Nonkilling Futures
- Visions -

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Center *for* Global **Nonkilling**

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"Not words of routine this song of mine,
but abruptly to question, to leap beyond, yet nearer bring"

(Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself", *Leaves of Grass*, 1855)

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Introduction

Moving Toward Visions of Nonkilling Futures

Jim Dator
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I have known, admired, and loved Glenn Paige (and his wife Glenda) for more than 40 years. They have both been a huge inspiration for me in many ways. For many years, Glenn was a very active member of the World Futures Studies Federation, of which I am also a member, offering many talks and symposia primarily on leadership at our regional and world conferences. He also introduced discussions about the possibility of a nonkilling world at those conferences. While I had various concerns about his views on leadership, I have always had nothing but instant and continuing 100% support of his views on the possibility of a nonkilling world.

My main academic and personal specialty is futures studies. I do not believe it is possible to predict the future—to say exactly what "will be"—but I do believe it is possible and necessary for people to envision and invent preferred futures, and so in my teaching, writing and consulting, I focus on that.

Like Glenn, I am a political scientist, and therefore am especially interested in envisioning and inventing new forms of governance since our current forms are so manifestly, completely, and damagingly inadequate. When I first began teaching courses on governance design, many years ago, I focused on two "complaints"—namely, that all governments are undemocratic and unfuturistic. I sought designs that would result in governance systems that were truly democratic and resolutely futures-oriented. Getting those two things in one design is not easy. Democracies give living people what they want now, while being futures-oriented means balancing the needs of present generations with those of future generations. A tough act.

But I soon realized there were other "complaints" about government that I needed to consider, and the one that I incorporated next into my governance design courses was the one that Glenn Paige brought so clearly into my understanding—that much of the killing in the world is done by of-

ficers of the state lawfully carrying out their duties. This is because at the base of the legal definition of a nation-state is the declaration that a nation-state is an organization that has the exclusive right in a specific territory to use and threaten killing force on its own citizens and on anyone who threatens its so-called "sovereignty". In his careful research, Glenn has shown that a nonkilling state supported by a nonkilling political science is not only desirable but possible if we will simply first believe that it is possible, and then do the many other academic, personal, cultural, social, political, and spiritual things to make it so (Paige, 2009).

This is the same basic attitude that futurists take toward the future—that in principle anything is possible if you believe it is possible and then do the necessary and often hard and dangerous work to make it so.

I have since added a few other "complaints" about the nation-state to those three, but there is no doubt that the hardest thing for most students to even be willing to imagine is a nonkilling government in a nonkilling world. The belief in the necessity, and perhaps even ennobling desirability, of killing for and by the nation-state is very deeply imbedded in the consciousness of far too many people, and it is difficult but necessary to enable them to root it out.

At the same time, futurists are not magicians. We do not believe that just wishing and hard work will inevitably cause our dreams to come true. One admonition is that "we can do anything but we can't do everything." It is a question of making priorities about what is most important and aim for them first. Thus Glenn wisely and correctly has focused on the narrow but extremely important goal of nonkilling instead of the also highly desirable but much broader and more difficult goal of nonviolence. Unfortunately, not many people easily grasp that distinction and so try to go directly toward nonviolence before achieving nonkilling.

Futurists also know that we live in a complex set of dynamically interacting institutions, behaviors and beliefs, and that by disturbing one factor we also influence the rest. Therefore, we need to proceed carefully but resolutely toward our nonkilling goal, mindful of what impacts that might have on the rest of the world we live in. As I added other "complaints" to the three of killing, undemocratic, and unfuturistic (namely, that states are too bureaucratic, too nationalistic [meaning, too focused on the nation-state to the exclusion of communities smaller and larger than the nation-state] and patriarchal [privileging "male" behavior and perpetuating the false myth of only two genders]), the web became both more interrelated and dynamic, and much more complex and potentially unstable.

Finally, there are a very large number of forces pushing us from the past and pulling (or approaching) us from the futures that we cannot easily change, or perhaps not change at all. We have to live with them. More importantly, we have to learn how to use them for our advantage. The metaphor I have used for a very long time is that we need to learn how to "surf the tsunami of change". If, as a society, we had paid serious attention to the waves earlier, we perhaps could have diverted them before they became tsunami, but they are now too close, too big, and no longer divertible. We need to surf them, to use their power to help us go where we want to go, and to enjoy the ride.

All of these features, and more, need to be included in our attempts first usefully to envision and then practically to design and move toward a nonkilling world. Which means we are talking about the futures. While there are things we can and should do now, many more things cannot be done immediately, but must be carefully planned and provided for, with their achievement in the future while the attainment of a fully nonkilling world might be still further into the future.

With this in mind, perhaps, knowing of my interest in futures studies and my contacts in the futures field, Glenn and Joám Evans Pim asked me to edit a book on Nonkilling Futures as part of the Center's nonkilling series. I put out a call to the list of the World Futures Studies Federation, and got about twenty or so replies from people interested. But as time went by, and these futurists began to see what a challenging task it is to envision and design a nonkilling world, more and more dropped out, and so I am left now with only nine people who were willing to contribute a chapter in a book on envisioning nonkilling futures. They are Guillermina Baena, Terry Beitzel, Karen Hurley, Vahid V. Motlagh, Maorong Jiang, Eleonora Masini, Dennis Morgan, John Sweeney, Aubrey Yee and myself.

Guillermina Baena Paz is Professor of Information Sciences and Public Administration in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico City. Her contribution considers the human emotional basis of killing and nonkilling that thwarts or enables nonkilling futures.

Terry Beitzel is Assistant Professor in the Department of Justice Studies at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, USA. His research interests are primarily in nonviolence, restorative justice, human rights, and theoretical development in conflict and peace studies. In our book, he explores the question of what should be the ethics of and ethical behavior in nonkilling futures.

Karen Hurley is instructor in the School of Environmental Studies, University of Victoria, British Columbia, Canada. Her chapter analyzes contemporary movies looking for images of futures that are potential contributors or distractors toward achieving nonkilling futures.

Vahid V. Motlagh is an Iranian Futures scholar, and since 2003 Editor and Advisor with the Stockholm-based Iranian Futurist Foundation. He applies value-focused thinking and decision analysis methods to enrich the specific vision of nonkilling global society.

Maorong Jiang is originally from China and is Professor of Political Science at Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. He focuses on using futures studies to envision nonkilling futures.

Eleonora Masini is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the Gregorian University in Rome, Italy, and was for many years the Secretary General and President of the World Futures Studies Federation. Among other things, she has specialized for a long time in the role of women in creating the futures, and so has focused on that in her chapter for this book.

Dennis Morgan is an associate professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, Korea. He uses the evidence of nonkilling throughout most of history to bolster his vision of a nonkilling future.

John Sweeney is a Ph.D. candidate in Alternative Futures in the Department of Political Science of the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, and instructor in World Religions at Kapiolani Community College in Honolulu. His paper is an analysis of images of killing or nonkilling societies in contemporary films and popular culture, and their potential contribution toward nonkilling futures.

Aubrey Yee is also a PhD candidate in Alternative Futures in the Department of Political Science of the University of Hawai'i at Manoa. Her chapter also focuses on the role of women in creating nonkilling futures, based upon her understanding of the historical evidence concerning women's role in nonkilling pasts.

For my part, I believe that the anthropological and contemporary evidence makes clear that humans are not inevitably natural killers, but do under certain circumstances have the ability to be forced to become killers, usually at great psychic cost to themselves and others around them. Humans' desire and ability to cooperate, love, and be loved outweighs by orders of magnitude our desire to kill, maim, and cheat.

Unfortunately, we have just gone through a period of history that has encouraged greed and killing without equal in the history of the world. Many people, especially our formal leaders, are still in the thrall of those ex-

ceptional decades, but their abilities to govern ended in 2007 when the economic structures based on myths supporting their beliefs collapsed and are slowly fading away. Moreover the energy source that fueled rapacious capitalism and bloody imperalism—cheap and abundant oil—is coming to an end and no equivalent energy replacement is anywhere in sight. At the same time, long neglected and exacerbated environmental challenges are demanding our attention. The old order is gone and only its façade remains, still looming, still pretending, but unable to do good, though still able for a while to do ill. (See Dator, 2009.)

A new era is emerging that seems more willing to imagine a nonkilling world. I can tell you that most of my undergraduate and graduate students now are very much aware of this and are more cooperative and peaceful people than ever before in spite of all the violent games they play and videos they see—in fact, maybe *because* of those games and movies which, like pornography, get the violence out of their systems, rather than causing more.

From my point of view the arc of history is moving toward nonkilling and cooperation, not away from it. There is still an obscene amount of killing in the world, a lot done with the acquiescence if not willing support of the American people. But there is a global outbreak of nonkilling as well, including the *OccupyWallStreet* movement, still peaceful at the time I write. Unfortunately most official leaders in the US are either ignorant of or immune to it. Many of us were bitterly deceived by Barack Obama's promises, and he needs to feel the depth of our disappointment and pain.

But that's OK. While once upon a time it really mattered what the US thought and how we acted, that will be less and less so in the future. In spite of all the enormous energy, environmental, economic, and governing challenges before us, envisioning and moving toward a peaceful future has never been more practical and achievable than it is now. The sudden global outpouring of support and help that Glenn Paige has received in recent years, in contrast to the neglect and abuse heaped on him for so much of his life as he bravely and studiously led us to believe in a nonkilling world, is additional evidence of that.

Immediately following the Second World War, there were a number of scholars and diplomats who wanted that war to be the last. Many of them believed it would be possible to have world peace if there were world law, and so tried to convince others of that. In the process of those conversations, they discovered that "peace", which sounded so good to their victorious ears, actually meant freezing the status quo, and hence solidifying enormous structural violence, to most of the world's population who were

still enslaved directly or indirectly by western imperial powers, by local dictatorships, or by the gender, ethnic, or social traps of their cultures. They replied that there can be no peace until there is social justice and economic equity. And, they added, it may be necessary to fight for justice and equity—a reply that was accepted by some and rejected by others who rejoined that one cannot kill for peace, or use killing to achieve justice and equity. Not only is peace the way to peace but justice is the way to justice and equity to equity. That reply also attracted some and repulsed many more.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, before the entire world went mad with the fantasies of neoliberal globalism and it was still possible for intelligent people to talk in public and the media about the possibility of peace and nonkilling, the three values of nonviolence, justice and equity were declared to be the guiding values of an organization called WOMP, the World Order Model Project. It is likely that the term "World Order" turned more people off than it attracted since it sounded very authoritarian even though that was neither the intention nor the process of those who espoused it. In any event, with the rise in the 1970s of what was then called the environmental movement, WOMP embraced a fourth value, ecological balance, to the other three and so WOMP had four values that guided its work—nonviolence, social justice, economic equity, and ecological balance. (See Mendlovitz, ed., 1975.)

Many important people participated in the WOMP project and tried to develop designs—or models—of a world that was based on and exhibited the four values. One of the most impressive, both from a substantive and a methodological point of view, was a book written by Richard Falk, called *A Study of Future Worlds* (1975). Falk's method still seems to me to be a useful way to proceed toward achieving a nonkilling world. First it is necessary to believe such a world is possible and then to do all of the necessary research to support that conviction. Second it is necessary to envision a nonkilling world in some detail. It is therefore incumbent to specify what those details are, and show how they interrelate. The four WOMP values provided an excellent basis for this. Next, the basic values need to be operationalized—put into forms that are specific, actionable, and measurable. Then, starting from the vision of a preferred future, we move back down the cone of time, indicating what has to happen just before a fully nonkilling world is functional. Then what has to happen before that, and so on down to the present—what has to happen now to begin moving up the cone of time, step by step? It is not possible to leap from the present to a nonkilling future. It takes time, in planned increments.

Falk wisely did not specify exact dates when each of the steps needed to be achieved. Rather, he named each time series abstractly as T-1, T-2, T-3 and so on, meaning that one did not move on to the tasks of T-2 until those in T-1 had been achieved, so that each step could be longer or shorter than other steps, depending on what was actually accomplished.

In addition, Falk said that at each step we should ask and answer the following questions:

> What institutions, processes, and values are already supportive of our values, and moving toward our preferred future? Align our work with theirs if possible.
> What existing institutions, processes, and values stand in the way of our preferred future, and how they can be overcome or marginalized?
> What new processes and systems not presently existing that can help us achieve our preferred future need to be envisioned, invented, nurtured, and maintained?

I have asked the contributors to our volume on nonkilling futures to do only the "easy" part—to envision as clearly as they can the crucial features of a nonkilling world. Even if they do that well, there is still much to be done.

It is also the case that these are visions, not blueprints or orders. And so, as we do move forward, learning more, needing more, incorporating more people with different ideas into our work, we will need to alter our visions even as we move toward them. That does not render the visioning process superfluous. To the contrary, without a clear vision, we cannot be sure about what our first moves should be since we are not specifically heading anywhere. As Yogi Berra might have said, "if you don't know where you are going, chances are you'll end up someplace else."

It would be unfair of me to ask others to state their vision of a nonkilling world without also developing and sharing mine. So here it is, as a tentative, incomplete, first step toward a fuller statement later. I would very much appreciate your critical comments on what I have done.

Better, I would like you to share with me and others your vision of a nonkilling future world. Please do that!

While I start my vision of a nonkilling future based upon the four WOMP values, I have greatly modified and extended them. First of all, I replaced WOMP's "nonviolence" with Paige's "nonkilling", "economic equity" with "material equity", and "environmental balance" with "environmental evolvability". I have also replaced "social justice" with "freedom/order". "Social justice" de-emphasizes individual freedom too much, and yet I am no libertarian

whose rally-cry is always "freedom". Indeed, I appreciate the fundamental primacy and dependency of the individual on the community while also highly prizing personal liberty, and so I have created a single value, "freedom/order" to capture the perpetually-contested balance between individual freedom and social solidarity. Similarly, I have also identified another political value, one that might be called "democracy". But "democracy" is now an almost meaningless word. So I label the value "effective participation."

Both "democracy" and "material equity" are very much focused on the needs, wants, and power of certain members of present generations. Indeed, the two most powerful social institutions of the present time—interest-group-based "democracy" and global neoliberal "capitalism"—are profoundly and exclusively based on a very narrow sliver of rapidly-vanishing time called "the present" which cares neither for the past and tradition, nor for the future and the impact of current actions on the lives of future generations. It is necessary therefore to add another value called "future-generations orientation" or "balancing the needs of current generations with those of future generations"—"futures orientation" for short.

Finally, I have added an aesthetic/artistic/emotive value that I call "aesthetic expression". So the seven values I want my society to manifest are *nonkilling, freedom/order, effective participation, aesthetic expression, material equity, environmental evolvability, and futures orientation.* I will explain each in a bit more detail later.

One of the things I need to stress is that values alone, stated in words like the ones I used here, are extremely vague—or at least are only a first step that require a great deal of clarification before they can be social goals used to guide behavior toward a preferred future. An example I often use to illustrate that is the value "equal", as in the statement, "I want a society where everyone is equal."

That is very common social value, perhaps not as popular in the US as it once was, but still expressed as a value by many people in many cultures. But what do I really mean if I say I want a society where "everyone is equal"? Think about that before you move on.

The chances are you will think that I mean I want "a society where everyone is economically equal". Some might point out that that too has many different meanings and ways of achieving. Some would say that everyone should "start out economically equal"; that they should be given an "equal opportunity." Many Americans do say they believe in that. But many then say it is OK if people begin to differ—perhaps greatly—in wealth and status.

If everyone has an equal opportunity at the outset, then it is OK for some to fail and for others to succeed big time, many Americans say.

Others argue, "No, I mean that people should not become either too rich or too poor; that the difference between 'the ceiling' and 'the floor' should be very small" (eg., the Gini index is close to zero). They therefore favor some process of redistributing the wealth so as to assure that is the case.

Now it turns out (for the sake of argument only, so as to show the vagueness of the value "equality" and other values expressed only in words) that by "equal" I did not not mean economic equality, or approximate equality of wealth and access to goods and services (though in truth, I do favor that—that is what I mean by the value "material equity").

No, for the purpose of illustrating my point, I had in mind that everyone should be of equal height and weight. Everyone should be 150 centimeters tall and weigh 54 kilograms, plus or minus 5 centimeters and one kilogram. Think of all the advantages if everyone were about the same height and weight. Food, clothing, housing, transportation—you name it—everything would be cheaper, more efficient, easier to make, distribute, and manage. It might actually promote world peace and greatly limit killing in and of itself if there were not so many big men able to bully most women and short men (and if short men didn't bully others to compensate for their short stature) and if everyone could subsist on about the same amount of food, water and other necessities—consuming less because of their more modest size. Imagine the space saved in manufacturing, warehousing, retailing, and disposing of goods if everyone were equal!

Did you guess that is what I meant by everyone being equal? Perhaps, but I doubt it. Thus, in order to be clear it is essential to describe what we actually mean by our values of freedom/order, material equity, environmental evolvability, aesthetic expression, and effective participation—and even nonkilling. This kind of clarity is called "the operational definition" of a value—the way it can be measured with precision to see if we have achieved our value or not. If it is not clearly operationally defined, how can we be sure we have a society of "equality" or not?

After each value has been clearly defined operationally, one needs to apply the three categories Falk mentioned, above—what processes exist that are already moving in the direction of your value that you can adopt; what is opposed to your value that you need to stymie; and what new factors or processes do you need to create to achieve your value? In order to make everyone roughly equal in height and weight we need to mobilize education to teach people to grow correctly; religion to preach salvation for those who

grow right with God and damnation for those who do not; laws penalizing deviants or, better yet, rewarding achievers; cutting off the feet of tall people and adding stilts on short ones; making barriers in entrances, chairs, beds, and the like to those too tall/short/fat/skinny; marrying tall thin people to small fat ones; using genetic engineering to see that everyone is "just right"….

So let us now take nonkilling, our key value here. What does that mean?

It seems clear enough, doesn't it? But is it?

Is it only not killing people, or not killing any form of life? Many people insist that killing animals, even for food, is wrong. Is that included in my definition? No, it is not. I am not here proposing forbidding the killing and eating of animals. I am not proposing vegetarianism, though there are many very good reasons for adopting a vegetarian or related perspective, and many people favor it and adopt it. But for me, here, "nonkilling" only refers to humans.

Is a deadly automobile crash "killing". Not if it is "an accident", I say. But at the same time, it is certainly possible to prevent most if not all automobile deaths by redesigning transportation completely, so maybe those "accidental" deaths should not be allowed either. Calling them "crashes" and not "accidents" is a step in that direction. The people who design, build, and profit from our deadly transportation systems should be held responsible for the killing that results. But no, though I believe our tolerance of automobile deaths to be inexplicable, given our fear of "terrorists" and willingness to spend trillions of dollars to prevent an extremely unlikely "terrorist attack", I mean here only the intentional killing of one or more persons by one or more other persons (or by an agent, including technology). So clearly what I mean by killing means primarily war (including deadly defense), deadly revolution, and the death penalty.

Does "killing" include suicide, or euthanasia—allowing people to kill themselves, or have others kill them as they wish? Big debate on that. But I say, "no." I am strongly in favor of euthanasia—depending on how it is actually done; depending on its operational definition. But I very much favor my right to end my own life with dignity and grace whenever I want to, and with the assistance of others who are willing to help me die gracefully.

Here is the real kicker: how about abortion? A really controversial topic. I again say "no." Abortion is not prohibited—depending on how, when, and by whom, it is done. Certainly far, far better to make unwanted pregnancies impossible (which in fact is possible!), but until then, safe, humane, and legal abortion is by far the lesser evil.

I may have lost you on that one.

But my point is, what appears to be (and may be) the clearest value of them all, nonkilling, is fraught with definitional problems, and so I have to be very clear what I mean by it.

Paige also stresses that "nonkilling" not only includes not allowing the act of killing of humans but also does not allow the threat of killing, the teaching of killing, preparations for killing, design and production of the means of killing, celebration of those who kill (even in "self-defense" or in the defense of one's "nation"), and all the other cultural, political, and economic factors that currently support, encourage, require, and reward people acting as the nation's agent to kill.

I agree with that.

In addition, Paige makes it clear that just as "killing" is taught and glorified in our current society, so also nonkilling must be taught and glorified in at least equal measure in a nonkilling society. Nonkilling is not just the absence of killing, it is the positive understanding, nurturing, and healthy presence of the things that will thwart and ultimately prevent the many motivations—strongly funded, glorified, and managed—that lead people to kill now.

Paige in his work, and now in the work of all who he has inspired, has gone on to operationalize in some detail what needs to be done to create a nonkilling society. They have given countless examples of how nonkilling values can be achieved. I rest my case for a nonkilling future entirely on what Paige has previously discussed.

Similar work needs to be done for all the other values I have listed. Some of the work has been done to some extent. There is a large and growing body of literature on environmental evolvability, although most of it, in my opinion, deals with trying to "conserve" an ecological arrangement that does not exist any more because of human intervention—and may not have existed in any "balanced" sense since hunting and gathering societies adopted the "slash and burn" techniques of horticulture. Any "natural" "ecological balance" clearly was disturbed with the introduction of farming and animal husbandry that released chemicals into the atmosphere and water that otherwise would not have been released without human agricultural activities.

All of this has been greatly exacerbated by more recent industrial processes, resulting in the largely and increasingly artificial environments of the present marked by huge and growing human global populations, megalopolical population concentrations, and technologies that destroy species, biological networks, and patterns of life that existed for millennia while replacing them with unintended and often unknown impacts that will persist for millennia to come.

We have, as some geologists have said, moved from the "Holocene Epoch" (when humans first appeared on Earth) to the "Anthropocene Epoch" since humans are now the major force shaping the geology and evolution of the Earth and all life upon it.

The implications of this still dimly-perceived fact are profound, and so far humans are not in the slightest prepared ethically, politically, and even scientifically to assume our responsibility to "govern evolution"—a responsibility that is intended to be acknowledged and fulfilled within my value of "ecological evolvability". (See Anderson, 1987; Dator, 2004, Goonatilake, 1999; Steffen, et al, 2007; Vitousek, ed., 1997.)

Consider now the value of "effective participation".

At the present time, "democracy" is so popular a word, describing so many kinds of political arrangements, that it is basically meaningless. It is simply a "good" word that covers many kinds of actual governing, almost none of them "democratic" in any reasonable sense of the word. Some years ago, I defined "democracy" as a form and process of governance that gives every person and entity influenced by another person and entity an equal and continual opportunity to influence the actions of that person and/or entity. That is also my definition of "effective participation."

By that definition there are no democracies in the world today, though some governments that call themselves "democracies" (such as the United States which is not and was never intended to be "democratic" by any reasonable measure) are very far away from it, while others (such as the Scandinavian countries and Holland) are somewhat closer to it. In my view, until "effective participation" is achieved—until we learn how to have "leadership" without "leaders"—we will not have a governing system capable of helping us achieve the other values. (See Dator, 2007; Mannermaa, Dator and Tiihonen, eds., 2006; Dator, Pratt and Seo, 2006.)

Similarly, there is a huge literature on future generations analysis, including many studies focusing on how to enable future generations to "participate effectively" when decisions are being made by members of present generations. Like so much else of relevance to the task of imagining and building a nonkilling future, the literature on future generations is largely unknown in conventional political science, but it should be accessed so as effectively to define operationally "futures-orientation" in regard to effective participation by future generations. (See Agius and Busuttil, 1994; Kim and Dator, eds., 1999; Partridge, ed., 1980; Sikora and Barry, eds., 1978; Tremmel, ed., 2006.)

"Material equity" (WOMP "economic equity") is probably the most thoroughly researched, defined, and argued of all of my values. It underlies

communism, socialism, and social democracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its allies, and the transformation of all "communist" nations into global neoliberal semi-fascist states has done a great deal to discredit the value. But of course the political-economies of the old Soviet Union, China, and North Korea had very little to do with communism and socialism as Karl Marx and others envisioned it. And in my view, global neoliberalism, born in 1980 with "Reaganomics" died in 2007. It is still struggling to be revived, but its movements are mainly those of rigor mortis and not signs of life. As I said in 1989 and many times later, it is not that "communism" died and "capitalism" triumphed. It is that "communism" died before "capitalism" did. Both are unsustainable.

We therefore very urgently need new economic forms and processes—largely unknown and certainly unappreciated if not ridiculed by the current economic priesthood still enthralled by the fantasizes of global neoliberalism—to emerge and thrive. Here, again, there are very good models and living examples that emphasize material equity, environmental evolvability, and intergenerational fairness that must be enhanced and coupled with the other values to achieve nonkilling futures. (See Daly and Farley, 2004; Daly, 1996; Hawken, Lovins and Lovins, 2000; Henderson, 1999; McKibben, 2007; Robertson, 1985; Yamaguchi, ed., 1997.)

Finally, I will say a word about "aesthetic expression." First of all, I need to point out that notably absent from my list of values is anything having to do with spirituality and very pointedly with religion. I am personally skeptical of spiritual sentiments, and profoundly opposed to any organized religion which in spite of very notable exceptions (European church music) is clearly historically the major source of killing, violence, hate, oppression and every other "bad" value one can imagine. Some people might object that without religious authority we will descend in even greater barbarism. That is not likely and by no means necessary. We certainly need (and will have) ethics and ethical behavior, but we do not need morals. "Ethics" designates rules of conduct made by and for humans while "morals" are said to be based on supernatural sources superior to those of humans, leading to fundamentalism, fanaticism, dictatorship and killing based on God's command.

Nonetheless, humans are clearly not primarily rational creatures. We are primarily emotional creatures who need to exercise and celebrate our irrational exuberance in many nonkilling ways. I mean to capture that by the term "aesthetic expression"—urging each of us to develop and share ideas of beauty, balance, harmony, dissonance, chaos, in many personal and social (nonkilling) ways—how we adorn ourselves, dress, walk, swim, fly, dance,

speak, sing, sign, sculpt, weave, model, act, enhance, discipline—our aesthetic expression. Each person should be encouraged to develop her own schtick—to exhibit it, show off, adopt/shed/share identities, play and pray to our heart's content. (See Dator and Seo, 2004; Huizinga, 1950; McGray, 2003; Pink, 2006; Postel, 2003.)

I am aware that the statement of my values remains very vague. I have not operationally defined them, nor have I given examples of how they can be achieved. That is work that will be done next.

Moreover, I hope that you have noticed that while these values are complementary in some ways, they are also contradictory in others. "Freedom/order" by definition is contradictory—a question of embracing and balancing two necessary but opposing forces. "Material equity" may clash with both "environmental evolvability" and "futures-orientation", and so on.

It is part of the overall challenge here to identify the conflicts and to devise ways to balance and harmonize them so that no one of the seven values dominates over the others—with the possible exception of the overriding value of nonkilling.

Finally, there is one aspect of the book about which I am very pleased. A while ago, I was reading an issue of *Science* magazine, the most important single journal of science published in the US. It featured a series of prize winning "informational graphics"—visualizations of scientific processes, procedures, or findings (*Science*, 6019: 850-851).

The one that caught my eye was titled, "Everyone Ever in the World". It was done by Peter Crnokrak of The Luxury of Protest design firm in the UK. The write up accompanying the graphic said this:

> The poster represents every person who lived and died on the planet, from 3200 B.C.E. to 2009 C.E. The total paper area represents the 78 billion people who lived over the past 5000 years. The gaping hole in the center represents every person who died in a major war, genocide, or massacre: approximately 969 million people, or 1.25% of the total number of people who have ever lived on the planet.
>
> Text is printed in transparent ink on plastic. The circles at the top represent the number of conflicts per millennium with more than 1000 deaths, and the circle of text lists them by name. The bottom circle represents the expected number of conflicts in the next millennium if the escalating pattern continues.
>
> Human life is one of the few values that's almost always given as an absolute (for example, "1100 died in a flood in Pakistan"; "20 million Russians died in World War II"), says Peter Crnokrak. Framing deaths as a percent of those who ever lived might risk degrading the value of individual life.

> But Crnokrak said he wanted to create something thought-provoking and the people who judged the graphics for inclusion in the special issue of *Science* felt "Everyone Ever in the World" did that very well.

I contacted Crnokrak to find out if he would allow his graphic to appear on the cover of our book on Nonkilling Futures, without charge. Crnokrak agreed. I am very grateful to him for allowing that. It will add an extremely important dimension to our work, I believe. I am just sorry that the bottom circle of the graphic is so big—or exists at all. Our task is to see that his graphic forecast does not come true.

Believe. Say yes to the task. Do the best research, imagining, designing, and testing you can. That is all any of us can do and if we do, a nonkilling world will emerge.

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Chapter One

The Image of a Nonkilling Future

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Throughout history, all civilizations have faced timely challenges to their existence. These challenges are so critical that the capacity of a civilization to recognize and respond to the challenges within a fixed window of time determines whether that civilization will rise and flourish or decay and collapse, due to intrinsic or extrinsic forces or, in most cases, a combination of both. Such was the challenge-and-response thesis of the 20th century historian, Arnold Toynbee. Furthermore, when a civilization fails to respond to the crisis and thus collapses, Toynbee (1947) faults the leadership of the "creative minority" for its poverty of "creative power" to recognize and respond to the challenges; hence, the "creative minority" thereafter simply becomes the "dominant minority," presiding over the masses in a desperate bid to cling to power during the time of the collapse.

During the 1950s, a Dutch sociologist, Fred Polak, obviously influenced by Toynbee's challenge-and-response theory of the rise and fall of civilizations, linked a civilization's challenge and response and rise and fall to the image of the future that the civilization held. For Polak (1971), the "challenge" is the challenge of the future, and the key to a civilization's survival depends on whether it can recognize this challenge and respond to it through a creative image of its own future, which acts as a positive force to help overcome challenges posed; in other words, the vigor of a civilization depends upon a positive and hopeful vision of itself in the future, which enables it with the capacity to meet these challenges and overcome them as part of the process of realizing itself in time. Thus, if a society loses its vision of the future, it will fail to recognize and thus respond to critical challenges and will then fall into decay and eventually collapse; however, if it possesses a positive image of the future, it will recognize, respond to, and overcome the challenges, and thus flourish and progress.[1]

[1] See Morgan (2002) for more on Polak's view of the image of the future.

Glenn Paige (2009), in his manifesto for a nonkilling world, considers the challenge to civilization that a killing world represents and the needed response to shift toward a nonkilling world. Such response revolves around the crucial role of the creative minority to recognize the self-destructive nature of the killing crisis and then create a basis to shift toward a productive, nonkilling world in the future. Hence, I see Paige's efforts, in addition to the contributions of others in the nonkilling world project, playing the positive role of Toynbee's creative minority. Yes, Paige acknowledges the predicament and challenge of a killing world, which rationalizes and justifies killing daily as an "unfortunate" but "necessary" price to pay for territorial expansion, "progress," social control, "civilization," and a future world. However, Paige rejects the ends-justifies-the-means rationalizations in these legitimizing efforts; instead, he questions the embedded assumptions (exposing the pseudo-logic) and counters them by elaborating on the evolving prospects for realizing a nonkilling world.

As a way of also contributing to those "evolving prospects," I investigate the historical basis as a reality starting point for imaging a nonkilling future and discover, from archeological sources, that a mostly nonkilling world did indeed exist from approximately 5000 to 3000 B.C.E. and quite likely throughout much of prehistory before then. Nevertheless, the age of "Empire" emerged and brought about the rise and fall of civilizations, which, almost without exception, embraced killing and war as perceived necessities for growth, expansion, occupation, domination, and social control. The same pattern has continued throughout the ages and has only intensified through technological developments of the weapons of war—the instruments of killing and destruction in the modern era—which have become so lethal on such a large scale that they threaten the future of humanity, thus representing the self-destructive, civilizational challenge and crisis that Paige and others are responding to.

In the context of such lethality, as well as the autonomous nature of technical civilization, which continually desensitizes the masses concerning the rationalizations and justifications for killing and perpetual war, I question whether the modern image of the future is capable of embracing the image of a nonkilling future and conclude by identifying this image from a postmodern rather than modern origin and perspective, which requires a major shift of consciousness in order to realize a nonkilling world. Finally, I examine the leadership role of the postmodern, creative minority to realize a nonkilling future and conclude that a nonkilling world and future can only come about through the evolution and transformation of consciousness in a paradigm shift from Global Empire to Earth Community.

The Thesis for a Nonkilling World

Glenn Paige's seminal study (2009) begins with a question: "Is a Nonkilling world possible?" Then, Paige explores the various reasons given for answering the question in the negative. Representing the prevailing rationalizations of current political thought, he cites three main reasons given by 20 American political scientists: (1) humans are natural killers, (2) scarce resources dictate the need to kill for them, and (3) the possibility of rape justifies the need to kill in defense of females. Thus, the primal arguments "of human nature, economic scarcity, and sexual assault served sufficient to make unthinkable the practice and science of nonkilling politics" (p. 22). Furthermore, Paige (2009) refers to classic political philosophy, which offers thorough support to discount the notion of a nonkilling world. Many of the world's great philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, and Weber) all give various justifications for killing. Moreover, as Paige (2009) recounts, American blood-filled political history, "violence-accepting" religious tradition, and popular culture resonates with killing, mandating it as if it were fundamental to the American identity. The history of killing began with the very foundation of the American republic and then extended throughout its expansion for two centuries, not only continentally but globally, until it founded a global empire, whose lethality is unquestionable, upheld by weapons of mass destruction—historically unparalleled.

However, according to Paige (2009), political philosophy and national political tradition are not necessary to convince Americans that a nonkilling society is impossible since "killing in everyday life confirms it" (p. 27). Paige (2009) then cites how much Americans kill each other on a daily basis—"news" that they are continually reminded of by mass media such that violence in the U.S. is "socially learned and culturally reinforced" (p. 29). Finally, as if this were not enough, Americans can look beyond their own borders and their own history for ample evidence of a world drenched in blood—the 20th century having the notable distinction for being "mankind's most murderous era" (p. 32). Paige (2009) cites the following research by Rudolf J. Rummel (1994), who gives a rough yet conservative calculation of the overall magnitude of human killing. In his study, Rummel distinguishes between "democide" (state killing of its own people) and "war" to conclude that almost 400 million people have been killed.

When you consider that these conservative totals do not figure in homicides, deaths as an indirect consequence of war, and is only until 1987, then the total must surely now be 400 million killings or more. It should be no

surprise then, as Paige concludes, that most Americans consider the prospects for a nonkilling society as utterly inconceivable.

However, when interviewing people from other countries, Paige (2009) finds that the responses are remarkably different. These responses range from: (1) "I've never thought about the question before …" (2) "It's thinkable, but …" (3) "We know that human beings are non violent by nature, but …" (4) "It's not possible, but …" and (5) "It's completely possible …" (p. 34-5) The remarkable difference is that where the question itself is considered absurd or preposterous by most Americans, people from other cultures and historical traditions seem to be more open-minded about the possibility, and some even affirm it. One has to consider then the role that cultural bias plays when confronted with this question.

Also, from the American denial of even considering the possibility of a nonkilling world, one can glean from some responses a common characteristic of American culture: exceptionalism—and the use of exceptions to undermine and distract from the rule. For example, two common objections to the possibility of a nonkilling world are: (1) "What about Hitler? Nonviolence is completely ineffective when confronted with a tyrant like Hitler," and (2) "One must reserve the right to kill in self-defense." Yet, both of these responses are indicative of begging the question and using the exception to distract from and undermine the rule. In the case of the Hitlerite retort, the historical example is abstracted from its social and cultural context as if the phenomenon of Hitler arose out of thin air. What is not considered is that a Hitler rising to power could only occur in a social, cultural, and global context of a violent world that rationalizes and legitimizes killing. World War II, not World War I, was the "war to end all wars." It was a watershed moment in history in which the world finally realized the horror of war and, through the U.N. Charter, took steps to prevent and eliminate wars of aggression. Of course, that doesn't mean that all wars have been eliminated since then, but it does mean that there has been a shift in consciousness toward realizing a world without war so that the phenomenon of another Hitler rising to power will not be repeated.

Likewise, the response about reserving the right to kill in self-defense also begs the question and uses the exception to undermine the rule. The overall thrust of proposing a nonkilling society and world is to change the mindset such that killing would be considered as an example of the pathological condition of a culture that rationalizes and legitimizes killing in the first place. If this condition is recognized as pathological and treated as such, then killing will be minimized to such an extent that one would almost

never be confronted with having to defend oneself from killing by killing in the first place; this scenario would be more of a hypothetical nature than a reflection of the real world, which by its very nature has thoroughly rejected killing, especially the rationalizations that serve to legitimize it socially and culturally. In other words, when such rationalizations exist in the form of state-sanctioned killing, as a form of social control and power maintenance through the threat of lethality, then the underlying, subtle message to the members of that society is that the way to power is through killing—that it's okay to kill as long one can rationalize the exception—much like Raskolnikov did in Dostoyevski's classic (2004), *Crime and Punishment*. As long as the state continues to rationalize killing and reserves for itself the "license to kill," as a means of control, power, and global expansion, then the people also pick up on this message and reflect its pathology through individual acts of killing. In a killing culture, one can surely maintain the right to defend oneself from killing by killing, but in a nonkilling culture, this becomes a mere hypothetical question since the act of killing itself is unacceptable under any circumstances and is truly considered a pathological condition. In other words, the situation would only very rarely occur (if at all) rather than be a commonplace, everyday "fact of life" continuously reaffirmed by the news media and celebrated by a Hollywood culture. Instead, it would truly be the exception rather than the rule; however, when killing is accepted as the rule by a culture, albeit reserved for those in power as a matter of social control, with the pretense that it's the exception, and celebrated in the popular culture, then a twisted message is transmitted to the members of that culture, who begin to view killing as a exceptionalist means to power—the social pathology of our times reflected in daily killings—in which one has to defend oneself by also killing—in a vicious cycle. The fact that one responds as such by defending the right to kill in self-defense merely reflects that one is unable to step outside of this killing cycle—that one refuses to get the bigger picture of killing.

In Chapter 2, "Capabilities for a Nonkilling Society," Dr. Paige (2009) delivers the "bigger picture" by giving a historical overview as the grounds for considering why a nonkilling society is indeed possible. Despite the hundreds of millions of historical instances of killing, humans are not "natural born killers" but are nonkilling by nature. Statistically speaking, only a very small percentage of people kill, and even the vast majority of these, through military training, have to overcome their "deep resistance to killing" (Paige

2009, p. 39).[2] Throughout Chapter 2 Paige (2009) masterfully brings to light the historical and present resources and capacities to realize a nonkilling society and world. Drawing upon spiritual and humanistic traditions as well as scientific, anthropological, and sociological studies, he exposes the undercurrent of consciousness and social change movements that have been gradually building up through the ages and are now ripe for the transformation of values that instead advocate a new, peaceful social contract, which does not use violence and killing (or the threat of the same) to maintain control. Moreover, as Paige (2009) points out, "salient manifestations of nonkilling capabilities" are appearing in a number of ways throughout various societies. Remarkable examples of political decisions "tending toward the realization of nonkilling societies are found in countries that have abolished the death penalty, countries that have no armies, and countries that recognize the right of conscientious objection to killing in the military" (p. 51). Regarding the abolition of the death penalty, Paige (2009) inquires why and how so many countries came to this nonkilling decision, and what the historical processes are that can account for this global shift. Furthermore, Paige (2009) gives specific instances of how social, spiritual, educational, economic, training, security, research, and problem-solving institutions have adopted nonkilling principles, and how nonkilling-based cultural resources and communications media have emerged, along with nonkilling political struggles, to bring about social transformation. Surely, Dr. Paige provides persuasive and convincing evidence to consider the possibilities of the emergence of a nonkilling world, which is the basis for the image of a nonkilling future.

However, at the same time, the historical record of killing cannot be ignored or denied and so must also be taken into account and fully understood in order to realize the transition to a nonkilling world and future. Understanding the justifications and rationalizations that legitimate killing is an important component for deconstructing the prevailing modern image of the future based on violence and killing (or the threat thereof) as a tool for social control and global dominance. Besides, we should also investigate the past in order to

[2] As Paige (2009) explains, the process of overcoming this "deep resistance to killing" can drive one insane, and then the very conditions of war can drive one further down the path of insanity—where killing becomes "second-nature," while other "aggressive psychopaths" are insane to begin with, so they "naturally" adapt to military training and then lustfully thrive on the conditions of war, unable to ever adapt to a life of peace in civil society. (p. 39)

determine whether or not a prototype nonkilling civilization has previously existed. If so, though social evolution will not allow us to "go back" to this civilization, nevertheless, the argument for a nonkilling world and the image of a nonkilling future will be further clarified and thus strengthened by such a discovery, for the "can do" spirit will then be provided a solid historical foundation, which will make it even less "theoretical" and thus more probable.

A Prototype for the Image of a Nonkilling Future

Recent archeological discoveries have confirmed that a mostly nonkilling world did indeed exist from at least 5000 to 7000 years ago (and perhaps much further back) chiefly through the advent of horticulture.[3] According to Leonard Shlain (1998), before the advent of horticulture, humans lived in predominately gatherer/nurturer—hunter/killer tribes, which were essentially unchanged for almost 3 million years; then, "somewhere, sometime, someone noticed that where seeds had fallen around the kitchen midden, grain consistently appeared the following season. This observation led inevitably to the insight that if seeds were *intentionally* planted and tended, they could ensure a reliable food supply." (p. 32) Also, around the same time, people discovered that some animals could be domesticated and bred; thus, for the women, who had primarily been gatherers/nurturers, the transition to horticulture and husbandry did not require a drastic psychological adaptation as it did for the men, who until then had been primarily hunters/killers. Farming was not very "… exciting compared to the chase. Suddenly, the male was required to fend off *other* predators who were determined to eat *his* ripening harvests and cull *his* flocks" (Shlain 1998: 33).

This cultural shift from gatherer/nurturer-hunter/killer to farming / husbandry was so dramatic, relates Shlain, it rapidly replaced the way of life of wandering nomadic tribes, who began to adopt the revolutionary new lifestyle whenever the two cultures brushed up against one another. Comparatively speaking, since the nomadic way of life had been predominate for almost 3 million years, this shift occurred in the blink of an eye. Beginning around seven thousand years ago, "farming societies began to sprout all across the Mediterranean and southern Europe." (Shlain 1998: 33)

Moreover, since the advance seemed to have sprang from the gather/nurturer, a powerful female deity, Earth Mother, emerged, whom men worshipped as well as women. However, psychologically speaking, this

[3] Whereas agriculture is large-scale farming, horticulture is small-scale gardening.

sudden shift was traumatic for men, whose psyche had been honed for hunting and killing throughout much of his evolution. Though agricultural advances increased, according to Shlain (1998), these bloodless activities could hardly replace the thrill of the kill, so the male's "… pent up aggression began its toxic accumulation. Sport hunting, contests of courage, ritual killings, and human sacrifices came into being because of men's need to replace the excitement of the hunt. Eventually, war-to-the-death superseded the hunt as the principal means of periodically lancing the boil of the men's innate combativeness." (p. 34)

Shlain (1998) writes that, due to farming, man's "predatory impulses" had been reigned in by "yoking his killer instincts to the plow," and then held in check and suppressed for at least 2,000 years until its "toxic accumulation" built up and then reemerged through sports hunting, contests of courage, ritual killings, human sacrifices, and war-to-the-death, which brought about a new era marked by killing through conquest, domination, social control, and empire building. However, Shlain (1998) does not offer much evidence to support his "toxic accumulation" theory and later seems to contradict this theory by offering alternate possibilities to explain why nonkilling societies disappeared. Moreover, his theory of a "killer instinct" is problematic for a number of anthropologists. For example, as Schoenherr (2006) reports, Sussman and Hart (2005) argue that primates, including early humans, "evolved not as hunters but as prey of many predators, including wild dogs and cats, hyenas, eagles and crocodiles." The idea of "man the hunter," asserts Sussman, is mostly derived from '"a basic Judeo-Christian ideology of man being inherently evil, aggressive and a natural killer'"; yet, as Sussman explains, when you '"… really examine the fossil and living nonhuman primate evidence, that is just not the case'" (Schoenherr, 2006). What they discovered through an analysis of the evidence is that *Australopithecus afarensis*s were not "dentally pre-adapted to eat meat"; so, asks Sussman, if they "'couldn't eat meat, why did they hunt?'" (Schoenherr, 2006). Furthermore, we can see the simple evidence in the teeth of humans today; they are not sharp, predator teeth designed by evolution for eating meat. As Sussman relates, it was not "'possible for early humans to consume a large amount of meat until fire was controlled and cooking was possible'" (Schoenherr, 2006). Finally, as Barbara Ehrenreich writes, quoting anthropologists Clifton B. Kroeber and Bernard L. Fontana, '"It is a large step from what may be biologically innate leanings toward individual aggression to ritualized, socially sanctioned, institutionalized group warfare.' Or as

a 1989 conference on the anthropology of war concluded, 'The hypothesis of a killer instinct is . . . not so much irrelevant as wrong.'"

Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not one can posit a "killer instinct," which was temporarily reined in by the shift to farming during a prehistoric era of two to three thousand years, as Shlain (1998: 34-35) maintains, still, archeologists have uncovered evidence

> from the period between 7000 and 4000 B.C., suggesting a muting of violence in many early farming communities. Settlers frequently located their villages in the rich bottomlands of valleys, and many of these communities lacked fortifications, suggesting that these people were not concerned about attackers (Baring and Cashford, 1991). Sifting through the artifacts of such settlements, archaeologists do not find the preponderance of war weapons over domestic utensils characteristic of later civilizations. Their deities are not depicted carrying spears or hurling thunderbolts, and their gravesites do not include elaborate tombs of warrior kings buried with their retinues and great material wealth (Eisler, 1988). Women are often buried in more favorable locations than men. There is little evidence confirming the domination of the many by the few. While archeologists cannot know with certainty what transpired in the day-to-day lives of these prehistoric peoples, these clues suggest an existence relatively free from the strife that seems to have characterized most of recorded history. And everywhere in the ruins of these cultures there are statue fragments of a female deity (Cashford, 1991).

