acknowledge the fictional status of the ethnic Other and demonstrate the directors' humanistic choice to refuse to assign value to the collective ethnic Other, and to strip it of its mythical status.

What is happening in the media space of Bosnia and Herzegovina is certainly not unique. One needs only to refer to the so-called 'culture war' in America between the red and blue states. In the US people are choosing whether to live in red or blue states according to their political preference, which is reflected in their lifestyle (Jenkins, 2006: 249). The gap between the two Americas is wide and people choose communication channels according to their political preferences (2006: 247). It would be interesting to see if viewers' taste in fictional content (e.g. movies or television series) is dependent upon or defined by their political preferences. There is some evidence that political positions influence people's taste in fictional content. An article in The New York Times reports on the correlation between the voting habits of Americans and their taste in films. The review was published in 2004, after John Kerry lost the election to George Bush. The report claims that "Hollywood is obsessed with 18- to 34-year-olds, and those people didn't come out and vote. The analysis concludes "most people who watch 'The Sopranos' voted for Kerry. Most people who saw 'The Grudge' didn't vote." Most of those who liked "The Passion of the Christ" (2004, Mel Gibson) voted Republican (cf, Jenkins). It would be interesting to do a study on the correlation between viewers' voting habits and their taste in film and television programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One can only guess that, let's say, those

in Republika Srpska who liked *Kod Amidze Idriza* (Pjer Zalica, 2004) or *No Man's Land* (Danis Tanovic, 2001) will not be voting for Milorad Dodik.

There is, however, a certain kind of fictional media content in Bosnia and Herzegovina that attracts viewers across ethnic lines: comedy television series. This type of media content is a strong common denominator—we can at least laugh at the same jokes and identify with fictional characters more than with real political figures of questionable character. In the context of contemporary America, Jenkins argues "We may be able to talk across our differences if we find commonalities through our fantasies. This is in the end another reason why popular culture matters politically—because it doesn't seem to be about politics at all" (2006: 250). The TV comedy series *Crazy, Confused and the Normal One* (*Lud, zbunjen, normalan*) (dir. Elmir Jukic, 2007-2013) is a telling example of a television program that attracts viewers of all ethnic groups. It aired in almost all of the ex-Yugoslavian states and is one of the most popular comedy series in the region. The series has an air of nostalgia for pre-war Sarajevo, and with the typical urbane Sarajevan multiethnic flair, it expresses a decidedly anti-nationalist stance. The comedic effect in *Crazy, Confused and the Normal One* is based on undermining the viewers' subjective position and unveiling ideological layers prevalent in Bosnian society. Ideology is being contested through the subversive role of the comic. The new ideology of ethnocentrism replaced that of the brotherhood, socialism, and national unity of the previous regime. The theme of nostalgia for the ideological values of the previous system—when Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of socialist Yugoslavia—is treated in *Crazy, Confused and the Normal One*. Nostalgia is prevalent among the characters of the older generation. Izet, the grandfather, when despairing over society's plunge into nationalist rhetoric, invokes Tito's name, "Dear Tito," almost as an incantation. However, through humour, the series undermines all characters' subjective positions—Izet's nostalgia for Tito's era, as well as, for example, his neighbour's nationalist rhetoric that promotes opportunism. Atila Lukic and Gordan Maslov, in their paper "Memories of Our Better Future: Remembering Socialism in Ex-Yugoslavia," argue that "in the form of so called 'socialist nostalgia' we do not encounter a desire for a utopian socialist past but yearn for a long-ago promised (utopian) capitalist future". Persisting memories of the shared Yugoslavian past and the betrayed expectations of a bright future in post-socialist societies are strong enough factors to bring together viewers throughout the region, at least to share a laugh. A systematic detoxification of the media from national rhetoric, but at the same time the acknowledgment of the crimes committed during the war is necessary for peace and stability in the region. In

the broader context of the role of communication channels in forming opinions, Jenkins, prominent media theorists, in his book *Convergence Culture* argues for 'find[ing] unifying principles or act[ing] upon points of consensus" in order "to communicate across our differences" (2006: 247-8). Jenkins emphasizes that "…knowledge cultures depend on the quality and diversity of information people can access (Jenkins, 2006: 249). Jenkins is cautiously optimistic that "…the emergence of a knowledge-based culture [will] enhance democracy and global understanding" because it will "model new protocols for interacting across our differences" (2006: 249). Sweeney (2013: 122) argues that "[i]n negotiating the relationship between technology and social change, it is obvious that this interrelation is causal, but it is equally apparent that the link is inherently imaginative, which is to say grounded in possibilities and potentialities. As the still unfolding events of the Arab Spring suggest, technologies inspire in as much as they transpire images of the future".

Comprehensive data about the role of digital media in the process of dismantling ethnic barriers in Bosnia and Herzegovina is lacking, but the social protests that started in February 2014 provide evidence of "new protocols for interacting across our differences." Using various social networks, people are gathering to participate in civil protests, unlike the earlier so-called "*mitinzi*" (rallies), which were in support of various nationalist leaders. The participants no longer act as members of ethnic groups, but rather as angry citizens demanding that their nationalist leaders step down and thus make it possible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to move forward.

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Films and TV Series

Crazy, Confused and the Normal One (Lud, zbunjen, normalan). Elmir Jukic, 2007-13.

Belvedere. Ahmed Imamovic, 2010.

Grbavica. Jasmila Zbanic, 2006.

The Perfect Circle (Savrseni krug). Ademir Kenovic, 1997.

"The Child is the Father to the Man"

Laying the Foundations for Nonkilling in Childhood

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War and killing are almost exclusively perpetrated by adults, yet the impact of such interpersonal violence is felt by all members of society including and perhaps especially children and youth (see Pearn, 2003; Plunkett and Southall, 1998; Wessells, 1997). In a recent follow-up study of 881 secondary students from nine schools in Central Bosnia, conducted by Layne and colleagues (2010) five years after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, over half of the youth reported having a bomb or bullet come so close they could have been hurt, and nearly half reported losing an extended family member in the war. Over one-third had a sibling and/or close personal friend who was killed; 10% reported losing their father, and 1% reported losing their mother. Nearly half of the students were forced to leave their homes because of the war. One in five reported witnessing someone being physically assaulted, killed or severely injured. There is no doubt that such experiences can adversely affect the development of a child, and indeed, a range of negative outcomes have been documented for children who experience such political violence and conflict, including internalizing difficulties such as depression, externalizing problems like aggression, post traumatic stress disorders, impaired academic performance, and disturbances in personality and moral development (see Barber, 2013; Barenbaum, Ruchkin, and Schwab-Stone, 2004; Entholt and Yule, 2006). The political conflicts that took place in the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s is no exception here, with several studies documenting the short-term and medium-term impact of the war on surviving youth (e.g., Allwood, Bell-Dolan and Husain; 2002; Baráth, 2002 a,b; Hasanovic, Sinanovic and Pavlovic, 2005; Kravic, Palevic, Hasanovic, 2013; Ringdal, Ringdal and Simkus, 2006; Smith, Perrin, Yule Hacam and Stuvland, 2002; Zivcic, 1993). Although research in this area is limited, and longitudinal studies documenting long-term effects are rare, findings to date leave little question that the effects of war and killing are evident in subsequent generations.

The effects of political violence and war on developing youth, however, varies across individuals (Barber, 2013), and we are just beginning to understand the risk and protective factors that operate here. We do know, however, that the impact of such violence differs as a function of the type of violence experienced and the social affiliations developed in its aftermath. Indeed, results of a 6-year longitudinal study of Catholic and Protestant children in Belfast, Ireland by Cummings and colleagues (see Cummings, Goeke-Morey, Merrilees, Taylor and Shirlow, 2014), showed that sectarian political violence (e.g., bombs, objects thrown across community divisions) has a more consistent and negative impact on youth adjustment than nonpolitical violence (home break-ins, robberies, muggings). They found that political violence erodes children's sense of security and safety within the family and community, leaving doubts about adults' ability to provide adequate protection. Such emotional insecurity, in turn, increases one's risk for internalizing and externalizing difficulties in later life. Importantly, the impact of political violence on children was found to vary depending on the groups with which youth identified subsequently. In cases where group members provided one another with positive social support, the effect was positive. In contrast, for those children who affiliated with groups that fostered and promoted aggression and discrimination against outgroup members, the impact was negative. Thus, how adults respond to political violence can buffer its impact on children.

Why do people engage in political violence, wars, and killing, and how can we put an end to such interpersonal aggression? We, the authors, are neither historians nor political scientists, but educational and developmental psychologists interested in how individuals develop socially. And each of us has led a rather privileged life, without any personal experience with war or killing. What then do we have to offer an exploration of nonkilling? We share a common interest in the study of human interpersonal relations, with a goal of finding ways to foster positive social development through education. To this end, we have worked with schools and educators to teach children the skills needed to treat each other with respect and dignity, to cope with conflict in peaceful ways, and to work together to create a world in which individuals respect one another and find strength in diversity. Admittedly, we have pursued these interests in Canada, an increasingly multicultural country that has experienced decades of peace. Although Canadians still struggle with issues of interpersonal violence and aggression, and with the challenges of racism and discrimination, especially with regard to its indigenous peoples, we recognize that we are working in a privileged context. However, such a context has afforded us a unique opportunity to explore the ways in which

we might foster positive human relations in future generations. In this chapter, we want to share what we have learned in our efforts to foster positive social development through education in hopes that some of our work might contribute to efforts to promote nonkilling.

We began by first trying to understand *why* human beings engage in killing. Although there are many different perspectives and disciplines considering this issue, our efforts focused on the psychology underlying such behavior. Political psychologists have long considered the factors that lead to war, conflict and interpersonal violence among adults (e.g., Staub, 2003a,b; 2011) and many view such inter-group conflict as emanating from unfulfilled needs (e.g., see Burton, 1990 on human needs theory). Put simply, they begin with the premise that human beings all have a shared or universal set of fundamental needs that must be fulfilled to achieve well-being, with more basic needs requiring attention before addressing higher level needs. These needs constitute a primary motivation for human behavior. When these needs are fulfilled constructively, positive, caring and helpful relations ensue, but when fulfilment of these needs are frustrated, human beings are far more likely to engage in hostile and violent behaviour toward one another.

Harkening back to the 1950s and 60s and Abraham Maslow's original hierarchy of needs (1954/1987, 1968), all human beings must first address biological and physiological needs, such as hunger and thirst, and the need for shelter and clothing. Once these most basic needs are met, humans focus on safety and security needs, including the need for protection and stability. Next comes the need to belong, feel part of a group, and to participate in intimate relationships, which social psychologists (e.g., Baumeister and Leary, 1995) and motivational theorists (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 1985) have increasingly recognized as critical to positive development and functioning for all humans. When people feel safe and have a sense of belonging, they turn attention to self-esteem and identity needs, which are again fundamental to all human beings. And it is only once all of these basic needs are adequately met that individuals can achieve their highest level of success and well-being, what Maslow referred to as *self-actualization*.

If we want to create caring, nonviolent and nonkilling societies, it becomes critical to understand the complex interplay of influences and mechanisms that serve to promote or discourage the fulfilment of basic human needs across the lifespan and the outcomes that ensue when basic needs are and are not met. In the research described earlier by Cummings and colleagues (2014) regarding the Catholic and Protestant children of Belfast, human needs theory would suggest that political violence undermined the children's sense

of safety and security, and efforts to enhance one's sense of connection and belonging were met by aligning with particular social groups. The nature and focus of those groups, whether they provided youth with positive social support or fostered outgroup discrimination and aggression, determined the positive versus negative outcomes that emerged for the children.

Maslow's hierarchy of human needs is typically applied to individuals, but people develop and function within a complex system of families, communities, institutions and cultures, each of which contribute to and influence development, beliefs and behaviour, as reflected in Bronfenbrenner's (1979) *social-ecological* model of development. Specifically, Bronfenbrenner posited that, in addition to the influence of individual characteristics such as age, sex, health status, etc., children's development is influenced by the immediate "microsystems" in which they function, including the family, the peer group, school, church, health services, etc. These microsystems interact with one another, positively or negatively, at the level of "mesosystems." For example, beyond families, schools are one of the most powerful socialization agents in children's lives, exposing children to the larger social world of nonfamilial adults and peers. Whether family values or priorities support or conflict with those of the school or the child's peer group can affect how a child develops. Moreover, these systems are also influenced by the larger society in which the child lives, as reflected in the "exosystem" which includes such things as neighborhoods, mass media, local politics, available social services, industry, etc. Thus, religious institutions (be it church, mosque, or temple), media, and social conditions also shape how individuals develop and to what extent their basic needs are met, as do relationships between levels of influence, systems and the people within them. And, in turn, these exosystems are influenced by the larger "macrosystem", including the attitudes, ideologies, and values of one's wider culture, and by the "chronosystem" which includes changes over time. Thus, although human needs are universal, just how particular needs are met is determined in large part by the culture and the contexts in which we live, promoting or discouraging particular behaviors, beliefs and attitudes (Staub, 2003a,b).

To illustrate the impact of the larger social context on children, we offer an example from the second author that occurred when serving as a school teacher in the United Arab Emirates, demonstrating how the experiences of adults who lived through war can impact the lives of the children they serve many years after the war is over. The incident took place with a group of elementary students (eight-year-olds) from nearby countries that were accustomed to political unrest, including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq,

and Iran. At that time (2004), many of the teachers and administrators were Lebanese expatriates who had left Lebanon because of civil war. As the teacher walked into her classroom, the students were yelling that one of the boys had slapped one of the girls in the class. The girl was in tears with a reddened cheek and the boy was standing in front of her. Just as the teacher was starting to think of how to address the situation peacefully, the principal walked in and the class yelled again, telling the principal what happened. Without hesitation, the principal turned to the girl and instructed her to slap the boy back. The girl started crying, prompting the principal to tell that that if she did not slap the boy back, the principal would personally slap the girl again. The girl had no choice but to follow orders and slap the boy. The principal left immediately and the teacher did not know what to say to the 30 stunned children looking at her. Years later, it became clear that the incident did not happen in vacuum. Although the two students lived away from unrest and war, born long after the war had ended, they were still part of a culture that knew war, raised and educated by a generation of adults who witnessed and were affected by war and who may have endorsed groups that caused tremendous atrocities. In this case, the principal was part of a Lebanese political party that was known for its aggression and cruel methods of retaliation. Although the war had been over for 14 years, the party remained violent. On that day, these young and impressionable students learned that the way to respond to violence is with more violence and that adults are not always a source of safety. But just as educators can teach children retaliation, they can also teach them alternative, peaceful ways to deal with interpersonal conflict. This has been the focus of our work, with a goal of creating educational contexts that foster positive social and interpersonal competencies in students. To do so, however, it is important to understand that need fulfilment operates at the group level as well as the individual level.

Staub (2003a) contends that, just as certain conditions in children's lives serve to support or frustrate the fulfilment of their basic needs, leading them to develop prosocial and caring versus aggressive behavior, so too do social conditions that hinder fulfilment of basic needs enhance the likelihood of violence between groups. Among these, economic deterioration, social disorganization, rapid social and/or political change, intense conflict or threat of attack, or even natural disasters are especially likely to frustrate the fulfilment of basic human needs. These factors contribute to feelings of injustice when self-other or between-group comparisons lead people to feel that they are being treated unfairly, undermining one's sense of self-esteem and identity, and the need to feel effective and able to control one's life. If these unfulfilled group

and individual needs are the factors that contribute to the likelihood of war and killing, the critical question becomes how we can use this knowledge to create a society in which basic human needs are met, and war, killing and other forms of interpersonal violence are eliminated.

In 1988, social psychologist Ervin Staub published an article entitled, *The Evolution of Caring and Non-Aggressive Persons and Societies*, considering what was then known in psychology about how parents and schools could create a society of peace. Although we knew little at that time, it was a start. Staub has continued to struggle with this basic question over the past three decades and his work continues to influence our own. According to Staub (2003a), there are two major ways to evolve a culture of caring and peace. One is the ability to move beyond interpersonal and/or group conflict that has already occurred. Those who survive war and killing are still victims. And the hatred and animosity that often follows between groups makes healing from the trauma of such victimization a slow and difficult process, although not an impossible goal. Staub (2003a: 10) argues that, "Healing requires that people engage with their painful experiences, have their suffering and pain acknowledged, receive empathy and experience loving connections." Such healing experiences can lead to what Staub calls "altruism born of suffering". Unfortunately, many victims of war and killing are not able to embark on a process of healing, owing in large part to the fact that they have neither the means nor the support needed to do so.

> *"Ideologies separate us. Dreams and anguish bring us together."*
>
> Eugene Ionesco

Reconciliation between groups is also required, according to Staub (2003a,b). Although healing can enhance one's willingness to engage in reconciliation, true reconciliation requires some sense of justice and forgiveness. It also requires that both parties agree upon a shared history, recognizing the contributions of both sides, rather than only engaging in blaming one another. The very nature of human intergroup processes makes these outcomes especially difficult. Indeed, as Sumner noted long ago in his 1906 book, *Folkways*, groups are *ethnocentric*, with a tendency to consider their own perspective and values as somehow better or superior to that of others. Decades later, in validating his *social identity theory,* social psychologist Henry Tajfel (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979) demonstrated that, when humans, both children and adults, are put into groups, they instinctively begin to operate in support of their own group and against the "other" group. The in-group favoritism and

out-group discrimination that results is so easy to elicit that Tajfel called it the *minimal ingroup paradigm* (Tajfel, 1970; 1982). Although such group biases can be highly adaptive for survival of the group (and with it, the individual), they make efforts at reconciliation especially challenging. Over time, increasing emphasis on group differences serves to magnify the perceived contrast between groups, as similarities between groups are minimized (Harris, 1995; Jetten, Spears, and Manstead, 1997; Tajfel and Billing, 1974).

War between groups can further amplify out-group biases, and negative feelings towards the "other" group can persist long after its end. Unfortunately, such antipathy can permeate several aspects of a group's life, including educational systems. In a paper examining the war and post-war effects on education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Pašalić-Kreso (2009) highlights the fact that three different educational systems emerged following the war: a Serbian system, a Croatian system, and a Bosnian system. Thus, students attended segregated, mono-ethnic schools that deprived them of growing up with peers of diverse backgrounds. Pašalić-Kreso lamented the fact that, with separate curricula, languages, history textbooks, and religious studies, students are learning to hate those who are different from them, rather than learning to be inclusive. Segregated schools implicitly communicate that that discriminatory practices are acceptable.

Tajfel's social identity theory posits that at least some of our identity needs are fulfilled with reference to the identity of the group(s) to which we belong. Thus, from a human needs perspective, reconciliation between groups and creation of a shared identity and history contribute to the fulfilment of individual as well as group needs for self-esteem and a positive identity. Unfortunately, given the natural but biased group processes in which humans engage, reconciliation may be difficult to achieve, and may take considerable time. Nevertheless, such efforts are critical to creating a nonkilling world and we certainly applaud those who promote such initiatives and who attempt to understand the processes involved (e.g., Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003; Long and Brecke, 2003; Lu, 2008; Siani-Davies and Katsikas, 2009).

> *"If we are to teach real peace in this world, and if we are to carry on a real war against war, we shall have to begin with the children."*
>
> Mahatma Gandhi

Our work in this area has focused, not on reconciliation efforts in the aftermath of war and killing, but on the development of future generations, a second option proposed by Staub (2003) for the evolution of caring and

nonaggressive societies. Although children and youth are all too often the unintentional victims of war, political violence and killing, they may also hold the key to creating a world without killing. Indeed, political psychologists who adopt a human needs perspective hold that one of the most important strategies for creating a caring, nonviolent world is "raising inclusively caring, morally courageous children" (Staub 2003a: 5). To do so, it is important to recognize that humans are highly complex social beings and that one's capacity to function effectively in a complex social world develops very gradually, and is shaped, both positively and negatively, by the socialization forces to which they are exposed.

Attachment theory, first articulated by John Bowlby in 1969, has long posited that humans come into the world with a fundamental, biologically-based drive to form attachments with others. And recent research in neuroscience confirms that human brains are "wired" for social relationships (e.g., Lieberman, 2013; Goelman, 2006). Despite these early social predispositions, human social behavior is shaped over time by various socialization experiences. For example, humans are born with some sort of instinctual understanding of fairness as well as a tendency to behave altruistically, both of which are found to change with age (see Hymel and Darwich, 2013 for a review). Infants as young as 12 to 18 months are sensitive to fair distributions of resources and respond differentially to adults that they have seen performing equal versus unequal resource distributions (e.g., Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011). Yet, in terms of their own distribution of resources, children below the age of five, across cultures, operate primarily on the basis of self-interest; it is only as they grow older that they are increasingly likely to demonstrate more egalitarian distributions. At the same time, infants as young as 14-18 months of age, who are only beginning to develop language, seem to be intrinsically motivated to spontaneously help others, even relative strangers (nonkin) and without being rewarded for such behavior (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006, 2009). However, altruistic behavior, which some consider to be unique to humans, declines when children receive material rewards for such behavior, underscoring the impact of socialization on interpersonal behavior (Warneken and Tomasello, 2008).

> *"No one is born hating another person… People learn to hate. They can be taught to love. For love comes more naturally to the heart."*
>
> Nelson Mandela

Beyond the family, schools and other educational institutions are one of the most powerful socialization forces that operate in today's societies and, for many children, school is the first exposure to the wider social world of peers and nonfamilial adults. As we have documented elsewhere (e.g., Hymel, Schonert-Reichl and Miller, 2006; Schonert-Reichl and Hymel, 1996), it is during the time that children are in school that they acquire the social and emotional skills they need to navigate our complex social world. Ideally, they learn to cooperate with others, to consider another person's point of view, and to behave pro-socially; they move from concrete and egocentric conceptions of interpersonal relationships to more abstract ones, able to consider the importance of things like loyalty and intimacy. And with age, children also gradually move from external to internal standards of moral behavior (Kohlberg, 1969).