In fact, archeologists have unearthed a number of societies who share these characteristics during this same time period; thus, regardless of whether a "killer instinct" can be argued to have been in effect throughout prehistory prior to that time, it does seem that for at least two to three thousand years the world was, indeed, for the most part, a peaceful place to live in, remarkably absent of the phenomenon of war and killing,

However, this era came to an end roughly five thousand years ago. Though scholars have speculated and proposed various theories explaining why it ended, no one is quite sure, but some notable changes are consistent: (1) agricultural techniques became more sophisticated and large-scale, (2) warrior sky gods displaced the Earth Mother and other goddesses, (3) the advent of writing (cuneiforms-phonograms), an abstract, left-brain activity exhibiting mostly masculine features, replaced oral authority through the formulation of "laws" and (4) war, conquests, and domination schemes founded empires in which the use of violence and killing was standardized as a means of power and control.

Another anthropological interpretation of this shift from largely nonkilling farming and nomadic tribes to successive killing civilizations for 5,000 years up to the present era is that of Les Sponsel (2009), who points to the rise of horticulture and then agriculture that spawned violence over property, which erupted into the killing cycles of civilization. Thus, Sponsel (2009) offers the following narrative (as summarized by Dator[4]) to explain the shift to the era of successive civilizations characterized by war and killing:

> It seems to me that humans lived for tens of thousands of years in small, nomadic, egalitarian, peaceful societies of abundance (what is often called by anthropologists "subsistence affluence"). It was only with the rise of horticulture and then agriculture (probably caused by rapid human population growth facilitated by the evolution of speech, and our overall propensity to exploit our environment to extinction and move on until we could no longer move anywhere) that humans were forced to become sedentary; property and killing in defense of property (including women and children) became important; hierarchies and eventually hereditary leaders maintaining power by killing force emerged; tribal squabbles became wars with professional warriors; free-floating matriarchal spirituality became organized patriarchal religion with orthodox texts and priests; peasants and slaves (of war) were ruled by urban elites; cities grew into empires and all the rest—all enabled by the invention of writing.

So it appears that all of prehistory can be mostly characterized by the absence of war and killing and that the "killer instinct" is mostly a myth used to justify killing throughout the 5,000 years that followed the prehistorical era of mostly nonkilling tribes and societies. In fact, John Zerzan (2005-6), in "The Origins of War," claims that, based on the archeological evidence, "it is now a tenet of mainstream scholarship that pre-civilization humans lived in the absence of violence—more specifically, of organized violence." Zerzan (2005-6) then goes on to reference a number of anthropologists whose interpretation of the evidence challenges and overturns previous anthropological scholarship, blinded by the Hobbesian framework for interpretation, to instead propose a new, mostly nonkilling perspective on prehistoric man. This new perspective is promising, for it bolsters the claim that it is indeed possible to conceive of and realize a nonkilling world, and through the evolution of consciousness during the past five thousand years, especially considering more

[4] Private email correspondence.

recent nonkilling historical sources (as recounted by Paige, 2009), perhaps a transformation toward a new, stable, nonkilling era is now possible.

Such is the thesis of David C. Korten in *The Great Turning: from Empire to Earth Community*. Like Shlain, Korten (2006) also believes that the relatively peaceful and nonkilling era of prehistoric tribes and societies holds clues that can help form the image of and blueprint for a new, nonkilling era in the transition from "Empire" to "Earth Community." As Korten (2006) relates, "'One of the best kept historical secrets is that practically all of the material and social technologies fundamental to civilization were developed before the imposition of a dominator society"' (p. 94). The foundations of complex social organization had been laid through the development of the institutions of law, government, and religion; also, the arts of dance, pottery, "… basket making, textile weaving, leather crafting, metallurgy, ritual drama, architecture, town planning, boat building, highway construction, and oral literature" had been cultivated (Korten, 2006: 94).

However, according to Korten (2006), what is also remarkable about these early societies is the relatively "egalitarian nature of their social structures," a critical dimension that gender-biased anthropologists and historians had often neglected. As Korten (2006) writes, recognizing the distinctive role "… of women in the initial humanization of the species, we can more easily understand the enormous cost to our humanity of five thousand years of imperial repression of women, the importance of gender balance, and the essential role of women leaders in birthing Earth Community" (p. 94). Moreover, "as best we can determine," continues Korten (2006), early humans were "… relatively undifferentiated by occupation, status, or power…. Burial practices and the generally uniform size and design of houses further suggested generally egalitarian societies with little of the differentiation by class, race, and gender that is characteristic of the societies that followed. The varied artworks of these Neolithic civilizations support a similar conclusion. There are no scenes of battles, images of noble warriors and wrathful gods, nor depictions of conquerors dragging captives in chains" (p. 97-8).

Korten (2006) writes that this nonkilling era prior to the emergence of the five thousand years of Empire may have been much longer than two or three thousand years—that its origin can be traced to the end of the Ice Age 11,000 years ago, which makes it comparable to the 5,000 year era of Empire. The contrast is stark; during this comparable era, the emphasis in the "Goddess societies was on the development and application of technologies that nurture life. Humans were expected to enter into partnership with the productive processes of nature, an activity for which women—the life givers of the

human species—were presumed to have special affinity" (Korten, 2006: 98). Of course, one should guard against sweeping generalizations that tend to idealize the past, and Eisler's research has received considerable criticism; nevertheless, as Korten (2006: 99) points out, our concern here is "… not whether women-led societies are always more peaceful and egalitarian than male-led societies, but merely to note the evidence of the rich variety of the early human experience, which included peaceful, egalitarian, highly accomplished societies in which women had strong leadership roles".

According to Korten (2006), the transition from a largely peaceful, settled, egalitarian, nonkilling world, based on generative partnership power relations associated with the feminine, to the era of Empire, associated with violent male sky gods, warrior cultures, social institutions based on the pursuit of power, domination, and technologies of destruction, came about through the division between settled agriculturalists and nomadic pastoralist tribes who sought to improve themselves through the development of more effective technologies of destruction rather than technologies of production. (p. 100) The nomadic pastoralists' focus on developing better and better weapons eventually gave them "an advantage in subsequent combat with the more prosperous agriculturalists, whose lands and labor they eventually appropriated through conquest" (id.). Thus began what

> Eisler calls 'a bloody five-thousand-year domination detour.' As the pre-Empire societies honored the power to give life, so later societies honored the power to take life. Kings and emperors bolstered their demands for obedience with claims of personal divinity or divine appointment. Angry male gods representing dominator power displaced the female and male gods representing generative power. Priestesses were gradually stripped of power and replaced by priests. Wives became the chattel of their husbands. The poor became the servants of the rich. The regenerative power of the Spirit gave way to the dominator power of the sword. Humans came to mistake dominance for potency, domination displaced partnership as the organizing principle of society, and the era of Empire was born (Korten, 2006 100-1).

Moreover, Korten (2006) notes a "striking change in the pattern of distribution" as conquered societies entered into this new era. Whereas in previous times pre-Empire societies focused primarily on improving the overall standard of living, one chief characteristic of Empire societies is that they are hierarchical, with "men at the top" appropriating the "bulk of the wealth and power," while their subjects are forced to make-do with the trickle-down crumbs falling from their tables. Those who achieved "… their positions of power by destroying and appropriating the wealth of conquered peoples continued their

established pattern of appropriation, distributing the spoils among those who faithfully served them—a pattern that remains familiar to this day" (p. 101).

Sifting through the archeological evidence, Shlain and Korten piece together a convincing picture of a largely nonkilling world during the era prior to that of Empire. Though some may question the interpretation of this evidence or whether it is conclusive; nevertheless, one should recognize that such objections often come from narratives that are also ideologically-based, focusing on exceptions to the rule rather than challenging the consistent pieces of the puzzle, which fit together to form the overall, compelling image of a mostly nonkilling world—in stark contrast to the image of five thousand years of blood-filled history that mainstream anthropological and historical narratives in the past supported and justified. More importantly, this image of a nonkilling prehistorical past bolsters support for the image of a nonkilling future by providing a prototype of an era comparable to that of Empire; this new narrative also tells the story of what went wrong—the "detour" into Empire. This "detour" has only accelerated in the modern, technological era, as killing and war have became an accepted "reality of life" and the "price that has to be paid" in the name of "progress" and the "March of Civilization."

The Modern Image of the Future as the "Technological Society"

In the modern era, we discover the culmination of 5,000 years of successive empires that have legitimized violence and killing as a means of territorial expansion, domination, and social control. So, the modern consciousness is one that has evolved from this foundation by accepted killing as the price of the "good life" that modernity brings through the advances of science and technology. In fact, one could very well say that the modern image of the future is that of the technological society. If this is indeed the guiding vision of the modern future, then the question of the position of the technological society toward killing is critical. In other words, is the technological society "neutral" when it comes to killing, as some contend, or is killing fundamental to its modus operandi?

According to Jacques Ellul (1964), in his classic study on the technological society, the notion that "technique" is neutral is "naïve" and "useless" because it doesn't really understand the dynamic, autonomous, self-augmented, monistic, universal nature of technique in the modern era. The pursuit of technique has come to define the modern image of the future, subsuming everything else in its path. Hence, throughout modern history, as wars of conquest spread all over the world, vanquished peoples were

filled with such a mixture of admiration and fear that they adopted the conquerors' machines, which "came to replace their gods" (Ellul, 1964: 118). The machine became the supreme symbol of power since, at the same time, it posed "the possible means for liberation from these conquerors" (p. 118). It's not as if the vanquished peoples had a choice in the matter; they could either embrace the machine as the means of liberation or face extinction. In other words, they had to embrace the killing power of the machine or else be exterminated by it if they refused.[5] This led to the birth of the arms race, and all "the instruments of power began to flourish as a means of provoking insurrection"; moreover, to the degree that "… these peoples became better organized and technicized, rebellion became a national affair….War provokes the sudden and stupefying adaptation of the 'savage' to machinery and discipline" (Ellul, 1964: 118).

This process of assimilation through advances in the techniques of war is the ritual of initiation into the vicious killing cycle of modern civilization, which cultivates a machine-like consciousness that seems to transcend the moral concepts of "good" and "evil" in favor of that which is most efficient instead—as the "means" become an "end" in itself, and the war industry increasingly attains a permanent status and feature of technical civilization. Ellul (1964: 142) presents a convincing argument that humankind does not master technique for either "good" or "evil"; rather, technique is the master, whose modern image of the future is the image of the machine, impervious to moral judgment. Technique does not accept the "… existence of rules outside itself, or of any norm. Still less will it accept any judgment upon it. As a consequence, no matter where it penetrates, what it does is permitted, lawful, justified."

Some may object and contend that technique can be transformed and wielded for only good purposes, as if the "end" of technique is human good. However, as he elaborates on the autonomous nature of technique, Ellul (1964) argues that this view is wrongheaded, for technique is totally "irrelevant" to the notion of human good; instead, it evolves in "… a purely causal way: the combination of preceding elements furnishes the new technical elements. There is no purpose or plan that is progressively realized. There is not even a tendency toward human ends. We are dealing with a phenomenon blind to the future, in a domain of integral causality." (p. 97-8)[6]

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[5] As the American writer and environmentalist Derrick Jensen (2006) puts it, "So, given the choice between Christianity or death, slavery or death, civilization or death, is it any wonder that at least some do not choose to die?"

[6] Ellul (1964: 97-98) elaborates on the nature of technique by reasoning thus:

For example, let's take a look at the technical process involved in the invention of the atom bomb. As Ellul (1964: 99) explains, the fact that the atom bomb was created

> before the atomic engine was not essentially the result of the perversity of technical men. Nor was it solely the attitude of the state which determined this order. The action of the state was certainly the deciding factor in atomic research….Research was greatly accelerated by the necessities of war and consequently directed toward a bomb. If the state had not been oriented toward the ends of war, it would not have devoted so much money to atomic research. All this caused an undeniable factor of orientation to intervene.

As Ellul (1964) concludes, if the state had not supported this effort, no atomic research would have been conducted in the first place, so no question of the peaceful use of nuclear energy would have been posed. Therefore, continues Ellul (1964: 99), the atomic bomb is a

> transitory, but unfortunately necessary, stage in the general evolution of this technique. In the interim period represented by the bomb, the possessor, finding himself with so powerful an instrument, is led to use it. Why? Because everything which is technique is necessarily used as soon as it is available, without distinction of good or evil. This is the principal law of our age. We may quote here Jacques Soustelle's well-known remark of May, 1960, in reference to the atomic bomb…. 'Since it was possible, it was necessary.'

This "principal law of our age," which defines our civilization through its image of the future, as being a *technical civilization*, is what is of concern here regarding the image of a nonkilling future. In Ellul's words, *technical civilization* means that "our civilization is constructed *by* technique (makes a part of civilization only what belongs to technique), *for* technique (in that everything in this civilization must serve a technical end), and *is* exclusively technique (in that it excludes whatever is not technique or reduces it to technical form)"

> Hence, to pose arbitrarily some goal or other, to propose a direction of technique, is to deny technique and divest it of its character and its strength….To say of such a technical means that a bad use has been made of it is to say that no technical use has been made of it, that it has not been made to yield what it could have yielded and ought to have yielded. The driver who uses his automobile carelessly makes a bad use of it. Such use, incidentally, has nothing to do with the use which moralists wish to ascribe to technique. Technique *is* a use. Moralists wish to apply another use, with other criteria. What they wish, to be precise, is that technique no longer be technique….There is no difference at all between technique and its use. The individual is faced with an exclusive choice, either to use the technique as it should be used according to the technical rules, or not to use it at all. It is impossible to use it otherwise than according to the technical rules.

(1964: 128). This involves an "inversion" that distinctively marks the modern era. As Ellul notes, without exception, in the course of history,

> *technique belonged to a civilization* and was merely a single element among a host of nontechnical activities. Today *technique has taken over the whole of civilization*. Certainly, technique is no longer the simple machine substitute for human labor. It has come to be the 'intervention into the very substance not only of the inorganic but also of the organic' (1964: 128).

That's why today we find that nuclear weapons, the supreme symbol of the power to kill, have increasingly attained an autonomous nature. In other words, nuclear weapons systems have evolved out of human hands as they have become more computerized with automated alerts in place in the event of a nuclear attack. Once an attack begins, whether by accident, "glitch," or intentional, the system responds automatically, while the possibilities for human intervention have become increasingly less and less.[7] In this "decisive evolution," we should be warned of the grave, fatal consequences; consider Ellul's (1964: 93) insight on the autonomous nature of the evolution of technical systems, in which humans do not play a part.

> Technical elements combine among themselves, and they do so more and more spontaneously. In the future, man will apparently be confined to the role of a recording device; he will note the effects of techniques upon one another, and register the results.

The problem with this scenario, of course, is when, for one reason or another, a "glitch" in the complex, automated, nuclear weapons system causes its responses to spin out of control—erupting into global nuclear holocaust.

Under such conditions, the prospects for a nonkilling world are no longer a matter for humans to even consider; it is out of the question since no longer do humans have a say about killing or nonkilling. This is the very nature of the technological society within technical civilization; increasingly, in the interests of technical efficiency, the decision-making process has been taken out of human hands and placed under the jurisdiction of the machine, which does not conform to the norms of human morality or judgment, whose only interest is the interest of efficiency, transforming everything, including human life, into means. Ellul (1964: 146-7) asks a rhetorical question, which still reverberates almost 50 years later:

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[7] For more on scenarios of nuclear war, see Morgan (2009).

> The tool enables man to conquer. But, man, dost thou not know there is no more victory which is thy victory? The victory of our days belongs to the tool. The tool alone has the power and carries off the victory….The individual obeys and no longer has victory which is his own. He cannot have access to his apparent triumphs except by becoming himself the object of technique and the offspring of the mating of man and machine.

The Image of a Nonkilling Future as a Reflection of Postmodern Consciousness

Since modern civilization is defined by its image of the future as the technological society, it cannot conceive of a nonkilling future, for the killing machine of technical efficiency stands outside of human morality and judgment and thus has no regard for human life if such life attempts to resist assimilation into the technological society. Its logic is the logic of social-Darwinism, which rationalizes and justifies killing as ever-so-natural in the course of evolution. Furthermore, the distinction between "peaceful industry and military industry is no longer possible," for every industry, every "technique, however humane its intentions, has military value" (Ellul, 1964: 110-1). Even nature itself is under attack by the artificial environment, which destroys, "… eliminates, or subordinates the natural world, and does not allow this world to restore itself or even to enter into a symbiotic relation with it. The two worlds obey different imperatives, different directives, and different laws which have nothing in common….When we succeed in producing artificial *aurorae boreales*, night will disappear and perpetual day will reign over the planet" (Ellul, 1964: 79).

Once we understand this driving force and modus operandi of the modern image of the future, we realize that it is impossible to consider a nonkilling image of the future from within the modern consciousness and paradigm. That is the precise reason why the 20 American political scientists interviewed by Dr. Paige *could not even conceive* of a nonkilling world. It simply did not conform to their worldview, which is but a product of the technical civilization—a machine-like consciousness that has been fully technicized.

So, if a nonkilling image of the future cannot appear from within the modern consciousness, from whence does it originate? I propose that this image of the future springs from a *postmodern* rather than modern consciousness, for it is only within the postmodern consciousness that critiques of and alternatives to the modern paradigm can be considered. Yet, at the same time, one should understand that the postmodern consciousness has its historic origins within modernism, even as it is a reaction to modernism.

Though its literal meaning is "after" or "beyond" modernism, its sources are often from the Romantics, anarchists, existentialists, humanists, and spiritual philosophers who have resisted and critiqued the modern paradigm, especially its image of the future as the technological society.

Every stage of consciousness contains its own pathologies as well as the seeds for its own transcendence, often in the form of critique; hence, the modern consciousness provided the basis for its own critique and transcendence in the form of postmodernism – the emergence of a new stage of consciousness *out of* modernism, which transcends the technical civilization paradigm to provide the basis for alternative images of the future to emerge, such as the image of a nonkilling future. It is an alternative future for a civilization that has become alienated and desensitized by the modern image of the future as the technological society.

However, the postmodern image of a nonkilling future is in a minority position since perhaps only 5% (if that) of the population has evolved into postmodern consciousness[8], which is characterized by universal pluralism/ multiculturalism / holism; the dignity of the individual; subjective truth; New Age spirituality; alternative medicine and therapy; sensitivity to the repressed, marginalized, and exploited; support of authentic, direct democracy; progressive politics; social activism; planetary awareness and global consciousness; environmental/ecological conservation/sustainability/restoration; rejection of scientism, materialism, reductionism, utilitarianism, and technical rationality; recognition of the pathologies of modernism; sensitivity to feminine, intuitive, and "right brain" ways of knowing; opposition to militarism, imperialism, corporatism, and capitalism; anti-globalization / pro-localism; anti-war; civil disobedience; peace studies and the principles of nonviolent conflict resolution and social interaction; and a refusal to accept the metaphor of the machine as the dominant metaphor in its vision of the future.[9]

As was stated, the postmodern consciousness sprang from within the soil of the modern consciousness. That's why many aspects of postmodern consciousness can be also located within the Enlightenment ideals of modernity; nevertheless, postmodern consciousness also recognizes the pathologies of modernity, which betrays itself through its inherent contradictions. For example, even though the ideal of democracy is an expression of

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[8] In this description of the postmodern consciousness, I am mostly referring to the "affirmative postmodernists" rather than the "skeptical postmodernists," a useful distinction made by P. Rosenau (1992).

[9] See McIntosh (2007) for more on the description of postmodern consciousness.

modern consciousness, at the same time, modernity embraces the capitalist economic system and industrial civilization, which is essentially antithetical to democracy. As a matter of fact, capitalism works quite well with slavery, which can be found throughout the modern era, principally in the form of wage slavery. In this case, the value and dignity of the individual is compromised in favor of the "freedom" of capitalism to expand, monopolize, and dominate with machine-like efficiency. The individual is given an ultimatum to accept this compromise and become a cog in the machine or else die; resistance is futile. The slow-killing global economic machine grinding away at the billions who live on less than $2 a day represents one of the pathologies of modern consciousness that postmodernism rejects.

Postmodern consciousness also rejects outright killing and violence (or the threat thereof) of militarism, which upholds, maintains, and advances the ruling interests of the hierarchal, authoritarian power elite of Empire, who use democratic ideology and rhetoric through its lapdog and mouth organ, the corporate media, to manufacture consent of the masses and thus legitimize its rule. Of course, this corporatocracy would rather use soft power ("smiley-faced fascism") than outright violence to maintain its rule, but the threat of violence is always present in case soft power doesn't work. For the corporatocracy, democracy is just a sophisticated shell game by which it can manage the masses more effectively than outright violence, but if one were to call its bluff, putting it to test by opening the curtains to expose the corporate wizard pulling all the strings, then the violent nature of its rule would surely reveal itself for what it is. Hence, disillusioned postmodernists are reluctant to participate in mainstream elections. If they do, they vote for marginalized third party candidates who do not have a chance of being elected; otherwise, they don't vote at all.

The realization of a nonkilling future is at once a local and global effort within postmodern consciousness. Both efforts are interlinked so that success in one level automatically impacts success in the other. Local activism represents pockets of resistance to "politics as usual" and to dependency on Global Empire and its rule by the power elite of the corporatocracy; on the other hand, postmodern global activism networks these pockets of resistance to form a movement of the rising multitude[10] toward authentic global democracy, with its image of the future being that of Earth Community, for it is only when Global Empire has been transformed into Earth Community can the image of a nonkilling future be realized.

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[10] See Hardt and Negri (2004).

These pockets of resistance began in the 1960s through the advent of localized organic farming communities, who were founded on the principles of nonviolence and who strove to be completely nondependent on the global economy. For example, one such self-sustainable organic farming community is that of "permaculture," which is the art and science "of designing human beings' place in the environment." Moreover, permaculture teaches how "to understand and mirror the patterns found in healthy natural environments" so that one can then "build profitable, productive, sustainable, cultivated ecosystems" that can include people, and "have the diversity, stability, and resilience of natural ecosystems."[11]

Such movements like permaculture represent the nucleus of the postmodern image of a nonkilling future, for it is only when humans learn to live in harmony with their environment and each other can the principles of nonviolence be activated in a very real way. In such an environment, killing becomes unthinkable. However, these independent "pockets of resistance" need to link up with others globally to form Earth Community. In this case, it is not necessary to completely abandon technology, since technology has always been an aspect of human societies and evolution. It's just that, as it was in pre-modern times, technology will be only one feature among many in Earth Community, and under the strict scrutiny of sustainability, made to benefit the whole of humankind—as a servant rather than an organizing, autonomous principle and ends in itself.

Now, let's examine what the image of a nonkilling future would look like within the context of Earth

Community. As Korten (2006: 295) writes, the turning from "Empire to Earth Community has

> two primary elements. First is a turning from money to life as our defining value. Second is a turning from relations of domination to relations of partnership based on organizing principles discerned from the study of healthy living systems.

Immediately one recognizes that when *life* itself becomes our defining value, and relations of domination are replaced by relations of partnership, based on principles of healthy *living* systems, then the underlying paradigm

[11] See Morgan (2010) for more on the role of the efforts of localized organic farming communities like permaculture to realize a new culture and alternative paradigm that is not dependent on and in opposition to Global Empire

in which killing emerges has been transformed into a paradigm in which killing is unthinkable.

Then, if we apply this supreme value of life paradigm based on healthy living principles to daily interactions within postmodern society, what image of life can we envision? Here are some features, as described by Korten (2006: 295-6):

- Locally rooted, self-organized, compact communities
    - Work, shopping, and recreation nearer to residences
        - Saves energy and commuting time
        - Frees up more time for family and community
          (Less fragmented and thus more coherent living; Community bonds denser, stronger, and more trusting; Youth more engaged in community life)
    - Less dependency on automobiles
        - Reduces CO2 emissions and dependence on oil
        - Land devoted to roads and parking converted to bike lanes, trails, and parks
    - Local governance more authentically democratic
- More food grown on family farms
    - No toxic chemicals
    - Processed nearby, saving transportation costs
    - Compost organic wastes recycled back into the soil
- Environmentally efficient buildings
    - Designed for specific micro-environments
    - Constructed by local materials, thus saving transportation costs
- Energy mostly produced through wind and solar sources
- Education philosophy and school curriculum redesigned to include vital life skills: developmental psychology; responsible citizenship; parenting skills; application of life skills through community service and mentoring of younger children.
- Elders upheld as caretakers, educators, mentors, and wise advisors
    - Restoration of respect and honor of elders
    - Elders more unlikely to suffer from longing for or fear of death
    - Elders serve as models to guide potential of the youth
    - Elders act as guides to individual and community futures

Korten's image of Earth Community is just a preliminary sketch that can certainly be fleshed out more to include how localism interacts within a larger framework, which includes the state, the nation, and the world. For example, while Korten does advocate the break-up of large corporations, he doesn't seem to be as ready to advocate the break-up of the nation-state or at least large nations, yet authentic, functional democracy dwindles

in proportion to the expansion of the nation-state and Global Empire. In other words, how do all the pieces fit together to form the global picture of functional democracy at each level to transition from Empire to Earth Community? Moreover, while direct democracy is achievable at a local level, is it possible to initiate direct democracy at the state, national, and global levels? If so, should representational democracy be scrapped, or can it still play a positive role if separated from financial influences?

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to answer these questions, which would help to flesh out the image of Earth Community as the new paradigm in a postmodern world, it is important to note that since the image of a nonkilling future can only be realized on the foundation of postmodern consciousness, as manifested through the paradigm of Earth Community, then questions concerning the functionality of democracy in larger contexts are also quite relevant. In other words, the image of a nonkilling future cannot be separated and treated as if it were a thing-in-itself, disconnected from social change in general, especially when you consider that the solution to the problem of killing cannot be resolved within the same framework that produced it; thus, it's a matter of changing the framework from which killing emerges. From this perspective, the frustrations that people feel as a result of disenfranchisement, of alienation and disempowerment, because the system itself is merely a democratic farce to legitimize authoritarianism by corporate soft power, as a form of smiley-faced fascism, then these frustrations can easily boil over and erupt into violence and killing in reaction. Furthermore, such reactions are viewed as pathological by those at the top of the hierarchy only because they are perceived as threats to the social order, while the violence and killing perpetrated by the power elite are justified as necessary to maintain the social order; thus, violence that preserves the social and global order is permitted and rationalized while individual violence out of frustration, repression, or defiance by those who are lower in the pecking order is considered as a "pathological" threat to the hierarchy of power. This hypocrisy itself only leads to further frustration that perpetrates the cycle of violence and killing. Therefore, once the problem of functional democracy is addressed in a way that people are enabled and empowered to make meaningful contributions to society, then this will also help to alleviate the problem of violence and killing.

Conclusion

As Toynbee (1947) pointed out, the "creative minority" has the historic responsibility to recognize and lead the responses to meet the challenges that face a civilization; otherwise, that civilization will perish. The modern image of the future as the technological civilization has fatal, structural flaws that cannot be fixed within the same framework that produced these flaws; instead, a new, wiser conceptual framework must be realized by the creative minority during the time of crisis, or better yet, through the exercise of clear foresight, in anticipation of the crisis. The time of crisis has already appeared on the horizon. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1992: 76) puts it, this is not just a "difficult period," since if the difficulty can be resolved in some way, it does not constitute a real crisis: "True crises are those difficulties that cannot be resolved within the framework of the system, but instead can only be overcome by going outside of and beyond the historical system of which the difficulties are a part".

More than 5,000 years ago, for a time period of at least two thousand years, and perhaps thousands of years more—from the end of the Ice Age until the age of Empire—much of the world was composed of mostly peaceful, nonkilling, horticultural societies. However, while the horticultural societies had turned their swords into plowshares, some nomadic tribes perfected their weapons (their "instruments of mass destruction") until they were able to successfully wipe out the communities of peace. Thus even the very beginning of the era of Empire was initiated through the advent of new techniques of war and weapons designed for the express purpose of killing in order to conquer, destroy, dominate, and enslave others, and such has been the story of empire after empire throughout the past 5,000 years. But now, as Korten relates, it's time to change the story, for the world faces a critical juncture, a very real "crisis," of weapons of mass destruction that possess the lethality to kill millions, in which it must ask itself whether or not the age of Empire *must* come to an end—to usher in instead the age of a peaceful, nonkilling Earth Community.

The image of a nonkilling future has a strong case to make based on anthropological and historical precedents, as well as current sociological research. Paige and others who have contributed to the conceptualizations of a nonkilling world can surely be said to be doing the good work of Toynbee's "creative minority" to help lead the way to realize a future in which the dominant metaphor is the sanctity of human life rather than the power of the killing machine. The question now is whether the creative minority will have enough influence to play a timely leadership role in the shift of consciousness toward the realization of this new image of a nonkilling future.

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Chapter Two

Living with Ambiguity, Risk, and Responsibility

Ethics and Agency in a Nonkilling Future

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How might a modern, contemporary society transform from killing to nonkilling? The following examines what is involved in a paradigm shift from supporting and advocating killing to supporting and advocating nonkilling. The study operates from a simple assumption: killing ends conversation, social interaction, and the possibility of learning from the one who is killed. It will be argued that ambiguity and risk are inherent, irresolvable and healthy aspects of human flourishing in the contemporary world. In terms of resistance: does it matter if insurgencies utilize nonkilling verses killing tactics? No blueprint currently exists for transforming into nonkilling societies because the future is open and underdetermined, but a few guidelines do exist. Advocates for nonkilling can proceed from moral /or pragmatic arguments. The following will examine inherent epistemological issues that arise from the human condition that support the moral decision not to kill and provide details necessary for the human conditions that lead towards a nonkilling future. The final section addresses pragmatic support for nonkilling. Two seemingly mundane assertions are made: first, killing ends the possibility of learning from the one who is killed; second, the process of nonkilling insurgency is more effective than a killing insurgency because nonkilling principles and behaviors build the intended outcome in the process of contention. Since human history is indeterminate, causal predictions are problematic. However, amidst the ambiguity and risk involved in human social life, the blooming of such events as the Arab Spring will give the world greater insights into nonkilling political contention. Support for nonlethality is rooted in the inherent ambiguity, judgment and risk involved in postmodernity and in problem solving generally. We still have much to learn and current events will increase our knowledge of the role of nonlethality in positive social transformation. John Burton's "problem solving" provides some guidance.

Introduction

The world is observing, at the time of this writing, in Tunisia, Egypt and beyond, what many are calling nonviolent social revolutions. These revolutions are taking place with active contentious strategies that rely on nonkilling tactics, and regimes that have stood strong in the Arab world are crumbling. The relatively small amount of violence and killing has been committed by the state, not the protestors. Arizona Republican Senator John McCain said after talks with Arab League chief Amr Moussa: "This revolution has shown the people of the world, not just in the Arab world, that peaceful change can come about and violence and extremism is not required in order to achieve democracy and freedom." In summary, "The explosion of joy in Tahrir Square at that moment signaled a victory for the protesters and a historic moment for Egypt, the region, and even the world. In a larger context, however, Friday 11 February 2011 also represents only "the end of the beginning." Two fundamental issues are recognized: first, large scale socio-political change is possible without resorting to killing if people mobilize nonviolently; and, second, this represents the beginning of a long process towards further self-governing, or what Robert Dahl refers to as what comes *After the Revolution* ([1970] 1990). Does it really matter which form of contention is utilized?

Acknowledging both traditional and nontraditional forms of warfare, the prevailing view among many scholars of contentious politics debate which forms of traditional and nontraditional forms of lethality are most effective (Abrahms, 2006; Byman and Waxman, 2000; Drury, 1998; Lyall and Wilson, 2009; Pape, 2005; Stoker, 2007). Implicit in many of the assessments among security scholars is the assumption that the most forceful, effective means of waging political struggle entails the use or threat of lethality. In fact, most scholarship concentrates on the effectiveness of military force, without comparing it to other, nonlethal, alternative forms of power (Brooks, 2003; Desch, 2008; Johnson and Tierney, 2006). These scholars often assume that lethality is effective, but compared with what? Nonetheless, the following will argue that insurgencies characterized by nonkilling strategies and tactics reap far better results than insurgencies that rely on killing. This is further developed.

Despite the assumptions of many security experts (Collins, 2010), in recent years organized civilian populations have successfully utilized nonlethal strategies to challenge entrenched political power. In a newly released empirical study of 323 lethal and nonlethal contentious campaigns between 1900 and 2006, Chenoweth and Stephan report the "most striking finding is that between 1900 and 2006, nonviolent resistance campaigns were nearly

twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts" (2011: 7). From this data that catalogued, compared and analyzed all known cases of substantial armed and unarmed insurrections, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that nonlethal resistance and movements have been strategically superior to lethal resistance during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Their study builds on Ivan Arreguin-Tofts earlier findings, in *How the Weak Win Wars* (2001), that nonconventional tactics, especially nonlethality, are more effective against a militarily superior opponent.

Beyond, or after, revolution what is required for a nonkilling society? More specifically, what is required from individuals, *from you and me*, in a nonkilling society? What are the individual character traits and behaviors and what social actions are involved in creating and sustaining a nonkilling society? The following will address these questions from a theoretical viewpoint to further Glenn Paige's call "to create basic and applied theory that will guide transition from conditions of political violence to nonviolent alternatives" (Paige, 1980: 105).

This chapter begins by describing a social ontology adequate for the contemporary world. The next section defines four different types of nonkilling. Then, the chapter examines both cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of individual agency, and draws upon Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration and Max Weber's essay "Politics as a Vocation" to develop a *conceptual framework* for ethics and agency that manifest in social actions required to both transform to a nonkilling society and also to sustain a nonkilling society. The focus of this chapter is on the relationships between people, not the relationship between states and citizens. As such, this writing is located in the positive peace tradition (Galtung, 2008). The following will argue that moving and sustaining a nonkilling society requires that *individuals* are engaged in civil and responsible attitudes and behaviors towards others.

The Nation-State or the Citizen?

To begin, what should be the relationship between the individual and the state? Several debates are prevalent in discussions about the citizen and the modern nation state. One debate is the perennial political science question as to the relation between the individual and the collective. This conversation is carried in philosophy as the debate between liberals and communitarians—the right or the good. In contemporary social sciences the discussion is between agency and structure. Though oriented by the same perennial questions, the questions are modified in international law and social justice.

The language of human rights, rather than state sovereignty, now dominates international law and the language of satisfying needs dominates social justice (for example, see Donnelly, 2003; Forsythe, 2000; Ignatieff, 2001; Paul, Miller and Paul, 2002; Burton, 1990; and Evans Pim, 2010).

The implicit question behind rights and needs is who bears the counterpart obligations or responsibilities to deliver on those rights. Or, said more succinctly, "Who must do what for whom?" Onora O'Neill (1996) reminds us that most contemporary approaches to rights and the satisfaction of human needs assume that *states* are the primary agents and view all other agents as secondary in accountability. The main problem with a state-centric approach to the delivery of human needs is that it unburdens the private individual agent from responsibility (Pogge, 2005). If the state-centric approach is accepted, then private individuals are basically free to pursue their own interests, with their primary moral responsibility simply to elect state leaders who pursue policies that work towards fulfilling human rights and needs.

What is the case if private individuals have responsibilities that exceed a strictly state-centric approach? It matters greatly whether needs and rights are postulated as negative duties (not to coerce others) or whether existing human needs and rights may impose positive obligations and responsibilities (to protect and/or aid) that go beyond the institutions of the state. This is not to suggest that how states relate to their citizens is irrelevant; rather, it is to argue that how individuals engage and interact with others is important.

These are difficult questions and propositions. Without lessening the importance of rights and needs, this chapter will explore the possibility that persons have *responsibilities* as well as rights and needs. The following will examine one way of addressing the behaviors of individuals interacting with other individuals by referring to a general discussion of the topics of moral character and virtue within the branch of philosophical thought termed ethics. Briefly, to do ethics is to focus on the nature of virtue—admirable moral character—and the process or means of how one attains virtue, and what relationships, communities and/or institutions may be required to promote moral character and virtue. If a nonkilling society relies on the virtue of nonkilling, what might this look like?

The following sections explore these difficult questions in terms of a future *nonkilling* society. M.K. Gandhi and historian of science Stephen Shapin provide the basis for further exploration into the epistemological and behavioral aspects animating the ethics and virtues of nonkilling. Max Weber then expands the individualist ethics and virtue into a socially appropriate posture with the "ethics of responsibility" that address the social aspects and consequences of individual action. For the purposes here, nonviolence

and nonkilling are generally blended together because the emphasis here is upon individual and social ethics—relations between people. Nonkilling may be a limited form of nonviolence, and, as will become more clear, provides a direct reference to behavior—*though shalt not kill*—and is less ambiguous than "nonviolence". However, once we appreciate the broader perspective of nonviolence, nonkilling becomes more reasonable and possible (Paige, 2001). Stephen Carter's understanding and use of "civility" provides insights into what a nonkilling future entails.

Four Types of Nonkilling

Advocates for nonkilling societies can promote nonkilling on behalf of *moral* or *pragmatic* grounds—nonkilling is the morally superior to killing or that nonkilling contention is more effective than lethal contention. A question to be clarified is what exactly is meant by nonkilling and when this should happen. Examining another nonlethal tradition—pacifism—helps to define the issues and the parameters and possible variations in defining nonkilling. Pacifism is commonly understood in a negative form as "nonresistance": refusing war, killing, and overt forms of violence. Nonkilling and pacifism are similar outlooks. The most notable distinction is that nonkilling, arguably, more overtly challenges the legitimacy of killing and the reliance upon the (threat of) killing and seeks to directly confront political ideologies and systems that (threaten to) exercise lethal force.

The word *pacifism* is often mistaken for its homonym, *passivism*—inactive or submissive. The pacifist tradition is not a monolithic enterprise and, both in contemporary and historical contexts, contains variations on the general theme of nonkilling. Most generally, pacifism is the principled rejection of war, violence and killing. Amid some diversity of the usage of the term pacifism, pacifists hold generally that killing is wrong. However, while committed to nonkilling, advocates of pacifism include a variety of commitments on a continuum from an absolute commitment to nonviolence in all actions to a more focused or minimal sort of anti-warism. The discussion of war, violence and peace, in the West, is typically viewed on a continuum with pacifism at one extreme, realism at the other extreme, and the Just War tradition occupying a somewhat tenuous middle ground. Examining the variations in pacifism is instructive because it may help to discern the contours of possible debates about nonkilling and provide guidance towards a nonkilling futures paradigm (see Evans Pim, 2010). The following appropriates some of the primary discussions and categories of pacifism to elucidate different perspectives on nonkilling.

The first form of nonkilling—absolute—is most straightforward. The second and third forms of nonkilling present some interesting arguments and require justification. One way to approach the second and third forms of nonkilling described above—principled and classical—is to deal primarily with the epistemological issue of when is it possible to have (enough) certainty to permit killing under those stated conditions. This section will examine the cognitive dimensions of agency that might allow for the possibility of examining one's own assumptions, one's own frameworks, and a way to deal with cognitive uncertainty. This will be approached primarily through from the perspective of individual agency rather than broader social system and structural components. Without denying the importance of structural dimensions of social life, this section explores the individual's capability to change one's own beliefs and behaviors—the cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of agency.

The discussions of varieties of pacifism range from absolute, maximal and universal to contingent, minimal and particular. Both pacifism and nonkilling agree that war and lethality are generally very bad choices, either morally wrong or strategically ineffective and ultimately destructive for individuals and societies.

Absolute Nonkilling

Absolute nonkilling is a commitment that all forms of killing is always wrong, no exceptions. This is a form of moral absolutism that contends that lethality can never be justified, excused or legitimate under any circumstances, regardless of the consequences. This is a maximalist position that rejects any use of lethality, force and coercion even in self-defense, protecting the weak, and for purposes of humanitarian aid and intervention. These forms commonly reject capital punishment, abortion, and eating meat. From this perspective, nonkilling alternatives always exist. Though these alternatives may involve suffering and some sacrifice, they are typically too easily dismissed or remain underexplored. Those committed to nonkilling for religious reasons are typically absolute in their perspective.

Absolute nonkilling is universal in the belief that nonlethality applies to everyone, everywhere, and not just to particular individuals or communities. For the absolute position, any profession or way of life that employs or threatens lethality (for example, soldier or police officer) is inherently immoral. This most extreme form holds that killing and the threat of lethality is always wrong for everyone, no exceptions.

Principled Nonkilling

Principled nonkilling, like absolute nonkilling, is motivated by a rejection of lethality. Like the absolute position, the principled position does not consider relevant the context or consequences as motivations to the commitment to nonkilling. The principled position differs from the absolute position, however, in that the principled position is based on a personal or communal commitment to nonkilling and that exceptions to nonkilling may be permissible within certain contexts. Although committed to nonkilling, the choice is personal and/or communal and principled, therefore these adherents do not pass judgment on others who may resort to violence (such as soldiers and police officers). In this way, principled nonkilling may represent separate communities and professions who reject lethality, while at the same time refusing to condemn those who might threaten and use lethality. Mark Allman describes this claim: "I (we) believe that violence is wrong, but accept the right of others to use force, such as the state or those responsible for protecting the common good" (2008: 65). Principled nonkilling allows that some (threat of) lethality may be legitimate and warranted *for others*.

Classical Nonkilling

Classical nonkilling distinguishes between the threat and use of lethality by the police and by the military. While working to abolish war, this view grants legitimacy to properly sanctioned police. Classical nonkilling rejects war between the armies of nation-states, but may support military "police actions" whereby limited lethality is used for humanitarian interventions to curtail aggression, defend human rights, and so on. Though blurring the distinction between the police and the military, classical nonkilling grants legitimacy to specific emergency circumstances in which the military are used for the protection of the weak and oppressed. In this way, the threat and use of lethality by the state is permissible to correct injustice and challenge abuse of power. Accordingly, lethality may be permissible as an emergency ethic applied in extreme circumstances.

Pragmatic Nonkilling

Pragmatic nonkilling (discussed in further detail in section three below) is motivated especially by the consequences of actions. Pragmatic nonkilling is a strategic commitment that views (the threat of) lethality as counterproductive and essentially ineffective. Killing is rejected not because it is intrinsically wrong or immoral but because killing produces bad outcomes. While

allowing for the use of (the threat of) lethality, such as in exceptional cases when confronting a Hitler or a Stalin, Pragmatic nonkilling views nonkilling tactics, such as those employed by many nonviolent social movements, to be more effective in confronting the abuse of power and to have fewer negative consequences, such as continuing the spiral of lethality. The nonkilling alternative(s) are selected because they are believed to be the most practical means to subvert existing power and propel change. Pragmatic nonkilling strategies and tactics are chosen because they work best.

Without exhausting the range of possible variations, it becomes clear that nonkilling is not necessarily a monolithic enterprise and that gradations and variations probably exist between different nonkilling commitments. For example, some may object to killing in warfare while supporting lethality that may result from normal policing. Just as there are differences in approaches to war and peace, there are degrees of nonkilling. At times, some of the nonkilling approaches may conflict, such as absolute and classical nonkilling when confronted with a lethal large-scale humanitarian emergency brought about by the abuse of state power. However, these degrees of nonkilling can and do often overlap. At this point in the development of the nonkilling literature, it would be helpful for advocates of nonkilling generally to identify which type of nonkilling they support.

How this question is answered important because John Keane, in *Violence and Democracy* (2004), describes democratic states as having a complex and uneasy relationship with the use of violence and killing both within and outside their borders. Democracy, by his definition, is defined by the rejection of the use of lethality: "Democracy is the historically unique, never perfect bundle of non-violent power-sharing techniques" (2004: 9). However, "mature democracies", first, can never fully escape (the threat of) lethality *within* their territories and are forced to address the fact their institutions and processes may be inadequately formulated, at present, for ensuring that disagreement does not erupt into violence. Violent eruption, moreover, may foment and authorize the problematic exercise of the (threat of) use of lethality as an emergency measure to reinstate social order. Second, lethality *outside* the territorial border of a given democracy places democracies in the difficult position of either being a bystander to injustice or intervening with the possible use of lethality. Keane considers the contemporary world to be in a "triangle of violence" demarcated by, first, Western-dominated global military order, massive war economies and global arms trade; second, failed states, genocides and gross human rights violations committed by states and private citizens; and third, the threat posed by

global terrorism (2004: 27). We are caught, awkwardly, on the one hand, with the exercise of lethality by the state as the vehicle of democracy and justice and, on the other hand, that the use of (the threat of) lethality contradicts the spirit and substance of democracy (2004: 182).

Rather than focusing on the state and large-scale social systems and which form of nonkilling is most appropriate, the following section will address ethics and both the *cognitive* and *voluntarist* dimensions of individual agency. Ethics, generally, involves both how we think and formulate answers to difficult questions—the cognitive dimension—and what actions are employed—the voluntarist dimensions of agency. To be engaged in ethical deliberation and action is to exercise reflection, choice and power in the world. The orienting assumption of this approach is that individuals are not determined by sociohistorical circumstances but are always, to some degree, capable of "doing otherwise." Both the cognitive and the voluntarist dimensions of agency are embedded in and inform the social context. But first, we must begin with a social ontology adequate to the conditions of the contemporary world.

Social Ontology and the Contemporary World

What is a human being and how does the social world work? (See also, Barnes, 1995; Little, 1991; and, Sandole, 2011). The answers to these questions define our social ontology and include the assumptions we make. All individuals are social theorists with social ontologies, to some degree, and must be to navigate the social world. When Glenn Paige, and others, ask that we re-evaluate our assumptions, what is being asked is to reflect on the ways in which we believe the world operates and what we believe constitutes a human being. For example: are people inherently aggressive or cooperative; are individuals determined by their genes or do they have free will, and so on. Rarely do different individuals come to complete consensus on ways in which these questions are answered. We should therefore expect disagreement on these issues. Among one of these perennial questions is the relation of the individual to the collective. A multitude of perspectives have been offered. Social philosopher Anthony Giddens, rather than pursuing parsimonious approaches to social theory, actually commends the plurality of social theory:

> For it can plausibly be argued that chronic debates and persistent dissensus about how the study of human social conduct is to be approached express something about the very nature of human social conduct itself; that deeply established disagreements about the nature of human behaviour are integral to human behavior as such, and thus necessarily intrude into the heart of the discourse of philosophy and social theory (1979: 239).

The "very nature of human social conduct," for Giddens, involves connecting human action with structural explanation in social and political analysis. It is here that accounts can be more or less robust, more or less accurate. The following argument is based on the assumption that Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration is a more robust and more accurate account of human social ontology (Cohen, 1984; Brettell, 1990). Chronic debates mean that it will never be settled, therefore, we should be incredibly cautious about stopping dialogue.

Making the connection between human action and the structure of social life demands a theory of the human agent, an account of both the conditions and consequences of action, and an account of social structure as coterminous in both of those conditions and consequences (1979: 49). For Giddens, individuals have knowledge (with limits) of the social world and make assumptions and predictions about themselves, others and how the social world works. This is the double hermeneutic in social life: individuals are variously informed by and inform the social world in which they participate (Giddens, 1984). For Giddens, individuals are the product of culture and social structures, but they are not determined by them. It is better said that that structures are determined by the repetitions of ongoing human actions.

In summary, the first element outlined above is that of individual agents. Agents are *knowledgeable* to the extent that they are familiar with the rules of social life and knowledgability is *reflexive* in that it is situated within the continuities of social life and *recursive* in that every action by human agents (re)produces the structures which render those actions possible. In this way, human action is rational in that situations which define the contextual framework are drawn upon reflexively and are reproduced intentionally through processes of social interaction. At the same time, human social action is bounded by the *unacknowledged conditions of actions* and by *unintended consequences of action*. Rational and purposive social conduct includes the calculations between means and ends and human agents do navigate and reflect and pursue goals. At the same time, for Giddens, cognition is influenced by *stocks of knowledge* that actors have of themselves and the world around them and by *motivations for actions*—the wants which prompt action—which are included in the unacknowledged conditions of actions. Giddens refers to this as the stratification model. On one side, the model includes rationally calculated purposive action (rational-choice models) in which individuals can be knowledgeable of the conditions in which they are located, can change their motivations, and can adjust their actions (individuals can exercise their capacity to do otherwise). These points will be dis-

cussed in sections that follow in relation to an ethics of responsibility (Weber and Gandhi) and in relation to civility and virtue (Carter and Aristotle).

On the other side, the combination of the limits of "knowledgability," the possibility of skewed motivations, and the unintended consequences of historical irony place limits on the rational-purposive action. This limited rationality available to the individual means that the origin and outcomes of actions because they are reciprocally related to the social structures and perhaps to dimensions of the personality (such as the subconscious?) of which the individual may not be fully aware. For Giddens, this means that the individual does have knowledge of themselves and of the social world, and can and does make assessments accordingly. However, the individual, first, can never have full self-disclosure and, second, can never have awareness of the full social implication of their conduct.

The second component, for Giddens, is structure. Structure constitutes patterned and regulated relationships which "shape, channel, and facilitate by providing agents with the awareness of the practices, relations, and spacio-temporal settings they require in order to participate" in the routinization process (Cohen, 1989: 201). Social structure relates both to the constitution of meaning and to positive and negative sanctioning of modes of social conduct (Giddens, 1984: 18). Structure is, therefore, both rules and resources. Mediating between "objective" structures and "subjective" individuals, are social system(s) as both rules and resources organized as properties of regularized social practices. For Giddens, while lacking parsimony, the importance of a robust human social ontology is that:

> The structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which such systems grounded in the activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of action contexts are produced and reproduced in interaction (1984: 25).

Therefore, power, for Giddens, is a central feature of all the components of a social system and exists in all dimensions along the stratification model, from individual to social structures. Power relates to the capacities of resources that agents draw upon in achieving desired outcomes. Power is not fixed, but refers to the ability to act in the social world and to the sanctions (both positive and negative), provided by others and social structures, of social action. For Giddens, neither individuals nor structures are devoid of all power or monopolize all power. The constitution of society is accomplished through the conduct of knowledgeable agents but not under "conditions that

are wholly intended or wholly comprehended by them" and occur within social structures that sanction behaviors, "as both the medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize" (Giddens, 1984: 25).

For Giddens, the "duality of structure" places the individual firmly within the context of society, wherein individuals and structures are (re)constituting each other. This means that structural properties of social systems may be so deeply embedded in the actor's practical and discursive knowledge that they may reify specific social relations so as to "naturalize" what are in reality historically contingent conditions. At the same time, through practical and discursive actions, humans can challenge, destabilize and de-legitimize social orders and naturalized social practices and representations (Giddens, 1984).

The crucial insight in structuration theory is that individuals do have agency and do have the capability to both reflect and to intervene in affairs. This leads to the decidedly indeterminate nature of human social life. While based in routines and continuities, understanding social life from a social science perspective (unlike the natural sciences) is "both nonreductionist and non-deterministic, treating phenomena that are not only diverse and irregular, but intentional and complex" (Bohman, 1991: 6). Therefore, human social life is marked by ambiguity and risk. What implications does this have for the future based in nonkilling?

Ethics and Epistemological Issues: Paradigm Shifts and the Possibility of Fallibility

This section will address individual beliefs and perceptions and the possibility of changing those beliefs and perceptions—the cognitive dimensions of agency. A fundamental issue to be addressed is the possibility of the fallibility of perception and beliefs, which provide further justification for nonkilling. Stated bluntly, killing extinguishes the opportunity for further interaction. Can we have complete certainty that another human being must be killed?

Returning to the question—how might a modern, contemporary society transform from killing to nonkilling?—directs attention to the root of how we answer this question and the various assumptions and commitments that we hold about what motivates human beings and how the social world operates. These include our deepest beliefs about the nature of wo/man and the relation of individuals to collectives. As discussed in many of the previous volumes of this series published by the Center for Global Nonviolence, our beliefs vary, might be misguided, and can change. Much of Paige's work is devoted to directly challenging the assumptions about killing and the ease in which killing

is commonly granted legitimacy. Said another way, much of Paige's work is dedicated to the cognitive dimensions of agency. The cognitive dimensions of agency, discussed below, are constituted by two elements: the capacity for choosing and the capacity for reflection (Sandel, 1996: 151).

As Glenn Paige maintains, it is the possibility of directly killing human beings that supports all forms of nonlethal and pre-lethal violence (2005). Paige's nonkilling denies the act of the taking of another's life, and also supports continuous efforts in a broad range of fields—education, policy making, economics, institutional and social systems—to develop and promote alternatives to killing. As Pim succinctly recognizes, it is not simply the direct act of killing that is problematic, but all forms of beliefs, institutions and systems that divert resources for the (possible) goal of killing that are problematic (2010: 13). Challenging these assumptions that support killing is part of the enterprise of the nonkilling focus. Questioning the assumptions that support killing and the introduction of a new paradigm of nonkilling is the difficult yet necessary task that Glenn Paige proposes (see also Evans Pim, 2010).

Nonkilling provides a helpful alternative to lethality. Recall the types of nonkilling described above. The first form of nonkilling—absolute—is most straightforward. The second and third forms of nonkilling present some interesting arguments and require justification. One way to approach the second and third forms of nonkilling described above—principled and classical—is to deal primarily with the epistemological issue of when is it possible to have (enough) certainty to permit killing under those stated conditions. This section will examine the cognitive dimensions of agency that might allow for the possibility of examining one's own assumptions, one's own frameworks, and a way to deal with cognitive uncertainty. This will be approached primarily through from the perspective of individual agency rather than broader social system and structural components. Without denying the importance of structural dimensions of social life, this section explores the individual's capability to change one's own beliefs and behaviors—the cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of agency. The point of the following exercise is to develop an ethical orientation creating and sustaining a nonkilling society.

M. K. Gandhi's writings on nonlethality are especially informative here and cannot be fully understood without reference to epistemology and the virtue of Truth (*Satyagraha*). Gandhi prefers the term nonviolence, but for the purposes here it sufficiently overlaps with Paige's use of nonkilling. Nonviolence as a means to access Truth is clear in Gandhi's writings. Nonviolence as an epistemology—"that branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope, and general basis" (Honderich, 1995: 135)—is, for

Gandhi, a particular stance towards knowledge that serves to foster better understanding as well as better relationships (see also, Grimsrud, 2003).

For Gandhi life is an experiment with *Truth*. That is, as we seek truth, we enter a process of moving toward it—a process we never cease because we never fully arrive. Because of our finitude, we must always be learning from others, including our adversaries. Truth is too big, and we are each too limited, to think we may know the truth fully (see Bohman, 1991). So, how do we arbitrate between competing conceptions of truth that arise from particular individual or cultural views? For example, how do we arbitrate between the virtues of the heroic ethic, on the one hand, and pacifism and nonkilling on the other?

Gandhi asserted that the quest for truth excludes the use of violence (or killing) because violence destroys and, therefore, it may destroy an important component of truth. Human beings are not capable of knowing the absolute truth. Hence, we must never close off the possibility of learning from our adversaries, nor must we ever take upon ourselves the absolute certainty that killing others assumes (Bondurant, 1967). Said another way:

> A practitioner of nonviolence, while holding on to the truth as she sees it, will assume her own fallibility and give the opponent every chance to prove that her position is erroneous. The doctrine of nonviolence can thus mediate between competing visions of morality. (Godrej, 2002)

For Gandhi nonviolence is a methodological imperative. Gandhi begins with the fallibility of individual human beings which includes both the cognitive and voluntarist notions of agency and considers nonviolence the best approach because "if this kind of force is used in a cause that is unjust, only the person using it suffers. He does not make others suffer for his mistakes" (Gandhi, 1909). Gandhi is offering the methodology of nonviolence as a way to approach and gain knowledge. Nonviolence or nonkilling (see also Paige, 2001) is therefore not just one virtue among several but is ultimately the means to achieve the primary virtue, truth. It appears that truth may not be disconnected from how we relate to other people.

Ethics and the Cognitive Dimensions of Agency

The following section deals with ethics and the cognitive dimensions of agency. Does ethics require a sociology? This leads to an emphasis on the role of judgment, begun in the last section, required in navigating and selecting moral frameworks and what they mean. For Bernard Williams, ethics presupposes a sociology: "For every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at

least a sociology… And we can…only understand the claims of moral philosophy when the implications—the 'social embodiment'—of the prescriptions are fully considered. (1985: 23). Here, Williams is drawing attention to the underlying ontological *a prior* assumptions, or frameworks, from which moral philosophers attend when doing ethics. For Zerubavel, in *Social Mindscapes* (1995), all thinking is intimately embedded, though not wholly determined, in the social world. If ethics is a demand for reflection and the social world is indeterminate, then there is no properly conceived ethical position that can be unquestionably held in a moral framework. Ethics therefore demands judgment concerning critical reflection and ethical positions must live with ambiguity.

The cognitive dimension of agency involves an ethical orientation to thinking reflectively and reasonably about the modern social world and continues to direct attention to the importance of judgment. Williams begins with Socrates question: "how should one live?" This phrasing is crucial for Williams since it does not ask the more common and contemporary question, what shall I do but, rather, is a question about a manner of life. This is not a question about what to do now, or next; rather, it is a demand for reflection on one's life as a whole (1985: 5). The ambiguity inherent in the question how shall I live incorporates dimensions of both moral and non-moral categories. It is ultimately a question about "what should I do, all things considered?" and, for Williams, "it does no harm that the notion is vague" (1985: 7).

Insights from the "linguistic turn" (Rorty, 1967) in philosophy directs attention to ethical life as expressed in social practices. Therefore, ethical understanding needs a discussion of social explanation (Williams, 1985: 131).

For Williams, the aim of the ethical is "to construct a world that will be our world, one in which we have a social, cultural, and personal life" (1985: 111). Therefore, the turn to theory is rooted in ethical thought itself, in reflection upon the conditions, consequences, and possibilities that are, and might become, available in a future social world in which individuals participate. Not all reflection leads to ethical theory. Explanations can be habitual, confirming what is believed, or explanatory reflection can be critical, revealing that certain beliefs or practices are not what they seem to be (Fuchs, 2005).

Voluntarist Dimensions of Agency

Agency—the active or capable component of personhood—has two dimensions. Said another way, there are (at least) two ways of conceptualizing what agency is. In the cognitive dimension of agency, the subject achieves self-governance not by will but by reflection. The voluntarist dimension of agency refers to the capability to act in the world and/or "to do

otherwise" in a given context. The differentiation of agency into these two dimensions clarifies the capability of intervention. Agency as a choice for a plan of action refers to the routinization of action and the breaking away from routinization with the possibility of changing action plans to contribute to the transformation of social systems and social structures. Agency as critical reflection, on the other hand, refers to the cognitive aspects of knowledge systems and to the self-awareness of the subject's relation to various possible projects and the connection between means and ends.

Two accounts of agency are needed for assessing social relationships, behaviors and agreements, which connects an account of the justification of the self with philosophical anthropology or a theory of the person. The first account of agency highlights the role of choice, the other emphasizes knowledge. Or, as stated earlier, these accounts highlight the voluntarist and the cognitive dimensions of agency. The voluntarist account is related to the capability to intervene or the power and will of the self. The cognitive account is related to the capability to understand the conditions and possibilities of the self, the conditions and possibilities of the social world, and the conditions and possibilities for change of the self and social world. In the voluntarist account, the ends are chosen; in the cognitive account, ends are discovered. Rather than separating these two accounts of agency, they need to be combined, since:

> Actual agreements often turn out unfairly because of the various (coercive and non coercive) contingencies associated with the inevitable differences of power and knowledge among persons differently situated (Sandel, 1998: 125).

Merging the two accounts of agency blends power and knowledge into a robust account of human ontology. The capability of intervention is both an act of will and self-discovery as participation with other intersubjective beings. Merging these two accounts leads to a more robust account social ontology by inferring a responsibility side to complement basic needs and rights.

Max Weber and the Social Virtue of the Ethics of Responsibility

Max Weber, one of the fathers of sociology, is not known for his optimism. In fact, in one of his last public speaking engagements, "Politics as a Vocation," Weber cautioned that "not summer's bloom lies ahead of us, but rather a polar night of icy darkness and hardness…" (Weber, 1958: 120). Should or can we be more optimistic than Weber? Glenn Paige writes: "The surprise insight…is that *what did not happen* explains why humanity lives today" (2010: 9). He continues that this "turns upside down" the conventional view that his-

tory is the story of the struggle of good defeating evil in an epic (often violent) battle. In fact, Paige contends that in order for the human species to survive killing attributes have somehow not extinguished nonkilling attributes. However, juxtaposed against the more optimistic conclusion of Paige is the assertion of Mihai Nadin that humanity is threatened by the slow transition to the expansion of killing with "no reflection, no sense of wrong, no sense of guilt" (2009: 383). Nadin's comments closely reflect much of Weber's perspective on modernity and the increasing emphasis on instrumental behavior. We need a more robust development of responsibility. This section will argue that located within the vast Weberian corpus is a more robust (and optimistic) understanding of responsibility—the "ethics of responsibility"—that can help as a guide to answer ethical questions and guide social actions. This provides a way to be more optimistic about the future. Keep in mind that, for Weber, the most radical social changes come not from the centers of power but from the margins.

This section will be more explicit in moving from individual action to social action through the works of Max Weber, relying primarily on his speech "Politics as a Vocation" (1919a). Weber here dismisses two prominent schools of political thought—those based in reward and those based in fear—and also contrasts the "ethics of conviction" and the "ethics of ultimate ends" with an "ethics of responsibility." The ethics of responsibility is the only orientation that properly connects the continuum of motivations-means-ends in the service of legitimate and civil social action that promotes self-governance. Weber's social ethic commitment to nonkilling is implicit, but when the ethics of responsibility—the voluntarist dimensions of agency—is combined with Gandhi's epistemological insights—the cognitive dimensions of agency—the connection will be more explicit.

Weber's conception of an ethics of responsibility is clarified when contrasted with *vanity*, as discussed earlier, and the ethic of conviction and the ethic of ultimate ends. The ethic of conviction presupposes a hierarchical and rationally ordered cosmos with accompanying non-conflicting values. The individual's responsibility begins and ends with obedience to the demand or action that accord with the cosmos, and the intention in obeying is the most important indicator of moral worthiness:

> If an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor's eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for evil…The believer in [an ethic of conviction] feels 'responsible' only for seeing to it that the flame of pure intentions is not quelched: for example, the flame of protesting against the injustice of the social order.

Weber's illustration of the person oriented by an ethic of conviction is the revolutionary who feels the inextinguishable demand for action on the basis of her convictions, and who, finding warrant for action in the rationally arranged cosmos, can embrace any means (withdrawal or violence) to bring about the desired ends. According to Weber, promoters of an ethic of conviction call that "The world is stupid and base, not I. The responsibility for the consequences does not fall upon me but upon the others whom I serve and whose stupidity or baseness I shall eradicate." For Weber, this view is problematic because the social means and consequences of action are ignored.

In fact, Weber notes, "the absolute ethic just does not ask for 'consequences' and that is the decisive point." The ethic of conviction operates from a simple thesis "from good comes only good." The crucial point here is that an ethics of conviction focuses on intentions and motivations of actions while ignoring the means and ends of actions. What is missing is an analysis of the results of action, the consequences of participating in social life, and the compromises that are made along the way. The ethics of ultimate ends suffers similar criticism for Weber: the proponent of this view ignores the motivations and means for actions and concentrates on the outcomes of action. For Weber, it is not that one type of social action is necessarily more or less "rational" than another type of social action. The point is that origins, means and ends must always be considered and evaluated to be considered responsible social actions. The tension in managing Aristotle's virtues is maintained in Weber's tripartite connection between origin, means and ends of social action. Managing this tension requires continual evaluation and effort.

After Weber simply dismissed two prominent forms of political thinking—those based in reward and fear—and two forms of orientation towards the social world—convictions and ends—he provides a stance he believes adequate to the ethical necessities of power, action and reflection in the modern world. First, Weber acknowledged that individual citizens have a role to play in politics, if for no other reason than they assent to following leaders. Stated another way, leaders need followers and therefore citizens need to reflect on why they are following. In terms of vanity, Weber was critical of actions based solely on self-interest, whether from fear or reward, because these provide a flimsy basis for social order since they are apt to change rapidly if/as the circumstances change. Social stability is better served through legitimacy, by willing consent. In terms of motivations-means-ends, Weber was critical of approaches that did not consider all three, as stated above. This leads Weber to the ethic of responsibility.

Weber's ethic of responsibility has several criteria—"passion and proportion"—that serve to properly orient social action. By *passion*, Weber refers to having an object of sincere interest outside of one's self, motivated by social goals and not simply one's own self-interest. By *proportion*, Weber refers to the connection between motivations, means, and ends, that does not overly accentuate one element but keeps them in balance and considers each important in itself. For example, the ethics of conviction is concerned primarily with motivations, while the ethics of ultimate ends is concerned primarily with outcomes. For Weber, social and political action requires careful consideration of all three. As convenient as it may be to eschew the tensions involved in judgment, the risk involved in sincerely listening to other points of view, and the uncertainty of living in a social world that is an open system filled with interactions with other agents and follows the unexpected contours of unintended consequences, this is not an appropriate orientation, according to Weber. We act and participate in social life and therefore our actions have social consequences.

This participation in social and political life includes responsibilities individuals have towards their own motivations and towards others. These responsibilities can then be evaluated in terms of Weber's model of the relations among motivations, means, and ends of social action. However, although Weber provided ways to reflect on human social and political action, he did not provide a moral framework to follow. The ethics of responsibility is a guide for critical reflection on motivations and social action but does not resolve the tension inherent in civil society.

In this way, ethics is going beyond justifying moral frameworks. Ethics is the social act of seeking legitimacy. Ethics is the further enhancing of civic engagement and respect, among contesting moral frameworks. Legitimacy itself is a relational attribute built on mutual recognition and reciprocity (see Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 98). Mutual recognition and reciprocity can justify independent moral frames, but legitimacy requires something new—a new relationship between antagonists. New relationships require sincerity, a sincerity rooted in an authentic concern, not instrumental strategic actions (Habermas 1985). In this way, responsibility is not limited to a vain accentuation that only includes in an analysis one's own needs, but must include others in a civic-minded responsibility.

While providing a useful template to examine social action and criticisms of truncated accentuations pursued in other forms of political and social theory (described above), a necessary role for tensions and conflict, and a prominent role for careful reflection and judgment, Weber had very little to say about the ontics of judgment. In other words, he had very little to say

about what to do in a particular situation. In this sense, Weber is in line with others who have focused on the ontological condition of judgment, from Aristotle to Bernard Williams, and with the openness and indeterminism of social life as presented by Anthony Giddens. Weber would agree that individuals have basic needs and would agree with much of the focus on the importance of human rights. However, Weber would be critical of approaches that focus exclusively on human needs/rights and overlook social action—responsibilities we have towards others. For Weber, social action is not simply to be concerned with how others treat us and the benefits we receive from social life, but must take into account how we treat others and the responsibilities we have towards others. It is not "responsible" if we simply focus on the benefits of belonging to a collective and ignore the costs.

The Virtue of Civility and Contemporary Society

For Alexis des Tocqueville, if citizens in democratic states fail to grasp "those ideas and sentiments which first prepare them for freedom and then allow them to enjoy it, there will be no independence left for anybody" (1969: 70). He cautioned, in a country that places little value on public virtue, there would be "subjects" but not "citizens" (1969: 93-94). From this perspective, more is required from modern governing than meeting needs and protecting individual freedoms. Therefore, what is required in the modern world is a way to build society in the process of change and revolution itself in the process of resolving conflicts. To lessen the effects of the unintended consequences of revolution, for overcoming oppression, and for resolving conflicts, the following will argue is the virtue of *civility*.

Thoughts and writings on the different virtues have focused on different qualities throughout the ages that have been considered virtues. MacIntyre's (1981 and 1999) history of virtue covers the transition of qualities of character that have been deemed virtues at different points in history. For example, the Homeric period focused on courage, physical strengths—especially those needed in battle—and familial loyalty. Aristotle distributed virtues as a balance, a "doctrine of the mean" between different vices—justice, prudence, courage, and fortitude. The early Christian church, in contrast, focused on faith, charity, humility and love as virtues. The virtues, therefore, are not universal but relate to differing social contexts. The virtues emerging during early modern Europe were based on "gentlemanly" conduct: how can individuals interact, disagree and resolve conflicts without resorting to dueling? (Shapin, 1994) Throughout the centuries, the virtues have provided models of right and good conduct within a given social cir-

cumstance. The virtue now called upon in the modern world to govern our social and political affairs, according to Stephen Carter, is civility. Carter recognized that civility itself is an ambiguous concept:

> Similarly, despite the growing concern, we seem to have trouble agreeing on exactly what civility *is*. Some people, when they think of civility, think of manners. Others think of proper standards of moral conduct, or a set of standards for conducting public argument. Still others think of willing participation in the institutions that enable our democracy to thrive, what has come to be known as the movement for civic renewal. Some long for a golden past. Others imagine a platinum future. And all of these views are partly correct: like the blind men and the elephant, the many observers of civility are talking about different parts of the same animal (1999: 11).

Civility is a term not easily defined and reflects the complications and necessity of making judgments. Carter's definition of civility is "the sum of the many sacrifices we are called to make for the sake of living together" (1999: 11). Civility is the "set of sacrifices we make for the sake of our common journey with others", a "signal of respect towards others." For Carter, we require civility "to mediate our relationships with those we do not love" (1999: 71). Civility is not a sentiment nor an affection (Carter 1999: 57), contra Rawls; rather, civility requires discipline to overcome our selfish interest and demonstrate our respect for our fellow human beings (Carter, 1999: 184; see also, Wilson, 1989; Taylor, 1989; and, Elias, 1978 [1939]). Carter stresses the point that civility to others "does not depend on how much we like them" (1999: 98). Civility, then, emerges when citizens are not operating from a position of vanity, as Weber chastised, but from a concern for social action in terms of past, present and future responsibility.

Carter begins by asking "why should we worry about how we threat strangers who do not love us and whom we do not love?" Carter's understanding of civility is nearly a paradox, civility requires sacrifice: "These sacrifices involve the surrender of something we can readily understand as large and important: the entirety of one's worldly goods, the totality of one's life…" (1999: 103).

While sacrifice is little discussed in contemporary moral philosophy, the concept of sacrifice is deeply embedded in the Judeo-Christian tradition (Wilson 1989; Elias 1978). In these accounts, it is cautioned that to sacrifice for a friend or family member is little more than self-love. Rather, the duty to love our neighbor flows from the relationship itself, not from our *feelings* about the relationships. It is a requirement that we respect all equally. The Golden Rule

does not depend on emotional intimacy, rather, it requires action towards others (Carter, 1999: 105). Therefore, Carter insists that discipline, is paramount in controlling impulses and desires when interacting with others. This point is more subtle than it appears: civility towards others cannot be dependent upon how much we like them, civility is not limited to a neighbor we happen to like. Again, "the measure of our commitment to the construction of civility is how much we are willing to give up to achieve it" (1999: 104). Stated from Weber's perspective, civility requires, first, limiting vanity, and, second, an increase in critical reflection on the ways that further legitimate social and political life by connecting means and ends. From the discussion of agency earlier, civility requires both the voluntarist and the cognitive dimensions of agency.

At this point, one way to understand what this study is calling human responsibilities as an important aspect of self-governance is captured by this understanding of The Golden Rule. Carter provides several principles of civility. For Carter, the problematic feature of modern "incivility" is the failure to follow a few basic "rules" of civility: "Our duty to be civil toward others does not depend on whether we like them or not" (1999: 35) and "Civility requires we sacrifice for strangers, not just for people we happen to know" (1999: 58). Carter begins with the maxim that civility does not require familiarity. Psychologist Richard Sennet argues that the desire for intimacy in all our relationships is an enemy of civility, that interactions in civil society require respectful "associations and mutual commitments between people who are not joined by family or intimate association" (1978: 3) Sociologist Benton Johnson makes a similar point that civility allows us "to live with unknown others" without "transforming them into either brothers or enemies" (1988, 7, 10) The point is that we need not have emotional attachments—neither love nor hatred—to interact with civil regard for others. Carter refers to this as putting a "rein on our impulses" by allowing others privacy "for those who are making the democratic journey with us" (1999: 70).

From this perspective, as individuals, we have the basic human responsibility to exercise moral judgment about the choices we make. Civility, as a virtue, requires the self-discipline—self-governance—to both abide by moral rules and to challenge them when they are immoral. For example, citizens need the faculty of self-governance and responsibility to discern when to disobey unjust laws—such as slavery in the American South—and when to obey just laws—such as not committing murder.

This brings the discussion back to *The Golden Rule*: Do onto others as you would have them do onto you. Carter dedicates a whole chapter of *Civility*, "Sacrifice and Neighbor-Love," to explain what he considers to be a

strange notion in modern society. It is so strange, in fact, that Carter appeals to theological categories in attempting to describe "the greatest benefit and the greatest difficulty" of behaving civilly towards "those we do not love" (1999: 100). Religion, for Carter, is both formative and communal, and, at the same time, can be critical and subversive. While religious categories and language may be helpful to understand sacrifice, they are not necessary. What is necessary is a responsibilities approach to self-governing.

Two general themes emerge in discussing civility alongside responsibility. First, civility is not the same as agreement. Second, civility requires communication and the articulation of criticism when appropriate. Therefore, civility requires disagreement and dialogue, in addition to responsibility. The connection between these as a mark of civility is not without tension (as Weber discussed earlier); for example, much incivility could be avoided if we simply agreed with each other all the time. However, as Carter explains, "civil dialogue over differences is democracy's true engine: we must disagree in order to debate, and we must debate in order to decide, and we must decide in order to move" (1999: 132). Civility does not require an overall consensus, civility and disagreement can, and should, exist together.

The virtue of civility allows for dialogue independent of whether or not all parties agree on certain positions. Two aspects are involved in civil dialogue and civil listening: First, those who disagree may be misguided in their opinion and therefore can correct their position. Michael Perry (1991) makes an even deeper point: second, we ourselves could be wrong. It is the possibility of the second dimension, the possibility that the other person(s) may be right that requires civil listening. Here Carter introduces another maxim: "Civility requires that we listen to others with knowledge of the possibility that they are right and we are wrong" (1999: 139). Carter acknowledges that sacrifice is involved "because we must hear views we may detest, because we must be open to the possibility of their rightness" (1999: 140). Therefore, civility requires that "we express ourselves in ways that demonstrate our respect for others" (1999: 162). To be civil is not to suspend moral judgment indefinitely, but it can mean tolerating differences in beliefs and behaviors. This is Carter's next maxim: "Civility allows criticism of other and sometimes even requires it, but the criticism should always be civil" (1999: 217). Criticism is appropriate when it reflects respect for both us and the other person. This allows for another dimension. In many situations, especially in the context of prolonged conflict, both parties may be wrong! Or said in a more nuanced way: both parties may be both partially wrong and partially right. This moves the discussion from who is right and who is wrong to a discussion about how to live in civil society in civility.

Civil dialogue and civil listening, therefore, are required much in advance of the creation of laws, and in the continuing evaluation of laws. Civility requires better democratic habits, practices and judgments, not better laws. Civility is what enables social interactions, including disagreements, to proceed without (the threat of) violence.

The practice of civility is the practice of self-governance. Civility expands human social ontology beyond a limited concern for basic needs, sentiments, rights and legal structures to include basic responsibilities we have to ourselves and to others in the ongoing project of social and political life. Civility is the form of social action based in critical self-assessment and respectful social interactions for the sake of our common journey with others. Civility is the connection between the ends of freedom from oppression and the means for achieving it. Civility builds a problem-solving conflict resolution society in the process of handling conflict and tension. How are individuals to discern, to pass judgment, on themselves, others, and the prevailing social and political systems? This involves the cognitive dimensions of agency, as discussed earlier and, first, an understanding that the social and political worlds are social constructions. According to the discussion above, civility requires both the voluntarist and cognitive dimensions of agency. The next section will explore in more detail the cognitive dimensions of agency involved in making judgments.

Judgment and Ambiguity

Judgment is in a perennial tension, but little has been said about it specifically (Larmore 1987). Judgments can be based on different conceptions (worldviews) and judgments are usually made according to a social ontology that is either action-centered or structure-centered (Giddens, 1976: 1984). The following section will examine judgment and outline some of the epistemological complications involved in making judgments, pointing to considerations of the indeterminacy of social life and the risks involved in making judgments.

Why has judgment been overlooked in Anglo-American moral philosophy (see Larmore 1987)? Theories of decision-making, choice and preference do exist in social and political theory, but these fail to capture the intricate and perennial tensions involved in judgment. More often, they are reduced to truncated understandings of human ontology: either action-centered or structure-centered (Larmore, 1987). In fact, for Larmore, there seems little that can be stated explicitly about judgment even though areas of moral experience, especially areas of social relations and interactions, require judgment. That judgment is indispensable does not mean that

it has been adequately described or clarified and yet it is especially in areas of moral disagreement and conflict where judgment must be exercised.

The nature of moral judgment, what this study calls ethics, is peculiarly difficult to describe. Part of this dilemma is that the tradition of moral philosophy "by so often neglecting the importance of judgment, has handed down to us so few attempts to make sense of it" (Larmore, 1987: 14-15). Could it be that moral judgment, by its very nature is resistant to systematic and theoretical analysis? Ethics informed by virtue means going beyond justifying moral frameworks. The ethics of civility means seeking mutual legitimacy for further enhancing civic engagement and respect. Legitimacy is a relational attribute built on mutual recognition and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 98). This is similar to Lederach's (1998) argument that an inclusive approach to transforming conflict without a predetermined end state is needed to transform violence into politics, since, in dealing with the past in the present, the future itself is created. What is involved, for Lederach, is the creation of a new relationship, with neither of the previous moral frameworks maintaining complete legitimacy, but working together to create legitimacy by working towards the future. Whether or not this is the case, the predominant path of Anglo-American discourse in social and political theory has sought to clarify the general principles of the exercise of moral action, not the complexities and ambiguities in systematizing judgment (Larmore, 1987).

Risk, Trust and 'Sub' Politics

For Ulrich Beck, we must acknowledge that the risks confronting the world of advanced industrial societies cannot be dealt with properly through traditional institutions—the nation-state and collective identities. Therefore, a "sub-politics" emerges based in grass-roots organization that is extra-paramilitary and is no longer linked to traditional class or party lines. This new "risk society" challenges the basic tenets of political science because sub-politics:

> Is distinguished from 'politics' in that (a) agents outside the political or corporatist system are also allowed to appear on the stage of social design (this group includes professional and occupational groups, the technical intelligentsia in companies, research institutions and management, citizen's initiative, and so on), and (b) not only social and collective agents but individuals as well compete with the latter and each other for the emerging power to shape politics (1994: 22).

By "sub-politics," Beck means a shaping of politics from below and increased inclusion in the arrangement of society of those formerly outside

the public political sphere. Sub-politics, for Beck, also reverses the marginal-core arrangement of politics and establishes a new relationship between the community, as Mouffe explains, "whose motto could be 'no rights without responsibility'" (2005: 58). What is at stake, Giddens proposes, is a new relationship between the individual and the community and between authority and democratic governance. For Giddens, the "third way is a widening of democracy that forms a new partnership between individuals, civil society, and state governance. The third way envisions a post-traditional decentralized society anchored in an active trust that maintains social cohesion" (1994). Post-traditional society does not abandon the welfare state, but modifies it to create a "redistribution of possibilities" guided by citizens who are "responsible risk takers" (Giddens, 1994: 25-29).

Anthony Giddens' expansive "social reflexivity" transforms an emancipatory politics that focuses on constraints into "life politics" that concern decisions, not limited to emancipation from constraints only but relate to human capabilities (Giddens, 1994). Giddens is critical of forms of liberalism that place the state in the center of politics and economic life because it is ill-prepared to grasp the emerging quality of individuals to participate in civic life and therefore misses the potential for greater democratization which those processes entail (Giddens, 1994: 25-29). Chantel Mouffee summarizes the critique of liberalism:

> They [liberals] cling to the traditional institutions of the welfare state without realizing that the concept of collective provision has to be rethought and that, since we now live in a more open and reflective manner, a new balance between individual and collective responsibility has to be found (2005: 57).

What is involved is a turn to an expansive conception of self-governance that is equally concerned with responsibilities of the individual and responsibilities of the community and the state towards possibilities. What is also involved is a new conception of responsibility that broadens to include all citizens in forming and transforming social structures (Giddens, 1984: 1994).

For Giddens, and Beck as well, post-traditional society and the concerns of life politics cannot fully be understood within the more traditional left/right political framework but requires a new "generative politics" according to which:

> the desired outcomes are not determined from the top; situations are created in which active trust can be built and sustained; autonomy is granted to those affected by specific programmes or policies; resources are generated which enhance autonomy; [and,] political power is decentralized (1994: 93).

The central idea that moves through all of these five dimensions is "active trust", which Giddens contrasts to "passive trust" of early periods of modernity. Passive trust is invested in expert-systems. Active trust, on the other hand, must be generated because, with the inclusion of reflectivity in expert-systems as well, expert knowledge must now be democratically validated. Giddens, continuing Beck's analysis, argues for further democratizing of the main institutions of society by opening them to debate and contestation. With active trust in post-traditional society, traditions and institutions are required to justify themselves in dialogic democracy. Returning to the earlier discussion of civility, it is through civil behaviors that active trust can be generated between individuals in a post-industrial social world.

For Giddens, active trust is generated less by collective identities than by individuals. This development coincides with the interrogation of tradition during the post industrial period and, consequently, greater autonomy of action to be defined by sub-politics or life politics filled with uncertainty, risk, and unintended consequences (Giddens, 1994: 90). The important insight at this point is that instrumental rule-following and strict adherence to method cannot adequately account for a future social and political world that is indeterminate (Woods, 2005). In this way, addressing current and future situations, especially those of conflict, is better addressed by Burton's problem-solving approach than by a puzzle-solving approach. Therefore, to complement legal structures, social norms, and puzzle-solving methodologies requires a civic republican ethics of responsibilities. Fulfilling human needs is an important component of self-governing; however, it is not enough. At the same time, what is required is to actively engage in participatory problem-solving, appropriately placing trust in others and in being a trustworthy agent in whom others can trust.

The Reciprocity of the Cognitive and Voluntarist Dimensions of Agency

So how might individuals and society adjudicate between different conceptions of justice—who is to do what for whom?—and manage disagreement on the principles of justice and the actions and practices appropriate for justice? The first step is to revisit the term institution in structuration theory. Recall that institutions are reproduced behaviors in the routine of living daily life, they are not things that exist apart from social reproduction by capable agents (Giddens, 1984). An adequate account to the foregoing question requires, first, some general account of the activity of reflecting on basic beliefs and assumptions—the cognitive dimensions of agency—as noted earlier, and second, further institutionalizing the actions of individuals—the voluntarist dimensions of agency—that promote justice.

Stephen White suggests the two most familiar ways of envisioning cognitive reflection—uncovering foundations and choosing frameworks—are insufficient because of the ontological-ethical status of human social life (White, 2009: 66-71). White contends that, as meaning-creating (and not simply needs-possessing) species, humans tend towards, on the one hand, envisioning ourselves as discovering a foundation that possesses authority, or, on the other hand, as choosing the framework of interpretation that gives priority to one value over others. Accordingly, individuals either discover foundations or choose values. For White, these two dualisms are "too one-sided…[W]e do better to affirm a model that captures the basic qualities of *both* discovery and choice" (White, 2009: 67).

First, the foundations model is based on the discovery of the truth and reflection is to serve enhancing conviction to that truth. However, while search, discovery and reflection leads to deeper commitment, they should not be equated necessarily with increasing certainty of knowledge or access to truth (White, 2009: 68). Operating from the foundations model locates the other who disagrees with my views and stands between truth and myself. The persistent tendency is to script the other as an obstacle to further elaboration and implementation of truth (Warnke, 1993). This is well-known in conflict resolution. In terms of possessive individualism and needs theory, selecting the foundation of human needs joins communitarianism in viewing the other (elites or structures) as the obstacle to the fulfillment of the truth of human development.

Second, in terms of the framework model, the activity of reflection is a periodic check-up between the relationship between our judgments and everyday life. The supporting structure of belief is chosen or affirmed and its authority rests on the voluntarist way that it is an act of will. It is the self, not the framework, which has agency to do otherwise according to one's values and preferences. The framework model is aimed at gaining clarity for the purpose of greater control. The problem, according to White, is that when we have committed ourselves to such a task, "we have thereby implicitly embraced an ontological figure of humans as sovereign entities" (White, 2009: 70). As Adorno (1966) and Foucault (1979) realized in different ways, once this occurs, we fashion ourselves as wills whose reason is in no need of chastening. In terms of human needs and possessive individualism, selecting the framework of needs theory joins liberalism in giving preference to the value of individual choice.

If both foundations and frameworks are limited and limiting conceptions, what model better adheres to the insights of the interpretive turn? Habermas suggested the free-speech act, but as discussed earlier, re-distributive

justice is required first, before communicative action is free from asymmetries. Given the pluralism in understanding and foundations, or in Weber's terminology the "plurality of life worlds" (1968), the task is to work for "institutional solutions that can be 'faithful' to all the differences" (Warnke, 1993: 159). One solution is to simply accommodate differing interpretive stances (Taylor, 1989) or, as Walzer mentions:

> When People disagree about the meaning of social goods, when understandings are controversial, then justice requires that the society be faithful to the disagreements, providing institutional channels for their expression, adjudication mechanisms, and alternative distributions (1993: 313).

Conversation is important to a hermeneutic approach to questions of justice, because the attempt to justify one's own position to others (may) allow reform and revision of interpretations (Arneson, 2009; Freeman, 2009; Habermas, 1984). However, neither Taylor nor Walzer consider how this might be done in concrete daily life. This is even more complicated when considering if pathological interpretations, as discussed by Lukes earlier, should be tolerated.

Rather than appealing to foundations or frameworks, Taylor (1989: 91-96) suggests an articulations approach that involves both discovering and choosing, but goes further to include creation. The foundations are acquired through frameworks of language and the creative act—meaning to the individual—is also delivered through language. This is the articulation approach. Bringing foundations into language is a creative act, and no meanings stand fully apart from language. Giving language to foundations and frameworks enables the construction of meaning and understanding. At the same time, meaning and understanding cannot be fully articulated because they are experiences imperfectly represented by the limits of language itself (Giddens, 1985; Taylor, 1989, 18, 22, 34, 334, 419). The linguistic turn in philosophy, especially with Wittgenstein (1953), Heidegger (1962), and Gadamer (1960), honors the anxiety of finitude and imperfection, rather than avoiding or suppressing it. In terms of articulation and reflection on the two-fold process of discovery and creation, something less than full-articulation is possible, and thus "the next other I meet may hold something crucial to a fuller understanding…" (White, 2009: 70). When discovery and creation are conceived this way, White argues, "It is not difficult to see how virtues of carefulness and humility toward the other are prefigured more clearly…" (White, 2009: 70). These considerations check the tendency to view the other as obstacle or instrument, and rather to view the other as a fellow traveler. Language enables

communication, but meaning cannot be fully articulated. Even if foundations exist, they are still available for (and require) interpretations.

The cognitive dimensions of agency point in the direction of better examination, clarification and criticism involved in reflecting on assumptions of thinking about the ontological questions and the foundations and frameworks used in answering the ontological questions. The limits of articularity demonstrate that as useful as language can be, it cannot do everything. In terms of the resolution of conflict, it is now that an appeal to the voluntarist side if agency is made. If language cannot express fully, and if it is susceptible to strategic manipulation (Habermas, 1991), what other options are available to the individual?

The voluntarist side of agency, the capability to do and to possibly do otherwise, adds clarity at the limits of articularity. If we all make assumptions about ontology, both enabled and constrained by frameworks, if language is incapable of complete expression, and if judgment can have pathological or "infantile" susceptibilities (Lukes), what next? Jurgen Habermas (1985) cautioned against communicative discourse manipulated through (instrumental) strategic action. If this is true, then language itself is limited to the extent that language alone can move a situation from intractable conflict to resolved conflict, from conflicting relationships to cooperating relationships. It is now time to turn to the action side of individuals as a possible answer to the question. A turn to behavior does not erase the possible necessity and usefulness of speech, but broadens the act of communication. Both words and actions serve to communicate.

Civility, as discussed earlier, is communicated both in word and deeds, just as assessments of truthfulness of testimony are evaluated partially in terms of biography. Even if full articularity were possible, the need for assessment of speech is still required (for example, someone could fully articulate a non-truth). In the following discussion, it will become clearer that judgments involve assessing both actions and words. In *A Social History of Truth* (1994), Stephen Shapin linked the cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of agency by exploring the assessment of truth claims in early modernity, specifically through the development of modern science. During the age of discovery (Borstein, 1985) incredible accounts of unknown and unseen phenomena were presented for evaluation to the Royal Academy (see Shapin, 1994: 213). To begin, Shapin examines the grounds of factual knowledge because "there is a massive mismatch between dominant characterizations of the sources of knowledge and the ways we secure that knowledge" (1994: xxiv). Shapin criticizes epistemological models based on direct individual experience, and "objective" science generally, which are to supplant the testimony of others, because:

> Knowledge is a collective good. In securing our knowledge we rely upon others, and we cannot dispense with that reliance. That means that the relations in which we have and hold knowledge have a moral character, and the word I use to indicate that moral relation is trust (1994: xxv).

The epistemological question is therefore tied to social conventions and to the attribution of motivations. The paramount question, then is, "whom to trust?", since the identification of trustworthy agents is necessary to the constitution of any body of knowledge. In this sense, "social knowledge" and "natural knowledge" are hybrid entities:

> What we know of comets, icebergs, and neutrinos irreducibly contains what we know of those people who speak for and about these things, just as what we know about the virtues of people is informed by their speech about things that exist in the world (Shapin, 1994: xxvi).

Shapin introduces the importance of "free-action" and "virtue" as general indicators of reliable testimony and reliable sources (1994: ch. 2). This connects biography and epistemology, since ascent to truthful testimony mobilizes local knowledge of trustworthy agents, or who can be considered reliable to tell the truth (Shapin, 1994: ch. 4). Defining truth, therefore requires judgments of testimonies, and judgments of testimonies involves judgments about the distribution of skill, judgments about what the world is like and judgments about the moral characteristics of individuals. The attribution of truthfulness is linked to characterizing a person as one of honest integrity, because "there is no point at which participants could help themselves to a pure form of 'thing knowledge' since,…schemes of plausibility are built up through prior decisions about who, and in what connections, count as a trustworthy source" (Shapin, 1994: 287). Even in the natural sciences, disputes about phenomena are also disputes about people, their virtues and capacities. Shapin concentrated on evaluating the testimony around three episodes—the size of icebergs, the existence of water pressure, and the paths of comets—and discovered that the character of the reporter and the reporter's location or relation in a social context (did they have incentive to deceive?) played a crucial role in the evaluation of testimony—it could be qualified, modified, or disqualified.

Shapin refers to the general schema of evaluation as an "epistemological decorum" that connects biography and epistemology, and provides seven maxims for the evaluation of testimony:

> (1) assent to testimony that is plausible; (2) assent to testimony which is multiple; (3) assent to testimony which is consistent; (4) assent to testimony which is immediate; (5) assent to testimony from knowledgeable or skilled sources; (6) assent to testimony given in a manner which inspires just confidence; and (7) assent to testimony from sources of acknowledged integrity and disinterested (1994: 212).

These seven maxims involve skill in judgment on part of both the reporter and the evaluator. These maxims point to counter-maxims that are also available to disqualify testimony and run in the opposite direction. Shapin explains: "The commonsensical rules pointing in one direction are all shadowed by rules pointing in the other, which, when articulated in the context of practical action, seem equally mundane and rational" (1994: 232). At the same time, it is not clear which maxims are more important or less important, or how many serve to qualify or disqualify knowledge. If there are no explicitly formulated rules to select which maxim or counter-maxim to follow, the evaluation of testimony is a skill-like activity requiring critical reflection and judgment. The only maxim Shapin found no counter-maxim is the seventh—the maxim that counseled assent to testimony form people characterized by their integrity and disinterestedness (1994: 237).

The importance of integrity—truth-telling—and disinterestedness—no apparent motivations to disguise the truth—though using different terminology, connects back to Weber's ethics of responsibility—lack of vanity and a straightforward moral connection between motivations, means and ends that takes into account the social component to action. This also connects to civility in terms of our relationships with others. Evaluating testimony is part of the cognitive dimension of agency and includes critical reflection. However, the complications of epistemological judgment, if Shapin is correct, direct attention to biographical and voluntarist dimensions of agency. Cognitive dimensions are not only socially-embedded, as discussed earlier, but, now, these socially-embedded dimensions are assessed in terms of individual biography and behaviors. Also, in terms of articularity, actions can fill-in-the-blanks of what cannot be fully contained in language.