The development of these social, emotional and moral competencies is increasingly recognized as critical, not only for effective social functioning, but also for academic and life success. Indeed, in a 32-year longitudinal study conducted in New Zealand (Olsson, McGee, Nada-Raja. and Williams, 2013), the quality of one's social connectedness during adolescence was found to be the strongest predictor of well-being in adulthood, and a stronger predictor than academic achievement. In contrast, social rejection and victimization by peers, even among children living in peaceful countries, has been shown to contribute to a host of negative outcomes, including mental health problems (internalizing difficulties such as depression and anxiety; externalizing difficulties such as aggression), unemployment, delinquency and criminality, suicide, poor academic performance and greater likelihood of dropping out of school (see Bonanno and Hymel, 2010; McDougall, Hymel, Vaillancourt and Mercer, 2001; Hawker and Boulton, 2000; Kaltiala-Heino et al., 1999; Juvonen and Graham, 2001; Swearer, Espelage, Vaillancourt and Hymel, 2010). In terms of psychological needs (Staub, 2003), such treatment erodes one's sense of belonging. Moreover, recent research in neuroscience, neuroedocrinology, and genetics shows that victimization by peers, even in childhood, gets "under the skin" and becomes biologically embedded in the physiology of the developing individual, placing them at increasing risk for later adjustment difficulties as well as mental and physical health problems (see Vaillancourt, Hymel and McDougall, 2013 for a review). One can only imagine how prolonged exposure to war and interpersonal violence might exacerbate these effects.

How is it that our children acquire these social and emotional competencies? And how can we foster positive social and emotional development

in future generations as a foundation for nonkilling and the creation of peaceful and nonaggressive societies? Our research has addressed this question in a variety of ways, with a vision of schools that educate the heart as well as the mind. Although parents and families clearly contribute to the social and emotional development of children and youth, children are also socialized by the groups in which they live, including communities, social media, cultures and, most notably, schools (see Harris, 1995, 1998/2009 for an in-depth discussion of how children are socialized by the groups in which they function). Historically, however, schools have focused primarily if not exclusively on academic competencies and curricula, focusing on basic cognitive skills like reading, writing and numeracy. It is only recently that social-emotional competencies have come to be recognized as foundational "master skills" that underlie virtually everything that we do. Over the past two decades, in North America and in countries around the world, there has been a growing effort to foster positive social and emotional development in school settings, in hopes of promoting positive behavior and adjustment and reducing the likelihood of interpersonal violence (see Hymel et al., 2006 for a review). In addition, we now know that these skills are malleable and can be taught, with a growing body of research documenting the significant impact of educational efforts to foster social and emotional learning (SEL) in schools, both in the short-term and over time.

> *"Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all."*
>
> Aristotle, 3rd Century B.C.E.

The concept of educating the heart as well as the mind is certainly not new. Staub (1988) focused on such strategies 25 years ago, considering how parents and schools could enhance children's positive interpersonal behaviour. However, it is only in recent years that there is empirical evidence to document the fundamental importance of such an educational focus. Particularly compelling are results of a recent meta-analysis (a study of studies), completed under the auspices of the Collaborative for Academic, Social and Emotional Learning (<http://www.casel.org>) in the United States (Durlak, Weissberg, Duymnicki, Taylor, and Schellinger, 2011). Evaluating the findings of over 200 studies involving over 270,000 students in kindergarten through high school, this meta-analysis showed that participation in school-based, SEL programs had a significant impact on youth outcomes, enhancing students' social and emotional competencies, increasing prosocial behavior and positive attitudes toward school, reducing conduct

problems and emotional distress among student participants and also enhancing academic achievement, consistent with arguments that SEL is foundational for school and life success. Other research has demonstrated that the effect of school-based SEL programs can be long-lasting. Specifically, longitudinal research by Hawkins and colleagues (2008) has demonstrated that the impact of a well-designed and executed, school-based elementary intervention program promoting social and emotional learning remains evident 12-15 years after the intervention ended. Those who participated in the program, as young adults, showed higher educational attainment, more employment, better jobs, and greater community engagement and involvement, as well as better mental and sexual health. These findings clearly demonstrate the social as well as academic benefits of SEL programs in schools, with long-term positive effects on both academic and life success. Although to date these effects have been documented only in western, industrialized communities, and primarily in North America, they lend promise to the potential for adapting these programs to other contexts and cultures.

As promoted by the Collaborative for Academic Social and Emotional Learning in the US, SEL is defined as "the process through which we learn to recognize and manage emotions, care about others, make good decisions, behave ethically and responsibly, develop positive relationships and avoid negative behaviors" (Zins, Bloodworth, Weissberg and Walberg, 2004, <http://www.casel.org>) and includes five major social-emotional competency areas:

- **Self awareness**: recognizing one's own emotions, values, strengths and limitations.
- **Self management**: managing emotions and behaviors to achieve one's goals.
- Social awareness: showing understanding and empathy for others.
- **Relationship skills**: forming positive relationships, teamwork, dealing effectively with conflict.
- **Responsible decision-making**: making ethical, constructive choices about personal and social behavior.

Whether these competencies are applicable in other cultural contexts and especially in the aftermath of experiences with war and killing remains a question for future research, but they provide a starting point for understanding the broad range of basic social skills that might be considered as a focus for such efforts.

Currently, there is no single approach to fostering SEL in schools, although in the zeitgeist of *evidence-based practices*, with increasing demands for accountability in schools, a growing body of research has focused on evaluating the impact of school-based prevention and intervention programs (e.g., Greenberg et al., 2003) and the importance of teacher social-emotional competencies in promoting such efforts (e.g., Jennings and Greenberg, 2009). Still, there are many different approaches to fostering SEL in children and youth in schools (see Schonert-Reichl and Hymel, 1996; see <http://www.casel.org/guide>, <http://www.blueprintsprograms.com> or <http://www.selresources.com>). A review of these varied approaches is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few examples are provided to reflect the breadth of approaches being explored within in this area. The Second Step Program developed by the Committee for Children in the US (see <http://www.cfchildren.org/second-step/>) teaches children to resolve conflicts and solve social problems in peaceful ways (Espelage, Low, Polanin and Brown, 2013; Fitzgerald and Edstrom, 2006; Frey Hirschstein and Guzzo, 2000; Holsen, Smith, and Frey, 2008). The RULER program, supported by the Yale Center for Emotional Intelligence (see <http://www.ei.yale.edu/ruler/>) is designed to teach children emotional literacy, including skills in recognizing emotions in oneself and others, understanding the causes of emotions, labeling, expressing, and regulating emotions (Brackett and Rivers, 2004, 2008; Brackett, Rivers, Maurer, Elbertson, and Kremenitzer, 2011). Other programs are aimed at promoting empathy in children (e.g., Schonert-Reichl and Oberle, 2011) or at reducing school bullying (e.g., see Rigby, 2010/2012; Salmivalli, Poskiparta, Ahtola, and Haataja, 2013; Sullivan, 2011), as well as developing strategies for establishing compassionate (e.g., Hart and Hodson, 2004, 2008) and responsive classrooms (e.g., Rimm-Kaufman and Chiu, 2007).

However, promoting social and emotional competencies in schools goes beyond the delivery of packaged programs and curricula. It is best promoted when integrated into all aspects of the educational context and promoted within positive and caring teacher-student relationships. Indeed, Nell Noddings (1986/2013a, 2005, 2013b) has long advocated for fostering positive relationships and caring in schools. For Noddings, dialogue with children and youth is key, giving them a voice in the process of healing and learning alternate ways of being, in identifying and effectively communicating their own needs, and in allowing them to see that they are not alone in their ethical confusion (e.g., feelings of hatred for the other). Dialogue also teaches interpersonal reasoning, giving children the opportunity to communicate and to be ac-

tive participants in decision making, reaching compromises, and supporting each other in solving problems (Noddings, 2005). For children who have witnessed violence, killing, and loss, dialogue may be an especially good place to start to see that even adults grapple with the moral, ethical and emotional issues that arise in the aftermath of war and killing. Children can also be taught to move beyond being "nice" and to develop into individuals with the capacity for moral growth (Nucci, 2009). Indeed, in his book, *Nice Is Not Enough: Facilitating Moral Development,* Nucci outlines various ways of including moral education into various subject areas, including math and sciences, for students in grades k-12. Children of war may benefit in particular from a curriculum that makes moral growth a natural part of their education.

SEL is also promoted in the way in which schools structure their learning situations. For example, David and Roger Johnson at the University of Minnesota have long distinguished cooperative, competitive and individualistic (mastery) learning structures in schools (Johnson and Johnson, 1978, 1989, 1999, 2005, 2009), with long-standing evidence that cooperative learning approaches are superior in terms of both academic (Johnson, Johnson, Nelson, and Skon, 1981) and social outcomes (Johnson, Johnson and Maryuama, 1983). More recently, Johnson and Johnson (2012) have emphasized the civic values that are implicitly communicated to students in the learning structures that are established in schools. In competitive learning situations, success is dependent on beating out or defeating other students, implicitly (if not explicitly) condoning obstructing others in an effort to "win". Individualistic or mastery learning structures communicate the implicit value that success depends solely on one's own efforts, regardless of others. In contrast, cooperative learning structures encourage shared learning goals and group support so that everyone can succeed, implicitly if not explicitly communicating that each individual is a valued contributor to the success of the group. In support of these arguments, research by Choi, Johnson and Johnson (2011a,b) has shown that increased exposure to cooperative learning structures is associated with greater prosocial behavior and less aggressive behavior, while competitive structures are associated with greater harm-intended aggression among students.

As a final example, social-emotional learning is implicit in the discipline practices that we utilize in schools, with distinctions made between punitive and restorative discipline (see Morrison, 2007; Morrison and Ahmed, 2006). With punitive discipline, which remains the dominant approach utilized in most schools, justice is based on identifying who is right and who is wrong or who broke the rules, and is achieved when guilty parties are punished, with pun-

ishment usually determined and administered by an authority figure. Restorative practices, in contrast, focus on healing, accountability and reparation, with justice determined collaboratively, as victim, perpetrator and community members work together to identify who is hurt and what relationships have been harmed, and propose solutions that promote repair and reconciliation. In schools in Canada, a variation of restorative discipline, called restitution self-discipline (Gossen, 1992, 2004, see <http://www.realrestitution.com>) focuses on having the child perpetrators recognize the impact of their behavior on others and requires that they identify ways to make up for the harm cause (restitution), beyond simply apologizing. Given that reconciliation and accountability are fundamental components of both restorative and restitution discipline practices, children learn early on that they are responsible for making amends for any harm that they cause others. Whether efforts to teach children alternative ways of addressing conflict, social problems, and discipline will ultimately translate into adults who can envision a different way of being remains to be seen. Our hope is that it may be one way that we can promote global nonkillng in future generations; at least it is a start.

> *"The child is the father to the man."*
> William Wordsworth

Over the past 30 years, we have worked in collaboration with school districts and ministries of education in Canada to help promote SEL as a primary focus within education, and we are beginning to see the results of these efforts. Although the concept is not a new one, current efforts to foster social and emotional competencies as an essential part of education is a movement that remains in its early stages. Moreover, we recognize that there are barriers to the implementation of such programs even in Canada and the United States, including the costs of such programs, the buy-in of schools, and the training of future teachers. Fortunately, however, this need for social and emotional competencies and training is gaining increased significance in Canadian post-secondary institutions that train future teachers. Whether or not these programs and educational practices can or should be implemented in other cultures or contexts remains an important, but unanswered question. However, our experience, both as educators and as educational researchers, supports the promise of such efforts, and our hope is that, by purposefully educating future generations in prosocial nonaggressive interpersonal interactions we contribute in some way to a world without war and without killing.

Cultural change is a slow process. Schools are a reflection of the larger society in which children live, and children demonstrate many of the same social tendencies as adults (e.g., in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination). In our research on bullying and peer victimization, for example, we find that perpetrators of such interpersonal aggression are able to justify and rationalize their negative behavior, using a variety of cognitive strategies that allow them to view such behavior in a more positive light (see Gini, Pozzoli and Hymel, 2014; Hymel and Bonanno, 2014; Hymel, Schonert-Reichl, Bonanno, Vaillancourt and Rocke Henderson, 2010). Student justifications for aggression and bullying are strikingly similar to those used by soldiers and terrorists in rationalizing killing behavior, as documented in Albert Bandura's social cognitive theory of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1990, 1999, 2002). Of concern is the fact that the process of disengaging from one's moral standards in an effort to justify inhumane behavior is a very gradual process. As Bandura (1999) notes, "Disengagement practices will not instantly transform considerate persons into cruel ones. Rather, the change is achieved by gradual disengagement of self-censure. People may not even recognize the changes they are undergoing. Initially, they perform milder aggressive acts they can tolerate with some discomfort. After their self-reproof has been diminished through repeated enactments, the level of ruthlessness increases, until eventually acts originally regarded as abhorrent can be performed with little personal anguish or self-censure. Inhumane practices become thoughtlessly routinized." (See Gutzwiller, this volume for a fuller discussion of the development of morality). Given the gradual process of moral disengagement, it is imperative that we provide students with alternative, prosocial strategies for addressing conflict and solving problems, and foster empathy for and acceptance of others, especially those who are victimized or less fortunate, rather than justifying aggressive behavior toward them. As Cummings et al. (2014) documented in their follow up of Catholic and Protestant children in Belfast, Ireland, the positive or negative impact of political violence on children depends on the degree to which youth affiliate with group members who provide positive social support versus encourage aggression and discrimination. Our children are indeed our future and we now have the knowledge, tools and educational practices that may help us to prepare them to create a better world in which universal human needs are met and killing is never an option.

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Not Unlearning to Care

Healthy Moral Development as a Precondition for Nonkilling

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Are we all born killers, born to kill if circumstances lead us, invite us, or even force us to do so? Is killing an inherent part of the "conditio humana", the human condition, an assumption that—as Paige (2009: 9) states—has been a constant and outlasting tenet in political theory and practice?

I am not a political scientist. I am a middle-aged woman, a mother and spouse, a developmental psychologist and teacher educator, a Swiss citizen enjoying all the privileges that living and working in our politically and socially stable country entail. Although my grandparents and their families eked out a poor, sometimes even miserable existence in the first decades of the last century; although my father's father had to join active service at the Swiss-German border in the early 1940s (during WWII) and the family lived mainly on potatoes because the breadwinner of the family had almost no pay during that time, still, in my families, there has been no history of direct experiences of war and killing during the two World Wars (or subsequent wars in Europe). So what can my contribution be, here, in Sarajevo, at the Nonkilling Balkans Forum 2014, addressing one of the "real big issues" relating to the human condition?

There is another side to my family history, a side that maybe a large part of humans across the globe have knowledge of or experienced in some way or other: *violence, hatred, abuse*. My grandfather's brothers trying to suffocate my father and his brothers in the haystack when they were still little; my grandfather trying to kill my grandmother immediately after giving birth to their youngest son because the placenta would not be expulsed, and his brothers insinuated that this was proving that she had had an affair with some other man. Thank God the doctor and the midwife tore him back. We are talking about Switzerland in the early 1950s here. In my father's family, violence and aggression were a part of life that had to be accepted, unquestioningly. "Either you are the hammer or you are the anvil" was his way of explaining to me how the world worked. Still, this is not about me or my family.

It stands for what has been happening in some form or other to many people and has been part of their lives: *violence, hatred, abuse*, sometimes even killing of the self and/or others. This affects and concerns us all, as potential aggressors, bystanders, or victims; or as friends or family members of aggressors, bystanders, or victims. And against this background I aim to make a contribution towards nonkilling by focusing on moral development. The main argument is that (a) moral development is a lifelong process; and (b) promoting healthy moral development in children is one small jigsaw piece towards the greater picture of nonkilling and nonviolence as an aim for humankind.

In the following paragraphs, I first describe some basic aspects of the developmental perspective taken. Afterwards, the conception of morality adopted within this perspective is explained, followed by a brief exploration of the moral domain. The subsequent sections are dedicated to some core prerequisites for positive moral action including the development of a moral self with the ultimate aim of moral maturity. They also show how moral development can be corrupted in the sense of an individual's not reaching moral maturity. In the final section, the various theories, models, and research findings are integrated. A stance is taken against moral indoctrination as the only possible avenue towards moral learning and development, and a point is made in favour of making moral mistakes and the important role of negative moral knowledge. Finally, a tentative outline of potentially important milestones or turning points in humans' sociomoral development is offered.

A Developmental Perspective

In this paper, a developmental, socio-moral perspective is taken to approach the question whether global nonkilling, that is, a global human community where people live peacefully and respectfully together without killing themselves or each other, is possible. This perspective includes two basic assumptions, namely that (a) human development is a lifelong process based on the interaction between the individual and the environment; and (b) moral development occurs in the social environment and includes the (co-)onstruction of meaning based on social interaction.

Addressing the first assumption, human development is understood as a process occurring throughout the lifespan, including physical, cognitive, personal, and social dimensions (cf. Sugarman, 2001). Following Baltes' (1987) basic tenets, I therefore assume that throughout their lives, humans have the potential for development, suggesting that *growth is always possible*. Moreover, development results from the interaction between the individual and the

environment and is embedded within cultural and historical contexts (Baltes, 1987; cf. Sugarman, 2001). Accordingly, I maintain that reaching adulthood does not automatically include the end of all developmental processes, that humans are not "finished" in the sense of remaining the same persons for the rest of their lives. This holds for psychosocial development (ego development) (Erikson, 1980), the ability to take increasingly complex social perspectives (Selman, 1980), or moral judgment competence (Kohlberg, 1969), to give a few examples. Each period in life entails specific, so-called developmental tasks, which the individual is required to address. Examples are learning to walk, developing friendships, making a career choice, becoming a responsible citizen, or accepting one's life (cf. Sugarman, 2001). Avoidance of or failure in solving these tasks results in unhappiness, social disapproval, and difficulties with later tasks, while achievement leads to happiness and success with later tasks (Havighurst, 1972/1948). Human developmental processes take place all the time, with sources or triggers of these processes lying both within the individual (e.g., bodily growth and maturation) and in the surrounding context (e.g., society's expectations towards formal education), and in their interaction. With respect to healthy moral development, I postulate that developing positive social relationships that include a genuine respect for and interest in the welfare of others, grounded in a mature moral self, represents a developmental "meta-task" relevant for the whole life course. This interest in and respect for the welfare of others cannot be reconciled with notions of violence, abuse, hatred, or killing. The concept of the mature moral self will be explained in more depth later on.

The second assumption refers to the *socio-moral* dimensions of the developmental perspective adopted here. These socio-moral dimensions relate to the conception of the "self in relationship" (Keller and Edelstein, 1991) grounded in a constructivist understanding of learning and development following Piaget's genetic epistemology (e.g., Piaget, 1969). According to *constructivism* sensu Piaget, individuals actively explore their environment and thereby expand, that is, adapt their mental structures. These adapted structures help the individual to interact with the environment in a new, more adjusted way. To give an example: Babies who start to reach for objects and try to hold them in time learn to adapt their movements to the characteristics of the objects. Accordingly, a small ball is taken up using the entire hand whereas beads are taken up using the thumb and index finger. This constructivist understanding of learning and development is complemented by social interactionism and social constructionism, both of them also major approaches. Social interactionism according to Vygotsky (e.g.,

1978) emphasises the importance of *social interaction* for human cognitive development, an aspect mostly neglected by Piaget. According to social interactionism, the social and cultural environment plays a crucial role in the construction of meaning from experience. Finally, social constructionism posits that our understanding of reality, our construction of meaning, the way we describe and explain the world are the result of *social construction processes* (Gergen, 1985). What we consider as real is what was found to be true based on a communicative process. Thus, meaning is shared and socially constructed, shaped by both historical and cultural/contextual factors.

Taken together, these three theoretical frameworks (constructivism, social interactionism, and social constructionism) allow a profound view on human learning and development, that is, on the construction of meaning based on experience, and on the way that this construction translates into action. By interacting with the physical and social environment we gain experience, construct meaning communicatively, and further expand our mental structures, which influence our behaviour and experiences; these in turn change our mental structures (by expanding, differentiating, integrating, and re-organising them). With respect to moral and morally relevant situations we may assume that our experiences, our thinking and acting are not only the result of our individual encounters, but also of our social interactions as well as socially constructed, communicated and shared meanings. Combined with a lifespan view of human development, we may further assume that even in adults, moral development has not reached its end point; thus, additional competencies can (sometimes must) be acquired, and the individual can (must) learn to use them appropriately across all kinds of situations and contexts (horizontal development; cf. Schuster, 2001). Thus, all moral and morally relevant experiences *entail the potential for stimulating moral growth*, both individually and socially. Transformation of the moral self affects and makes possible the transformation of society. Related to a future of nonkilling, we may assume that promoting individuals' and societies' moral development towards nonkilling is an ongoing task, involving also respective socially constructed, communicated, and shared meanings. From a lifespan view, this development can be stimulated at all ages and developmental stages.

In the next section, some core prerequisites and requirements for positive moral action, that is, action not harming or restoring others' welfare, are presented. The relation between moral thought, emotions, and action as well as the role of the situation will be given special consideration. In a first step, morality and the moral domain will be briefly outlined, to serve as a foundation for describing the processes involved in the formation of positive moral action.

Morality?

Although often equalled to morals or conventions, the term "morality" includes a distinct area of meaning relevant for our subsequent considerations. According to Pierer's *Universal-Lexikon* (4th edition, 1857-65), among other meanings, morality refers to (a) a characteristic or competency inherent in a person enabling him or her to act according to "moral law"; and (b) an act and its merit, insofar as it was performed out of moral freedom to achieve a moral end, also relating to the degree to which it can be appreciated as conforming to this moral standard. Both meanings refer to moral standards, that is, "moral law" and moral purpose, respectively, emphasising the normative or *prescriptive* aspect of morality as distinct from its merely descriptive aspect (Gert, 2012). According to Gert (2012), the descriptive aspect of morality relates to potential behavioural codes which are either dictated by a (religious) society or group or accepted by an individual as right. On the other hand, morality can be used in its prescriptive, that is, normative sense to refer to a behavioural code which—if specific requirements are met—might be asserted by all rational individuals (Gert, 2012; cf. Kant's categorical imperative, von Kirchmann, 1870). Ethical (i.e., moral philosophical) theories which only relate to the descriptive aspect of morality show a more *relativistic* orientation (cf. Gowans, 2012) in the sense of denying or at least neglecting that there is a *universal morality* relating to *all humans* (Gert, 2012), independent of the race, social class, society, nationality, religion, etc. they belong to. Morality in its descriptive, relativistic meaning is always applied to a given group, society, time, etc. as well as the respective predominant rules, norms, and values[1]. Based on a relativistic view of morality, bodily mutilation for example can be seen as morally right and appropriate if it conforms to the customs and values of the respective society. Accordingly, all that is moral becomes relative, can change or be changed any time and refers to a "local" area of validity.