In summary, both behaviors and testimonies inform judgments about ambiguity and risk that exist as perennial features of the modern social world. Therefore, in terms of an ethics of responsibility approach to self-governing, interpersonal relations impact the judgment assessments of others. In terms of a future nonkilling society what types of actions fuel nonlethal conflict resolution? What types of actions build trust? As noted, actions based on respect

and integrity towards others, accepting difference, and promoting dialogue promote trust. For Weber, trust is enhanced when ambiguity is embraced and evaluated in terms of the connection between motivations—means—ends continually informed and evaluated with an ethics of responsibility.

Vivien Jabri uses Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration to develop a framework for understanding violent human conduct (1994: 34). While agreeing with Jabri's conclusions concerning war and killing in modern society, the following will argue that this is a rather pessimistic and conservative use of structuration theory. War and killing are part of the routinization process in modern social life and structuration theory aids in understanding this. However, structuration theory contains a more optimistic tone as well, since agents can and do influence structures. The optimistic implication is that war and violent conflict are not necessary features of modern social reality. From this perspective, we can exercise individual agency to promote nonkilling.

In terms of social theory, structuration offers insights for scholar-practitioners attempting to transform killing into politics. Structuration theory is focused primarily on the "constitutive potentials" of social life: the generic human capacities and fundamental conditions through which the course of social processes and events are generated and shaped in the manifold ways in which this can occur" (Cohen, 1987: 17). The aim of social theory is to provide "conceptions of the nature of human social activity and of the human agent which can be placed in the service of empirical work" (Giddens, 1986: xvii).

Vivien Jabri uses Giddens' structuration theory to locate violent human conflict in terms of the "discursive and institutional continuities which legitimate and enable war as a form of conduct and which are drawn upon and reproduced by actions in strategic actions" (1994: 54). In her framework, the social position of elites allows them enough control over allocative and material resources that they generate a hegemonic war discourse, and this discourse is reconstituted by (enough) members of society so as to (re)constitute the system that enables war as a form of human conduct (see Jabri, 1994: 1-10, 84-6).

While accepting Jabri's conclusions, this study will argue that hegemonic discourse and practices, using structuration theory, can be challenged as well by pursing what Giddens refers to as "dialectic of control" that can react against strategies of control that draw upon structures of domination in seeking compliance and conformity (1984). For Giddens, structures of domination, embedded in the historical irony of unintended consequences, generate counter-strategies and counter-discourses which challenge the "given", established social order. Even the most change-resistant embedded social system is not capable of determining the cognitions and behaviors of

individual agents because agents always have the "capacity to make a difference" (Giddens, 1984: 29). Whether or not a single individual agent can in fact transform a deeply embedded social institution, from a structurationist perspective individuals do have the capacity not to engage in activity as to further reproduce that social institution. For Jabri, "A central concern in understanding violent human conflict is related to the *choice* available to actors in conflictual social relations" and therefore "it could be concentrated in the enabling aspect of structure: that is, those discursive and institutional continuities which enable and legitimate the occurrence of war as a form of conflict behavior" (1994: 178). This study is concerned with the cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of agency that do *not* serve the reproduction of social systems that utilize violence and oppression as a means of social interaction. Thompson wrote: "One of the key tasks of social analysis is to explore this space of possibility" (Quoted in Jabri, 1994: 179).

In structuration theory, the concern is with both the (re)production and the transformation of institutional practices over time and space. The aim of structuration theory is to "analyze social structure so that we can clearly discern how it *requires* agency and analyze human agency in such a manner that we grasp how all social action *involves* social structure" (Bernstein, 1989: 25). Structuration theory can be viewed pessimistically—victims are implicated in their own oppression—or structuration theory can be viewed optimistically—everyone can participate in the emancipation process and in the process of transforming killing and oppressive structures.

Pragmatic Nonkilling and the Evidence from the Strategic Logic of Nonlethal Conflict

As noted above, pragmatic nonkilling is a type of nonkilling that selects nonlethal strategies and tactics because they are believed to be more effective forms of resistance to oppression and state-sponsored tyranny. How effective can nonkilling strategies and tactics really be against the massive modern state apparatus with organized military and police forces? This section will examine the empirical evidence of nonkilling movements and revolutionary attempts compared to revolutionary attempts that utilize lethality.

The explanation for the success of nonlethal campaigns compared to lethal campaigns is, according to Chenoweth and Stephan, mass participation (2011: 30-61). While scholars disagree as to *why* mass mobilization occurs (Kalyvas, 2006; Peterson, 2001), once mobilization begins a nonlethal campaign has wider appeal than a lethal campaign. Chenoweth and Stephan explain:

> [R]ather than effectiveness resulting from a supposed threat of violence, nonviolent campaigns achieve success through sustained pressure derived from mass mobilization that withdraws the regime's economic, political, social, and even military support from domestic populations and third parties (2011: 44).

Accordingly, nonlethal campaigns achieve higher levels of participation from the population and large-scale participation translates into tactical and strategic advantages through a massive and diverse withdrawal of regime support directed at contentious politics.

This leads to the next question. What are the relative consequences of waging lethal and nonlethal campaigns in terms of greater democracy and the decreased chance of the recurrence of lethal civil conflict? Although decades of research have been conducted, much debate continues concerning the conditions under which democracies emerge (Diamond, 2008; Putnam, 1993). Also, scholars are beginning to study ways in which the success of lethal contention have negative, perhaps unintended, impacts on the societies and polities (Collier, 2009; Fortna and Huang, 2009). From the research, it appears that lethality often begets lethality in the "conflict trap" wherein the recent history of lethality is one of the most important factors determining whether a country will revert to internal war (Licklider, 1995; Walter, 2004). The experience of lethal insurgency typically produces negative long-term economic, social, and political consequences where it occurs (Chenowith and Stephan, 2011: 205-209) and impose major public health crises, thwart investment and destroy vital infrastructure (Collier, 1999: 2009) resulting in stunted political reliability and order.

These findings lead to several generalizations. Perhaps most important is that the nature and tactics of contention matter (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; Karl, 2005). Accordingly, constructing reliable, accountable and legitimate democratic institutions is less problematic when the contention has been nonlethal. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 205-209) attribute this finding to, first, the active participation by large numbers in the process of nonlethal change and will more likely remain politically engaged after the transition and nonlethal contention encourages democratic skills. Second, successful nonlethal contention strengthens citizen's expectations that the postconflict regime will also employ nonlethal means to achieve political order. Karl argues that the opposite occurs following successful lethal insurgencies: in the context of high lethality "war transitions threaten to produce failed states or democracies that are so perilous that many of their citizens long for authoritarian rule" (2005: 19-20). Finally, successful lethal campaigns tend to operate by means of secrecy and martial values, leaving little room for accountability and nonlethal contention.

Conclusion

Can the threat of killing be completely eliminated? Perhaps not, but a nonkilling future can be better approximated. At this point, advocates of nonkilling should specify which form of nonkilling they support—universal, principled, classical, or pragmatic. This is the first step to help clarify policy objectives, strategies and tactics. I hesitate to further develop a list of policy guidelines for a nonkilling society. There is no existing blueprint that definitively provides answers to building and sustaining a nonkilling society. The argument presented above insists that individuals, and not simply states, are a vital and necessary component of decreasing killing. Through both the cognitive and voluntarist dimensions of agency, to live in a nonkilling society we must live more constructively with ambiguity, risk and responsibility. This includes civil dialogue, even with those whom we do not like. We must be willing to re-examine our own assumptions just as we expect that from others. At the same time, nonthreatening behaviors help to build mutual trust amid the ambiguity and uncertainty of human social life.

In the Preface of *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (2009 [2002]), Glenn Paige offers explanation for the term nonkilling: "It seeks to direct attention beyond "peace" and "nonviolence" to focus sharply on the taking of human life" (9) Paige further defines a minimum condition of nonkilling as a "human community…characterized by no killings of humans and no threats to kill" (p. 21). Paige acknowledges that this is daunting task faced with questions such as: but how would you stop Hitler and the Holocaust? He then traces the genealogy of killing (especially in relation to the state) from Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx and Weber; he also recounts the history of killing in establishing the United States (pp. 23-34).

Killing human beings appears in political philosophy as well as popular consciousness in the West and lethality is reinforced in language; it "is socially learned and culturally reinforced" (29). For Paige, it is little wonder that "[i]n such a context of primal beliefs, philosophical heritage, patriotic socialization, media reinforcement, cultural conditioning, and global bloodshed—it is not surprising that most American political scientists and their students emphatically reject the possibility of a nonkilling society" (p. 33).

In the middle of this pessimism, Paige asks: is a nonkilling society possible? As absurd as the question may seem to us, we should also recall that Gene Sharp observes: "As recent as 1980, it was to most people unthinkable that nonviolent struggle—or people's power—would within a decade

be recognized as a major force shaping the course of politics throughout the world" (1989: 4).

However, and importantly, Paige also reviews the history of political thought to recover nonkilling insights. Paige, for example, recovers in Plato an ethical ideal of "non-injury"; in Plutarch, a "resort to the knife…shows a lack of skill…by the statesmen…"; and, in Mencius, "he who, using force, make a pretense at virtue is a tyrant…" (85-6). The point Paige is making, similar to several contemporary anthropological accounts, is that both violence and nonviolence are social constructions and we can read the classics of political philosophy in different ways, just as we can (re)construct society and social relations in different ways: "Classical texts supportive of violence can be reinterpreted to subtract lethality [and therefore]…retain and advance nonkilling insights" (86). The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the "theoretical revolution," as Paige asks, required in the construction of a future society that takes seriously the transformation to nonkilling.

Glenn Paige asks us to reevaluate our assumptions about killing. For Paige, the assumptions too many hold about killing is that it is not only inevitable, but that it is desirable as well. For Paige: "It is as if medical scientists approached cancer as incurable and socially desirable" (2001: 64). He continues, the solution is not "to apply more disease. More Cancer will not cure cancer."

Howard Zinn writes that "Most men everywhere agree that they want to end war, imperialism, racism, poverty, disease and tyranny. What they disagree about is whether these expectations can be fulfilled within the old frameworks of nationalism, representative government and the profit system" (2010: 288). As we saw above, for Gandhi, self-rule does not rely on other institutions to bring self-rule to the people, the people to some extent must master it themselves. In fact, Zinn goes one step further in that in the pursuit of peace and justice "it is up to the citizenry" to permanently engage in a nonviolent critical relationship of "constructive dissent" with the state (2010: 293). But how is one to actively and perpetually engage in open nonviolent dissent?

Where do we look for concrete examples? Nonkilling epistemology, discussed above, offers a means for gathering information and furthering the quest for truth. I offer no clear taxonomies. I do suggest, however, that we listen and learn from the so-called Arab Spring. For examples of how to build nonkilling futures, it is better to look at nonWestern societies that are currently involved in sustained nonkilling revolutions. The Arab Spring presents incredible opportunities to examine both the principles and pragmatic dimensions of ushering large-scale social revolution without (the threat of) killing.

Sidney Tarrow argued twenty years ago that nonlethal political action and conflict is good for democracy: it encourages governments to comply with citizen demands and encourages citizens to participate in the political process (1989). Chantel Mouffee (2005), echoing James Madison, goes even further asserting that nonlethal conflict, not consensus, is the true engine of democracy. Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that not only are nonlethal resistance campaigns more effective in challenging a regime, successful nonlethal contention is much likelier to lead to democratic governance and continued civil peace, whereas lethal contention, even when successful, stunts or reverses the development of democratic governance while increasing the likelihood for recurrent killing and civil war (2011: 218). However, it is not clear that the necessary antidote is western-style democracy. We need to observe.

Paraphrasing conflict studies scholar Richard Rubenstein (2011, 12: 22), we do not ordinarily pursue or accept killing because we are deceived by small stories, but "we allow ourselves to be deceived by accepting the broader rationale" for killing. We must ask the question, "who stands to gain from killing?" A striking feature of justifications for killing is the moral and ideological content. Citizens seldom consent to kill unless they have been persuaded that the cause is morally just. Therefore, it is incredibly important to debunk myths of killing and to be clear about our ethical mission. We must be prepared to live responsibly with ambiguity and risk.

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Chapter Three

Shaping the Futures of Global Nonkilling Society

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Introduction

Realizing a global nonkilling society is a multi-faceted challenge. As a matter of fact most of contemporary people, in particular politicians and political science scholars, are doubtful about the possibility of this vision. In this chapter we first bring to light both the evidences supporting this vision and the insights from the prospect theory that help us understand the impact of turning impossibility into possibility in our judgment about such a global vision. Assuming this uncertain prospect we then make explicit a well thought out formula for global transformation to achieve the single medium-long term goal of global nonkilling. In the second section, we briefly introduce and then apply a useful method of decision analysis to guide our strategic thinking and subsequent information collection. The product of this effective method is a conceptual tool called the fundamental objective hierarchy. It is a future-oriented, intelligible and logically coherent specification which makes nonkilling formulation open to the critical assessment. The third section deals with the information collection efforts and the indicators that we should define to measure how close we are to this vision. It is argued here that some of the recent global attempts to measure the killing/nonkilling objectives are misleading because they are misguided. With the specified fundamental objective in our hand a whole range of better attributes could be defined to measure and monitor our progress toward the global vision of nonkilling. Building a set of alternative futures can also be guided by the specified fundamental objective. In the fourth section, evolutionary evidences about the story of leaving Africa and then populating the globe are introduced and counter-factual thinking is suggested as a powerful tool to develop alternative futures. Also some implications of the sophisticated brain related technologies are addressed.

A Call for Global Transformation

Historical records suggest that up till now political killing has claimed almost 400 million human lives across the globe. Also, in the US, since WWII, homicide victims registered nearly 750,000 which go well beyond war casualties reported at 650,053 in the same period (Paige, 2009). Today individuals have a great deal of control over their own mortality. But over one million people prematurely die each year in the US (44.5% of all deaths) due to their personal decisions (Keeney, 2008). Given all the relevant statistics on mortality, violence, lethality, and killing one could only react by justification, seeking the causes of killing in the human nature and the needs of people on the one hand and the environment constraints on the other hand. Supported by the ancient wisdom most of the elite observers, with the possible exception of professional futurists and visionaries, are often doubtful about the possibility of a killing-free global society.

Unless you count the vast majority of nonkilling people as nonhumans, there is no firm ground to support the idea that humans are natural born killers. New research in primate and other kinds of animals shows a biological basis for co-operative and empathetic behavior and concludes that humans are naturally nice (de Waal, 2009; Bekoff and Pierce, 2009). Moreover, Paige (2009) provides ample evidences which demonstrate that prototypical nonkilling local societies already exist in the global experience. Therefore attempts toward the realization of a killing-free global society are not based on utopian speculative pure imagination. For typical futurists a prospect characterized by zero killing remains an uncertain prospect, i.e. only the probability of this scenario is unknown and not its possibility. But, despite the evidences, the majority of people, including the contemporary political scientists, still view it a null event. People might have diverse weighting schemes and judged probabilities with respect to the alternative futures of killing or nonkilling. However, Kahneman and Tversky (2000) in the prospect theory point out that the impact of scenario A on our judged probabilities is greater when it is added to the null event than when it is added to some nonnull event B. This is known as the possibility effect which highlights the point that in people's decision weighting, an event has greater impact when it turns impossibility into possibility.

Paige (2009) first attempts to turn impossibility of nonkilling into possibility in order to change our judged probabilities and then prescribe his formula for a transformation to achieve the single medium-long term goal of global nonkilling: *Nonkilling global transformation = S4 x L C I R* Where: *S4* are spirit, science, skills, and song; *L* is democratic leadership; *C* is citizen empowerment; *I* is institutional expressions; and *R* is resource commitments. Explaining his

formula he suggests that "spirit, science, skills, and song, creatively combined through need responsive processes of democratic leadership and citizen empowerment, amplified by institutional expressions and resource commitments can contribute to realization of a nonkilling world."

Making clear statements about an audacious goal such as zero global killing in the political science and vocation is rare if not unprecedented. But visionary companies in their strategic business management indeed define and pursue Big Hairy Audacious Goals (BHAG); single medium-long term organization-wide goals likely to be externally questionable, but not internally regarded as impossible (Collins and Porras, 1994). Seen from the Moon, the big hairy audacious goal of global nonkilling may seem questionable but internally on the Earth several communities and individuals are consistently proving otherwise. Nonkilling leaders continue to arise throughout the world. Until 2009, 94 of 195 countries and territories have abolished the death penalty, 27 countries have different sorts of nonmilitary statehood. Using nonlethal weapons is increasing and conscientious objection to killing in military service has been recognized in 54 countries.

Applying Value Focused Thinking

Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) is a philosophy of decision making and a useful method for prescriptive decision analysis (Keeney, 1992). The main advantages to be gained from VFT are:

- Guiding strategic thinking
- Identifying decision opportunities
- Creating alternatives
- Guiding information collection
- Improving communication
- Facilitating involvement in multiple-stakeholder decisions
- Interconnecting decisions
- Evaluating alternatives
- Uncovering hidden objectives

In VFT a decision is framed by the values and the alternatives. The values are explicitly expressed in the fundamental objectives and the set of alternatives is called the decision context. An important distinction is made between the fundamental and means objectives. A fundamental objective characterizes an essential reason for interest in the decision situation, they are important because they are important, whereas the means objectives

are important because they are means to the achievement of the fundamental objectives. VFT suggests that one should structure fundamental objectives in a hierarchy and means objectives in a network. The fundamental objectives in the hierarchy are not only prioritized but also specified. In the network of means objectives they are linked to each other through means-ends relationships. Therefore the structuring logic of fundamental objectives compared to the means objectives is completely different.

An objective, either fundamental or means, has a straightforward definition in VFT: It is characterized by three features: an object, a decision context, and a direction of preference. By taking nonkilling as the object, the global and local as the context and maximizing as the preference then the overall fundamental objective could be stated as "maximizing global and local nonkilling". This Big Hairy Audacious Goal of global and local nonkilling is important per se and thus should be considered the fundamental objective. All other objectives of interest, however identified, are means objectives and are tools to achieve it. A suggestion would be using the logically related fundamental objective defined as: "minimizing global and local killing of humans". But here we deliberately do not use it for two reasons. First, framing effects, largely studied in the behavioral decision making, show that even though logically related, and in a normative perspective they are indeed the same, but once presented to humans this framing may elicit different judgment and subsequent choice and action. Second, given the huge focus on killing and "violence-accepting classics of the past", a transformative focus on nonkilling could enormously help "challenge seriously the assumption of lethality".

Specification, like a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) which is an essential tool for project management professionals, breaks an objective into logical parts. The lower-level objectives under any higher-level objective are the answer to the question "What aspect of the higher-level objective is important?" There should be at least two lower-level objectives connected to any higher-level objective. These lower-level objectives are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive to characterize the higher-level objective. A higher-level objective is defined by the set of lower-level objective directly under it. For example, the fundamental objective of commitment to nonkilling (a higher-level objective) could be specified by a) no killing of humans and b) no threats to kill c) no weapons designed to kill humans d) no justifications for killing, and e) no conditions of society dependent upon killing which are lower-level objectives. Likewise, maximizing group nonkilling methods could be broken down to 1) for leaders and 2) for citizens.

According to Paige (2009) a central theme in the transformation formula for realizing the nonkilling is maximizing the knowledge of past, present and future causes of nonkilling in the social institutions and diverse human vocations. For specifying this fundamental objective even more, in particular with respect to the future, applying the four components of Dator (1996) for shaping tomorrow is helpful. He suggests that the future emerges from the interaction of the four components described below:

- Images: They are positive visions of the future, reflected in the ideas, hopes, beliefs, values, and concerns about the future.
- Trends: Ordered data or measurable facts seen in the historical developments either up/down or cyclical and including new emerging issues.
- Events: Things utterly unknowable and out of the blue, occasions that may or may not repeat
- Actions: Efforts which are based on the images of the future with the intention of influencing it.

When considering the causes of nonkilling in the past and present the image of perpetual peace put forward by Kant, the trend of increasing successful nonkilling struggles and movements (such as Gandhian and Kingian), the event or occasion of King Frederick I of Prussia in 1713 to exempt pacifist Mennonites from conscription, and the action of removing economic support for lethality help specify the fundamental objective.

Table 1 shows the WBS or fundamental objective hierarchy to maximize global and local nonkilling. Using this conceptual tool we can enhance strategic thinking, identify opportunities, create better alternatives, efficiently collect information, and most importantly, develop scenarios on the future of nonkilling. In this structure the part on nonkilling has been expanded to highlight the major contributions of Paige in his seminal work. The detail aspects of killing are evident more or less for many observers and analysts and are subtracted from the text (an action aimed at encouraging nonkilling). Also causes of transition between killing and nonkilling are yet to be studied by political scientists.

Table 1. Fundamental Objective Hierarchy
Maximize Global and Local Nonkilling in terms of

Commitment to	No killing of humans
	No threats to kill
	No weapons designed to kill humans
	No justifications for killing
	No conditions dependent upon killing for:
	- Maintenance of society
	- Change of society

Knowledge of past, present, and future

Causes of killing in the:

- Academic disciplines
- Social institutions and vocations

Causes of nonkilling in the:

- Academic disciplines such as:
    - Military and Defense
    - Political Science
    - Psycho-bio-neuro-logical Science
    - Social Science
    - Economics
    - Environement
    - The Arts
    - Classical Texts
        - Spiritual (religious, secular)
        - Philosophical (Western, Eastern)
    - Others
- Social institutions and vocations, manifested in:
    - Images:
        - Perpetual peace
        - Nonviolent Revolution
        - Army-free nations
        - Execution-free countries
        - Weapon-free zones:
        - Nonkilling ecology
    - Actions:
        - Nonkilling security
        - Nonkilling civilian defense
        - End war taxes
        - Abolish weapons
        - Remove economic support for lethality
        - Protect the human rights
        - Protect the environment
        - Subtract lethality from classical texts
    - Trends:
        - Abolition of the death penalty
        - Nonmilitary statehood
        - Use of nonlethal weapons
        - Conscientious objection to killing
        - Nonkilling leaders in the world
        - Nonkilling struggles/movements
    - Events:
        - Jeannette Rankin (1916)
        - King Frederick I (1713)
        - Pacifist Quakers (1682-1776)
        - Pharaoh Shabaka (c.760-c.695 BCE)
        - Emperor Ashoka (c.262 BCE)

	Causes of transition between killing and nonkilling in the - Academic disciplines and vocations: - Social institutions
Creative capabilities, practices and skills	Individual nonkilling methods for: - Leaders - Citizens Group nonkilling methods for: - Leaders - Citizens
Inspiration	Poetry, novel and film for the celebration of peace Nonkilling as an integral element of future cultural identity Ecological responsibility

Attributes to Measure and Monitor

In VFT the set of fundamental objectives should be essential, controllable, complete, measurable, operational, decomposable, nonredundant, concise, and understandable. These properties have several benefits among them is the easier identification of attributes to measure the achievement of the overall fundamental objective. There are three types of attributes: natural, constructed, and proxy. Natural attributes are those measures or indictors that are in general use and have a common interpretation for all. To minimize costs the natural attribute is "costs in dollars". When there is no natural attribute we can either construct an attribute to measure the associated objective directly or measure it indirectly using a proxy attribute. A constructed attribute is often made up of descriptions of several different levels of impact and a proxy attribute for a fundamental objective is a natural or direct measure for a means objective that influences (with other means objectives) that fundamental objective.

For no killing of humans, nonmilitary statehoods, and nonkilling leaders, there are of course natural attributes; their numbers, however, the normative-empirical paradigm shift in the political science has to be measured by constructed attributes that may combine seven interdependent sub-fields 1) normative 2) factual 3) theoretical 4) educational 5) applied 6) institutional and 7) methodological. But nonkilling as a source of pride and cultural identity is even harder to measure and thus needs a proxy attribute. Number of Nobel peace prize laureates from a region could be such an attribute. This attribute indirectly measures how much people see nonkilling as a source of pride. Another proxy attribute could be the number of all sorts of prestigious global and national peace prizes that people attempt to win. Also it is worthwhile to note that the WBS shown in the Table 1. provides a founda-

tion for different levels of a constructed attribute to measure the overall fundamental objective of Maximize Global and Local Nonkilling.

Humanity is increasingly becoming conscious of itself. Information age has played a key role to enable this transformative global change. Launched in 1996 amid a very doubtful environment, where "many assumed it would produce an incoherent mess", the Millennium Project continue to serve as a collective global future intelligence gathering, analyzing and sharing body that document and report important indicators on 15 global challenges (Glenn, Gordon, Florescu, 2011). The State of the Future Index (SOFI) is "a measure of the 10-year outlook for the future. It is constructed with key variables and forecasts that, in the aggregate, depict whether the future promises to be better or worse." Two of the 15 global challenges are directly related to the nonkilling fundamental objective because they care about, measure and monitor security strategies that reduce ethnic conflict, terrorism, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational organized crime networks. Using VFT one can think of the remaining 13 global challenges such as the genuine democracies, population growth, rich-poor gap, sufficient clean water, and meeting energy demands as means objectives that impact the fundamental objective of global and local nonkilling. Among the natural attributes in the SOFI that measure nonkilling related objective are:

- Major armed conflicts (number of deaths >1,000)
- People killed or injured in terrorist attacks (number)
- Countries that have or are strongly suspected to have plans for nuclear weapons (number)
- Homicides, intentional (per 100,000 population)

In the most recent SOFI, the Millennium Project's participants see improvements in terms of major armed conflicts and countries that have or are strongly suspected to have plans for nuclear weapons but people killed or injured in terrorist attacks shows backsliding. Glenn (2011) concludes that "traditional military wars have decreased over the past two decades, cross-cultural dialogues are flourishing, and intrastate conflicts are increasingly being settled by international interventions."

By February 2011 there were 22,000 nuclear warheads in the world, 2,000 of which are ready for use by the United States and Russia. The United States and Russia continue to reduce their nuclear weapons, whereas China, India, and Pakistan are on the course of proliferation. By December 2011, there were 10 major armed conflicts with at least 1,000 deaths per year, down from 14 in 2010.

However, considering that the fundamental objective here is maximizing global and local nonkilling, the SOFI is rather misguided by the logically related yet different objective of minimizing global and local killing. By referring to the Table 1 it is evident that we can introduce new, reasonable, and more sensible attributes that measure and monitor maximizing the nonkilling objective instead of minimizing the killing objective. This will help the MP participants to alter their mental model and seriously challenge the assumption of lethality. If we do not measure continuously and monitor, for instance, the weapons-free zones, execution-free countries, and number of award winning published poetry, novel and film for the celebration of peace then the majority of futurists may not care about upward or downward nonkilling trends let alone other members of the global society.

The recent work of Pinker (2011) is yet another misguided attempt that tries to shed light on the status of global nonkilling. His book which has already drawn significant mainstream attention including numerous book reviews first tries to establish as a fact that today it is less likely that on average a person may die as a result of killing or witness the killing of other humans. And then embarks on an argument explaining why we seem to see a decline of violence. Even though it has a disapproval attitude toward Psychopath killers but stops short of making the same case against the Goal-Driven killers.

According to Paige (2009) today the ultimate Hobbesian state, responsible for highly organized, centralized and goal-driven killing of humans, is the United States which has:

> Extended its lethal capabilities to encompass the globe. From less than one thousand men in the Revolutionary era the nation's regular armed forces by the 1990s had grown to 1.5 million men and women, backed by 23,000 Pentagon planners, an innovative scientific elite, and the world's most advanced weapons industry—all made possible by annual commitments of at least a quarter trillion taxpayer dollars approved by the Congress and the President.

Nonetheless, without having the fundamental objective of nonkilling in mind, Pinker (2011) introduces an ill-informed perspective: more civilization even though under the huge influence of goal-driven violence-accepting philosophical and spiritual classics, implies less killing. In addition, a dangerous implicit assumption is that proportional rates or the number of killed with respect to world population is a reasonable attribute. He suggests that, for instance, if the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Using such at-

tributes to project a peaceful global society implies that the road is open for all potential killers to kill as long as they have not reached the historically calculated proportional quota because for that matter we, on average, will still live in a relatively peaceful era. Also, on average probabilistic thinking with regard to violence and killing is in stark contrast with the vision of a global nonkilling society where "the basic unit of nonkilling political analysis is the individual human being" (Paige, 2009).

Longer Term Scenarios

In a critical realism perspective, which is an appropriate epistemology for futures studies, in the first step we can assert statements about the future that are called *posits*. They are defined as what we treat as true, although we do not know whether they are true, in order to explore alternative possibilities for the future, including improbable ones. In the second stage *knowledge surrogates* are produced, posits that we accept as conjectural knowledge. They can be subjected to test, first, by making the grounds for them explicit, intelligible, and logically coherent which make formulations open to the critical assessment of others, and, second, by attempting to refute them by examining their consistency with relevant past and present facts (Bell, 2003). For most observers a global nonkilling society may remain simply a *posit*. But for the futurists the specified fundamental objective in Table 1 provides a conjectural knowledge; an explicit, intelligible, and logically coherent ground which is open for critical assessment. As mentioned above, guiding strategic thinking is one of the key advantages of VFT.

A key assumption of futures studies notes that: "Not everything that will exist has existed or does exist". And Wittgenstein (2001) points out that: "If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning". Clearly a future not-yet-existing possibility or scenario that was in the world from the beginning is achieving the specified fundamental objective shown in Table 1 in terms of all relevant natural, constructed, and proxy attributes.

Even though this future might appear for many to be an utterly visionary scenario one could assert an even more visionary posit: when there will be no killing related words, terms, or expressions in human languages. This does not mean euphemisms that "customarily cloak real killing." (Paige, 2009) Instead, it describes a future world where people will not be able to find corresponding practices in reality that semantically match to words such as kill, torture, aggression, assault, violence, etc.

From a biological and evolutionary perspective we can perform a counterfactual thinking involving the role of the mitochondrial DNA. Mitochondria lie in the cytoplasm of eukaryotic cells and they provide energy to the cell. We humans are a huge collection of eukaryotic cells and inherit our mitochondria from our mothers, they from their mothers, they from their mothers, and so on. Any mutation in the mitochondrial DNA is therefore passed in a direct female line of descent. If we trace back the female line of descent we reach a common female ancestor who is the head of the mitochondrial haplogroup. Every haplogroup in turn branches off to several haplotypes.

A recent research sheds light on the relationship between mitochondrial haplotypes and killing propensity. This helps provide a rather powerful support for people who seek the causes of both killing and nonkilling in the human nature. Moreover, it highlights the point that the possibility of a global nonkilling society was in the world from the beginning.

Among the African hunter gatherers the tribe !Kung carries the most basal mitochondrial DNA haplogroup L0. !Kung do not kill and conflicts are addressed through creative problem-solving such as humor. Before the migration out of Africa, three main lines of humans diverged from the !Kung line: L1, L2, L3.

The mitochondrial haplogroup L1is characterized by peaceful gatherings: storytelling, music, and dancing. The mitochondrial haplogroup L2 is a pacific society too with no preference for killing or simulated killing. But the mitochondrial haplogroup L3 is the killing-prone one. It has been proposed that all non-Africans are bearers of haplotypes M and N, closely related in an L3 subbranch. Foragers of both N and M mitochondrial haplogroups share the activity of killing and simulated killing (i.e. ritual gatherings). In short, a tribe of belligerent people has populated the Earth (Moreno, 2010). But we can wonder what would have happened if haplogroup L1 or L2 populated the globe.

Despite the killing-prone genetic codes there is indeed some good news in the burgeoning scientific fields that may help us control how genes are expressed. The total human sequence consists of approximately 3.2 billion base pairs. Only a small percentage of the human genome (less than 2 percent) encodes proteins. The protein encoding regions are called genes. Genes usually change at very slow rate and disappearance of a gene could take as long as millions of years. DNA sequences that do not encode proteins are sometimes referred to as "junk DNA" (reflecting our current ignorance about their biological function) (Hodge, 2010). Some noncoding DNA sequences, however, have a known function, they regulate when and where genes are expressed. This switching feature is called epigenetics. Al-

though genes remain intact for millions of years, epigenes have a relatively fast rate of change. Epigenes help understand the complex dynamic reciprocity between nurture and nature. For epigenes it takes three to four generations to reach their full effect and the same amount of time is required to wipe their effect off from the population. In line with the key role of environment in promoting nonviolence and nonkilling, Participants in the Exploratory Colloquium on Neuroscience and Nonkilling at the Center for Global Nonkilling (2009) suggest that upbringing and diet (both significant topics in epigenetics) play a role in creating conditions for a propensity toward violence. For example, maternal nurturing (through holding and breastfeeding) from birth through especially the first three years of life, has significant impacts on brain development which affects the propensity for violence.

For the foreseeable future we should also pay a great deal of attention to the potential impacts of empirical scientific findings and future technology applications that may directly engage brains of both human and nonhuman (i.e. robotic) generators and consumers of politically significant content. The dynamics of international politics depends on the future scenarios of cooperation and conflict across the globe which is well reflected in the peaceful or violent competition among human ideas and thought products. Today almost all of the initiatives and diplomatic projects and media works are informed and directed from the established political theory, media theory, as well as international law.

All the current nonkilling engagement tools that are usually exploited to influence political judgment, decision, and action on the individual and group levels are based on media theory, decision theory, and psychology theory. In such a frame the dominant paradigm is to indirectly engage brains of both leaders and ordinary citizens through cyber space networks, platforms, and applications. There has been some recent significant and accelerating growth of knowledge about the Nano, Bio, Information, and Cognitive (NBIC) technologies and especially mapping the functions of human brain areas that could be useful for, say, Predictive Policing and Mental Surveillance. But the potential impacts of these achievements on international politics and the importance of deciding whether Thoughts of Mass Destruction or Placeless Brains Triumph should emerge have yet to be identified. Brain technology applications are still futuristic concepts that need more progress and require even more R&D investments. DARPA program entitled "Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales" (ADAMS) with the aim of analyzing the digital trails to uncover hostile intentions is an example. Today in addition to the nonkilling political science a prospective neuropolitics is needed too before these technologies are commercialized (Dunagan, 2011, Motlagh, 2011).

Conclusion

From a futures perspective, a global nonkilling society should be treated as an uncertain prospect. This presumes that this vision is possible in the first place. People might differ on how likely it will be for us to achieve it. However, taking into account the past and present facts any argument about the possibility should be a nonissue. After applying Value-Focused Thinking we made a coherent, multi-layered, intelligible, and future-aware specification to capture the essence of the prescriptive nonkilling formula. Framing our fundamental objective as maximizing nonkilling instead of minimizing killing implies that our strategic thinking, collection of information and monitoring the related facts will be fundamentally different. Evolutionary evidences suggest that killing-prone mitochondrial haplogroups have moved out of Africa to populate the globe. However, the nonkilling-prone mitochondrial haplogroups lived and continue to live in our world too. In other words, a global nonkilling global society which will be committed to creative problem-solving was a major possibility in the world from the beginning. The accelerating growing knowledge about the genetic codes and how to control the gene expression offer a tremendous opportunity to revive this possibility in the medium and long term. Also, neuroscience findings and developments pose some serious new challenges for the future political science and vocation in terms of predicting the violent minds and then launch preemptive efforts to maximize nonkilling. A huge preoccupation with the sophisticated science and technology, however, may distract us from very simple yet largely effective ways that will shape the futures of nonkilling. On the personal and family level, a better upbringing, a better diet, and a better personal decision making may help us achieve the fundamental objective of global nonkilling as well. On the community and social levels lots of inspiring stories are continuously discovered while focusing on a nonkilling perspective. During the 1600's the Iroquois Indian tribes in North America, engaged in warfare with many other tribes. The men had absolute control over when to declare war. Women resorted to boycott of sex and not giving access to cultivating crops. Under this creative pressure, men eventually gave up and agreed to grant women the veto power concerning all wars (Vanchieri, 2011).

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Chapter Four

Catastrophe and Progress in Nonkilling Futures

Imag(in)ing Technology and the Cultural Conditioning Zone of the Dream Society

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As the recent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa suggest, the struggle for equality and justice that underly nonkilling futures remains just that—a simultaneously inspiring, for what might come to be, and frightening, for what has been allowed to persist, image of *a* present whose inegalitarian misgivings have come home to roost. While it might seem prudent and perhaps even necessary to focus one's gaze firmly upon the tumult of *the* present and *the* (presumed) future to follow, as Dator's first Law of the Future suggests: "'the future' cannot be 'predicted' because 'the future' does not exist." In radically de-temporalizing *the* future and consequently problematizing *the* present, Dator's assertion strikes down the commonly-held, if not intuitive, premise that tomorrow will look a whole lot like today, and this maxim serves as a reminder that it was, if anything, a lack of foresight that both masked and encouraged the violent incursions within the Arab Awakening, especially as archaic governance systems lashed out in response to dissidents employing social mediation technologies, primarily Facebook, Twitter, etc., that were beyond the control, at least initially, of the region's provincial hegemons. As this tangible trend relates to *the* future, Dator's suspension of the definite article, which affirms that there are indeed *futures*, presences a fragmentation on both spatial and temporal planes; thus, alternative futures exist as identifiable, examinable, and experiential phenomena, even if only as imaginings in and of *the* present. Indeed, one can argue that it was such an imagining of the future(s) that led thousands of citizens to occupy peacefully Tahrir Square in Egypt and other public spaces across the region in protest, and as many continue to risk life and limb against their own governments, it is certainly the prospect of an as yet undetermined and alternative future(s) that clearly inspires such resolve—an image that gives many outside these regions hope that more equitable and just futures are being birthed.

In the wake of these seemingly viral protests, the place and function of technology has ascended in importance among those seeking to situate this historic turn of events. In the parlance of Marshall McLuhan, was the medium the message? Did social media generate, metaphorically if not literally, social change? Technology as a driver of social and political change has come to the fore through the events of the present, and the impact of mediation technologies require further examination and analysis. As such, it is crucial to be clear about what is precisely meant by technology, and even though most deploy the term intuitively, it is necessary to instantiate a definition of how it is understood and contextualized for the purposes of this project. As used in this examination, technology refers to nothing less than the defining characteristic of what it means to be human—an attribute internal to the conditions of possibility for humanity to subsist. As Dator explains, "For good or ill (and it may be ill), humans become humans and change the meaning of what it means to be human (i.e. change 'human nature') in large measure by interacting with themselves and their environment through their technologies. The technological-human relationship is thus symbiotic and not parasitical" (Dator 1983: 29). To be human is to engage intimately with the technological, but it is very much apparent that present technologies have set humanity on a course toward the trans- and post-human, even though it is already the case that cyborgs, and to a lesser extent androids, walk among us. In negotiating the relationship between technology and social change, it is obvious that this interrelation is causal, but it is equally apparent that the link is inherently imaginative, which is to say grounded in possibilities and potentialities. As the still unfolding events of the Arab Spring suggest, technologies inspire in as much as they transpire images of the future, and it is this delicate balance between the two, which is negotiated in the present, that requires clearer articulation.

Dator's addendum to the first law, which calls for alternative futures to be forecast, implies that one of, if not, the most crucial dimensions of futures research centers on the critical engagement of the myriad forms of cultural production from various socio-cultural milieux of the past and present. One cannot begin to understand and/or forecast where things might go without a firm grasp of where things are and/or were, and as we live in an age of seemingly ubiquitous mediation, which is particularly noticeable in the U.S. where social media accounts for "one in every six minutes" spent online, situating the function and role of media in its various forms is paramount (Lippman 2011). Wading through these ceaseless flows of information and media, futurists systematically and rigorously analyze and examine

these imag(in)ings, as they are hybrids with equal parts imaging and imagining, to create new mediations for considering alternative futures—as such, imag(in)ing is used herein to denote the complex nature and function of the image from the futurist's perspective. Consequently, the influence of media on the formation of these imag(in)ings of the futures is immeasurable, and if there is one constant in contemporary imag(in)ings of the future and contemporary media, it is certainly killing and/or the threat of killing.

As Hall and Pilisuk contend, "In developed societies, unless we live in high-violence urban zones, our images of how violent humans are derive less from what we witness directly and more from media depictions" (Hall and Pilisuk, 2012: 128). As one of the more likely scapegoats as to why cycles of killing persist in modern culture, media, especially in its popular forms, has become, for better or worse, a means by which one can gauge impressions and contentions as to what the future can and might hold. While violence and killing have been part and parcel of media from pre-agricultural to information societies, film is unique in the way in which it provokes and stimulates the brain, perhaps most dramatically through mirror neurons, since, as Gallese explains, "the observed action produces in the observer's premotor cortex an activation pattern resembling that occurring when the observer actively executes the same action" (Gallese, 2001: 6). While the neuroscientific impact of film on the brain is still being explored and cannot be presumed to be fully deterministic in understanding media's role in perpetuating cycles of violence and killing, the powerful affects of cinema offer extraordinarily rich resources for analyzing and studying imag(in)ings of the future(s). As a decidedly mass form of art that reflects an interpretative context and affective presence by which social, political, and economic issues are revealed and, at times, concealed, film grants one purchase on facets of one's experience that escape conscious sensation. As Benjamin observes, "By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring common place milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action" (Benjamin, 2005). For Benjamin, film offers a complete nexus between the macro- and micro-dimensions of one's experience of the world, but the ultimate judgment as to what is seen (and unseen) rests with the spectator, and it is precisely the "comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives" that is most useful for situating film within nonkilling futures.

Beyond the limits of the viewer and within the conscious eye of the camera there are deeper and more subtle phenomena whose value lies in

its recalcitrant invisibility—it is precisely what the screen represents unintentionally or suggestively through an "unconscious optics" that has the greatest weight in situating contemporary images of the future, and just as the eyes perceive unconsciously, the ultimate task of the futurist is to see, hear, taste, smell, and touch things that escape sensation in the present (Benjamin, 2005). Uncovering and decoding this latent imagery, futurists can, and ought to, mine the depths of filmic imag(in)ings in order to study and engage contemporary images of the future(s) with particular attention to those that are widely diffused as these mediations shape, even if indirectly, social and cultural conceptualizations of the potentiality for alternative futures, which is simply to say a tomorrow that might not look and feel like today. As method, filmic imag(in)ing considers the unconcealed imaging of cinema as an aesthetic form of sensory engagement, surveys the masked imag(in)ings inherent within cinematic media and the subsequent internalization inherent to the viewer's sensory experience on screen and in the world, and situates the production of certain types and forms of filmic media at specific (and perhaps futures) historical moments, which positions them within what Paige calls the "cultural conditioning zone" of the funnel of killing, which is a sort of cartography from the neuro-physiological influences through the actual act of killing (Evans Pim, 2002: 23).

Mapping the textures and flows of filmic imag(in)ings, futurists should engage the distinctly micropolitical aspects of cinema as a means to distill drivers and inhibitors to preferred future scenarios within the cultural conditioning zone, which encompasses "religions, political 'isms,' celebration of triumphs and atrocities, family traditions, law, mass communications, and the arts" (Evans Pim, 2002: 75). Engaging contemporary filmic imag(in)ings of the future, this project reflects upon four popular films to flesh out the skeletal structure of alternative scenarios for post-information societies or what Rolf Jensen calls "The Dream Society" (Jensen). Jensen's neologism refers to market conditions of capitalism within increasingly ubiquitous media environments, and while it is clear that the global culture industry is hastily advancing toward this end, the Dream Society is less a form or type of specific media than a totality of mediation, which pairs nicely with DeBord's "Society of the Spectacle." For DeBord, and perhaps for Jensen, the institutionalization of mass communication foments "social relationship[s] between people that [are] mediated by images," which when aggregated become an all-encompassing, yet amorphous, superstructure (DeBord, 1967: 4). Another prominent deployment of the Dream Society concept stems from Dator and Yongseok's analysis of the Republic of South Korea's calcu-

lated movement toward a "dream society of icons and aesthetic experience" (Dator and Yongseok). In their estimation, the Dream Society is one where mediation technologies have become an equally, if not preferred, mode of experiencing reality, and narrative and aesthetic considerations are central to an individual's conscious, material, and perhaps even spiritual sense of being-in-the-world. The critical dimension among this constellation of ideations about the Dream Society hinges on the question of agency within a technologically-driven and mediated *body politic*.

Although seeds of this future continue to germinate in the present, it is precisely the unthinkable and unimaginable nature of technology within the Dream Society that makes it useful for examining the cultural conditioning zones, or the spaces of social mediation, for nonkilling futures. For this project, the Dream Society is useful for exploring the micropolitical possibilities and potentialities of nonkilling futures within scenarios of advanced technological development as a point of entry to the social conditions requisite for nonkilling future(s) to arise. Utilizing *Children of Men* (2006), *Minority Report* (2002), *Inception* (2010), and *The Animatrix* (2003), this projects surveys contemporary imag(in)ings of the future through the Manoa School's alternative scenarios modeling technique, which uses four generic images of the future—collapse, disciplined, growth, and transformation. Explaining the foundation for this division, Dator notes, "These four futures are "generic" in the sense that varieties of specific images characteristic of them all share common theoretical, methodological and data bases which distinguish them from the bases of the other three futures, and yet each generic form has a myriad of specific variations reflective of their common basis" (Dator, 2009: 7). While the four futures are generally used to distill distinct alternative scenarios, the Manoa School method is useful for elucidating disparate potentialities and possibilities while employing similar, if not the same, drivers to define the parameters for a scenario, especially as the "four generic forms differ from each other fundamentally in cosmology, epistemology, and often deontology, and are not variations on a common set of themes" (Dator, 2009: 7). Consequently, the four generic images of the future are used herein to map alternative imag(in)ings of the Dream Society with an eye toward probing the decidedly somatic and micropolitical dimensions of technology as a driver within nonkilling imag(in)ings of the future(s). Will further technological development ameliorate or exacerbate the prospect of nonkilling futures? What technologies might forestall and/or inspire a nonkilling future? Might the Dream Society portend a truly nonkilling future?

Collapse: Playing Games with *Children of Men*

> Dirty government hands out suicide kits and anti-depressants in the rations but ganja is still illegal (Cuarón, 2006).