Such a relativistic understanding of morality cannot be reconciled with the constructivist approach to moral development presented here which—if we follow both the Kohlbergian and the Neo-Kohlbergian tradition—is committed to moral universalism. This universalist position entails respect for and consideration of the welfare of all human beings which must be both protected and restored (if violated) and also encompasses the desire

[1] It is important to note that more than one form of moral or ethical relativism exists and that moral relativism is not to be rejected on principle (Gowans, 2012; Kölbel, 2009).

to prevent future harm. Violence, hatred, abuse, and killing are *irreconcilable* with a universalist understanding of morality. In its purest and most unrelenting form, a universalist position holds that under no circumstances can killing be allowed. Therefore enabling humans' growth towards such a universalist morality can be seen as one potential avenue towards a nonkilling global society. After this first clarification of the term "morality" and the meanings relevant for this paper, we will now explore the area/s of life morality is related to, namely, the moral domain.

The Moral Domain

The moral domain refers to the norms, values, and rules of social coexistence, of living together, with moral philosophy (i.e., ethics) defining, systematising, and recommending notions of right and wrong acting and behaviour. This includes the justification and legitimisation of acting and behaviour (Montada, 2002). Such a broader understanding of the moral domain, which encompasses also customs, morals, etiquette, decency, propriety, and similar concepts referring to appropriate, socially desirable or even required behaviour will now be narrowed down on the basis of *social domain theory* (e.g., Turiel, 1983).

Expanding and critically testing Kohlberg's theory of moral development (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969), social domain theory posits that children interact with various interaction partners (parents, peers, teachers, etc.) resulting in the development of different domains of social knowledge (see e.g., Smetana, 2006 for an in-depth characterisation). Thus, it is postulated—and substantiated empirically in numerous studies—that already preschool children are capable of differentiating between moral, social conventional and personal domains and issues. Moral issues refer to behavior (or nonbehaviour) which affects the rights and welfare of others. Conventional issues are related to "arbitrary" and contextually relative norms like manners, etiquette, customs, etc., which guide social interactions. Finally, personal issues include the private sphere, control over one's body, as well as preferences regarding outer appearance (clothes, hair, etc.), friends, and activities. However, it is not possible to clearly assign all issues to either the moral, the conventional, or the personal domain, indicating that there are mixed or multifaceted issues belonging to more than one (Smetana, 2006).

According to social domain theory, and in contrast to the broader understanding of the moral domain described above, customs, norms, conventions, etiquette, etc. do not constitute morality. This is the position taken here, re-

lating moral-ethical issues to the "right and good", requiring us humans to show benevolence and kindness towards others (Gibbs, 2003), with the aim of *not harming, protecting, or restoring others' welfare*. To achieve this, we need to overcome our own, egocentric point of view and the self-interest inherent in such self-centeredness and take a more "objective", moral point of view lying outside ourselves (Baier, 1965). Thus, there is a shift of focus away from our own interests towards the needs of others, requiring and even obliging us to consider the consequences of our actions for them. This requires reaching higher levels of social perspective-taking and moral judgment competencies (cf. Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2010). Terms like "require" or "obliging" pertain to the normative aspect of morality mentioned above. Real positive moral acting does not arise from mere sympathy but from a genuine feeling of obligation, and aims at preserving or restoring the rights or welfare of others. Obligation is all-encompassing and more inclusive than sympathy, and is an expression of genuine respect (Montada, 2002). At this point, we can make a direct connection to a universalist understanding of morality, because the notion of obligation—unlike sympathy, which necessarily only relates to a small or specific set of people —can be understood as including *everyone*. With reference to nonkilling, this genuine feeling of obligation refers to every other human being in the world, whether we like them, feel similar to them, sympathise with them, etc. or not. Thus, not only are there no circumstances allowing us to kill others, but also nobody, not even the people we may dislike or even hate, must be killed. Killing is not an option.

One prerequisite of adequate moral acting includes *judging* about what is morally right or wrong in a specific course of action, requiring us—besides feeling an obligation towards doing the "right thing"—to know what principles to orient ourselves by. In his theory on the development of moral judgment competence Kohlberg (1969) describes how, starting from an orientation relating to their own needs, individuals proceed towards a focus on social relationships and finally towards universally valid ethical principles and values when judging moral situations. Kohlberg conceptualised these orientations as developmental stages and measured them by interviewing individuals on hypothetical moral dilemmas. In these dilemmas, two irreconcilable moral values were in conflict, with the interviewee being forced to decide upon a course of action. Whatever course of action s/he selects, the interviewee cannot avoid violating one of these moral values. What is relevant in discussing and solving these dilemmas is not the actual content of the judgment and subsequent acting, but the way this judgment is justified and therefore legitimised by the individual. Hence, in the famous *Heinz* di-

lemma, it is not vital whether we say that Heinz should steal the expensive drug to save the life of his terminally ill wife or not. The question is what principles or orientations we use to justify our judgment, what meaning we *construct* in a given situation. All this is dependent on our experiences, knowledge, socio-moral maturity, and especially our understanding of the social world (Keller and Edelstein, 1991). Accordingly, promoting moral development towards nonkilling addresses several issues. Among others, the individual needs to overcome an egocentric orientation (focusing mainly on his/her own needs) in order to turn towards others and society. S/he needs to learn about and refer to universal ethical principles; and s/he needs multiple opportunities for experience and learning in the moral (social) domain. All these issues relate not only to the cognitive (thinking, judgment, etc.), but also to the affective or emotional side of moral experience, learning, and development.

Moral Emotions

Moral emotions are perceived as a key element of human moral experience. They may also be key to understanding why individuals adhere to or fail to adhere to their own moral standards (Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek, 2007). Haidt (2003: 853) describes moral emotions as those emotions "that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent". Thus, also on the level of emotions do we need to overcome an egocentric orientation. Tangney et al. (2007) distinguish between self-conscious (shame, guilt, embarrassment, and moral pride) and other-focused moral emotions (righteous anger, contempt, disgust, elevation, and gratitude). Moreover, both theorists and researchers discuss other-oriented empathy as a morally relevant emotional process involving both affective and cognitive components (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 2000). Some researchers have argued that moral emotions are inevitably associated with moral cognitions, because emotions such as sympathy are based on an understanding of the other person's circumstances and constitute the *basic motive* in situations calling for moral actions (e.g., Eisenberg, 2000; Malti, Gasser, and Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2010).

From a moral developmental perspective, moral emotions are important in several respects. First, moral emotions indicate that moral events are *more salient* than nonmoral events and are thus central to the development of moral judgments (Smetana and Killen, 2008) and moral motivation (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). Second, a child's immediate moral emotional reaction to a moral rule violation indicates the *importance* the child assigns to the

moral issues involved (Malti, Gummerum, Keller, and Buchmann, 2009). Third, children judge moral transgressions negatively because they experience them as emotionally salient, and they associate moral emotions such as sympathy with these transgressions (Arsenio, 1988; Arsenio and Lemerise, 2004). Thus, while children's moral judgments are essential to morality, moral emotions, particularly sympathy, are assumed to help them anticipate the negative outcomes of moral transgressions and coordinate their moral action tendencies accordingly (Malti, Gasser, and Buchmann, 2009).

While the cognitive side of morality (rule understanding, judgment, etc.) has been studied intensively, the emotional or affective side of morality has been comparatively neglected (e.g., Malti and Latzko, 2010), the two research traditions developing more or less independently of each other. Lately, there has been a call for a more integrative developmental view of moral judgments and moral emotions (e.g., Arsenio and Lemerise, 2004; Arsenio, Gold, and Adams, 2006; Malti and Latzko, 2010; Smetana and Killen, 2008). Empathy, an affective response to the apprehension of another person's emotional state or condition, involves such interplay between cognitive and affective or emotional processes (Eisenberg, 2000). Whereas the affective response is similar to the other person's feelings, the cognitive response includes an intellectual identification with that person's feelings (e.g., Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, and Signo, 1994). Sympathy describes the affective response to the apprehension of another person's emotional state or condition which is not similar to the other person's feeling, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern (Eisenberg, 2000). Both empathy and sympathy have been shown to be positively related to helping, sharing, altruism, prosocial behaviour, and positive moral behaviour (e.g., see the reviews by Eisenberg, 2000 and Eisenberg and Miller, 1987) as well as negatively related to aggressive, antisocial behaviour (e.g., see the reviews by Eisenberg, 2000 and Eisenberg and Miller, 1988) in a multitude of studies. Already at a very young age (about age two), children show empathic capacities which enable them to show prosocial actions and reparative behaviour (Hoffman, 1998; cited in Eisenberg, 2000).

> Empathy for a victim, combined with an awareness that one has caused another's distress, is believed to result in guilt, which motivates attempts at reparative behavior. Moreover, empathy or sympathy often motivates prosocial actions, even if the child did not cause another's distress or needy condition. (Eisenberg, 2000: 679)

Empathy steadily increases during childhood and adolescence (Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998). Relating empathy and other moral emotions like guilt to aggression and violence, we see that moral emotional responses refer to another person's (a victim's) potential, anticipated or actual plight. Thus, these moral emotions are indicators of the concern felt for others' welfare and motivate positive moral behaviour (see also below). Once these moral emotions towards a potential victim are aroused in an individual, they prevent him or her from engaging in violence, hatred, and abuse. Absence of moral emotions like empathy or guilt in children and adolescents are stable over time and are related to particularly *severe* aggressive and antisocial behaviour (e.g., see the review by Frick and White, 2008). As being able to empathise and sympathise with others leads to nonkilling attitudes and behaviour (Kool and Agrawal, 2012), the fostering of moral emotions may provide a powerful tool in promoting global nonkilling. It is therefore important to foster children's and adolescents' inherent moral emotional capacities—relating to both self-oriented (e.g., guilt, shame) and other-focused (e.g., empathy, sympathy, righteous anger) emotions—and prevent these capacities from deteriorating.

The Gap Between Moral Thought, Competence, and Action

Although a myriad of empirical studies have indicated that moral rule knowledge and further morally relevant competencies like moral judgment, social perspective-taking, or empathy are significantly related to positive moral behaviour (helping, sharing, prosocial ways of interacting, etc.) in children and adolescents, these relationships are moderate, though stable (e.g., Eisenberg and Miller, 1987). Thus, the *actual formation* of positive moral action or behaviour in a concrete situation can only partly be explained by these factors. Being able to make sophisticated moral judgments or showing empathy in a given situation does not necessarily result in positive moral behaviour, even if—based on the moral judgment made—an individual realises what a/the moral course of action would be. Accordingly, there is a vast body of both theoretical and empirical literature trying to explain the causes of this gap between moral knowledge, judgment, and action (e.g., Bandura, 2002; Gibbs, 2003; Krettenauer, Malti, and Sokol, 2008; Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988). One comprehensive approach to the potential components involved in positive moral action and behavior is the four component model of moral action by Rest and colleagues (e.g., Narvaez and Rest, 1995; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma, 1999), which is briefly introduced here (Figure 1).

The first component, *moral sensitivity*, relates to the receptivity of the sensory (perceptual) system to social situations. It also relates to the interpretation of the situation with respect to what actions are possible, who and what would be affected by each of the possible actions, and how the parties involved might react to possible outcomes. The second component, *moral judgment*, involves the decision about which of the possible actions is most moral. The choices have to be weighed, and the individual must determine what a person ought to do in such a situation. The third component is *moral motivation*. Moral motivation implies that the individual gives priority to the moral value (above all other values involved) and intends to fulfil it. Finally, *implementation* (sometimes referred to as moral character) involves the execution and implementation of the chosen action and depends on both ego strength and the social and psychological skills necessary to carry out that action (cf. Rest, 1984: 27). To be able to act in a morally adequate way in a given situation, the individual must recognise its moral dimensions and construct it as moral or morally relevant, that is, see that someone's welfare is affected. Based on his/her interpretation of the situation, s/he must generate and weigh potential alternative actions with respect to their consequences for the person(s) involved and evaluate the morally most adequate course of action. S/he must also be motivated to prioritise moral values over other values (including personal desires) and finally implement the chosen course of action, that is, see it through in spite of potential difficulties and obstacles.

Figure 1. The four component model of moral action (e.g., Rest et al. 1999)



Applied specifically to issues of nonkilling in a given situation, the components might manifest themselves as follows. Let us consider a situation where we are buying groceries in a shop when suddenly an armed man runs in, threatens the woman at the counter and tells her to give him all the money. Some other customers manage to overpower him and get hold of the gun. One of them is very angry. He grabs the gun and points it at the

burglar, threatening to shoot him. We realise that the man's life is at stake, that the angry customer might actually shoot him, that this might happen if we do not act. The burglar might end up dead, the angry customer might end up as a murderer, and we might end up as witnesses to a murder and, thereby, as the people who did not intervene to save the burglar's life (moral sensitivity). We realise that the burglar might have hurt or even killed the woman at the counter, that he is not an "innocent" person. At the same time, we see that he is now powerless and can do no further harm, and that he is just another human being. Still, the angry customer holds a gun, we do not know him, so we cannot guess his reaction if we intervene. Is he also a threat to us? Shall we remain passive to protect ourselves? On the other hand, not preventing someone from being killed and not preventing someone from becoming a murderer seems to be no option, even if we do not know whether we will be safe. So we decide to intervene by telling the angry customer not to shoot but to pinion him and call the police (moral judgment). Preserving a life is more important than our own safety (moral motivation). We tell ourselves to stay calm, friendly, and show no fear, then muster all our inner strength (moral character). We approach the angry customer and tell him not to shoot the burglar but pinion him with the help of the other customers while we call the police (moral action).

While psychological research on moral development has long emphasised research on moral judgment, that is, the cognitive component, there has also been a pronounced research tradtion regarding moral motivation, that is, the emotional component. Various studies within the so called Happy Victimizer Tradition have indicated that knowing about and understanding moral rules and making moral judgments including the selection of the morally most adequate course of action does not necessarily lead to positive moral behaviour. As stated above when describing the four component model, this is the case when individuals do not give priority to moral values over other values like for example hedonistic values promoting the fulfilment of personal desires, that is, when they are not motivated towards acting in a morally adequate way (e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 2007; Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988). Moral motivation is usually assessed using *moral emotion attributions*, that is, the emotions someone ascribes to a protagonist transgressing a moral rule. A large proportion of preschool and young schoolchildren state that it is not right to steal another child's candy, but that the protagonist feels good because s/he now has the candy s/he desired. Feelings of guilt or remorse are not relevant for these children. Normally, around ages 7 to 9 most of the children come to attribute negative

emotions to a moral rule transgressor (see e.g., the review by Krettenauer et al., 2008). However, and contrary to earlier views, this Happy Victimizer pattern (making a morally adequate judgment while at the same time ascribing positive emotions to the rule transgressor) can also be found in adolescence and adulthood (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Heinrichs, Latzko and Minnameier, 2012; Heinrichs, Minnameier, Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, and Latzko, 2015; Nunner-Winkler, 2007). In children and adolescents, lack of moral motivation has been consistently shown to be associated with increased levels of various forms of aggression, including bullying (e.g., Gasser and Keller, 2009; Gasser, Malti, and Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2012; Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Malti, Stadelmann, von Klitzing, Argentino-Groeben, and Perren, 2015; Perren, Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Malti, and Hymel, 2012; see also the reviews by Gasser, Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, Latzko, and Malti, 2013 and by Krettenauer et al., 2008, as well as the recent meta-analysis by Malti and Krettenauer, 2013). These findings give additional support to the importance of fostering emotional moral development to prevent the development of aggressive and detrimental behaviour.

In relation to nonkilling, heeding the motivational component implies that individuals should *never* come to a point where taking someone else's life to reach one's goals is associated with positive feelings like satisfaction and seen as more important than its protection and preservation. This devastating connection of killing and positive feelings is possible and is not as uncommon as we may think. MacNair (2012) analyses empirical, theoretical, and anecdotal literature on the traumatising effects of killing on the killers. She quotes research indicating that, paradoxically, instead of experiencing horror, killers sometimes feel thrill and exhilaration, and that they are in danger of becoming addicted to this "thrill of the kill" (MacNair, 2012: 97). Her in-depth analysis shows that once the threshold has been crossed, some killers will develop a need to do it again (and again). This finding makes *primary prevention of killing* even more imperative, especially in a developmental context. As has been documented over the last decades, tens of thousands of children and adolescents (boys and girls) have been used and are currently being used as so called "child soldiers" in armed conflicts all over the world (e.g., Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008). Apart from working as spies, sex slaves, or household slaves, they are often trained for and directly involved in armed combat. Many of them have been forced to kill (e.g., Betancourt, Brennan, Rubin-Smith, Fitzmaurice, and Gilman, 2010), sometimes even family members or members from their own communities (e.g., Betancourt, Borisova, Williams, Brennan, Whitfield, de la Soudiere, et al.,

2010,). Research indicates that child soldiers involved in extreme forms of violence (e.g., torture, mass executions, killing squads) report a gradual process of getting used to and even finding excitement from engaging in these acts (Maclure and Denov, 2006). In a clinical context, this form of pleasurable aggression is called "appetitive aggression" (e.g., Weierstall, Schalinski, Crombach, Hecker, and Elbert, 2012) and can take the form of an addiction (MacNair, 2012). If the stage of addiction is reached, we may assume that healing in the form of desisting from injuring and killing people can only be achieved with difficulty. In fact, longitudinal studies suggest that even if former child soliders participate in professional care programs, they display an increase in externalising (aggressive and hostile) behaviour and a decrease in prosocial/adaptive behaviour. These behavioural problems were aggravated whe the former child soldiers were stigmatised based on their earlier involvement in war and killing (Betancourt, Brennan et al., 2010).

Responsibility and Accountability

A further prerequisite of moral acting not discussed so far relates to moral responsibility and accountability. Expanding his theoretical approach, Kohlberg developed a process model of moral action (Kohlberg and Candee, 1984), which bears some resemblance with Rest and colleagues' four component model[2]. Kohlberg and Candee (1984) identify the socalled *responsibility judgment* which is made after selecting the morally most adequate course of action. Thus, the individual, after selecting an action alternative, judges in a next step whether s/he is both responsible and willing to implement that action, the "whether" indicating that it is still possible for the individual not to feel responsible and willing to do so. Thus, it is necessary to develop a general or basic sense of moral responsibility. But where does this feeling of responsibility arise from?

According to Blasi (e.g., 1983) to be able to act morally (also) requires the development of a *moral self* or identity, that is, the commitment of our own identity towards moral norms and values and a related sense of responsibility and accountability. This means that we need to *construct our identity as (consistently) moral*. The moral self is conceptualised as holistic, developing on the basis of moral or morally relevant experiences and the

[2] It is not possible to give a detailed description of the model and explain similarity and differences with the model by Rest and colleagues. An insightful analysis can be found for example in Bergman (2002).

subsequent meanings and judgments constructed. Moral norms and values are not passively absorbed but internalised actively in a construction and understanding process. The individual ascribes meaning to these norms and values and recognises them as relevant to the self. In the sense of self-consistency, not acting on the basis of our moral judgments would be seen as highly inconsistent, as a fundamental breach within the inner self (cf. Blasi, 1983), indicating that a personal sense of obligation has developed. According to Blasi (1984), this personal sense of obligation is established in adolescence, although not yet in its fully-fledged form. As soon as we see ourselves as moral individuals, it is therefore important for us to act according to our own identity, to stay true to ourselves. Recent research shows that even preschool and young schoolchildren seem to have a desire to see themselves as morally good persons, suggesting that at least a partial moral identity has been established (Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger et al., 2010). According to Bergman (2002), who theoretically integrates (among other approaches) the four component model by Rest and colleagues, Kohlberg's, and Kohlberg and Candee's approaches to moral functioning, the aim of moral development is to be seen in *moral maturity*:

> […] moral understanding gives shape to personal identity even as that identification with morality shapes one's sense of personal responsibility and unleashes moral understanding's motivational power to act in a manner consistent with what one knows and believes. In this way, the objective and the subjective, the universal and the personal, the rational and the affective and volitional, are integrated. Such integration—or integrity—is the mark of the morally mature individual. (Bergman, 2002: 121)

Accordingly, by constructing personal meaning regarding moral norms and values on the basis of past experiences and interaction, and by perceiving these norms and values as meaningful and relevant to ourselves as individuals, we develop a moral self, which in turn becomes the source of our sense of personal, moral obligation. The moral self provides additional motivational power to act according to one's moral understanding and beliefs. We may therefore claim that an individual's moral identity must include nonkilling as a core feature. The moral self represents a holistic, integrative moral force. Identifying oneself as a nonkilling human being and striving to live up to one's personal obligation of not killing may provides a strong basis for being able to withstand killing even under adverse circumstances. However, as the moral self only emerges during adolescence (Blasi, 1984) and even then is not fully developed, we must assume that children and adolescents trained as and

forced to act as killers lack this moral self and cannot (fully) develop a moral identity that might help them abstain from killing. Their moral development is dramatically impaired, maybe even stunted.

A last prerequisite of moral action to be considered here concerns *moral agency* (e.g., Bandura, 2006), that is, both the ability and the empowerment to act in moral and morally relevant situations. In his theory of human agency, Bandura (2006) describes humans as actively and intentionally influencing or shaping both their own functioning and their environment and living conditions. Humans set goals for themselves, plan their actions, try to look ahead, for example by anticipating potential consequences of their own actions. Humans motivate and regulate the implementation of their plans. They use reflection to critically assess their actions, their personal efficacy, the soundness of their thinking and reasoning, and the significance and impact of their activities. If necessary, they make adjustments to their chosen course of action. Moral agency represents a core domain of human agency, as humans monitor their behaviour and the accompanying conditions, judge it in relation to their moral standards and the perceived circumstances and regulate it based on the *consequences they anticipate* for themselves (and for others). Hence, they act in ways that make them feel proud of themselves and avoid acting in ways violating their moral standards, because that would make them feel guilty; that is, they adhere to self-sanctions (Bandura, 2006). Moral agency involves both "the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely and the proactive power to behave humanely" (Bandura, 2002: 101). Consequently, moral agency includes both feelings of responsibility (i.e., being responsible) and accountability (i.e., being held accountable) for one's actions. Moreover, empathy plays an active part: "Adherence to self-sanctions against injurious conduct is strengthened not only by a sense of empathy but also by assuming personal responsibility for one's actions and not minimizing their injurious effects" (Bandura et al., 1996: 371).