Alfonso Cuarón's critically acclaimed 2006 film, *Children of Men*, takes place in the highly militarized setting of England circa 2027 amidst a global social, economic, and political collapse. Loosely based on P.D. James' 1992 novel, *The Children of Men*, the film's main narrative follows the harrowing events surrounding a miraculously pregnant woman, Kee, in a future where humanity has lost the ability to reproduce and where the United Kingdom is the world's only remaining sovereign, yet highly militarized, state. Following the death of the world's youngest person, the 18-year old "Baby Diego," and after a near-fatal escape from a bombing at a coffee shop, Theo, the main protagonist, gets ensnared by his former wife, Julian, to help deliver Kee to the Human Project, a rogue international collective seeking to solve the world's infertility epidemic. While this "modern day nativity story" offers a critical imag(in)ing of a future in which nationalist interests foster rampant killing, the film appears to take an ambiguous stance on technology as an aid and/or restraint to a (non)killing society, even though the film is put forth here as a collapse alternative of the Dream Society (Stevens 2006). Closing with Theo and Kee escaping peril at a refugee camp and making contact with the Human Project, the film's happy ending is tempered by the micropolitical imag(in)ing of a highly segregated society where even the threat of no future, generationally speaking, is still not enough of a motivator to inhibit killing. While there is much that can and might be drawn from the film's imag(in)ing of the future, the most useful scene for exploring the question and place of technology in relation to a nonkilling future derives from a scene where Theo visits his cousin, Nigel, who works as a minister in the government and who helps Theo secure transit papers himself and Kee. As Theo and Nigel converse over a lavish meal, they are joined by the latter's young-adult son, Alex, who is entranced by an interactive video game, which appears as a sort of virtual rubic's cube that he controls through a device that rests next to what appears to be an identification bracelet worn on his right wrist.

While Alex, who sports various prominent tattoos and some scarring on his right cheek as artifacts of a troubled youth, frantically clicks his fingers and motions his hand as part of the game, the camera shows him ignoring his dinner and never breaking eye contact with the game's display, which makes his presence at the dinner table spurious. During a pause in the conversation between Nigel and Theo, his father repeatedly whispers to Alex, whose ar-

gyle sweater and tame hair acts as a thin veneer masking his checkered past, that it is time to take his pills, but his son's lack of response drives his father to scream his name wildly, which jolts Theo from his glass of wine. As one of the most dynamic scenes in the film, Alex's seemingly narcotic fixation with his personal gaming device offers an imag(in)ing of how immersive gaming technologies, which have recently become fashionable as a site for exploring how virtual problem-solving might translate into tackling real-life challenges, factor into nonkilling futures, and this scene is best read alongside some recent literature concerning gaming technologies and the prospect of creating a preferred, which is also to say nonkilling, future.

Caption 1 and 2. *Children of Men* directed by Alfonso Cuarón (courtesy of Universal Pictures)

In 2011, Jane McGonigal released *Reality of Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can Change the World* to great fanfare and widespread praise. As a sort of prophet for the positive dimensions of video games, McGonigal proclaims, "Compared with games, reality is pointless and unrewarding. Games help us feel more rewarded for making our best effort" (McGonigal, 2011). For McGonigal, the negatives aspects of contemporary

gaming, especially pro-killing first-person shooter platforms and the harmful effects of playing over twenty hours per week, are secondary to the positives, particularly the interactive and collaborative components imbued within the community and team-building skills requisite to massive multiplayer online gaming environments. Indeed, McGonigal willfully overlooks the pro-killing ethos endemic to much of contemporary, and likely future, gaming, but when she does engage the "shoot first and ask questions later" gaming paradigm, it is only as a means to extract her perspective on the underlying social dynamic driving such gameplay. She observes, "While the 10 billion kill milestone was a significant community achievement, *Halo* players have actually spent more time working on two other epic projects—both collaborative knowledge projects" (McGonigal, 2011). As one of the world's most popular and widely-played video games, *Halo*, which grosses billions in related merchandising revenue, is a perfect example of the types of economies that underly gaming as a global multi-billion dollar industry now and perhaps in the future(s), and the creation and maintenance of "epic projects" centered on the game are but an extension of the transnational industry marketing for a game that hosts more "active personnel [than] all twenty-five of the largest armed forces in the real world, combined" (McGonigal, 2011).

McGonigal's gleeful complicity with this type of economy offers a lens from which to situate Alex as an emissary of a future where gaming has overtaken reality, which is also to say that the transnational corporations creating and producing games have taken over reality. In this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, one's very sense of self is intimately tied to the way in which one is able to navigate the predefined and prescribed challenges of virtuality, and as with past and present gaming interfaces as a guide, one can draw on an infinite number of lives, which trivializes killing and positions the act of killing and dying as necessary evils or mere hurdles to the ultimate goal of mission completion and victory. Furthermore, an individual in this scenario prefers, if not presumes, that reality should mirror one's preferred gaming environment, and this link, which has dire consequences for a nonkilling future, has become trendy among gaming enthusiasts, of which McGonigal speaks the loudest. Explaining her experience as a lead designer at Entertainment 42 working on the popular first-person shooter game, *Gun*, which takes place in the American Wild West of the 1880s, McGonigal recounts her work on an alternate reality campaign as part of the marketing for the game. She explains, "In a world where video gamers are much maligned for being desensitized to violence, it struck me as a particularly provocative idea to send gamers to the *real-world graves* of characters they had

killed in *Gun*" (McGonigal, 2011). When positioned alongside recent studies (Anderson and Dill, 2000; Funk, 2004; Carnagey, Anderson, and Bushman, 2007) that have found a tangible desensitization to violence and decrease in empathy after playing pro-killing video games, McGonigal's "provocative idea" in concert with Alex's presence at the dinner scene points toward the misplaced valorization of gaming technology as a potential savior, even if only virtually, to real-world challenges, especially the potentiality of nonkilling futures. There seems to be as much novelty in asking players to attend an Italian dinner following a marathon Super Mario Brothers gaming session, and the logic by which this type of media, and its underlying economies, have been glossed over is obviously problematic.

Noting the ubiquity of gaming worldwide, Elkington reports, "In the US, there are over 180 million active gamers, each playing over 13 hours a week on average. Wrap in console and mobile phone games and there are more than 4 million gamers in the Middle East, 10 million in Russia, 105 million in India, 10 million in Vietnam, 100 million in Europe and 200 million in China" (Elkington, 2011). As gaming, and the mindset accompanying it, continues to spread across the globe, it is certainly possible, though not probable, that immersive entertainment technologies could usher in a nonkilling future, but McGonigal's optimism definitely seems misplaced. Responding to a direct query about the social components of gaming, she explains, "There's a ton of research that shows playing games with people actually improves relationships with them. You feel more positive about them, you trust them more, and you have a better sense of their strengths and weaknesses, so you're better able to work and collaborate with them in the future" (Bensen, 2011). While her comments give voice to the social bonds of gaming, the link she draws between potential future collaborations is, at best, specious, especially if the nature of one's involvement centers solely on the eradication of zombie Nazis or the retrieval of magical elements to use in virtual combat. This latter aspect, which affirms the materialist critique of contemporary video games, recently came to the fore as reports surfaced from China that prison guards were forcing inmates to mine "virtual gold" as they realized that more money could be made through gaming than by having the prisoners perform manual labor (Nosowitz, 2011). In the cultural conditioning zone of a collapse version of the Dream Society, gaming might just become an opiate-like technology whose regulation and administration portends dire social consequences upon human agency, including further desensitization to killing.

Disciplined: Eye Spy a *Minority Report*

> It's like my daddy used to say: In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king (Spielberg, 2002).

Steven Spielberg's 2002 film, *Minority Report*, received exceptional reviews upon release, and some critics even went so far as to say that the award-winning director was "back" in light of his less than well-received efforts of the 1990's. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, Jensen identifies Spielberg, "the great storyteller of the silver screen, as the closest we now have to a Dream Society icon" (Jensen, 2001: 121). Popular with futurists, especially as the director "convened a think tank of experts for a 3-day brainstorming session to help envision a future half a century hence," and the general public for its portrayal of Washington, D.C. circa 2054 as a high-tech and nonkilling, at the outset of the film at least, society—one that most closely resembles contemporary imag(in)ings of the Dream Society—the film follows the personal and professional struggles of John Anderton, whose fall from grace as the chief of precrime sets off a chain of events that eventually brings the entire precrime system, which is on the precipice of going national, to a halt (Wright, 2008: 482).

While *Minority Report* offers the only genuine nonkilling image of the future among the selected films for this project, it is included here as a disciplined imag(in)ing of the Dream Society since, as Shapiro notes, "Spielberg's *Minority Report* plays out the tension between the machines of capture and the micropolitics of escape" (Shapiro, 2005: 29). As Anderton unravels the mystery behind his (pre)crime—a murder for which he has been deemed guilty but which he has not actually committed—he retreats into the subterranean haunts and black marketplaces that underly the futuristic cityscape—some of which he is already familiar with due to an illegal drug habit. In order to abscond from the exacting gaze of ubiquitous monitoring devices, which are mostly advertisements attuned to one's unique retinal signature that the police can use to track one's movement, Anderton undergoes a complete eye transplant, which coalesces the film's micropolitical imag(in)ing of nonkilling as an affect of perception, even if only by the precognitives, who foresee crimes before they are enacted and have become the society's primary crime deterrent. To be a criminal in this scenario is to see and be seen by the monitoring agencies that regulate actions in the present and the future—used here in the singular as the "precogs" imply more than a modicum of metaphysical determinism.

Caption 3 and 4. *Minority Report* directed by Steven Spielberg (courtesy of DreamWorks Pictures)

Although the many and varied technologies at the disposal of the formidable precrime unit, including the retinal-scanning "spiders" that use electric shocks to subdue assailants, inevitably lead to Anderton's capture, the film's counter-balanced take on technologies, particularly those that can and might be used to foster a nonkilling society, including nonlethal weapons, offers a unique purview from which to examine the potentiality for surveillance technologies to be used within a nonkilling future. Losing sight in one of his new eyes after lifting his bandage too early to elude capture, Anderton loses one of his original eyes, which he carries around in a plastic bag, when he tries to gain access to precrime headquarters. Although this scene provides a moment of comic relief as Anderton is shown chasing his own eyeball as it rolls down the hallway and into a grate in the floor as one might lose a set of keys, the micropolitical relevance of this scene centers on "how human fallibility can undermine even the most advanced security," especially as Anderton is able to use his remaining original eye to gain access to an underground entrance to the secure holding area for the precogs (Wright, 2008: 45). In this rendering of the Dream Society, extraordinary surveillance and security technology is beset by its fundamental humanity, and one might imagine an immense bureaucracy built around such mundane tasks as updating security protocols for subsurface points of entry to precrime headquarters, even and

perhaps especially for former police chiefs who have recently become the city's top criminal suspect. While this scene can certainly be taken as a weak plot point in the film, it cements the film's imag(in)ing of technology as being simultaneously ever-present and yet, at times failingly, indiscernible—a continuous reminder of a society whose false security acts as a facade that can be easily breached by agents whose field of vision is unencumbered by the hypocrisy of its own law, which allows criminals to be prosecuted and judged prior to committing the crimes for which they are charged.

Outlining the specific operations underlying intuitive to this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society and its emergence as a form of "Intelligent government," Bullinga (2004: 32) argues:

> In the years ahead, technology will provide government and society at large with tools for a safer world and for automatic law enforcement. Permits and licenses will be embedded in smart cars, trains, buildings, doors, and devices. Laws will automatically download and distribute themselves into objects in our physical environment, and everything will regularly be updated, just as software is now automatically updated in your desktop computer. Innovations in government will enable us to have a safer environment for law-abiding citizens because built-in intelligence in our environment will minimize fraud, global crime, pandemic diseases, accidents, and disasters. Law-abiding citizens will gain privacy, while criminals will lose it.

Describing many of the experiential facets apparent within *Minority Report*, which actually came out two years before his article, Bullinga's formulation presumes a degree of fluidity and effortlessness with regard to anti-crime and nonkilling technologies that the film does not, and as anyone who has encountered difficulties updating software on a personal computer, to use Bullinga's analogy, can attest, such technologies are often not as simple and seamless as one might imagine. Furthermore, he asserts that citizens within this society will gain additional privacy by making their specific results anonymous and granting them more control over the environment around them. As this plays out in the film, it becomes evident that for each and every instrument of control, there exists an equal and opposite counter-measure that effectively negates the intended impact of the surveillance technologies.

However, *Minority Report* makes it abundantly clear that even in a society without killing, as in the beginning of the film, criminal elements conspire and even thrive by making certain sacrifices, such as, perhaps not surprisingly, life without sight. Correspondingly, Bullinga proclaims, "No technology will be visible. The intelligent environment is about living and being comfortable and

having a nice time and relaxing and resting. The technology is embedded" (Bullinga 2004, 36). The invisibility of the technology is precisely what makes it so dramatically visible through the subtle, yet exacting, ways in which it manages the spatial flows of bodies and, as the film suggests, thoughts through the potentiality of precognitive crime surveillance, which has emerged as an issue in the present. As reported across mainstream media outlets, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is currently lab-testing Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) for possible use in airports and other critical infrastructure locales to combat terrorism. Dubbed an homage to *Minority Report*, which Shapiro actually regards as a "notable ideational challenge to the state's surveillance practices," FAST centers on one's mental aptitude toward promulgating a "disruptive act" through various neural sensing technologies (Shapiro, 2005: 29). Ultimately, this announcement portends a clear intent to develop the requisite surveillance technologies to manufacture a nonkilling society, even if the mere apperception that such technologies, which "measures a variety of physiological indicators, ranging from heart rate to the steadiness of a person's gaze, to judge a subject's state of mind" exist and are under development for use (Weinberger, 2011). In this future, surveillance technologies will know more about one's innermost thoughts and feelings than perhaps one's self even knows, and it is clear that what is primarily embedded about these technologies is a sense of complete fear that one's thoughts are no longer private. As it relates to the film, the opening scene introduces one to the workings of precrime through a red ball, which is the code for a murder that is not premeditated and thus barely within reach of the precogs' awareness, which further extends the film's argument that any technological effort to secure a nonkilling society will inevitably produce a small, albeit manageable, degree of chance, whose variability rests with the imperfection of humanity—one of the film's main themes—even within a seemingly secure and perfect environ.

As an introduction to the human side of precrime's chief, Anderton is shown running through a less-then-friendly neighborhood on a rainy night. While a national advertisement for precrime displays across the sides of buildings and underneath overpasses, Anderton is nearly indistinguishable as a cop with a hood pulled low over his head, and the emptiness of the streets implies that there is no crime to perceive anyway. Although one gets the sense that Anderton is simply blowing off some steam, it quickly becomes evident that his route is not chance as he answers the call of a dealer waiting to supply him with his drug of choice. As the two trade pleasantries during the exchange, the dealer catches Anderton off guard by quipping, "sweet dreams, chief," which demonstrates that even outside of the city's surveillance systems, someone is

always watching. Reassuring Anderton that he is not interested in turning him in, the drug dealer brazenly leans forward to take off his sunglasses revealing that he has no eyes and proclaims, "It's like my daddy used to say: In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king" (Spielberg, 2002).

Coalescing the film's take on technology's ability to deter (pre)crime, particularly killing, this scene rebukes Bullinga's contention that the intelligent environment can and might provide complete solace and safety through surveillance, which has again become an emerging issue as it has recently been reported that popular smart phones, such as Apple's iphone and Google's Android line, secretly create files that "contains the latitude and longitude of the phone's recorded coordinates along with a timestamp," which is clearly only a problem if one does not want any corporate or governmental agency—as the latter could supeona such information—to have access to such detailed personal information (Arthur, 2011). In the context of a disciplined Dream Society, technological observation becomes tantamount to the obfuscation of one's private life in the name of safety and security, even though the film makes it abundantly clear that such measures are not completely effective. Whether one is seeing and being seen by retinal scanner or eye-less drug dealers, the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society contends that agency centers on one's participation within an all-encompassing game of eye spy.

Growth: Merrily, merrily, merrily...life is but a dream in *Inception*

> Do they come here everyday to sleep?
> No, they come to be woken up. The dream has become their reality. Who are you to say otherwise? (Nolan, 2010).

Christopher Nolan's ascent in Hollywood over the last decade is a direct result of his expansive and critically-acclaimed oeuvre, including *Memento* (2000), *Insomnia* (2002), and his widely popular reboot of the Batman franchise, particularly *The Dark Knight* (2008). If Spielberg is, as Jensen contends, the closest we have to a Dream Society icon, then Nolan is more akin to a Dream Society prophet as the grandeur and immersive nature of his work often elicits comparisons between the two auteurs. After nearly a decade of planning and development, Nolan released *Inception* (2010), which became one of the highest grossing films of all time as well as a recipient of numerous Academy Award nominations, including Best Picture and Best Original Screenplay. Exploring the impact of a dynamic technology, predominantly within the arena of corporate espionage and by extension

the global economic system, the film follows the story of Dom Cobb, a masterful thief who steals knowledge and ideas from his victim's unconscious minds while they inhabit delicately-crafted lucid dreams. As the technology was created initially by the military to allow soldiers to simulate combat, which is to say killing, the film makes no mention of how the technology was made available to the public, but it does make it abundantly clear that it has become tremendously popular and even a substitute for reality to some, especially as one can create anything one can imagine and dying simply causes one to wake up, most of the time.

Caption 5. *Inception* directed by Christopher Nolan (courtesy of Warner Bros. Pictures)

As an embodiment of the creatively aesthetic dimensions of a growth paradigm for the Dream Society, *Inception's* imag(in)ing of technology offers a lens from which to situate the potential neurological impact of a future in which the blending between dreaming and reality have become seemingly indistinguishable. This trope, which forms the existential crux of the film, offers a complex imag(in)ing of the frailties of the human brain, especially when positioned alongside recent investigations on the impact of image-rich advertising on memory and the Internet on the functionality of human perception, which have a bearing, even if indirectly, on the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society. As someone who spends an inordinate amount of time within lucid dreams, Cobb has lost the ability to dream when sleeping normally, and the film chronicles his struggle to distinguish between waking and dreaming life. To overcome his ailment, he utilizes a totem, which for him is a child's spinning top, that only he has access to so as to know if he is awake or asleep, since the top will spin interminably while dreaming and

feels differently when he is awake. However, the top also symbolizes Cobb's deceased wife, Mol, who haunts his unconscious mind as a projection and subsequently appears while he is dreaming, often as a subversive figure who disrupts his jobs so as to have him all to herself.

The totem, then, reminds one of the plasticity of the brain with regards to its ability to be influenced by mediation technologies, especially those that can and might produce false memories, as is the case when consumers develop "false beliefs about having experienced a brand" that "arise[s] on exposure to high-imagery advertising" (Rajagopal and Montgomery, 2011). In this future, as with Cobb's subconscious mind, one delicately balances the ubiquitous imagery of one's own mind with the dream-like imag(in)ings of an economy requiring incessant consumption as a means to sustain production. In a growth scenario of the Dream Society, all consumers have Cobb's affliction, and just as with the film, the planting and stealing of ideas and knowledge becomes the essential marketplace for a post-information society where perceptions and affects, even if false, are of the greatest significance. As this specifically relates to nonkilling, it is clear that various entities will go to great lengths to cover over the harmful impacts of their products and services so as to maintain the appropriate public perception and appearance. As this model is continued growth, which intimately links it with the present, this trend is apparent within the rise of Apple, which recently surpassed Microsoft as the most profitable computer company in the world and, for a brief time, eclipsed ExxonMobil as "the most valuable company in the U.S." (Ortulay, 2011) and whose brand identity is so strong that MRI results showed that Apple devotees' brand allegiance "was actually stimulating the same parts of the brain as religious imagery does in people of faith" (Riley and Boome, 2011). Although a complete analysis of the ways in which various religions have supported cycles of killing falls outside the scope of this scenario, it is obvious that the totem takes on a decidedly spiritual purpose in the film as the only means by which Cobb can keep from losing himself within his dreams and the darkness of his unconscious mind.

As Cobb and his team take on the arduous task of planting an idea into their victim, which is known as inception, they seek out a chemist who can provide them with the requisite compounds to provide a deep enough slumber to complete the job, which involves many levels of dreaming—dreams within dreams. While connected to the dream machine, which allows one to inhabit dreams communally, one will be awakened if killed unless they are under the influence of a powerful chemical agent, then they are exiled into the unconscious abyss of the last dreamer to fall into this

state. As Cobb confesses to one of his colleagues that he performed inception on Mol, who did not want to leave the comfort and creative power of the lucid dream-state, he intimates the timelessness of unconscious lucid dreaming, which allowed him to build an entire world over 50 years trapped with his wife in his subconscious. Mol's codependent, and ultimately fatal, experience with *Inception's* dream technology is foreshadowed by a scene in which Cobb's team meets Yusuf, the chemist who concocts the sedative necessary for multi-layer dreaming and runs a dream-farm where people pay to come and dream for three to four hours at a time, which they experience as 40 hours of lucid dreamtime.

Caption 6. *Inception* directed by Christopher Nolan (courtesy of Warner Bros. Pictures)

Cobb and his team are clearly awe struck by the sight of the twelve dreamers, even though they are equally impressed by Yusuf's work. When one of Cobb's colleagues casually queries, "Do they come here everyday to sleep?", the old man who watches over Yusuf's clients responds, "No, they come to be woken up. The dream has become their reality. Who are you to say otherwise?" (Nolan, 2010). Encapsulating the film's take on technology as a force of social change, often with severe consequences, this scene contextualizes the popular contemporary argument that "our brains are always in flux, adapting to even small shifts in our circumstances and behavior," which is often used to undergird the claim that the impact of Internet technologies are a-moral (Carr, 2010: 31). From this perspective, the postulate that our brains are fundamentally plastic does little to situate the motives and intent of the (political and economic) forces whose high-imagery

mediation enacts change, and, perhaps most importantly, if such alterations contribute toward a more egalitarian and secure, which is also to say nonkilling, future. Employing a religious metaphor for the fragmentary nature of existence within the nascent Dream Society, Nicholas Carr explains in *The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains* that "the *Net* reroutes our vital paths and diminishes our capacity for contemplation" by, in Heideggerian terms, "welcoming the frenziedness [of technology] into our souls (Carr 2010). In the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, agency is an exercise in salvaging the vestiges of our imperfect humanity, whose ultimate end might become saving itself from thinking that life, even if merrily, is perpetually dreamlike.

Transformation: For a time it was good in *The Animatrix*

> Then man made the machine...in his own likeness. Thus did man become the architect of his own demise (Maeda 2003).

As part of the Wachowski Brothers' immensely popular Matrix trilogy of films, *The Animatrix* is a composite of animated shorts that gives some back ground on *The Matrix*, which chronicles the rise of Neo (Keanu Reeves) as "the one" who is prophesied to end the apocalyptic war with the relentless *machines*. While many of the shorts in *The Animatrix* are ripe for analysis, parts I and II of "The Second Renaissance" are useful for situating technological development, particularly sentient and robotic machines commonly referred to as AI (artificial intelligence), within the cultural conditioning zone of a transformational imag(in)ing of the Dream Society. Furthermore, these two shorts illuminate the social and economic conditions underlying a truly transformational Dream Society as is evidenced within the complex imag(in)ing of the relationship between humans and technology, or "the machines," who challenge directly humanity's monopoly on agency. Capturing the differences between *The Animatrix* and the trilogy succinctly, Silvio notes, "Quite simply, whereas *The Matrix* casts the conflict between humanity and technology mostly in terms of good versus evil, *The Animatrix* presents the struggle as being marked by moral ambiguity and ethical complexity" (Silvio, 2006: 121). Embodying a vastly different ethos from the trilogy of films, the initial scene of the Second Renaissance depicts the trial of B166ER, who fatally turns on his owners, and consciously re-frames the moral high-ground claimed by the machines alongside historical struggles for equality from marginalized groups during the 20th century, particularly the Civil Rights' Movement. For the machines, the trial of B166ER is a "Rosa Parks" moment—one that coalesces the

rising tension between humanity and the artificial intelligence of the machines, who seek equality and protection under the law.

Caption 7. *The Second Renaissance* directed by Mahiro Maeda (courtesy of Warner Home Video)

At his trial, B166ER's argues that his decision to kill his owners was self-defense as they were going to destroy him as they would with any other possession. In response to a guilty verdict that includes the eradication of "all of his kind," the machines take to the streets in a "million machine march" to express their solidarity and dissent, but the past repeats itself as governmental forces enact a calculated and open genocide upon the machines (Maeda 2003). From this point forward, the two shorts chronicle the war between humanity and the machines, which eventually leads to the formation of the Matrix—whose locus centers on the extraction of energy from the ambient heat produced by the human body. Although humanity survives its war with the machines, the symbiotic relation between humanity and technology, which is now exemplified by the superiority of the machines, has been turned on its head: the relation between humanity and technology continues to redefine and change the nature of what it means to be human, although humanity is no longer the primary entity fashioning the definition.

Although the focus of "The Second Renaissance I & II" centers on the how and the why with regards to the impetus for the Matrix, the repetition of explicit and implicit religious imagery throughout both shorts situates the spiritual ramifications of technology in this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society while providing a lens with which to view the economic conditions underlying the cultural conditioning zone. As Buddhists receive blessings from monks before combat, Christians listen to an evangelist urging them to put on "spiritual armor," and Muslims pray at sunrise before fighting against the machines, one gets the eerie impression that a greater evil was necessary to create solidarity among humanity, which has often used religion to perpetu-

ate cycles of violence and killing. Reading this phenomena as a direct consequence of its intimate relation with technology, it becomes easier to articulate the impact of technology, especially artificial intelligence, with regard to the distinctly human constructs, particularly religion, inhabiting the cultural conditioning zone of the Dream Society and nonkilling futures. In this future, technology has usurped traditional religion and other human constructs as the primary force of division to the point where the disassociation of the machines from what it means to be human—apparent in the advent of truly independent artificial intelligence—signals a break within the symbiosis between humanity and technology. It is this systemic rupture that allows for a radical restructuring whereby humanity has lost the capacity to define itself with regards to its relationship with technology, which is depicted as bringing about, in decidedly Judeo-Christian terms, a new Fall of Man, so to speak.

As the machines seek solace apart from humanity, they build a mega-city, called Zero One, in the former "cradle of human civilization" (Maeda, 2003). With superior intelligence and the creation of more advanced AI, the machines begin to dominate the global economic system, which eventually leads to an emergency United Nations (U.N.) summit where the machines peacefully plead their case for inclusion. The meteoric rise of Zero One contextualizes the economy underlying a truly transformational alternative of the Dream Society, and humanity resorts to military action, in the form of a blockade, as a means to subvert the machines' hegemony. The assertion that an economy based on technological development is best managed by technological development itself has roots at present within high-frequency trading (HFT), which is mostly performed by complex algorithms that "compete by making thousands of trades a minute to maximize profit," and has led to the exponential development of bandwidth infrastructure, including the creation of a "Chicago-New York cable will shave about 3 milliseconds off … communication time" (McCabe, 2010). The ability to manage time with such precision for the express purpose of economic gain is paramount within a scenario where reliance upon technology for distributing and producing wealth is absolute, and it is this ultimate end that sets humanity on the path toward a complete redefinition of its relation with technology, which becomes the predominant agent of change, for better or worse, into the future.

As the ambassadors from Zero One seek reconciliation and the establishment of a "stable, civil relationship" with humanity, which is evidenced in part by the gift of an apple, they are mobbed by angry leaders who see their dominion as an affront to the very nature of what it means to be human. While they are violently taken out of the chamber, the narrator solemnly

notes, "But this would not be the last time the machines would take the floor there" (Maeda, 2003).

Caption 8. *The Second Renaissance* directed by Mahiro Maeda (courtesy of Warner Home Video)



As the narrator continues to explain that their admission to the U.N. was denied, the apple falls and as the back ground fades to black, it mutates into a brain that develops a nervous system and finally a human form that becomes surrounded by darkness. This stark transformation speaks to the inevitable inversion of the symbiosis between humanity and technology within this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, and the transformational ascendency of technology, or the machines, along moral and spiritual lines in comparison to humanity—indeed, the machines' economic superiority is a mere addendum to their overt righteousness.

As the machines represent technology completely unfettered from human imperfection, they harken back to the theoretical development of the Turing Machine and the origins of complex algorithms for computation, whose architect spoke about their creation with religious zeal. In *The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention*, David F. Noble notes, "In designing such machines, as in conceiving children, Turing observed, 'we are … instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls He creates'" (Noble, 1997: 152). Compounding the imag(in)e of the apple, Turing's tragic suicide, which was carried out by lacing an apple with cyanide as it was discovered half-eaten next to his body, speaks to another infamous usage of this fruit—Apple's logo, which some think might be an homage of sorts to Turing or an allusion to the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Book of Genesis. The convergence of the apple metaphor cements the contention that in this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society technology takes on the properties of ultimate knowledge and functions to provide humanity with some context for its relationship with a truly higher

power—the machines. Echoing Kurzweil's *Singularity* contention that "Machines, derived from human thinking and surpassing humans in their capacity for experience, will claim to be conscious, and thus to be spiritual," the use of the apple in this scene speaks to humanity's wanton lust for self-actualization, even at the cost of its own humanity, in this transformational imag(in)ing of the Dream Society (Kurzweil 1999, 153). Outlining the roots of this scenario and the troubling social conditions endemic to cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, Noble writes:

> A thousand years in the making, the religion of technology has become the common enchantment, not only of the designers of technology but also those caught up in, and undone by, their godly designs. The expectation of ultimate salvation through technology, whatever the immediate human and social costs, has become the unspoken orthodoxy, reinforced by a market-induced enthusiasm for novelty sanctioned by a millenarian yearning for new beginnings. This popular faith, subliminally indulged and intensified by corporate, government, and media pitchmen, inspires an awed deference to the practitioners and their promises of deliverance while diverting attention from more urgent concerns (Noble, 1997: 207).

This movement is most apparent in recent efforts to advance AI toward and beyond human capacity, and "IBM has unveiled new experimental brain-inspired chips that are able to learn based on experience" (Callow, 2011). With human-like learning capabilities that mimics "spiking neurons and synapses in biological systems," this technology, especially when positioned alongside Kurzweil's contention and the machines of *The Animatrix*, raises a fundamental question as to the nature of intelligence, consciousness, and spirituality and how the advent of AI might impact nonkilling futures. For the purposes of this scenario, the sentient technologies of *The Animatrix* are best viewed as machines of loving grace, who appear to show Christ-like agape, so to speak, toward their human counterparts by eventually imparting a gift of salvation (the Matrix) and, perhaps most importantly, an opportunity for the cessation of hostilities, even though a cabal of dissidents continues to wage war against the machines.

As humanity embarked upon a plan to slow the machines' growing power, they sought to attack their primary energy source—the sun. Enacting "Operation Dark Storm" as a means to geo-engineer the planet to displace all solar energy, humanity ultimately creates the conditions of possibility whereby the machines take the reigns of their symbiotic relation. While it seems difficult to imag(in)e humanity displaying the technological capacity to complete

such a feat while still lacking the requisite humility to accept the machines as equals, this scene affirms the decidedly spiritual interconnection between humanity and technology, especially as the camera pans out to show the earth being engulfed in black smoke as the narrator intimates, "may there be mercy on man and machine for their sins" (Maeda, 2003).

Caption 9 and 10. *The Second Renaissance* directed by Mahiro Maeda (courtesy of Warner Home Video)





As the machines begin to experiment upon the bodies of those captured in combat to exploit the human production of energy, the results inexorably lead to the creation of an alternate virtual reality for humanity—a technologically-driven afterlife of sorts. As the new ambassador for the machines stands brazenly at the podium of the U.N., it holds an apple in one of its many hands and declares, "Your flesh is irrelevant, a mere vessel" (Maeda, 2003). After putting down the apple to sign via barcode what appears to be a treaty as humanity's leaders watch forlorn, the machine continues, "Hand over your flesh, and a new world awaits you. We demand it" (Maeda, 2003).

This final return of the apple, which is now completely virtual, coalesces the codependence upon technology in the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, and in this future, "a newly refashioned symbiotic relation between the two adversaries [is] born: the machine drawing power from the human body—an endlessly multiplying, infinitely renewable energy source" (Maeda, 2003). Whereas the first Renaissance

ushered in a period of extended study and engagement with humanism and the classics of antiquity, the Second Renaissance, on the other hand, challenges the decidedly human limits of technology and signals a complete transformation of agency, which, for a time, was good.

Concluding Imag(in)ings

> No example of a nonkilling society is known in history; it is simply unthinkable (Paige, 2009: 33).

As Paige makes clear in *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, "life in a nonkilling society is characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill, neither technologies nor justifications for killing, and no social conditions that depend upon threat or use of lethal force" (Paige, 2009: 22). A few pages after this weighty contention, Paige outlines some of the objectionable responses—the most ardent of which prefaces this conclusion—he heard over many years as a university professor teaching courses on and researching the parameters for a nonkilling society. While the lack of a historical model would seem at the outset to be a debilitating inhibitor to the creation of nonkilling futures, it is the precisely the unthinkable nature of such a feat that makes it relevant from a futurists' perspective. As Dator's Second Law of the Future contends, "Any useful idea about the future should appear ridiculous." Another equally unthinkable ideation with regards to the future emanates from the four filmic imag(in)ings of technology of the Dream Society, especially as the threads of each can be found in the present, even if only as imag(in)ings. This is not to say that the Dream Society, in any of its forms including those presented herein, is a most likely or even a preferred future, quite the contrary; the unassailable hegemony of further technological development, explicitly as a marker of social and economic well-being in the present, positions the Dream Society construct at the very heart of the cultural conditioning zone that has come to dominate the incestuous mechanisms of capitalistic ideology that drive the contemporary conditions of possibility for nonkilling futures. Although remarking on the scientific, Virilio captures this sentiment succinctly, "'There are perhaps just wars, but there are no innocent armies', or so the saying goes. From now on, it is the same with science as it is with war: there is no longer any really innocent science" (Virilio, 2005: 31).

Positioning Virilio's assertion alongside the analysis of technology as found within the four filmic imag(in)ings of the Dream Society, one can imagine that the primary means by which nonkilling futures can and might emerge rests with the successful decoupling of technological, which is also to say scientific,

development from imbalanced social and economic conditions, which remain endemic to the conditions of Late Capitalism, which Jameson conceives of as "catastrophe and progress all together" (Jameson, 1992: 55). This striking duality, which is exacerbated within the four filmic imag(in)ings of the Dream Society, serves to contextualize the materialist reading of technology offered of each film while situating the integral link between capitalist ideologies and economies of lethality, even and perhaps especially within technologically-driven scenarios for the futures (i.e. The Dream Society). As Paige notes, "Sometime in the future when economic exploitation ends, the class-based lethal state will disappear. But in the period of transition economic factors will predispose to killing" (Paige, 2009: 24). Similarly, Jensen argues, "In the long run, digitizing the information flow will lead to freedom of information and freedom of speech, but in the coming 10 to 15 years, latent conflicts will be mounting" (Jensen, 1999: 216). As the analysis of each film set out to affirm, the economics underling the invention, development, and diffusion of increasingly more complex technologies, especially those challenging long-held notions of agency, does not preclude nor necessarily buttress the potentiality for nonkilling futures to emerge, but as capitalism remains critical to the ethos of the Dream Society construct, it seems apparent that this formulation's beloved free market cannot adequately internalize the costs, to use the the appropriate parlance, associated with nonkilling futures; thus, Jensen takes solace in his prediction that the emerging Dream Society will inevitably produce strife that echoes much of what has been seen surrounding the Arab Spring. However, moments of sanguine reflexivity within the Arab Awakening, especially in the early days of unrest in Egypt, point toward a complete reconceptualization of the nature of social change with regards to the symbiotic relation between humanity and technology. In one of the most widely circulated photos from the Tahrir Square protests, a demonstrator proudly displays a home-made sign drawn on a sheet of notebook paper that states, "Delete Mubarak" and shows the infamous trash can from both Microsoft and Apple operating systems.

Although there have been innumerable challenges following the departure of Hosni Mubarak from his 30-year tenure in power, the most significant and palpable opportunity resulting from his historic egress is apparent within the sentiment of the above photo. From the perspective of the Dream Society, as with imag(in)ings of the present, one can just as easily and carelessly delete a dictator as one would a spreadsheet from one's computer. This sentiment contextualizes the shutdown of Internet technologies during the tumult in Egypt and the complicity of transnational corporations in supporting such authoritarian endeavors, and speaks to the primacy with which tmedia echnolo-

gies emerged as an instigator and accessory to the Arab Spring. "Delete Mubarak" also speaks to the potentiality for the reappropriation of mediation technologies for egalitarian ends as it does to the material economies underlying such calls for revolution; indeed, if there is anything to be learned from Egypt and ongoing revolutions elsewhere, it is the fact that mechanisms of capitalism, especially the nascent dimensions of a truly Dream Society economy, have become entrenched within imag(in)ings of the future(s)

Picture 1. *Delete Mubarak*
(MARCO LONGARI/AFP/Getty Images, January 31, 2011)

As this relates to the imag(in)ings of technology of the Dream Society found within the four films, it is clear that the inherent plasticity of the symbiosis between humanity and technology offers, at the very least, the potentiality for a radical reconstitution of the economies underlying further technological advancements as found and presenced within the cultural conditioning zone of the killing funnel. There might not be a silver bullet, with regards to ameliorating social and economic conditions, but the first step, as Paige points out repeatedly in his treatise, involves jettisoning both the medium (silver representing the technological) and the message (bullet representing the indirect valorization of killing) of such formulations—as such, a sign that condones "deleting Mubarak" is an enormous advance from one advocating "death to Mubarak."

As such, the symbiotic relation between humanity and technology must regain, as Virilio puts it, a modicum of innocence, which is to say a conscious and intentional movement away from its charted course toward catastrophe and progress through the continual modeling of nonkilling futures, including, and perhaps especially, the unthinkable and/or the ridiculous with regards to the futures of capitalism, which remains the predominant imag(in)ing of the

future for many even in the wake of monumental social and economic disparities. As this lies at the heart not only of the four filmic imag(in)ings of the Dream Society presented herein but also the theoretical and practical foundations for a truly nonkilling, which is to say preferred, future, the model for such an endeavor might be found within the technological structures of the present. Elucidating the scope and magnitude of crafting nonkilling futures, Paige observes, "The purposive pursuit of nonkilling conditions of global life portends institutional changes as pervasive in scope to those associated with the global diffusion of contemporary communication and information technologies" (Paige, 2009: 114). This apt analogy succinctly captures the spirit of crafting nonkilling futures, which is first and foremost an exercise in disassociating catastrophe from progress now and in the futures.

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Chapter Five

Envisioning Nonkilling Futures in Film

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Synergistic nonkilling creativity among the arts can uplift the human spirit and imagination for the crucial transformational tasks ahead.

(Paige, 2007: 139)

Introduction

Is nonkilling futures in films an unrealistic dream or an idea whose time has come? Glenn Paige (2007) in his pioneering book began the discussions about nonkilling, and in it he questions whether nonkilling can be viewed as possible, especially by those in his field of political science. Similarly, the possibility of creating a film about a future that does not include killing would, initially, be questioned in its desirability by the film industry and, questioned by by much of the conventional future (sci-fi) film audience. To many people the idea of scenarios of nonkilling futures in films seems impossible, even naïve. And yet, Paige (2007: 139) challenges filmmakers and others in the arts to "find ways out of violence" and participate in the creativity of nonkilling. The ways out of violence in filmmaking are possible *if* the filmmaking process from script development to distribution, including audience and critics' attitudes, can evolve sufficiently to allow nonviolent, nonkilling images of the future to be depicted in film.

To envision nonkilling futures, like any visioning, requires a leap of faith, to what we most want and desire for our communities' futures (Meadows, 1996). For filmmakers to see past the practices and mindset that focus on killing and create a film about the future based on nonkilling is an act of resistance against the hegemonic forces at work in contemporary society, and within their industry. Most films about the future are expensive blockbusters produced in Hollywood studios now owned by transnational conglomerates. The films, as well as filmmaking industry that creates them, are part of a society that is based on militarism and focused on violence. But films about the future, and the filmmakers who create them, can also be part of a purposeful resistance, and begin the envisioning of nonkilling futures. Films,

with their powerful images and stories, contribute to how contemporary society envisions the future. According to filmmaker and film screening innovator, Mandy Leith (Hurley, 2009), film is the "magical fire place, it's the fire, *it's the hearth of our time* that people gather around and that continues the storytelling tradition". Storytelling is a powerful communicator of information and mythology; film has the additional strength of providing images to accompany the narrative.

In this chapter, I will explore why images of the future are important, how Hollywood dominates in films about the future and its connection to the military industrial complex, the gendered nature of films, how film and filmmakers are important to envisioning nonkilling futures. I will also use Glenn Paige's (2007) theory on nonkilling societies to evaluate films about the future and the filmmaking industry relative to his criteria of a nonkilling society, and explore possible ideas for change.

What film images of violent future are telling us, and why it matters

Frederik Polak (1961) analyzed images of the future that a number of societies held throughout the millennia, and found that when a society had a positive image of the future they flourished, and when a society held a negative image of the future the society perished, an indication that the images had agency. He argued that the first step in moving toward positive images of the future is identifying what is wrong with the images of today as a "preliminary clearing of the decks for the great act of purposeful, responsible recreation of images of a still glorious future" (Polak, 1961: 367). Guided by Polak (1961), we will explore images in films about the future as the preliminary phase of working toward the depiction of nonkilling futures in film.

Feature films are a compelling and visceral source of dominant futures imagery that are now global in their reach. Most feature films about the future are created by Hollywood, and are part of the highly lucrative genre of 'blockbuster' science fiction or sci-fi, which is "a significant economic weapon for Hollywood, few others being able to afford to compete at the expensive high end of the latest effects technologies" (King and Krzywinska, 2000: 64). These special effects technologies, in the hands of skilled filmmakers, result in highly pervasive and persuasive images of the future. These films are now globalised through film theatre releases as well as the seemingly limitless reach of television and its thirst for content.

The dominant contemporary images of the future are of bleak ecological wastelands rife with violence and despair (Lisa Garforth, 2006; Slaughter,

1998). These Hollywood films, with their compelling, intoxicating imagery, may be negatively affecting what Elise Boulding (1988) refers to as our *futures image literacy*: our ability to envision our own futures. At the societal level, and as individuals, we are losing our ability to engage our imagination in acts of creating images of the future—visions for our futures—that are unique to our community. But without visions to work toward we do not know what direction to take with our actions (Meadows, 1996). While I make no attempt at a direct causal link between the film images and actions, or inactions, I argue that the powerful, dominating, film images may be interfering with our ability to create peaceful, diverse visions of the future that are unique to our community and country. As Bruce H. Franklin (1985: 85) warns: "With no better vision of the future to offer, the United States may possibly succeed in forcing the rest of the world into one of those futures imagined in Hollywood". We have an obligation to future generations of humans, and nonhumans, to create visions of diverse futures that are more life sustaining than those presently coming out of Hollywood.

The dominant, and repeating, images of the future in contemporary film are of violent conflict, where war or killing seen as inevitable: whether by hand-to-hand combat (*Blade Runner, Star Wars*, *Terminator*, *The Fifth Element*) or fantastical weaponry (*Star Wars* series, *Terminator* series, *Minority Report*) and even nuclear bomb annihilation of the entire world (*Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines*). Much of the violence results in killing, and most is men-on-men, but there are a few examples of sexualized women fighting (*Blade Runner, Alien, Aeon Flux, The Matrix*). In most films about the future, violent conflict or war is underway, or preparations for war are being made, all supported with spectacular, seductive visual effects (Hurley, 2008, 2009). These dominant images of war and violent conflict reinforce themselves from one film to the next. The repeated nature of the images contributes to violence and war being seen as *the* only possible future: the singular future that repeats itself across mediums and over time (Milojevic, 2005).

The repeated pattern of violent conflict in many films about the future, involving guns and other armaments, including nuclear weapons, is not especially surprising given Hollywood's many ties to the US military (Franklin, 1988; Rosenbaum, 2000; Valantin, 2005; Alford and Graham, 2008). Since 1942, when the American War Ministry set up a partnership bureau in Hollywood, which remains active today, "the cooperation between the [US] security system and the major studios functions in many complex ways and has increased over the decades" (Valantin, 2005:6). Recent research has exposed the Pentagon's involvement in reviewing screenplays and editorial

influence in exchange for studio access to equipment and locations including the Navy lending aircraft carriers, planes and pilots, (Rosenbaum, 2000; Valantin, 2005). As Franklin (1999:72) observed "the infrastructures that support the preparations for war and violence are very powerful and deeply entrenched". Filmmakers in the US, and increasingly filmmaking in Canada and other countries, appear to be part of these preparations, as war is glorified and made to seem inevitable and necessary. As Paige (2007: 13) argues "violent media socialization is useful for a state in need of professional patriotic killers". The connection between the film industry and militarism is historical and tightly woven, but the pattern could be broken if many filmmakers are courageous enough to offer less violent ways of addressing conflict, and if audiences support these films by buying tickets.

Another dominant pattern in films about the future is loss of human life due to an apocalyptic event, including films based on environmental disasters (*Day After Tomorrow:* climate change; *The Awakening:* virus/red tide killing humans; *Children of Men*: global loss of fertility, *Aeon Flux*: global virus and global loss of fertility). I worry that these films also impoverish futures literacy by reducing hope for the future.

Films about the future are also highly gendered. Women are highly outnumbered by men as characters in films, and their roles in society are of those of support to the elite men in charge, or the love/sexual interest of the male lead. The journey is masculinised, and the narrative arc of the story is always that of the male lead. Children are rare in films about the future, and when they are seen, they are almost always boys. An exception is *Aeon Flux*, although the girls are in the background of scenes, at least they are visible. The dualistic way that men and women are depicted in films about the future is not healthy for society, for women nor for men. Women are not seen as politicians or leaders in other positions of power in filmic futures, reinforcing the notion that *the* future is the domain of men and where women and girls do not see opportunities for themselves to be powerful agents in society.

In some films about the future (as in some films based in the present and past) women are so invisible, so completely missing from the screen, that these films could be contributing to the notion that women and girls don't matter, that their presence in society is optional. The optional future for women and girls is likely contributing to policies and practices that result in higher women's mortality, including higher levels of mortality in natural disasters (Ikeda, 1995) as well as globalised violence and killings of women and girls. *Femicide* is a gender specific killing that takes the forms of murder by spouses/partners, dowry deaths, sexual assault, 'honour' killings and female infant/child neglect. "Femi-

cide is an extreme form of the gender-based violence (GBV) that many women suffer at home, in the workplace, in the community and in their relations with the state, violence that is intrinsically linked to deeply entrenched gender inequality and discrimination, economic disempowerment, and aggressive or machismo masculinity" (Prieto-Carrón, et al., 2007: 26). Much too often in films about the future, women and girls, if they are seen at all, are victims of male violence, sexual predation, societal oppression, or neglect.