Nevertheless, humans are also capable of highly sophisticated ways of thinking and arguing, finding ways to circumvent the responsibility and accountability inherent in moral agency. By disconnecting moral thought and moral action, they avoid feelings of conflict, guilt, or remorse. Thus, it is possible for individuals to enact behaviors that are not concordant with their individual or social moral standards while at the same time claiming to adhere to them. To achieve this, they use cognitive mechanisms that can be selectively activated in order to escape negative self-evaluations and self-sanctions. Accordingly, they distance themselves from adherence to moral standards (Bandura, 2002). Through this *moral disengagement*, harmful be-

havior is thus cognitively reconstructed so as to make it appear less harmful or not harmful at all to oneself and to others. Bandura identifies four general strategies and eight subordinated mechanisms or practices of moral disengagement that are selectively activated to weaken moral control. These strategies may operate on the behavior itself (harmful conduct is reconstructed as not harmful or even good), the individual's sense of personal responsibility (one's own responsibility is obscured, accountability is prevented), the outcomes of the behavior (injurious consequences are ignored or misrepresented), or on the recipients of the behavior (the victim is devaluated and even blamed) (Bandura, 2001; 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, and Caprara, 2008).

Disengagement practices reconstructing the harmful behaviour itself as harmless are *moral justification* (making immoral behaviour appear personally and socially acceptable), *euphemistic labelling* (making harmful behaviour appear harmless and respectable by giving it a harmless name), and *advantageous comparison* (making harmful behaviour appear harmless and righteous by contrasting it with more reprehensible conduct). Disengagement practices operating to reduce the sense of personal responsibility by obscuring or minimising the individual's agentive role in the harm caused are *displacement of responsibility* (a legitimate authority accepts responsibility or is held responsible for the effects of the behaviour) and *diffusion of responsibility* (actions are viewed as ordered by social pressure). The disengagement practices helping individuals to avoid facing harmful outcomes of their detrimental acts include the *disregard or distortion of consequences* (negative consequences are ignored, minimised, distorted or disbelieved). Finally, the disengagement practices addressing the recipients of harmful acts (the victims) by discrediting them are *dehumanisation* (denying the victim human qualities, e.g. by attributing bestial qualities) and *attribution of blame* (holding the victim responsible for the harmful act by suggesting that he or she provoked the perpetrator into behaving badly; Bandura, 2001; 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Paciello et al., 2008).

Whereas the four component model of moral action presented earlier explains the steps necessary to bridge the gap between moral thought, competence, and action, Bandura's moral disengagement framework shows *how a gap can be opened* (or widened) between moral thought, competence, and action. By disengaging ourselves from our own moral responsibility in an active, purposeful way, we become capable of planning and implementing harmful, detrimental behaviour in advance and of excusing such behaviour afterwards.

It is no coincidence that Bandura developed this framework to explain how ordinary people came to commit atrocious and inhuman crimes or act

as helpers in the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust. Related conceptualisations like Gibbs' (2003) *self-serving cognitive distortions* and Batson and colleagues' *moral hypocrisy* (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, and Strongman, 1999) or longstanding criminological research on *moral neutralisation* (see e.g., Maruna and Copes, 2004; Ribeaud and Eisner, 2010a), reveal that the use of such strategies in the context of immoral behavior can be consistently found. Indeed, a vast body of social psychological (e.g., Aquino, Reed, Thau, and Freeman, 2007; Bandura, 2002; Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, and Regalia, 2001; Shu, Gina, and Basermann, 2011), developmental psychological (e.g., Gini, 2006; Hymel, Rocke Henderson, and Bonanno, 2005; Menesini, Sanchez, Fonzi, Ortega, Costabile, and Lo Feudo, 2003; Paciello et al., 2008; Perren and Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2012) and criminological research (e.g., Fontaine, Fida, Paciello, Tisak, and Caprara, 2014; Kiriakidis, 2008; 2010; Ribeaud and Eisner, 2010b; Shulman, Cauffman, Piquero, and Fagan, 2011) has been documenting this relationship between moral distancing and aggressive, antisocial, and delinquent behavior for more than fifty years.

Moreover, moral disengagement strategies and mechanisms have been and still are widely used to justify terrorism, war, and collective violence as mirrored in ongoing conflicts and accompanying public debates, and as investigated and confirmed in numerous, also recent, studies (e.g., Aquino et al., 2007; Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandström, Udd, and Morrison, 2002; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, and Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Mc Alister, 2000). Bandura (2002) presents various examples of how each of the mechanisms can be observed in operation. Thus, moral justification (i.e., justifiying immoral acts by making it appear acceptable) is often used in combination with religion to justify terrorism and war against nonbelievers. An example is the jihad proclaimed by Islamic extremists like Bin Laden who claimed that it served self-defence against tyrannical infidel exploitation. Or dehumanisation, that is, "stripping people of human qualities" (Bandura, 2002: 109) is described as a powerful and crucial component for the perpetration of inhumanities:

> Primo Levi (1989) asked a Nazi camp commander why they went to extreme lengths to degrade their victims, whom they were going to kill anyway. The commandant chillingly explained that it was not a matter of purposeless cruelty. The victims had to be degraded to subhuman objects so that those who operated the gas chambers would be less burdened by distress.

Salzman (2012) identifies processes of dehumanisation in their various forms and guises as a prerequisite and precedence of atrocities and killing.

Those who are not human or less than human can be killed without remorse because the killers do not recognise themselves (as humans) in their victims' eyes (as fellow humans). Less-than-humans need not be the object of concern or care; the killers need not be sensitive to their plight, empathise or sympathise with them. On all levels of moral functioning can "subhumans" be excluded from the moral consideration owed to humans. Accordingly, dehumanisation is a powerful facilitator of killing.

Following current news on armed conflicts in Syria, Israel, Iraq and many more countries, we find instances of moral disengagement no matter where we look, with each side involved finding good reasons for using weapons and perpetrating cruelties against fellow humans. Accordingly, healthy moral development—also with respect to nonkilling—necessitates individuals' not learning to use mechanisms of moral disengagement in order to make own injourous behaviour possible. The danger inherent in ongoing selective activation of moral disengagement mechanisms lies in *moral corrosion* as suggested by Bandura's theorising (e.g., Bandura, 2001; Bandura et al., 1996). Individuals may thus harden themselves against reflecting on the morality of their behaviour, against recongising the consequences of their actions, against empathising with the victim, etc. and continue to engage in detrimental behaviour, which in turn requires the use of justification strategies, resulting in a vicious circle.

Taken together, we see that all approaches to explaining moral behaviour presented here include responsibility as a central factor: judging whether the self is responsible to implement the morally most adequate course of action; the sense of personal responsibility towards morally adequate action having its source in moral identity; or responsibility and accountability as grounded in moral agency. Responsibility and accountability are always *ascribed to the self* by the individual, based on his or her construction of a given situation and the potential consequenes of his/her own actions.

The Role of the Situation

Kohlberg formulated his theory of the development of moral judgment competence on the basis of several assumptions. One of these assumptions posits that the stages of moral development function as structural wholes (Kohlberg, 1969). Accordingly it is assumed that individuals form their moral judgments on their highest stage of competence, across situations, contexts, themes, situations in life, or problems encountered (e.g., Beck, 1999). Therefore, depending on their highest stage of reasoning, individuals always refer to obedience and punishment (stage 1); own interests or in-

strumental reciprocity (stage 2); close social relationships (stage 3); maintaining social order (stage 4); social contract and individual rights (stage 5); or universal ethical principles (stage 6). However, findings from research in economic education have shown that individuals use different moral principles, depending on the area of life concerned; this suggests a differentiation of moral judgments (e.g., Beck, 2000). Bienengräber (2011) goes even further by postulating that also within different areas of life a situation specific differentiation of moral judgments occurs, representing a *situation specific implementation* of moral judgment competence. In the formation process of a moral judgment, an individual's moral judgment competence is an inherent part of his/her construction of the situation. Situated moral judgments result from the interplay between various situational components.

> An individual perceives the characteristics of the environment, interprets them using his/her internal structures and constructs a situation based on that interpretation. Depending on the role the individual assumes—with conceptions and the constellation of objects being of importance—the selection of a moral judgment principle deemed adequate in this specific situation is the result. The social circumstances for development so to say expand the fundus individuals can use to judge a given course of action. At the same time, in the individuals' awareness these conditions for development are linked to *concrete events*, that is, to real, past situations. (Bienengräber, 2011: 19; own translation, original emphasis).

Accordingly, the way an individual interprets a situation influences his/her moral evaluation of that situation, and as a consequence also the selection of the morally most appropriate course of action. The situated moral judgment described here can easily be combined with Rest and colleagues' four component model of moral action (Rest et al., 1999), because making a moral judgment represents the second component of that model. What is described as the perception of the environmental characteristics by Bienengräber (2011) can be linked to moral sensitivity, the first component. At the same time we need to be aware that Bienengräber's (2011) approach does not yet explain moral action, leaving an important function to the remaining two components of Rest and colleagues' model, that is, moral motivation and moral character.

Another link to Bienengräber's situational approach is Bandura's conception of moral agency (e.g., Bandura, 2002), where the perceived circumstances, that is, the interpretation of the given situational factors, are included in the evaluation of own (planned or already implemented) action. Moral action is always action in a given situation (and its respective context)

based on the interpretation of that situation. As individuals—from a constructivist point of view—bring their own experiences, points of view, competencies, etc. into play when interpreting a specific situation, it is evident that one and the same situation can be perceived (and constructed) in different ways. Thus, experiences from different moral and morally relevant situations and the accompanying conditions for learning and development make it possible for the individual to acquire a repertoire of principles serving as orientations when evaluating a specific moral situation. Combined with the insight into the importance of the social and cultural environment and the co-construction of meaning as emphasised by social interactionist and social constructionist approaches, we realise that moral learning and development include complex processes drawing heavily on the meanings individuals co-construct based on their own and others' moral experiences. That killing is not and need not be an option must be encountered in various contexts and environments, including a multitude of interactions and (joint) meaning making, with ongoing discussion and implementation of moral principles.

Integration and Outlook

It is now time to integrate the various approaches presented and relate them to a vision of a future nonkilling global society. At the beginning of the paper, a developmental perspective grounded in constructivism (constructing meaning based on actions and experiences), social interactionism (interaction partners and the community support our meaning making), and social constructionism (meaning is jointly constructed, communicated, and shared) was described. Combined with the theoretical approaches explaining the formation of positive moral behaviour, the approach to morality described here and the related expectations towards ourselves and others do not inlcude moralising, lecturing, or indoctrination. I do not put morally relevant behaviour in black or white boxes, labelling them as either (absolutely) wrong or right or conceive of positive moral behaviour as mere application of rules and virtues from pre-defined catalogues. This does not mean that my position moves away from moral universalism in the sense of preserving the dignity, rights, and welfare of every human being. Rather, following Blasi's conception of the moral self and Bergman's conception of moral maturity as the aim of individual moral development, I argue that the individual must explore and experience moral and morally relevant situations in a variety of environments and time and again construct meaning from those experiences, as well as internalise moral standards in the sense

of actively recognising them as meaningful and relevant to the self. Thus, knowing about and applying moral rules is an important component of moral learning and development, but this cannot be the endpoint.

First, to act in a morally adequate way in a given situation, several prerequisites and processing steps are necessary. As indicated by Rest and colleagues' four component model or Bandura's theory of moral agency the individual is required to capture that situation and its moral dimensions, to interpret it, devise potential plans for action which in turn must be evaluated with respect to their consequences both for others and for the self in order to decide upon the morally most adequate course of action. The individual must be motivated to actually implement that course of action, be it on the basis of a sense of moral responsibility grounded in the individual's moral identity; due to expected positive emotions like pride or self-affirmation because s/he intends to act in such a way as not to harm another's welfare; or because moral norms and values are given preference over other values, some of which serve to satisfy personal needs. Finally, the individual also needs the character strength to see the chosen course of action through.

Second, moral norms, values, and rules offer important orientation to make sense of and understand moral or morally relevant situations and gain first insights for potential action alternatives. However, as they are formulated in general ways and are by nature abstract, they cannot cover all possible situations and varieties of situations in all possible contexts and under all possible circumstances. As Bienengräber's situational approach to moral judgment competence suggests, the circumstances of a given situation and the individual's respective interpretation influence the selection of the judgment principle seen as most appropriate. Hence, the individual needs to actively relate to moral (and other, nonmoral) norms, values, and rules and to find out which of them apply in a given situation in orde to derive a moral judgment and later course of action. With respect to children and adolescents we may assume that learning to match specific situations with abstract rules, that is, finding out what abstract rules (norms, values) apply in a given situation or what abstract rules that specific situation is an example of, is highly demanding and requires ongoing experience, interaction, and discourse.

Third, humans are (moral) agents who actively engage in influencing their functioning and shaping their environment. They do not merely obey and apply rules. They reflect their actions and regulate them on the basis of further experiences, insights, and understanding. Thus, in the course of moral internalisation, moral norms, values, and rules are not merely received or absorbed passively, but processed actively, endowed with mean-

ing and considered as relevant to the self in the formation of moral identity. Associated with this is the vital role of *moral mistakes and negative moral knowledge* for moral development (Oser, 2005), and the chance inherent in as well as the potential healing powers of acknowledging of one's wrongs, apologising, atonement, forgiveness, reconciliation, etc., a heavily underresearched area (Enright, 2014). Making mistakes, also moral mistakes, is an inherent part of human life.

> […] it is exactly these life stories which are related to moral judgments. Our identities are scars of life as personal wealth. In relation to morality our identities are especially negative identities. What is uppermost in our minds are not our heroic deeds, the good we once did, the act of justice that we enforced. What is uppermost are our failures, our moral mistakes. And these generate negative moral knowledge, which is both protective knowledge and at the same time brings order into our moral cosmos. (Oser, 2005: 180)

Building negative moral knowledge as a consequence of moral mistakes serves several important functions (Oser, 2005). First, one function lies in offering *orientation in the moral cosmos* through moral experience. By transgressing againgst moral rules (or observing others' transgressions) and the subsequent reactions by and interactions with the environment moral learning is possible. Second, negative moral knowledge contributes to individuals' increasing certitude in making moral decisions, for example by knowing what strategies are not morally appropriate or do not work in some situations, etc. Not doing the negative is just as important as doing the positive. Many catalogues of moral duties (e.g., the Ten Commandments) include negative moral duties, using formulations like "you should not; thou shalt not; you must not" and the like. A third function relates moral action to the transparency and salience of norms in a social system (family, school, business, leisure). What moral rules are valid in what system; what situations do they apply to; what are the consequences of transgression, etc.? Related to this is the need to know or learn what happened to people breaking these norms, what the consequences for them and for others were. Thus, the suffering caused by such transgressions and atrocities, like for example the Holocaust before and during World War II and its aftermath, must be kept alive in people's discourse and memories in the form of negative moral knowledge. Fourth, negative moral knowledge has also a protective function by helping individuals to surmise what might be the consequences of a certain course of action in a new situation not encountered before. For example, based on historical knowledge about (recent and current) fascist and dictatorial regimes, too much tolerance of right wing propa-

ganda is recognised as dangerous for the welfare of society (cf. Oser, 2005). What is crucial—especially in relation to nonkilling—is that this negative moral knowledge be kept alive and constitute one foundation of constant personal, social, and communal moral meaning making through discourse and interaction. As socio-moral development occurs and is possible throughout the lifespan, it is in everybody's power to contribute to personal, social, and societal moral transformation. There is enough negative moral knowledge related to killing available to all of us to endorse nonkilling as a universal orientation.

What milestones or turning points might be important in humans' positive and healthy moral development towards *moral maturity as the fundament of nonkilling*? Based on the theories, models, and research findings presented we might summarise healthy moral development as *not unlearning to care* and learning to care even more, with a safe grounding in a personal sense of moral identity and the universalist understanding that this orientation of care (cf. Gilligan, 1985) reaches beyond our family and friends to include each and everyone, and that it needs to be activated and implemented across situations, contexts, and environments. Accordingly, one milestone refers to overcoming one's own egocentric viewpoint (with hedonistic needs and their satisfaction seen as most important to the self) to become open for other's views, needs, experiences, and to increasingly learn about their inner and outer world. Related to this, a second milestone relates to reaching a sympathetic understanding of others' needs and plight, coupled with the preservation and further enhancement of one's moral emotional, especially one's empathetic, capacities. A third milestone includes the development and ongoing experiencing of moral agency and the related facets of moral responsibility and accountability. Finally, a fourth milestone involves the development of a moral identity as well as the associated character strength to resist tempations towards using mechanisms of moral disengagement in order to make own injourous behaviour possible. Naturally, this list is both tentative and incomplete. Moreover, despite speaking of milestones or turning points, I do not suggest that these represent fixed, discrete achievements which—once accomplished—the individual can enjoy in peace without further effort. Rather, when once reached in a first, rather rudimentary form, this achievement gives strength and power for the ongoing pathway towards developing more complex forms as required by living in increasingly complex, often partially conflicting or contradictory contexts of live.

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Psychology of Nonkilling in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Knowledge and Attitudes of Students Toward Nonkilling Culture

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Introduction

Nonkilling refers to the absence of killing, threats to kill, and conditions conducive to killing in human society (Paige, 2009). Although the term refers mostly to the killing of humans, it is sometimes extended to include the killing of animals and other forms of life (Kool and Agrawal, 2009). Paige (2002) coined the term nonkilling incorporating and expanding on the concept of nonviolence in a positive and dynamic way. Since its initial development, many academics and professionals have begun to analyze nonkilling from the perspective of their own disciplines (Evans Pim, 2009). In relation to psychological aggression, physical assault, and torture intended to terrorize by manifest or latent threat to life, nonkilling implies removal of their psychosocial causes (*Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems*, 2005). Kool and Agrawal (2009), MacNair (2009) and, especially, Christie and Evans Pim (2012) have analyzed nonkilling from a psychological point of view; however, little empirical research from a psychological perspective has emerged.

In the mid 1980s, UNESCO proposed to all member states to join forces to create global culture of peace, which they later articulated with the help of an Action Plan that consisted of 8 basic guidelines. Education is one that is enthroned at the top of the list of guidelines that should lead toward the building of a culture of peace, with special focus on peaceful conflict solving (Adams, 2009). According to this concept, the culture of peace would involve values, views and behaviours that would reject all forms of violence, prevent conflicts by researching their causes and aspire to solve issues by dialogue and negotiation. This would be a culture seeking to manage conflict situations transforming them into cooperation with the aim to achieve common goals. It is quite clear that education plays an important role in the

promotion of a society based on nonkilling, becoming an important component on thee way of building the attitudes and value systems for killing-free societies (see *Vasa Statement on Education for a Killing-free World)*.

Although many topics from psychology of nonkilling are very relevant for our society, this is a new field in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). As far as we know, there are no previous works on nonkilling psychology in our country. Therefore, the goal of this research was to examine the knowledge and attitudes of students about topics from nonkilling psychology. Taking into account a broader theoretical framework, and the lack of research on this topic, this chapter deals with individual knowledge and attitudes of students about nonkilling culture in general.

The first part of the chapter provides a methodological framework, describing the research questions, selected research methods, sample and the research procedures. The second part presents the results, some of which are discussed with further detail in the third section together with some limitations and conclusions of the research.

Methodology

Participants

The research was conducted with fifth year students from four departments of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo. The total number of participants was nine (N=9), of which were 3 males and 6 females, with an average age of 24.2. Three participants were from the Department of Psychology, another three from the Department of Pedagogy, two from the Department of Comparative Literature and Library Science, and one from the Department of Sociology.

In this research the sample was selected in a specific way. The researchers decided to include only fifth year students, with the assumption that they had an advantage over students of lower academic years with respect to their knowledge. The principle of homogeneity has been met on one side, which is important for two main reasons: people speak more openly and freely when they are among peers; the results of focus groups are interpreted at the group level, and not at the individual, meaning that responses of the group as a whole are observed and therefore it is important for the group members to be more similar to each other. However, it is important to emphasize that researchers made a conscious methodological decision that they would deviate from this principle by the fact that the students from different departments would be included in the research.

This is justified when the goal is to obtain different perspectives on an issue and in this research that means the opinion of students coming from different scientific fields. The aim of this type of research is to reveal how a phenomenon is expressed through the dynamic, its consequences and movement through the context, rather than generalize the phenomenon in a general population (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Skoko and Benković, 2009).

Instruments

For the purpose of this study a questionnaire consisting of ten open-ended questions was developed and applied in the first part of the research. Questions arise from the three areas that are the focus of this research: *Phenomenology of Violence*, *Responsibility of the Community in Preventing Violence* and *Education System and the Psychology of Nonkilling*. Within the research a short questionnaire was also applied for collecting data on certain socio-demographic characteristics of participants.

Characteristics of Qualitative Methodology and Research Procedure

Before the research began, written invitations had been addressed to the fifth year students from several departments of the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo. Professors also served as intermediaries in the process of informing and inviting students to participate. All the students that were interested needed to confirm their participation to one of the research leaders. The research was conducted in March 2014 in one of the classrooms at the Faculty of Philosophy. At the beginning, after obtaining all the necessary information, the participants gave their written consent by which they confirmed their voluntary participation within the research.

The research consisted of two parts. In the first part, participants were supposed to fill-out the questionnaires in about 45 min. In the second part a focus group was created, and its duration was limited to 90 min.

Qualitative methodology is by its logic and nature open, with the primary purpose to acquire more profound insight and understanding of the issues researched. With this aim the researchers decided on a focus group within the research. Qualitative methods are characterized by the fact that the researcher is a basic instrument for collecting and interpreting results. Studies are usually descriptive, since the focus is on the process itself, and at the meaning and understanding the words of participants in the research (Tkalac Verčić et al., 2010). Focus groups are formed in order to allow discussion in an organized manner under the leadership of a moderator or facilitator, on the issues that are important for particular study. The modera-

tor establishes interaction with participants and encourages discussion following the previously prepared protocol. The protocol contains a series of open-ended questions aimed at stimulating the discussion on a particular topic and gathering different opinions and points of view. In this research those were the questions from the questionnaire that participants filled out in the first part. The focus group opened the possibility for additional explanations of participant's answers and to understand and collect through discussion considerable amounts of data that were the focus of the research. Moderators were minimally involved, so as not to influence the comments of participants with their own views and opinions.

With the focus groups we obtain answers to the question of "why?" and not of "how much?" They allow us to make the reconstruction of the range of views toward a certain issue, the tangle of motives that people have, the structure of rationalization models of certain decisions or views, the link between different topics that might not seem connected at first sight, etc. The analysis of the results included collecting of impressions, careful analysis of sets of transcripts, all with the aim to systematize the answers of participants on certain questions and make adequate conclusions. The focus groups open the possibility for further research (Barker et al., 2002).

Results

Phenomenology of violent behavior

We first wanted to examine attitudes of students about the phenomenology of violent behavior. For this purpose, we asked them four questions.

In the first question we asked students about their attitudes about the protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina in February 2014. Most of participants agreed that, in spite of the violence, protests had to occur, and that they were a justified and positive event, because every citizen is responsible for the political and economic situation in the country:

> To have neutral attitude is actually running away from responsibility. We are all responsible, as individuals. You need to enable freedom of choice and freedom of choice of others should be sacred. Here people are not free in such sense. (Student of Psychology)

But the violent destruction of government buildings was wrong, because

> Buildings do not make decisions and they can't be blamed for social problems. (Student of Comparative Literature and Library Science)

One student also argued that this reaction on social injustice came too late:

> It's not possible to apply justice retroactively. Modern society has contributed to making of differences between people and abolished the human right to choose. Differences are constructed throughout history. (Student of Sociology)

There was also a discussion about what actually happened during the protests:

> It was about class conflict between two classes that are ideologically shaped. The oppressed class used violence—the means justifies the goal. The oppressed class has this only way to react. Albert Camus: if the end justifies the means, then what justifies the goal? The only answer is—means! If we choose violence as a means I'm not sure whether it is a good goal. When you say that the goal is good you have already justified it. (Student of Comparative Literature and Library Science)

Also, a student mentioned that protestors should not be blamed or accused for destruction of government property during the protests:

> *The perpetrators of violence in this case where kids, and they are a product of this system. They can't know any other way to fight other than violence in this society. You shouldn't blame kids but those who are responsible for them. (Student of Pedagogy)*

The second question concerned the student's attitudes about the most frequent reasons for violent behavior of individuals and groups.

Regarding the reasons of violent behavior of individuals, the most frequent answers were: (1) *personal factors*: character and temperament of individuals; type of personality; frustration because of lack of ability to satisfy personal needs; not being able to control own behavior; social status; self-defense; and (2) *social factors*: social context; insufficient education on nonviolent alternatives; group influence; social deprivation; social injustice.

During the discussion, students concluded that the most frequent reasons for violent behavior were: due to the feelings of vulnerability, the group may be the trigger for the violence of individuals, groups as a refuge, channeling negative energy and moved aggression.

We also asked if the absolute elimination of violence is possible in society, although if the question had focused on eliminating killing the response may have been different. Almost all participants answered that is it not possible, that such society does not exist, and that it would represent utopia. Only one student said that it is possible to make such society through long period of work and education:

> It is a long-term transgenerational process. If we raise future parents as nonviolent individuals, they will thus raise their children. Man is not born violent, he does not have to be violent. (Student of Psychology)

Some participants also added that it may be possible to reduce violent behavior through nonviolent conflict resolution and prevention programs, but that would also take time.

During the discussion, we got additional information and explanations regarding the students' attitudes about this question. For example, a student of sociology said that violent behavior has a relevant role for social interactions, especially in Bosnian multicultural society:

> In a society rich with differences, there must be conflicts, which are sometimes necessary for development (there must be dynamics for society to progress). But it is important to keep violence under control, with the existence of certain sanctions for any escalation. (Student of Sociology)

Also, students concluded that every period in history has its own type of prevailing violence. For example, in contemporary society we not only have physical and emotional violence, but also cyber-violence.

The last question concerning the phenomenology of violence was: "Is violence sometimes the only way to achieve goals? If so, in which situations is it justified to use violent behaviors?"

Most of participants said that violence is not a legitimate way to solve problems, but almost everyone agreed that it is right to use violence for self-defense and survival, not only on an existential level, but also to preserve one's identity.

During the discussion students agreed that violence should always be the last option for conflict resolution:

> It's justified to use violence only if someone threatens my life or the life of others, and it should be used for defense. But first you should try to talk calmly, to establish a dialogue, but if you do not manage you should be defended. (Student of Psychology)

Responsibility of the Community in Preventing Violence

Through the analysis of the answers and discussion, we found out that all participants believe that the society they live in shows a high threshold of tolerance toward violence. One of the reasons they allege is the fact that people in this region often witness violence, which leads to becoming less sensitive and not sensitized for its recognition and response. Participants

explained that tolerance of violence is also tied to the belief that violence is increasingly recognized as a way to solve problems and achieve goals:

> If violence is shown as a strategy that enables the individual to achieve the goal, many will adopt it and apply it. (Student of Psychology)

Participants emphasized that the historical background has significant influence. The war that took place in this region and the fact that we live in a country with an increasing number of poor and socially neglected people, who will recognize violence as a way of releasing accumulated frustrations and dissatisfaction, must be considered.

Societal tolerance for violence is developed through the family, as well as through the educational context, and very often certain forms of violence are not recognized as violence because the individual has not had the opportunity to adopt alternative patterns of behaviour that would be socially preferred and enable him or her to cope with the problems:

> Still, in many families, violence is acceptable as a method by which parents should raise their children. (Student of Pedagogy)

Participants argued in the discussion that Balkan societies are more tolerant to latent violence, which often means psychological abuse:

> For many, only physical violence is a form of violence that is condemned and that they believe it should be penalized. (Student of Psychology)

It was also argued that in the background of tolerance for violence lies the fear to react to situations when violent behaviour is manifested:

> If there is no support from the system and if an individual is perceived as being unprotected, it is more likely that his or her reaction to the violence is absent. (Student of Psychology)

When it comes to taking responsibility for the prevention of violence, the participants indicated at the very beginning of the discussion the importance of the role that educational institutions have. In the opinion of some participants, education should be implemented through the educational system, within which individuals would be familiarized with the consequences of violent behaviour, but also which would enable the adoption of constructive and socially desirable ways of solving problems. In the opinion of students, parents should take more responsibility:

> The work with parents is also necessary. They should be conscious and aware of the fact that children learn by the model and in many situations

> imitate their parents. After the same principle, teachers should build a positive climate in the school context and be consistent models in manifesting of nonviolent behaviour. (Student of Pedagogy)

Through the discussion participants stressed that school, in addition to the family, represents the context in which children spend the most time and, therefore, the education of children and young people should be more focused on acquiring the knowledge and skills of nonviolent conflict solving on nonkilling alternatives, more quality communication and ways of prevention of socially undesirable forms of behaviours.

> Schools often do not take that kind of responsibility but instead complicate it by dividing some children for certain reasons (religious, national, social status, etc.). (Student of Psychology)

> The educational system has a complex task, which is primarily adequate socialization that includes teaching tolerance, quality communication and accepting differences. Educational institutions should be holders of programmes that will educate children and young people for solving conflicts in peaceful ways. (Student of Pedagogy)

Students feel that intervention and prevention programmes should start in lower grades of primary school, and that should help strengthening family relationships and improving the partnership between family and school.

During the discussion the question of to which extent the educational institutions should take over the responsibility for raising the individual was raised. Students share the opinion that the educational system should have a greater responsibility from the current one:

> Child raising and education often cannot be separated. When a person acquires certain knowledge and competences, it is important to teach him or her how to apply them. (Student of Pedagogy)

> The educational system has responsibility because it represents the machine of social control. It is responsible for the transfer of knowledge and ideology to an individual. Education is the instrument for systematic implementation of ideas. (Student of Comparative Literature and Library Science)

However, in addition to educational institutions, the responsibility for the promotion of nonviolent behaviour should also be taken by media, NGOs, political structures, religious institutions and sport associations. Participants emphasize that the strong linkage and cooperation between those institutions is important. Media can sensitize the public when it comes to recognizing violence and the adequate response to it:

> Public figures should be particularly sensitive and take responsibility due to the influence they have over society (Student of Comparative Literature and Library Science)
>
> The social system creates the foundations for a culture of nonviolence, it creates the system of values. All aspects of society are relevant to raise a person, as they influence on his or her formation. (Student of Pedagogy)

Education System and the Psychology of Nonkilling

In order to obtain a better insight into the field of recognizing the psychology of killing/nonkilling from the perspective of the students, we asked them whether they had ever heard of this field and, if so, in what context. Most of the students had never heared of the term "nonkilling":

> I only became familiarized with this area by surfing the Internet after I had been invited to voluntarily take part in the study (Student of Psychology).

One student emphasized that the invitation to participate in the study encouraged her to be more informed, which increased her interest in the evaluation of the basic foundations of the psychology of nonkilling and recognizing its congruency with its own system of values and beliefs:

> I haven't heard of the psychology of nonkilling until the invitation to participate in this study. Later on I found some papers… I became interested about the philosophy of the Buddhist ethic, and in accordance with that, I have also become involved with Neo-Buddhists who are advocating peace and coexistence… I have started to research the psychology of nonkilling (Student of Comparative Literature and Library Science).

Although our intuitive preconception of the relative nonprevalence of the term the "psychology of nonkiling" in the academic and nonacademic context has been confirmed through the student responses, we wanted to see to what extend the students had encountered nonviolent conflict solving during their education. Our next question was formulated in the following way: "Have you ever had the opportunity to study nonviolent ways of conflict solving during your formal education (within a specific educational course)?" The students who responded positively to the question should state the program name within which this issue was processed and the way in which the program was conceived.

The students of psychology and pedagogy referred to the specific programs, including Social Psychology, Mental Health, Psychology of Groups and Intergroup Relations, Counselling Work, Management in Education, and

Methodology of Educational Work. Some of the answers described how the content of the educational course was designed and implemented:

> The program was designed in such a way that we worked in groups or in pairs discussing certain issues, including conflict in relationships: pupil-pupil, pupil-teacher, and teacher-parent. (Student of Pedagogy)

The students of Comparative Literature and Library Science answered that they had not had an opportunity to learn about nonviolent ways of conflict solving during their previous education, while the student of Sociology did not state any specific educational course, but instead expressed the view that sociology as a science generally has toward this issue:

> For example, the view on the integral role of an individual in society, consensus as the solution of certain problems. (Student of Sociology)

Within this broader issue, it was interesting to examine what was the students' perception of the way the programs had an impact on them:

> I have started to look differently at conflicts, trying to make the best out of them… It has affected me, as I react less impulsively in conflict situations and use dialogue more efficiently… I am aware that conflict is not always negative. (Student of Pedagogy)

Although most of the students said that they experienced positive changes on a personal level as a result of attending these courses, a certain caution was observed in evaluating the applicability of the acquired skills:

> I have become aware of certain characteristics of my own personality. I try to abide by certain assumptions within an assertive way of sending messages to others, but I'm not always successful. (Student of Psychology)

One of the students emphasized in her answer that these programs had resulted in positive changes, but she still questions their efficiency:

> Newly acquired pieces of information have served to look at the intergroup conflicts from a different perspective, although I am not convinced of their effectiveness (Student of the Psychology).

Discussion and conclusions

Before we make some conclusions, it is important to indicate a few limitations of this research. The results of this study have limited generalizability. To achieve a broader picture on this subject, a larger sample is needed.

The study is also limited by the characteristics of participants. Since all of them were students, their opinions and attitudes are certainly significantly

different from the opinions of other social groups. A third limitation is related to the homogeneity of the sample: participants were young students from different departments of Faculty of Philosophy. Therefore, this study is an initial attempt to examine nonkilling psychology in BH.

Concerning the questions about *phenomenology of violent behavior*, most participants agreed that protests had to occur, and that it was a justified and positive event for the country. In most discussions of civil disobedience, certain characteristics are offered as essential to an act of justifiable civil disobedience, or sometimes to any act of civil disobedience. One of the most frequently mentioned is nonviolence. Some thinkers like Stuart Brown and Rex Martin hold that, though nonviolent civil disobedience is justifiable, violent civil disobedience is not (Morreall, 1976).

Concerning the questions about responsibility of the Community in Preventing Violence, most of participants stress that education of children and young people should be more focused on building killing-free societies, as the "Vasa Statement" reinforces. Educational institutions should be holders of intervention and prevention programmes. They should start in lower grades of primary school, and through them act toward strengthening family relationships and improving the partnership between family and school. In addition to educational institutions, the responsibility for the promotion of nonkilling should be also taken by the media and other institutions.

In spite of the little difussion of the term "nonkilling", the student responses evidence how the term can arouse initial interest and cognitive engagement after the first encounter with the word itself if it is adequately placed (for example, through an invitation for participation in a research study or a round table, debate, etc.). Therefore, measures for increasing initial interest for this field can be initiated in a relatively simple way.

Changing the view of the world is possible through educating and learning about oneself, others, and differences. Salzman (2006) argues that defensive mechanisms such as ethnocentrism, exclusivities and prejudices become a less plausible option where alternative values "are appreciated". These values of second or third order lose the battle where the higher values such as mercy, justice, love and compassion lead. However, it seems that this scenario is possible only when the values affirming humanity are upheld in a society, namely by its cultural, political and educational components.

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Ljubljana Festival in the Early 1960s

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The period after the Second World War and up to the 1960s was very diverse in Slovenia and Ljubljana from a cultural and historical perspective. Four key moments in this period are the end of the Second World War, the Informbiro resolution, dismissing agitprop, the rebellion against the centralization of the cultural sphere in the 1960s, and the so called "relaxed sixties" (Gabrič, 1993: 245). Musical institutions, that started to bloom after 1945 in Ljubljana, can also be studied within this cultural and historical frame (Ribizel, 2012). Among those institutions is Festival Ljubljana.

Festival Ljubljana was established in 1953 with the purpose of sharing Slovenian and Yugoslav cultural creativity, shaping Ljubljana into an important festival area (A. R., 1953: 5). Guests from other countries were able to visit Ljubljana as the cultural season lasted the whole summer. In 1960 the 8th edition was held, including the first ballet show on the program. The ballet festival included the ballet ensembles of the former Yugoslav republics and was the first ballet festival of Yugoslavia. The modern ballet show continued in following editions, also featuring modern opera in biennial series.

The purpose of this article is to present these first meetings of Yugoslav ballet and opera ensembles illustrating the relevance of cultural cooperation among Yugoslav composers and ballet and opera performers in creating a context for peaceful and nonkilling co-existence. (On the importance of music for killing-free societies, see Urbain, 2008 and 2009; Urbain and Robertson, 2015; Laurence and Urbain, 2011.) The article also features the performed program and responses to the biennial events in Ljubljana from two daily newspapers: *Delo* and *Ljubljanski dnevnik*.

Yugoslav Ballet and Opera Ensembles in Ljubljana

In its early beginnings Festival Ljubljana included various programs, featuring a performed program and individual performers (Ribizel, 2012: 175). In

1959 the Festival Department at the Ljubljana Institute organized the 7th Ljubljana Festival, held from June 30th to July 13th. The performed program consisted of comic opera, operetta and modern music. Besides the Festival itself there was also the 1st Vedro Ljubljana, an autumn festival event from September 1st to 15th and other events in December. Media saw this Festival duality as its final shape with the potential of becoming a new but also traditional event attracting a wide range of visitors ("Sedmič", *Delo*, 60, 30. 6.1959: 6).

The next year the organizers went one step forward holding the first ballet Festival, named 1st Yugoslav Ballet Biennale, within the 8th Ljubljana Festival. This was the first time that the ballet ensembles of former Yugoslavia first met, signaling a closer cooperation of the Festival with other musical institutions outside Slovenia. During this first ballet biennale a competition of individual performers of opera ballet of the capital cities in Yugoslavia was also included. Until 1966 there were three opera and four ballet biennials, but later this biennial sequence of opera and ballet was discontinued. Featured ensembles included Opera Beograd, Opera Ljubljana, Opera Skopje, Opera Zagreb, Opera Theatre Maribor, Opera Theatre Novi Sad, etc. Through this framework they were able to cooperate as a whole *corpus de ballet*.

Opera and Ballet Program

The essence of Ljubljana Festival war based on these cooperative ensembles, bringing toghether performers that were already active in other musical institutions from the former Yugoslavia. Although the focus of cooperation was on the former Yugoslav republics, in the period between 1960 and 1963 the program included Yugoslav and also foreign composers.

Among Yugoslav composers were Krešimir Baranović, Nikola Hercigonja, Jakov Gotovac, Konjović, Marjan Kozina, Mirko Polič, Danilo Švara, Slavko Osterc, Natko Devčić, Ivo Tijardović and others. Foreign authors included Sergej Prokofjev, Peter Iljič Čajkovski, Gioachino Rossini, Edvard Grieg, Béla Bartók, Rahmaninov, Aleksander Borodin, Bedrich Smetana, Manuel de Falla, Igor Stravinski, Jules Massenet, Ermanno Wolf-Ferrari, Jacques Offenbach and others.

Yugoslav composers were more obviously present in the first editions, especially in 1961. That can also be noticed in a piece published in *Ljubljanski dnevnik*: "On the Fighter's Day, July 4th, the Sarajevo opera theatre will hold the first home, partisan opera of M. Logar "Enainštirideseto Forty-

one"[1]. Later, in the years 1962 and 1963, the presence of Yugoslav composers was reduced. But in spite of this, the Festival remained as a display of Yugoslav creativity although it was initially envisioned to present Slovenian creative and post-creative culture[2]. By expanding its focus outside the Slovenian borders it also enlarged the reputation of the city Ljubljana. The media reported regularly on festival events, mainly through musical critiques.

Conclusion

During the 1960s Festival Ljubjana became a showcase for Yugoslav cultural cooperation, particularly among ballet and opera institutions. The Festival itself also grew over the years, as the program of the 5th edition explains:

> From the first modest beginnings of the local touristic week in 1952 we have reached, after a selection of quality and meaning, specific and rigorous festival programs, appealing not only to those who are close but also the wider world cultural audience. This is proof that Ljubljana Festival is improving in the right direction, the one it was established for and that it has created by itself.[3]

The central thought of the whole initiative was that Festival Ljubljana and other Yugoslav institutions could come together for performances and join hands to propagate themselves and the whole Yugoslav creativity. Festival Ljubljana became a huge achievement for all Yugoslavia as the first ballet festival of Yugoslav ensembles, demonstrating how culture and music could serve to promote friendship, cooperation and common initiatives.

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[1] "Gorski venec prva predstava Ljubljanskega festivala," *Ljubljanski dnevnik*, 23/6/1961.

[2] *Zgodovinski arhiv Ljubljana*, LJU, Festival Ljubljana, ljubljanski Festival, box 1, d. 1.

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Doukhobor Nonkilling Legacy

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Introduction

Although a definite link has yet to be found, my ancestors the Spirit Wrestlers / Doukhobors were probably influenced centuries ago by the Bogomils of the Balkans and the *Raskol* or Big Split in the Russian Orthodox Church, but through time took on the mantle of nonkilling and became a social movement. Today as part of the traditional peace group, Doukhobors have generally maintained an absolutist stance on the issue of war and peace. This stems from their universal Spirit of Love or God in every person. It follows that it is wrong to kill another human being.

My ancestors the Spirit Wrestlers / Doukhobors were nicknamed in Central Russia about 1786. Their developing nonkilling stance resulted in mass movements of isolation to South Ukraine and then to the Southern Caucasus in the 1840s. In 1895 their protest against militarism by burning guns in three locations resulted in persecutions, which aroused the international renowned Russian philosopher and writer Lev N. Tolstoy to advocate for them. Doukhobors transformed into a pacifist social movement. They have acquired embedded qualities of opposing militarism and war.

Spirit-Wrestlers or Doukhobors have been around for several centuries. Over eight thousand Doukhobors have moved from Eastern Europe to North America and settled primarily in Western Canada. Several hundred have ventured into the United States of America in search of livelihood. Many others have continued to reside in Russia enduring the transitions from tsarism, communism, and now to a hybrid of capitalism and socialism. A few individuals have ventured to other parts of the world including Australia, Japan, West Indies, Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

What have we learned from the wanderings of this group around the world? What useful insights have we gained? And what wisdom have we discovered from the Doukhobor experience as we begin the new century? Has this social movement transformed the way we look at the world? This

chapter is designed to answer these questions. The answers take the form of a summary of ten central Doukhobor values, propositions or commandments. The numbers of people involved in this social experiment are very small, but their ideas are pregnant with possibilities for a world without war. If that is the legacy of the Doukhobors to the world, then we can say that small is indeed beautiful and that our contribution will not be in vain.

The Spirit Within[1]

The pioneering invention of the 'Spirit Within' is a revolutionary discovery. It resembles the *Power of the Lord* or just simply 'The Power' as used by early Quakers, members of the Society of Friends (Martin, 2001:11). Also it is similar to Lev N. Tolstoy's *Kingdom of God is Within You*, which was first published in 1893 as an individual moral template affecting a person's actions towards others. Some modern communication gurus have called this phenomenon 'personal power'.

Historically in Russia, the Spirit Wrestlers, or Doukhobors, arose against a ritual Orthodox Christianity where the pomp of the rites, the splendor of the ceremonies, the richness of the sacred vestments and ornaments constituted the essential elements in the religious life of the Russian people.