Violence and killing is pervasive in films about the future out of Hollywood. The lead characters in the films are often not the best role models. What are we modeling as futures appropriate behaviour to young people, especially young men and boys, who are the main target audience for films about the future? According to Jo Groebel (1998: 4), the lead scholar of the UNESCO study of 5,000 12-year-old students from 23 countries, "the study revealed a fascination with aggressive media heroes, especially among boys: Arnold Schwarzenegger's 'Terminator' is a global icon, known by 88% of the children surveyed, be they from India, Brazil or Japan". In films about the future, the elite men are predominantly depicted as warriors/fighters of some kind, which narrows role model opportunities for boys to aggressive hyper-masculine roles with little opportunity to witness caring, creative men in their personal lives, as well as in the public domain.

The repeated images of war and militarism in films about the future continue the notion that war is inevitable. Many countries of the world, and certainly the US, have intertwined militarism throughout much of their society. We have disregarded Dwight D. Eisenhower's (1961, my emphasis) caution in his final speech as president: "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. *The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist*". And it has. In 2010, global military expenditures reached $1,630 billion USD—with US 42.7% of the total—and shocking annual increases in South America (5.8 per cent) and Africa (5.2 per cent) (SIPRI, 2011a). Beatrice Fihn (2011) argues that the global military expenditures are having a direct and disproportionate effect on women by keeping them in poverty, and directing funds away from health care and education, and quotes the World Bank's estimate that it would take only 35 to 72 billion USD per year to 2015 to meet the Millennium Development Goals—a tiny fraction of that spent on the military—but those in power, overwhelmingly men, continue to priorize war.

Author Margaret Atwood (1992: 79) argues in a poem that killing is gendered: "Why do men want to kill the bodies of other men? / Women don't want to kill the bodies of other women / By and large. As far as we know… / Men's

bodies are the most dangerous things on / Earth. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully analyse the nature of men and killing, but I suggest that films about the future are contributing to the problem by repeating the future…"

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully analyse the nature of men and killing, but I suggest that films about the future are contributing to the problem by repeating the future as violent and warring, and focusing on male characters solving conflict with violence. There is ongoing debate about the nature of violence and whether it is gendered or not, but it appears to be gendered, and pretending otherwise is not going to help us create nonkilling futures. Richard Wrangham (2010: 30) argues that "men are inherently more dangerous than women and that massive imbalances of power among hostile entities tend to induce violence" and that understanding this violence provides opportunities in reducing it.

> By stressing the particular dangers of male coalitionary behavior *Demonic Males* [Wrangham's book] contributes to an ongoing debate about the prospects for promoting nonviolence through the education of women and their increased representation in legislative bodies. Since *Demonic Males* was published I have participated regularly in seminars with such programs as Women Waging Peace, in which participants represent conflict zones from around the world. I have repeatedly found that they cherish the optimism represented in *Demonic Males* by its identification of some sources of violence that we can do something about—namely, the appalling ease with which men are induced to violence under some circumstances (Wrangham, 2011: 44).

Filmmakers may argue that their films include violence and killing because that is what audiences want, and we will see below that audiences do have a role in changing the nature of films about the future, but films remain a creative act and the filmmakers can create films in a different way, with different stories and images.

As women in the Global North are becoming increasingly involved in public life, business, medicine, education, research—albeit with glass ceilings at the most senior levels (Valian, 1999; Douglas, 2010)—women's roles and creative involvement in film production have narrowed or decreased over time. Contemporary women's film roles are generally limited to wife, mother, sex object, and victim; while women in the 1940's had more diversity in movie roles. Today, the Hollywood filmmaking industry also suffers from a lack of women in the upper creative positions. "In 2010, women comprised 16% of all directors, executive producers, producers, writers, cinema-

tographers, and editors working on the top 250 domestic grossing films"—a decline of 1 percentage point from 1998, and with only 7% of directors being women (Lauzen, 2011: 1). Martha Lauzen (2008: 10) has also documented the domination of men in the reviewing of films and concluded that: "In short, men dominate the reviewing process of films primarily made by men featuring mostly males intended for a largely male audience. The underemployment of women film reviewers, actors, and filmmakers perpetuates the nearly seamless dialogue among men in US cinema". The film industry needs to address the reality that its institutional structures have enabled a small elite of white men to maintain an unequal advantage over women, people of colour and less powerful men. This is an outcome of what R.W. Connell (2002: 142) calls the *patriarchal dividend* where men, as a group, maintain "an unequal gender order". The process of identifying the unequal order in filmmaking has begun. Hollywood producers, Susan Davis, Susan Valdes and Steve Mills, created the 2005 film *Invisible Women* to address women's experiences in Hollywood, and Jennifer Siebel Newsom wrote and directed *Miss Representation* in 2011. I am confident that as the number of women in senior creative positions within the film industry increases to above 50% that the amount of killing in films about the future will significantly decrease.

American/Hollywood global dominance of film industry and images

Another repeated pattern in films about the future is that the story takes place in the US, even when the films are international co-productions (*The Awakening:* India/US; *The Fifth Element*: France/US) reinforcing the concept that *the future* has been fully colonised and it *is* American (Sardar, 1999). This is not to say the US does not have place in the future, rather that the US is only one of many countries in the world, each with their own culture and landscapes that are worthy of futures visioning. But at the present, American futures dominate in the films, and American films dominate the screens of the world.

In 2007, according to the Motion Picture Association of America statistics (MPAA, 2008a), the total Hollywood domestic (US and Canada) box-office gross was $9.63 billion, while the total international box-office was $17.1 billion (64% of total revenues). The international market includes: $8.92 billion Europe/Middle East/Africa, $6.92 billion Asia Pacific, and $1.25 billion Latin America. This translates into a total of *5.54 billion international paid moviegoers* (79% of 7.04 billion world wide admissions) (MPAA, 2008c). Therefore, as Scott (2005) argues, Hollywood may not dominate internationally in the total number of films produced, but they do dominate

in terms of revenue and in the number of people who watch films.

Economists Acheson and Maule (2005: 339) argue, "to our knowledge, no other industry has been persistently dominated in the same manner". These two authors attribute the early historical dominance partially because the US was able to attract talented creative people who were fleeing hostilities during both world wars. They also argue that Hollywood's international dominance is based on the efficiency of a system that provides them with an unfettered free market to the US domestic market (including Canada), which is the single largest English speaking market in the world, as well as Hollywood's success in assimilating large numbers of viewers from different ethnic backgrounds (Acheson and Maule, 2005). This economic efficiency has significant support from the US federal government, which lobbies hard for Hollywood at international economic negotiations, such as World Trade Organisation (WTO) (previously General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arguing that film is a product or commodity like any other and that Hollywood should have open, unlimited markets for their films and television programs in all countries.

> The [US] Department of State, Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the MPA [international arm of Motion Picture Association of America], often referred to as the "Little State Department", are critical to the success of American films and television programs in international markets. The American troika demands that foreign markets are open for Hollywood to exploit, while the oligopolistic nature of the American market makes it all but impenetrable to foreign products. The exportation of cultural products improves the trade deficit, but the US government also argues that "trade follows films," that motion pictures and television programs provide a mechanism through which to advertise American products and disseminate ideologies (Kunz, 2007: 6).

The Motion Picture Association (MPA-Int, 2012) openly flaunts this role on the MPA-Asia Pacific website as a "little State Department" and describes their foreign country activities in "diplomatic, economic and political arenas".

Therefore, the global reach of the blockbuster Hollywood films about the future is significant. The worry in this global nature is that that powerful, intoxicating imagery dominates people's thinking and they lose the ability to imagine a future different than what they see in the films. Without our *futures imaging literacy* we cannot engage our imagination to envision positive futures for our own community—our localised preferred futures (Boulding, 1988). There is also the possibility that with America being seen as *the fu-*

ture that non-US communities and nations will see themselves as lesser, not as valuable now or in the future. But, as Wangari Maathai (2004) wrote about Africa, it is from the love of one's own community and culture that diverse and peaceful future communities are possible.

The way that films are created today also contributes to the movement away from localised ideas because of the global business nature of the film industry. Hollywood films used to be made in studios that existed only to make movies. In today's New Hollywood, film production is only a small part of large companies that, in turn are part of "an increasingly diversified, globalized entertainment industry" (Schatz, 1997: 75). And often, within the conglomerate, the media/entertainment component is small compared to other activities. For example, General Electric owns Universal Pictures[1] as well as 80% of NBC television, many local US television stations, the Sci-Fi cable broadcaster, and a new pay TV company USA Network (Columbia Journalism Review, 2011). GE/Universal/NBC is also extending its reach further into India via a joint venture with the Indian media empire Network 18 (Overdorf, 2007). The film component of the GE conglomerate had box office gross of $933 million USD in 2006, while the total parent company revenue was $149.7 billion USD. And according to a study by the Centre for Public Integrity (Makinson, 2004), General Electric is number 7 in the list of the top 100 contractors to the Pentagon, further reinforcing the ties between Hollywood and militarism.

Hollywood has also changed from making many movies a year to an increasing reliance on the big blockbusters to reach the annual corporate profit projections. Sedgwick and Pokorny (2005) argue that part of Hollywood's success and survival over time is the focus on the hit movie, the blockbuster, with large production values that work to differentiate films from television productions. The reliance on blockbuster films, especially sequels, is more likely explained by the notion that blockbusters are viewed by executives to have significantly less risk, and more opportunity for revenue than other films (Ravid, 1999; Scott, 2005). Blockbusters dominate in films about the future, and high cost/ high revenue sequels have been a consistent pattern (*Matrix*, *StarWars*, *Terminator*, *Star Trek* series).

As discussed above, Hollywood now sells the majority of its tickets in its international market (79% of global admissions and 64% total revenue) so there is financial pressure to keep the international market strong. Violent action films about the future travel well into this market.

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[1] This may be changing as General Electric is in negotiation for a partial sell-off of Universal to a sports media corporation.

> Action movies don't require complex plots or characters. They rely on fights, killings, special effects and explosions to hold their audiences. And, unlike comedy or drama—which depend on good stories, sharp humour, and credible characters, all of which are often culture-specific—action films require little in the way of good writing and acting. They're simple, and they're universally understood. To top it off, the largely non-verbal nature of the kind of films that journalist Sharon Waxman refers to as "short-on-dialogue, high-on-testosterone"makes their dubbing or translation relatively inexpensive (Media Awareness Network, 2011).

To reform or transform Hollywood filmmaking, to move out of the focus on profits based on violent films and into filmmaking that supports nonkilling futures will be challenging, but not impossible if there is the will for change at many stages in the process.

Filmmakers within and outside of the Hollywood studios, have an opportunity to create films with non-US based, diverse, peaceful communities, as images of nonkilling futures. This will not be easy, at least not in the beginning, because Hollywood has become such a dominating cultural force in the world. Juan Mayr (2008) suggests that:

> Throughout human history, dominant powers have imposed their language and their cultural vision on other territories and cultures. It is time to take pause in the present process of globalization while we consider ways of overcoming problems confronting our civilization… We must pursue these efforts in order to protect the heritage of humankind.

The UNESCO (2001) *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* provides principles for protecting cultural diversity, creativity and international solidarity. It acknowledges the current imbalance in cultural products and Article 11 suggests that public policy is required to promote cultural diversity in the world. Convincing Hollywood that they do not have a inalienable right to the theatres and television screens of the world will take time and diplomacy, but the distribution and screening of films is part of the technology of filmmaking that requires reform if nonkilling futures in film are to emerge.

Transforming the filmmaking process to contribute to nonkilling futures

Ursula Franklin (1999) sees *technology* as *systems of practice* that go beyond the things one normally relates to technology (such as cameras, film, editing equipment, lights, computers for creating visual effects) to include also *organisation, the people, procedures, policies, myths, and, ideas*. In the case of

feature films, the systems of practice include: the studios within conglomerates, writers, directors, actors, editors, sound engineers, accountants, unions, marketing people and processes, production assistants, the pitch, the script, merchandising, caterers, traffic and parking attendants, star-system, scheduling, critics and film schools. Franklin (1999) argues that of all the processes and practices that make up the technology the most important of all is *mindset*. It is mindset that can entrench ways of practice without reflection. Mindset can inhibit people from seeing even the possibility that patterns of images or systems of practice can be different. Mindset can tell us that there is no point in examination or protest because nothing will be different. For example, some people have the mindset that war is inevitable because humans are intrinsically violent or that human activity will always harm nature in some way. But we can create a mindset that is open to possibility and change. We could develop a mindset that sees violent conflict only as a temporary phase in human development, and that people can live in harmony with each other and with nonhuman nature. Shifting mindset, however, is challenging and will require recognition of power injustices and shifting to shared power.

> It is my conviction that nothing short of a global reformation of major social forces and of the social contract can end this historical period of profound and violent transformations, and give a manner of security back to the world and its citizens. Such a development will require the redefinition of rights and responsibilities, and the setting of limits to power and control (Franklin, 1999: 5).

Filmmakers could be part of this shift in power by transforming the systems of practice, the technologies of filmmaking, to one of shared power and to depicting nonviolent societies—past, present and future—in their films. According to Riane Eisler (1987) and Marija Gimbutas (1982) humans have been peaceful and nonkilling in the far past, therefore, we have historical precedents to initiate system change; humans have not *always* been violent and warring, as many argue. Filmmakers can provide a leadership role in shifting mindset toward nonkilling futures by depicting communities that solve conflict without violence and where killing does not exist.

Glenn Paige's vision of a nonkilling society is one where there is no killing of humans nor threats to kill, and that this nonkilling may extend to animals. It includes a society where:

> there are no weapons for killing and no legitimizations for taking life; governments do not legitimize it; patriotism does not require it; artists do not celebrate it; no relationships of dominance or exclusion—boundaries, forms

> of government, property, gender, race, ethnicity, class, or systems of spiritual or secular belief—require killing to support or challenge them, and no social conditions that depend upon threat or use of lethal force (2007: 1).

In its present form, the majority of the filmmaking industry does not meet Paige's (2007) criteria of a nonkilling society. It legitimizes killing and war in cahoots with the government; its artists celebrate killing; its racist and sexist practices are based on relationships of domination (Hurley, 2008); and it contributes to social conditions in its glorification of lethal force. Paige (2007: 13) quite accurately identifies mass media, which includes industrialised, corporatised filmmaking, as part of the desensitization of life through violent images that demonstrate "dramatic ways in which people, property, animals, and nature can be destroyed by heroes and villains". And yet, Hollywood also is responsible for some of finest, most joyful and creative films ever made, which celebrate the best of humanity including: joy, love, compassion and empathy. Therefore, there is no reason why films about the future cannot depict positive, nonkilling societies, which include conflict and romance and intrigue, but without violence or killing. It is true that contemporary films about the future sometimes contain moments of love and compassion, but these aspects are overwhelmed by the dominant images of despair and violence. It is time for some filmmakers to claim a leadership role by depicting alternative and diverse futures, including nonkilling futures.

Hans Richter (1986: 163) refers to *progressive cinema*, as a filmmaking genre or style where filmmakers understand their responsibility to "make an incomparable contribution to the welfare, the recovery of humanity". I interviewed filmmakers in my recent research and most agreed with Richter's argument that film can make positive contribution. They were in filmmaking to make a difference in the world, but some did not want to feel an obligation to do so, while others were comfortable with the responsibility to provide a positive way forward. Hollywood publicist, Paula Silver (in Hurley, 2009) suggests that "all films have a social impact, the question is: is it good or bad impact? And that all films can be a *catalyst for change* and challenge filmmakers to ask themselves: what images do we need to create hope—to inspire people to take action—to do something?" Filmmaker/ futurist Kate McCullum (in Hurley, 2009) argues that filmmakers are beginning to understand that they need to be wiser with their craft.

There is a tremendous opportunity for filmmakers to choose to participate in the movement toward positive futures. The films could still contain conflict, drama, spectacular visual effects, even the odd flying machine, but by wielding

the tool, the technology of filmmaking, more wisely, the films could offer hopeful alternatives to a generation of moviegoers who badly need them. Academy Award winning, director/ producer Norman Jewison (2004: 281) understands this need when he argues, "Hope is what we hang on to. It's our anchor in a sea of despair. Hope, like faith, remains constant, independent of evidence. When we lose hope we lose everything. People who have no hope become desperate. But hope is a gift of the spirit". Not everyone agrees that hope is important to creating positive change (Jensen, 2007), but I have witnessed numerous classroom and community situations where individuals without hope are unable to envision positive futures or participate in action planning.

Elise Boulding's (1988) visioning workshops focused on creating a *World Without Weapons*, and she observed that a *social imaging* process happened when people began to see hope for a peaceful world within the workshop setting. Most people arrived at the workshops feeling ineffective about peace and disarmament and left feeling empowered to varying degrees because they gained hope that a world without weapons is indeed possible (Boulding, 1995). The link between hope and action is created during act of collaborating on desired futures. In addition, as Anthony Reading (2004: 17), argues, "hope depends on being able to predict that a desired future is potentially achievable". Therefore, stories and film images of nonkilling futures are important because they make our desires for peaceful, nonkilling futures plausible, which creates hope for positive change, and actions toward change can begin.

A filmmaker who creates a film about the future without violence, militarism and killing will risk having her or his film being labeled as a 'message film'. But all stories have a message. It reflects the power of the neo-liberal paradigm that *their* messages are not seen as *a message*. Any works that stand outside of the dominant story, or challenge it, run the risk of being belittled or of being the recipient of critical unkindness, tinged with cynicism. As Marge Piercy (2003: 141) argues "contemporary critics often assume that there is something wrong with fiction that has an ideological content, as if all fiction does not". It hasn't always been this way. Hollywood writer Bob Thomas (in Hurley, 2009) described how in previous decades there were many message films that were box office successes. Some of the films were not immediately successful, for example Stanley Kramer (1984) produced and directed *On the Beach* (1959) with the clear purpose of ending the use of nuclear bombs. Many people avoided the film in the theatres because of the theme and the critics derided it as "another message from Kramer, taking a subject too seriously, the do-gooder at work or good intentions swallowed by speculation", but the film went on to have strong success on television "probably due to the activism of

citizens' groups, the clergy and women's organizations in protest of the nuclear arms race" (Kramer, 1984: 118). According to James Goodby (2011) the contemporary global "obstacles to ending the nuclear threat are more political than technical or military". Therefore, filmmakers today have great power to affect change through their films by addressing the public and political institutions, and as Stanley Kramer did, they could chose to be part of a less violent future by envisioning futures without nuclear weapons.

In addition, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2011), "small arms and light weapons are involved in more violent, conflict related deaths each year than any other type of weapon system". Filmmakers could have a major impact on the reduction of small arms by making choices not to include them in their films, not valourizing the use of guns, or not associating guns with masculinity.

Perhaps films about the future that is not based on violent conflict would be derided by most critics, because such films would lack the high action fight scenes that are so common in films about the future, but I hope that those critics would see the dramatic tension in other parts of the films (after all, conflict does not require violence). There will certainly be cynicism directed toward the first brave film that dares to provide an image of the future different from the dominant, hegemonic images. But with luck, some critics will support the film, and audiences will go in large numbers to the film, and a new, more diverse, fan base will emerge.

German film director/producer/writer, Wim Wenders (Dixon, 2011) is considering a futures-based film in 3-D: "I think 3-D is a still unexplored cinematographic story. In my book, it's the ideal medium for the documentary of the future. It's not invented to show us different planets [like in Avatar]. It's invented to show us our own planet". Based on Wim Wenders previous films, and his recent focus on joyful music and dance, I believe there is a good possibility that his futures 3-d film will envision nonkilling futures, and a flourishing Earth.

There is also tangible reason for optimism about a nonkilling film about the future because American author Starhawk (1993) has begun production on the film version of her novel *The Fifth Sacred Thing*. Starhawk's approach to the film diverged from the patterns in Hollywood filmmaking right from the beginning: when she and her team used crowd sourcing (Kickstarter) to gather funds for the development stage instead of pitching the idea to a studio. And congruent with Alfonso Montuori's (2011) argument for a *new collaborative creativity*, Starhawk is creating a community-based, collaborative approach to the images of the future in the film by encouraging people to contribute ideas and designs for the film via the website. The story in the

film will also break with Hollywood patterns by offering a vision of a caring, green, nonviolent, nonkilling society, with women in positions of leadership and heroism. *The Fifth Sacred Thing* juxtaposes a dystopic Los Angeles as a projection of the hegemonic present with water used as tool of control by the elites, with a green, permaculture-based, utopian San Francisco where "No one in this city goes hungry. No one lacks shelter. No child lacks a home. There is sickness here… but no one lacks care. We have guarded our waters well, our cisterns will not run dry, no one thirsts, and our streams run clear" (Starhawk, 1993: 19). It is a hostile world around them, but San Francisco is kept safe by the Defense Council: nine old women with their magic, dreams and vision. Collectively the citizens make a decision not to pursue military style defense, but to focus their resources on healing the Earth and providing high quality of life for all, including no tolerance for violence or sexual assault. One of the Defense Council elders explains, "War is the great waste, as much in the preparation for it as in the waging of it. We learned that, at least, from last century, as that same military drained the country and destroyed our true wealth" (Starhawk, 1993: 154). They are able to save their city by offering the invading soldiers 'a place at their table', a home and healthy work. There are many heroes in the book, but the main hero's journey in the story is taken by Madrone, a young woman who is a healer and community leader. Starhawk's film will depict beautiful, positive images of alternative futures, including a nonkilling city. It will do much to inspire people, especially youth, to envision their own images of nonkilling futures.

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Chapter Six

Futures of the Feminine

A Woman's Place in the Futures of the Nonkilling Society

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Femicide: The Killing of a Woman

16 year old Zahra al-Azzo is just one of an estimated 300 female victims of what have come to be known as honor-killings in Syria each year. When she was abducted from nearby her home in Northern Syria and raped, the authorities feared that her family would blame her for the crime committed against her and kill her, in what is commonly known as "honor-killing" in her country and elsewhere. The authorities put her in a girls prison in an effort to protect her from such a fate until a cousin of hers, 27-year old Fawaz, agreed to marry her. He hoped to put to rest her family's shame. Just one month after their wedding, Zahra's brother Fayyez, snuck into her apartment while she slept and stabbed her to death. Honor killings are part of a cultural upbringing that teaches men to see their own personal honor as directly tied to the chastity and reputation of the women in their family. In many parts of the world, it has long been culturally acceptable to kill women for either real or purported sexual affairs whether they are forced or consensual. (Zoepf, Katherine, "A dishonorable affair", NY Times, 2007)

In northern Bangladesh, Nurjahan Begum took poison to kill herself after an attempt by the men in her community to stone her to death failed. She had been found guilty of adultery by a 'shalish'—village ruling council—and condemned to death by stoning. Despite being technically illegal, an activist named Hosein explains, "It's very difficult to enforce a law in Bangladesh. The state is very weak. There's always this sense in the community that they know what's best and they're taking up what they consider to be moral issues." (IRIN, 2010).

In Guatemala, men who kill women operate in a culture of almost total impunity. According to official figures quoted by Amnesty International, 685 women were killed there in 2010 alone. Some of the cases reported to Amnesty International include 22 year old Mindi Rodas who was violently

attacked by her husband in 2009. He was charged and prosecuted, but not sent to jail. She was forced to leave her community and was sent to a women's shelter. In 2011 she moved to be closer to family and friends and was found dead less than one month later. There has been no investigation into her killing. Maria Isabel Franco, just 15 years old, was raped and killed in 2011. Her mother Rosa has been seeking justice with no help from the authorities. In fact less than 4% of all homicide cases in Guatemala result in a perpetrator being convicted. The resulting culture of impunity has led to escalating murder of women throughout the country (Amnesty, 2011).

Dowry murder occurs when a husband or his family feel that the bride's family did not give them a sufficient dowry in exchange for marriage. In India, a 19 year old girl named Rinki was beaten and then burned to death because her husband's family had demanded a color television and motorcycle for her dowry instead of the black and white television they had received. Such brutal accounts in the *Times of India* are commonplace. Dowry deaths increased 15-fold in India from the 1980's to the 1990's and are estimated at 9,500 a year today. This form of killing is not limited to India and has been documented extensively across South Asia (Hitchcock, 2001).

In Lancaster County, Pennsylvania in 2006, Charles Roberts walked into a small Amish schoolhouse with a gun, separated the girls from the boys and allowed the boys to leave so that he could murder the remaining young girls in an execution style. As New York Times columnist Bob Herbert (2006) later pointed out, if the segregation had been based on race or religion the whole nation would have been outraged, but "None of that occurred because these were just girls, and we have become so accustomed to living in a society saturated with misogyny that violence against females is more or less to be expected."

How does one begin to envision nonkilling futures when there is so much killing occurring all around us? It takes great creativity, hope and desire to embark on such a mission. As I began to think about the concept of nonkilling and the root causes, I began a journey of unfolding and unpacking the deepest reaches of the currently prevailing worldview. It became clear to me that examining the roots of the sanctioned killing of women could hold a key to nonkilling futures.

Since at least the advent of written history if not earlier, societies around the world have by and large been dominated by the masculine principles of human nature. Most major religious figures, government figures, historical heroes down to the dominant figures in domestic home life have been male. This is true in almost every culture and every country world-

wide. This epoch in human history has also been marked by rampant killing, war, genocide and violence. Not only do humans wage war upon and enact killing of one another, but our economic and social systems have waged an aggressive and destructive war on other living creatures and we are in the process of killing the planet herself to the point where many experts agree that humankind's continued survival on earth is in question.

Women in particular, currently and historically, have been the victims of often brutal, often sanctioned killing. Around the world, women are killed for dishonoring their family, failing to produce a large enough dowry, offending or angering their partner and in some cases for simply being a girl or a woman as is the case with infanticide and the common case of insufficient or withheld medical care for young girls.

Today, there are some hopeful signs that the tide may be shifting. Women are seen taking key leadership roles in the workplace, government, spiritual and social life all around the world. In many war torn regions, women are banding together to build peace-making engines in their shattered communities. Light is increasingly being shed on the sanctioned killing of women and with this spread of information, some are more willing to speak out and defend women from harm.

Yet, despite some of the hopeful trends, violence against women and the sanctioned killing of women is pervasive and on the rise worldwide. The UN and The World Health Organization estimate that, globally, up to six out of every ten women experience physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime. In Turkey, the murder rate of women skyrocketed 1400% from 2002 to 2009. From the UNIFEM World fact sheet: in the United States, one-third of women murdered each year are killed by intimate partners; in South Africa, a woman is killed every 6 hours by an intimate partner; in India, 22 women were killed each day in dowry-related murders in 2007; in Guatemala, two women are murdered, on average, each day.

Some of the killing of women today happens even before birth. A 2005 Amnesty International report estimated that some 60 million girls who would otherwise have been alive are deemed as "missing" due to gender selective abortions, or as a result of receiving inadequate care because they were seen as less valuable than their brothers.

I will argue that since the advent of the modern prevailing worldview, which places higher value and status on male members of society, greater value has been placed on the perennial masculine principles of competition, domination, and revenge as well as linear, sequential and abstract thinking. These principles have long overshadowed the perennial feminine principles of nurturing, com-

passion, forgiveness, holistic thinking, intuition and compassion. Such a paradigm has produced one of the most violent times in history, both in terms of human-human killing as well as human killing of other species and mankind's current all out decimation of the Earth's resources. Women have born the brunt of much of this killing as a result of their lower social status and lack of access to resources such as health care, education and control over their own futures.

In terms of the perennial archetypal principles I wish to address, I would challenge that the feminine aspect of human nature supports cooperation over division, reconciliation over war, and compromise over dictatorship. It's not to say that these traits exist only in women and not in men or vice versa. Rather that within each human exist both feminine and masculine energies. In the last few thousand years, humankinds dominant social structure has been ruled by the masculine energies. The result is our world today, which is ripping apart at the seams in so many different ways.

Alternative futures looks at the various ways our life experience as humans on this planet may evolve. The strength of futures work lies in acknowledging that there are at any given moment an infinite number of possible futures and no one is more plausible than any other. By studying the trends, emerging issues, technologies and coming social shifts, we are able to better guide our societies toward preferred or aspirational futures. Herein lies great possibility for social and cultural transformation.

Causal Layered Analysis is a futures method that encourages deep introspection and insight into issues we face as a society. Developed by Professor Sohail Inayatullah, it is a concrete futures theory and method based in sound social science which allows groups from all backgrounds, cultures and socio-economic experiences to gain greater understanding of their own deep biases in order to generate new and novel approaches to existing issues. By doing the same thing we have always done, we will only get to where we have already been. It is only in breaking the standard mode of thinking and discussion through methods such as CLA that Inayatullah believes deep, meaningful and lasting change can occur. Sohail Inayatullah sees the study of futures as process and the role of futurist as facilitator of transformational change. There is no one definite truth, rather a series of interpretations of reality based on one's history, experiences and resulting viewpoint. We are not to define the future, but rather un-define it, question how we are constructing the future we envision and why we are making those assumptions, those choices. In engaging the CLA process we will be able to ask, "How might different futures appear if alternative units of analysis are used?" (Inayatullah, 2004: 5-6). CLA "seeks to integrate empiricist, interpretive, critical, and action learning modes of knowing

at inner and outer levels. As a method, its utility is not in predicting the future but in creating transformative spaces for the creation of alternative futures. It is also likely to be useful in developing more effective—deeper, inclusive, longer term—policy." (Inayatullah, 2004: 1) It is important to note that this method was developed through *doing*. Through repeated action learning in workshops around the world with all sorts of different types of people, CLA developed and continues to evolve. It is truly an evolution of Inayatullah's deep view of futures as process and the important role of futures in transforming society.

Causal Layered Analysis consists of four distinct layers or levels of analysis and experience or questioning. The first level of analysis deals with the Litany. This level is most identified with the mass news media, the parts of an issue that lie at the "official unquestioned view of reality." (Inayatullah, 2004: 1) At this level of analysis there is often an underlying current of helplessness, apathy or fear, a sense that nothing can be done so why bother. In many cases of popular discourse, the discussion never reaches far beyond the litany. It is the level that we are all most familiar with in daily experience.

Delving into deeper inquiry, the next level of CLA is Systemic Causes. This level of analysis looks at the systems and structures in place that are important to the issue at hand. In this level of discussion there is often evaluation of quantitative data, editorial pieces, statements from policy institutes and the like. From the level of system, the litany can be examined from a new angle, which may bring about new perspectives. Solutions will often arise that require more research or "create a partnership with industry" to begin addressing the issue at hand. (Inayatullah, 2004: 19)

The third level of CLA is concerned with the worldview and discourse that supports the litany. Inayatullah calls this arena the "deeper social, linguistic and cultural processes that are actor-invariant." It becomes helpful to look at how the worldview or discourse in place is "complicit in our framing of the issue" itself. (Inayatullah, 2004: 12) Within the exploration of worldview there are multiple levels. There is the stakeholder level, the vested interests of those involved; the ideological level which is the "deeply held positions on how the world is and should be" (Inayatullah, 2004: 1); the civilizational level which relates to a person's distinct cultural background; and the level of episteme or way of knowing that each person brings to the table. All of these levels of worldview can be unpacked to better comprehend the root of one's understanding as it relates to any particular issue at hand. Once the worldview is understood, it can then be questioned to see whether it is really effective or not.

The fourth level addresses myth and metaphor. These are the deepest held stories and archetypes, which often inhabit the unconscious of the individual in question. As Inayatullah loves to query, "What is your inner story?" What is the archetype or myth that defines your deep sense of self? A story that is so deep, you are no longer aware of its influence. He explains, "At this level, the challenge is to elicit the root myth or metaphor that supports the foundation of a particular litany of issues." (Inayatullah, 2004: 19) To truly access the level of myth/metaphor, I find it helps to understand the belief that humans are born a blank slate and that it is our culture, our experience of what we call reality that layers on our sense of individual self. Once deeply layered, these identifications *become* our reality and we forget how they came to be in the first place or what it was like to be without them. Only by actively engaging in peeling back the layers through deep inquiry can we arrive at a place of new self-understanding. This type of work is important because it allows us to arrive a place of power and self-knowledge from which can arise transformation.

Futurist Marcus Barber (2009) summarizes the four levels of CLA as:

- What we say—the litany
- What we do—social or systemic causes
- How we think—worldviews
- Who we are—myth and metaphor

So, with that futures philosophy and methodology in mind, let's return to the reality of escalating killing of women in our world today. When we speak of nonkilling futures, it is my belief that the full, equal inclusion of women and, by extension, the archetypal feminine principles of human nature will play a keystone role in such a transformational process. To actualize a nonkilling future is definitely a lofty goal. Some would call it a utopian image of the future. In futures there is a term called e-utopia that is often used to describe the best world we can imagine that is possible, also known as our preferred or aspirational future. A nonkilling world and the path toward a nonkilling society must be seen as eutopian goals that can be achieved if the endeavor is to have any merit.

In thinking about the eutopian goal of a nonkilling society, it became very clear to me that the ancient and intrinsic feminine principles of both human nature and the human spirit must play a central role in the grand process of social transformation we are proposing. Called both the divine feminine and the sacred feminine, the generally accepted principles referenced by these terms are those of universal motherhood, wisdom, compassion, nurturing,

transformation and ultimately a balance between masculine and feminine—a shedding of dualistic concepts of reality. The concept of the sacred or divine feminine can be found in virtually every religious and cultural tradition.

It's very important at the outset to understand that a discussion of feminine and masculine principles does not necessarily relate to women and men in the physical sense of sexual differentiation. Rather, my exploration of the feminine principles and the sacred feminine is based on the belief that humans of both sexes are fully endowed with what can be defined as feminine and masculine natures. Sometimes upbringing, cultural values and life experience tend to highlight or emphasize one over the other in an individual. What is of most interest in our discussion here is the overarching value, emphasis and relative importance that has been placed on masculine principles in the predominately patriarchal societies that exist worldwide today. I would argue that this "tipping of the scales" toward masculine principles has resulted in a world of competition, rampant consumption and consumerism, violence toward all life and disconnection from both nature and natural spiritual wisdom. And with the eutopian goal of a nonkilling future in mind, I believe that a shift toward more egalitarian cultural worldviews endowed with the principles of the sacred feminine is necessary if we wish to achieve such an aspirational future.

To spark the transformation toward this nonkilling society, we have to begin to look at the root causes of violence toward and killing of women. The trends and statistics are clear. By employing the Causal Layered Analysis method of inquiry in relation to this issue, we can begin to dig deeper into the root causes of the killing and begin to imagine another way which values the principles of nonkilling.

CLA applied to the issue of the sanctioned killing of women

The Litany

We are constantly barraged with statistics of violence against women and the culturally and legally sanctioned killing of women around the world in the news and in our own life experience. In some areas, the levels of violence and oppression of women have reached an extreme.

- For women and girls 16-44 years old, violence is a major cause of death and disability—more dangerous than cancer, motor vehicle accidents, war or malaria.
- 1 in 6 women will experience violence in her lifetime, in many cases this violence leads to death.

- Between 1989 and 2004 21,124 women in the United States died at the hands of an intimate.
- The prevalence of physical or sexual violence is as high as 71% in places such as Ethiopia (Source: UNIFEM and US Dept. of Justice).

This is unfortunately not new news. In 1976 the term Femicide was defined as the misogynist killing of women. This type of violence against women has been a worldwide phenomenon for millennia. In many cases condoned by religion, cultural practices or even the state, women have for thousands of years been treated as subservient and second-class citizens and killed for real or purported wrongdoing that would not be considered justified reason to kill a man. The statistics are truly shocking and can numb us to a point of accepting that this is simply "the way things are" in the world today. We have come to see the sanctioned killing of women as a normal facet of life.

The issue is truly worldwide and cuts across socio-economic boundaries. It is one that has existed for as long as written history has been around to tell the tales. Numbers and statistics of such magnitude send most people into a tailspin of despondency and despair. It seems that the problem is so huge, there is nothing to be done. While some nonprofit groups, aid organizations and certain government agencies attempt to battle the epidemic, we watch as it continues, seemingly unabated.

The Systemic Causes

Many studies point to low socio-economic status, women as the "weaker sex", lack of education and opportunity as reasons for violence against women. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, violence against women has been likened to a "weapon of war". Women as young as 3 and as old as 75 are brutally raped in front of their family to break apart the unity of their community with shame. In Muslim, Hindu and some Sikh communities the concept of honor-killings is viewed as an acceptable way for family members to react when they feel their family's honor or reputation has been soiled by a female relative's real or purported actions. In domestic violence and murder cases, it is often the heat of "passion" that is blamed for a man's violence and brutality against his partner. The low status of women in societies around the world has been blamed for the trends as well as, "gender inequality and the lack of empowerment of women and girls and discrimination, stigma, and social marginalization." (UNAIDS, 2010).

Local traditions and laws also reinforce the victimization of women such as the dowry tradition for a bride in marriage and the fact that in many

countries a woman must have her spouse's written permission to work or open a bank account. The existing social systems have institutionalized violence against women and placed higher value on both men and the masculine principles of competition and violence as a means of achieving success.

Worldview

Causal Layered Analysis of the situation asks us to probe deeper. Beneath the surface systemic causes of this violence, there is a worldview that perpetuates violence against women on all levels and allows the sanctioned killing of women to continue. From inequality in the most common forms to all out violence, women have been consistently discriminated against and victimized in society as far back as our earliest written history. Who are the stakeholders and what are their vetted interests?

The predominately patriarchal worldview that dominates in virtually every society has vested power in men who control the systems that dictate economic and social status. The trends of honor-killing, domestic murder, war crimes against women, all are based in deeply held issues of maintaining social control and wielding power over women. The way that our current system of gender inequality operates, there is a huge vested interest in maintaining status quo in order to maintain social, cultural and economic power. Were the system to shift in favor of a more egalitarian worldview in which both genders were considered of equal social and cultural importance, there would be a deep shift in the power structures that underlie society.

Myth and Metaphor

The deepest and sometimes most transformative analysis can occur at the level of myth and metaphor. Male and Female, Patriarchal and matriarchal, us and them, you and me: perhaps the deepest underlying myth that fuels the sanctioned killing of women in our world today is the myth of dichotomy, of separation. This deeply held nearly universal myth says that one half exists in separation from the other, that one side of human nature, and as a result one of the two genders, must prevail as the principle ruling gender.

Perhaps one of the most important shifts in the world consciousness paradigm has been happening relatively silently for several decades now. This is the shift from a worldview informed by Newtonian theory, which has at its core a belief in matter and materialism as well as determinism, to a new paradigm based in Quantum theory. German theoretician Marco Bischof summarized the key insight from Quantum theory that is emerging at the frontier of the life sciences as the following: "Quantum mechanics has

established the primacy of the inseparable whole. For this reason, the basis of the new biophysics must be the insight into the fundamental interconnectedness *within* the organism as well as *between* organisms, and that of the organism *with the environment*." (apud Laszlo, 2004: 39)

The concepts of interconnectedness and nonlocal communication arising from discussions of Quantum theory have the potential for incredible reverberations throughout every level of human experience. If our relationship to the world, to other humans as well as nonhuman life on the planet is understood as one of an interconnected whole, then the eutopian vision of a nonkilling future becomes increasingly more natural and attainable. How can one consider killing that which is the same as oneself? It becomes a much more complicated question and one we are less able to distance "ourselves" from. It also resolves the dichotomy created by the original myth of separation. If two individuals are not actually so individual, if they are instead linked by a complex and evolving system of nonlocal communication, then the myth of one being superior to the other has no weight. There is an assumed equality that is literally inalienable. The previously important definitions of male and female or superior and inferior no longer hold sway as humanity and in fact all of life in the universe becomes understood as a connected continuum in constant and dynamic interaction.

In her book *The Chalice and the Blade*, author and feminist researcher Riane Eisler proposes "that there can be societies in which difference is not necessarily equated with inferiority or superiority." (1987: xvii) Eisler, through her extensive research, argues that Paleolithic cultures, which were primarily Goddess oriented, existed in many cases as what she has termed a "partnership model" where men and women were seen as equally contributing members of society. The myths of the Goddess allowed for symbols and messaging that encouraged a celebration of life and participation by members of both sexes in the creation of culture. She maintains that if in these ancient mythical images, "the central religious image was a woman giving birth and not, as in our time, a man dying on a cross, it would not be unreasonable to infer that life and the love of life—rather than death and the fear of death—were dominant in society as well as art." Anne Baring and Jules Cashford in their book *The Myth of the Goddess* express the power of neolithic myths in this way:

> Can we understand from this that there were originally not one but two basic myths: the myth of the goddess and the myth of the hunter? The pregnant figures of the statues *(found in numerous ancient archaeological*

> *sites)* suggest that the myth of the mother goddess was concerned with fertility and the sacredness of life in all its aspects, and so with transformation and rebirth. By contrast, the myth of the hunter was concerned above all with the drama of survival—the taking of life as a ritual act in order to live. The first story is centered on humanity, who, as hunter, has continually to rupture this unity in order to live the daily life of time. These two stories, both essential to human experience, pull apart in response to two apparently different human instincts: the instinct for relationship and meaning, and the instinct to survive. They seem, then, to tell different and even mutually exclusive stories: one where life and death are recognized as phases of an eternal process; the other where the death of animal and human being loses its connection to the whole and is no longer sacred. Here death becomes final, and our experience of life tragic. (1993: 39)

As a whole humanity, we now need to consider the possibility that somewhere in the reaches of history we allowed the myth of the hunter, the myth of death, competition and violence as a mode of survival, to become dominant and to color almost every aspect of modern culture around the world. Could we consider that the reach of this dominant myth extends to every facet of the modern human experience? That our current violence toward each other, the environment and nonhuman species; our over consumption of material goods and the pillaging of the natural environment required to feed our rapacious consumer appetites; that these patterns are tied to a deep and ancient myth of competition over scarce resources. That the image of the hunter has become the dominant paradigm and that a shift back to life enhancing myth and metaphor is urgently required for the survival of our species.

Leonard Shlain in *The Alphabet versus the Goddess* argues that the shift from feminine to masculine principles or from partnership to domination occurred not necessarily because of a social or cultural shift but as a result of a shift from primarily image based right hemisphere thinking to logical and rational left hemisphere thinking with the advent of written language. Shlain posits that "Nonverbal clues, concrete gestalts, music, inflection, spontaneity, simultaneity, aesthetics, emotion, slips of the tongue, gesticulation and peripheral vision are all features best processed by the right brain." Whereas,

> The written word issues from linearity, sequence, reductionism, abstraction, control, central vision, and the dominant hand—all hunter/killer attributes… Writing made the left brain… dominant over the right. The triumphant march of literacy that began five thousand years ago conquered right-brain values, and with them, the Goddess. Patriarchy and misogyny have been the inevitable result." (1999: 44)

Mirroring and in concert with the shift from oral societies to ones based in written language is the shift from nomadic, hunter-gatherer cultures where there was no value for personal property to more sedentary agricultural societies in which defense of property and ownership became important sociocultural factors. "Literacy made empire possible. So, with literacy also came the emergence of organized religions, usually, though not always, featuring jealous and vengeful solitary male gods (whereas manifold fertility goddesses and other spirits had coexisted peacefully before) and the systematic, organized use of killing to gain, control, and extend property" (Dator, 2007). In these emerging agricultural, literacy based cultures, women and children became important aspects of property to be commodified, controlled and objectified, paving the way for culturally sanctioned violence and killing of women.

These are just a few theories in a sea of opinions on the subject. What is clear from this analysis is that the popular myths and metaphors of our current social paradigm have established a distinct hierarchy of masculine principles over feminine ones, and that this hierarchy is responsible for the prevailing violence, unsustainable consumption and destruction of the natural world occurring on the planet.

Critiques of Eisler and Shlain's vision of matriarchal pre-history by Cynthia Eller and others have highlighted the notion that the "Matriarchal Prehistory" is likely a myth itself, pointing to evidence that refutes the claims of archaeologists such as Marija Gimbutas that there was a golden age before the onset of patriarchy when women and feminine archetypes ruled over a world of relative peace and harmony. Despite the competing theories and critiques, the central important question for futurists still remains, what could and should a new myth for humanity look like?

By examining the futures and delving into expanded visions of a preferred or aspirational future we have the opportunity to choose from many myths and metaphors to arrive at those which serve to create the society which will realize our collective vision, in this case the vision of a nonkilling future. As futurists Ivana Milojevic and Sohail Inayatullah suggest in their essay, "Feminist Critiques and Visions of the Future", "The future most women envision is quite different from the future envisioned by, if not all men, at least their most powerful members. Frankly, it would be difficult to imagine societies run by women where the main effort would be in the "destroying lives industry". Or societies in which women would considered themselves so utterly above nature that its destruction would not be connected with the destruction of our species and its future generations." Renowned futurist Eleonora Masini also argues that women are often better than men at creating al-

ternative futures because of individual and social capacities such as flexibility and solidarity which closely mirror the principles of the sacred or divine feminine archetype (<http://www.metafuture.org>).

Perhaps even deep within our human neural wiring is an age-old choice between aggression and cooperation. Michael R. A. Chance in his book *Social Fabrics of the Mind,* speaks of two mental modes inherent in human beings which were available to our primate ancestors as two different tracks of evolution. He calls these two tracks the Agonic and the Hedonic. The Agonic track is one of ranking and aggression where sex is symbolic of power. In contrast, the Hedonic track is one of cooperation, low aggression and mutual dependence. Two of our closest genetic primate relatives are prime examples of these vastly different social modalities. Chimpanzees, warlike, violent, hierarchical, they are known to fight fiercely with rival groups and among their own clans often to the death. Bonobos on the other hand, primarily peaceful and matriarchal, are known to resolve conflicts among their social groups and with outside groups through sharing food and having sex. And not sex for procreation, but sex for pleasure both heterosexual and homosexual.

Similarly, one of the ancient cultures studied heavily by Eisler and others in their examination of Goddess-based cultures was Minoan Crete where "the entire relationship between the sexes—not only definitions and valuations of gender roles but also attitudes toward sensuality and sex—was obviously very different from ours… From what we now know through modern humanistic psychology, this "pleasure bond" would have strengthened a sense of mutuality between women and men as individuals." It seems the Cretans, like the Bonobos, "seem to have reduced and diverted their aggressiveness through a free and well-balanced sexual life." (Eisler, 1987: 39). In contrast, many cultures today, America included as seen from any review of popular media culture, seem to view sex as more sinful than even violence.

Intertwine these theories with the biological fact that during the act of sex and orgasm a hormone is released known as Oxytocin. This has been called both the "love hormone" and the "bonding hormone". Representing a biological basis for love and bonding, the existence of this hormone underscores the need for a more liberal acceptance of sexual interaction as we aim for the nonkilling future. Imagine an alternative future where your contribution to the eutopian vision of the nonkilling society is realized through open loving sexual relations. Not a bad vision indeed.

With some seven billion people on the planet and counting, the old consumer driven, violent, masculine value dominated forms of society will need

to shift to a more inclusive, life affirming, interconnected vision of humanity's futures if we wish to survive as a species with any semblance of success. Elise Boulding, hailed by many as the mother of the modern peace movement, espoused the vision of a "gentle society" in which androgenous beings created a world where society was both decentralized and demilitarized but still interconnected and interdependent (Milojevic, 2005: 93). There are many today working to create a similar vision for society and there are many sources from which to draw as we craft a new mythological perspective that incorporates both the masculine and feminine sides of human nature. In order to achieve the eutopian vision of a nonkilling society we will need to spark a transformation, the other side of which will see women and men co-existing as equally valued participants in a world which values the core principles of the sacred feminine.

Novo Foundation, *The Girl Effect* and the International Council of 13 Indigenous Grandmothers

There are numerous groups working in the world today to radically shift the status quo of patriarchy and oppression of women. I will mention just a few here, but a simple Internet search for women's peace movements or women's empowerment groups illuminates a massive resource of organizations seeking to shift the prevailing worldview that has held women inferior for so long.

The Novo foundation is a nonprofit dedicated to "catalyzing a transformation in global society, moving from a culture of domination to one of equality and partnership." They aim to do this by promoting the welfare and advancement of women and girls in the world believing that women and girls embody the principles of "mutual respect, collaboration and civic participation" that will bring around such a social transformation away from our current dominant culture of greed and competition. They also see that when a woman or girl is given assistance she often turns around and passes along what she has learned or gained to her community and her family. By helping one woman, you help everyone in her sphere of influence. (<http://www.novofoundation.org>). Headed by Peter & Jennifer Buffet (son of Warren Buffet), one of the projects they support is the Girl Effect which is funded and supported by the multi-national corporation Nike. These are big names behind a transformational undertaking.

The Girl Effect looks at the ripples effects that happen when a young girl is given a chance to better her life through access to proper health care and education. Some of the facts (from <http://www.girleffect.org>):

- When a girl in the developing world receives seven or more years of education, she marries four years later and has 2.2 fewer children.
- When women and girls earn income, they reinvest 90 percent of it into their families, as compared to only 30 to 40 percent for a man.
- More than one-quarter of the population in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa are girls and young women ages 10 to 24.

Groups like the Novo Foundation and the Girl Effect believe that issues of overpopulation, poverty, spread of disease and community stability can be solved by elevating the status of women and girls to be equal to that of men. By counterbalancing in this way the historical shift to patriarchal societies dominated by masculine principles a transformation can begin, taking the vision of the nonkilling society closer to reality.

From an indigenous perspective, the International Council of 13 Indigenous Grandmothers seeks to restore the reverence and respect once held for the wisdom and judgment of elder women in Native American society. The council of grandmothers is originally an Iriquois concept. The Iriquois nation always consulted their council of grandmothers before making any decision, especially the decision to go to war. The idea of a council of elders in governance itself is common to many indigenous cultures and relies on the image of a circle rather than a hierarchy.

The current council was formed in 2004 and is made of a mixed group of indigenous elder women from all around the world with a total of some 889 years of wisdom and experience. These women believe that the current destruction of the earth and indigenous ways of being must be urgently mitigated and that any decisions made must take into account future generations, in this case the next seven generations, if we wish to create a viable world in which both human and nonhuman life can survive. The Grandmothers' stated mission is, "to [develop and reinstate] the proper relationship between women and men, integrating traditional and indigenous medicine, maintaining the Earth's balance, and bringing forth the collective power of wise women by deepening our relationship with the feminine." (Schaefer, 2006: 10)

Images of the future—Alternative Futures

At any given moment, an infinite number of alternative futures exist. Any one of them is possible and while some may seem more probable than others, an educated look at the past, both recent and ancient, shows that novelty will often present itself and quickly turn what seemed to be "prob-

able" on its head. This forms the intellectual foundation of futures studies. By examining our images of the futures and allowing for varied alternatives, we open out a way for creating system wide social transformation.

Dator studies speaks of four main categories when discussing images of the future. After many, many years of analyzing images of the futures as they have been presented in literature and media across time and culture, he concluded that all images of the futures fall into one of four main categories. These are: Collapse—an image of the future in which the idea, issue or structure at hand falls apart; Continued Growth—an image in which "business as usual" continues to its extreme extrapolation; Discipline—an image in which some event or events happen which lead almost to collapse but by luck and/or hard work we are able to sustain some semblance of the past through strict discipline; Transformation—an image in which the idea or issue is completely and utterly transformed (typically technologically or through spiritual transformation) to the point where it no longer resembles its predecessor at all. In the futures of nonkilling and the role of the patriarchal worldview, such alternative images can be important and helpful as we envision a eutopian world.

A brief look at some alternative futures of the sanctioned killing of women

Collapse, a world without killing…

In this image of the future, the sanctioned killing of women as well as the un-prosecuted killing of women and girls has ceased around the world. It is no longer acceptable in any culture to kill a woman whether she has admittedly or allegedly dis-honored her family or for any other reason. Women from birth are valued as equal and important members of their communities and social structures. They are given access to adequate health care, education, economic opportunity and the ability to make individual choices about the direction of their own life as well as the futures of their families and children.

Sexual relations are experienced with freedom and an absence of social judgment. There is no distinction between heterosexual or homosexual experiences, rather sex in all of its possible iterations is seen as a natural and enjoyable part of being human and a healthy way to release tension, create bonding and experience our physicality. This shift from sex as a tool of power and control to sex as a natural human function of connection and social bonding collapses the previous social patterns of rape, incest and other sexual violence as a means of social control and domination.

Continued Growth, the killing continues to escalate…

In keeping with the trends we see today, there is increased violence against and killing of women and girls worldwide into the future. This is mirrored in mankind's violence against the planet and nonhuman life, which in turn leads to the wholesale destruction of nature and the life sustaining aspects of the natural environment. We see an increase in corporate control of natural resources. Economies and governments operate with the bottom line of 'monetary profit at any cost' taking its toll on both humankind and all life on the planet. Women in communities all around the world continue to be killed for simply being women. Honor killings continue to expand into the United States and Europe as increased immigration from middle and near eastern Asia brings the culture of this sanctioned form of femicide to new areas of the world. In this future, it is a difficult and dangerous time to be a woman.

Discipline, manage and minimize the sanctioned killing of women…

In a disciplined vision of the future, humanity has come close to destroying the life sustaining aspects of the earth. We have reached the brink, but before declining into total collapse, we are able through disciplined action and increased equality between men and women to save ourselves from total social and environmental collapse. Strict laws, both state governed and cultural, come into being which enforce the equal status and human rights of women. Rather than a deep psychological or profound social shift in human behavior bringing about the nonkilling of women, we see a highly controlled and enforced environment where the killing of women is forbidden and heavily punished both socially and through the justice systems.

Transformation, androgeny and the "gentle society"…

Elise Boulding's vision of the gentle society in which androgynous beings embodying the best of both male and female principles comes to fruition through advanced technological breakthroughs which nullify the idea and physical realities of gender altogether. Through artificially intelligent silica based life and the combination of this AI with biological life, we wipe out the pre-definition of gender. Human beings are able to choose and change their gender at will creating a natural egalitarianism between "men" and "women" that allows an equal honoring of the inherent wisdom of both archetypal principles of human nature.

Toward a Preferred Future—the vision of a Nonkilling Society

My preferred or aspirational future incorporates different aspects of these alternative images of the futures. I envision a world where women and men are valued as equal participants in the creation of society. The traditional gender roles assigned to men and women are cast aside in favor of valuing the best principles of each side of human nature in a way that does not assign them to gender. The values of compassion, nurturing, connection, collaboration, peacemaking, benevolent leadership and communion with nature and the natural wisdom inherent in nonhuman life forms would be universally acknowledged and honored as the core of a civil society. Killing of any kind would be seen as an abhorrent and unacceptable practice to be minimized with life and liberty protected and valued for all members of a society and all parts of an ecosystem.

While some violence and killing may still exist, such acts would be seen as deeply socially and culturally unacceptable and treated as a disease to be compassionately dealt with as any physical disease is currently. Women and men would both hold important leadership roles in society with the caveat being that the best person to lead would, regardless of gender. Women and men would have equal access to educational opportunity, health care and control over their own futures. As a result, consumerism and consumption of resources would decline as people began to see relationships and experiences as more valuable than material goods. Communities would strengthen around an egalitarian core that included all members regardless of age or gender in the crafting and governing of society.

To get there from here we must begin to shift the tide from the current world paradigm of male domination and female subjugation through education, access to resources, shared information about the realities of killing and violence and a profound cultural re-framing of this violence as unacceptable under any terms. This eutopian goal may not happen quickly but with persistent and concerted effort I believe that it can be a reality. By reinventing the deep myths that inform our culture and instilling an ethic of compassionate stewardship for all life, human and otherwise, we can begin this magnificent social transformation.

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Chapter Seven

Women's Invisible Role in Building Nonkilling Societies

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Paige's concept of nonkilling societies has been very strong for a lifetime. It is a daring ethical challenge that strikes at the very heart of political science which accepts killing as a legitimate function of governance. His thesis is also a difficult one to accept for the future in a world that seems to be accelerating in initiating wars and supporting violence, especially in the last ten years. It is also a challenge to the past—to the basic assumption that killing is inevitable and even positive for human wellbeing; that indeed we should celebrate killing and killers. Political scientists of today seem to be afraid of ethical condemnation if the possibility and desirability of a nonkilling world is accepted. Many also seem to be afraid of a universal ethic while I think that a framework of universal ethics assumes the necessity of present generations assuming responsibility for the way their acts impact future generations.

According to Antonio Papisca, Italian sociologist whose work has always been centred on peace, in his introduction to Paige's book in Italian (*Non uccidere, Una nuova scienza politica sociale* which in its original English text is *Nonkilling Global Political Science*), expresses very clearly, in his writings, that political science should go through a process of deep re-thinking in relation to its content, its methods, as well its relationships with other disciplines. Papisca underlines Paige's understanding that education and socialization are vital in moving toward liberation from killing.

Paige recognizes that both scientific and meta-scientific approaches such as spirituality, creativity, music, leadership, institutions, and resources are needed. Such a formulation is similar to integral humanism as described by Jacques Maritain in his foundational six lectures at the University of Santander in 1934 with the title "Integral Humanism", published in 1936. Integral humanism assumes its fullness in human dignity in the context of Christianity. Antonio Papisca is an open-minded Christian, as Maritain was, and his work has always dealt with peace building. There could be an inter-

esting debate between Papisca and Paige who in this founding book stresses his basic thesis about the challenge of ethics to the essence of political science in our time and for the future.

The main questions to be answered in order to build a future of nonkilling societies are clearly discussed in Paige's basic text. Paige also explains that by "nonkilling societies" he means human communities—small or large, local or global—in which there is no killing by humans of other humans; no threats of killing; no arms designed to kill; no justification for their use in any social situation. Paige's starting point for achieving a nonkilling global society is via a nonkilling political science since currently political scientists uncritically assume the right of a state to kill in certain circumstances. If political scientists can see that effective and fair governing need not be based on killing or the threat of killing, and that a world without legitimate killing of humans by any one can be achieved, we will have moved a long way toward achieving such a world.

An important passage in Paige's book which is a basis for this article is that women historically have not fought in wars, and that military and ethnographic museums do not glorify women's role in wars. It is true of course that some women have participated in wars and have killed in them, but it has always been a tiny minority of women. This is what I shall try to explain in this paper relying on my own research on women mainly in so-called developing countries.

Before closing this introduction I wish to mention one other basic point made by Paige that is important for understanding the role of women that I wish to develop, and this is the role of education and socialization. Paige focuses mainly on education of and by political scientist and others in the academic community to create the capacity necessary for imagining and creating nonkilling societies. I would like to show in this paper how, in invisible ways, women also develop such capacities by actually living in nonkilling societies and often unwittingly educating their children for nonkilling societies. Paige himself discusses the Waorani in Ecuador who offer a potent example of moving from killing and the acceptance of killing toward nonkilling. He points that much was due to two women who were able to gain the support of other Waorani women. He concludes that what was done initially by the women was completed by political scientists who offered professional support.

Similarly, Paige says that we find support for nonkilling societies not only "from the bases of society" but also in the top of the societies whatever their level, local, national or international. This leads me to my main topic. I will show women's capacities in many different societies to prepare for nonkilling societies in their different countries.

Women's contribution to building nonkilling future societies

In all societies women's role in building the future while thinking about their children is mostly invisible. Women all over the world--even those who do not have children—are very often occupied in taking care of children by working in religious groups or in associations engaged in education or health issues. All these activities—especially those carried out in response to the ravages of war—help to prepare societies to become nonkilling societies. This is shown quite clearly in research done by certain international and national organizations. I shall describe my own research done in many countries. This comes out clearly from the fieldwork, "Women, Household and Change", that I coordinated for the United Nations University (UNU) for about 10 years (1980-1990). It is also well documented in the NGO called WIN (Women's International Network, Emergency and Solidarity) that I coordinated from 1995 to 2005. The role of women in building the basis of nonkilling societies exists often as a reaction to killings in their own societies.

As Elise Boulding wrote in the prologue to the book based on the WIN experience, "we sought a perspective that could make visible yet not repel those who reject the idea that women should be the focus of special studies. The answer was the household. Here, in all its cultural diversity, is the primary living unit of human beings". It was certainly interesting to find in each country researched something related in some way to violence and women's capacity to make efforts so that their household and especially their children should be protected within societies where killing was a norm. The entire research project had as a leading theme the effect that global changes have on women and households. The specific effects were different according to the country involved which were Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Sri Lanka, China and Kenya. In Colombia research was based on studying the demographic transition which showed that in some parts of the country women in rural areas frequently faced violent situations. In fact, in rural areas where the less educated women are it was clear that even in the household where women are so central, power was in the hands of men who often behaved violently toward women. Although this was not the objective of the research, the existence of violence by men against women was clearly visible. It would hence be very important to aim at building nonkilling societies by enhancing the capacity of women to oppose violence in the household as preparation for building a nonkilling society generally.

Another case emerged from UNU empirical research done in Kenya. In Kenya there are many tea and coffee plantations which are the main source

of income of the country since the establishment of such plantations by the British at the beginning of the 20th Century. The main workers are women. There is a prevalence of women-headed households with women working very hard on the plantations while also attending to their children at home. Women also do everything possible to educate their children even though there was no public system of education. These women were in continual danger of violence from men and tried to do everything in their power to see that their children did not live in the kind of violent societies they had to endure. By this I wish to stress that, even if unwittingly, women in many countries—and mostly poor countries—are building the basis for nonkilling societies even though they are not recognized as such and may not even realize they are playing that role themselves.

Now, I wish to mention the case of China. This part of the research project was very long and complex as at that time there were no trained social science researchers in China, except for one extraordinary woman from the All-China Women's Federation to whom I was directed. This lady, Madam Sun, helped those of us from the UNU to find possible researchers and train them which we did with great difficulty. Our research focused on the economic reforms which had been established in 1979 and was developed in two very different parts of China, one in Jiangsu province and the other in Sichuan. Madam Sun worked without rest on the project for ten years. I travelled to China at least twice a year and went to the provinces with Madam Sun. Even though the research was very difficult to do, it was carefully done, and I learned much about women in China at that time and later. Certainly China was coming out of very difficult times where women's roles were unclear and much suffering was caused to them. Apart from the results of the research and its great interest in showing the changes occurring with women and in women, as Madam Sun wrote in her report, women were quite satisfied with their activities while at the same time they were convinced that housework is women's main duty. I was especially struck by the hidden role of women in decision-making processes in the household which seemed to be in men's hands. When I participated in meetings at the village and township level I realised how much was in women's hands. The coordinator of the township who usually spoke first was a man and the second was a woman. At the same time I was able to detect that women had great influence over decision-making in a silent way. On the other hand, what was an unfortunate surprise was that in this period there was a trend toward women receiving less education than they had in the recent past.

Again, indications in this research of women's role in creating nonkilling societies was very subtle. It was mainly revealed in the great effort by some

women to work peacefully and to maintain the peace in the townships. We must remember that China at that time was a place of violence often leading to killing. Women were building the possibility of nonkilling society for their children in many quiet, hidden ways, but even such work put them in great danger. For example consider the case of Madam Sun.

During the World Conference in Beijing in 1988 of the World Futures Studies Federation, when the research we had undertaken together had just been finished, Madam Sun came to the conference and participated in the group on women's issue and the future which I was coordinating. However, after the meeting she disappeared and neither I, nor anyone else, was able to contact her. Her disappearance coincided with a meeting which was sponsored by the Chinese government (it would not otherwise have been possible to hold it). Many students from various universities in Beijing were also present as secretaries to the various working groups. I myself had been received by the highest officials in the Government. But suddenly she disappeared. Many of the students were in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 just a few months after the WFSF conference and were never heard from again. I am relating this to show how in an apparently peaceful society such as China seemed to be at time, where women, like Madame Sun and others were working for a peaceful future for households and children, leading perhaps nonkilling future societies, women again paid high prices for their peaceful attempts.

The role of women living in violent situations, as many are, in preparing nonkilling societies is well documented in a NGO which I coordinated for ten years called "WIN". It engaged in empirical research basically aimed at discovering women's groups, not recorded in any official sources, who are working in different societies around the world in emergency situations such as wars, revolutions, violence of different kinds, and natural disasters. WIN was founded and hosted officially by the municipality of Rome. It was a small group but with the presence of many women around the world all coming from countries where killing was widespread such as Algeria, Armenia, Brazil, Cameroon, Congo-Zaire, India, Iran, Palestine, Rwanda, and Serbia. Just to mention a few of the women involved in the research there was Vanda Shiva from India , Lily Kasthani Mostafavi from Iran, Thais Corral from Brazil, Sandra Guerrero from El Salvador, Susanna Diku from Congo Zaire, Luisa Morgantini, Italian and founder of the Women in Black in the former Yugoslavia, Matilde Cechin from Brazil, and others. They were all women working in silence in their countries creating groups to confront violence and, with different means, opening the way toward nonkilling societies. Their actions aimed at saving their children and enabling them to have a peaceful future.

In the first meeting in Rome, we elected as honorary president the Nobel Prize winner, Rita Levi Montalcini, who remained with us until the very end. Through her entire life (she is now 102), she has worked for the benefit of women in different manners such as funding education for women in Africa while wars were ongoing. I was elected acting president and we started to work with very little funding. In fact, unfortunately, the group was not able to last long because of this, but many of the groups identified have kept in contact in an invisible network around the world which was the final objective of the research.

I hope I have shown from my personal experience in these research activities some ways in which women create the basis of nonkilling societies as a reaction to killings in their societies. These women aim for a peaceful future not only for their own children but also for future generations. This role is mainly invisible even to the women themselves which is why the WIN project aimed at giving visibility to such women to the world as well to themselves. Acting peacefully but effectively where widespread killing was going on around them, these women are clear indicators of possible nonkilling societies everywhere the world. Their examples should be known, studied, lauded, and followed. They are seeds of change for a nonkilling future. What follows are only a few of the many examples from the research that show what this actually happening. Fuller descriptions can be found in two books: *A directory of women's groups in emergency situations* and *Experiences by national and international women's groups in emergency situations*.

An interesting initiative I found is "Monzambique Movimiento das Muhers Mocambicanas per la Pax." Their declaration of intent says they "pressure the two main political parties to put an end to violence; to promote a culture of peace though dialogue; to maintain peace and at the same time to promote a culture of peace by educating women since that is a way to educate the new generation how to create peaceful conflict resolution environments". In this declaration by women who lived in an environment of violence and killing, the intention of preparing the younger generations is to me without doubt a step toward a future of a nonkilling society which goes beyond peace-seeking in the present.

Another case I wish to mention is that of Rwanda after the genocide in 1994 where more than a million inhabitants were killed and entire families destroyed. The women founded an association of solidarity between Rwanda women in the country since they were left alone to face the situation created by men many of whom died in the extraordinarily bloody conflict. This group of women, along with many others, looked after surviving

children, many of whom had participated in the killings themselves. They needed these women to build villages so they could have a roof over their heads and food in their stomachs. They also needed to be sent to school. As one of these women said, they did what they called rehabilitation work since many children where highly traumatized orphans. This group in Rwanda was one that really worked for peace in a country still at war within its very moving frontiers and they did in their own way by looking after their children and building their own homes, they were looking at the future generations so that they could live in a non violent society where future generations could live peaceful. I think it is interesting to see that as a consequence the number of women in Parliament in Rwanda is the highest in the world even compared with North European countries. Hence one can say that these are indications in the present that Rwanda is indeed moving toward a nonkilling society in the future, a future which has already started. Women like those in Rwanda in Parlament, are now building non killing societies. The need to make these women more visible to the world is extremely important as evidence of the possibility of a nonkilling future in spite of widespread killing in the recent past and in the present.

Very inspiring is the experience for over thirty years of the women belonging to RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan). This group cannot always operate in Afghanistan itself. When I met them they were out of the country and the young woman who was head of the group (when I met her in 2001 she was only 25 years of age) she said "life in Afghanistan is a torture for everybody. The world is forgetting us". The welfare of future generations was the main worry even for such a young woman who had witnessed much violence. "Please do not forget us. Now you know what is happening in Afghanistan". But the voice of this young woman resonates in our times even more. Indeed her example and words should resonate all over the world since there is an increase in violence in Afghanistan. It should awaken all those who advocate a nonkilling society but do not know or do not listen to women who are suffering and asking for our support. These are the voices we should listen to for the future of future generations with the aim of building effective nonkilling societies not only in Afghanistan.

I wish to add one other example of women aimed at creating a nonkilling society. It is the women in Sicily fighting against the mafia. There is an association, created since 1980, in Calabria and Sicily where the mafia is strongly embedded. The association was formally established in 1984 with Giovanna Terranova, a mafia widow. It was in fact mostly built and carried out by women who had directly been harmed in their men, whether magistrates or

lawyers. As they wrote, "we are women who have not resigned ourselves to a destiny that seemed immutable". Over the years, such groups have become more numerous. Indeed they have increased even as killing is constantly increasing in those society as well. These women also write that what they do is indeed for their children and for future generations, in this way paving the away for nonkilling societies. Such women's groups exist in spite of great dangers. The women are often abandoned by their friends and even families. One tangible result is that the mafia are now spoken about openly in schools and among young people. Even the region provides funding in the schools for anti-mafia activities and for support of mafia victims. These women have moved the populations in some parts of Sicily, as also demonstrated by meetings organized by young people on the anniversaries of great killings such as when the judges, Falcone and Borsellino, were killed.

Conclusion

I have tried to show in this contribution how women's groups work in often invisible ways and in extremely dangerous environments toward building nonkilling societies, often through the choices and actions they make about the care and education children, not only their own but also future generations. These actions show that nonkilling futures can and should be lived and created now. We should not wait until everyone is convinced about the possibility of nonkilling futures. Live one now wherever you are.

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Chapter Eight

Nonkilling Emotional Infrastructure

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Life From a Single Angle: The One-dimensional World

One day we woke up and realized that Humanity has lived in a one-dimensional world, we saw everything with a single optic, from one angle: harmony, intelligence, the power of upper class people, what eyes can see, the short term, the surface of things, the classic topics, the formal logic, the imposed reality, mass media's reality. We end up explaining everything that we perceive and learn with the same old categories: our positivist training is Western, we practice planning without action, we only use the left side of the brain, we privilege reason, we cannot get out from traditional paradigms, somebody has told us that killing is fine, we used to say "an eye for an eye".

That's how the 20th century was significant. It began with close contact wars and ended with sophisticated netwars; new wars with unusual situations, such as the same company selling weapons to both sides. There are new ways to make war. We have moved from the massive use of physical force with armies to nuclear weapons, from technological war, "Star Wars", to intelligence as strategy's spine. Security has changed its perspectives and its concepts. We have gone from national security, homeland security and public security to security for development, today called "securitization" or enhanced security.

21st Century Shock: Multidimensional Life

When we arrive into this century, we discover a different, kaleidoscopic society that we had not understood. After living in a one-way dimension it seemed that everything had been turned around. The shock occurred when we penetrated into uncertainty, complexity and the fuzzy logic.

Unfortunately, in presence of new views and knowledge, there are also new problems, the way to uncertainty becomes denser each time, all futures are possible, but also all the impossible things can become futures.

The greatest discoveries of this kaleidoscopic age were the number of magnifying glasses that we began to use in order to see the world, the recovery of syncretic, holistic and heuristic thinking. If we looked for harmony then we had to look into chaos; if there was intelligence, then we must consider stupidity. If the upper class has power then the lower class could also have it.

We could see beyond our eyes and we could foresee on the long term a desirable future that could be built. Many wonderful situations are becoming true; among these is our capacity to see the iceberg's deepness, but also a new generation of transversal concepts where thinking acts with its operative skill to integrate, discover and relate all things with everything else. All of this enables us to solve problematic situations where we identify different coexisting logics, and we already know that there are multiple realities; we must break paradigms. We are aware that without action, any vision of future is only speech. Furthermore, that we are human beings with emotions and feelings that could rule beyond reason, and the fact that humanity was not made to kill, that nonkilling is in its essence.

Humans or Post-humans?

What is a human being? Fukuyama (2002) argued that it has rights, nature and dignity. But we can find many other definitions with determinant factors of our essence: intelligence, memory, spirituality, emotional sensitivity, sexuality, and all of these add specificity to the idea of being human.

But is the Prozac society a society of human beings? At the beginning of the first decade of the 21st century, 28 million US-citizens were taking Prozac pills just to feel better and escape from a world full of threats, risks and dangers.

The rate of depression is growing. In 2002 more than 10 million Mexicans were depressed and depression has become the main mental illness (*Noticieros Televisa*, November 26, 2002). Psychiatrists say that for every ten patients they treat, eight have depressive problems. The total expenditure in antidepressive pills in Mexico has grown up to 10 million pesos per year, the suicide rate has doubled and the rate of suicide's attempts tripled.

Human being hurts itself and is itself hurted. Aggression, according to Zimbardo (1986) is the physic or verbal conduct made with the intention to injure or destroy. Hobbes believed that people are brutal, selfish and cruel (*Homo homini lupus*), so it would seem that human beings are aggressive, instinctive animal. Freud discussed two situations: *eros* as life's instinct and *tanatos* as death's instinct. He thought *tanatos* could guide its energy to the exterior in the form of aggression against others. The energy of death's in-

stinct is generated constantly inside the body and this energy is accumulated when it can't be liberated in little amounts, taking a socially unaccepted extreme form. He suggested that one way to liberate this energy is by catharsis (screaming, weeping or by symbolic means).

Konrad Lorenz also argued that aggression is an innate disposition. But when Bandura applies the social learning view, he affirms that aggression is learned by the same way as other conducts: it is the result of norms, rewards and punishments experienced by the individual, and the observed models. He rejects the idea of catharsis that suggests that the expression or observation of aggressive increment the probability of future aggression.

According to Morris and Maisto (2001), most psychologists, in view of the evidence, are inclined to affirm that aggression is learned. (See *Nonkilling Psychology*, edited by Christie and Evans, 2012.) One way to learn is from observing models. So what if humanity learned mostly aggression and for a whole century? But if aggression is learned nonaggression and nonkilling can also be learned. If the model of aggression and lethality is learned by watching, surely the proliferation of models of nonkilling and nonaggression to release anxiety, manage feelings and emotions can also be learned.

In view of the wave of violence and insecurity, and overwhelmed by organized crime, we are sinking into a fuzzy logic, justified by complexity, but we let ourselves go with the flow of a "liquid society" using Baugman's term, where the only alternative option is to face up true reality with emotional answers. But are these answers human? That humans are not supposed to kill and be killed changes the way how we see life, and death. Kirkwood explains that people believe that they are programmed to die, that there's something like a "Death Gene". But, in fact, we are programmed to survive, to live and let others live.

Nonkilling Emotional Infrastructure

The analysis of emotions from a social point of view has become necessary and urgent. During the 20th century the individual approach was predominant, specially in psychology. But neuroscience discoveries provided new light to problems that had not been thought of in every possible way.

Certain phenomena such as neurosis has shifted from been considered a mental disorder in the 19th century to a "normal" feature of 21st century urban life. It is inscreasingly difficuld to define and set boundaries between normality and pathology. Who says who is normal? Whit what indicators?

There are pathological situations in the social environment and at the level of political organization that present themselves as infuriating situations.

In a world where emotions have been repressed, the urgency to recover them has raised; to express them is an issue of survival. We are educated to stay still, like flowers in the garden; that's why some mothers do not raise nurtured children, irrigated children. Not only family but mostly media have taken charge to dramatically manipulate our emotions. We are unprotected. We should stop and reflect about the multiple possibilities in order to recover our emotions before it's too late, before our brain are blocked and can no longer process what is there for us.

Coon (1999: 429) states that "emotion is a state characterized by physiological arousal, changes in facial expression, gestures, stances and subjective feelings". Emotion greatly increases the meaning and significance of life and the depth of affection in our relationship.

It is in the limbic system where emotions are born and they take place in our body like biochemical reactions: chills, "little butterflies" in the stomach, changing facial skin colours. The cerebral limbic system amygdala is specialized in producing fear, and receives direct information without passing through the cortex. This primitive response to fear is not controlled by the upper brain centers. The sympathetic nervous system is the one acting for emergency action wile the parasympathetic systems reverts the emotional arousal calming and relaxing the body. The first is faster than the second.

Physiological changes in the body are an important element in fear, anger, rage, happiness and other emotions. Changes occur at the brain level in the form of biochemical reactions including heart rate variations, blood pressure, perspiration and other bodily responses.

The four fundamental emotions (joy, sadness, anger and fear) are natural, not learned, and they fulfill specific functions and last only the indispensable time to accomplish their mission. We have to live with them, integrate them into our life and learn how they work.

Anxiety is the fear's anteroom. Fear is in charge of warning us of danger, but in a permanent anticipation can become panic. When sadness, which deactivates the body to recover it later, stays permanently it becomes self destructive in the form of depression. Anger is stored as rancor, as powerlessness, as resentment. Joy tries to remove us from reality or restrict reality, and is attached to pleasure, where one escapes to artificial dimensions.

Emotional pathologies have become critical threats to human security. We must protect ourselves as individuals generating an emotional infrastructure that enables us to defend ourselves against these threats.

These critical threats are characterized by their tragic depth, not by their sudden appearance. Our fear is manipulated trough the State's systems of political control, namely the media. We are living the social depression as a product of the economic interests of large corporations and political groups. As in Durkheim's "mind of the crowd" or collective consciousness, this also produces collective diseases that are contagious.

Rami Schwartz is convincing: A continuous depression brings further fatalisms—all politicians are the same, all political parties are the same—, to further manifest destinies, to aberrant scenarios of corruption and to the disenchantment that today form the national and international environment.

Many cities, Barbero explains (2004: 29), seem cursed because of the abundance of criminal prints and generalized confusion. But what made our cities some of the most chaotic and insecure places in the world is not just the number of murders but the cultural anxiety experienced by most of their inhabitants. When people live somewhere that feels strange, because of unknown objects and persons, insecurity can make any person act aggresively.

Incompetence, irrationality, corruption, and dark dealings toward the personal interests of power are altering the patience, the human being's goodness to a possible social outbreak. Anger is spontaneous, it is uncontrollable when it appears, hard to handle and can last for along time, until memory forgets its origin, but not of feeling that is always present. Remember the *vendettas* between families that have lasted for generations.

How would you feel if tomorrow there was not a single intentional death in the world? What would you do if you knew that you will die in ten minutes? Emotions play a fundamental role in our life, that's why we should know them and learn how to use them. Zimbardo (1986: 298) argues that emotions can influence the bodily functions, memory, thought and perception. If a person is able to modify or inhibit emotions, it shows that emotions are under learned control, that knowledge can influence the affective quality of the response. The kind of emotion depends on the cognitive evaluation that a person performs in relation with the event that excites the emotion (Zimbardo, 1986: 299).

Emotions may be ephemeral or stay as stable features of an individual. Fragility lead us to affront daily situations for which we are unprepared, a host of wild cards as disturbing phenomena such as natural disasters and those generated by other human beings. It is urgent to build an emotional infrastructure that works like an immunologic mental system to defend ourselves against what we are living daily and what lies ahead.

The human being is reason and emotion. The positivist training in which we are educated prevents us to consider ourselves human beings, just ra-

tional minds and rational choices with no possibility of feeling. But what is possible always involves the impossible. We can't see oneself without seeing the other. The impossible leads us to formulate another kind of questions that challenge those considered as common and routine, such as Cartesians, with a single-vision glasses, moving beyond traditional paradigms and confronting us with changes of attitude and new ways to see the world.

The manipulation of information presented as "rational choices" attacks the vital centers of our lives and has lead humanity to processes which are becoming collective social pathologies—socio-paranoia, socio-psychosis, socio-neurosis, socio-schizoid images—where a human being can not clearly distinguish if something happening is real or not, if it exists or not.

This has become a great threat to human security. Fear is being used as a way of control, repression and insecurity. The ghost of fear is haunting our veins, such as the nervous systems of the States and the global nervous systems. Although the acts for themselves can't be foreseen there should be ways to limit the force of their impacts.

Lane Jennings (2005: 13) mentions that Loren Coleman, in her book, *The Copycat Effect*, shows wide evidence on how news reports and media exposure to violent acts, particularly suicide and murder, influence others to commit those acts themselves. These images become a contagious illness that spreads without control. When watching or reading about crime, killings or suicide, this behavior may pass onto the mind of the individual even when he or she would have never thought about it spontaneously.

The media, Coleman suggests, must stop using scenes about mad snipers, celebrity suicides, bridge jumpers and murders in schools, in the same way that they use twisters and earthquakes to attract people to see their shows. Report on human behavior impacts on the future behaviors of human beings *Vox media vox dei*: What does not happen on television does not exists, but wasn't television who led entertainment and turned politics into a show and the show into merchandise?

The Indescribable and Inevitable Fear of Dragons

We are all extraordinarily alike: we want to be happy and we are all afraid! Fear together with anxiety is an emotion that everyone experiences sometimes. Both help us to be prepared against future threats and to protect ourselves against danger. The goal should be to reduce fear and anxiety to a level that cannot interfere significantly in our lives (Antony and Swinson, 2008).

Fear unleashes other pathologies and feelings such as panic, worry, terror, dread, horror, anguish, hysteria, stress, excitement and tension. Just as the worst of dragons that we can imagine in our childhood, fear is the worst of our enemies. This dragon hounds us, paralyzes us, and does not allow us to act. When it's behind us, it immobilizes us, when it's in front, it becomes our major obstacle to continue.

Fear is in the present, but freedom can also be conquered also from our present. We must anticipate. For Benjamin, the idea of anticipation is the promise that something different is coming. The controversy is present: is it possible to build a different, nonkilling world from the current conditions of insecurity, harm, inequality and unjustice? Do we have the capacity to build this world? The answers are yes, provided that we can considerate the present as a gradual process to transform us, our communities and our world.

We anticipate to raise the promise that something different is coming. Freedom begins when thinking about it make us feel free; security begins when thinking about it make us feel secure. The impossible as a nonexistent "us" that must be born within the integrated struggle of everyone of us to perform the "us" who will change things. Our work must generate enthusiasm for a common goal, for something different that is to be buildt. Because if we don't dream it, we don't give form to it; if we don't talk, we will not build promises; if we don't act, we will not find the way.

Mexico: Running With Scisorrs

> "Mexicans are turning into beings with mutilated souls, which is a form of death" (Javier Sicilia, 2011).

Since 2006 the daily drama in our country is to live a war not only of killings, losses and anguishes but also, as Nietzche would say, a war of interpretations. Each truth is modified with other interpretations: the deaths, the kidnapped people, the media, have all become sensationalist showing nothing that can be gratifying, siking us even further every time. But can collective action pull the emergency brake and avoid the train derailing?

What causes people to feel secure or insecure? In 2004 we conduced a small survey in Mexico City. We tried to find out which were our sources of security and insecurity. Results showed that main security sources for people were basically family, home and friends. Instead, sources of uncertainty are multiplied and diversified in a hierarchical order: politics, narrow streets, darkness, fire guns; delinquency and police, public transport, homeless, war and violence, ignorance, mass gatherings and corruption, public

places, kidnappers, injustice, political system, drug addicts, sickness, unemployment, aggression, loneliness, the unknown, and poverty. Fourty thousand deaths in four years (official data for March 2011) are an statistic but to know that each figure has a name, a face, heartbreaking stories mutilates our soul. Everyone is a victim as we live the vicarious trauma in each one of those lives and in each one of those stories. Insecurity has permeated every aspect of our lives during the last years, each time with increasing intensity.

An inhabitant from Ciudad Juárez said: "Going out to the street is like playing Russian roulette; you don't know when you will get the bullet". The multiple and sophisticated ways to defraud, steal or kidnap seem to escape from fiction and moved into this tragic reality. We go from fear to powerlessness, and from there to anger and rage. The urge is to challenge the existent order, to elucidate the scenarios in the midst of this fuzzy logic in which the world of organized crime has bmerged together with an organization that works for crime (judges, police, politicians). Because of impunity, simulation and corruption, our State is moving close to a failed system, with it's inhabitants paralyzed by the power of fear, leaving us orphans of dreams, longings, desires…

The risk is to turn ourselves into a pathological society, sick and criminal, where it no longer matters to risk life in an attempt of revenge, rage, powerlessness or pain. Rami Schwartz (2004) argues in his book *El botón rojo* (*The Red Button*) that documented facts of hysteria, fear, fury or depression have begun to prove that:

1. Collective mental illnesses exist
2. They may affect large population groups
3. They are contagious, spreading by mechanisms not always evident
4. One of these collective illnesses is depression

Fear begins to become the main enemy. Fear paralyzes, Roosvelt said: the only thing we should be afraid is fear itself. Fear as an irrational and unjustified horror which paralyzes the necessary efforts to convert retreat into advance. The problem is that government and organized crime tame us through fear. The problem is that they control us and that when fear is involved with other emotions things can be fatal.

Schwartz argues that we have started to assume the situation as a fatal destiny, huge tombstones we must carry on our backs and that seem impossible to mover away from. Tombstones which have to be removed immediately as they are crushing the society, bringing down its spirit, destroying hope and sinking it deeper and deeper into the dark pit of depression.

The Future as a Building of Social Hope

The horizon of the future should not be kidnapped; it should not be pierced by bullets. For dreams not to fail, they should be systematized and realized in actions. If results are not fulfilled, we will take on charge as a goalkeeper or lookouts to chase their paths. As Ikram Antaki said: "Understanding is a sad trade, expressing freely is a risky job", but being in charge to transform our thought, our look and our awareness is a wonderful risk.

The futures view is a matter of method where the holistic becomes a general methodology where the objective is not to write an article but reach a collective success story. Futures thought takes us to deconstruction and reconstruction of concepts. Hard data without qualitative approaches becomes static. All variables must be integrated in order to become immediately useful for people. We must leap toward the future and from there find out what must be emphasized. We have all the possibilities to become better human beings. We cannot accept to witness the common death of our dreams.

One of our focus points of attention toward the future is nonkilling human security. Human security is an holistic concept, completed and psychologically balanced. Security involves social cohesion, how to integrate societies in order to solve problems. Our goal is to find a methodology which is not fragmented. But to what point should a methodology be objective?

Hope is what we need to leave this state of insecurity which overwhelms us and we need to find the emotional and spiritual balance which liberates the physical damage that makes us feel victims of everything. A methodology of hope based on life-affirming central concept, where human beings are a vital part of their own existence. We should start from each one of us to the extent that if we do it we will be able to transcend and help others. Lead our own life, changing the individual attitude toward a different way of life: "If you believe it, you create it".

Future facts are created twice, first on the mind and then in reality. It is about fulfilling the two stages. We are builders of social hope as the systemic web that understands the next elements interacting among them: social learning, mitigation, adaptation, resilience, social cohesion, human security. It is the mitigation and adaptation to changes of environment what develops resilience to successfully take on what is coming, and this can promote social cohesion and make social learning easier.

Governments have proven themselves unable to cope with disasters. When something is already urgent, it is usually too late. They continue to pay no attention to priorities have not looked after us to be prepared physi-

cally and mentally despite having to face up the disasters and a disturbing socio-organizational order on a daily basis. The proposal is to create social learning toward an adaptive capacity of a sustainable nature and where the sustained resilience is the key point. Adaptive capacity is linked to social learning: changing of values, creativity, risks taking and imagination are features of this adaptation. Undoubtedly we face a long social learning process that will be faster as people are made aware of the necessity for nonkilling human security. Cultural processes are decisive too, as they are interwoven into the deep structures of learning of our peoples and our traditions.

Social cohesion is the promotion of dialogue, negotiation, consensus construction. It is the way for governance, where all members from a community have access to a participative context, to be part of the planning and of the government processes. Social cohesion is a prerequisite for resilience and to avoid inequalities. Handling resilience requires learning how to work with disturbing elements, which may be ecological, economical or social elements

The theory of common divisors discussed the need for fragmenting ourselves in our individual and social ego. When this is made, we can give part of us to others without losing our individuality. Simultaneously, we would boost our physical and mental immune systems and learn the fact that all together can be stronger, and that two is more than one. We have a long way of nonkilling social learning in front of us. Even if we lose tranquility and faith: we can rise collectively… we can keep living.

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Chapter Nine

Political Conscience for Future Generations

State and Nonkilling

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It is noted that people are living in the most revolutionary era in human history. While we may not have time to right the wrongs of the past 500 years in human history, it is high time for us to get out of a past-oriented comfort-zone. In this comfort-zone, state, democracy and development have become symbols of power, success of humanity and happiness in life. In fact, this comfort-zone, to some, is a coffin of holistic humanity, tomb of innovative ideas, and graveyard of the future generations. In this comfort-zone, millions have been killed as human beings, and millions more are still being killing.

Jim Dator (1999), in his "Future Generations: They Are Our Conscience" refers the "future generations" as all of the humans who "will live after us who we will and can never know but whose lives our actions impact." He reminds us that "future generations will never meet us, and they are not able to tell us what they believe their needs and preferences are, or what they think of the world we have mindlessly given them." Dator, in his comment on *While Mortals Sleep,* states "Future generations have informed me that (they) do not accept our apologies. That we are selfish, disgraceful twits who are better off dead and forgotten."[1] Things are indeed bad. According to the Children's Defense Fund, thirteen children under the age of 20 are killed on a daily basis across the United States. Recall numerous school shooting incidents since 1966, killing teachers and classmates by "troubled" kids seem to be one of our accidental ways of life, horrific but not unimaginable.[2] News on body counts of killed soldiers from war zones no longer disturbs us, we accept that just like the ups and downs of the Wall Street Stock Market numbers. Americans have killed more of each other in the last fifty years than any foreign military combined since the

[1] Dator's email to Wendy Schultz, copied to the futures groups on June 15, 2011.
[2] From a conversation with Shaylene High Elk, a native Indian, who experienced a school shooting when she was in high school, September 13, 2011.

beginning of this nation. Information on killings is taught in schools, projected on television and shown in museums throughout the nation that hardly any place is safe, since accidents can happen in the road, people can be robbed in the street, or someone can break into your house and kill you. In a class discussion on the political impact of school shootings, a college student says that "(M)any killings in America are caused from the media and contemporary music. With our generation being so young, we look for a cause to fit into; therefore we admire movies, music and even the evening news that can inspire someone to become violent."[3] It requires no further observation that the violent nature of American society has had major repercussions in the American homeland. In his "Dr. King Weeps From His Grave," Cornel West (2011) takes us to the state level of the violent nature of the United States:

> Militarism is an imperial catastrophe that has produced a military-industrial complex and national security state and warped the country's priorities and stature (as with the immoral drones, dropping bombs on innocent civilians)…The age of Obama has fallen tragically short of fulfilling King's prophetic legacy… The absence of a King-worthy narrative to reinvigorate poor and working people has enabled right-wing populists to seize the moment with credible claims about government corruption and ridiculous claims about tax cuts' stimulating growth. This right-wing threat is a catastrophic response to King's four catastrophes; its agenda would lead to hellish conditions for most Americans… King's response to our crisis can be put in one word: revolution… Like King, we need to put on our cemetery clothes and be coffin-ready for the next great democratic battle.

Seventeen years ago, in 1994, Dator posed a question to the Future Generations Alliance Foundation Symposium, "As we get more democratic, are we less future-generations concerned?" While one wonders how many people today come to think about that question, Dator's logic does not stop at the hypothesis that the less democratic society is the more concerned we are for the future generations. The growing number of school shootings since 2006 in the US alone portrays the fact that we are still "democratic," but, at the same time, we seem to encounter increasing school shootings in the hands of children who we thought hold our and their own futures. The following table does not intend to verify Dator's legitimate concerns on the ones who are coming from the future, rather, it proves that our school systems in this democracy are failing.

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[3] From a class discussion at Creighton University, August 30, 2011.

Table 1. School Shooting Incidents (1966-2012)

#	Year	No. of incidents	Victims	Killer's Age/ Average age
1	1966	1	16	25
2	1974	1	3	17
3	1976	1	7	37
4	1979	1	2	49
5	1982	1	1	14
6	1983	1	2	13
7	1985	2	2	14
8	1986	1	0	n/a
9	1988	3	3	23
10	1989	1	6	47
11	1991	1	6	28
12	1992	5	8	20
13	1993	6	7	17
14	1994	3	3	37
15	1995	2	4	17
16	1996	4	8	23
17	1997	3	7	15
18	1998	3	8	14
19	1999	3	13	17
20	2000	3	4	13
21	2001	2	2	22
22	2002	2	3	29
23	2003	4	6	33
24	2004	3	2	19
25	2005	2	9	15
26	2006	6	12	23
27	2007	7	38	18
28	2008	9	16	23
29	2009	11	7	22
30	2010	11	12	23
31	2011	5	4	15
32	2012	3	5	29

Note: Data collected by author and Daisy Liberato with references of online sources.

Conventional theories, philosophical hypothesis and empirical guidance rooted in the past-oriented or history-bound management are no longer in any position to hold up the retaining walls of a falling apart world system. In fact, it only makes the process of falling faster and faster. Killings among people, genocides at State level and wars in a global scale manifest the failure of the old, outdated and cruel social systems. Neither democracy nor other existing ideologies seem to be able to introduce or maintain peace for a long time. In other words, we have come to the moment that much "progress"

and "development," ironically made in our hands, have left us to cope with our crises with far less therapeutic means or helpful institutions. We are forced to look at our time, NOW, from the future. George Owen's *1984* was applauded because he presented a future society, which mirrored the former Soviet Union vividly in many ways. However, the totalitarian state that he envisioned for the year of 1984 was precisely as ugly as the ones of the past, based on which he recognized in the first place as the source of monopoly in the hands of the state. We need a worldview, a nonkilling vision, and a perspective from the future, which is coming to us from nowhere and beyond our knowledge, a thing that has never been thought of, experienced and impossible to comprehend, but, it is surely different from what we have gone through or turn out not properly the same as imagined and prepared for.

Conventional criticism of our modern world usually involves the rejection of science and technology. However, it does not depart its ontology from the modernist view of linear time logic, with events happening only one after the other, and continuingly within the boxed framework. Dian (2009: 63) states that "Linear time is the progression from the past to future, moving only in one direction. It is an integral part of the current, although fading, Newton/Descartes paradigm highlighted by linear, mechanistic and rational thinking. It is the pervasive world view upon which industrial society has supported itself for over three centuries." Dian pertinently calls that we are currently dominated by linear time. Future remains blind to most people with their linear-orderly ontological perspective both at the physical and social level. When the society is planned to move ontologically from yesterday to today, and today to tomorrow, there is no political conscience for the future. Human society is hijacked by its own means, thus stuck in the trap it creates.

Facing increasingly pressures of political conscience for the future generations, one must look for alternatives from the future, not solutions generated from the lessons of the past. While other disciplines are also trying to rescue the current crises, the Futures Studies appears making more sense with potential alternatives in preparing us for the future.

Defining Futures studies is not an easy thing, as Dator (1999) states, "the need for thinking and acting that is explicitly future-oriented is relatively new." Unlike other disciplines or sciences, such as education, political science or chemistry, Futures studies does not fall into the category as either an art or a science. According to some futures field practitioners, Futures studies is a discipline that concerns a much bigger and more complex world system. Therefore, it is crucial that one needs to know how the Futures studies defines things. Generally speaking, Futures studies focuses on

the process of changing, it transcends momentary now, defines events when they are more of the known impossibility or best of the unknown possibility. Unlike other disciplines, Future studies un-does things, including un-learning our past history, un-training our mind, and un-educating anyone who is to be interested in the studies of futures.

To approach alternative futures, Dator (1993) considers that any emerging futures may rise from the interaction of four components: events, trends, images, and actions. Based on these components, he develops four images of the future: 1) Continue growth; 2) Societal collapse; 3) Discipline; and 4) Transformation. These applicable scenarios become necessary conceptual futuristic framework, not just as preferred futures. In order to address futuristic components from historical events, moving trends, transforming images and changing actions, one has to be with an innovative mind of forward-looking vision for changes.

How to interpret the interaction of these four components, from which we see an emerging future, is in fact an important tipping point between a futurist and a non-futurist. Among these four components, *events* and *images* can be understood either as something that had already happened/appeared or as something that will happen/appear. The other two, *trends* and *actions*, shall be considered neither as something in the past or something from the future. While *trend* is seen here as nothing stagnant, but something of the process with beginning from the past, idling at the present, and departing to the unknown future, *action* is a moving form of all three other combined with a consequence, which, depends how one looks at it, can be an action that is done, as well as an action undone yet. Two different ways of looking at *events*, *trends*, *images* and *actions* result in different visions of the future. One can be a reflection of the past, and the other is a wonder for the future. The past can not provide us with a repeated "future," or a "future of the past." It is the wonder of the futurists, with unlearnt lessons from the past, that there is a world coming to us from nowhere and beyond our knowledge. In his 1997 article "As If I Virtually Said This to Pepsi Executives During a Futures Discussion at their Headquarters," Dator said that "(A)ny useful statement about the future should appear to be ridiculous and to elicit responses of disbelief, shock, horror, or disgust. If you nod your head in agreement about some statement about the future, then forget it. It may be true, but it is not particularly useful to you. What you need to know about the future is what you don't already know, and which you find difficult if not repugnant to hear." This seemingly Unitarian statement consists of Dator's profound philosophical urgency: For an affordable future, for either ourselves or future generations, we must exodus from the past.

Transforming Nation-State *Action* towards Nonkilling

A nation-state is composed of a territory, a population, a state, and is sovereign. Max Weber saw that a state is nothing but a "sole source of the 'right' to use violence." In his 1919 address to the Free Students Union at Munich University, Weber elaborated more on the state power:

> "Every state is founded on force," said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of "state" would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as "anarchy," in the specific sense of this word. Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state—nobody says that—but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib—have known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.

Thus, from conventional perspective, the state maintains the right to kill in the name of any given nation. Hammarlund (2005) puts it rightly in a modern sense that the state "stands in the way of a peaceful and prosperous cosmopolitan world order. It is a war organization, levying excessive and unfair taxes, hampering international communication and exchange."

A nonkiling society needs to move nation-state action friendly by shutting down its murderous machine. Do we have a trend for this development? Can we transform the state and make it friendly towards humanity?

Coughlan (2004) defined the nation in the context of democratic principles:

> (…) democracy can exist normally only at the level of the national community and the Nation State. The reason is that it is within the national community alone that there exists sufficient solidarity, mutual identification and mutuality of interest among people as to induce minorities freely to consent to majority rule and obey a common government based upon that. Such solidarity is the basis of shared citizenship. It underpins a people's allegiance to a government as 'their' government, and their willingness to finance that government's tax and income-transfer system, thereby tying the richer and poorer regions and social classes of the Nation State together. The solidarities that exist within nations do not exist between nations, although other solidarities may exist, international solidarity, which becomes more important with time, as modern communications, trade, capital movements and common environmental problems link all nations together in global inter-dependence as part of the modern 'global village.'

Coughlan conveys two strong messages in the above statement. First message is that all nations are comminutes of people; the second is that "the nation which gives up its sovereignty or is deprived of it, ceases to be an independent subject of international politics. It is no longer able to decide even its own domestic affairs. It literally puts its existence at the mercy of those who have taken its sovereignty into their hands and who decide the policies of the larger body." His specific understanding of the nation, state, democracy and sovereignty can be summarized as follows:

1. Insistence on the sovereignty of one's own State is a natural right as well as a social duty.
2. The national sovereignty of a democratic State is analogous to the freedom and autonomy of the individual.
3. State sovereignty is a result of advancing political culture and is an achievement of modern democracy.
4. Without sovereignty a nation's politics become provincialised, dealing only with marginal and unimportant issues.
5. Maintaining State sovereignty alone guarantees the political independence of a nation and creates conditions for its members to continue to assert their right to self-determination.
6. The sovereignty of a democratic State means at the same time the sovereignty of its people.
7. The end of the sovereignty of a State is at the same time the end of the sovereignty of its people.
8. The sovereignty of a State and of its people are democratically inalienable. No government, no parliamentary majority, has the right to alienate it, for they have no right to deprive the next generation of the possibility of choosing their own way of life.
9. Therefore the only mode of international cooperation that is acceptable to democrats is one which will not demand of a State the sacrifice of its sovereignty.

While completely ignoring his first message, i.e., nations are made of people, Coughlan focuses primarily on the authority (sovereignty) of the state. However, Coughlan's second message, albeit with a strong defensive tendency, points out something remarkably significant for the future, that is, the crisis that the state is confronting at our current time. In a futuristic wording, the trend of change is taking place. The nation-state is moving to crisis, which can be both a risk and chances in the eyes of futurists. Delbrück (1994) defines the state as the dominant form of political organization and the nation state as the universally realized form of political organization of societies. Af-

ter reviewing the history and development of the nation-state, Delbrück thinks that our modern political and social environments have altered the traditional notion of the nation-state. Delbrück acknowledges that there is a "growing concern about the future of the traditional concept of the nation state," and "there are indications that could suggest that nation state may become obsolete" (1994: 45). In the midst of this change, Delbrück points out that "Politicians are becoming concerned about a serious loss of State authority and power, both externally and internally." (Id.)

While the nation-state is moving into crisis, society is losing authoritative figures. This action should be perceived as transformation of power shifting from state to individuals. A historical image should be reawakened. Despite its distance from our reality, it represents an event that can be emerging from the action that the state is undertaking, with the underlying loss of authority.

Gandhi was an advocate for nonviolence at an individual level. He understood that one's needs and interests are the core of the conflict among people. Gandhi strongly believed in the idea of social communication and personal engagement with others. He thought that any forms of violent interactions among people would not allow a broader view of the truth by opening our personal perspectives and appreciating others' points of view (Juergensmeyer, 2005: xi). It was not necessary, as Gandhi pointed out, that people must choose violence to overcome or avoid cowardice, weakness, differences and opposing viewpoints. "An eye for an eye will only make the world behind." Gandhi claimed that "we, as individual human beings, are violent because of life in our bodies, so that is why we should aim to be rid of it or at least train ourselves to become imperious to its needs." The essence of Gandhian approach to conflict is called Satyagraha, an idea of "grasping onto principles," or the "truth force." (Juergensmeyer, 2005: 3) Satyagraha can pose itself many challenges as many people struggle to step outside of narrow mindedness and see a dispute or disagreement in the viewpoint of others, but this challenge is indeed the effective tactic behind Gandhi's approach. Satyagraha is the idea of finding a new position more inclusive than the old one and move into it through three steps:

1. Through examining of the other conflicting side in search of the valid principles, then create a resolution plan that might also satisfy the interests of the other party as well as one's own.
2. Sorting through all imaginable options in looking at a mutually beneficial alterative that fits best to both sides.
3. Move forward by taking the alternative actions that avoids the violence for the sake of both (Juergensmeyer, 2005: 9-10).

Gandhi and the Gandhian approach emphasize alternative to avoid violence among people. Gandhi had reasons to do that as he feared the power of the state. He believed that the state "does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress." Gandhi wished "each individual is (her) own ruler," and that "government is the best that governs the least." Gandhi claimed that "India had been a country right from ancient time," and India was unified centuries before British thought that its railways that made India a nation (apud Gier, 1996). Considering building India as a village-based republicanism, Gandhi encouraged Indians "study (their) Eastern institutions in (a) spirit of scientific inquiry… (to) evolve a truer socialism and a truer communism." (id.) Gandhi wished that his village republicanism would not act like a modern state which, in his belief, would swallow up individual persons. However, Gandhi came to realize the fact that many Indians were losing their moral autonomy in a dehumanizing bureaucratic state. Gandhi's vision of nationhood was based on decentralized local control, assimilation and tolerance of cultural differences and above all, nonviolence. Gandhi's position did not go with what Bhikhu Parekh puts that the state abstracts "power from the people, concentrates it in the state and then return it to them in their new (abstract roles) as citizens." (id.) This was Gandhi's principle fear as to see that individual people would not have enough self-determination, under the state monopoly, to perform acts of civil disobedience. From Gandhi's five distinctive human powers, self-determination, autonomy, self-knowledge, self-discipline and social cooperation, one realizes that Gandhi's "soul force" is from the individual, not from the state.

Although our human societies seem to be still stuck inside a circle, neither with a beginning to end killings, justified by the *de facto* existence of the State, nor with an end to begin nonkilling, a nonkilling future does not seem to be remote in the change of powers from state to individuals. Paige (2009: 21) manifests his nonkilling philosophy in the actions he prescribes:

> Governments do not legitimize it; patriotism does not require it; revolutionaries do not prescribe it. Intellectuals do not apologize for it; artists do not celebrate it; folk wisdom does not perpetuate it; common sense does not commend it. In computer terms of this age, society provides neither the 'hardware' nor the 'software' for killing.

To echo Delbrück's point that "Politicians are becoming concerned about a serious loss of State authority and power, both externally and internally," French futurist Fabienne Goux-Baudiment (2006: 81) offers a prom-

ising trend to compromise the two way-traffic, i.e., the state authority shrinks while the role of individual people increases:

> In the beginning of the twenty-first century, two strong trends are manifesting themselves: the empowerment of individuals and the weakening of the nation-state as the best representative of a democratic regime. As a way perhaps to escape the State-octopus and the old institutions that are linked to, individuals have built new clans, bringing them together whatever the geographic scale (from the smallest area to the world diasporas) and giving them more power (through NGOs) and the feeling of more freedom.

Goux-Baudiment (1996: 85) continues,

> The nation-state is indeed challenged by globalization and the related interdependence. With, on the one hand, expanding diasporas and, on the other, an increasing number of foreign populations inside the country, the notions of nation and state are less clear. Between devolution to local authorities and a less explicit, but equally restrictive devolution to regional (e.g. European Commission) and global (WTO, UNO) authorities, nation-states have entered a slow but real process of weakening. They are probably no longer the most efficient place to govern in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

While it is going to be an emerging issue if one looks into any problems of a society in which the state has less authority than individual powers, it is certain that the state action of the murderous nature will first become much less dangerous to humanity. This is a huge progress for a nonkilling society we envision. Paige's dream of that society relies on his first condition that "governments do not legitimize" the killing.

Growing Democracy for Nonkilling Future

In our political life, most people seem to be certain that our systems in the United States are democratic, and the democracy that we embrace here at home and promote to abroad is real. However, if someone, most likely not a historian, says that democracy is weakening, democracy is a myth, a failure, not real, or, there is absolutely no democracy of whatsoever in the US or anywhere in the world, one can not image how many people will be shocked, get angered, or feel sad or even become hopeful.

Conventionally, democracy can be defined in a few different ways. Generally, all seems to accept that the word democracy comes from the Greek words "*demos"* meaning "people" and "*kratos"* meaning "authority"

or "power." The ancient Greeks established a direct form of government in Athens. Democracy meant originally rule by a mob of land-owning citizens. People gathered in the Agora and whoever yelled the loudest won. Common understanding of democracy is that it is a system where people can change their rulers in a peaceful manner and the government is given the right to rule because the people say it may.

Goux-Baudiment (2006) thinks that democracy occurred due to the fear of totalitarianism. She states that the invention of the modern State, and of the Nation which supports it, has led to a new step in its evolution. Based, during the last two centuries, on the idea of the human progress and the fear of tatalitarism, democracy occurs today as the indisputable best political regime.

Love (2005) states that "democracy as we understand it today is a product of the Enlightenment, based on what Kant termed *autonomy*, again from the Greek, a law (*nomos*) that you impose on yourself. In short, "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Love continues, "Today, many people see democracy as a form of modern civilization…Some see democracy as a form of identity and a byword for market freedom, which is not just to be shared, but protected and spread as a counterweight to tyranny." (id.) In other words, democracy exists to provide a way for people to live and be together in a way that is beneficial to all. In addition to this basic meaning, there is wide agreement on the empirical conditions that either give substance to what democracy means or must be present for democracy to exist. Democracy is based on the people, and it works well in proportion as the people are enlightened and informed about what goes on both in peace and in war. However, for many, especially those in newer democracies, it is a complex term and coming to grips with its practical meaning takes a long time. The specific form that democracy takes in a country is largely determined by prevailing political, social, and economic circumstances and it is greatly influenced by historical, traditional, and cultural factors.

In the introduction section of the *Democracy and Futures*, Mannermaa (2006) has two concerns, one is that he thinks that the "western democracies are suffering from a certain chronic short-sightedness, and the other is that western democracies are under increasing challenges." He states that "the models of democracy will face prominent challenges in the traditional democratic western societies in the future. The main reason for that is the general societal development from industrial nation-state into global information societies…One can even speak of a paradigm shift from the concept of democracy of the industrial age into the one of the information age."

Goux-Baudiment (2006) mentions that democracy occurred due to the fear of totalitarianism. However, she accepts the idea that democracy is "soft tyranny," coined by Alexis de Tocqueville more than a century ago. Democracy is a tyranny in such a way that the democratic experiences from the late 18th till the end of the 20th century, as Goux-Baudiment states, "have resulted in not the extinction of the State but, on the contrary, its strengthening to the point of totalitarianism…as we know well from history, whereas Mussolini comes to power through a coup d'etat, Hitler gains it through elections, in a very democratic way" (2006: 80). Goux-Baudiment continues that "…in the best case, liberal democracy has failed to protect society against arbitrary power; in the worst case, there is something rotten in modern society itself, either because of the industrial model of mass consumption according to Arendt or because of the very nature of human beings, and the democracy can't change it, liberal or not" (2006: 81). Goux-Baudiment also points out that our modern democracy is to be jeopardized by the challenges ahead. These challenges include "the nature of the next generations, the increasing demand for another world, the consequence of globalization and the development of the noosphere." Is democracy still the best model to face 21st century, asks Goux-Baudiment?

Dator has been at the forefront of efforts to channel our criticism on some vital political paradigms, ranging from modern science, nation-state, to the liberal democracy. Author of numerous articles, books and other groundbreaking works, Dator was one of the first scholars to anticipate and critique democracy and governance in various forms. In "Will America ever Become a Democracy?" Dator, as bluntly as he was 20 years ago, points out that "The United States is not a democracy, has never been a democracy, was not created to be a democracy, and will not become a democracy without substantial changes in the structure of government and the understanding and will of the American people." Portending a future nonkillong society, Dator makes it utmost clear that "Until it is fully understood and recognized that America cannot possibly be a model for democracy anywhere since it is not democratic itself, neither America nor the rest of the world will be able to move towards the kind of peaceful self-governance that democratic theory and practice promises."

White it may sound pessimistic to many people, Dator thinks it as a startling and liberating thing that US was not intended to be a democracy. Optimistically, the very absence of a real democracy, as Dator points out, "should enable Americans and all others to strive towards creating a form of government that does not yet exist anywhere as fully as it can and should." It should be noted, as Dator clarifies, that he extends the term democracy to more

than just formal government. He makes it clear with belief "it is not possible to have effective formal democratic government unless we have routinely informal democratic governance as well." To echo Gandhi's concern that "liberal democracies do not empower individuals," Dator thinks similarly that "in the US and generally elsewhere, governance structure are designed to prevent, or to make extremely difficult, participation in policy making (and policy implementation, which is often completely overlooked) in any effective way." However, Dator envisions that if an informal governmental structure can make political participation easy, fun, and effective, more citizens will participate in formal government just as they participate in religious, sports or other activities that they are interested in. In other words, Dator's combination of any formal and informal governance in a growing democracy will enable individuals to be his or her own ruler, as Gandhi wished. With or even without any imagination, one can not foresee the possibility of mass killings in a society where political power of the state is in the hands of each individual people who are empowered through their participation in formal and informal governmental decision-making process. The reality seemingly is calling for that participation along with societal development, as Mike Mannermaa points out, is shifting from industrial nation-state into global information societies. We have in fact witnessed that future through the handling of the Katrina disaster during the Bush administration. Halal (2009: 103) states that "Bush's response to the Katrina disaster in New Orleans highlighted the problem of unresponsive government run by the old boy network…We are likely to see more failures as the old system topples slowly over the next few years. With the constraints of a collapsing world order and Nature's hard reality pressing in, the excesses of the industrial age will be sloughed off like an animal shedding its outworn skin." Halal sees today as a historical transition time in which we should address profound institutional shortcomings. Nevertheless, he is "afraid we have slighted the need for a guiding vision, powerful new strategies, or even a clear understanding of what is taking place and what it all means. We lack a sense of what would constitute a good society beyond the present one that is now failing." However, for preferred futures, Halal's concerns provide us a platform in which we envision the coming of the lacking we suffer at the moment. The failing cases on the part of the national governments, despite otherwise viewed as negative incidents, can serve as a promising scenario for us to work on the power changes, or, in Mannermaa's words, a paradigm shift, from formal government to the combination of formal and informal government decision-processing, as Dator envisions.

Image *Collapsed*: an Empirical Case on Nonkilling Scenario

In a discipline for which no statistical analysis was performed to confirm the styles a few years ago, Natalie Dian began her study on Foresight Styles Assessment (FSA) as to question if there is a way to gauge whether one person is more proactive than another about the future. The FSA, as Dian points out, "attempts to describe the variety of behaviors ensconced in our human ability to plan and visualize the future and how they react to external change." It also, in Dian's words, "fills a gap in understanding the range and qualities of foresight competency." In responding Dian's FSA, Gary (2009: 1) claims that "Future orientation is recognized as a critical competency of leadership, but few studies have empirically examined the construct of foresight. This is in part due to a dearth of quantitative research on foresight as a construct. Academics need validated scales to relate foresight to organizational theory. Foresight professionals need reliable measures that might tell us whether one individual has more foresight than another."

While realizing the importance of different foresight styles, this section attempts to verify the functionality of the projected alternative futures based on one and half case(s). The first one is on a regional case about the alternation of the China-Taiwan relation, and the half of the second one is on a larger scale about the on-going falling process of our political and economic systems. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, the one and half case(s) call for a theoretic study on the methodology in verifying the empirical practicality of one or any other once preferred futures. Dator cautions that "It is the duty of futurists to support and provide an audience for those who have 'stupid' ideas in the sure expectation that some of them will turn out to be revolutionary truths while others will not." Theoretically, Dator's statement requires a methodology as to differentiate the revolutionary truth or otherwise. As Dator aptly warns that "there is great harm done in squelching something that turns out to be valuable." In addition to the lack of empirical study on cases where great harm done as Dator indicated above, there is no theoretical framework under which many revolutionary truths have been verified.

As mentioned above, the first case focuses first on the scenario posed by two killing-ready political entities for the sake of their nation-states, and its transformation from a deadly political hostility to an assured economic integration within a decade-long period. The vital cause for the change lies on the collapse of the antagonistic image from both sides. A nonkilling situation is cultivated through zig zag detours, which end in no vain.

The trajectory of the China-Taiwan relations in the recent past takes us into several vital theoretic concepts, such as nationalism, democracy, national state, as well as related empirical experiences, such as rough relationships, security crisis and economic consequences.

As Richard Bush III (2010) pointed out that China and Taiwan was hostile neighbors, "each feared that the other was preparing to challenge its fundamental interests." In so doing, mutual suspicion was deepened. Bush continued that "Beijing increased its military power to deter such an eventuality. Taiwan feared that China wished to use its military power and other means to intimidate it into submission to the point that it would give up what it claims as its sovereign character. Taiwan's deepening fears led it to strengthen and assert its sense of sovereignty." The vicious circle of mutual fear started from the remarks made as a conclusion by the then ROC President Li Denghui at the 13th meeting of National Unification Council on July 22, 1998.[4] On August 3, 1998, Li made his point again that there was but a divided China across the Taiwan Strait. He said:

> The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present reality by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And that reality is that China is divided, just as Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today. Hence, there is no 'one China' now. We hope for this outcome in the future, but presently it does not exist. Today, there is only 'one divided China,' with Taiwan and the mainland each being part of China. Because neither has jurisdiction over the other, neither can represent the other, much less all of China (*Central News Agency*, August 4).

Prior to Li's argument on a divided China across the Taiwan Strait, the relations between Beijing and Taipei had suffered from the issue of sovereignty since 1949. The official positions stipulated in both constitutions, respectively of PRC and ROC claim that the Beijing and Taibei governments were supportive of the reunification of China, and they both argued that they each had sovereignty over the other's territory.[5] According to this argument, either Beijing or Taibei should concede its sovereignty to the other side. This was therefore a zero-sum game, which had brought the two par-

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[4] A closing remarks delivered by the former ROC President Li Denghui at the 13th meeting of National Unification Council on July 22, 1998.

[5] The ROC constitution implies the concept of "One China" as denoting a single political entity by encompassing the Republic of China's claim of sovereignty over both Taiwan and the mainland.

ties to a deadlock. While claiming to have the sole sovereignty over China, both Beijing and Taipei fought over political ideologies. Most notable at that time, PRC and ROC were on absolutely the same page in their solid commitment that there was one China, and Taiwan was part of it, although they clashed over whose political system—the authoritarian developmental state of the Nationalist Party (GMD) or the Communism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For an example, on April 8, 1995, President Li Denghui addressed to the National Unification Council and repeated ROC's long and continuous mainland policy. He stated that "at this time when all of humanity longs for peace and is pursuing conciliation, all Chinese should work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve our common goal of national unification." He reaffirmed his long time stance that "both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory," and believed that "helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people." He faithfully concluded that,

> It is my firm belief that the most direct and effective contribution the two sides can make to the entire Chinese nation at this time when the international situation is more and more relaxed is for them to respectively develop democracy and their economic systems through engaging in peaceful competition. By doing so, both sides will not only be able to reach a genuine solution for China's unification, but also enable the Chinese people to take pride in themselves on the world stage. This is the essence of Dr. Sun's Principle of Nationalism; it is a responsibility leaders on both sides can never shy away from as they face the 21st century.[6]

From a futuristic perspective, the change of Li's arguments from "one unified China" to "a divided China" reflected the trend that had been going on for a decade inside the Island of Taiwan. Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has undertaken a radical transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The democratization process produced major changes in the Taiwanese political system. These changes hold significant implications for the content and direction of its policies. Democracy has brought about multi-party politics, [7] and it be-

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[6] See President Li Denhui's address to the National Unification Council (1995).

[7] During the first three decades since ROC relocated in Taiwan, the ROC political system was dominated by a single Leninist-style political party—the GMD—and the views and activities of a single paramount leader—first, Jiang Jie-shi from 1949 to 1975, and then his son Jiang Jin-guo from 1975 to 1988. GMD and its predominantly mainland Chinese leadership controlled the major activities of all key governmental agencies and supervised a network of cadres charged with carrying out its policies. The party remained under the

came the driving force behind Taiwan's policy toward the mainland. Taiwan's democracy has, since its birth, begun with the quest for political independence. The democratization of Taiwan has thus created a dilemma. On one hand, Taiwan's democratization helps foster a strong sense of political identity, enhance the legitimacy of Taiwan's independence, and discredit the PRC's claim over the island of Taiwan. One the other hand, it has also served to increase the possibility of intervention by the rival regime across the Straits. These developments suggest that as long as the PRC stands ready to infiltrate Taiwan's domestic political process and threatens to subvert, or even to thwart, with the use of force if necessary, any democratically elected government that allegedly promotes Taiwanese independence, Taiwan's new democracy will have a difficult time on its way to consolidation.

Mainland China has never ruled out the possibility of the force against Taiwan if the latter declares independence. However, despite the fact that mainland China presents an immediate threat to Taiwan, and yet the Taiwanese feel that they can afford to fight to a stalemate, mainland China, therefore, has to think twice before it resorts to force, for it simply cannot do so without incurring a potentially dangerous response from the United States. Thus, without a convincing prospect of victory, China dares not initiate any military action.

The Taiwan issue involves complex combinations of military and political factors. The United States has remained concerned with the security of Taiwan, and would retain its long-held position that the settlement of disputes between Taiwan and mainland China must be peacefully arrived at. A stable relationship between Taiwan and mainland China depends on the balance of military power in the region. From this scenario, threat of China's military action against Taiwan is most unlikely to achieve its goal over the sovereignty issue.

It is known as a fact China was a culture long before it was a nation. Like John King Fairbank, many Western scholars prefer to use "culturalism" rather than any other existing concepts, such as nation-state, to depict China's national ideology. Lucian Pye (1996: 109) simply calls China as "a civilization pretending to be a nation-state."

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ultimate control of mainlanders and hence the regime reflected the interests of this minority segment of the population throughout most of this period. During this time, the GMD-led ROC regime was a highly personalistic political system. The undemocratic GMD also relied on brute force to ensure obedience, suppress resistance and prevent the emergence of genuine opposition political movements. For more of GMD rule in Taiwan, see Keith Maguire (1998: 32-33); Hung-mao (1989) and Gold (1994: 197).

It is also known that Mainland China had been unable to think of its conflict with Taiwan outside of two boxes, box one: the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and box two: its "long desired" goal of unifying a whole country with dignity. People inside these two boxes shared one image, e.g., a great China, with the PRC having complete sovereignty over its territory, to which Taiwan properly belongs. They thought that they should shoulder the unification mission in the name of national security, including protection of Taiwan from foreign invasion. For this mission, freedom and liberty were less pertinent than national unity. Any political innovation or institutional infrastructural changes would be harmful to the image of a sovereign China if the political agents were non-Chinese or pro-West. The PRC would be harmed as well. On top of that, as a unique and ever enduring culture, Chinese has been very much past-oriented, and bears significantly less interests in the future than the past. To be specific, not long ago, China was not expecting anything from future, instead the future seemed to them that it oftentimes has had unexpected and fearful events that again and again devastated the country in many ways. A short list of these events that had been China's future resulted in only mostly hard-core humiliation imposed by the Westerners and its close neighbors such as Russians and Japanese. This explains in part why the Chinese was, if not still is, fearful of future while even the latest past within the last one hundred fifty years were so unforgettable to them. Only the far past still hosts the most comfort zone in the heart of the Chinese culture. Not surprisingly, Chinese learned to adapt itself to the modern world designed and manipulated in the hands of what they used to believe "barbarians." Consequently, in the period of 1980s and 1990s, PRC embraced as its righteous mission maintaining its territorial integrity and national security. As an authoritarian state, it viewed its sovereignty and related global issues primarily from its domestic political goals. The Beijing government, in various white papers then, emphasized the paramount role of sovereignty in protecting its national dignity. With historic colonial impositions in mind, sovereignty was indeed viewed as the foundation from which to resist Western encroachment. Its ongoing political conflicts with Taiwan, Tibet, and Islamic ethnic groups in Xinjiang loomed especially large among the factors shaping its domestic policies. The PRC took a hard line, allowing no room for any compromise on its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. The Mainland Chinese people and their political elites alike firmly believed that the implications of Taiwan's independence were unimaginably dangerous. To them, Taiwan's permanent separation would signify nothing but a lead domino in the dissolution of mother China. In other words, if Taiwan was allowed to remain separate indefinitely, this would set an ex-

ample for potentially rebellious parts of China such as Tibet, Xinjiang, perhaps Inner Mongolia, and even Hong Kong. That is to say, Taiwan's future as a part of China was perceived to be inseparable from the integrity of a unified Chinese state. Tom Plate (2004) pointed out timely then that the "Chinese military is ready to 'Saddamise' any effort in that direction."

Arguably, one might insist that China's stance on sovereignty is as rigid as it was in its current political thinking. There is no doubt that China, on one hand, is trying to adapt itself with the international norms; on the other hand, it has been in the process of defining western concepts in its own understanding. However, in front of the rapid changes resulted from the globalization during the time when China was (is) using the Western concept to survive the "un-Chinese" world order, it finds itself once again falling behind. While the concept of nation-state and the national security still remains foreign in their cultural mind, the West has begun to study the economic impact of globalization upon the "modern" concept of nation-state. While China started to market itself as an ultimate sovereign state in the 80s, Dator asked "Show me one nation that is big enough to control its own destiny?" As it was late for the oldest civilization to embrace the modern notion of nation-state, it is now also so sudden for it to confront the fact that sovereignty is but obsolete. China is stuck in the dilemma between protecting its national sovereignty and accepting outside intervention. Traditional notions of sovereignty are evolving. While respect for the territorial integrity and political independence remains fundamental to the stability of the global system, globalization and increased transparency of borders associated with it will require nations to adapt to these changing circumstances. The concept of sovereignty, which has been the major issue affecting the Mainland China-Taiwan relations, is in need of alteration. Regional and global stability depend on a peaceful resolution of cross-strait tensions.

Realizing the improved situation across the Taiwan Strait after the 2008 power return to GMD from DPP, Bush thought that this transition "created the possibility of reversing the previous negative spiral." In his analysis of the presidential campaign strategy, Bush pointed out that "Ma (Ying-jeou) campaigned on the idea that Taiwan could better assure its prosperity, dignity, and security by engaging and reassuring China rather than provoking it." Although neither a peace deal nor a diplomatic truce is formally reached, the relationship between the People's Republic of China in the Mainland and the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan has come to a stage where two half Chinas share the sovereignty of an ancient concept of a unified state (Jiang, 2009: 52). As one follows the decreasing of the rhetoric from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Dator foresaw the coming trend of changes resulted from

the economic integrations, which has gradually made Beijing and Taipei calm down and started to share things in common, albeit under two different political systems. Bush depicted the relation as follows:

> Since Ma took office in May 2008, the two sides have undertaken a systematic effort to stabilize their relations and reduce the level of mutual fear. They have made significant progress on the economic side, removing obstacles and facilitating broader cooperation.

However, the most unusual undertaking by Beijing government is worth special noting here. Bush continued,

> There has been less progress on the political and security side, but this is partly by design…The Beijing leadership recognizes the importance of building mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges after a decade-plus of mutual fear. It is emphasizing what the two sides have in common—economic cooperation and Chinese culture—and agreed to reduce somewhat the zero-sum competition in the international arena.

What Bush presented above serves an excellent example of the empirical futures studies case. It is noticeable that Bush considered the lacking of the key conceptual issue, sovereignty in particular, is internationally designed. At this time, one may ask how political theorists, either from liberal camp or realist camp, have to design a "wait and see" strategy, either for the purpose of winning the balance of power or doing something for the sake of morality in the China-Taiwan case. The case scenario is in no contradictory to what Inayatullah (2007: 44) described: "The political right, for example, focuses on security, disowning freedom; economic growth, disowning distribution. The political left focuses on structure and blame, disowning innovation and agency. The empiricist focuses on data, the bottom line and disowns meaning and imagination. Finally, the visionary focuses on the image, the metaphor, disowning the real world."

Expecting what can be a trend from which one would see the future, Dator posed THE question on the concept of sovereignty in 1993, "So what do we mean by 'National Sovereignty' any more? Show me one nation that is big enough to control its own destiny?" He continued:

> The 'Pacific Century' looms, dominated—by whom? Japan? Perhaps. More likely China with nearly 1/3 of the world's bloated population not only on its very diverse mainland and across the straits in prosperous Taiwan but also, as so-called 'Overseas Chinese,' spread worldwide, and soon, perhaps to embrace the other Confucian powers—the reunited Koreas, Singapore, perhaps even a subdued Japan itself (Dator, 1993).

Reflecting the current economic situation across the Taiwan Strait, Dator's above vision turns out to be an optimistic reality. It does give hope for a nonkilling scenario, at least among Chinese, Taiwanese Chinese, or Chinese Taiwanese.

As only half of the second case, the following discussion aims briefly on the on-going process of the systems failing. Acknowledging China is no longer a socialist state, Dator (1997) touched a long shot on the fate of capitalism,

> Neither capitalism nor socialism seems to me to have a bright future. As I have said repeatedly, it is not that capitalism triumphed over socialism. It is that really-existing socialism collapsed before capitalism did. Neither system is sustainable over the 21st Century and beyond.

Dator's view is reflected on the political systems in the words of George Salzman, a physicist and political activist, as quoted by Bageant (2010):

> Everyone in these 'professional' institutions dealing in money lives a fundamentally dishonest life. Never mind 'regulating' interest rates…We must do away with interest, with the very idea of 'money making money'. We must recognize that what is termed 'Western Civilization' is in fact an anti-civilization, a global social structure of death and destruction. However, the charade of ever-increasing debt can be kept up only as long as the public remains ignorant. Once ecological limits have been reached the capitalist political game is up.

Dator provided the reason, albeit three decades ago, for what Gorge Salzman talked about today. "For almost three decades now," Dator (1991) said, that "government has failed miserably to perform its basic functions, from preserving order in public spaces to dispensing justice to providing decent education in its schools. But the reasonableness of the motives does not diminish the danger of the potential consequences." Joe Bageant, in his two essays, "Our Plunder of Nature Will End up Killing capitalism and Our Obscene Lifestyle," and "The Battle for the American Soul is Over and Jay Leno Won," provides some of the reality-show consequences that Dator included in his remarks in 1991. For a meaningful verifying of Dator's accurate foresight, the author quotes a few of Bageant's points:

- Like the term populism, the people have no idea what democracy really is, but has something to do with the free market capitalism that issues forth such things as bass boats.
- Nature has no place in contemporary economics, or the economic policy of today's industrial nations.

- Capitalists, however, remain unimpressed by global warming, or melting polar ice caps, or Southwestern desert armadillos showing up in Canada, or hurricanes getting bigger and more numerous every year.
- When the U.S., and then the world's money economy started to crumble, the first thing capitalist economists could think of to do was to monkey with the paper. That's all they knew how to do.
- The main feature of capitalism is the seductive assertion that you can get something for nothing in this world.
- Not that most Americans can see the big picture. They were blinded at birth, so as not to view the monstrous system that has taken on a life of its own.
- One that rules their lives through the small elite class it created and governs.
- Blame it on water fluoridation, lousy education or degraded breeding stock, but not one in a hundred Americans can grasp that monolithic ideo-economic systems can become intelligent entities of their own sort (although capitalist state indoctrination has conditioned Americans to readily accept that Soviet Communism did just that).

Futurist Halal cries out that "The future has arrived." On the shoulder of Dator, he concludes, "Just as the collapse of Communism resulted from an over-controlled planned economy, today's 'collapse of Capitalism' is the result of an under-controlled market economy." Dator proclaimed in 1993 that neither socialist system nor capitalism is sustainable over the 21st Century and beyond. The reasons (for Dator's 1993 rational) proved valid against today's reality, albeit in Halal's words of 2009:

> The financial collapse of 2008 and its cascading business failures is certainly daunting, but the truly frightening thing is that the financial meltdown is part of a larger 'global crisis of maturity'—energy shortages, climate change, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and other yet unforeseen threats that are escalating as accelerating technological change and globalization strain old systems to the breaking point. These mega-crises are interrelated elements of a failing global order that looks like a train wreck in slow motion. If not sub-prime mortgages, some other flaw in today's aging economic system would likely have caused roughly the same failures.

Conclusion: Paige's Nonkilling Society in Dator's Preferred Futures

The proceeding sections serve as a tool, like paralleling switchgear, in the discussion surrounding Dator's major components, such as, action/transforming, image/collapsing and trend/growing, in exploring Paige's nonkilling society. Technically, paralleling switchgear (PSG), according to Maurice D'Mello (2008), is a combination of protection, metering, control-

ling and switching elements, acting as an integrated system, to control the distribution of power for the following systems:

- Emergency system
- Legally required standby system
- Critical operation power system
- Optional standby system

Maurice D'Mello ends his study on the paralleling switchgear this way,

> Paralleling Switchgear can be built as simple as possible with minimal control or as complex as possible with complete control, load management and redundancy. At the lower end, hardwired relays are used but at the higher end, complete digital control is adopted…The trend is towards Digital Control as it can handle complex algorithms that enable multiple scenarios for load management and redundancy. It provides flexibility for system upgrades and enhancements. It also permits operational modifications to be done outside the equipment and then uploaded after complete testing. Digital controls have extensive diagnostics that can enhance reliability.

Maurice D'Mello's description on building the paralleling switchgear really mirrors the other two building blocks in Dator's alternative futures principle. One is the *event*, and the other is *discipline*. These two building blocks can be interpreted as Paige's nonkilling society, as an *event*, and Dator's preferred futures, as a *discipline*.

Paige defines his "nonkilling society" as "a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, in which there is no killing of humans, and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society that depend for maintenance or change upon the threat or use of lethal force. There is neither killing of humans nor threats to kill." Paige's nonkilling society, literally, can be a metaphor, or an episode, or an event with a transcendental nature. It is an unprecedented undertaking, a divine transformation and a glorious collapsing.

Although Paige's nonkilling society is not yet the one like Maurice D'Mello's paralleling switchgear, the vision presented in his book N*onkilling Global Political Science* serves as both means and end towards killing-free future. James Robinson personifies Paige's spirit embedded in the book. Sharing Paige's vision, Robinson (2009: 13) calls for a global endeavor for the humanity towards a nonkilling future,

> The promotion of evolutionary biases in favor of nonkilling depends ultimately on more than will and dedication, more than the goodwill of public

> opinion, but also on secure bases of knowledge from which alternative courses of action may be designed, implemented, and appraised. Hence, the immense importance of a political science of nonkilling.
>
> Therefore, respected reader, you have presented to you a work of science and policy. You are entitled, indeed urged, to suspend judgment until you have encountered the case for a nonkilling global political science. If unconvinced, you can take comfort amid a silent but continuing effective plurality who explicitly or implicitly accepts killing and threats of killing as constitutional. If persuaded, you will find a niche in the complex panoply of opportunities suggested in this book to join in mobilizing the enlightenment and energy of men and women of similar perspectives among every culture, class, interest, and personality type in situations of whatever level of crisis or stress in promoting and favoring strategies of persuasion over those of coercion in every arena affecting all the values of a potentially global commonwealth of human dignity.

In the process of transformation of literally everything in this digital age, a nonkilling society will remain as "a vision of the mind," a human attribute, competence, and process that "pushes the boundaries of perception forward." (Gary, 2009: 2) Paige's nonkilling society embraces Dator's political conscience for the future generations. However, fundamentally, Dator's political conscience facilitates all preferred and ethical futures for Paige's nonkilling society. The future generations are our destiny. Do not kill them before they are even born.

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Design

Everyone Ever in the World
Design Explanation

Peter Crnokrak
The Luxury of Protest

Process / Format

- 1st edition: screen print gloss transparent ink on GFSmith Plasma Polycoat 700 micron matte Jet Black plastic. Print by K2 Screen, London.
- 2nd edition: screen print gloss milk-white ink on GFSmith Plasma Polycoat 700 micron Clear Natural plastic. Print by K2 Screen, London.
- 3rd edition: commemorative Science edition: laser engraved and laser cut print on Rives BFK 300gsm 100% cotton paper. Special limited edition of 5 prints, by CutLaserCut London.

Size—650mm X 920mm
Quantity—20 / 20 / 5
Date—2010 to 2011

Concept Description

"Everyone Ever in the World" is a visual representation of the number of people to have lived versus been killed in wars, massacres and genocide during the recorded history of humankind. The visualisation uses existing paper area and paper loss (die cut circle) to represent the concepts of life and death respectively. The total number of people to have lived was estimated through exponential regression calculations based on historical census data and known biological birth rates. This results in approximately 77.6 billion human beings to have ever lived during the recorded history of humankind and is represented in the poster as total paper area (650mm X 920mm). The total people killed in conflicts was collated from a number of historical source books and was summed for all conflicts – approximately 969 million people killed, or ~1.25% of all the people to have ever lived (die cut area = 650mm X 920mm X 0.0125). The timescale encompasses 3200 BCE to 2009 CE—a period of over 5 millennia, and 1100+ conflicts of recorded human history.

The sequence of dots to the top left of the graph shows the dramatic increase in the number of conflicts over the past 5 millennia (left to right: 3000 BCE to 2000 CE) with the most recent 1000 years being the most violent. The large dot below the graph represents the 1000 years to come: a predicted startling increase in the frequency of human conflict.

The graph exemplifies the value imparted to data with regard to the manner in which it is visualised: the culturally attuned perceptual differences in absolute versus proportionate values. The absolute value of 969 million people killed in wars, massacres and genocide is an astonishingly high number. But when presented as a proportion of the total number of people to have ever lived, it becomes quite low, 1.25%. Most statistical measures are expressed as a relative value (eg. standardized as a percentage) which is represented in the graph with the die cut circle. Death counts in humans is one of the few instances where absolute values are culturally accepted as appropriate—likely due to the absolute value placed on human life.

The relative simplicity and intuitive graphical approach of using a die cut area to represent total people killed, lends a direct poetry to the concept and affords the viewer an instantaneous assessment of the degree to which conflict has shaped human history. Printing in transparent ink allows for a visual assessment of die cut area as compared to paper area without interfering graphics. The graphic simplicity of the poster belies the necessary complexity of mathematical modeling of cumulative population size and the depth of research required to obtain death counts for all conflicts of recorded human history. However, it is the very same simplicity of representation that imparts a sombre and respectful tone to such a weighty subject matter.

Format and Materials Description

"Everyone Ever in the World" is as much focussed on the content of the data presented as it is an exercise in the use of unique materials and print processes to express a concept. All three editions of the project use different materials and printing to approach the concept of life contrasted with death in a manner which brings meaning and understanding to the data.

1st edition: the first edition incorporated the basic elements that were necessary to convey the concept—physical poster material to represent total number of people born and a die cut circle, the total number of people killed. The spiral arrangement of text was primarily a graphic tool to tie in the list of conflicts with the summed total of people killed in those conflicts, as represented by the die cut centre. Contrast this with the early incarna-

tion of the piece which used a list arrangement for the text—where the conflicts have virtually no relation to the die cut form and is ultimately poor design. This arrangement also alludes to grooves in a record—the choice of heavy black plastic completes the "historical record" metaphor.

Printing the text in clear gloss ink was a device to allow for the text is disappear when the poster is viewed head-on, but be readable at angle. This is an important concession to the massive list of text in that if printed in standard white ink, would visually obscure the form relationship between total poster area versus die cut area—the single most important data relationship represented in the piece.

2nd edition: as a contrast to the heaviness of the first "black" edition (which in itself has a direct symbolic relationship to the void of death), the second edition printed on frosted semi-clear plastic takes on a ghost-like transparency to express the same concept, but using diametrically opposite language. The fundamental relationship of poster area to die cut area remains, but the lightness of the milk-white ink on semi-clear plastic to a nod to the fleeting nature of existence and the symbolism of loss—that life disappears as easily as it is created.

3rd edition: the commemorative *Science* edition—the 3rd and final print of "Everyone Ever..."—is entirely laser engraved and laser cut in heavy cotton paper. Laser engraving produces a distinctive burn pattern with subtle smoke-like wisps that are particularly pronounced on white paper. Being a subtractive process, engraving is a perfect process to convey the notion of loss. The burn patterns also convey the concept of inferno which is in and of itself, inextricably linked to destruction and death.