Against this general tendency of Russian orthodoxy sprung up through a spirit of reaction and under the influence of Protestantism, "the rationalistic sects, which aim to rid Russian Christianity of its ritual dross, to bring into greater activity the inner life of religious feeling, and to establish direct relations between God and man without the mediation of pastors invested with a divine mission" (Palmieri, 1915: 62). These groups, in short, while not rejecting Christianity, proposed to simplify it, to free it from its theological trappings and to make its great principles effective in the life of society.

The Doukhobors were one of those liberating groups. Divested of all the mystical elements of modern Christianity, this universal rationalist religion or morality contained in 'The Spirit Within' made them equally acceptable to the Christian, the Buddhist, the Hebrew, the Moslem, the follower of Lao-Tse and to every ethical philosopher.

The name of the Doukhobors (Russian *Dukhobortsy*) is derived from two Russian words, *dukh*, meaning 'spirit', and *borets*, meaning 'wrestler'. Taken in a negative sense, the name was first used in 1786 by adversaries against

[1] Revised from Chapter IV of Tarasoff (2002). *Spirit Wrestlers: Doukhobor Pioneers' Strategies for Living*. Ottawa: Legas Publishing and Spirit Wrestlers, pp. 361-378.

them, labeling them as heretics who rejected all the elements of the supernatural life of the church and the mysterious operation of the Holy Spirit in the soul of the sacraments. The Doukhobors, on the contrary, took the concept in a positive way: they are people who interpret God in spirit and in truth. Or simply put, they conceived the naturalistic notion that there exists a God Within or the Spirit Within.

In establishing direct relations between God and man without the mediation of pastors invested with a divine mission, Doukhobors have posed a new way of thinking about spirituality. They consider the Spirit Within as a new direction in human evolution. The frills, the structures of worship and ecclesiastical hierarchy, the Bible, are all superfluous, they say. Sacraments have no useful reason for existence because Doukhobors do not believe in the priesthood and the church. Each person has all the resources within him or her to do good: to relate to others as good respectful neighbours and to co-operate in all things that provide a full social and economic welfare to all regardless of race, colour, creed, or political affiliations.

Basically, Doukhobor beliefs can be distilled into the following propositions:

- Because we all have the abode of God within us, it is wrong to kill another human being. This idea originates from the assumption that every individual, man, woman and child, regardless of age or sex, has a bit of a Divine Spark in them. Life is to be lived in accordance with the guidance of that Spirit. Herein lay the deep roots for the Doukhobor manifesto against conscription and military service.
- The Bible's many sacred narratives are simple moral allegories. It can never rise to the height of the living word that penetrates the inner resource of reason and the soul. Those who are accustomed to the mainstream notion of the church, the Bible, the ministers, and the sacraments are free to do so; however, these concepts and habits have no basis in the essential Doukhobor philosophy.

The Bible, as a book has existed for many centuries. In the late 1800s, Lev N. Tolstoy in his extensive research on Jesus of Nazareth's teachings found that there were over 50,000 changes made from the original writings. Some teachings were totally omitted, some were deliberately misinterpreted, and others were inserted under the illusion that they were those of Jesus. The Doukhobors came to the same conclusion and instead shifted their gaze to the actual lifestyle of the individual and not mere rhetoric. In sum, they argued that our deeds must be a measure of our level of spiritual development.

The earliest Russian Orthodox theological scholar Orest Novitsky in the

1890s in his Ph.D. thesis understood that the early Doukhobors recognized the Bible as a worthwhile collection, containing some important writings, but was a 'dead book,' in contrast to the 'Living Book' oral tradition which lives in their minds and hearts.[2]

Doukhobors selected the best biblical stories, psalms, and Questions and Answers, revised them in their oral tradition, and out of this developed *The Doukhobor Book of Life*. However, to this day, Doukhobors universally select bread, salt, and water as the only symbols, which they acknowledge, and place in front of official sobranie meetings.

There are no corporate creeds to adopt except the principle of hard work, kindness towards others, hospitality and nonkilling.

Doukhobors do not believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ. Jesus of Nazareth was a human being, a teacher of wisdom, one who was a very strong and provocative social critic, and a pioneer with good moral qualities for a civilized society. Some considered him as 'the first Doukhobor'. For them, Jesus was a human being who provoked people to come up with their own solutions to their own social problems. He asked everyone to question himself, 'What can I do?' to resolve a social problem. And out of this came forth a morality of love stemming from the Spirit Within.

The accounts in the Gospel relating to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus are to be understood in a metaphorical sense. The Gospel is a journal of our existence narrated in our hearts. The whole teaching is to love one another.

As early as the 1200s the Bogomils of the Balkans (possible predecessors to the Doukhobors in spirit) and later in the 1700s Doukhobor leader Savely Kapustin considered Jesus as a man with a normal birth. Jesus was the Son of God in the sense that he represented the divine wisdom. Everything narrated concerning Jesus is repeated in us as an eternal gospel, living in men's hearts. We are all Sons and Daughters of God. Often Doukhobors would say: 'God is wisdom, God is love, God is man.'

Heaven for the Doukhobors is synonymous with virtue, while hell is a metaphor for bad deeds. Hell exists not in some nether region, but in living people who resort to anger and violence.

They do not believe in the existence of a personal self-sustaining supernatural God in heaven. For them God is Spirit, God is wisdom, God is love; the spirit of God dwells in each of us. The emphasis of religion and philosophy shifts from heaven to earth, from the next world to this one, and from

[2] Novitsky's list of 12 "tenets" can be found in Maude (1904: 11-18).

dogma to spirituality and ethics.[3] To spiritualize means to refine oneself intellectually and morally and thereby to be in touch with one's heart. It is morality in practice.

When applied to individual behavior, a case can be made that Doukhobor is a humanistic religion. When these individuals take collective action for a social policy such as nonviolence, then Doukhobors take on the characteristics of a social movement. On both counts, the Doukhobor position is revolutionary; for many it is scary because it involves confronting personal and social responsibility with consistent deeds.

Indeed, the Spirit Within presents a new and important definition of society and us. It is a definition based on action, rather than words.

Some people on first seriously looking at the Doukhobor ideology have expressed shock about the critical thinking surrounding the church, the Bible, and the divinity of Jesus Christ. Yet it is no surprise that Doukhobors have long held an alternative view of spirituality and morality as a normal view of life.

Although the philosophy and ideas of the Doukhobors were sometimes misunderstood through the centuries, today their values have not gone unnoticed by the wider public. In recent years special attention was given to the Doukhobors by the Canadian Museum of Civilization in their Spirit Wrestlers exhibit as well as in several recent feature films and books on the group. The important truth is finally being revealed.

The Peace Act

Imagine what the world would be like today if the 1895 nonviolent message of the Doukhobors had been accepted and acted upon. Would there have been the mass state-sanctioned murders of 110 million citizens from wars in the past century? Would the deadly landmines even exist? And would nations still be stockpiling nuclear weapons and talk again of such strategies as National Missile Defence? I doubt it.

As we know, Lev N. Tolstoy was a well-recognized Russian figure in the international peace movement, a movement that was highly politicized in the last decade of the nineteenth century. The peace community was split in half. One side sought to transform violence within existing government systems through the process of organizing, lobbying, and voting. The other side represented Christian pacifists, such as Quakers and Mennonites, who rejected

[3] Compare this to Anthony Freeman (1993: 29), Anglican priest, who advocates a similar non-supernatural form of Christianity.

war on the basis of their interpretation of Christ's teachings that 'Thou shalt not kill'. For them, this teaching required personal example as the way to peace. 'Speak truth to power', some said, or 'practice what you preach'.

In his remarkable book, *The Kingdom of God is Within You* (1893), Tolstoy stated that the power to bring about the Kingdom of God lies within you and me, not with the tsar, the church, or even the government. All that was needed to destroy the circle of violence was for individuals to refuse to participate in it. Simplicity, nonviolence, and true spiritual feelings of goodwill as well as personal action, according to Tolstoy, were the way to oppose the Hobbesian state of violent human nature, which for centuries had been the cause of wars. These were values that were really identical to those of the Doukhobors.

What a delight for Tolstoy when he learned that a group of simple peasants had refused to continue to serve in the military on Easter Sunday 1895. Later that year, the same group organized 7,000 people and proceeded, on 28-29 June (11-12 July, new Calendar), to destroy their weapons as an act of opposition to the violence and injustice of the Russian state. 'Behold, these people exist!' he proudly proclaimed.

For more than 300 years, the Russian group known as the *Dukhobortsi* or Doukhobors saw the spirit of God and love as existing in every person; therefore, they argued, it was wrong to kill another human being. The nonkilling ethic was born. This group, Tolstoy soon discovered, set up a cooperative sharing society. Many of them had recently become vegetarians. They rejected the right of the state to wage wars. They rejected the tyrannical church institution as being primarily a supporter of state power. In effect they promised a new era in human relations where we are all citizens of the world.

To Tolstoy this 1895 revolt was evidence that the new millennium was near. It was in fact a shift in thinking in society. For the rest of the 1890s, Tolstoy used the Doukhobors again and again in his writings, not only to help them, but to buttress his own arguments as well. In 1895, he affirmed that the Doukhobors were following Christ's path and that they were suffering for it as the early Christians had done.

While the first rebellion took place on Easter Day, when the brave Matvey Lebedev and 10 other Doukhobor conscripts threw down their guns as a manifestation of their moral beliefs, the burning of arms was undoubtedly one of the most spectacular symbolic events in pacifist history. The state and the church reacted immediately with force. Persecution, exile and death was the fate of these dissenters, but Tolstoy intervened by publicizing their situation to the world and inviting Russian intellectuals and the English and American Quakers to assist them.

The rest is history as Canada provided a haven for one-third (7,500) of these pacifist dissidents who soon embarked on their long journey of becoming citizens of the new land. Several hundred Russian Doukhobors arrived in Canada in the next three decades.

The Work Ethic

Over one hundred years ago, a group of Doukhobors set foot on the Canadian prairies. They were practically penniless and without knowledge of the English language, but they had strong backs and a spirit determined to survive in the Wild West. And they were part of the people that Sir John A. MacDonald had visualized as being needed to settle the West and prevent the United States from annexing part of the new Canadian territory. In early spring of 1899, most of the able-bodied men went off to work in building the railroad, while the remainder found employment on neighbouring farms. They would not return home until late fall.

Women, old men, and children stayed behind to build dozens of villages and provide food for their families. Only a few horses and oxen were available; these were already occupied in transporting supplies long distances to their villages, as well as skidding logs for the buildings. With their limited resources, what were they to do? How could they cultivate the new soil and seed their first crops?

If we could come to a strip of plowed field in 1899, we would see at the far end of it an unbelievable site. Russian playwright and actor Leopold Sulerzhitsky in his diary *V Ameriku s Dukhoborami* [To America with the Doukhobors], 1905, writes about this in his diary entry of 27 May 1899:

> Early this morning...I came to a narrow strip of plowed field [where] I saw at the far end of it a colorful crowd of people slowly moving in my direction in a long file. These people were hitched in tandem pairs to an iron plough. It became quite awesome when, stepping heavily on the wet grass, this somber procession began to approach me. There was something solemn, deeply moving, in the figures of these straining women pulling the heavy plough. The heavy sticks to which the rope was tied cut into their breasts and stomachs. With sunburnt hands the women pushed the plough trying to reduce the pain.
> In the lead an older tall woman with a stern face moved with measured but heavy steps, looking at the earth. She knows what life is like and even this work does not surprise her. She knows this is necessary.
> .... And she, strong in spirit and in body, is prepared to go around the earth's sphere in this harness with the same quiet stern face, seeing this work as her duty (Sulerzhitsky, 1982: 153).

That classic picture of work was repeated countless times by our pioneering ancestors who believed that 'in the sweat of thy brow shalt thou earn thy daily bread'. For those of us who were born in the 1920s and 1930s, we might recall that our parents and grandparents often began work at dawn and ended at dusk or later. Bush on the prairies and the huge forest in the Kootenays were largely cleared by hand and transformed into productive fertile soil.

Work was not only a means of achieving economic stability for the family and the community; it was also a way of gaining human dignity. What a good feeling it is to accomplish something with honest labor. 'I work, therefore I am', to use an alternative paraphrase of philosopher Immanuel Kant's famous phase 'I think, therefore I am'.

As we come to the present, we see many outstanding examples of the work ethic at play amongst Canadian Doukhobors including people from all professions and nearly every walk of life. We have our examples of pioneers of the soil who could shovel by hand a whole truckload of grain without the outward appearance of tiredness; an engineer who ventured into the wilderness and mapped some of Western Canada's most rugged boundaries; a doctor who was honoured for his 52 years of dedicated professional service to society; a lawyer who served for half a century, was a staunch pacifist, and was the first Slavic graduate from a Saskatchewan University; an artist who was a contemporary of Group of Seven and whose works reflected both the subject and artistry of the Group; a poet whose work captured the first half of the 20th century with a monumental collection of 1,000 poems and hymns with many set to music; an architect whose talents are sought for their practicality and special attention to the needs of the customer; and many others.

Indeed, as Tolstoy once scribbled in his *Calendar of Wisdom* for February: 'Nothing can make a person feel more noble than work'. For Doukhobors it was expressed as 'Toil and peaceful life' whereby you 'walk your talk'. Or, as some would like to say: 'you place your foot where your mouth is'.

There is an important footnote to work that I would like to add in perspective. In our fast-paced, high technology age, we often find people rushing to and from work, working long hours, and coming home and worrying about the rise and fall of the stock market. These workaholics leave very little space for rest, for humor, for philosophy, and for other priorities that give spirit and balance to life. Yes, the work ethic is essential in meeting some of our basic economic needs. However, let's not forget that 'man (and woman) does not live by bread alone'.

Cooperation is the Way

Let me tell you a story about the strength of numbers. During the 1930s, thousands of people worked on one of the wonders of the world, the Golden Gate Suspension Bridge in San Francisco. Many people wondered how a single structure of 1.22 miles could withstand the weight of hundreds of cars and their passengers. The answer was found in the strength of numbers. Its two 36 3/8 inch diameter cables are made of 27,572 wires totaling 80,000 miles. Those statistics are staggering.

A single strand can easily be broken, but many strands working together can withstand great adversity. In spite of the adversity they have faced for generations under many different political systems, the Doukhobors have survived over 350 years largely because they have worked together.

One of the distinctive features of the Doukhobor landscape is the principle that everyone is equal in the eyes of God. It follows then, that we ought to help one another so that we can all work together in peace.

Those 7,500 Russian migrants who settled in a village system in western Canada in 1899 followed a pattern not unlike that of the peasant commune or *mir* in Russia, where everyone was equal—at least in theory. On Peter V. Verigin's design based on John C. Kenworthy's radically minded Christian influence, they organized the Christian Community of Universal Brotherhood (CCUB), which became the 'largest communal experiment in North America'. The new migrants established themselves on a communal basis, with no more than fifty families to a village. Such an arrangement enabled the limited resources and moneys from donations to reach the people. It also enabled the inhabitants to establish themselves as a viable community with close family and social supports.

It is not surprising that the grand experiment eventually came to a sudden halt with the loss of lands and properties in 1907 and 1938, for various reasons including mismanagement, economic depression, depredations by arsonists, faulty leadership, and opposition from the individualistic capitalist society itself. Yet the beacon of cooperation is still treasured today by the Doukhobors and its spirit continues to shine.

One of the legacies of this spirit arose in the 1940s when the Doukhobors in British Columbia became actively involved in promoting the development of cooperatives and credit unions under the guiding principle of 'one member, one vote'. One of its active proponents Peter P. Podovinikoff grew up in the community first working locally then nationally and internationally in the cooperative movement for several decades. Similarly, on the

prairies, many people of Doukhobor origin became active in the major co-operative ventures that continue to dominate the agricultural, consumer and financial sectors there.

Doukhobor groups themselves demonstrated that they can get together in spite of different leadership styles. Between 1974 and 1982, the Independents, the Community, and zealot groups got together for 68 monthly public sessions in a successful Joint Doukhobor Research Committee Symposium project. Remarkably, 400 people came out regularly and shared their views in a kind of Western Canada truth and reconciliation exercise. A report documented the ideas presented.

The same spirit was shown during 1995 and 1999 when the Doukhobor Centennial Coordinating Committee managed a diverse program including national and international singing tours, panel discussions, publications, youth festivals, drama events, handicraft revival, art shows, Web Site development, and the construction of a retreat centre in the interior of British Columbia. Gradually the old habits of isolationism have given way to cross-boundary participation not only within the Doukhobor community but also between the Doukhobors and the wider society. The outstanding example was the Canadian Museum of Civilization that involved Doukhobors in the development of a Spirit Wrestlers Exhibit that was presented between 1996 and 1998—and which officially acknowledged the contribution of this small group to Canadian society.

Today the 'win-win' cooperative ethic is dramatically illustrated by a successful cooperative cottage industry near Perth, Ontario. Since 1971, artist-educator Jim Deacove (born to a Doukhobor family in Saskatchewan) and his Ukrainian wife Ruth have operated a successful home industry *Family Pastimes* based on the cooperative principle. To date, the Deacoves have conceived, designed, and produced over 200 board-type games based on the philosophy of winning or losing together. These values stem from childhood experiences of sharing toys, helping parents and being kind to people. In 1996, Jim developed the game *Ploughshares* honouring the 'brave peacemakers' who burnt their firearms in Tsarist Russia in a public proclamation to the world to get rid of militarism and war once and for all. (See sidebar, right.) This small half-million dollar innovative cottage industry is a breath of fresh air in our sometimes overly capitalistic world.

Another example of the cooperative principle at work is that of George Zebroff and his Czech wife Anna who operate a unique organic fruit farm on an eleven-acre hillside site in the beautiful valley of Cawston, British Columbia. Established in 1973, the farm has been a veritable cornucopia of delicious,

nutritious, organically grown food. To achieve this, the owners exercise patience in working with nature, they follow the natural rhythms of the seasons, they have learned to let go and forgive, and they deliberately prefer to work on a small scale with an environmentally friendly relationship to the world. 'It is wrong to strive for wealth at the expense of others', George told me during a visit to the farm in 1999, 'for if you get more, somebody gets less'.

The principle that 'we win together or we lose together' has existed for many years and it is still valid today. Those pioneers who have used this principle to make our lives better must forever merit our grateful appreciation. Not only have they helped to make a positive contribution to the communities in which they functioned, but they also brought about a lasting change in the dynamics of the relationships between Doukhobor and non-Doukhobor peoples. With imagination, wisdom and courage, we can still use this principle to better society even if it means going against the current.

Ploughshares is designed for ages nine to adult and can be played by one to eight players. It addresses the issues of war and peace.

A burning of arms scene in colour decorates the box containing the game, while a summary statement presents its objective:

> In 1895 in Russia, a group of Christian villagers, believing deeply in peace and sharing, burned the weapons issued to them by the Tsar. In this game we are the villagers whose task is to work together, driving our wagons through the countryside, visiting homes to collect both Firewood and Weapons. These are taken to the Village Center and made into Ploughshares. We must be on the alert for the Tsar's patrolling Cossack Soldiers who will confiscate our wagons and send us to prison.
>
> We must learn Love and Courage so that with the guidance of our Wise Elders we will remain determined in our cause. We might even inspire some of the Soldiers to drop their weapons and join with us in our holy cause. It will be an adventure filled with danger and great rewards. To fulfill our task, we must be gentle as a Dove and wise as a Serpent. This is a game of collaboration, learning and discussion; a game full of exciting strategy, with each of us making an important contribution.

The game includes a full colour board measuring 17 inches by 17 inches, special playing cards, movers, dice, a collection chart, wagons, and rules for regular and advanced players.

At a time when the massive worldwide military establishment continues to protect and increase military spending despite serious cuts in virtually all other federal programs, Deacove's Ploughshares is a fresh alternative paradigm to our overfed military sacred cow. Let's seriously take the biblical ad-

vice of turning weapons for killing into ploughshares for growing food. We will not only help our families learn new skills of living, but we will be helping to make our world become more human and more peaceful.

Creativity and Inventiveness

Creativity, inventiveness, and ingenuity have a common base. They all draw on the inner spirit of imagination to find a solution to some common problem; they often involve some discovery; and because they deal with newness, an element of risk is involved. The Doukhobors demonstrated these qualities from the earliest times to the present.

Psalms, for example, were designed to carry revolutionary messages such as equality and nonviolence in a way that the mainstream would not recognize as a 'heresy' (which in those days meant persecution and death). In retrospect, this form of singing was a clever way of passing on the oral tradition in the face of opposition from the church and state.

Folklorist and composer Kenneth Peacock was so impressed with Doukhobor singing in the 1960s that he spent almost two years recording it for the National Museum of Man. It had many features that made it unique: no written musical scores, no books, singing from memory, yet in multipart harmony.

One of the contributors to this style was Ivan Sysoev, a poet and composer. From the early part of the century until his death in 1967, he composed more than 1000 Russian hymns and poems pertaining to the movement, nearly 100 of which remain in the active repertoire. One of my informants described Sysoev: 'Here is a man who came out of nothing, no education, a self-made man and look at what he was able to do. Another thing, he had a very strong talent in putting the melody to the poems that he wrote' (Tarasoff, 1977: 55).

The 1895 arms burning episode was an innovative and a revolutionary act that heralded the coming of a new society based on nonviolent principles. The act spurred Lev N. Tolstoy to help the Doukhobors, whom he called the 'people of the 25th century'. In 1963 we might recall that Martin Luther King and other black leaders organized the March on Washington to protest discrimination against black Americans, in which King delivered his famous speech, 'I have a dream'. As with the arms burning, this brave act involved imagination to dream of a world that was yet to be, a world in which justice, nonkilling and peace would fill the earth like the waters that fill the sea.

Inspired by the 100th anniversary of the arms burning, Jim Deacove used

his imagination and developed board game, *Ploughshares*, which addresses the issue of peace and war, with a search for a fresh alternative to militarism. This was one of over 200 games that Jim has successfully developed in his home cottage industry called Family Pastimes. His games as well as his personal manner are based on the spirit of cooperation in a competitive society.

Necessity as the mother of invention stimulated many Doukhobors in the early part of their settlement in Canada to do more with less, to create things of beauty, to heal the sick without doctors, and to develop opportunities for fun. A retired farmer in northeastern Saskatchewan told me: 'My hands are always aching to do something' (Ibid.,165). This man echoed the creativity of many Doukhobor craftsmen who have produced beautiful wooden ladles, bowls, grandfather clocks, and toys for children.

Women, especially, have been known for their 'golden hands' and their ability to produce exquisite things 'superior to anything of the kind known in the western hemisphere' (*Regina Leader Standard*, Oct. 22, 1903). Doukhobor women created beautiful crochet work, shawls, table covers, wall decorations, articles of clothing, and rugs.

May Fitz-Gibbon, who wrote under the pen name of the creative Lally Bernard, visited the Doukhobors in the fall of 1899 and testified on the work done by the Doukhobors in their pioneer homes:

> In many cases these people had neither tools nor nails, and the carpentering work of the interior of the house is a marvel of ingenuity. Their great ovens, molded out of clay, always presented a symmetrical appearance which the appellation "mud oven" does not convey. They are built close to the entrance, and occupy a space about five feet square. There is always three or four niches which are used to keep things warm and act as tiny cupboards, while the flat top, about four feet from the roof, is occupied on cold days by the old grandma with her never-idle knitting needles, and perhaps close to her swings the curious cradle covered with a curtain drawn close round it, and containing a chubby baby swaddled, like most of the peasant race, in real swaddling clothes and looking for all the world like a parcel tied up with broad ribbons (Bernard, in *The Globe*: 1899: 21).

Doukhobor innovation filtered into the health field. In earlier times, when people got sick, many Doukhobors relied on folk cures and home remedies, on prayers and incantations, treatments which in some ways parallel modern psychotherapy in curing fright, stunted growth, and stuttering. As one physiotherapist told me: 'good thoughts will naturally have good results upon a person' (Tarasoff, 1977: 218). This means 'healing thoughts, visualizing these things and the great intent and desire to help, to rid a person of this misery, is

something that has to go along with any type of healing'. Yes, the power of the mind to heal does work! Of course, mustard plasters, chicken soup, and hot lemon were also used to help cure the common cold.

Doukhobor youth in the early days had to be creative and to make do with what they had: a hand-sewn horsehide ball, a stroll in the meadow, singing and dancing to harmonica music or hand clapping, tenting at the lakeside, or playing simple but creative social games, such as *Na v Gilki* or Russian Bats and *Na Plotochki* in which the object is to catch the person with the handkerchief. Though neglected now, simple games such as these are worth reviving (Ibid., 187).

Creative people who visually discover beauty in materials they work with have artistic inclinations. Amongst the Doukhobors in the early part of the century was a young Saskatchewan lad, Frederick Nicholas Loveroff, who started playing with paints and brush when he was working on his father's homestead. The principal of the Normal School took a personal interest, encouraged him in his art and found a patron who sponsored him for four years at the Ontario College of Art. Soon Fred was associated with the Group of Seven. His paintings reflected their style and expertise. At the peak of his success, he had exhibits in London, Paris and Buenos Aires.

Loveroff paved the way for other Doukhobor artists. Painter Bill Perehudoff (1919-2013), of Saskatoon, has exhibited his works of art in every major art show in Canada as well as in New York, London and Stockholm. Perehudoff's abstract paintings resemble the seemingly unsophisticated patterns of the scatter-rugs which Doukhobor women once made. The old has come together with the new.

In my childhood, I recall that my father, a farmer, was a practical man who was innovative when he faced a problem. For example, our home was isolated in the bush with no telephone service. Father strung an eight-kilometer barbed-wire communications line between our home and the main telephone line at my grandparent's home near the North Saskatchewan River. Nearby was Uncle Alec who made life easier for his family by inventing a simple device to open any jars large or small. I have one of these simple, but effective devices on my desk, which I picked up as a keepsake from my aunt following her husband's death.

In the building trade, Peter Rezansoff, a Vancouver builder and architect is sought worldwide for his unique skills in tailoring the needs of the client to the job at a price that is affordable. That's innovation par excellence!

In the oil, geological, mining and fruit industries, several Doukhobors have gained national and international prominence as successful entrepre-

neurs. These include Saskatchewan-born Michael Chernoff, chairman of an innovative geological survey company, has made very generous gifts to Queen's University in Ontario (where he obtained a scholarship for his Engineering Degree), revealing his care and commitment to future generations; Russell Kalmacoff of Rochmount Corporation of Calgary, Alberta, who is heavily involved in creating entrepreneurship centres in Canada (he says that he was inspired by his grandfather Jack Kalmacoff who in the 1930s began an oil refinery in Kamsack, Saskatchewan); Alan Markin of Calgary who as a CEO of a large company, quit, pulled out his resources, and set up a foundation for philanthropic work; mining magnate Wally Berukoff is Fidel Castro's special Canadian friend who cooperated with the Cuban state in building 11 hotels with 4,200 rooms; Alex A. Vereschagin (1903 - 1989) who owned and operated with his Molokan wife Ann and children a fruit growing and retail-wholesale industry in California; William Kanigan of Saskatoon who once owned and operated a large furniture plant created a system of ethical selling; and many others (see Tarasoff, 2002).

Since the early 1970s, Canadian-born Nick Troubetzkoy has resided in the Caribbean Island of St. Lucia where he is owner and architect of the first-class prize-winning Anse Chastanet and Jade Mountain Resorts. His designs are outstanding. Nick travelled the world and observed what makes a good resort. When he discovered that most resorts were generally stuck in being 'boxes' and close to the beach, Nick sought a way to break this pattern. His intent was to create harmony between people and nature — and he and his colleagues designed the architecture to support this goal. The concept of the open sanctuaries, the building up the mountain (thereby leaving the beaches for the visitors), and the use of local technology and materials received this concept.

I would like to leave this discussion about creativity and inventiveness on a humorous note. Fred Konkin in Kamsack, Saskatchewan, told me how he and his wife discovered an innovative formula for staying together: 'When my wife and I got married, we agreed that if one of us quarrels the other one goes out of the house. You can imagine how fresh air helps maintain good health'.

Cleanliness is Next to Godliness

'Cleanliness is next to Godliness' is a high virtue that Doukhobors have traditionally aspired to through the centuries. This virtue is still valued today. For them, bodily cleanliness is considered a symbol of spiritual purity, the one nurturing the other. Their core value dictates the need to keep

their bodies, their God-given abode, clean. That's the ideal!

Until the coming of running water, showers and modern bathtubs, the *bania* or Russian steam bath was the main instrument for keeping the body and mind beautifully clean. Coming from a Russian tradition, Doukhobors from time immemorial have used it to clean and warm both the body and soul. The soothing heat and a bunch of birch switches or a broom drive away anxieties, cares and mental stress.

The bania dates back hundreds and hundreds of years. In some Russian villages one can still see a small cabin half dug into the ground. This technology was transplanted to Canada by the Doukhobors on their arrival here in 1899. Inside there is first an antechamber where you undress. Then there is the steam room, which has a wood-fuelled stove and several benches. The stove, which has its opening in the antechamber, was usually made of a large steel barrel with stones around it. When the stove is heated, the stones become red hot. Water is poured over them and steam rises to the ceiling. To get properly 'steamed up' people climb onto one of several wooden ledges just below the ceiling.

To get the full benefit of the bania, bathers had their partners beat them with a water-soaked clump of birch or maple leaves. Usually this was done on the top shelf when the body was thoroughly warmed. After dipping the leaves into cold water, the beating begins from gentle to more vigorous from head to foot leading to full stimulation of your total organism. After ten minutes of this ordeal, you feel invigorated like after a good massage.

A distinctive feature of every Doukhobor communal village was its *bania* that also served as a laundry. A line was strung in the anteroom so you could hang clothes, diapers, and linens to dry. Often the stove had on it a large iron open kettle for heating water; by keeping the stove going day and night, you had a handy source of hot water. The men coming from the fields, dirty from the day's work, would wash up in the evenings and change their clothes. Because these early baths had no electricity, workers rushed to get clean during daylight hours.

As a youngster growing up in the Henrietta district near the North Saskatchewan River, I remember traveling in winter with my parents and brother on horses and sleigh to my grandparent's farm eight kilometers away. Every Saturday, the whole extended family would gather for a bania in the basement—one family at a time—and then we all would meet around a large table drinking tea, playing cards, talking, and generally socializing. It is interesting that the modern version of the bania, the steam bath and sauna, have become equipped with such socializing facilities as snack bars and swimming pools.

Also, as a youngster in the 1930s and 1940s, I remember traveling by car with my parents to visit relatives in British Columbia. En route we would regularly stop at the hot springs in Banff and Radium. There we would meet with other Doukhobors and Slavs cleansing their bodies, but also socializing. After each swim, we would all return to one of our cabins for food and tea, lemon and honey, or other refreshments. It was also a time to converse, laugh, sing, and generally enjoy some of the simple pleasures of life.

Doukhobors in particular and Russian people in general believe in the curative properties of banias and hot springs. Scientists have substantiated that steam baths, whether in the form of banias, saunas, hot springs, and Jacuzzis, improve the metabolism, help reduce fat, train breathing and the heart, stimulate blood pressure, make the pulse stronger and prevent colds. For athletes, steam helps to restore their strength. And everyone benefits by becoming clean.

The value of the *bania* and its cleansing and socializing benefits is highlighted in the present popular historic tourist attraction in the interior of British Columbia, the Doukhobor Village Museum (also known as the Doukhobor Discovery Centre) in Castlegar. Besides the restored traditional village double-story double houses, connecting outbuildings with a central courtyard, and a separate barn and blacksmith shop, there is a building containing a traditional *bania*. Volunteer members of the Bania Club fire up the wood stove on demand, pour water on the hot stones, and invite in several people at a time to bask in the soothing heat which promises to take away the dirt, and when combined with the stimulation of birch leaf broom over your body, washes away your cares, anxieties and mental stress.

In 1987, the late Ilya V. Tolstoy, the great grandson of Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy, was in Castlegar to officially open a Tolstoy statue at the Museum site. On this occasion, I had the pleasure of being a sauna partner with Ilya in the historic *bania*. Ilya demonstrated how it is done in Russia. As we got steamed up, Ilya begin to give me a massage as I lay on the top shelf. With a birch leaf broom in hand he thrashed me on my back and front. Then he used his elbow to give me a very penetrating massage on my back, the like of which I have never experienced before. After this, I took my turn and massaged his back with hand, broom, and elbow. Others joined us with similar pleasures after which we all sat around in another room with refreshments, conversations, and much humour. Ilya spoke about his famous relative, the great writer who completed his book *Resurrection* and thereby made possible the migration of 7,500 Russian Doukhobors to Canada. His great grandfather was an inspiration to us all.

With the recollections of that memorable event, the cleanliness that I experienced, the intellectual stimulation, and the overall joy of the evening, I am not surprised that Doukhobors continue to have an interest in the core value of cleanliness, whether it comes from the *bania*, the modern sauna, the natural hot springs, or your common shower and bathtub. Today a few *banias* are still found in such cities as Vancouver and Grand Forks in British Columbia; Cowley in Alberta; Saskatoon, Verigin, Blaine Lake, and Kinley in Saskatchewan; and Winnipeg, Manitoba. My Saskatoon friend Dan says: 'Banias for me are a spiritual experience'. He should know; he has one in Kinley that is large enough to accommodate his physically handicapped brother who enters this curative oasis on the Saskatchewan prairies on a wheelchair. Cleanliness cures. Indeed, it's next to Godliness!

In matters of personal and general cleanliness, the early Russian Doukhobors were careful as to the neatness of their houses; they say that for people of the Spirit, it is proper to live cleanly and tidily. When the first shipload of Doukhobors on *S.S. Lake Huron* arrived in the Port of Halifax, it is said that the ship was so clean that you could eat a meal from the floor.

When six train loads of Doukhobors passed through Ottawa on the way to Manitoba, Miss Mary McKay Scott who was in charge of distributing food, expressed the following opinion of the new arrivals:

> I have seen a great many parties of colonists, but I must say that Doukhobors are the cleanest and best looking lot that I have ever seen. I was struck particularly with their cleanliness. Why, on an ordinary excursion train, the aisles and seats are littered with empty boxes, parcels and papers. These cars were models in that regard. There was nothing to offend in any way. Their cleanliness was also shown in the way they kept their cars ventilated. The air in all the cars was good, all seemed well.... (*The Hanover Post*, 9 Feb., 1899).

Four years later, a Winnipeg writer penned the following:

> A recent lady visitor to the colony informs *The Western Home Monthly* [January 1904] that for cleanliness and tidiness the homes are models. Everything is in fine shape; even the streets are kept in excellent order.

Singing from the Soul

'When we sing from the soul [*ot dushi*] we are drawing upon all the physiological, psychological and spiritual benefits available to us'. This is how musicologist Shirley Perry summarized the importance of song in Doukhobor life when she addressed the International Doukhobor conference held at the Uni-

versity of Ottawa (Perry, 2000: 351). As a Doukhobor child growing up, Dr Perry was taught that God resides within us. As an adult, she had learnt from mystical teachings that the source of wisdom is within and that our singing can reflect 'love, passion, joy, community and connectedness with all there is'.

Singing from the soul is best exemplified by spoken and sung *psalmy* [prayers], followed by the singing of *dukhovnye stikhi* [spiritual verses, hymns]. All is done in *a cappella* style, without instrumental accompaniment. According to Doukhobor custom, everyone stands during the formal part of the prayer service with men and boys in one group and women and girls in another.

Historically, most psalms are centuries old and have been transmitted orally from generation to generation as a 'Living Book' either by recitation or, more usually, by the singing of massed choirs and congregations. The singing of psalms became a way of life itself. According to prominent folklorist Kenneth Peacock, the Doukhobors 'like the Bogomil followers before them' (Peacock, in Tarasoff, 1998: 301) rejected any attempt to institutionalize spiritual phenomena by means of ritualistic devices. Instead they invented auditory techniques to reveal spiritual and moral phenomena.

Facing a hostile church and jealous state, especially in Tsarist times, the Doukhobors developed a special technique to ensure the survival of their ideology. They imbedded their values in long drawn-out passages for outsiders appeared to be nonsensical.

When these people spoke about love, equality, peace, and the spirit within, all revolutionary ideas for pre-Renaissance man, these views were hidden to the uninitiated and therefore had survival value. To be effective, the Doukhobors themselves had to rely completely on their memory to replicate these values and pass them on to their offspring beginning with the young children. Replication was reinforced by the visionary experience of euphoria, which occurs as long as the singing continues. The basis of this euphoria is likely chemical in nature; carbon dioxide intoxication results from prolonged breathing practices not unlike the effects of prolonged chanting of Buddhist and Christian monks [Peacock, in Tarasoff, 1998: 304]. Personally, I have found that the Doukhobor psalm chant stimulates our vocal cords for public speaking.

This survival technique was a remarkable achievement for ordinary Russian peasants! For example, the selection *Penie psalmov dusham nashim ukrashenie*] ['The Singing of psalms beautifies our souls'] takes about ten minutes to sing just eight words, an average of a minute and a quarter per word. To sing the complete psalm would take over three hours. Nowadays only the first few lines are sung, the remainder being recited (Peacock, in

Tarasoff, 1998: 302).

Probably none of this oral tradition would have survived today if it weren't for Russian ethnographer Vladimir D. Bonch-Bruevich who helped the Doukhobor migrants come to Canada in 1899. He lived with them for nearly one year and for the first time recorded on paper the oral history and philosophy of the Doukhobors. In 1909 he published the *Zhivotnaia Kniga Dukhobortsev* [Doukhobor Book of Life] which today remains as a major source of psalms, hymns, and spiritual writings. His rare remaining research notes were recently published in two new books (1999) authored by ethnographer Svetlana A. Inikova.

The old type of psalm-singing was based on martyr-like suffering, sung by old-timers who actually suffered in Siberia and elsewhere. The style was melancholy. In Canada, the young people have not experienced the same suffering and consequently they are not able to take over these psalms. One elder told me that psalm-singing is 'considered difficult for many, especially for the young people... often times only hymns are sung in small funerals; and fewer and fewer psalms are sung...' (Tarasoff, 1977: 64). Historical hymns, especially, deal with specific events in Tsarist Russia, such as the burning of firearms, the persecution that followed the migration, and the Doukhobor martyrs. Contemporary ones reflect social ideals and events among the Doukhobors in Canada, such as those composed by prolific writer and singer Ivan Sysoev.

Doukhobor choirs have become well known; their *a cappella* style in Russian, English, and at times other languages, have attracted public attention as a unique form on the international stage. In June 1931 a delegation of six—three fathers (Gabriel Vereschagin, Semeon Gritchin, and Feodor F. Vanjov) and their daughters (Luba, Agafiya, and Anastasia)—spent several months in Germany awaiting permission to go to Russia. As they waited, they sang hymns in Russian, gave speeches, and were well received as international artists by the local people.

In the last half-century, many choral groups have sprung up, particularly among the community Doukhobors but also among the independents of Saskatchewan and Alberta and the zealots of British Columbia. These groups have visited communities throughout North America and have recorded over one hundred albums, cassettes, and CDs. Choirs have participated in tours to the Soviet Union in 1966, to Russia in 1995 and 1999; Expo 67 in Montreal; Expo in Spokane, Washington in 1974 when 325 voices performed on stage; the opening of the British Columbia legislature the same year; the United Nations in 1982; a youth festival in Cuba in 1997; and a tour of Germany in 2000

as part of a Canada-Germany cultural and business exchange.

At the same time, individuals are experimenting with new musical forms. Some have taken up the guitar and accordion, especially for entertaining at parties. Others have mastered the piano, the keyboard, the flute, the banjo, the saxophone and the mini-harp. With all these rapid changes and opportunities in the international marketplace, there is a feeling that there is still a place for the old and the new: the psalm and the hymn, as well as the folk song and musical instrument. With practice and mastery, there is a growing realization that all these influences can indeed beautify our souls.

Here is an excerpt in translation of one of the large group of Doukhobor psalms that beautifully expresses its meaning in metaphorical terms:

> The singing of psalms beautifies our souls brings the angels to help, drives away the darkness, creates holiness, strengthens the mind of man, effaces sin. It is like the grace of saints: it augments faith, hope, and love. As with sunlight it illuminates, so with water it cleanses; as with fire it scorches, so with holy oil it anoints....The light of Truth brings comfort to the old, beauty to the young, perfection for the mind....it brings help and gives the tongue the gift of prophecy... (Peacock, 1970: 32-33).

The Spirit of Sharing and Hospitality

While there is no denying that Doukhobor food is unique and delicious, what is more important is the sharing of food and hospitality, symbolized by the basic ingredients of bread, salt, and water. As Slavs, Doukhobors use these ingredients as a traditional part of their way of life. For them there is no connotation of ritualism as with the established churches. In fact, Doukhobors have a total absence of ritual symbolism in their folkways largely because of their radical rejection of churchism with its crosses, ikons and other ritualized objects.

The expression of sharing and hospitality are genuine. It stems from the central philosophy of love and respect for humanity. Witness the following examples of this through the ages.

In Tsarist Russia in 1898, Doukhobors who were leaving for Canada were said to have left bread, salt and water on the tables in their homes. They believed that, in this way, they would welcome the newcomer to their abandoned home by sharing their basic food with them. And when they arrived at the Immigration Hall in Winnipeg, before going to the prairies to establish their new homes, some of the men began to carve wooden spoons that they gave out as gifts to visitors. With demand, more Douk-

hobors occupied themselves with carving, and gave out more spoons as a gesture of their thanks to Canada. Much later, Peter T. Oglow of Castlegar, BC took up this spirit and made hundreds of wooden spoons of all sizes some of which he sold, but many of which he gave away to visitors at home and abroad. Some of his spoons were gifts to Queen Elizabeth, the Pope, and Members of Parliament.

Author William Dawson Coninsby in 1907 wrote about his visit to Canora, Saskatchewan:

> .... On asking an opinion of their English-speaking neighbors, I found that no one had a word to say against them, and that for the most part they were praised. Of their hospitality very much was said, for any man, no matter what his tongue or nationality, who knocks at a Doukhobor's door is sure to be welcome. It is a religious instinct and principle with them to do all that lies within their power for the stranger and to allow no payment. His horse is taken in, and fed on the best fodder which they can provide, whilst the master is given the run of the house (Coninsby, 1907: 266-268).

Royal Commissioner William Blakemore had high praise for the hospitable character of the people:

> When it comes to deal with the personal character, with habits, the customs, and the practices of the Doukhobors, one has nothing but a pleasant task. Whether in Russia, in Saskatchewan, or in British Columbia, they have at all times impressed those who have come into contact with them as being the very essence of kindliness, courtesy, and hospitality. They cannot do too much for a traveler. They give him their best, both of food and accommodation, and they refuse to accept payment. Not only so, but by every word and gesture they endeavor to convey the idea that he is welcome in the fullest sense of the word (Blakemore, 1913: T42).

So deep-rooted is the hospitality ethic that it has been incorporated into business and volunteer enterprises that sell recipes and food of traditional Doukhobor and Russian heritage. Some of the mouth-watering culinary delights include *lapshevnik* (noodle loaf), *borshch* (cabbage-tomato soup), *pirogi* (vegetable or fruit tarts), *lapsha* (homemade noodle soup), *vareniki* (cottage cheese or fruit dumplings), and *blintsi* (crepes, thin pancakes).

In the mid-1970s, one homemaker from the British Columbia interior told me about the persistent value of hospitality as an expression of friendliness:

> ....With us Doukhobors, hospitality is 'the most important thing' because that shows our friendliness; and I've never heard of anyone that went away from the Doukhobors that wasn't satisfied....Most of the things, they

> grow in their own gardens and I think there's no waste in there; it's their own labor and they are so efficient in many ways.
> Doukhobor women are so industrious, so considerate and capable. They can create something out of nothing almost and make people feel so good. They can make things just wonderfully...Every year, there's somebody that thinks of a better way of serving, putting together or creating a new dish out of the same things that they had. It's just unbelievable how well they do it. Anyone that comes to a banquet, it's just grand. The visitors that came from Vancouver not too long ago had tears in their eyes when they started parting; that's how close they came. Bread, salt and water, like they say, that's our hospitality (Tarasoff, 1977: 118).

From Uncle Bill's Kitchen, a cookbook by William (Bill) Anatooskin is a good example of Russian/Doukhobor recipes with a twist. The author learned the recipes over the years from his mother Margaret, and modified them to reduce fat and cholesterol content. He also added new ingredients to enhance the taste and flavor. Published by his company Bilkin Enterprises Ltd., Bill has the entire collection of recipes on computer floppy discs. Because of his amicable manner and professional expertise, Bill is frequently invited to talk shows on television and has been featured in several prominent regional and national food magazines. If you like nutrient analysis, good food, and good humor, give Uncle Bill a try.

Another book, *Hospitality: Cooking The Doukhobor Way,* is a 1995 Doukhobor Centennial book project featuring a collection of vegetarian dishes which draws on the cooking expertise of five generations. As with mentor Lev N. Tolstoy, vegetarianism has been used as a moral force underpinning the movement. Published by the Union of Spirit Communities of Christ (USCC), Orthodox Doukhobors, this popular book has stimulated the recent creation of the USCC Kootenay Ladies Catering and Hospitality Services whose objective is to provide an authentic Doukhobor heritage food service in our multicultural community. Conventions, seminars, special occasions, and memorials have benefited from this unique community service.

For Doukhobors in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, the hospitality and nutritional value of bread has taken on a special cooperative and festive meaning. Since the mid-1950s, every summer during the annual week-long city exhibition, Doukhobor men and women bake bread in brick ovens as their ancestors have done during the pioneer era on the Canadian prairies. The fresh aromatic bread is then sold in loaves or slices, with or without butter or jam, and sometimes with vegetarian *borshch*. So popular has been this undertaking that it has effectively funded their organization and has pro-

vided support for community and charitable causes such as aid to underdeveloped countries and medical research.

Saskatchewan Doukhobors, like their Alberta and British Columbia brothers and sisters, have discovered that bread, as the basic staff of life, is an important ingredient in bolstering the spirit of sharing and hospitality. While the table runneth over with food and good feelings, good tasty food is the direct path to the stomach and the mind. It is part and parcel of the important equation that gives Doukhobors their core qualities of loving and caring human beings.

The Bridge-Building Tradition

Most Doukhobors know that bread, salt, and water combine to form the basic staff of life. However how many people know that these common ingredients found in our homes have the power to bring people together and nurture the spirit of friendship?

Let me illustrate what I mean by bringing together the wisdom of the ancients with those of my personal experiences in modern times.

Many, many, many years ago, in what is now Russia, there were warring tribes who killed one another for various reasons. Perhaps they encountered a group of people whom they defined as being 'different', therefore 'evil'; being 'heathen', therefore anti-God; speaking a strange tongue, therefore 'ignorant'; or following an outlived dictum, 'My country right or wrong, but my country'.

Yet on some remarkable occasions, because of exhaustion or otherwise, these warring tribes came together in friendship. Although they usually did not speak a common language, they understood the ancient wisdom when bread, salt, and water were brought before them. This was the time to make peace.

Warriors would put away their swords and sit down. Food would be brought in and they would gorge themselves in a meal. But the door opener for peace was the bread, salt, and water.

Let us also recall how our own country came into being in 1867. John A. Macdonald had a problem with the four tribes of Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Ontario. He called a meeting of representatives who were soon to become the Fathers of Confederation. He brought in a load of food and drink and instructed this group to eat and drink together until they came forward with an appropriate solution: Canada. Although this is an oversimplified explanation, the strategy worked.

In modern times, I have seen that same folk wisdom used in Vancouver,

British Columbia in the early 1960s when I was living there and attending university. One afternoon shortly after we arrived in the city, there was a knock on the door. My wife opened it and found a local Slavic couple Ivan and Natalie who had come to welcome us to the city.

Natalie gave us a loaf of bread and a jar of salt with an embroidered sash neatly folded underneath. As we exchanged words, I soon realized that this was part of that same ancient tradition of strangers ritually crossing boundaries. We both felt good as the aroma of the fresh bread enticed our nostrils and drew us to our youth when our mothers and grandmothers regularly baked homemade bread, while the embroidered cloth represented beauty, and beauty was something that our mothers had created with their gifted hands. We felt like we had received the Key to the City.

My own Slavic ancestors placed these basic ingredients on a table in front of all official meetings, a prayer service, or at the opening of a concert. For my generation, this still is the proper thing to do.

In Ottawa when I first observed the Sergeant of Arms carrying in the Mace into the House of Commons, indicating that Parliament is about to begin, I discovered here a similarity to the old Slavic custom of placing bread, salt, and water on the table. The intent was the same. We are all human beings worthy to be civil in word and deed. (In the House of Commons, the presence of the Mace may not always guarantee civil order, but that is the direction and the intent. Just imagine how this ethic of respect could benefit our Parliament!).

The Cold War Years of the 1960s to the 1990s was another test of my observation about these common basic household goods. This was the time when the West, especially many Americans, looked upon the Soviets as 'better dead than Red', and the Soviets in turn looked on the West as 'those rapacious capitalists who fanned the flames of war'. As a bridge-builder, I did my bit during this difficult Cold War period in bringing about understanding between the East and the West. Several times I led a group of Canadian and American tourists to the Doukhobor villages of southern Russia.

Our tour bus would invariably be met by a group of villagers and amongst them was usually a beautiful woman, dressed in traditional costume, carrying bread, salt, and water. Like an ambassador of goodwill, she would invite us to break a piece of bread from a large round loaf, dip it into the container of salt and eat it. And this we did. The ritual would continue around the circle while our group leader would exchange greetings with local villagers after which a scrumptious meal would be served. Of course, all of this was accompanied with an abundance of drinks (not just water!), singing ('*Ochi Chyornaya*...'), and

many toasts for peace, for friendship, for the guests and the hosts; and for beautiful women. You might call this: 'breaking bread' par excellence!

On these and other occasions, the Cold War barriers would come down momentarily, if not permanently, partly because of those common ingredients found in our homes. If there is a moral to this story, it is this: Do not underestimate the use of bread, salt, and water to nourish our bodies and our souls. Be aware of the magical power these items have to bring people together as equals in a spirit of friendship in our world community called Planet Earth.

As bridge-builders, Doukhobors have contributed to East-West understanding in a number of ways. Especially during the 1995 and 1999 Centenary celebrations, Doukhobor choirs travelled across Canada and Russia with a message of understanding and peace. During the Cold War, they were involved in international visits, peace tours and peace caravans, correspondence, learning the language of communication of the other side (Russian), holding international and disarmament workshops and conferences, sending a photo-journalist (me) to the Moscow Olympics in 1980 to learn about the stranger, sponsoring Chernobyl children for the summer as well as organizing concerts with artists from abroad. Some have been involved in translating documents, interpreting on Soviet-American joint-ventures ships, doing business in Russia, holding living-room discussions with Soviets and the public, and lobbying at the United Nations. The tradition of bridge-building persists.[4]

When they were in their 50s, Elaine and Alfred Podovinikoff of British Columbia emigrated to the Tula region where they built a large log communal home for family and friends in the heart of Tolstoy's birthplace, Yasnaya Polyana. Alfred used his carpentry skills to build the house and worked for a Russian construction company, while Elaine worked at a British International School in Moscow. As bridge-builders, the couple have found friends from all beliefs, even though their ancestors were ostracized by the Orthodox Church.

Another example of Doukhobors participating in building new bridges of understanding was the opening of the Whatshan Lake Retreat Centre near Nakusp in northern British Columbia 24-25 July 1999. In my keynote address, I stated: 'The project has the possibilities of building bridges of un-

[4] One current joint Canada-Russia project is the Yasnaya Polyana Bakery Cafe Revitalization project, spearheaded by the Canadian Doukhobors in cooperation with Vladimir Tolstoy (Lev's great-great-grandson), who is currently director of the Yasnaya Polyana estate south of Moscow. Revitalization involves the construction of a facility housing the Bakery Cafe along with meeting rooms, a souvenir shop and other amenities, all located near the historic site.

derstanding between the ages, between the generations, across geographical and political boundaries and most of all across the boundaries of our minds. May the spirit of our ancestors who dared to come to Canada one hundred years ago nurture all of us in finding our place in the sun. And may we do it with professional style, with laughter and joy, and with sensitivity to human survival and the health of our planet'.

Because of their great respect for human beings, Doukhobors recognize themselves as pioneering citizens of the world. For them, all human beings belong to a single species, regardless of race, colour or creed, and ought to behave accordingly.

Roots for Survival

A heartfelt sense of belonging, rootedness, community, and identity are essential elements for the health of individuals and society. Doukhobor pioneers have known this since they settled in western Canada over one hundred years ago. With the strength of their families, their commune structure, and their deep values of hard work, hospitality, pacifism, and the Spirit Within, they were able to withstand some but not all the forces of severe assimilation.

Paradoxically, these 'free' market societies require the continuing presence of a powerful control system including 'carefully engineered management, advertising, taxation, and mass media techniques required to keep people buying, selling, working, borrowing, lending, and consuming at optimal rates, deliberately undermining the countervailing influences of new social structures that spontaneously arise in modern families, offices, factories, etc.' (Alexander, 2001: 5).

Bruce K. Alexander used examples from Canadian and Scottish History to show that free markets inevitably produce widespread dislocation among the poor and the rich 'As free market globalization speeds up', he wrote, 'so does the spread of dislocation and addiction'. For Dr. Alexander, Vancouver with its 10,000 ragged junkies in the downtown's east-side presents a stark example of dislocation leading to tragic forms of addiction:

> There are gambling addicts in the casinos, alcoholics in the bars, money and power addicts in the financial district, workaholics in the offices, cyber-sex and video game addicts at the monitors, ski bums in the resorts, television addicts on the couches, food addicts at the convenience stores, celebrity addicts in the theatres, relationship addicts working on their issues, religious fanatics spreading the Word, and on and on' (Alexander, 2001: 3).

Without deep roots, as experienced under a new free market economy,

people are subjected to the devastating influence of insufficient psychosocial integration called 'dislocation' often leading to addiction either to drugs or to many other habits such as drinking, gambling, overeating, and overspending.

Without doubt the debate on the relationship of addiction to free market society will continue. The key to controlling this addiction is to build a society in which psychosocial integration is attainable by the great majority of people. People need to belong, not just trade in its markets. People need to pay attention to the root causes of addiction. In the words of Dr. Alexander: 'We need to restore social spending. We need to enhance our ability to care for one another. We need to invest in social housing. We need to reform our public services, so they become more nurturing. We need to rebuild programs like welfare and UI [Unemployment Insurance] that give people choices and allow them to stay in their home communities. We need to place full employment once again at the top of the public policy agenda' (Ibid., 11). And using the experience of our Doukhobor pioneers, I would add, we need to restore public support for culture.

It was no accident that the Canadian Museum of Civilization chose the Doukhobors as a subject of a major exhibition in the mid-1990s. Although relatively small in numbers, the Doukhobor pioneers provide important roots as models of survival in our civilization. Values such as respect for life, hard work, hospitality, cooperation, and building bridges are valuable templates for a flowering future.

Like the great California evergreen sequoia tree that could stand tall and strong against the gales that periodically buffet our lives, roots planted deep in good soil can bring forth wonderful growth and an enduring future for life. Let's set our priorities straight. Let's not be overwhelmed by the self-serving instant gratification of 'free market' economics that maximizes certain freedoms, but curtails the freedom of citizens to safeguard social cohesion and physical environment.

Let's locate a delicate balance between a world of high technology, instantaneous communication, idolatry of the market place and a world with a heartfelt sense of belonging, rootedness, community and identity, to paraphrase journalist P. McKenna (*Globe and Mail*, 26 June 1999, 'Life in the "Fast World"', D12). The necessity of preserving our roots must not be lost sight of. The future we preserve may be our own.

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The Spirit of Baljvine

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Center for Global Nonkilling

At a first glance, it may appear naïve to discuss the possibilities for building killing-free societies in a country riddled with bullet holes and mortar shrapnel. To many, the Balkans in general and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular suggest vivid accounts of people systematically exterminating each other under the leadership of a chorus of "butchers". Such images reinforce the ideology of "innate depravity" (Fry, 2013) that supports individual attitudes and public policies that feed lethality while suppressing the evidence for violence prevention strategies.

But the fact remains that the history of the Balkans, regardless of how historians present it and school history books disseminate it, is that of a diversity of people's systematically *not* killing each other. Otherwise, this book—and many of the authors who have contributed to it—would probably not exist. This is what Adolf (2010: 14) argues in his essay on "nonkilling history" regarding the need to historicize what did not happen but makes the past, present and future possible: "the histories of nonkilling are the interpreted records of attempts and successes at or overcoming acts and systems of killing".

Without denying the horrors of the wars, many untold histories illustrate the previous observation. The village of Baljvine (Балъвине), currently part of Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzogovina, is one such example. Roughly divided half by half between Muslim Bosniaks and Orthodox Serbs, the whole community kept united and protected each other throughout the war, even facing VRS General Momir Talić when he visited in an attempt to stirr ethnic hatred (Arnautovic, 2010).[1] By the end of the war, the mosque of Baljvine was the sole functioning and undamaged mosque in the territory of Republika Srpska, having been actively defended and preserved by the local Serb villagers (Walasek, 2015: 55). The persistence of traditional village communal institutions (such as the *opstina*) is mentioned among the factors that fostered cohesiveness in this community.

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[1] See "The Village the War Forgot" <http://youtu.be/SeAJEVW1MIU> and "Baljvine - village where there was never been a war" [sic] <http://youtu.be/fj3ACxhQ6xI>.

As Sanja Garic reminds us in her chapter, in many other places of the Balkans people did not remain indifferent and decided to mobilize against the war. In December 1991 the *Centar za Antiratnu* (CAA, Center for Antiwar Action) was founded in Belgrade, organizing demonstrations and concerts under the slogan "*Ne računajte na nas*" (Don't count on us!). Simmultaneously, *Žene u crnom* (Women in Black) organized vigils in Belgrade and supported draft resisters. Many other such groups operated during the war, including *Antiratna Kampanja* (ARK, Antiwar Campaign) in Zagreb, *Suncokret* (Sunflower) in Rijeka and the Centers for Peace and Nonviolence in Osijek and Karlovac (Jung, 2010: 174). Such antiwar movements are not something new in the Balkans, going to the active opposition to militarism, military budgets and aggressive expansionism during the early 20th c. by figures such as Dimitrije Tucović in the Serbian Parliament (Milenkovitch, 1985: 965).

Going further back in time, the Bogomil Christians that left their *stećak* tombstones in the village of Baljvine as in hundreds of other villages across the Balkans, opposed feudal social stratification, government and refused to fight in wars of aggression, representing one the first nonkilling Christian revivals. As Runciman (1947: 68) explains: "true Bogomils were unwilling to shed blood". Koozma Tarasoff's chapter on the Doukhobors, a religious movement that is historically connected to the Bogomils, allows us a glimpse to some of their core values, that in many ways still persist among rural Balkan societies.

Among these values is certainly that of defiance. The cultural and political atmosphere that Tjaša Ribizel describes as beginning to emerge in the late 1950s and 1960s in Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia, eventually led to the airing of previously unheard demands such as those for conscientious objection to military service (the *Right to Refuse to Kill*), publicly endorsed by the Socialist Youth Organization of Slovenia in 1986. The open debate on this issue in Ljubljana fostered the introduction of noncombatant alternative service and lighter sentences for those who continued to refuse to military service althoghether (Jung, 2010: 173).

The first warnings and calls for nuclear disarmament came also from the Balkans, even before the bombing of Hiroshima in 1945, through the foresight of physicist and peace activist Ivan Supek. Later on he refused to participate in Yugoslavia's attempt to join the nuclear arms race and in 1960 he founded the Institute for Philosophy of Science and Peace under the umbrella of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts and the international Pugwash movement. Supek also helped create the peace research focused Inter-University Center in Dubrobnik—with Johan Galtung as first Director—and issuing of the 1976 "Dubrovnik-Philadelphia Declaration".

If it was not for the "historic and current systemic bias of the disproportionate amount of attention given to violence and war" (Sponsel, 1996: 113-114), recent decades in Balkans would also be recalled and studied for their unique movements of nonviolent civil resistence. The decade long (1989-1999) Kosovo nonviolent struggle relentlessly applied civil disobedience and non-cooperation strategies, including the establishment of parallel institutions (government, schools, health system, etc.), until it was severely underminded by Western armed and trained Kosovo Liberation Army (Clark, 2001; Salla, 1995). In Serbia, it was *Otpor!* (*Отпор!*) that shifted the country's politics through a well organized nonviolent movement, effectively bringing down Milošević's rule in a two-year campaign (1998-2000). The documentary film "OTPOR! Bringing down a dictator"[2] illustrates the movement's succesful strategy that has inspired many other movements to embrace civil resistence around the world. (See CANVAS.[3])

These are just a few images from the Balkans nonkilling kaleidoscope that were explored in August 28-29, 2014, during the first Nonkilling Balkans Exploratory Forum, held in Sarajevo. Other contributions featured in the book, such as those by Ingrida Grigaityte or Danica Borkovich, shed light on other peaceful and nonkilling aspects of Balkans culture. As the "Sarajevo Declaration for a Nonkilling Balkans" stated: "we seek to reinstate and celebrate our Common Nonkilling History and Balkan contributions to a peaceful killing-free world" also reminding ourselves and others that

> the fact that during the entire history of this region the vast majority of people, even in the course of war, have not killed and would not kill, leads us to uphold the principle of the right of every single person not to be killed and the right and responsibility of everyone not to kill. (...) The examples of multiethnic communities that renounced killing each other during wartime or were able to achieve true reconciliation in times of peace reinforce this view.

"The Spirit of Baljvine" lies not only in those communities that were able to steer away fratricidal killing but also among those that, drawn into such violence in the past due to unfavorable contexts—such as being on the "wrong side" of the map—have been able to pull themselves toghether to reconcile and work toward brighther nonkilling futures. The Center for Global Nonkilling was extremely excited in 2014 to having extended its first Nonkilling Communities Flag and Award to the municipality of Bosanski Petrovac. The Flag and

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[2] Watch online at <http://youtu.be/UBvzsDUh8eY>.

[3] Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies <http://canvasopedia.org/>.

Award seek to honor local governments and communities that have shown efforts to significantly reduce killing or that have become communities with no killing. From Bosanski Petrovac we also took the ensign of "*The Tree of Life*," a traditional weaving pattern for Bosnian Kilim that is being recovered and that is represented as part of the cover design for this book.

The publication of this collective volume under the title *Nonkilling Balkans* is another step toward the fulfillment of the goals set in the "Sarajevo Declaration" that should continue with the establishment of a permanent nonkilling structure involving local scholars, activists, public institutions, and others. The editors and authors of this book sincerely hope these contributions may continue to prepare the ground for the seed of a nonkilling Balkans to sprout.

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“ The slogan of the *Nonkilling Balkans Forum* states that true patriotism is the love for all people in the world, because dissemination of hatred towards others causes the worst damage to the one who hates.

… The human mind is a powerful tool and can make miracles, but we must not allow us kill humans. We can have different names, we may appear in variety of forms, we can dress however we like, eat different food, enjoy the way we choose, socialize with whomever we feel like it and believe in whatever we find appropriate, but we must not kill people; we have to take care of the life of each member of the human community.

… I am sure that *Nonkilling Balkans 2014* will echo in the Balkans and all over the world as an encouraging hope for people in that part of the world, motivating them to engage all human potentials in order to build a society of new generations ready to reject hatred and killing and accept nonviolence and nonkilling as a philosophy of social living and human relations.”

Branko Tomić
Journalist of the Scandinavian
newspaper *Bosanska Pošta*

“ The idea of Nonkilling Philosophy and Nonkilling Political Science cannot last forever if it stays isolated. In order to succeed and be established as a universal human way of life, the new science of Nonkilling must be widely accepted and practiced around the world. I do not know if creators of that new science know are aware of the history of the peaceful peoples of Bosnia and their philosophy of life in the centuries of Balkans Bogomils and in several decades of the 20th century within the Yugoslavian Federation. In the history of human kind we had many similar movements, but they never became the philosophy of entire countries. In Bogomil Bosnia, between the 12th and 15th centuries, people and rulers respected and practiced Bogomils nonkilling philosophy of life. For that reason Bosnia, although shaken by many wars in the last century, is historically prone to be receptive to the science of Nonkilling.

As an idea, Nonkilling looks great! To make it work is a completely different story. In the last couple years the Center for Global Nonkilling and the Nonkilling Balkans Forum initiative found their way to make some first steps to accomplish that idea in a small part of the world. They did it in Bosnia, a place that witnessed mass killings in the ethnic wars of recent dec-

ades. They organized the *Nonkilling Balkans Exploratory Forum* in Sarajevo, with prominent scientists and public activists, having positive response from the local media. They also established the First Nonkilling Community in the Bosnian municipality of Bosanski Petrovac, showing that people of that region are willing to move towards a peaceful killing-free future.

We are probably on a very long journey to a Nonkilling civilizational goal. But it is worth all the efforrt. Humans of today and tomorrow do not have a more important duty."

Ilija Katić
Bosnian/Canadian teacher

"The newly formed educational systems [in newly formed Balkans countries] led to the blossoming of national identities and cultures, which in this part of Balkans is synonymous with religious faith. Thus, educational systems varied from area to area, depending on the majority population, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has three constitutive nations (Bosniac Muslims, Serbian-Orthodox Christians and Croat Catholics). Together with the economic stagnation, impoverishment, ethnic cleansing and war, refugees and mass murders that marked the Balkans and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular in the early to mid-1990s, educational systems like these have had serious and so far irreversible consequences on the education system in Bosnia-Herzegovina and society as a whole.

This meant that the uniform educational system that had formerly been in place in each of the six newly formed countries was replaced by six systems, each attempting to be different from the next. Creators of such systems focused more on trying to be different then on attempting to assure the quality of the systems. (...) It would appear that in the current political climate, the authorities are content to keep education just the way it is due to its vulnerability and the way in which it can be used for the purposes of political indoctrination enabling teachers, students, and indirectly, the students' parents to be manipulated. (...) By maintaining the status quo, schools predispose young people towards segregation and engrain in them strongly discriminatory attitudes that lead them to believe that such intolerance represents socially acceptable behavior."

Adila Pašalić-Kreso
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo