Nonkilling Media

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"The conventional view serves to protect us
from the painful job of thinking"

John Kenneth Galbraith

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Foreword

Beverly Deepe Keever
University of Hawai'i

> *The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental human values comes with great responsibility. Those who control the media are accountable for its consequences. … Without a firearm, machete or any physical weapon, you caused the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians.*
>
> —Presiding Judge Navanethem Pillay, warning three media executives found guilty of genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2003.

This book amasses for the first time anywhere the roles and responsibilities of the media for establishing and securing a nonkilling world.

The ten authors assembled and introduced by Joám Evans Pim for the Center for Global Nonkilling cull a wide array of academic and community sources to assess the state of today's global media and to offer recommendations for achieving a nonkilling world.

That nonkilling world has been described by Glenn D. Paige in his seminal book as one characterized by the absence of killing of humans, threats to kill, conditions conducive to or justifications for killing and of "no conditions of society dependent on threat or use of killing force for maintenance or change" (Paige, 2009: 21).

This first-ever book comes at a most propitious moment in history. It is a moment of profound shifts—a term I use to describe an unmooring from the past amidst momentous technological changes headed in a which-way direction that may imperil the planet and its population.

It is in a direction in which "the future does not exist," according to Professor Jim Dator's First Law of the Future, as recounted by John Sweeney in Chapter 5. In short, the future is waiting to be shaped or may be happening right now. Will it shift toward more killing or toward nonkilling?

Partly determining the shaping of the future lies in the hands of the media in reflecting and responding to these five monumental, even if slow-moving, shifts:

- the shift away from supports for killing or threats of killing,
- the shift away from paying the costs of killing or threats of killing,
- the shift toward more fact-finding about conditions causing killing,
- the shift toward a nonkilling society and world,
- the shift in media technologies.

The shift away from supports for killing or threats of killing is visibly underway. Daily at this writing citizens globally are repulsed by the killings of people within Syria by their own government or its armed opponents, as distributed worldwide by the media, while simultaneously experiencing fears of nuclear happenings that could destroy much of the planet and its population. In the United States random shootings of pupils in schools have even prompted some parents to buy bulletproof backpacks for their little ones.

Yet covering killings has become increasingly significant because the speed, reach and impact of the media have become more pronounced than ever before. For the first time perhaps, journalists themselves have become targets. As Associated Press' Middle East Regional Photo Editor Manoocher Deghati explains: "When you cover conflict, it's really dangerous, but being a target is a different thing. Because we know inside Syria, the pro-government militia are looking for journalists."

At the other end of the spectrum, killings have been done purely for propaganda purposes. As Marine David J. Morris explains, a four-man U.S. Marine Corps sniper team was spotted and executed on a rooftop in downtown Ramadi, Iraq. Then, he continues, "Video footage of the executions was running on several local Arab television networks before the Marines could even mount a patrol to investigate."

In short, as Jason Burke, a British expert in terrorist groups, elaborates, "The terrorists have become producers and film directors and video cameras have become their most potent weapon."

The global media are on notice that messages inciting killing might be considered war crimes, as the italicized quote at the beginning of this text underscores. In this landmark decision by the International Criminal Tribunal, three media executives were convicted of genocide for inciting people to participate in the wave of killing in 1994 that swept across Rwanda; about 800,000 were killed. The Tribunal found that a popular radio station and a newspaper were used by the media executives to inflame hatred against the country's Tutsi minority plus their sympathizers and to encourage massacres.

The Tribunal's decision "marks the first time since the Nuremberg trials after World War II that anyone has been convicted of responsibility for

mass murder through the control of the media," Dworkin writes. The verdict on Rwanda "is likely to stand as a decisive precedent in determining that media organizations can be held accountable for the crimes that they direct their listeners and readers to carry out." Similarly, scholar Alison DesForges told the *Washington Post* that the Tribunal's decision is extremely important "because it does recognize that media can be used to kill." (Dworkin, 2003; visit <http:www.crimesofwar.org>).

The shift away from the economics of killing or threats of killing is already hitting governments' budgets and taxpayers' pocketbooks. Facing a multi-trillion-dollar national debt, stubborn unemployment, under-funded public schools and infrastructure, the U.S. government has slashed monies for its military establishment and is withdrawing its troops now killing and being killed in Afghanistan.

In the Middle East, Europe, Brazil, and elsewhere protestors risk being killed or killing others by taking to the streets, smashing windows and fighting law enforcers as they demand better economic and social conditions. Instead of expending these pent-up violent reactions, however, protestors might well benefit from studying the effectiveness of Gandhi's nonviolence. Thanks to the electrifying revelations of renowned leaker Edward Snowden, protestors and other dissidents—and citizens and governments everywhere—are now alerted that all of their electronic media messages are being spied on by the U.S. government, often with help from its allies.

Willingly, unwillingly or unwittingly, the media often serve as a vast surveillance network useful to governments and commercial enterprises and perhaps even to criminals. And this prospect may increase as drone journalism and other media outlets gain momentum. To offer individuals counter-surveillance protections, cutting-edge designers are creating "stealth-ware" that block unwanted photo-taking or aerial tracking (Worthham, *New York Times*, 2013).

In other cases, some media companies are owned by or inter-locked with corporations holding or seeking government contracts or other benefits. For example, General Electric, a major U.S. defense contractor, owns a 49 percent interest in NBCUniversaal, 51% interest in Comcast, is a joint partner with Microsoft in the cable news network of MSNBC, and has holdings abroad intertwined with several giant international corporations ("Who Owns What," *Columbia Journalism Review*, June 2013).

The powerful images and stories of film are often overlooked to create uplifting and inspiring nonkilling productions, as Karen Hurley describes in Chapter 6, because major studios are owned by transnational conglomerates operating in a "society that is based on militarism and focused on violence".

They adopt story lines that often take place in the United States. In effect, she notes in citing others, "the future has been fully colonized and it is American."

In addition, as Philip Lee explains in Chapter 1, the U.S. mass media generally "colluded in the so-called 'war on terror', aiding and abetting the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan." Some media celebrated "legitimate" weapons of mass destruction like smart bombs, he continues, instead of realizing that "journalists' choice of stories, angles, sources and ways of structuring narratives strongly influence readers' and viewers' attitudes and beliefs."

Yet done wisely, as Virgil Hawkins notes in Chapter 2, the media "have the power to contribute to better policymaking in responding to conflict, by providing detailed information and context to the public and policymakers, and encouraging discussions and debate." The media could also do more to reduce killing, he explains, by exposing the trafficking of arms, trade in natural resources associated with conflict, and financial support of the belligerents.

Despite today's dire economics and the public horror of real-life, real-time killing, producers of movies, video games and other entertainment media are reaping huge profits in the global multi-billion dollar market, as Sweeney reminds us in Chapter 5.

These producers could conceivably usher in a nonkilling future, he notes, but most games and other media entertainments involve dramatic killings or other fast-action violence that can be more easily comprehended and absorbed by global audiences regardless of their language or culture, thus evidencing "the integral link between capitalist ideologies and economies of lethality."

The shift to more factfinding globally about conditions causing killing is underway. The extent of killing worldwide in 2009 is explained by Xu Xiaoge in Chapter 3. Based on the latest global report of the World Health Organization, he details that 1.79 billion people were killed in that year, including:

- 44% committing suicide,
- 28% in homicides,
- 17% during wars,
- 11% were murdered and
- .04% as death penalty.

In a most illuminating content analysis, he also made the significant findings that document inequities in news media coverage of killings. He found that eight selected English-language national newspapers covered killing or its equivalent far more often when it occurred in undeveloped or developing countries (80%) than when it occurred in developed countries (20%). These newspapers most often used the word *killing* or its equivalent in

headlines and in leads and in stories covered by their own correspondents. The stories most often de-legitimated the killings but usually slighted or omitted entirely references to nonkilling actions or attitudes.

He found that murder was reported as the major cause of killing (50%), followed by terrorist attacks (24%), conflict (23%), genocide (.9%). Suicide was reported as the cause in only 1.1% of the stories, even though the *World Health Report* he cites lists that as the leading cause of killings globally—almost more than homicides and wars combined. In addition to the cause of killings, the scholar urges, news coverage needs to include "what should be done" to prevent their re-occurrence. He also urges news media professionals, professors and students to be exposed to and learn nonkilling concepts, principles and practices so that they can be utilized in gathering, producing and presenting news stories on killing.

Paige outlines these four principles of nonkilling journalism and other media, in an 18-minute instructional video available online:

- Report the killing without euphemisms and inquire into its causes,
- Report nonkilling—why people don't kill—and report human creativity,
- Report the causes of shifting from killing to nonkilling or the reverse,
- Report the characteristics of a nonkilling society. (Keever, 2007).

Inequities in economic and social arrangements cause killings and other forms of violence. "The poorer people are, the poorer the circumstances in which they live, the higher the rate of violence," Michael Marmot reported to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2009).

Within the United States, the Occupy Wall Street protests in 2011 inspired offshoots around the country and overseas, with a long-lasting one still holding on in Honolulu. The Occupiers voiced the outrage of the 99 percenters against wealth and power concentrated in the hands of the 1 percent. Despite their sputtering out, the Occupiers' claims have been borne out in a recent analysis documenting that top executives of the biggest U.S. firms got a huge pay increase—16 percent—over 2011. (Morgenson, *New York Times*, 2013).

Similarly, a vivid social movement in Spain that used graffiti, posters, assemblies and other inventive ways to capture and spread the "Spanish Revolution" calling for "Real Democracy Now" is detailed by Eloísa Nos Aldás in Chapter 4. She notes that one slogan used hand-scrawled letters on a poster reading "Yes we Camp," as a play on the words used in 2008 by U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama his successful "Hope" campaign.

Much violence is directed at women. Physical or sexual violence affects more than one third of all women worldwide, according to a recent WHO survey, and "is a global health problem of epidemic proportions." (WHO, 2013.)

Scrutinizing this epidemic situated in male-dominated societies, María José Gámez Fuentes notes in Chapter 7 that women are most often portrayed as victims of violence—and hence receive a law-enforcement focus in the media—or of domestic violence—and hence a social welfare focus. Instead violence against women should be considered as a human rights violation to be addressed by all segments of society in an attempt to rectify imbalances within the power and social structure.

The shift toward nonkilling societies is moving forward. Paige asks if a nonkilling society is possible. Of course, he replies. It already exists. One key characteristic is strict egalitarianism, by age and gender, which Peter Gardner found over 40 years of researching the Paliyan, a hunting and gathering tribe in South India (Gardner, 2012).

Using news reports to bring academic research up-to-date led in 2004 to the starting of the *Peaceful Societies* site (http://peacefulsocieties.org) that Bruce Bonta discusses in Chapter 9. News reports occasionally report on economic, social, educational or cultural and religious information about selected nonkilling societies. These sporadic news reports provide clues that peaceful societies were marked by what Bonta calls "the giving spirit, call it generosity, perhaps."

As for the news reports themselves, Bonta indicates, "some of the reporters show abysmal ignorance about the societies they are covering" and they "rarely if ever consult prominent scholars, much less read their works, when significant events occur."

A significant shift now in motion is underway in a Movement for a Nonkilling Philippines. The Movement urges that a nonkilling Philippines is a desirable vision and a goal that can be measured by a proposed Philippine Index of Killing/Nonkilling. That index "will record, map, and monitor the incidence of killings nationwide," thus detailing the kinds of killing and their probable cause, Abueva reports.

Moreover, "communities that excel in nonkilling peacefulness will be recognized and their experience sought to be replicated elsewhere," he elaborates. To institutionalize the Movement's vision, a Senator has drafted a legislative bill establishing a Department of Peace.

The Movement was founded in 2009 by 17 Filipino scholars and community leaders who had written a trail-blazing study five years earlier about developing a research and action agenda for developing a nonkilling Philip-

pines. Their study was inspired by Paige's *Nonkilling Global Political Science* that had been translated into Filipino (Abueva, 2013).

To expand this shift beyond the Philippines, Eloísa Nos Aldás in Chapter 4 urges organizations with peace-culture and nonkilling missions to move beyond their structural requirements of fund-raising and branding and instead to make education and advocacy as their unique objective.

The silence of intellectuals advocating nonkilling is also overshadowed by "an increasingly war-accepting, if not war-promoting, public discourse," according to Tom Hastings in Chapter 9. He lists a number of remedies including:

- framing nonkilling initiatives as cost-reduction measures,
- featuring successful nonviolent examples,
- calling on sources who are experts on or can speak to the structural reasons for violence, and
- marking nonviolent anniversaries.

The shift in media technologies is rapid and far-reaching. Glenn Paige's seminal book that touched off a nonkilling movement in the Philippines is one striking example of the far-reaching impact of the new media technologies. With his manuscript rejected by traditional publishers, Paige utilized the Internet to distribute his book without any cost to readers, and within a decade to have it translated into dozens of languages through which his powerful ideas can be shared across time zones and cultures.

A corollary of Paige's example is the demise of newspapers and other print-based media. Their demise illuminates one of Postman's principles of media technology, "A new technology usually makes war against the old technology" by competing with it for time, attention, money, prestige and worldview (Postman, 1996). The United States and the modern West are based on the culture of print, which enables commercialism and imperialism, according to Harold Innis in his formulating the bias of communication and the linkage between communication technologies and empire (Innis, 1951;1972).

"A new technology does not merely add something; it changes everything," Postman also explains. He elaborates that every new technology benefits some and harms others; it "predisposes us to favor or value certain perspectives and accomplishments and to subordinate others"; it changes "how people use their minds, in what it makes us do with our bodies, in how it codifies the world, in which of our senses it amplifies, in which of our emotional and intellectual tendencies it disregards." Each new technology has different political biases because of the accessibility and speeds of their

information, has different sensory biases, different social biases and different content biases (Postman, 1996).

These new technologies have ushered in the so-called "global village." Thus far, this "global village turns out to be an unstable and in many ways an unfriendly place in which ethnic nationalisms again occupy the center of the stage," Carey ventures. "Everywhere state and nation are pitted against one another; primordia have been globalized and identity politics is practiced on a world scale" (Carey, 1996).

Yet this unfriendly village can be transformed. Human violence is a curable disease and it can be prevented just as some diseases have been eradicated or reduced, according to the *World Report on Violence and Health,* the first such comprehensive survey of global scope.

"The factors that contribute to violent responses—whether they are factors of attitude and behaviour or related to larger social, economic, political and cultural conditions—can be changed," the *Report* states. In addressing ways for primary prevention, the *Report* calls for media campaigns to "change attitudes, behaviour and social norms" (WHO, 2002).

A heightened, constructive role by the media adds a vital ingredient to accelerated research, programming and implementation needed to curb the curable disease of violence. By doing so, Paige emphasizes, "We are going to eliminate human killing on the globe just the way we put a person on the moon" (Keever, 2007).

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Introduction

When the messenger is the killer…

The Possibility and Need for a Nonkilling Media

Joám Evans Pim
Center for Global Nonkilling

> *What is violence? In the first place we think of weapons, knife, killing, and so on. We never think of connecting violence with our tongues. (…)The first weapon—the most cruel weapon—is the tongue.*
>
> —Teresa of Calcutta (in Kelly-Gangi, Ed., 2006: 43).

An average person in the US watches approximately 30 hours of television every week. That equates to nearly 4 and half hours a day, an estimate common to most industrialized countries. During those 4 and half hours viewers have a choice of programming which usually ranges from several thousand individual or serial killings in crime fiction serials to multiple complete anihalations of the whole human species and all planetary life available on film. Counting individual murders alone, an average child in the US will have viewed 16,000 killings by the age of 18 according to a study by the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. Television series exclusively focused on killings break audience figures leading all rankings ("Criminal Minds" in CBS has a DVR of 13.5 million viewers), spearheading a multibillion dollar industry for the socialization of lethality and its institutions.

News channels also broadcast in multiple and repetitive occasions every single intentional killing or public act of violence that takes place in the "civilized" world, toghether with escalating threats, military deployments and security hazards that constantly siege the average viewer. While the World Health Organization (2002) calculated that an average of 4,000 people are killed from self-inflicted, interpersonal or collective violence every day—of which the most part is attributed to suicide—every television spectator is presented with several billion human killings every day, including nuclear holocaust, planetary extinction and every single form of random or organized interpersonal or collective form of lethality. In a society increasingly shaped by what is conveyed by the screen, this statistical anomaly has more far reaching consequences that

can be imagined, especially in the increasing number of youths that have in the media one of their main sources of socialization and worldview formation.

While the media enshrines lethal violence almost constantly, its appalling impacts or nonkilling actions in fiction or reality hardly receive any attention. The 1998 National Television Violence Study evidenced that while 61% of US TV programming contained violence, only 4% had anti-violence theme. While 55% of programmes portrayed violence in realistic setting, only 16% showed long-term negative consequences and in most scenes (71%) there were no traces of criticism or remorse over inflicted violence. Lethal violence is often (42%) associated with humor and is committed by attractive people in 39% of cases (Federman, Ed., 1998). Nevertheless, long-term frequent exposure to media violence has been proven to decrease the sensitivity level of viewers (Eron, Gentry and Schlegel, 1996).

Videogames escalate lethal socialization among younger generations. Military psychologist Dave Grossman (2013: 45) recently pointed out how violent videogames "act just like police and military simulators, providing conditioned responses, killing skills and desensitization, except they are inflicted on children without the discipline of military and police training." In the wake of the Newtown killings, Grossman warned that although only some children that use these games may actually become killers, "they will all be desensitized to human death and suffering, intentionally and realistically inflicted by themselves, for their own entertainment" (id.). Even though interaction with violent imagery can have greater effects than passive reception, as a learning process is developed, videogames of extreme violence are the most widely sold by large. In 2012, *Call of Duty: Black Ops II* (Xbox 360 and PS3) sold 10 million, *Halo 4* (Xbox 360) sold 4.7 million, and *Assassin's Creed III* (Xbox 360 and PS3) sold 4 million (Variety, 2013: 14).

Brain scientists and psychologists alike have brought forward consistent evidence showing how violence in film, television and videogames has "substantial short-term effects on arousal, thoughts, and emotions, increasing the likelihood of aggressive or fearful behaviour in younger children". Structural equation modelling has demonstrated "that childhood exposure to media violence was predictive of aggressive behaviour in early adulthood in both men and women, even when controlling for socioeconomic status, intelligence quotient, and various parenting factors" (Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis, 2005: 702; see also Christie and Evans Pim, Eds., 2012). This is especially so in the case of aggressive television characters with whom viewers tend to feel identified. For this reason, many are now calling for the same degree of care with media violence regarding children as with medica-

tion or hazardous chemicals, considering exposure to the extreme violence that currently floods film, television and videogames a form of parental or caregiver neglect and emotional matreatment.

Journalism is not foreign to this responsibility. Obssesed with violence, homicide and war, it has, in general terms, failed to provide appropriate coverage of nonviolent social actions and initiatives to prevent or reduce killing. This has been been analyzed in detail by many of the excellent works on "Peace Journalism" that have been published in the past 15 years. Not only has mainstream journalism magnified violence but is has also created a macabre equation of news value of deaths according to geographical and cultural variables. Studies such as those by Simon (2006) or Adams (1986) provide factual basis for the US newsroom truism "one dead fireman in Brooklyn is worth five English bobbies, who are worth 50 Arabs, who are worth 500 Africans", indicating than the actual reality is much worse. Only a few nonkilling journalism initiatives (such as *Pernambuco Body Count*, in Brazil—now closed—or the *Los Angeles Times Homicide Report*) have been able to take the coverage of killings beyond media ghoulishism and turn reporting into a tool for prevention and public awareness of nonkilling alternatives.

We are well aware of how the media have gained increased relevance in the way global events are shaped and transformed, especially when covering conflicts but also everyday reality. Although their lethal capacity for triggering and promoting killing across the twentieth century has been verified on many occasions, little effort has been made to refocus this power on nonkilling conflict transformation. Ignoring the role of the media is not a viable option if we seek the contruction of killing-free societies.

Governments have been aware of these possibilities for many decades, as various international documents and treaties illustrate. The *Broadcasting Peace Pact of 1936* (still in effect) established that foreign broadcasting should guarantee truthful information aimed towards peace and international understanding, although its signatories soon abandoned these principles. Decades later, the *1978 UNESCO Mass Media Declaration* also pointed out the significance of the media as having "an important contribution to make for the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racism, apartheid and incitement to war" (Art. 3.1). In spite of this, neither media corporations nor governments have played a major role in implementing nonkilling media strategies and usually delegate this responsibility to professional bodies of journalists and nongovernmental organizations.

Nonkilling media strategies include a wide range of actions in the field of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and postconflict reconstruction and

reconciliation. Different kinds of actions have been undertaken depending on the type and stage of specific conflicts, from basic and advanced training for journalists to media-based interventions and intended outcome programming. Ross Howard identifies five stages in the media practices continuum from conventional conflict coverage to interventionist media programming (Howard et al., 2003). These phases are not rigidly set, as most actions tend to move horizontally across different possibilities, simultaneously strengthening capabilities at all stages.

Stage one refers to the traditional Western approach to journalism that ideally tends toward objectivity and neutrality, taking no responsibility for the immediate or indirect consequences of reporting. This position is not necessarily negative, as basic journalism skills and ethical values, if strictly followed, contribute to the strengthening and development of fair reporting. Stage two, responsible journalism development, deepens the sense of journalistic responsibility, developing a critical apparatus (avoidance of stereotypes and sensationalism, challenging of official views, etc.) and advanced journalism tools (investigative, explanatory, specialist, and analytical reporting). Various training projects have been carried out with relative success in war-torn or violence divided societies to foster responsible media practices aimed at nonkilling reconciliation and understanding.

Stage three breaks down the barrier between alleged objectivity and a proactive peace-advocating journalism, consciously introducing news items that maximize nonkilling opportunities. Stage four introduces a new concept of constructive media for peace/nonkilling, in which journalists assume the role of mediators or facilitators above profit-seeking values of conventional media. Stage five, which not always easily distinguishable from the previous one, moves beyond the field of journalism toward directly interventionist media strategies with an intended outcome.

These media-based interventions are actions usually designed to counter hate propaganda and lethality-prone conventional media, providing specific programming to tackle conflict and postconflict scenarios (refugee reunion, training and awareness on postwar hazards, health education, election procedures, etc.). Local or external institutions—either nongovernmental or international bodies—have helped establish media projects and production facilities to foster reconciliation, tolerance, discussion, and debate on conflict-related issues, gradually transforming attitudes and stereotypes. These projects include well-planned and goal-directed creative programming in the communications sphere: radio dramas, soap operas, cartoons, comics, theatre, music, school media, and a whole range of innova-

tive and traditional propaganda and communication techniques (from wall posters and free newspapers to Internet-based projects).

Some interesting examples can be cited. In the African Great Lakes region, *Studio Ijambo* ("Wise Words") was established in 1995 to counter hate press and broadcasting (especially that of Rwandan government-supported *Radiotélévision Libre Mille Collines*), fostering reconciliation. The station had a multiethnic staff of 30, bringing together Hutus and Tutsis, not only in news coverage but also in entertainment programming. In addition to becoming an independent and credible source of news in the region, *Studio Ijambo* developed media products deliberately aimed at intergroup reconciliation. One example is the *Our Neighbours, Ourselves* soap opera, which helped to build interethnic community cooperation and trust. Similar projects were also brought into practice in Zaire/Rwanda (*Radio Agatashya*), Nigeria (*Radio Kudirat*), Liberia/Sierra Leone (*Talking Drum Studio*), Angola (*Rádio Ecclésia*), Sudan (*Voice of Hope*), Somalia (*Radio Galkayo*), Kosovo (*Radio Blue Sky*), Serbia (*Radio B52*), Afghanistan (the BBC's *New Home, New Life* radio soap opera), Timor (*Studio Moris Hamatuk*), Colombia (*Sipaz*), and Cambodia (*Radio UNTAC*).

Nonkilling television programming has also shown positive results. Examples of children-focused programs include those in Macedonia and Israel/Palestine. In the former, children ages 7 to 12 of several ethnic backgrounds participated in an eight-part television series titled *Nashe Maalo* (Our Neighborhood), in which cultural, linguistic, and gender differences were cooperatively solved. The latter consisted of an Israeli/Palestinian coproduction of the Sesame Street series (*Rechov SumSum/Shara'a SimSim*) aimed at children ages 3 to 7. The program stimulated intercultural dialogue, encouraging cultural exchange and countering entrenched stereotypes.

As Herman and Chomsky (1988) pointed out, conventional media tend to provide support and legitimization for actions perpetrated by political and military leaders during armed conflict, defending the social, economic, and political agendas of these dominant groups. Mainstream media discourses and propaganda sustaining war and violence usually blend together, inducing social identification with the "common" one-sided position and excluding the challenging of official views and information. Escalation-orientated and warmongering reporting fosters myths and beliefs that inflame conflict, demonizing the "other" through a zero-sum game of antagonism using oppositional metaphors ("us" vs. "them").

Even if it may not directly advocate violence, violence-obsessed media can easily fall into (the allegedly more profitable) sensationalist and partisan stances, thus consciously or unconsciously sabotaging any nonkilling efforts.

Historical evidence shows that warmongering can easily produce self-fulfilling prophecies (the Spanish-American War is commonly cited as an example), as politicians—especially in democracies—tend to follow (and condition) public opinion trends for better outcomes. The predominant focus on immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism of conventional media inevitably leads to tension between traditional news routines and news values and peace efforts (Wolfsfeld, 2004). Peace journalism has been proposed and implemented as a viable alternative to build nonkilling media.

As a critical-realist normative theory, peace journalism (also known as constructive conflict coverage) is an alternate model for conflict news coverage. It is committed to a positive peacebuilding, de-escalation, and reconciliation role by the media. First conceptualized by Johan Galtung, it focuses, through conflict analysis, on the underlying cultural and structural causes of violence, assuming a proactive role by investigating conflict causes and possible cooperative solutions.

In their peace journalism model, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) consider journalists not simply observers but also active participants, catalysts, and messengers. Willingly or unwittingly, journalists serve as mediators of a given reality, having a great potential to influence it, positively or negatively. The media have the capacity for consensus and confidence building, humanizing and bringing together conflicting parties, and serving as an emotional outlet, functioning as a communication mechanism in deeply divided societies (Bauman and Siebert, 2001). Not only can they educate and correct misperceptions, they also enable informed participation, giving voice to all who are involved.

Critics have stressed the incompatibility of promoting peace/nonkilling through journalism with the ideal of objectivity that is espoused in its traditional Western definition and practice, where journalistic neutrality and (veiled or unveiled) commercial imperatives prevail. On the contrary, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) maintain that reality is always subjectively mediated and cannot be neutral toward peace. Therefore they propose a new "ethics of responsibility," using conflict resolution as a news value toward alternative outcomes.

Nevertheless, Galtung explains that the basic point of peace journalism is not advocacy but "the expansion of the conflict discourse to include peaceful outcomes and processes, making peace perspectives visible" (2007: 10). The emphasis is thus on balanced, critical, contextualized, and deepened analysis of facts, giving attention to the goals of all parties, including those who oppose violent conflict. While war journalism tends to be "propaganda oriented," peace journalism should be "truth oriented."

Although peace journalism is far from being a mainstream approach to conflict coverage, professional organizations have been inclined to support its ethical background. The *International Principles of Professional Ethics in Journalism*, drafted in 1983 at a summit of eight international journalist organizations representing 400,000 professionals, state that journalists should actively participate in social transformation, contributing "to a climate of confidence in international relations conducive to peace and justice" (8th Principle). The Charter also points out that "the ethical commitment to the universal values of humanism calls for the journalist to abstain from any justification for, or incitement to, wars of aggression" (9th Principle).

The importance of rethinking media and entertainment from a nonkilling perspective is self-explanatory. In *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, Paige (2009) pointed out how violence is "socially learned and culturally reinforced". This social effort is by no means casual or due to some innate taste or demand for violence content—historically considered repugnant—but rather, "violent media socialization is useful for a state in need of professional patriotic killers". Nonkilling creativity throuought the ages also shows how a life-enhancing media is possible. Previous works and efforts have proven this. Keever's (2007) pioneering article on nonkilling media, developed as an instructional resource that included a webcast with Glenn Paige (video available at CGNK's YouTube), highlighted how media provides "vicarious learning for lethality and desensitization of the value of human life", also contributing "to a sense of naturalness and inescapability." In *Nonkilling Psychology*, Mitch Hall and Marc Pilisuk (2012: 128) explain how the often distorted vision that media portray creates an unrealistically violent view of the world that leads to fear regarding everything that sorrounds us:

> Despite the highlighting of violence in media, people mostly cooperate, share, care, compete peacefully, act altruistically, and forgive. Despite the frequency of conflict, most humans go through a typical day without being either a perpetrator, victim, or witness of any type of physical violence (id).

In *Nonkilling Linguistics*, Lauren Chamberlain (2012: 60) calls attention to the fact that exposure to media violence has also shifted the nature and content of play as "young children both imitate the violence they see and attempt to make sense of the violence present in various ways through out their lives". Regardless of the will of media conglomerates and policymakers to take action regarding this problem, families and educators need

to take action. We have also decided to reproduce in this volume two essays from the book *Nonkilling Futures* (2012) that analyze the role of film in reproducing, reinforcing and casting into the future the lethality-centered vision of human society that currently prevails. At the Center for Global Nonkilling we sincerely hope that the contributions compiled in this volume may help shape an alternative to the lethal ideology that permates media (including journalism and entertainment) that may enhance the value of life and the importance of nonkilling societal values.

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Chapter One

Nonkilling Media

A Normative Framework

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A concise definition of nonkilling is offered by Joám Evans Pim, based on the work of Glenn D. Paige (2009), in which "nonkilling refers to the absence of killing, threats to kill, and conditions conducive to killing in human society" (Pim, 2009: 15). Summarising the concepts encompassed by nonkilling, he states that, "Nonkilling... is the affirmation of the act of not taking the life of another person" (ibid.). In this sense, nonkilling media can be described as those that respect the sacredness of human life and the universality of human dignity.

The theory of communicative action expounded by philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1987) explicitly recognizes and affirms the dignity and worth of other human beings. Communicative action depends on the capacity and willingness of everyone to dialogue and to understand or temporarily adopt each other's perspectives and, from that starting point, to develop actions that have just consequences for everyone involved. Mutual understanding, not merely reciprocal influence and certainly not one-sided coercion, are crucial. In this respect, the proactive elements of nonkilling (affirmation and recognition) harmonize with those of communicative action, which asserts that systematic discussion can reveal universal truths and codes of appropriate conduct that enable everyone involved to reach agreements from which they can benefit equally. As Habermas notes,

> The rationality potential in action oriented to mutual understanding can be released and translated into the rationalization of the lifeworlds of social groups to the extent that language fulfils functions of reaching understanding, coordinating actions, and socializing individuals; it thereby becomes a medium through which cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization take place (Habermas, 1987: 86).

Among other things, communicative action tries to resolve the problem of universal truths that posit extending morality across all cultures despite differing cultural values and belief systems—a controversial proposition that is the subject of intense debate, for example, in the field of communication

ethics (Christians and Traber, 1997; Boltanski, 1999). Communicative action challenges the notion of relativism—that each culture or community has belief systems that cannot conform to universal principles because of cultural practices and experiences. It contests this idea with the foundational assertion that reason is a universal capacity inherent to all human beings. Implementing communicative action would ideally create a globally just society in which all members adhere to a shared principle—the ethic of reciprocity or the "golden rule"—that:

> Is found and has persisted in many religious and ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of years: "What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others." Or in positive terms: "What you wish done to yourself, do to others!" This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations, and religions (*Declaration Toward A Global Ethic*, 1993: 7).

Implicit in communicative action is a process of reconciliation with people "whose freedom has been taken away", based on the core values of genuine communication: "truth-telling, commitment to justice, freedom in solidarity, and respect for human dignity" (Traber, 1997: 335, 341). That process of reconciliation can only begin in a context of mutual trust in a shared reality: "Reconciliation requires seeing the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. We cannot make compassion dependent on a transformation to the ideal; we must begin with reality if we want to have any hope of influencing reality" (Sivaraksa, 2001: 41). A clear starting point for genuine communication and compassion is engaged dialogue—a dialogue that involves a desire to hear and understand what other people are saying and how they see the world. It is what Adam Kahane (2004) calls "deep conversation".

Kahane models four ways of talking and listening. The first is "downloading", consisting of polite, socially acceptable, conventional exchanges in which people do not listen carefully and nothing new is explored. The second is "debating", when people actively search for new information or perspectives and engage in argument. The third is "reflective dialogue", characterized by placing oneself in the position or circumstances of another person and listening to oneself through his or her eyes and ears. The fourth and most powerful is "generative dialogue" in which two or more people experience a sense of common purpose and are fully engaged with what is taking place and its potential for change. The premise is simple:

> The way we talk and listen expresses our relationship with the world. When we fall into the trap of telling and of not listening, we close ourselves off from being changed by the world and we limit ourselves to being able to change the world only by force. But when we talk and listen with an open mind and an open heart and an open spirit, we bring forth our better selves and a better world (Kahane, 2004: 4).

This kind of engaged dialogue is the most democratic, in which everyone is listened to and everyone can take part on an equal footing. It is reminiscent of the talking circle, a traditional instrument for dealing with conflicts, misconceptions, disagreements, or deeper problems that interfere with the everyday concerns of a person or community. Talking circles are where people can search for new directions, abandoning the old, making amends, righting wrongs, and creating new pathways toward conflict resolution and possible reconciliation. They represent a model of "integrative conversation" that reinforces the skills of listening attentively, making connections, and working cooperatively to address problems and challenges. Individuals place the community in the foreground of their thinking and response and themselves in the background in order to participate in a conversation involving:

> A genuine exchange of ideas, feelings, perspectives, opinions, and so forth, where for each person involved there emerges a sense of self as part of the whole. To participate in integrative conversation, one accepts responsibility not only for actively listening to every perspective, but for creating an integrative story along the way. In doing so, the underlying dynamics of power shift from traditionally myopic, self-centred, and rigid to inclusive, interconnected, and fluid (Cowan and Adams, 2002: 3).

How might it be possible for mass and community media to adopt the position of communicative action, deep conversation, and engaged dialogue? What models of mass and community media are conducive to the establishment of nonkilling societies and how can they contribute to the paradigm shift identified by Thomas Kuhn (1962) resulting in fundamental alterations to the fabric of society and culture? In attempting to answer these questions, we do well to bear in mind the caveat that:

> A paradigm shift is a long social process that implies significant changes in how disciplines function, slowly modifying views on what is thinkable or unthinkable, altering intellectual strategies for problem-solving and modifying terminology usage and conceptual frameworks in a changing universe of discourse (Evans Pim, 2009: 19).

In today's information and knowledge sharing societies, such a paradigm shift is unthinkable without the complicity of mass and community media and without reconceptualising the role of public service communication in a globalized context of cultural and religious diversity.

A paradigm shift in media content and practice?

The principles of journalism ethics—including professional journalism's much lauded "objectivity"—rest on truth-telling, independence and fairness, and a sense of solidarity with humankind. In addition to factual accuracy, truth-telling requires anticipating the possibility of error, rigorous research, and cross-checking based on a sure grasp of the issues in play. Independence and fairness mean striving to avoid bias, giving space to reasonable disagreement, providing alternative points of view and solutions, and avoiding partisan interests. Solidarity with humankind means minimizing harm and standing up for the rights of the "other". All these principles implicate those working in the media in an indiscriminate sense of individual and collective moral responsibility. As the MacBride Report underlined thirty years ago:

> Communication, with its immense possibilities for influencing the minds and behaviour of people, can be a powerful means of promoting democratization of society and of widening public participation in the decision-making process. This depends on the structures and practices of media and their management and to what extent they facilitate broader access and open the communication process to a free interchange of ideas, information and experience among equals, without dominance or discrimination (MacBride, 1980: 265).

The concept of journalistic objectivity has been critiqued by many commentators and has decisively influenced the burgeoning field of "peace journalism" studies. Advocates of peace journalism are attempting to articulate a new set of norms and practices aimed at changing the way the media frame and report war and conflict situations. Critics argue that peace journalism is synonymous with good journalism, but fail to see that journalists' choice of stories, angles, sources, and ways of structuring narratives strongly influence readers' and viewers' attitudes and beliefs. While public consumption of mass media journalism rests firmly on the assumption that stories are fair, balanced, and objective, we do not have to look far for evidence to the contrary.

With a few notable but ultimately ineffectual exceptions, it is now generally accepted that the mass media in the U.S.A. colluded in the so-called "war on terror", aiding and abetting the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan and helping to generate a politics of fear that enabled the Bush Administration and its allies to further their right-wing agendas. Many U.S. broadcasting networks (notably Fox News) and newspapers (such as *The New York Times*) offered a sanitized view of the war, emphasizing patriotism, military technology and heroism, and celebrating "legitimate" weapons of mass destruction (such as "smart bombs") as opposed to "illegitimate" ones such as those used by Saddam Hussein. Apart from notable alternative media sources such as the Indymedia network, the absence of critical judgement or, rather, the presence of government control and the now notorious role played by embedded journalists, led one commentator to observe that:

> Dominant media are complicit in a culture and politics of fear... that fuels the military-industrial complex, the private security industry, the small arms trade, a gated community/fortress mentality, and a foreign policy that, arguably, practices state terrorism, economic exploitation, and cultural domination, fostering hatred amongst subordinate populations (Hackett, 2007: 4).

A more recent but equally disturbing example can be found in media coverage of the Haiti earthquake of January 2010. Governments and humanitarian agencies around the world responded with immediacy and compassion to the unfolding drama of thousands of people killed and made homeless by the devastation. The mass media descended on Haiti to cover stories of the havoc wrought by the earthquake, the lack of water, food, medicine and shelter, and the "miracle" of people pulled alive from the rubble. Within days, however, leading newspapers on all continents were publishing stories criminalizing people desperately searching for a means to keep themselves and their families alive. On its web site *The Los Angeles Times* ran a series of photos with captions that included descriptions of "looting" and "looters". The *New York Times* published an op-ed column (January 14, 2010) blaming Haiti's ills on cultural inadequacies and the *Washington Post* published an op-ed column (January 18, 2010) denigrating the Haitian people's ability to determine their own post-earthquake future. It would not have taken an unduly perceptive or sensitive editor to have contextualized what was reported, to have asked "What would you do in this person's place?", or to have put more faith in the resilience of a people that has struggled for so long against imperialism, corruption, and grinding poverty.

This kind of reporting is an obstacle to distinguishing between what is morally right and what is morally reprehensible. We cannot assume that the mass media represent reality and certainly not the whole truth and nothing but the truth. For this reason, the mass media stand in urgent need of the kind of corrective proposed by peace journalism, since:

> The approach of peace journalism is geared toward the stimulation and maximization of readers' judgement ability and prudence. By challenging routine coverage methods and by providing the broadest possible range of accounts, peace journalism writers entrust the onus of interpretation to their readers. By doing so they do not treat the audience as a passive monolith, but rather supply an elementary and essential commodity for all readers... In summation, peace journalism is about supplying background for questions rather than furnishing answers (Peleg, 2007: 7).

It is recognized that "war journalism" is an inadequate term, limited as much by language as it is by a notion of journalistic reporting by aggressors or victors. The *Oxford English Reference Dictionary* (1995) is not alone in defining "peace" as "freedom from, or the cessation of, war... a treaty of peace between states etc. at war." It took the pioneering wisdom of Johan Galtung to shape a broader, more inclusive definition, although the whole notion of "peace journalism" still has its critics and detractors. Recent research findings seem to imply that there is still a long way to go to validate both its concept and practice, since:

> Neither war journalism nor peace journalism is being consciously practiced on a wide scale, and the prevalence of the former over the latter can be related to news organizations' structures and routines, including journalism's anchorage in the ideologies and power structures of the broader society (Hackett and Schroeder, 2009: 52).

Yet, it was in 1670 in his *Theological-Political Treatise* that Spinoza wrote, "Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice." If that is true, we need a broader concept of "peace" as one that takes into account all the sites and forms of human conflict and misunderstanding in society—especially those impacting on the most vulnerable (children, women, and minorities). "Peace journalism" then becomes "benevolent journalism" or, since that is rather obscure and what we are really talking about is human dignity and justice, "just journalism".

Just journalism can challenge the injustices and impunities that lead to killing

Writing in *The New York Times* (March 2, 2009), Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu called on Africa's political leaders to take sides and support the International Criminal Court (IIC) in its attempt to have President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan indicted for the crime of genocide. Tutu pointedly asks if African leaders are "on the side of justice or on the side of injustice? Are they on the side of the victim or the oppressor? The choice is clear but the answer so far from many African leaders has been shameful." Tutu's appeal was in response to the culture of impunity that appears to exist among many of the world's political leaders, few of whom are ever called to account for dubious or downright criminal acts. Bosnia, Rwanda, Chile, and Cambodia may be exceptions (when the political climate is right), although many questions remain unanswered, although we already know that few of the perpetrators of injustice will actually be convicted.

If one takes into consideration the leaders of democracies—who never wage war on each other but only on "rogue" states—impunity is also the name of the game. France's actions in Algeria, Britain's during the Malvinas/Falklands war, Russia's in Chechnya, the USA's in too many Latin American countries to name as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan—it has to be concluded, as has long been known, that there is one international standard for the power-brokers and another for the rest. Impunity has deep roots. On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court finally issued an arrest warrant against Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan on charges relating to the conflict in Darfur, including war crimes. He was accused of running a campaign that killed 35,000 people outright, at least another 100,000 through "slow death", and forcing 2.5 million people to flee their homes in Darfur. But the IIC stopped short of charging Sudan's leader with genocide because "it did not find sufficient evidence of a specific intent to destroy ethnic groups in Darfur." Yet, the UN reported that up to 300,000 people died from the combined effects of war, famine, and disease and more than two million people fled their homes. Al-Bashir stands accused of being criminally responsible for intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population of Darfur that included murdering, exterminating, raping, torturing, forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians, and pillaging their property.

Western media were uncritical in their reporting of the conflict in Sudan and found it difficult to determine what position to take. When the violence and oppression went relentlessly on and on, news editors turned their at-

tention elsewhere. Similarly, African and Arab-language media have been criticized for ignoring the worsening situation. While it is clear that the mass media cannot prevent war, they can alert, explain, and offer more balanced and insightful opinion. The just journalism option—choosing stories that create opportunities for civil society to consider and value nonkilling responses to conflict—is also an antidote to impunity. The more people know about what is done in their name, about which governments, organizations and groups are doing what to whom, the more likely they are to challenge, contest, and—who knows?—act to prevent.

In his Op-Ed contribution, Tutu commented that, "African leaders should be the staunchest supporters of efforts to see perpetrators brought to account. Yet rather than stand by those who have suffered in Darfur, African leaders have so far rallied behind the man responsible for turning that corner of Africa into a graveyard." The leaders of the world's democratic countries need to take that lesson to heart. They, too, should be the staunchest supporters of international efforts to see the perpetrators of gross injustice brought to account. And those responsible for media enterprises of any kind have a public duty to expose them. When it comes to war, genocide, and human rights violations, there can be no impunity. Only justice.

It is not only the news media as such that can be scrutinised for their take on moral and political responsibility and accountability. The entertainment media are notorious for a rather cavalier attitude to objectivity, balance, and issues of representation. William Randolph Hearst is credited with instructing artist Frederic Remington not to return from Havana, Cuba, in 1898 without images of war: "You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war." Indeed, American and Cuban forces soon attacked the Spanish at Guantánamo Bay which led to the eventual defeat of the Spanish and the U.S. military establishing a naval base there. In the James Bond film *Tomorrow Never Dies* (1997), media mogul Elliot Carver is a fictional character modelled on Robert Maxwell, although many viewers saw Carver as a satirical take on Rupert Murdoch. Elliot Carver, head of the Carver Media Group Network, plans to use an encryption device to provoke war between China and the United Kingdom. As the existing Chinese leadership is not receptive to giving Carver Media Group Network exclusive broadcast rights in their country, Carver wants to use a war to eliminate them in favour of politicians more friendly to his plans. Carver quotes newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst towards the film's climax, updated to "You furnish the photographs, I'll furnish the war."

It is to the power of cinema that we turn for a case study of how the mass media can consistently and persistently misportray and misrepresent a whole race of people with lethal consequences.

Case study: Reel Bad Arabs

In a groundbreaking book published in 2001 Jack G. Shaheen provided conclusive evidence that Hollywood films have spent several decades maligning, caricaturing, and misrepresenting Arabs. They portrayed them, deliberately or not, as "uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural 'others'." *Reel Bad Arabs* reviews feature films with leading Arab characters, the overwhelming majority of which, such as *Prisoner in the Middle East, Wanted Dead or Alive, The Delta Force*, and *Executive Decision* negatively stereotype Arabs. Only a handful of screenplays that surfaced in the 1980s and 1990s featured Arab characters as heroes, such as *The Lion of the Desert* and *The 13th Warrior*.

> In this first comprehensive review of Arab screen images ever published, I document and discuss virtually every feature that Hollywood ever made – more than 900 films, the vast majority of which portray Arabs by distorting at every turn what Arab men, women, and children are really like. In gathering the evidence for this book, I was driven by the need to expose an injustice: cinema's systematic, pervasive, and unapologetic degradation and dehumanization of a people (Shaheen, 2001: 1).

Shaheen describes a symbiotic relationship between cinema's ability to create fictional narratives and images and its power to create social attitudes, to shape thoughts and beliefs, and to construct prisms through which people view the world and other people. It is an argument that can be extended to mass media generally and especially to the news media.

The first section of *Reel Bad Arabs*, "The Genesis", discusses the negative stereotyping of Arabs in American pop culture. It is followed by "Real Arabs" whom Shaheen has known: family, friends, colleagues, and people he has met and worked with. A third section, "The Stereotype's Entry", articulates how Arab images entered American popular culture as an embellishment of preexisting caricatures found in European literature, opera, and paintings. One example of this genre is *Oriental Stories* (later retitled *The Magic Carpet Magazine*), a magazine of 1930-34 and an offshoot of Weird Tales, the American fantasy and horror fiction pulp magazine first published in March 1923. *Oriental Stories* specialized in adventure and fantasy stories with Mid-Eastern or North African settings and elements. Its stories were peopled by "cheating vendors

and exotic concubines held hostage in slave markets" and Shaheen concludes that the American public's acceptance of such images tremendously influenced American culture in its relationship with the "Oriental" Arab.

Reel Bad Arabs describes how Hollywood movies depicted the desert habitat of the Arab: "The Desert locale consists of an Oasis, oil wells, palm trees, tents, fantastically ornate palaces, sleek limousines, and, of course, camels." The screen Arab male lives in the desert like Ali Baba with "curved dagger, scimitars, magic lamps, giant feather fans, and nargelihs" (tobacco water pipes). The Arab female passively accompanies the Arab male in every sort of film imaginable, beginning with two silent, black and white shorts—one censored, the other uncensored—*Fatima* (1897) and *Fatima's Dance* (1907). Both feature the star of the 1896 Chicago World's Fair, as a veiled bosomy belly dancer. To see Arab belly dancers appearing in early films is not surprising. At the turn of the century, dancers were a familiar turn in vaudeville and burlesque. In transferring vaudeville to the silver screen, Hollywood merely emulated them—as did Roscoe "Fatty" Arbuckle in *The Cook* (1918), in which Buster Keaton consorts with a belly dancer at the Bull Pup Café. The trend continued:

> In Arabian Nights fantasies such as *The Sheik* (1921), *Slave Girl* (1947), and *John Goldfarb, Please Come Home* (1964), Arab women leer out from diaphanous veils, or as unsatisfied, disposable 'knick-knacks' lounging on ornate cushions, scantily-clad harem maidens with bare midriffs, closeted in the palace's women's quarters and/or on display in slave markets (Shaheen, 2007: 27).

Shaheen puts Walt Disney's *Aladdin* (1992) on trial. The film's opening song immediately turns the Middle East into a dangerous and barbaric place in the minds of young children. The cartoon was unstinting in its depiction of scantily clad belly dancers and moustachioed angry guards with big swords. All good fun, some might argue, until one recalls a reverse scenario. In 1943 Disney produced an animated short film for RKO Radio Pictures called *Education for Death: The Making of the Nazi*. The film featured the story of little Hans, a boy born and raised in Nazi Germany, who is bred to become a merciless soldier. Intended as anti-Nazi propaganda during World War II, a voice track of Adolf Hitler in full demagogic rant is used in a torchlight rally scene and a sequence follows in which Hans becomes a Nazi soldier along with other Hitler Youth. One might struggle to distinguish between the "propaganda" of *Education for Death* and that of *Aladdin*.

True Lies (1994) with an all-star cast that included Arnold Schwarzenegger and clearly touted as a comedy portrayed Palestinian freedom fighters as bumbling, angry, and fanatical terrorists. Not intended to, it never the less did nothing to acknowledge the grievances of real Palestinians forced from their homes in neo-colonial Israel—in contrast to the non-Hollywood film *Lemon Tree* (2008) directed by Eran Riklis, which sought to offer a Palestinian perspective. Shaheen describes as yet more disturbing the "inoculation" attempted in *Rules of Engagement* (2000), which begins by making it appear as if Col. Childers was at fault for ordering his men to fire on a crowd of Yemeni citizens. Yet, later in the film the same crowd is portrayed as actually having fired first, even a sweet one-legged girl shown earlier.

Shaheen does not give an entirely negative account of Hollywood productions. He highlights *Three Kings* (1999)—on which he happens to have consulted—which presents a balanced portrayal of Iraqis during the first Gulf War. Some are loyal to Saddam Hussein, but others are depicted as having families and even as victims of State oppression. One scene memorably shows laughing teenage girls: not wrapped from head to toe in black but as human beings. *Reel Bad Arabs* makes a genuine attempt to answer the question: Why the stereotyping? One answer can clearly be found in U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East. To further such ends, the Pentagon has collaborated in making movies that portray Arabs as terrorists out to kill Americans and destroy "the Western way of life." One example is *Black Hawk Down* (2002), which Shaheen places on his "worst list". Backed by the U.S. Department of Defence, it distorts what actually happened in Somalia in 1993 and omits key facts. "Viewers are never told why so many Somalis are fighting against American soldiers; nor does the film explain that one year earlier, in 1992, the Somalis were very friendly to the Americans" (Shaheen, 2008: 100).

After 9/11, President Bush called a meeting (widely reported) between executives and high-level managers and producers from Hollywood and the White House to discuss how cinema can contribute to "combating terrorism". Jack Shaheen's second book (2008) asked if Hollywood's powerful post-9/11 images had smashed stereotypes or reinforced them and, if images had solidified viewers' perceptions of the Arab as the evil "other", what steps should be taken to resolve the problem. He underlined the essential point that:

> Filmmaking is political. Movies continuously transmit selected representations of reality to world citizens from Baghdad to Boston. Dehumanizing stereotypes emerging from the cinema, TV, and other media help support

> government policies, enabling producers to more easily advance and solidify stereotypes (Shaheen, 2008: xviii).

Noting that at the time of publication there were in excess of 1,150 films that defiled Arabs, he analyzed some 100 post-9/11 films in which 22 that otherwise had nothing to do with Arabs or the Middle East contain gratuitous slurs and demeaning scenes, 37 in which Arabs do dastardly things, 12 containing sheikhs caricatured as ugly, evil, or over-sexed, and six in which there were stereotypical portraits of Palestinians.

The survey did, however, commend 29 films that projected worthy Arabs and decent Arab Americans leading Shaheen to comment that, "thoughtful imagemakers are beginning to rollback slanderous portraits and create fuller, more complicated Arab characters and stories" (Shaheen, 2008: 87). Even so, television has not followed suit. More than 50 post-9/11 TV shows vilify Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, in particular *West Wing, Navy NCIS, Criminal Minds, The Unit*, and *24*. Clearly, much work remains to be done before the entertainment industries begin to construct bridges of understanding and trust, "illustrating that regardless of color, creed, or culture, we [humans] are bound together" (Shaheen, 2008: 89).

The "reel bad Arabs" case articulated by Jack Shaheen serves as a critical point of reference for the discussion of other areas of media content (even though they are becoming increasingly cross-platform and digitally incestuous). How far do today's mass media—newspapers, television channels, radio stations, magazines, books, blogs—align themselves with the practical implications of Habermas's "communicative action" explicitly to recognize and affirm the dignity and worth of other human beings? How far do they explicitly or implicitly promote or condone "conditions conducive to lethality" (Paige, 2009: 77), those in which war, conflict, and violence are not only found to be acceptable but are seen as necessary and inevitable? How far do they negate or denigrate other peoples' cultures, or beliefs? Here, we are not talking about freedom of expression and opinion: the sine qua non of critical reflection and debate, whose purpose is to tease out political, social, and cultural conundrums in order to question, to understand, and to try to reach consensus about ways forward. What is at issue is communication conceived of as a revolutionary political practice leading to social change. As Richard Keeble has pointed out,

> Change will, in fact, only come if based on a radical political analysis of the media and society. This will incorporate an awareness of the possibilities

> of journalistic activities both within and outside the corporate media and as part of a broader political project to democratise the media and society in general. The strategy will also ultimately involve a radical broadening of the definition of journalism to include intellectuals, campaigners and citizens—all of them articulating their ideas within the dominant and alternative public spheres (Keeble, 2009).

The questions articulated above apply equally to "community media" (those genuinely owned and operated by a local community and having the interests of that community at heart) as well as to alternative and citizens' media, Indymedia, and Web 2 networks. Today's world is an exceedingly complex hierarchy of interrelated information and communication networks that exist to a greater or lesser extent in every country. The blogger in Afghanistan is not so far distant from his or her counterpart in Estonia or Chile. Access to technology may be an obstacle, but once in place, access to sources of global information and opinion tends to be a given. The question is how such access can be used to agitate for the reformulation and reconstruction of political, economic, social, and cultural frameworks that are more equitable and more just, and which, in the broadest definition, are "nonkilling". Participatory development experts, at least, are forcibly clear that:

> Citizens' media are part of a process of redefining dominant norms and power relations that marginalise and exclude people. Through having the capacities, the ownership, and the control to manage their own media, people can reshape and create the social, cultural, and political spaces in which their voices find expression. This gives meaning and legitimacy to diverse expressions of citizenship, adding depth and value to formal mechanisms of voice and representation (Pettit, et al., 2009: 451).

What would nonkilling media look like and how might they come about?

A necessary condition of nonkilling media is discernment, a willingness to challenge principalities and powers, to serve truth, and to denounce falsehood. In communication terms, discernment includes stimulating critical awareness of the multiple realities constructed in the mass media (and, today, in the virtual worlds of social communications and Web 2.0 technologies) in order to enable people to distinguish reliable information from propaganda, to take into account different positions, and to empathize in the course of reaching decisions. It often means investigating, exposing, and helping rebuild trust as vital steps towards conflict resolution and the long

road to reconciliation. The concept of "just journalism" discussed above is a good example of communication as discernment. Just journalism illuminates structural and cultural inequities as they impact the lives of ordinary people. It equips people to distinguish between self-interested positions and more positive aims and it places the emphasis on conflict prevention or the peaceful resolution of conflict.

A second necessary condition of nonkilling media is an ethical imperative guaranteeing people enough information and knowledge to make critical decisions and providing a framework for acts of indignation that affirm human dignity, sympathize with and take the part of people who are suffering. Michael Traber puts the matter succinctly:

> All affirmation of human dignity takes place through various modes of communication: through intrapersonal reflections and interpersonal and social communications. As the mass media are an important source of meanings for many people, they contribute to our understandings of human dignity and respect for life. When their images and messages rob people of their dignity, we do not remain unaffected. The way they describe and depict acts of violence—from street crime to wars—are of special relevance. They disclose what life is worth and how human dignity is valued or devalued (Traber, 1997: 341).

The Declaration Towards a Global Ethic endorsed by the Parliament of the World's Religions (1993) identifies such an ethical imperative as "a fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable standards, and personal attitudes." Leonard Swidler (1994) has pointed out that the Global Ethic was specifically aimed at uniting religious and nonreligious positions and can, therefore, be seen as a humanist endeavour. Swidler went on to propose combining the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with those of the Global Ethic to create a *Universal Declaration of a Global Ethic* based on the following assumptions: that every human possesses an inalienable and inviolable dignity; that no person or social institution exists outside the scope of moral order; that humans as beings endowed with reason and conscience should act rationally; and that humans are an inextricable part of the universe and as such should act in harmony with nature.

Based on Swidler's claim that the principles of universality, of humanity, and of the autonomy of the human will are found and empirically formulated in all cultures, religious and secular ethical traditions as practical precepts of the ethic of reciprocity, it is possible to formulate at least two characteristics of nonkilling media:

1. *Nonkilling media should treat all human beings as ends, never as means*, respecting their intrinsic worth and dignity. Such respect should be extended to individuals, communities, nations, the world, and the cosmos.

2. *Nonkilling media should observe the right of all humans to hold their own opinions and beliefs*, fostering rational dialogue as the only method of reaching a consensus in which people can live side by side in peace.

As such the content of nonkilling media will be impartial, accurate, honest, gender aware, and contextual.

However, content is by no means the whole problem. There are key issues of corporate ownership and control of the media; government interference and/or censorship; and, crucially, deeply embedded political, social, and cultural ideologies that dictate prejudice, hatred, and injustice. Corporate media giants are silencing diverse voices, abandoning quality journalism, and eliminating local content. In the USA, Free Press (<http://www.freepress.net>)—a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization working to reform the media—has identified General Electric, Walt Disney, NewsCorp, TimeWarner, Viacom, and CBS as the "Big Six" with revenues in 2009 in excess of US$ 276 billion from television, film, publishing and online holdings (<http://www.freepress.net/ownership/chart/main>). Government interference or censorship in relation to freedom of the press and editorial independence has been a contentious issue since the Vietnam War, notably during the Falklands War (1982), the U.S.-led invasion of Grenada (1983), the First Gulf War (1990-91), the second Gulf War (2003-), and the war in Afghanistan (2001-). Last but certainly not least, political, social, and cultural ideological differences have led to tension and conflict throughout the world.

Independent media, alternative media, and social media offer better possibilities for communicative action, deep conversation, and generative dialogue. They also challenge the hegemony of traditional mass media enterprises by increasingly providing organized material that is (to a certain as yet ill-defined extent) credible and reliable. Since corporate media are unlikely willingly to diminish their profitability any time soon, and since there will always be a demand for independent public service media, we might imagine a future scenario in which there will be three tiers of media activity that are interwoven and which interact. There will be some kind of integrated public service media at the national level, offering credible in-depth news, information and opinion mainly focused on political, economic, and cultural issues. There will be both independent and commercial media at the community level, offering less

structured news, information, and opinion mainly focused on local interests. There will be social media at the ultra local level, offering highly partisan news, information, and opinion mainly focused on small groups of followers. People will dip in and out of all three tiers to varying degrees.

Is it a plausible notion that these three tiers of media activity will take up the principles of nonkilling? The obvious answer is "no", and yet there is room for optimism. There is increasing awareness and activism around global poverty, ecological and environmental issues, climate change and global warming, gender equality and justice, forced migration, food and water shortages, violence, conflict, and security. These are signs of a growing awareness (acceptance?) of collective responsibility for what are, inevitably, global problems—in short, all the imperatives that challenge the creation of a nonkilling society. More than twenty years ago, Hans Küng wrote:

> For the next millennium a way must be found to a society in which men and women possess equal rights and live in solidarity with one another... a way must be found to a reconciled multiplicity of cultures, traditions and peoples... to a renewed community of men and women... to a society in which peacemaking and the peaceful resolution of conflicts is supported... to a community of human beings with all creatures in which their rights and integrity are also respected (Küng, 1990: 67-9).

This is the role of nonkilling media. A genuinely democratic world will only accept a communications infrastructure that respects basic notions of justice, equality, and human dignity. Within that framework, nonkilling media would be duty-bound to maintain high standards of probity, accountability, and impartiality, as well as to mediate political, economic, social, and cultural conflicts in constructive and conciliatory ways. Access to public service media would be guaranteed to civil society groups and people's movements, providing openings for ordinary people to dialogue about issues of global, national and local interest. Such a system would be deliberately aimed at actively encouraging a politics of dissent in the interests of greater democracy.

There are many tyrannical institutions and individuals that would object to such a realignment—being content to profit from misery. Nonkilling media would elucidate that reality. Nonkilling media would highlight what Karl Jaspers identified as a form of metaphysical guilt, "the lack of absolute solidarity with the human being as such—an indelible claim beyond meaningful duty" (Jaspers, 1947: 71). Metaphysical guilt resonates throughout today's globalized world, yet all is not lost:

> Something can be done if we all accept and practice the humanity, the indivisibility in plurality, of one another. Then we might care for human being as such; we might demonstrate a certain solidarity with those whom we feel to be distant otherwise and accord to each person a due measure of the dignity they deserve. That would involve solidarity with the aspiration and need of others to secure the resources of dignity. It would also involve the condemnation of any institutional policies or economic practices which deny access to, or the provision of, the security of those resources of dignity or which allow a surfeit to be allocated to specific groups at the expense of others (Tester, 1997: 151).

Humanity, indivisibility in plurality, solidarity, and empathy: these are exemplary watchwords and normative principles for nonkilling media.

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Chapter Two

The Media's Untapped Potential

Contributing to the Reduction of Conflict-Related Deaths

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Introduction: conflict, death and the media

Armed conflict since the end of the Cold War may well have resulted in as many as 12 million deaths (Hawkins, 2008: 7-25). At any given point in time there are 20 or 30 conflicts going on at varying degrees of intensity throughout the world. Obviously, stopping this killing would be achieved by bringing each and every one of these conflicts to a permanent end. Policy-makers and mediators have a variety of tools at their disposal if they are willing to engage themselves in helping to bring conflicts to a halt. But there are a number of other more immediately achievable measures that have the potential to significantly reduce the level of killing associated with conflicts even if the conflict itself cannot be so easily stopped. Parties to conflict can be pressured and/or shamed into being more restrained in their conduct of conflict, and efforts can be devoted to controlling the activities of those who facilitate and support conflict. Furthermore, the effective provision of emergency aid can serve to reduce the nonviolent effects of violent conflict.

It is important to emphasize at this point that promoting nonkilling in conflict is not simply the act of stopping bombs, bullets and blades from violently claiming human life. For it is not only the acts of violence themselves that kill. In fact, the vast majority of deaths related to conflict—in some cases more than 90 percent—are not caused by violent means, but are rather a result of conflict-related illness and starvation. We know that these deaths can be attributed to conflict because of meticulous mortality surveys that compare the incidence of such deaths before conflict with that during or after the conflict (see, for example, IRC, 2008). Conflicts force civilians from their homes and into hostile environments where there is inadequate access to clean water, food, shelter, sanitation and health services. Where civilians are able to remain in their homes, conflict may still destroy their sources of income, wreak havoc on agricultural activity and on the provision of health services. Each of these impacts can and does take human life. As

indirect as it may appear, this destruction of social function must also be considered as part of the killing associated with conflict, and nonkilling strategies must take this into consideration.

What role do the media play in stopping killing associated with conflict? Considering how little coverage media corporations devote to the world's conflicts (and the world beyond the boundaries of the "home" country in general), perhaps the more appropriate question is, what role could the media potentially play in stopping killing associated with conflict? It should be noted that the role of media corporations based in areas of conflict is somewhat different from that of those based outside. This chapter focuses on the latter media corporations—the "distant" observers.

Coverage of foreign affairs by the media in general has fallen considerably since the end of the Cold War and has not recovered. A study of the proportion of front page articles of 16 US newspapers, for example, found that whereas foreign affairs stories made up 27 percent of the total number of front page articles in 1977 and 1987, in 2004 they made up just 14 percent (Journalism.org, 2005). It must also be noted that much of the news that is "foreign" is in fact closely centred on events or issues directly involving governments, organizations or individuals from the "home" country. These trends also apply to foreign conflicts. A study found that for the year 2009, coverage of just four conflicts—Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine, Iraq and Pakistan—accounted for 97 of the coverage of conflicts throughout the world by key US television channels (Hawkins, 2011). Needless to say, these were conflicts in which the US was either directly involved as a belligerent, or for which the US government had strong political interest. Television coverage of the remainder of the world's conflicts was negligible.

The media may well have the power to influence belligerents and policymakers in a way that reduces the killing that ensues from armed conflict, but by choosing not to cover most of the world and its many conflicts most of the time, it largely removes itself from the equation. In doing so, it also takes away much of the potential power of civil society and the general public as well, who tend to rely heavily on the media for information on, and cues about the importance of, conflicts in the world. This means that belligerents (in terms of how far they will continue to fight) and foreign policymakers (in terms of how much effort they are willing to expend to halt or reduce conflict and its effects) are left largely to their own devices.

Much has been made of the rise of the internet and its effects on the news. For some it even seems that mobile phone cameras, internet news and social networking sites are making the traditional news irrelevant. This is certainly

not the case. The revolutionary changes that the internet has brought notwithstanding, the traditional media maintain a solid role in credible newsgathering, and performs the vital role of sifting through, filtering and prioritising potential "news", providing cues informing the audience of their "importance". It also provides the vital background and context that connects the dots and attaches meaning to individual events/phenomenon, in a way that no atrocity video or series of *Tweets* can. The traditional media remain (and will continue to remain) a powerful force in the setting of the global media agenda.

In more ways than one, there is a far greater potential for influence on conflict by the media—traditional and new—than is currently being exerted. This chapter explores the ways in which the media can, and at times do, contribute to the reduction of killing associated with armed conflict.

Belligerents, policymakers and the media

It is clear that the media matter to belligerents. Those involved in conflict are aware of how damaging critical media coverage can be to their cause, and how beneficial that which is supportive can be. They are also aware of the benefits of the absence of coverage in the course of the conflict. Examples of such effects were seen in Iraq. Having invaded and occupied Iraq, US forces attempted in April 2004 to capture the city of Fallujah, which had become a focal point of resistance to the occupation. Coverage of the assault by Al Jazeera, which focused on the humanitarian tragedy and included graphic footage of civilians killed, proved very damaging to the US forces, and the assault was called off. US forces returned to Fallujah again in November the same year. In the interim, Al Jazeera had been expelled from Iraq, and the only journalists allowed to cover the second assault (perhaps appropriately named "Phantom Fury") were embedded and thus effectively under the control of the US military. Negative publicity did not hinder the operation this time and the city fell. In general, the US military has proved quite adept at influencing the media during conflict. It allows generous access to information and footage of the military's choosing through hi-tech media centres and the embedding of journalists, while discouraging in the strongest terms independent entry by journalists into the conflict zone. Based on circumstantial evidence from numerous incidents, Phillip Knightley (2003: 536-41) suggests that independent journalists may now be considered as enemy targets.

Some belligerents go further in their attempt to avoid disadvantageous media coverage, choosing to keep the media out of the conflict zone altogether. In its conflict in the Darfur region, for example, the Sudanese Gov-

ernment prevented journalists from entering the region. Those that did enter, did so together with rebels across the border with Chad. Similarly, in its final assault on rebel forces in 2009, the Sri Lankan Government also imposed a media blackout on the conflict zone, which was relatively effective in preventing concentrated criticism of the humanitarian consequences of the offensive (Mortimer, 2010). In 2011, as anti-government demonstrations began to be met with violent crackdowns by the security forces in Syria, the Government ensured that journalists were not able to enter the country.

We also see the perceived importance of media coverage to belligerents in the effort and money that goes into media relations. Many governments pay large sums of money to renowned public relations firms in a bid to improve their perception by the outside world. While much of this effort and money is focused at winning the favour of powerful foreign policymakers through direct lobbying (see, for example, Kelley, 2011), a considerable amount is also directed at shaping media perception. The Government of Kuwait, for example, hired a public relations firm (Hill and Knowlton) to help make the case for military intervention after it had been invaded by Iraq in 1990. Together, they fabricated the (ultimately effective) story of Iraqi soldiers throwing babies out of incubators at hospitals (Knightley, 2003: 486-8). By the time it was found to be a lie, the desired effect had already been achieved. At times, policymakers go to great lengths to influence or respond to the media in the interests of image management. While not in a conflict situation, the President of Rwanda took the trouble (apparently personally) to respond to critical statements over the human rights record of the Rwandan Government by a UK-based journalist on Twitter, sparking a heated exchange between the two, with Rwanda's foreign minister also taking part in the discussion (BBC News, 2011).

Awareness of the importance of positive media coverage is by no means the sole domain of government parties to conflict. Rebel groups also tend to recognise the power of the media in garnering support for their cause and work to broadcast their point of view, counter the views of their opponents, and generally shape a favourable image of themselves and their cause in the media. Rebels in Darfur, for example, maintained a "slick PR machine that operated from one of the Land Cruisers," from which they maintained a website and posted videos to YouTube (Crilly, 2010: 87. See also Sengupta, 2004). Rebel groups also work to attract the attention and sympathy of the media in collaboration with powerful foreign nongovernmental organizations (Bob, 2005).

But as many of these examples show, the fact that the media matter to belligerents does not necessarily mean that the media are able to pressure or force belligerents to act (or refrain from acting) in a certain way. The

same can be said of policymakers that are not directly involved in a particular conflict, but are seen as having the capacity to respond to it. The media are but one of many forces that exert pressure on belligerents and other policymakers, and these actors have a number of options at their disposal when dealing with the force that is the media. While the media may serve as a source of pressure for belligerents, belligerents tend to aim (often successfully) for the opposite effect, with the media becoming (to a degree) a tool for belligerents to further their causes. Free press or not, one of the realities of journalistic practice is that the media rely heavily on policymakers as sources, and the power of entrenched nationalism give policymakers enormous influence over media corporations that cater to domestic audiences. Furthermore, a leader (government or rebel) that is charismatic or otherwise appealing to the media can at times win over journalists, which can lead to their cause being portrayed in a positive light (Al Jazeera, 2011).

Where the media cannot be won over, where negatively framed coverage threatens support for belligerents or policymakers, media pressure is something that belligerents and other policymakers may simply choose to deal with or live with, without bowing to pressure to act (or not act). This may mean responding with rhetoric, defending actions (or the lack thereof), diverting attention from the issue by providing new information to journalists on a different issue, or by acting in a way that gives the appearance that 'something' is being done without making a substantive change in course. At times, when media attention is deemed altogether unacceptable, the choice may simple be made to prevent access, shutting out the media. After all, on television, news that is not accompanied by images simply is not considered, and does not become, news.

But the potential of the media to exert influence on armed conflict and the resulting humanitarian suffering goes far beyond the question of the direction and effectiveness of the influence between the media and belligerents, and as the discussion below finds, it is clear that the full potential of the media in this regard is not being utilized.

Potential avenues for influence

There are two key areas in which media coverage can have an impact in reducing conflict-related killing: stopping or limiting acts of violence, and reducing the humanitarian effects of conflict. More specifically, the media has the potential to reduce killing by encouraging policymakers to take action in response to conflict, encouraging increases in humanitarian aid, encouraging restraint on the part of the belligerents in their waging of the conflict, and by

limiting the actions of those who facilitate conflict (those involved in the arms trade and the sourcing of funds). In a more general and long-term sense, the media also have the power to contribute to better policymaking in responding to conflict, by providing detailed information and context to the public and policymakers, and encouraging discussion and debate. One related area in which the media coverage is less successful (and may in fact be counterproductive) is peace negotiations (Wolfsfeld, 2004). The media tend to instinctively seek out action and controversy, neither of which are generally welcome around peace negotiations. Nor are peace negotiations receptive to media pressures to produce results in a short time span. Furthermore, peace negotiations require privacy, most importantly to allow parties to conflict the ability to make compromises without appearing weak to their constituencies. This considered, media pressure may not be helpful in this field.

The following section examines each of the areas in which the media are able to have an impact on the levels of conflict-related deaths. It is by no means an exhaustive list, but it does highlight the key areas. It explores the potential for influence, referring to examples of actual influence in the past while also noting pitfalls and weaknesses in the media's ability to influence.

Encouraging action by policymakers

A considerable amount of research has been conducted on the impact of media coverage on policymaker response to distant conflicts. Much of this can be traced to the early 1990s, when a notion came to prominence suggesting that concentrated and emotive real-time media coverage of certain conflicts and the associated humanitarian suffering was largely responsible for policymakers' decisions to respond. Research on this so-called "CNN effect" has focused largely on the power of the media to provoke a response that involves military intervention and much of it has found that initial assumptions on media power in this regard have been considerably overestimated (Gilboa, 2005). Conversely, research has also demonstrated a considerable amount of influence in the opposite direction—the media agenda being influenced by powerful policymakers (Bennett, 1990, Entman, 2004).

The role of the media in influencing policy decisions is, of course, far more complex and nuanced than those initial assumptions (Robinson, 2011). Findings that the media were not solely responsible for intervention decisions does not negate the fact that media coverage does have an impact on policy decisions. Piers Robinson (2002) demonstrated that during the Bosnian conflict, there were examples of identifiable media influence on in-

tervention decisions (intervention using air power rather than troops on the ground) in specific instances in which there was policy uncertainty. Babak Bahador (2007) showed how the coverage of atrocities in Kosovo gave certain US policymakers who supported military intervention a window of opportunity to push their agenda through.

Perhaps more importantly, it must be noted that military intervention is an exceptionally rare form of response. Policymakers have a wide range of other options to choose from when responding to conflict, all of which are cheaper and less risky than military intervention. This includes diplomatic pressure (bilaterally, multilaterally, and/or through the UN Security Council), mediation, political and/or economic sanctions and prosecution (see Geldenhuys, 2004: 43-7). Unless a country's national interests (or their government's political interests) are threatened by a foreign conflict, or opportunities for considerable gains in terms of national/political interest are identified, risk-averse governments with tight budgets are most likely to opt for a minimalist approach in responding to foreign conflict—doing as little as they can. But importantly, response options that cost less and are less risky are more susceptible to media pressure than more extreme forms of intervention – namely military intervention (Robinson, 2002: 124-5).

Accompanied by the right forms of leverage, diplomatic pressure has the potential to be quite effective in reducing conflict and the associated killing. In the DRC, for example, the escalation of hostilities by rebel leader Laurent Nkunda in late 2008 and early 2009 was eventually brought to an end when his Rwandan patrons, seeing Nkunda as liability, had him arrested. His group, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) was subsequently integrated (officially at least) into the Congolese national forces. This turn of events was attributed in large part to the pressure Western governments applied to Rwanda (Philp, 2009). The threat was not military intervention, but rather the withholding of budget support and military aid. Interestingly, many Western governments had been relatively sympathetic towards Nkunda and his Rwanda backers, but media coverage of the rebellion grew considerably during this period, and, particularly as massacres came to light, coverage became increasingly critical.

The media also have a role to play in encouraging action through what is known as the 'boomerang effect' (see Tarrow, 2005: 145-9). This effect refers to cases in which local groups working to address grievances that are unable to bring sufficient pressure to bear domestically, enlist the support of more powerful actors outside the area of contention, including state and nonstate actors. These foreign actors are able to generate and redirect pressure back to the

state in question, resulting in far greater leverage. The role of the media in this model is obvious. Generating pressure in an outside country means building awareness of an issue that can be converted into demands (and support) for action. This requires media coverage. NGOs working to generate pressure focus their efforts both on advocacy aimed specifically at policymakers and on efforts directed through the media to attract the attention and interest of the public.

Darfur is also an example of policymaker response coinciding with media coverage. Western powers chose not to intervene militarily in this case, but their diplomatic efforts and financial contributions were instrumental in achieving the deployment of a hybrid UN/African Union force in Darfur. Other responses included numerous diplomatic expressions of condemnation, the imposition of sanctions, and an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for the Sudanese head of state. Media coverage of the conflict was relatively high, particularly between 2004 and 2006, and tended to aim to evoke an emotive response and thereby serve as pressure on policymakers to act. The sequence of media coverage and policy action suggests that in general, as in Somalia in the early 1990s, policy preceded media coverage, but it is also clear that both fed off the other, with media coverage contributing to further policy responses. While many would argue that the response has been a case of "too little too late", and that it has failed to bring the conflict to a halt, it can also be argued that no other conflict in Africa since the 1990s has been able to attract such levels of sustained attention from Western policymakers or from the media. It can also be argued that, without the media pressure and policymaker action that there was, far greater levels of death would have been observed.

The media is generally not the determining factor that forces the formation or changing of policy in response to conflict, but it does serve as one of the factors that influence policy (see also Miller, 2007). It is less a matter of whether or not the media provoked a response from policymakers, and more a matter of recognizing that the relationship is interactive and dynamic at several levels.

Encouraging increases in humanitarian aid

Considering that illness and starvation are responsible for the vast majority of conflict-related deaths, the provision of humanitarian aid is an area of critical importance in preventing deaths associated with conflict. There is a number of ways in which the media have the potential to influence this provision.

Governments provide the bulk of humanitarian aid, so this is an appropriate starting point. In a number of comprehensive studies covering gov-

ernment assistance in response to disasters throughout the world (not only those associated with conflict), it has been found that during the Cold War, media coverage had a consistent and substantial influence on the levels of disaster assistance (Van Belle et al., 2004). It has since been found that this consistency failed to apply in the decade following the end of the Cold War—there were select situations in which the media continued to have a major impact on levels of humanitarian aid, but the more modest yet consistent influence across the full spectrum of disaster response seemed to disappear (Van Belle, 2009). This decline in media influence was attributed to changes in the global system—with the end of the Cold War, the relatively stable set of priorities in the making of foreign policy that had ensured the media its influence no longer applied. This change also needs to be considered in the context of the decline in the quantity of coverage of foreign affairs in general that accompanied the end of the Cold War, and the fact that the majority of conflicts receive negligible coverage in the media.

It is also clear that, on the whole, humanitarian aid does prevent nonviolent deaths associated with conflict. The levels of humanitarian aid per person per year for the DRC in 2004, for example, stood at 3 USD, while for Darfur, the figure was 89 USD (Nolen, 2004). In Kosovo, in the space of just three months in 1999, the UN spent more than 110 USD per person (Fisher 1999). These discrepancies are reflected in the levels of death caused by illness and disease in these conflicts. Mortality surveys have found that nonviolent deaths caused more than 90 percent of the conflict-related deaths in the DRC, with the figure dropping to 69 percent in Darfur. For Kosovo, nonviolent deaths were virtually negligible (Geneva Declaration, 2008: 40). Of course this is not simply a matter of differences in the levels of humanitarian aid. While Kosovo did receive far more humanitarian aid than did the others, the difference in the proportion of nonviolent deaths between the conflict in Kosovo and its African counterparts can also be explained by the fact that the victims of conflict in Kosovo were economically and environmentally in a better position to respond to the effects of conflict without their situation becoming life-threatening. The difference in mortality levels between Darfur and the DRC is less-easily explained in this sense. This difference can perhaps be attributed in large part to higher levels of humanitarian aid reaching Darfur than that reaching the DRC. In any case, the fact that millions of people have died from illness and starvation associated with conflict in the DRC is in itself a clear sign of a critical lack of humanitarian aid.

The links between media coverage and humanitarian aid are not limited to the work of governments and international organizations. There is a con-

siderable amount of evidence of the impact of media coverage on donations to NGOs and other aid agencies (Brown and Minty, 2006, Moeller, 2006). NGOs are keenly aware of the power of the media in this regard, including the dangers of unfavourable coverage and its impact on the flow of donations, and the importance of branding, in light of increasingly tough competition among NGOs and aid agencies for donations (Cottle and Nolan, 2007). NGOs employ media/communications officers who work to raise the profile in the media of certain humanitarian emergencies, and encourage journalists to visit and report on their implementation of humanitarian relief in the field, which will then result in more donations to support their activities in those places. NGOs are also well aware of the difficulties in raising money for emergencies in which there is little media interest. A media officer for Oxfam, for example, spoke of the need to be particularly creative in crafting messages that the media will be receptive to, in the case of complex conflicts to which the media typically give scant attention, such as those in Somalia and the DRC (telephone interview with the author, June 2011).

One problem with the media's ability to generate humanitarian aid is that while it can it can have a powerful and immediate effect on aid, the coverage and the effect tend to be highly selective and short-lived. The BBC's Nik Gowing (1994: 57-9), for example, used the case of the high-profile evacuation to the UK (and treatment there) of a five-year-old girl wounded by shrapnel in Bosnia in 1993 to demonstrate how selective and disproportionate media coverage can lead to a selective and disproportionate response. Observers were critical of the way in which resources were being devoted to this one girl, when many others in similar situations were not being attended to. The girl's name, Irma, became a cynical acronym for Instant Response to Media Attention. Sympathy for the girl as an individual did contribute, however, to a degree, to a short-term rise in concern and donations for others suffering from the conflict. Improvements in the selective and instant yet here-today-gone-tomorrow nature of the media's coverage of conflict will undoubtedly contribute to similar improvements in the allocation and effectiveness of humanitarian aid.

Encouraging restraint

Focusing the glare of the media spotlight on conflict situations has the potential to encourage restraint on the part of belligerents in their waging of conflict. Parties to conflict (governments in particular) are well aware of the negative impact of media coverage that exposes and criticizes illegal and questionable measures employed during conflict, including massacres, the

bombing of civilian targets (whether intentionally or by mistake), torture and other forms of human rights abuse. Such coverage is not only damaging to the image and reputation of the party in question, but can also have a considerable impact on the levels of support (political, financial, and/or military) the party can garner. It can therefore be expected that belligerents will work to avoid exposure to such coverage.

But the evidence of the actual effectiveness of such media power is mixed. On the positive side, there is a fair amount of anecdotal evidence of the presence of the media helping to prevent atrocities. The BBC's Nik Gowing points to incidents during the Bosnian conflict in which belligerents engaged in atrocities halted these activities or reversed course when they became aware that there were television cameras on the ground filming. In one incident, a captured humanitarian convoy whose truck drivers were being murdered was allowed to go through, and in another, prisoners whose execution seemed imminent were released following the broadcast of television footage of their plight (Gowing, 1994: 55, 59). Johannes Botes (1996) also points to instances during the Bosnian conflict, in which it was reported that the presence of journalist helped prevent (or at least postpone) atrocities. For some, the conflict in Darfur is considered one example in which the impact of media coverage far exceeded that during individual incidents or atrocities. Jan Egeland, former UN Under-Secretary-General for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, asserted that the pressure of media coverage was "instrumental" in the Sudanese Government's decision to open up to humanitarian aid in the spring of 2004 (telephone interview with the author, May 2011).

Advances in information and communication technology also appear to be making a difference in terms of the power of the media to encourage restraint. Deborah Amos, a journalist with the US National Public Radio, points out that the levels of atrocities committed by Syrian security forces during anti-government uprisings there in 2011 were far below those witnessed during brutal government crackdowns on uprisings in 1982, with the presence of images from the ground serving as a major inhibiting factor on the part of the security forces (BBC World Service 2011). It was not the presence of journalists on the ground that made the difference in this case—journalists were almost entirely shut out.

This generally held belief that belligerents and oppressive regimes will be deterred by the fact that they are being watched and recorded was the idea behind the creation of the WITNESS, an NGO co-founded by musician Peter Gabriel. WITNESS trains and supports local groups in using video to put a stop

to human rights abuse. There are no guarantees, however, that the availability of cameras on the ground, or even footage of atrocities successfully captured and showed to the world, will lead to coverage by the mainstream media or concentrated pressure on the parties responsible. A massacre of unarmed women at an anti-government rally in Cote d'Ivoire in early 2011, for example, attracted little international attention, despite the fact that footage was successfully captured on a mobile phone camera and the footage uploaded onto the internet. It can be exceptionally difficult to attract and maintain attention and indignation regarding atrocities in the absence of audience knowledge of the background and context, a role that previous coverage is supposed to have fulfilled. Furthermore, it is ironic that the more atrocities for which there is footage, the less attention each is able to garner. There is a limit to the amount of audience attention and indignation that can be generated.

But there are other, less positive dimensions of the perceived power of the media as a deterrent to belligerents. Sometimes the presence of the media in a conflict situation can serve to inflame tensions, rather than encourage restraint, with some parties taking advantage of the media's interest in action and violence to attract further attention to their cause. Tim Butcher, former Middle East correspondent for the UK's *Daily Telegraph*, points out that the arrival of a camera crew in Gaza can often serve as the spark that leads to Palestinian youth throwing stones at Israeli positions, and the appearance of armed Hamas gunmen on the scene (telephone interview with the author, June 2011). Furthermore, coverage that is particularly sympathetic to one of the parties to the conflict may encourage or embolden that party to step up acts of violence to bolster its position. In such cases, it is often the weaker party that attacks the stronger, deliberately provoking an excessive counter-reaction and taking advantage of the sympathy generated in a bid to attract greater political, financial and even military support from the more powerful members of the international community (Crawford and Kuperman, 2006).

It is also clear that in some instances, working to avoid the negative effects of critical media coverage means just that—restraint is not observed and atrocities are not curbed, it is just that greater efforts are made to prevent critical media coverage of those atrocities. This may mean shutting out the media from areas where atrocities are being committed, as seen in Darfur, Sri Lanka and Syria. In other cases, it may mean that while the conflict remains in the media spotlight, media relations efforts are stepped up to keep coverage from becoming more critical than the belligerents are able to handle. Masako Yonekawa, formerly the UNHCR's head of office in Goma, DRC, observed little impact of the media in restraining the actions

of CNDP rebel leader Laurent Nkunda. Atrocities continued in large part because Nkunda was aware of where the media could and could not access (interview with the author, June 2011). Similarly, Tim Butcher saw Nkunda as a "media performer", whose confidence in his ability to control the Western media may well have played a part in the overextension of his forces, which ultimately led to his being reigned in by his patrons in the Rwandan Government (telephone interview with the author, June 2011).

Limiting the facilitation of conflict

Conflicts cannot be fought without weapons, and, considering that most parties to conflict do not produce their own weapons, these must be bought and transported. In order to maintain and extend their participation in conflict, belligerents require sources of funding (both for weapons and for sustaining their organizations), which generally includes local resources that can be sold on the international market, and/or financial support from abroad. Media coverage has the potential to contribute to the reduction of conflict by exposing (and thereby deterring) the facilitation of conflict through the trafficking of arms, trade in natural resources associated with conflict, the transportation of these commodities, and financial support for belligerents.

Arms production and trade is a difficult area for media pressure to be effectively applied. The vast majority of arms traded globally are done so legally and the governments buying them are quick to claim that they have a legitimate right to obtain arms to protect themselves. Illegal transfers often occur only after the arms reach their "final" destination. Furthermore, as Peter Danssaert, a researcher focusing on the arms trade, points out, companies involved in the transport of arms may handle both licit and illicit arms transfers, and the same companies may also handle the transport of humanitarian aid (email interview with the author, May 2011). Companies involved in the brokering or transporting of arms can change their names or shift their operations to another country if under pressure. All of this makes it difficult to trace illegal transfers and to generate media/public condemnation of the arms trade and those involved in it.

In the long term, it may be difficult for media pressure to contribute in a major way to positive changes in the arms trade, but there are examples where media pressuring has played a significant role in exposing and limiting arms transfers. The media were instrumental in uncovering arms sales—in violation of arms sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council—that supported the return to power of the Sierra Leone Government-in-exile in 1998, as well as the role of Sandline International (a private military corporation) and the UK Gov-

ernment in the affair (Cornwell, 1998). In 2005, media pressure in Belgium, based on concerns over the proliferation of arms in the central African region, helped halt the transfer of ammunition manufacturing capability from the Walloon Government to Tanzania (interview with Peter Danssaert, May 2011). Media attention also helped clean up Ostend Airport in Belgium, which was exposed as a transfer point for arms trafficking (Association for a Clean Ostend).

Although coming long after the actual incident, the media also helped expose the transfer of arms from Ukraine to southern Sudan in 2007 and 2008 in violation of the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The transfer had originally raised suspicions when a ship carrying 33 battle tanks, ostensibly from Ukraine to Kenya was captured by Somali pirates in 2008. US State Department cables leaked by Wikileaks in 2010 revealed that the pirates had in fact been telling the truth—the tanks were destined for southern Sudan and the US Government was aware of and had condoned the sale (Gettleman and Gordon 2010). And it is not only UN Security Council resolutions and government action that have the power to actually put a stop to arms deals. Strong public opposition to a shipment of arms from China to Zimbabwe following controversial and violent elections in that country in 2008, including the refusal of dock workers to offload the weapons in the South African port of Durban, put a stop to the deal. It can be said that the media's focus on the elections and the arms shipment played a role in this development.

In terms of limiting the trade in natural resources associated with conflict, the media also has a role to play. Combinations of advocacy campaigns by NGOs and media attention in several cases have helped bring about the introduction of policies in this regard. Such pressure was largely responsible for the establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in 2003, which requires governments to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are conflict-free. Legislation in the USA aimed at curbing the conflict-related trade in tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold originating in the DRC is also largely the result of advocacy and media campaigns. The Dodd-Frank Act, passed in 2010, requires the Securities and Exchange commission to order US-based companies to report on whether or not their products that contain such minerals are conflict-free.

And it is not only the policymakers that have been moved by such pressure. In many cases, the corporations involved have taken great lengths to ensure that they are seen as being cooperative in limiting the trade in conflict minerals (Campbell, 2004). The diamond industry is particularly susceptible to public pressure because of the value of the image of the diamond itself, unlike other minerals like tantalum that simply serve as one of many "invisible" parts

in electronic circuit boards. But the tantalum industry has also proven sensitive to the damaging effects of negative publicity (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers, 2002). Cabot, a major US-based supplier of tantalum, for example, advertises extensively with Google, such that online news articles about the DRC are frequently accompanied by an advertisement entitled 'Cabot's position on Coltan', simply stating that 'Cabot has not, and will not, mine tantalum in the Dem. Rep. of Congo'. The Belgian-Swiss airline consortium Sabena/Swissair was quick to put a stop to its shipments of Coltan to Europe in 2001 to avoid negative publicity after it was named in a UN report (IRIN, 2001).

From the perspective of belligerents, while some may not be particularly susceptible to pressure exposing their atrocities, most are certainly susceptible to pressure that limits their access to arms and funding. The success in cutting off support for increasingly unpopular rebel movements in Angola and Sri Lanka, for example, played a major role in their eventual downfall. In the case of Angola, the crackdown on "conflict diamonds" robbed the rebels of their prime source of funding that could have helped sustain their military struggle. The crackdown on international remittances in the wake of the September 11 terrorist in the USA weakened the military power of the rebel group in Sri Lanka, which was designated by the US Government as a terrorist organization.

Contributing to better policymaking

The impact of the media on conflict and its humanitarian consequences goes beyond the kinds of relatively clear and immediate cause-effect relationships between pressure and response outlined above. In a more general sense, the media can also contribute to better policymaking in response to conflict. By providing the public and policymakers with a more substantial flow of information about, and in-depth analysis of, conflicts in the world, including detailed information on root causes and regional context (or "joined up reporting") (Dottridge, 2007: 244), the media can also contribute to a broader and better informed discussion and debate about conflicts. This will feed into the policy formation process and contribute to policymaking that is likely to be better suited to alleviating or bringing to an end the conflict, or at least reducing the humanitarian impact.

Media coverage of most distant conflicts tends to be patchy at best, often marked by occasional stories briefly mentioning a major event that has taken place, but with little in the way of background, context or continuity that would contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the problem. Even when a conflict does become the focus of concentrated coverage, this is often related

to the fact that it is framed in a simplistic innocent victim versus aggressor ("good" versus "evil") format, making it easier for viewers/readers to become emotionally attached and therefore to "stay tuned". While the something-must-be-done sentiment generated by such coverage (McLaughlin, 2002: 166-77) can lead to pressures on policymakers to take action in some form or another, to do "something", this "something" may not be the most appropriate or effective form of action. It may even be counterproductive. Furthermore, emotive coverage tends to focus almost entirely on the humanitarian problems associated with conflict, with little appreciation for the political problems that perpetuate it. Where response to distant conflict is designed more to satisfy domestic pressures that have been formed around an overly simplistic understanding of that conflict, and less to actually contribute to the solution of the problem at hand, the effectiveness of the response is likely to be compromised.

At the other extreme, simplistic coverage using distance framing, or a nothing-can-be-done type of coverage can serve to hinder an effective response to conflict. Conflicts that are framed as intractable "tribal bloodletting" that has simply been repeating itself since ancient times, encourage observers to wash their hands of the matter and pay no further attention. Such misleading portrayals ignore the political dimensions of the conflict and leave no room for innocent victims worthy of our sympathy or indignation. Similarly, conflicts that are portrayed as being "chaotic" rather than "complex" send a signal to viewers/readers that a solution does not exist and that the only option available is to avoid involvement in any form. By its nature, group violence serves to entrench hatred and polarize groups which contributes to the intractable nature of conflict. As such, responding to distant conflict with a view to achieving resolution or even an improvement in the situation is certainly an extremely difficult endeavour, one that does not often result in success. But there remains a wide range of options between committing to full engagement and doing nothing, and even responses that are limited to addressing the humanitarian effects are clearly better than doing nothing.

In summary, simplistic coverage that encourages emotional involvement and indignation on the part of the viewer/reader can lead to pressures for a response, but not necessarily one that is best suited to the problem, while simplistic coverage that sees the problem as one best left alone discourages a response. But conflicts are always a highly complex form of social activity, and are never as simple as a "good-versus-evil" or "tribal bloodletting" storyline. More (and more in-depth) information and less reliance on emotional attachment may lead to more reasoned and effective responses to conflict. While it may be argued that it is difficult to generate policy re-

sponse in the absence of powerful emotional attachment and indignation, many policy responses to conflict do take place in the absence of concentrated media coverage. It can also be argued that a modest yet appropriate response to a conflict may be better than one that is powerful and explosive, yet potentially ineffective or counterproductive.

There certainly is a limit to the amount of information that can be provided by news media corporations. Newspaper and television news space is limited, as is the human capacity for paying attention, particularly when it come to matters happening in distant places. To a degree, it is inevitable that the media be selective in their coverage of the world. But the internet gives media corporations far greater scope to provide readers with more information and depth in reporting what is going on in the world. And the notion that the media don't cover foreign affairs issues because there is little public interest in them comes across as a rather convenient excuse. The public will clearly not take an interest in an issue if it has no information about it to begin with. People seem to have a far greater capacity to absorb information and to pay attention to (and take an interest in) world affairs than sceptical media executives tend to give them credit for.

Conclusions

This chapter has identified a number of areas in which the media can contribute to the reduction in conflict-related killing—both violent and non-violent. It should be emphasised that these are potential ways in which the media can exert influence. The actual influence that is brought to bear depends not only on the media coverage itself, but also in large part on the circumstances surrounding the conflict and those waging it. There are many factors that may reduce the power of the media, render it ineffective or even counterproductive, and the influence that its does have may be very short-lived. And more coverage does not necessarily translate into more influence or a positive outcome. By the same token, it is also clear that, given how little coverage the media tend to devote to conflict throughout the world, and given the evidence from cases in which media coverage has helped make a difference, there remains a considerable amount of untapped potential for the media to contribute to the reduction of conflict-related killing.

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Chapter Three

Covering Killings

A Nonkilling Approach

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Introduction

Killings occur almost everywhere in this world due to war, homicide, suicide, murder, or death penalty. According to a report released by the Work Health Organization on progress in preventing violence, 1,798,047 people were killed in 2009. The breakdown is as follows: 300,000 people were killed during wars, accounting for 17% of the total, 500,000 were killed in homicide (28%), 800, 000 committed suicide (44%), 197,333 were murdered (11%), and 714 were killed as death penalty (.04%) (see Table 1).

Table 1. Killing Statistics Worldwide

Categories	*Number*	*Percentage*
War	300,000	17%
Homicide	500,000	28%
Suicide	800,000	44%
Murder	197,333	11%
Death penalty	714	.04%
Total	1,798,047	100%

Sources: World Health Organization and Amnesty International.

Killing, however, is neither inevitable nor imperative, regardless of its cause. Although humans are capable of killing "biologically and by conditioning," they are also capable of nonkilling by the same token (Paige, 2009: 9). To kill or to nonkill can be cultivated or stimulated by many different factors. In either process, humans can be influenced by news coverage of killings in terms of their notions, perceptions, understandings of killing or nonkilling on the one hand and their attitudes and responses towards killing or nonkilling on the other hand.

To stop killing is a global call, gaining strength and momentum around the world. In that call, news media can play a vitally important role through its coverage of killings. How should news media cover killings in light of nonkilling principles and practices? To address this central question, it is es-

sential to get an idea of what previous studies have found on news coverage of killings or related topics. And it is equally essential to map the current situation regarding news coverage of killings. What is more vital is, based on the findings of the current study, to make recommendations regarding what practitioners and professors of journalism should do in covering killings or teaching how killings should be covered from a nonkilling perspective.

Academic Studies on Coverage of Killings

Earlier studies are predominately on deaths, but not so much or directly on killings. Although private deaths are largely absent from news media coverage, the deaths of public figures or public deaths of private individuals can be regularly reported in the news, either boldly headlined or significantly portrayed (Walter et al., 1995). In news stories on famine, killings and victims, certain social groups, such as women, children or elderly men, tended to dominate news coverage (Gerbner, 1980; Moeller, 1999; Ho¨ijer, 2004). Besides, social status can also influence how death is perceived. For instance, the death of a public figure will be more prominently portrayed than that of a stranger, slave or child (Palgi and Abramovitch, 1984). And it is more likely for news media to cover violent death than normal death. Newspapers tended to place more emphasis on homicides, accidents and disasters over deaths caused by diseases (Combs and Slovic, 1979).

Differences also exist in covering deaths or killings in foreign news. And different coverage may be more culturally oriented in that news media tend to provide "more gruesome photographs" but "less detailed written accounts" of a victim if culturally removed (Sontag, 2003; Walter et al., 1995). Among other identified differences is the fact that "the more an audience could identify with the victims, the more interest was shown in the story, the so-called "it could have happened to me" effect (Walter et al., 1995: 587). Further differences also lie in news photos, where the dead during "one of 'our wars'" were also less likely to be depicted in photographs, whereas "their dead" were more acceptable to be shown (Carruthers, 2000: 277).

Differences were also identified in that as there were "worthy victims" (people abused in enemy states) and "unworthy victims" (those abused by the media's own country or its clients), "coverage of worthy victims was more generous, included gory details and quoted expressions of outrage and demands for justice, while coverage of unworthy victims was more low-key" (Herman and Chomsky, 1988: 39, cited in Hanusch, 2008: 343).

More directly related to studies of killings by news coverage, Eke's study

(2008) found inadequate coverage of the killings in Darfur kept the public in the dark, which helped "prolong the plight of Darfurians who have been killed, raped, starved and displaced". Lack of media coverage of killings resulted in "little public pressure on policy makers, or outcry from the international community to stop the atrocities" (Eke, 2008: 277).

Killings can be legitimated or de-legitimated in news coverage as found in the study of how the *New York Times* and *Chicago Tribune* framed Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The two newspapers "legitimate(d) Israeli killings by implicitly justifying Israeli violence and assigning more prominence to the Israeli perspective" while "the newspapers de-legitimated Palestinian violence by implicitly condemning Palestinian killings" (Elmasry, 2009: 1).

As indicated by the brief review of previous studies on deaths, none of previous investigations has ever taken a nonkilling approach to examine news coverage of deaths. Although killings were examined in relation to deaths, few devoted studies have been conducted to examine coverage of killings from the nonkilling approach.

Research Questions and Methods

To fill the void, it is imperative, first of all, to find out how killings were covered by news media. The second pressing need is to find out if there was any congruence between news coverage of killings and nonkilling principles.

- RQ1 How are killings covered by news media?
- RQ2 To what extent is news coverage of killings congruent with the fundamental principles of nonkilling?

To investigate how killings were covered by news media, eight leading newspapers were selected from eight countries and regions. They are *The New York Times* (US), *The Globe and Mail* (Canada), *The Australian* (Australia), *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong, China), *The Jakarta Post* (Indonesia), *The Times of India* (India), *Straits Times* (Singapore), and *China Daily* (China). News stories on killings were selected from the selected newspapers from the database Factiva. The key word of killing was used to generate relevant stories. The period under study was the calendar year of 2010, consisting of 53 calendar weeks. For each week, one major article on killing was selected in the presence of multiple stories on killings. Altogether, 339 news stories were selected. *The New York Times* has 53 news stories, *The Globe and Mail,* 39, *The Australian,* 51, *South China Morning Post,* 51, *The Jakarta Post,* 28, *The Times of India,* 53, *Straits Times,* 33, and *China Daily*, 31 (see Table 2).

Table 2. News Stories on Killing in Seven Selected Newspapers

Newspaper	*Expected*	*Selected*	*Percentage*
1. *The New York Times*	53	53	100%
2. *The Globe and Mail*	53	39	73.6%
3. *The Australian*	53	51	96.2%
4. *South China Morning Post*	53	51	96.2%
5. *The Jakarta Post*	53	28	52.8%
6. *The Times of India*	53	53	100%
7. *Straits Times*	53	33	623%
8. *China Daily*	53	31	58.5%
Total	424	339	80%

Specifically, all news stories were coded into the following categories of story source: (a) newspaper own story, (b) from other domestic news media, (c) from foreign news media, and (d) others. And then they were grouped into seven categories of story nature: (a) domestic killing news, (b) domestic killing news with foreign involvement, (c) foreign killing news (killing in another country), (d) foreign killing news with domestic involvement, (e) international killing news (killing in more than one foreign country), (f) international killing news with domestic involvement, and (g) other. Thirdly, they were also coded to determine the country or countries, where killing occurred. Fourthly, the frequency of using the term "killing" or its equivalent was used in the headline, the lead and the rest of the story (such as killing, kill, murder, slay, slaughter, massacre, assassinate, homicide, genocide, or its equivalent).

Crucial to the investigation are two coding items. They are "to legitimate killing" and "to de-legitimate killing". For the legitimacy of killing, six categories were used to code news stories: (a) war as a way of justification of killing, (b) self-defense as a way of justification of killing, (c) accident as a way of justification of killing, (d) explicit rationale as a way of justification of killing, (e) other, and (f) cannot determine. For the de-legitimacy of killing, another seven categories were used: (a) aggression, (b) criminality, (c) cruelty, (d) humanization (details on the killed indirectly condemn killing), (e) public health issue, (f) other, and (g) cannot determine.

To investigate the possible congruency with the nonkilling approach, a number of coding items were designed to reflect the following action principles of nonkilling (Paige, 2009: 77):

> Draw strength from life-respecting inspiration, religious or humanist. Respect your own life and lives of others. Seek the well-being of all. Killing divides; nonkilling unites. In conflict, from beginning to end seek reconciliation not humiliation, degradation, predation, or annihilation. Join in constructive

> service to remove conditions of suffering of those in need. Be creative. It has taken great creativity to reach present conditions of technological and structural violence. It will require greater creativity for nonkilling transformation. Adopt an experimental approach to change. Seek successive approximations of nonkilling societies, learning from successes and failures. Respect both individual and large-scale social action, from the influence of moral example to mass nonkilling people's power. Be constructively courageous. Withdraw support from violence and commit it to strengthen nonkilling alternatives. Walk lightly upon the earth, reduce demands upon nature and fellow human beings that contribute to killing.

The list of coding items includes the following fifteen categories: (a) focus on factual coverage of killing, (b) focus on sensational coverage of killing, (c) focus on prevention of killings, (d) focus on interventions in killings, (e) focus on causal explanation of killings, (f) focus on human rights and responsibilities, (g) focus on life-respect, (h) focus on "killing divides while nonkilling unites", (i) focus on reconciliation, (j) focus on constructive service to remove conditions of suffering, (k) focus on efforts to build nonkilling societies, (l) focus on efforts to strengthen nonkilling alternatives, (m) focus on reduction of demands that contribute to killings, (n) other, and (o) cannot determine.

Two coders were trained on how to code the collected killing stories according to a codebook consisting of 13 coding items. Excluding the coding items which would not invite any possible disagreements (Coding Items 1-9: newspaper code, story code, story length, story source, story nature, country of killing, use of killing in headlines, use of killing in leads, and frequency of using killing in stories), two coders agreed 98% on the 10th coding item "cause of killing", 93% on the 11th coding item "legitimate killings", 95% on the 12th coding item "de-legitimate killings", and 90% on the 13th coding item "story focus" according to Hoslti's intercoder reliability test formula.

Findings

RQ1. How are killings covered by news media?

This question was addressed by comparing story sources, story nature, use of the word killing or its equivalent in headlines, in leads, and in the rest of stories, causes of killings, countries of killings, legitimating or de-legitimating killings.

Most killing stories are actually the respective newspaper own stories, i.e. stories reported by respective newspaper journalists. In the case of *The Globe and Mail, South China Morning Post, The Times of India, The Jakarta Post,* and *Straits Times*, news stories are 100% produced by the respective newspa-

pers. *The News York Times* published more than 94% of news stories and *China Daily* produced 87%. *The Australian* is only newspaper under examination that published only 20% their own stories while 89% are foreign news stories on killings (see Table 3). The results tend to suggest that killing stories are largely dominated by newspaper own stories. As killings are by nature eye-catching, sensational, and newsworthy, no newspaper would publish killing stories from other domestic news media or foreign news media.

Table 3. Comparing Sources of Killing Stories

	Newspaper Own Story	*Other Domestic Media*	*Foreign Media*	*Other*	*Total*
The New York Times	50 (94.3%)	0	3 (6%)	0	53
The Globe and Mail	39 (100%)	0	0	0	39
The Australian	10 (20%)	0	41 (80%)	0	51
South China Morning Post	51 (100%)	0	0	0	51
The Jakarta Post	28 (100%)	0	0	0	28
The Times of India	53 (100%)	0	0	0	53
Straits Times	33 (100%)	0	0	0	33
China Daily	27 (87%)	3 (10%)	0	1 (3%)	31
Total	291 (85%)	3 (1%)	44 (13%)	1 (1%)	339

As shown in Table 4, most killing stories (75.4%) had the word "killing" or its equivalent such as murder, slay, slaughter, massacre, assassinate homicide, or genocide highlighted in headlines. Killing or its equivalent was highlighted in headlines of *The New York Times* (60%), *The Globe and Mail* (79%), *The Australian* (76.5%), *South China Morning Post* (74.5%), *The Jakarta Post* (66.7%), *The Times of India* (94%), *Straits Times* (75.8%), and *China Daily* (71%) (see Table 4).

Table 4. Comparing Killings in Headlines

	Yes	*No*	*Total*
The New York Times	32 (60%)	21 (40%)	53
The Globe and Mail	31 (79%)	8 (21%)	39
The Australian	39 (76.5%)	12 (23.5%)	51
South China Morning Post	38 (74.5%)	13 (25.5%)	51
The Jakarta Post	18 (66.7%)	9 (33.3%)	27
The Times of India	50 (94%)	3 (6%)	53
Straits Times	25 (75.8%)	8 (24.2%)	33
China Daily	22 (71%)	9 (29%)	31
Total	255 (75.4%)	83 (24.6%)	338

Besides in headlines, killings were also emphasized in leads, with 89% of news story leads containing the word killing or its equivalent while only 11% having none. Table 6 shows the detailed breakdown of killing or its equivalent being highlighted in leads of *The New York Times* (88.7%), *The Globe and Mail* (76.9%), *The Australian* (76%), *South China Morning Post* (88.2%), *The Jakarta Post* (74%), *The Times of India* (98%), *Straits Times* (84.8%), and *China Daily* (96.7%) (see Table 5).

Table 5. Comparing Killings in Leads

	Yes	*No*	*Total*
The New York Times	47 (88.7%)	6 (11.3%)	53
The Globe and Mail	30 (76.9%)	9 (23.1%)	39
The Australian	49 (76%)	2 (24%)	51
South China Morning Post	45 (88.2%)	6 (11.8%)	51
The Jakarta Post	20 (74%)	7 (26%)	27
The Times of India	52 (98%)	1 (2%)	53
Straits Times	28 (84.8%)	5 (15.2%)	33
China Daily	30 (96.7%)	1 (3.3%)	31
Total	301 (89%)	37 (11%)	338

Besides headlines and leads, the word killing or its equivalent was also used at least four times in the rest of the story in most cases (Mean=4.79, Std Deviation=2.987). The maximum of using killing or its equivalent was 18 while the minimum was 0. The identified frequency spectrum was divided three parts: (a) low (0-6), (b) medium (7-12), and (c) high (13-18). Most of news stories in all newspapers under scrutiny fell into the low category, meaning the word "killing" or its equivalent was used below six times (77.4%). And between 6% and 33% of news stories used killings between 7 and 12 times or 22.5% of the total while the high range accounted for 2.1% of the total (see Table 6).

Table 6. Comparing Frequency of Killings in Story

	0-6	*7-12*	*13-18*	*Total*
The New York Times	34 (64.2%)	17 (32.1%)	2 (3.8%)	53
The Globe and Mail	27 (69.2%)	10 (25.6%)	2 (5.1%)	39
The Australian	36 (70.6%)	15 (29.4%)	0	51
South China Morning Post	44 (88%)	5 (10%)	1 (2%)	50
The Jakarta Post	23 (85.2%)	4 (14.8%)	0	27
The Times of India	47 (88.7%)	6 (11.3)	0	53
Straits Times	29 (87.9%)	2 (6.1%)	2 (6.1%)	33
China Daily	21 (67.7%)	10 (32.3%)	0	31
Total	261 (77.4%)	69 (20.5%)	7 (2.1%)	337

As far as story length is concerned, news stories on killings vary greatly from story to story among the selected newspapers. The minimum length was 47 words, while the maximum reached as many as 1,767 words (Mean=502.35, Std Deviation=278.810). Most news stories fell between 301 and 600 words in length, accounting for 48.7% of the total. Stories below 300 words accounted for 21.5% while stories between 601 and 900 words accounted for 20.9%. Stories above 901 words accounted for 8.8% (see Table 7).

Table 7. Comparing Story Length

Newspapers	*1-300*	*301-600*	*601-900*	*>901*	*Total*
The New York Times	4 (7.5%)	17 (32.1%)	14 (26.4%)	18 (34%)	53
The Globe and Mail	2 (5.1%)	11 (28.2%)	19 (48.7%)	7 (17.9%)	39
The Australian	10 (19.6%)	34 (66.7%)	5 (9.8%)	2 (3.9%)	51
S. China Morning Post	24 (47.1%)	21 (41.2%)	5 (9.8%)	1 (2.0%)	51
The Jakarta Post	9 (32.1%)	15 (53.6%)	4 (14.3%)	0	28
The Times of India	18 (34%)	27 (50.9%)	7 (13.2%)	1 (1.9%)	53
Straits Times	2 (6.1%)	16 (48.5%)	15 (45.5)	0	33
China Daily	4 (12.9%)	24 (77.4%)	2 (6.5%)	1 (3.2%)	31
Total	73 (21.5%)	165 (48.7%)	71 (20.9%)	30 (8.8%)	339

When it comes to countries of killings, it was found that 34 countries were located in news stories where killings took place. They are Afganistan, Australia, Britain, Canada, China, Congo, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Iraq, Iran, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgysttan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sweden, Thailand, US, Uganda, Wazaristan, Northern Ireland, South Korea, Malaysia, and Turkey.

Among these countries, nine countries mentioned between 13 and 68 times as places of killings: Afghanistan was mentioned 25 times, Canada 22, China 68, Iraq 22, India 59, Indonesia 32, Pakistan 31, and Singapore 13 (see Table 8).

Table 8. Mentions of Countries Where Killings Occurred

Countries	*Frequency*	*Percentage*
Afghanistan	25	7.4
Canada	22	6.5
China	68	20.1
Iraq	22	6.5
India	59	17.4
Indonesia	32	9.4
Pakistan	31	9.1
Singapore	13	3.8
Total	272	80%

The rest of the 25 countries were mentioned between 1 and 6 times as places of killings. A further closer look at mentions of countries as places of killings showed that 272 stories or 80% of the total mentioned 20 undeveloped or developing countries as places of killings while only 67 killings or 20% of the total mentioned 14 developed countries as places of killings.

As for the causes of killings, it was found that genocide was reported as the cause of killings in only 3 stories (.9%). Murder was reported as the major cause of killings in 169 stories (50%). Terrorist attacks were the cause of killings in 82 stories (24.3%). Conflict was the cause of killings in 80 stories (23.7%). But suicide was the cause of killing in only four stories (1.1%) (see Table 9).

Table 9. Comparing Causes of Killings

Newspapers	*Genocide*	*Murder*	*Terror*	*Conflict*	*Suicide*	*Total*
The New York Times	2 (3.7%)	8 (15.1%)	27 (51%)	16 (30.2%)	0	53
The Globe and Mail	0	24 (61.5%)	8 (20.5%)	7 (17.9%)	0	39
The Australian	1 (2%)	13 (25.5%)	25 (49%)	12 (23.5%)	0	51
S. China Morning Post	0	45 (88.3%)	2 (3.9%)	2 (3.9%)	2 (3.9%)	51
The Jakarta Post	0	14 (51.9%)	2 (7.4%)	11 (40.7%)	0	27
The Times of India	0	27 (50.9%)	10(18.9%)	15 (28.3%)	1 (1.9%)	53
Straits Times	0	22 (66.7%)	1 (3%)	9 (27.3%)	1 (3%)	33
China Daily	0	16 (51.6%)	7 (22.6%)	8 (25.8%)	0	31
Total	3 (.9%)	169 (50%)	82(24.3%)	80 (23.7%)	4 (1.1%)	338

Killings can be legitimated or de-legitimated in news stories. As indicated in Table 9, killings were de-legitimated in most stories (91.2%) while killings were legitimated in fewer stories (8.8%). Specifically, *The New York Times* de-legitimated killings in 92.5% of its killing stories, *The Globe and Mail* 95%, *The Australian* 94%, *South China Morning Post* 98%, *The Jakarta Post* 77.8%, *The Times of India* 92.5%, *Straits Times* 87.9%, and *China Daily* 87.1% (see Table 10).

Table 10. (De-)Legitimate Killing in Comparison

	Legitimate Killing	*De-legitimate Killing*	*Total*
The New York Times	4 (7.5%)	49 (92.5%)	53
The Globe and Mail	2 (5%)	37 (95%)	39
The Australian	3 (6%)	47 (94%)	50
South China Morning Post	1 (2%)	50 (98%)	51
The Jakarta Post	6 (22.2%)	21 (77.8%)	27
The Times of India	6 (7.5%)	49 (92.5%)	53
Straits Times	4 (12.1%)	29 (87.9%)	33
China Daily	4 (12.9%)	27 (87.1%)	31
Total	30 (8.8%)	309 (91.2%)	339

RQ2. To what extent is news coverage of killings congruent with the fundamental principles of nonkilling?

The way most of the news stories under scrutiny covered killings was not congruent with the core perspectives of nonkilling approach (76.9) while only 23.1% of killing stories could be considered congruent. Newspaper wise, *The New York Times* was noncongruent with the fundamental principles of nonkilling in 71.7% of its killing stories, *The Globe and Mail* 74.4%, *The Australian* 78.4%, *South China Morning Post* 84.4%, *The Jakarta Post* 70.4%, *The Times of India* 70.4%, *Straits Times* 78.8%, and *China Daily* 70.1% (see Table 11).

Table 11. Comparing Congruency with Nonkilling Perspectives

	Congruent	*Noncongruent*	*Total*
The New York Times	15 (29.3%)	38 (71.7%)	53
The Globe and Mail	10 (25.6%)	29 (74.4%)	39
The Australian	11 (21.6%)	40 (78.4%)	51
South China Morning Post	8 (15.7%)	43 (84.3%)	51
The Jakarta Post	8 (29.6%)	19 (70.4%)	27
The Times of India	10 (18.9%)	43 (81.1%)	53
Straits Times	7 (21.2%)	26 (78.8%)	33
China Daily	9 (29.9%)	22 (70.1%)	31
Total	78 (23.1%)	260 (76.9%)	338

Discussion and Recommendations

As shown by the results of the comparative content analysis of story sources, most of the newspapers under study had their own journalists report killings in most cases. The results demonstrated a tendency among the newspapers not to use or to limit use of other domestic media or foreign media in covering killings, whether they were domestic killings or foreign killings. That is one of the common features identified by this study.

How to report killings, however, is far more crucial than what to report, to the advocacy of nonkilling principles. As shown by the findings of this study, most news stories tend to play up killings by either using the word killing or its equivalent in headlines to grab attention, followed by use of the word killing or its equivalent in leads. Even within the rest of stories, it was used at least four times. Therefore, most killing stories are quite attention grabbing via headline and leads. And they also maintain that momentum through the rest of stories, which in most cases are quite substantial in terms of story length. But the job is not done to simply have killings "boldly headlined or significantly portrayed" in news stories. More importantly, in

light of nonkilling approach, news media should focus why killings occurred and what should be done to prevent them from happening again. Therefore, a mere account of killings is not enough. Further efforts should be directed to applying nonkilling principles and practices in covering killings.

Most killing stories mentioned far more underdeveloped or developing countries than developed countries as places of killings. This finding points to the possible unbalanced news flow even in covering killings around the world between developing or underdeveloped countries and developed countries. Since the outset of the debate on the New World Information and Communication Order, which started in the late 1970s and early 1980s, unremitting efforts have been made to address various issues of unbalanced information flow. Against this backdrop, this finding also set us to think if killings in developing or undeveloped countries tend to be more covered by news media in general. Since the purposive sample in this study is small, the finding may be more explorative and explanatory than conclusive as some other killing stories, less important but in other developed countries, may have been excluded. This finding, however, does alert us to the need for further studies on the possible imbalance of news flow in news coverage of killings. For further research, a larger sample should be used to guarantee a better representation of reality.

And among the causes of killings, murder was the major causes, followed by terrorist attacks and conflicts. Other causes, such as wars and aggressions, have not been identified in news stories under scrutiny. This may due to the period of study selected and also the weekly-based purposive sampling, which may have excluded killings caused by other types of causes. So for further research, a larger sample is needed. This finding, however, did alert us to the legacy of newsrooms identified in earlier studies that violent and abnormal killings would be more likely covered by news media at the expenses of killing of other kinds. In the eyes of nonkilling advocates, killings of any kind should be condemnable and avoidable as long as the public sees eye to eye on nonkilling. In light of the nonkilling fundamental principle of respecting life, lose of life as a result of killing in any form or format is newsworthy in itself, which should be covered by news media to alert the public and government alike. Along that line, news media can play a crucial role in not just how killings should be covered but also what to cover. By exposing killings, news media can play a key role in alerting the world to the topic, which is a serious violation of a human right of life. No excuses or whatever reasons should be accepted to kill human beings.

In covering killings, the majority of news stories de-legitimated killings in condemning them as (a) aggression, (b) criminality, or (c) cruelty. But the findings showed that there were a number of news stories did legitimate killings as (a) war as a way of justification of killings, (b) self-defense as a way of justification of killings (c) accident as a way of justification of killings, (d) explicit rationale as a way of justification of killings. The legitimation of killings, regardless of its excuse, size or impact, is definitely a big concern to advocates of nonkilling. Loss of life, as a result of killing in war, self-defense, accident or any other rationale to justify it, is a serious violation of respecting human lives and therefore unacceptable to nonkilling advocates.

De-legitimation of killings is just one of the first steps to be taken by news media in covering killings. But it is still far away from the action principles of nonkilling. As demonstrated in this study, the way news media cover killings was largely noncongruent with the nonkilling approach. As a new academic discipline, the political science of nonkilling remains little known to the public including news media. Even if news media are aware of it, it has not been embedded in the way they cover killings.

Since news media can play a crucial role in building a nonkilling society, they should be equipped with this new approach to their coverage of killings. To beginning with, to translate the nonkilling concept and paradigm into the guiding principles of covering killings in the newsroom, nonkilling advocates should cooperate with both practitioners and professors of journalism in coming up with a set of specific guidelines on how to cover killings.

Specifically, nonkilling views and responses should be covered including those of "life-respecting inspiration, religious or humanist." More emphasis should also be placed on information or topics on how "remove conditions of suffering of those in need." "In conflict, from beginning to end," news media should "seek reconciliation not humiliation, degradation, predation, or annihilation". Other topics should also be covered that are conducive to creating killing free societies, such as "seek(ing) the well-being of all, "respect(ing) your own life and lives of others," or anything information or views that are closely related to the idea that "killing divides; nonkilling unites," and "respect(ing) both individual and large-scale social action, from the influence of moral example to mass nonkilling people's power." On top of that, news media should also "be constructively courageous" and "withdraw support from violence and commit it to strengthen nonkilling alternatives". And finally, news media should also join the global nonkilling communities to "walk lightly upon the earth, reduce demands upon nature and fellow human beings that contribute to killing" (Paige, 2009: 77).

For more effective translation from the action principles of nonkilling into the actual practice of news coverage, further studies should be conducted to locate more effective ways of following the nonkilling approach. More studies should be conducted to compare different practices of both old and new news media, including social and mobile media, of implementing nonkilling principles in covering killings around the world.

Ultimately, what is more crucial is to expose news media professionals to nonkilling concepts, paradigms, principles and practices so that they would not be either biased or blinded to nonkilling approach. Beyond increasing awareness of nonkilling practices, journalism practitioners and professors alike, should also incorporate in their journalism practice or education the action principles of nonkilling, especially in gathering, producing and presenting news stories on killing.

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Chapter Four

Public Discourses for Nonkilling Societies

Peace Research and Communication Trends

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Introduction

This chapter approaches "media" from a broad understanding of communication, as all the different discourses that articulate societies. Specifically, it focuses on the capacities of public discourses to configure -or not- nonkilling cultures. In the same line of thought as Urbain in his "Nonkilling arts" (2009: 73-94), here I focus on public discourses as tools and scenarios of communication towards positive ethics (assuming also the principles stated by Lee in his normative framework to this book). As such, this chapter will be structured in three different parts. First, I present a conceptual and methodological framework on the educative and transformative possibilities of communication from the basis of Peace Research (peace culture and cultural violence), discourse theories, communication efficacy and collective memory. Second, these concepts challenge public discourses to influence an active global civil society aware of the causes of present-day violence and engaged in the alternatives for nonkilling world societies. Third, I review some good practices in order to reach conclusions.

All in all, this piece of work deals with the limits and possibilities of the interaction of all kinds of discourses and communication actions for the articulation and activation of a responsible and committed society in order to counteract the influence of mainstream media and official discourses and the dangers of a dehumanized social system based on a war economy. With this goal in mind, this chapter analyses the present discursive scenarios created by civil society actors (NGOs, social movements and other civil institutions or groups) to spread "the universality of human dignity" (Lee, 2011) and reflects on possible criteria in order to plan, design and evaluate the communicative actions of civil society actors in terms of long-term cultural efficacy (defined from the conceptual approach of cultural peace).

Discourse and Peace Research: A different efficacy based on educative memory

I understand nonkilling media through the concept of cultural peace to focus on the symbolic construction of violence and peace in present-day societies, its implications and consequences. That is, I probe how discourse becomes a core concept as related to others such as "communication", "publicity", "public discourses", "social discourses", "global civil society" and "nonkilling cultures", all criteria to work on a long-term educative efficacy on the symbolic level that leads to nonkilling social systems.

This approach arises from the initial reflections of Galtung on "cultural peace" (1990; 1996) as the counterpoint to "cultural violence" (understood as the legitimization of "direct violence" and "structural violence" through discourse, symbols and metaphors).[1] This approach is tightly related to the concepts of justice and development, theoretical tools to overcome the limitations of thinking about peace in negative terms (as being just the absence of war) and proposing a global concept of cultures of peace as a way of integrating all different variables ranging from identity and freedom to basic needs (symbolic, structural and interpersonal aspects).

Therefore, I emphasize the focus of this approach and methodology on the role of discourses (symbolic mediations which foster certain behaviours) as forms of legitimizing or fostering violence (cultural violence, killing) but also as main tools in order to denounce these injustices, delegitimize and transform them into nonkilling paradigms. Galtung states: "the major causal direction for violence is from cultural via structural to direct violence" (1996: 2). Therefore, that is also the arena in which we want to work: on a "cultural peace" (Galtung, 1990), via nonkilling discursive status quos, in order to reach nonkilling cultures, or, in other words, nonkilling societies.

The conceptual framework to approach this problem from communication theories arises from the origins of "publicity" (Detienne, 1996; 2008: 91). Publicity understood as public communication in terms of the discursive relations among individuals as a community in the public sphere in order to negotiate their ideas and representations on the scenarios of social interaction. Publicity means how societies work through communication on sharing their proposals and identities and getting recognition for them (Benavides, 1997;

[1] Direct violence is understood here as the immediate deprivation of life by a specific actor and structural violence as a slow deprivation of life resulting from structural conditions such as bad living conditions (poisoned water, for example).

2011). I also relate this concept to Habermas' interpretation of publicity as "the process of informing the public on important matters (...) [with] educative and critical functions" (1988: 200). The main aim then becomes spreading and discussing nonkilling discourses (social imagery), structures and behavioural proposals. For such a communicative project we need to recover the double sense of publicity both as the persuasive usage of language in order to communicate with our community in the public arena and make our speech comprehensible and interesting (rhetoric), and also as a way of making public, visible (spreading) those issues that concern everyone (strategy).

This challenge takes us to the next and core concept embedded in this reflection, "public discourses", which binds the two main approaches to communication chosen for this research: a discursive and a collective focus. Hereby, I consider discourses as the specific spaces where publicity can configure civil society. In this sense, we need to highlight that the notion of "communication" here is linked to the concept of "discourse" as an act of communication (composed by certain discursive elements that orientate the interaction patterns among interlocutors) that takes place in a specific scenario with a history, a culture, a symbolic universe (certain production and reception contexts) and leads to certain social discourses through interpretation and behavioural processes (Benavides, 2011). These spaces of interaction can be composed of all sorts of communicative elements (words, images, music, silence, etc.). This definition, therefore, involves all of the different types of discourses (interpersonal, media, street, creative, art, factual and fictional, official or alternative, digital, etc.).

This concept of discourse is understood here from the tradition that emphasizes the role of the utterance itself, the contexts and the intertexts in the configuration and interpretation of meanings and values (Benet, 2004). The way discourses are uttered (their discourse choices) reflect their meanings, values and interests and articulate the communicative relations established, and the reactions that are derived from such communicative situations (Benveniste, 1971; Todorov, 1978; Ricoeur, 1988; Bakhtin, 1986; Nos Aldás, 2007). In this sense, I understand discourse as a communicative act which takes place at communication scenarios where interlocutors interact and negotiate certain meanings, attitudes and values (Austin, 1976; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Galtung, 1990).

This leads us to "social discourses" (Benavides, 1997: 253-255; 2011): discourse as a cultural and social mediator plays a role in the representation of reality (Hall, 1997) and influences the way interlocutors configure their relations with each other and with the contents they interpret. Discourse takes part in the interpretation of realities and also introduces proposals about how

to think about and deal with them. As Austin (1976) explains in his Theory on Speech Acts and the performativity of language, when we communicate, we act; utterances are facts and they imply certain commitments in the sender and particular expectations and reactions in the receivers. We look at "language" (metaphorically, as a way to refer to all discursive and creative forms of communication, to discourse) in terms of commitment. Form (using the Saussurean distinction between form and content) derives into social behaviour. The way contents and realities are stated and represented influence the way people think about them and act in relation to them.

The cultural influence of discourse in configuring the world in nonkilling or violent terms is based therefore on this approach: how discourse performs actions and establishes certain relations among peoples, groups and topics. In this sense, the way we design and perform our communication, transmits

- a certain image of the reality presented
- a certain type of relation with that reality on the senders side
- a kind of reaction sought in our interlocutor (hatred, reconciliation, political engagement).

In other words, every discourse proposes a specific conception of reality which reflects the attitude of the sender towards the contents and the people they are communicating about and with; it also reflects the real aims of that communication, and through these intentions and proposals shows the coherence and consistency between their actions and discourses. Rhetoric, therefore, is closely related to thought, to the way the receiver will relate to those contents, trusting them, for instance, or getting involved in the projects proposed. In turn, this process plays an important role in their final behaviour, what takes me to define communication as informal education, as far as it configures the public sphere, what society considers "reality", politics, ethics.

We are dealing therefore with the short term and long-term cultural consequences of all the discourses that configure societies and cultures, which can contribute towards killing or towards nonkilling. In other words, this approach to communication takes into account all discourse elements that construct the public presence of people (groups) and ideas (relations) with the aim of contributing to a culture of nonkilling through communication scenarios based on collective intercultural interests and justice. In other words, I want to emphasize the role of discourse for constructing social relations and social change.

Henceforth, communication actions towards nonkilling societies implies acting consistently on these ideas through the interaction among all social actors in present-day scenarios, from civil society individuals to top politi-

cians or power groups. Specifically, we head towards scenarios of collective reflection where individuals and groups recognize each other and negotiate their interests in the public sphere from collective concerns. Due to the imbalance of power and the reign of private interests, many times we are talking about the need for lobbying or advocacy actions, including nowadays the engine of social networks such as Facebook, Twitter or different blogs and other web 2.0. platforms. In this sense, this paper debates the challenge of involving global civil society in the project of nonkilling societies through the reconfiguration of the common scenarios of communication which give voice to the local and the global and construct the shared stories that maintain present-day hegemony (Gramsci in Gramsci and Forgacs, 2000).

Therefore, communication is approached here from the core concept of peace cultures, collective aims and long-term cross communication, so that we can share some criteria that can help us to think about the role of communication in spreading nonkilling cultures through long-term communicative projects developed from grassroots actors to mass media and mainstream discourses[2]. In order to translate this way of looking at discursive cultural scenarios into practice, we apply the epistemological shift proposed by Martínez Guzmán for Peace Studies and Peace Research (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; 2006a; Martínez Guzmán, Comins Mingol and París Albert, 2009; Comins Mingol and París Albert, 2009: 273-274). Accordingly, this chapter assumes that there are as many different ways to practice peace as there are cultures, narratives and logics. From his proposals, I understand communication and discourse effects from a value-based epistemology committed to human suffering and to the promotion of nonkilling societies.

The above mentioned proposals have to be further developed from Lee's "paradigm shift in media content and practice" based on Spinoza's "just journalism" and Martínez Guzmán's "epistemological turn" for peace research and peace studies. These convergent approaches take us to the following characteristics for communication for nonkilling cultures, contrary to the trends of "hatred communication", war propaganda or hegemonic discourses":

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[2] Mainstream mass media is referred to here as one of the main sources of "control memes" (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010) in present-day communication scenarios. I will not go in detail on them because they have been largely analysed from power and peace analysis as the alternative of peace journalism (Kempf, 2008; Shinar & Kempf, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Fawcett, 2002; European Centre For Conflict Prevention and IMPACS, 2003; Melone, Terzis and Beleli, 2002; McGoldrick and Lynch, 2000; Galtung, 1998; Manoff, 1997; Adam and Thamotheram, 1996; Bruck and Roach, 1993).

- Utter discourses from subject to subject. Configure communication through the interaction among interlocutors, recognized as equals, and responsibility-based discourses which always talk about people as subjects and take care not to represent them as objects, thereby avoiding the dangers of dehumanization or disrespect (cultural violence).
- Discourses that make the effort of presenting the complete picture of the situations or experiences; discourses that face the complexity of human relations, with their mistakes and assets, without bipolarity or dichotomies of good and evil but including the multiple sides and perspectives of every conflict from the different actors (accepting and dealing with vulnerability but also recognizing responsibilities).
- Ethically-committed discourses, not neutral ones. Discourses that explicitly state the interests behind them. At the same time that they present alternatives, they point out who is responsible for what as well as the real causes of injustice, and claim for justice.
- They are performative. They share a participant approach. These are not objective (detached) discourses. They search for intersubjectivity. They take part in the action. They search for effective discourses, for changes, for results. This also leads to present a representative individualization of experiences (the narrator being part of the realities talked about) so to help to understand their complexity and idiosyncrasy and to foster awareness and remembrance.
- All of these characteristics imply a dialogic rhetoric in order to structure interactive and horizontal discourses.

This way of understanding communication leads us to introduce here the idea of a cultural, educational and transformative efficacy (and efficiency) as the only way to really have a cultural impact and instigate the processes of social change. In this sense, we need to combine the traditional concepts of communication and advertising efficacy, usually based on quantitative criteria of impact and behavioural short-term change, with a more qualitative analysis based on the forms of relating to each other (of communicating). In other words, it is essential to pay critical attention to the "styles of communication" (Erro, 2002) we use and how they influence our beliefs, values, attitudes and long-term behaviour analysis.

We link the style of a nonkilling communication to a cultural responsibility: a socio-cultural efficacy (applying all the ideas of cultural peace aforementioned) as part of an awareness, education, advocacy and constituency pro-

gram (Smith, 2004). In this framing, in which how we relate to each other, which discourses represent us and our proposals, are of utmost importance.

Nonetheless, if we look at the general picture of all the senders who work in the field of peace culture and nonkilling (all the potentially nonkilling discourse producers), we realize that—mostly in the case of the most structured organizations—their communication usually does not have education and advocacy as their unique objective. Their communicative needs and programs (actions) are quite varied, ranging from lobbying to funding. For this reason I distinguish between "cultural efficacy" and "cultural efficiency". "Cultural efficacy" can be seen as the goal for those discourses that arise from social and collective aims and have social education as their final and unique aim. They are born within social change, advocacy or educative programs. In this case, every creative choice needs to go towards that communicative horizon (transformation), and their discourses will have to be examined and evaluated in relation to sociocultural objectives (reframing cultural assumptions) rather than purely quantitative ones. However, as we are aware that many communication practices need to combine educational aims with other specific needs, such as management, branding or funding, among others, here we also consider the term "cultural efficiency" as a criteria to implement a cultural responsibility for any message uttered by a sender working towards a nonkilling society. This means that actors with such a communicative personality will always have to take into account long-term education as a cross responsibility of any of their messages or actions in spite of their immediate goals. They need to put both of them into dialogue. I uphold that they need to be communicatively "efficient" in the sense of, at least, not *dis*educating society, not falling into the trap of using "killing" imagery (or legitimizing it) for the sake of increasing the impact of a specific campaign for funding or social visibility.

These symbolic goals (a cross responsibility, global to every communicative action) have to become central claims and methods for the nonkilling agenda, not only in specific awareness campaigns but even—or mostly—in funding or branding campaigns, sometimes even more aggressive and "dangerous" from the cultural perspective. These senders cannot forget that they are actors of civil society with public education as an ultimate aim.

As part of this challenge, memory becomes a core part of these learning/transformation processes so that people really grasp and apply new proposals or behaviours. Memory is the way of connecting the past and the present, the known and the new. In this context, memory is the key approach to relate new needs and changes to collective and historical experiences. Specifically, we refer to a useful memory, an "exemplary memory" as Todorov (1996) defines

it: a memory constructed and used with ethical and educational aims. In this conceptual framework, memory put into practice learns from the past in order to be useful to the present. It functions as a way to as a way to help new generations to understand and to learn the lessons of history, either the dangers and suffering of violent events or the benefits of social change good practices.

Therefore, cultural efficacy, as we understand it here, is based on human relations, on people, on working on the meeting points among a global civil society understood as an intercultural committed citizenship (Erro, 2002) on a cosmopolitan arena where we all have the same rights and responsibilities (Martínez Guzmán, 1999). We work on communication efficacy at the level of messaging and discourse production from a global civil society focus, understood, as Kaldor puts it, "in terms of what one might call deepening and widening, a move away from state-centered approaches, combining more concern with individual empowerment and person autonomy, as well as territorial restructuring of social and political relations in different realms" (2003: 6). Cultural efficacy for social change searches for certain styles of communication with multiple challenges: information, awareness (short-term), remembrance, education, behavioural change, social mobilization and action (all from the local to the global and in a short-term and long-term scope).

The capabilities and responsibilities of communication to strengthen a global civil society towards nonkilling cultures

From the scope of Communication, Discourse and Peace Studies presented in the first part of this chapter, I look here at the awareness, education and mobilization capabilities of discourse and how social civil actors that work for nonkilling cultures can try to involve civil society worldwide in their projects and proposals by spreading and making visible alternative public discourses for nonkilling.

In this scenario, communication is defined from advocacy. It plays a central role in embodying awareness, education and political will in the process of social change, and therefore also relates to constituency in terms of creating the support for new political agendas of society. That is why, when approaching public discourses towards nonkilling cultures, it is necessary to work on their interaction with formal education programs and policies, political action and decision making as well as on legislation as concrete ways to foster social change. However, we will not deal directly with all of these spheres, but will focus on public discourses in themselves as informal education (in dialogue with formal and nonformal education) and how narrative

power rules society (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010) and is a supporting element for lobbying, advocacy and constituency work.

Talking about discourses for nonkilling is also talking about the actors involved in these communication scenarios where nonkilling efforts are taken as a collective work towards nonkilling societies as the alternatives to the defense culture imposed today and based on a war economy and logic. These actors range from individuals (citizens, civil society members) to International Non Governmental Organizations (INGO) and Governmental or Official International Organizations. Governments themselves (States) and Market actors are also part of the picture, but civil rights and social change networks and social movements are implicated too.

In order to draw a basis for this debate, I have drafted a schematic representation of the actors and spheres involved in communication, citizenship and the challenge for nonkilling cultures (see also Nos Aldás, 2010):

Figure 1. Communication challenges (cultural / public) and actors of communication, citizenship and nonkilling cultures



To deepen and critically analyze these scenarios, I focus specifically on civil society actors, including from the most structured—third sector/INGO—to the more unstructured or spontaneous ones—social movements or other civil society actions such as grass roots organizations (GRO). I am interested in approaching what has been called "narrative power analysis," the people's power to changing hegemonic/conventional wisdom (Gramsci, 2000; Reinsborough and Canning, 2010: 21-23).

Therefore, there is a good number of actors, target groups, discourses and interests that take part simultaneously in these scenarios (consciously or uncon-

sciously) and play a role in the possibility (or not) of fostering public discourses for informal (peace) education and the transformation of the present-day global war culture into a nonkilling culture. The state, the market, the third sector, social movements and civil society could be defined as main variables when looking at the gears of social relations, as Smith (2008) also states. Global civil society actors can act as gears that work on the mistakes created by the market, governments and the way we all have written and interpreted History (capitalized) and the stories, meanings and assumptions that support it (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010). One of the main strategies for these transformations is making explicit the presence of cultural violence in the underlying stories and myths that rule our cultures and legitimize a certain life style and economy. The relations among these actors, their actions and their discourses configure cultures.

As movements and institutions born from civil society, they have a very specific communicative personality. They are socially committed organizations or groups with collective aims ("public good before private interests," Kaldor, 2003: 23), which have among their goals social transformation towards nonkilling or peace cultures. In other words, these organizations, or groups, are closely linked to the idea of global civil society as a new political arena. They are born from it and have as one of their aims to take its goals and needs towards the rest of spheres, to spread the story and influence those which silence injustice and violence.

The core of this debate is the existence of (or the need to recover) a common awareness of the links and power among people and their sharing of certain values as responsibility (accountability) towards the construction of a fair and nonkilling world for all and everyone. I dialogue here with Alexander's emphasis on solidarity and communication as the node that makes sense of the definition of civil society:

> As the scale of other institutions, interactions, and discourses expands, so might the organization of the civil sphere. / If it were possible to organize a global sphere, the systematic problem of earthly war would cease, for civil virtue could not be demonstrated by exterminating the other side. It would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve this new resting place for the spirit of civil utopia. There would have to be a world state or something like a state for civil communication to become regulation on a global scale and for civil repair to proceed. (…) Only the civil sphere can regulate force and eliminate arbitrary violence. It does so through persuasion and civil power and, if necessary, by dispensing force to defend democratic solidarity and to keep the aspirations of civil society alive. As violence becomes global, so must the civil sphere (Alexander, 2006: 552).

This brings into the picture the complexity of the project of a nonkilling global citizenship networking, a cross project in which communication plays a central role as a tool to denounce and call attention to what are considered priority problems from a nonkilling paradigm, to spread its proposals and alternatives and take the necessary steps to make these reforms "real" ones (that means, part of the dominant or hegemonic culture). Nonetheless, I am aware that at present I am talking about counter-cultural actions. Rewording Castells (1997; 2009) when he refers to the challenges of social movements, communication for nonkilling goes against the established order. The main aim here, therefore, is to open spaces on the opaque and thick wall of mainstream discourses (*meanings*) which are officially the "accepted" ones, because they are the most visible, repeated and numerous ones. They are the "control mythology of the dominant culture" (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010: 24-25).

The proposal here is that communication for nonkilling societies needs to work on sound and persistent narratives about the legitimacy of nonkilling. The challenge is that the values of a sustainable and fair society become, although they should already be, the criteria for world policy making: the norm, the accepted ones, not the margins. In this regard, a strategic communication is necessary (and a communicative strategy at the same time), such as the one Reinsborough and Canning (2010) propose through story-based strategies that reframe present control narratives and foreshadow nonkilling scenarios in ways we all "re:imagine" change.

Beyond strategy, deepening the idea of messaging itself, proposing nonkilling cultures implies a number of topics which go against the routines of society, the media, the market and states, and the discursive strategies we use become central. We face the challenge of communicating between the mass and the personal; that is, spreading the message as much as possible without losing the personal approach, the human focus. We face the need to not only to talk about very specific information, but also about very abstract concepts, usually unknown to the larger majority and which may even be unpleasant for them or opposed to what they have learnt in school, in their families or even through their previous experiences.

This challenge therefore implies communicative experiences which go from making people realize their mistakes (or the market's or the government's ones, even some of our cultural trends mistakes), protest and propose. It needs interlocutors to open themselves to new topics and perspectives, to pay attention to them and incorporate them into their references and images and, once affected by them, to act consequently (Aranguren Gonzalo, 2000: 183-184).

These processes work from indignation (Freire, 2004; Hessel, 2010) to effective actions, from demonstration to advocacy, lobbying, negotiation, accountability and assessment. It is a complex and long transformative communication process which has to be taken into account by the actors involved in these cultural nonkilling projects as a cross criteria that anticipates the social imaginaries and the behaviours that are being proposed to the society by every communication action. Therefore, these styles of communication are defined by a particular dialogue between emotions and reasons, feelings and arguments, information and persuasion. As we are talking about a cultural role of communication, as far as its final aim is behavioural and beliefs change, this communication seeks an educational process. Furthermore, as Freire himself considered (1994; 2004), education is linked to persuasion. An educative and transformative communication, therefore, faces the challenge of combining denunciation and hope and closing the gap between the ideas for a nonkilling society and the everyday worries of citizens, so that they become part of their interests and agenda.

To this end, this communicative approach joins with certain discourse strategies and modes of discourse presentation which have been traditionally used to represent and keep memory. These strategies have been used once and again by witnesses, writers and all kinds of artists who were protagonists of different violent experiences in their attempts to compose the collective experience they went through in the form of an "exemplary memory" (Todorov, 1996), as defined previously. In other words, the communicative epistemological shift we apply here, based on an educative memory, uncovers useful characteristics for culturally effective discourses for nonkilling in the traits of testimonial discourse:[3]

- Discursive strategies used by witnesses are a way to personalize narrations through individual experiences and feelings but with collective and exemplary memory aims which focus on its representative side for a whole collective (usually through diaries, letters or life stories, among other genres).
- Personalizing is one of the main witness strategies used in order to represent the human side of events (as personal, individual, specific) and subvert or transform the dehumanized constructions of the

[3] The strategies presented here have been extracted from testimonial works by exile and concentration camps writers and artists and from corpus based analysis of present-day awareness campaigns and other discourses with educational aims.

other as an enemy historically used in hatred discourse. Personalizing is used to avoid the distance of abstractness (mass, general) through strategies such as focusing on orality (the traits of oral discourse) or talking about common aspects, as daily routines, for instance.

- The strategy of polyphony and dialogism (Bakhtin in Holquist, 1996) is also one of the most used and more effective. It implies a plurality of perspectives (which allow for intersubjectivity and interculturality and help to present the whole image of a situation. Through this strategy dialogue becomes part of the configuration of discourse (in literature, painting, or cinema, for instance). It becomes unfinished, open, expecting participation; it accepts disagreement (Eaglestone, 2000).
- Irony (humour) is also very common, as it helps to reflect on certain issues, to look at them from a distance or very closely (Bakhtin in Holquist, 1996: 23).
- Defamiliarization or estrangement can also help to stop automatic perceptions or stereotypes on certain collectives and situations and look at them from a different perspective.
- Also playing with the grammatical person in discourse ("I", "we", "they"), the time of verbs or the space in which the action takes place, helps the interlocutors to put themselves in the shoes of others or get more involved with the events presented.

All these strategies can help to bring distant or complex realities closer to those who are not familiar with them or are desinterested in certain social problems, thus introducing them to the imaginaries and priorities of the different social actors. They are the result and the means to interpret experience through discourse from a truthful, trusting (Pipet, 2000: 19) and honest perspective that searches for memory and understanding.

In this way, they can help to challenge todays advertising rationality and crisis of memory (Benjamin, 1992; Ferrés i Prats, 2008)[4] and to awaken the

[4] Apart from realizing that the trend of present-day rationality is fragmentation and consensus, as for mass media influence on how publics interpret reality and think about it (Stein, 1979; Postman, 1986; Ferrés i Prats, 2000; Pérez Tornero, 2000 or García Matilla, 2003, among many others), it should also be taken into account that our discursive proposals have to dialogue with the rest of discourses in public scenarios. In mass media and advertising public spaces we face many apparently "social", "responsible" or "collective" messages. That is, in the latest trends of advertising and corporate communication many times the values of "green", "ethical", "sustainable" are used just as an "aesthetical" element, rather than reflecting real policies or traits. This takes us to the

consciousness and indignation against injustice towards ethical responses. Rhetoric can help to emphasize the ideas of nonkilling cultures, to make them visible and to interpret them for society so that people are motivated by them (Calle Collado, 2000; Pinazo, 2003) public debate and action for nonkilling societies. In this sense, in terms of rhetoric and narration, telling and showing become more effective in terms of awareness than explaining and arguing. They are an effective way of involving people in human stories, showing the connections and the nonsense, confronting them directly with the untold and the unexplainable and letting them get involved at their own pace. As a result, ideas are not imposed or forced on them to accept them without reflecting on them. All of this needs of course to be done by giving them evidence of the benefits and goods of nonkilling philosophy.

The style behind this is what Lederach has called a "moral imagination" which through its relation with reality opens new ways for exploring it, as also occurs with Japanese *haiku*, embedded with humbleness and sincerity. This concept is related to Aristotle's sense of a "rational and deliberative imagination" which slows down the interpretation of interlocutors and allows them to make conscious decisions (Martínez Guzmán, 2006b). This is the idea emphasized by Ricoeur (1988) regarding the way fiction and discourse work through imagination to create a distance between reality and its representation where interpretation and thinking processes take place.

Testing theory with practice: the efficacy of discourses for nonkilling societies

The heterogeneity of the actors and discourses that are part of this field of communication, in terms of the specific topics and areas they work in, presents a broad range of concerns that goes beyond what has been traditionally called the antiwar movement. We could call "nonkilling" organizations those who work on the cross-fields of justice, democracy, development and cooperation, conflict transformation, interculturality, equality or the environment[5]. Therefore, in these scenarios of communication we find coexisting public dis-

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need of recovering authentic socially focused discourses for nonkilling cultures and denouncing those which are not. In this sense a good practice I would like to focus on is that of *Adbusters* (in Canada) and *Ecologistas en Acción* (in Spain).

[5] In order to frame this range of actors and discourses we need to refer to all the literature on the definition of nonkilling plus the UNDP definition of human development (plus further thinking such as Streeten, 1997 or Sen, 1999) and the many proposals of peace and development education (Mesa, 2000; Celorio, 2006; 2007; Boulding, 1991).

courses from human rights organizations, anti-capitalist initiatives, peace education networks, environmental projects, development cooperation agencies and NGOs, international organizations campaigns and governmental messages in addition to traditional pacifist or anti-war movements.

In this sense, looking at public communication for nonkilling societies as informal peace learning (Boulding, 1991: 36) takes us also to the latest trends in development education, in the sense that both projects aim at the development of a critical global citizenship empowered from the ideas of Peace and Development Studies and based on transnational networking (Boulding, 1991), a capacity building necessary to change the world and to be able to prevent slaughters. These approaches have distinct specific aims, but at the same time they share basic principles such as global partnership (Eisler, 2002; 2004) rooted in a communicative global civil society.

In the crossroads between all these different interlocutors and areas, and when we explore the experiences of communication for the articulation of a global peace culture based on nonkilling, we realize that the challenge of articulating public discourses as new nonkilling legitimized narratives lacks an actual general coordinated long-term scope. There exist thousands of successful effective experiences which have been taking place and continue doing so towards nonkilling societies.[6] The challenge of making

[6] Mailing (e-mail) lists asking for signatures to foster certain causes (like Avaaz.org or Amnesty International), or people on the streets doing so (lobby campaigns against governments that do not respect human rights, actions for non weapon proliferation, boycotts against brands which finance wars…); innumerable newsletters by individuals or groups that make a big effort to spread news of injustice and to inform about alternative projects taking place to transform them; initiatives which launch web pages and blogs, conferences, workshops, trainings and brochures for specific actions; walkouts and protests with speeches on the streets and other actions (such as street theatre, for instance); specific one day actions to make people remember certain anniversaries or injustices they need to act against (like the "Stop the Machine! Create a new World! Call for October 2011", http://october2011.org/, for the 10th anniversary of the invasion of Afghanistan or the Global Day of Action on Military Spending); documentaries and films by directors who believe in a culture for peace; film festivals, art festivals and exhibitions to denounce injustice and tragedies, to work on a reconciling memory, and also to spread information about alternatives and projects that exist; other civil initiatives and performances such as cyclists or runners going out onto the streets of the cities to call attention to the necessity for alternative transportation to protect people's health and promote environment sustainability and a peace culture without wars for oil, or other actions such as smart mobs or graffiti and many other kinds of street art; T-shirts; buttons; community radios; community gardens; alternative media, most of them on the internet, etc.

these different projects global and interconnected is also present in these communication scenarios. We find a high number of international networks and calls to coordinate large numbers of initiatives and organizations to try to reach effectiveness in terms of social change, fostering initiatives in favour of a better world based on democracy, solidarity, justice and respect.[7]

Nonetheless, in these coalitions and programs, communication is underemployed. A story-based long-term and cross-cutting strategy to counter-act the hegemonic discourse of war is not approached collectively. Communication plays a central role in very instrumental terms (as sharing information among members, contacting each other, managing resources, having a web page, etc.). We find lots of stories for nonkilling in the international scene. However, the discourses created by these initiatives stay fragmented and do not filter into the international status quo. They keep on being alternative and accepted by reduced groups. These actions communicate with limited groups of people, usually with groups that are already aware of these topics and committed to them. In other words, they do not reach the public sphere, they do not "battle the story" (Reinsborough & Canning, 2010: 43-47) of war-based structures (that is, include as a main aim in all organizations to introduce those alternative nonkilling discourses as part of a new status quo). You just get to know these proposals if you look for them. Nonkilling organizations work brilliantly on denunciation and political actions. However, there is not a global coordination project in order to make the story, the discourse of nonkilling, part of the political, cultural and educational global agenda.

The challenge remains to reach those with war or violence logics or those who are not aware of (or are not interested in) nonkilling proposals (in all the different spheres we have drafted before). These discourses are not legitimized nor placed on the global collective accepted imaginary so that the process of transforming war structures can take place. This would be linked to the possibility of broadening working networks with the capacity for quick and global responses before a crisis of war during the "transition" towards nonkilling societies (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010). This takes us again to the relevance of formal education for peace cultures and global citizenships to have people ready and empowered to react when injustice arises, but also

[7] The Global Campaign for Peace Education, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (which gathers also the initiative People Building Peace), the Global Action to Prevent War and Armed Conflict, the International Peace Bureau (IPB) for a World without War, the Global Call to Action Against Poverty related to the Millennium Campaign… and so many other associations and projects.

formal, nonformal and informal media literacy; to be able to network and act and create communicative organizations; and to keep the process moving until structures are changed. As Alfaro proposes, the project is to activate global "societies in movement" beyond "social movements" (2005: 57-80).

The question remains unanswered: how can these publicity actions find an echo in the global cultural scenarios (including mainstream media) so that we articulate public discourses for nonkilling cultures and make them part of a global citizenship consciousness? How do we make sure all of our actions have a long-term focus which takes into account the informal education every discourse and action implies? How do we make sense of all these heterogeneous but at the same time related projects? How do we reach all of the different public and private spaces, including media, cinemas, theatres, streets, political arenas, as well as formal and nonformal education?

In these scenarios, most of these initiatives have found the new technologies and the Internet to be a perfect space to articulate their communication challenges due to its flexibility, interactivity, global scope and low costs, particularly, social networks such as Facebook, Twitter or Youtube.

This is why I do not want to finish without analyzing one of the social movements taking place as I write, which shares most of what has been discussed in this paper. As a case study, I will focus on a case study on the discourses (in posters, graffiti and other signs) used and spread by the "15M" Movement in Spain in 2011 (or the so called "Spanish Revolution", "the Indignated" or "Real Democracy Now" camps, assemblies and protests).

Figure 2. "We are the yeast that will raise the dough" (Spanish).[8]



[8] Examples included in this section which do not have a specific reference are from the consumehastamorir.org website: <http://www.letra.org/spip/spip.php?article4060>. Most are slogans used at Sol (Madrid) in the 15th of May Revolution.

In the line of the aforementioned text by Hessel (2010), the 15th of May 2011 many people in Spain said "enough". Under the meme "indignated" ("*indignados*" / "*indignadas*"), people occupied the public space (Sol Square in Madrid and Cataluña Square in Barcelona, among many other spaces all over Spanish cities and supported worldwide) to convey a message to their politicians days before the municipal elections of May the 22nd. The relation to Hessel's analysis is not only found on the signs "*Indignados/as*", but also in the one I include here, referring to his sentence: "*una minoría activa (...) será suficiente (…) para elevar la masa*" (an active minority will be enough to raise the masses).

Figure 3. "Indignadas for a Real Democracy". Outside the Spanish Consulate, Sutter Street, San Francisco (May the 19th, 2011).

This movement recovered the historical memory of all the different events leading us to the present-day economic crisis, and asked for "reinitiating the system," playing with a computer language based metaphor. Smart slogans summarized all the different sensitivities joined in their protests. Many used an expressive style, sometimes similar to a haiku or popular saying, very effective in catching people's attention by utilizing a combination of emotion and reason (of data and interest), many of them even humour, irony and everyday life language (strategies we have talked about earlier).

Their concise and clear use of words helps people to understand the importance of the topics discussed and to get involved in their proposals for change. Learning, understanding and remembrance are fostered at the same time, mostly through witness discourse. As far as all these posters are held up by the people protesting themselves, they are the product of their experience and their personal, but collective, claims—mostly while they march, but also when they hang around the squares as people camp close by. More importantly, they are memes that are addressing the real causes of the actual situation. And at the same time, they are proposing and foreshadowing alternatives (Reinsborough and Canning, 2010).

Figure 4-6. 4. "Democracy: from the Greek δημοσ ('people') and κρατος ('sovereignty'). Is that what we have now? It's a joke, right? Let's fight for a real democracy". 2. "Democracy 1.0 Obsolete / Democracy 2.0 Installing" 3. "System error. Restart!".





Part of the rhetorical efficacy of these discourses lies in the use of intertextual dialogue. Predominantly, as the reader can observe, with digital language, the computer based world, part of the engine of this revolution itself, through social networks and web 2.0. technology. An example can be found in the signature of the message below, referring to twitter rhetoric at the same time that the poetry of the quotation comes from a song by Javier Krae. These messages establish a dialogue with mainstream media, as far as most of the protesters are young people trying to legitimize themselves in the public sphere against the stereotypes and construction that official media discourses have spread out.

Figure 7-8. 7. "I like you Democracy, but you're kind of absent". 8. "Without *botellón*[9] we do not appear on television" (in Spanish, *botellón* and *televisión* rhyme).





At the same time, a very interesting instance of polyphony and dialogue is counter advertising. The example included below transforms advertising (with private interests) into publicity (collective interests) using the private message to foster debate and recover the public space:

[9] *Botellón* does not have a literal translation into English. It is the slang for an informal street gathering where young people meet to drink and socialize.

Figure 9-10. 9. "Sol, Madrid, 15th May 2011. From *L'Oreal* they construct "Democracia Real" ("Real Democracy"). 10. "Yes we Camp" sign.



The communication of the "Real Democracy Now" not only dialogues with private campaigns, but also primarily with political ones (being present-day politics their main concern). One of the slogans most used has been an intertextual use of the "Yes we can" of the Obama "Hope" campaign.

They have also used other publicity elements recovering public spaces such as the underground station ("Metro"). This action ("*Plaza Solución*" = "Solution Square") foreshadows the search for solutions. It represents the nonviolent and effective intentions of the assemblies at the Madrid camps to reach real results finding solutions to violence caused by the war system.

Figure 11-14. 11. "Solution Sq." 12. "Earning 600€ is violence". 13. "Less bombs, more smiles". 14. "Neither side A nor side B. We want to change the record".

All in all, these discourses also share the characteristic of being personal but meaningful for the community, and one of the main formal traits that reinforces this is their format, their "imperfect" (personal) design, not trying to convince through the perfection of persuasive forms, but through words.

We cannot know right now whether these actions (communicative in themselves) will have a cultural long-term efficacy through the achievements of their specific demands, as they are still in movement. However, we can say it has already reflected the way certain communicative actions evolve and af-

fect determinate groups: how the mainstream media have reacted according to the "political" and "economical" groups that support them; how this "privatized" media have radicalized their discourse on the 15M movement fostering fear in the society by the way they have represented them and their interests (though they have manifested themselves in every moment as a peaceful and nonviolent movement in itself). Very few of their real proposals have appeared on those media, but they have been widely widespread by social networks, keeping many collectives working together on the project. Most of these discourses reflect the fact that many of the proposals discussed by the nonkilling paradigm are well known by this "indignated" movement. We can even find the debate on such an important idea as memory, with which we started and which provided a foundation for this chapter, as opposed to the selection of the news by the mainstream media (also mentioned in the example we included before of "*Sin botellón no nos sacan en la televisión*").

Figure 15. "If we do not appear in newspapers, we will in history books".



As Manuel Castells said at "Barcelona Camp" (#acampadabcn) on the 27th of May, 2011: "*Vamos despacio porque vamos lejos*" ("We go slow 'cause we go far"). The acceptance of these counter-cultural discourses and their transformative proposals will take time, but history has proved that working collectively and patiently can drive society to important changes (jumping in time: slavery abolition, women's right to vote, anti-personnel mines ban, etc.).

Conclusions

As we have seen, not only explicit violence discourses (direct violence) but also cultural violence (stereotypes, disinformation and distorted media images, not only in the news, but also in all different cultural products and discourses, even from civil society actors and NGOs) interfere in the change process to-

wards nonkilling cultures. Many cultural and social voices are silenced and discriminated. The serious challenge is achieving visibility and a cross-cutting and sustained presence of these kinds of messages in everyday life and in all the different spaces where culture, politics, legislation and economics are configured and negotiated. From stories and their rhetoric we can influence people's identity and engagement in social change (as hegemonic discourses in fact do).

For that, it is necessary to increase the number of new approaches to communication based on coherent and collective values through dialogue and interaction so that through networking they become new social discourses that lead into new sociocultural relations based on and sustained by a social consciousness for nonkilling societies and cultures. The 15M movement in Spain "as a reflection of many others" is part of this direction, finding in assemblies and social networks their local-global institutions for a democratic communication.

Therefore, we propose here to discuss, build together and incorporate a cross-cutting and steady process planned consistently from cultural efficacy strategies. All the ideas summarized here can serve as criteria in order to evaluate the role of public discourses in the generation of a committed and responsible global citizenship that articulates nonkilling cultures as part of an open communicative project that leads to political change.

Acknowledgment

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Chapter Five

Catastrophe and Progress in Nonkilling Futures

Imag(in)ing Technology and the Cultural Conditioning Zone of the Dream Society

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As the recent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa suggest, the struggle for equality and justice that underly nonkilling futures remains just that—a simultaneously inspiring, for what might come to be, and frightening, for what has been allowed to persist, image of *a* present whose inegalitarian misgivings have come home to roost. While it might seem prudent and perhaps even necessary to focus one's gaze firmly upon the tumult of *the* present and *the* (presumed) future to follow, as Dator's first Law of the Future suggests: "'the future' cannot be 'predicted' because 'the future' does not exist." In radically de-temporalizing *the* future and consequently problematizing *the* present, Dator's assertion strikes down the commonly-held, if not intuitive, premise that tomorrow will look a whole lot like today, and this maxim serves as a reminder that it was, if anything, a lack of foresight that both masked and encouraged the violent incursions within the Arab Awakening, especially as archaic governance systems lashed out in response to dissidents employing social mediation technologies, primarily Facebook, Twitter, etc., that were beyond the control, at least initially, of the region's provincial hegemons. As this tangible trend relates to *the* future, Dator's suspension of the definite article, which affirms that there are indeed *futures*, presences a fragmentation on both spatial and temporal planes; thus, alternative futures exist as identifiable, examinable, and experiential phenomena, even if only as imaginings in and of *the* present. Indeed, one can argue that it was such an imagining of the future(s) that led thousands of citizens to occupy peacefully Tahrir Square in Egypt and other public spaces across the region in protest, and as many continue to risk life and limb against their own governments, it is certainly the prospect of an as yet undetermined and alternative future(s) that clearly inspires such resolve—an image that gives many outside these regions hope that more equitable and just futures are being birthed.

In the wake of these seemingly viral protests, the place and function of technology has ascended in importance among those seeking to situate this historic turn of events. In the parlance of Marshall McLuhan, was the medium the message? Did social media generate, metaphorically if not literally, social change? Technology as a driver of social and political change has come to the fore through the events of the present, and the impact of mediation technologies require further examination and analysis. As such, it is crucial to be clear about what is precisely meant by technology, and even though most deploy the term intuitively, it is necessary to instantiate a definition of how it is understood and contextualized for the purposes of this project. As used in this examination, technology refers to nothing less than the defining characteristic of what it means to be human—an attribute internal to the conditions of possibility for humanity to subsist. As Dator explains, "For good or ill (and it may be ill), humans become humans and change the meaning of what it means to be human (i.e. change 'human nature') in large measure by interacting with themselves and their environment through their technologies. The technological-human relationship is thus symbiotic and not parasitical" (Dator 1983: 29). To be human is to engage intimately with the technological, but it is very much apparent that present technologies have set humanity on a course toward the trans- and post-human, even though it is already the case that cyborgs, and to a lesser extent androids, walk among us. In negotiating the relationship between technology and social change, it is obvious that this interrelation is causal, but it is equally apparent that the link is inherently imaginative, which is to say grounded in possibilities and potentialities. As the still unfolding events of the Arab Spring suggest, technologies inspire in as much as they transpire images of the future, and it is this delicate balance between the two, which is negotiated in the present, that requires clearer articulation.

Dator's addendum to the first law, which calls for alternative futures to be forecast, implies that one of, if not, the most crucial dimensions of futures research centers on the critical engagement of the myriad forms of cultural production from various socio-cultural milieux of the past and present. One cannot begin to understand and/or forecast where things might go without a firm grasp of where things are and/or were, and as we live in an age of seemingly ubiquitous mediation, which is particularly noticeable in the U.S. where social media accounts for "one in every six minutes" spent online, situating the function and role of media in its various forms is paramount (Lippman 2011). Wading through these ceaseless flows of information and media, futurists systematically and rigorously analyze and examine

these imag(in)ings, as they are hybrids with equal parts imaging and imagining, to create new mediations for considering alternative futures—as such, imag(in)ing is used herein to denote the complex nature and function of the image from the futurist's perspective. Consequently, the influence of media on the formation of these imag(in)ings of the futures is immeasurable, and if there is one constant in contemporary imag(in)ings of the future and contemporary media, it is certainly killing and/or the threat of killing.

As Hall and Pilisuk contend, "In developed societies, unless we live in high-violence urban zones, our images of how violent humans are derive less from what we witness directly and more from media depictions" (Hall and Pilisuk, 2012: 128). As one of the more likely scapegoats as to why cycles of killing persist in modern culture, media, especially in its popular forms, has become, for better or worse, a means by which one can gauge impressions and contentions as to what the future can and might hold. While violence and killing have been part and parcel of media from pre-agricultural to information societies, film is unique in the way in which it provokes and stimulates the brain, perhaps most dramatically through mirror neurons, since, as Gallese explains, "the observed action produces in the observer's premotor cortex an activation pattern resembling that occurring when the observer actively executes the same action" (Gallese, 2001: 6). While the neuroscientific impact of film on the brain is still being explored and cannot be presumed to be fully deterministic in understanding media's role in perpetuating cycles of violence and killing, the powerful affects of cinema offer extraordinarily rich resources for analyzing and studying imag(in)ings of the future(s). As a decidedly mass form of art that reflects an interpretative context and affective presence by which social, political, and economic issues are revealed and, at times, concealed, film grants one purchase on facets of one's experience that escape conscious sensation. As Benjamin observes, "By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring common place milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action" (Benjamin, 2005). For Benjamin, film offers a complete nexus between the macro- and micro-dimensions of one's experience of the world, but the ultimate judgment as to what is seen (and unseen) rests with the spectator, and it is precisely the "comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives" that is most useful for situating film within nonkilling futures.

Beyond the limits of the viewer and within the conscious eye of the camera there are deeper and more subtle phenomena whose value lies in

its recalcitrant invisibility—it is precisely what the screen represents unintentionally or suggestively through an "unconscious optics" that has the greatest weight in situating contemporary images of the future, and just as the eyes perceive unconsciously, the ultimate task of the futurist is to see, hear, taste, smell, and touch things that escape sensation in the present (Benjamin, 2005). Uncovering and decoding this latent imagery, futurists can, and ought to, mine the depths of filmic imag(in)ings in order to study and engage contemporary images of the future(s) with particular attention to those that are widely diffused as these mediations shape, even if indirectly, social and cultural conceptualizations of the potentiality for alternative futures, which is simply to say a tomorrow that might not look and feel like today. As method, filmic imag(in)ing considers the unconcealed imaging of cinema as an aesthetic form of sensory engagement, surveys the masked imag(in)ings inherent within cinematic media and the subsequent internalization inherent to the viewer's sensory experience on screen and in the world, and situates the production of certain types and forms of filmic media at specific (and perhaps futures) historical moments, which positions them within what Paige calls the "cultural conditioning zone" of the funnel of killing, which is a sort of cartography from the neuro-physiological influences through the actual act of killing (Evans Pim, 2002: 23).

Mapping the textures and flows of filmic imag(in)ings, futurists should engage the distinctly micropolitical aspects of cinema as a means to distill drivers and inhibitors to preferred future scenarios within the cultural conditioning zone, which encompasses "religions, political 'isms,' celebration of triumphs and atrocities, family traditions, law, mass communications, and the arts" (Evans Pim, 2002: 75). Engaging contemporary filmic imag(in)ings of the future, this project reflects upon four popular films to flesh out the skeletal structure of alternative scenarios for post-information societies or what Rolf Jensen calls "The Dream Society" (Jensen). Jensen's neologism refers to market conditions of capitalism within increasingly ubiquitous media environments, and while it is clear that the global culture industry is hastily advancing toward this end, the Dream Society is less a form or type of specific media than a totality of mediation, which pairs nicely with DeBord's "Society of the Spectacle." For DeBord, and perhaps for Jensen, the institutionalization of mass communication foments "social relationship[s] between people that [are] mediated by images," which when aggregated become an all-encompassing, yet amorphous, superstructure (DeBord, 1967: 4). Another prominent deployment of the Dream Society concept stems from Dator and Yongseok's analysis of the Republic of South Korea's calcu-

lated movement toward a "dream society of icons and aesthetic experience" (Dator and Yongseok). In their estimation, the Dream Society is one where mediation technologies have become an equally, if not preferred, mode of experiencing reality, and narrative and aesthetic considerations are central to an individual's conscious, material, and perhaps even spiritual sense of being-in-the-world. The critical dimension among this constellation of ideations about the Dream Society hinges on the question of agency within a technologically-driven and mediated *body politic*.

Although seeds of this future continue to germinate in the present, it is precisely the unthinkable and unimaginable nature of technology within the Dream Society that makes it useful for examining the cultural conditioning zones, or the spaces of social mediation, for nonkilling futures. For this project, the Dream Society is useful for exploring the micropolitical possibilities and potentialities of nonkilling futures within scenarios of advanced technological development as a point of entry to the social conditions requisite for nonkilling future(s) to arise. Utilizing *Children of Men* (2006), *Minority Report* (2002), *Inception* (2010), and *The Animatrix* (2003), this projects surveys contemporary imag(in)ings of the future through the Manoa School's alternative scenarios modeling technique, which uses four generic images of the future—collapse, disciplined, growth, and transformation. Explaining the foundation for this division, Dator notes, "These four futures are "generic" in the sense that varieties of specific images characteristic of them all share common theoretical, methodological and data bases which distinguish them from the bases of the other three futures, and yet each generic form has a myriad of specific variations reflective of their common basis" (Dator, 2009: 7). While the four futures are generally used to distill distinct alternative scenarios, the Manoa School method is useful for elucidating disparate potentialities and possibilities while employing similar, if not the same, drivers to define the parameters for a scenario, especially as the "four generic forms differ from each other fundamentally in cosmology, epistemology, and often deontology, and are not variations on a common set of themes" (Dator, 2009: 7). Consequently, the four generic images of the future are used herein to map alternative imag(in)ings of the Dream Society with an eye toward probing the decidedly somatic and micropolitical dimensions of technology as a driver within nonkilling imag(in)ings of the future(s). Will further technological development ameliorate or exacerbate the prospect of nonkilling futures? What technologies might forestall and/or inspire a nonkilling future? Might the Dream Society portend a truly nonkilling future?

Collapse: Playing Games with *Children of Men*

> Dirty government hands out suicide kits and anti-depressants in the rations but ganja is still illegal (Cuarón, 2006).

Alfonso Cuarón's critically acclaimed 2006 film, *Children of Men*, takes place in the highly militarized setting of England circa 2027 amidst a global social, economic, and political collapse. Loosely based on P.D. James' 1992 novel, *The Children of Men*, the film's main narrative follows the harrowing events surrounding a miraculously pregnant woman, Kee, in a future where humanity has lost the ability to reproduce and where the United Kingdom is the world's only remaining sovereign, yet highly militarized, state. Following the death of the world's youngest person, the 18-year old "Baby Diego," and after a near-fatal escape from a bombing at a coffee shop, Theo, the main protagonist, gets ensnared by his former wife, Julian, to help deliver Kee to the Human Project, a rogue international collective seeking to solve the world's infertility epidemic. While this "modern day nativity story" offers a critical imag(in)ing of a future in which nationalist interests foster rampant killing, the film appears to take an ambiguous stance on technology as an aid and/or restraint to a (non)killing society, even though the film is put forth here as a collapse alternative of the Dream Society (Stevens 2006). Closing with Theo and Kee escaping peril at a refugee camp and making contact with the Human Project, the film's happy ending is tempered by the micropolitical imag(in)ing of a highly segregated society where even the threat of no future, generationally speaking, is still not enough of a motivator to inhibit killing. While there is much that can and might be drawn from the film's imag(in)ing of the future, the most useful scene for exploring the question and place of technology in relation to a nonkilling future derives from a scene where Theo visits his cousin, Nigel, who works as a minister in the government and who helps Theo secure transit papers himself and Kee. As Theo and Nigel converse over a lavish meal, they are joined by the latter's young-adult son, Alex, who is entranced by an interactive video game, which appears as a sort of virtual rubic's cube that he controls through a device that rests next to what appears to be an identification bracelet worn on his right wrist.

While Alex, who sports various prominent tattoos and some scarring on his right cheek as artifacts of a troubled youth, frantically clicks his fingers and motions his hand as part of the game, the camera shows him ignoring his dinner and never breaking eye contact with the game's display, which makes his presence at the dinner table spurious. During a pause in the conversation between Nigel and Theo, his father repeatedly whispers to Alex, whose ar-

gyle sweater and tame hair acts as a thin veneer masking his checkered past, that it is time to take his pills, but his son's lack of response drives his father to scream his name wildly, which jolts Theo from his glass of wine. As one of the most dynamic scenes in the film, Alex's seemingly narcotic fixation with his personal gaming device offers an imag(in)ing of how immersive gaming technologies, which have recently become fashionable as a site for exploring how virtual problem-solving might translate into tackling real-life challenges, factor into nonkilling futures, and this scene is best read alongside some recent literature concerning gaming technologies and the prospect of creating a preferred, which is also to say nonkilling, future.

Caption 1 and 2. *Children of Men* directed by Alfonso Cuarón (courtesy of Universal Pictures)

In 2011, Jane McGonigal released *Reality of Broken: Why Games Make Us Better and How They Can Change the World* to great fanfare and widespread praise. As a sort of prophet for the positive dimensions of video games, McGonigal proclaims, "Compared with games, reality is pointless and unrewarding. Games help us feel more rewarded for making our best effort" (McGonigal, 2011). For McGonigal, the negatives aspects of contemporary

gaming, especially pro-killing first-person shooter platforms and the harmful effects of playing over twenty hours per week, are secondary to the positives, particularly the interactive and collaborative components imbued within the community and team-building skills requisite to massive multiplayer online gaming environments. Indeed, McGonigal willfully overlooks the pro-killing ethos endemic to much of contemporary, and likely future, gaming, but when she does engage the "shoot first and ask questions later" gaming paradigm, it is only as a means to extract her perspective on the underlying social dynamic driving such gameplay. She observes, "While the 10 billion kill milestone was a significant community achievement, *Halo* players have actually spent more time working on two other epic projects—both collaborative knowledge projects" (McGonigal, 2011). As one of the world's most popular and widely-played video games, *Halo*, which grosses billions in related merchandising revenue, is a perfect example of the types of economies that underly gaming as a global multi-billion dollar industry now and perhaps in the future(s), and the creation and maintenance of "epic projects" centered on the game are but an extension of the transnational industry marketing for a game that hosts more "active personnel [than] all twenty-five of the largest armed forces in the real world, combined" (McGonigal, 2011).

McGonigal's gleeful complicity with this type of economy offers a lens from which to situate Alex as an emissary of a future where gaming has overtaken reality, which is also to say that the transnational corporations creating and producing games have taken over reality. In this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, one's very sense of self is intimately tied to the way in which one is able to navigate the predefined and prescribed challenges of virtuality, and as with past and present gaming interfaces as a guide, one can draw on an infinite number of lives, which trivializes killing and positions the act of killing and dying as necessary evils or mere hurdles to the ultimate goal of mission completion and victory. Furthermore, an individual in this scenario prefers, if not presumes, that reality should mirror one's preferred gaming environment, and this link, which has dire consequences for a nonkilling future, has become trendy among gaming enthusiasts, of which McGonigal speaks the loudest. Explaining her experience as a lead designer at Entertainment 42 working on the popular first-person shooter game, *Gun*, which takes place in the American Wild West of the 1880s, McGonigal recounts her work on an alternate reality campaign as part of the marketing for the game. She explains, "In a world where video gamers are much maligned for being desensitized to violence, it struck me as a particularly provocative idea to send gamers to the *real-world graves* of characters they had

killed in *Gun*" (McGonigal, 2011). When positioned alongside recent studies (Anderson and Dill, 2000; Funk, 2004; Carnagey, Anderson, and Bushman, 2007) that have found a tangible desensitization to violence and decrease in empathy after playing pro-killing video games, McGonigal's "provocative idea" in concert with Alex's presence at the dinner scene points toward the misplaced valorization of gaming technology as a potential savior, even if only virtually, to real-world challenges, especially the potentiality of nonkilling futures. There seems to be as much novelty in asking players to attend an Italian dinner following a marathon Super Mario Brothers gaming session, and the logic by which this type of media, and its underlying economies, have been glossed over is obviously problematic.

Noting the ubiquity of gaming worldwide, Elkington reports, "In the US, there are over 180 million active gamers, each playing over 13 hours a week on average. Wrap in console and mobile phone games and there are more than 4 million gamers in the Middle East, 10 million in Russia, 105 million in India, 10 million in Vietnam, 100 million in Europe and 200 million in China" (Elkington, 2011). As gaming, and the mindset accompanying it, continues to spread across the globe, it is certainly possible, though not probable, that immersive entertainment technologies could usher in a nonkilling future, but McGonigal's optimism definitely seems misplaced. Responding to a direct query about the social components of gaming, she explains, "There's a ton of research that shows playing games with people actually improves relationships with them. You feel more positive about them, you trust them more, and you have a better sense of their strengths and weaknesses, so you're better able to work and collaborate with them in the future" (Bensen, 2011). While her comments give voice to the social bonds of gaming, the link she draws between potential future collaborations is, at best, specious, especially if the nature of one's involvement centers solely on the eradication of zombie Nazis or the retrieval of magical elements to use in virtual combat. This latter aspect, which affirms the materialist critique of contemporary video games, recently came to the fore as reports surfaced from China that prison guards were forcing inmates to mine "virtual gold" as they realized that more money could be made through gaming than by having the prisoners perform manual labor (Nosowitz, 2011). In the cultural conditioning zone of a collapse version of the Dream Society, gaming might just become an opiate-like technology whose regulation and administration portends dire social consequences upon human agency, including further desensitization to killing.

Disciplined: Eye Spy a *Minority Report*

> It's like my daddy used to say: In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king (Spielberg, 2002).

Steven Spielberg's 2002 film, *Minority Report*, received exceptional reviews upon release, and some critics even went so far as to say that the award-winning director was "back" in light of his less than well-received efforts of the 1990's. Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, Jensen identifies Spielberg, "the great storyteller of the silver screen, as the closest we now have to a Dream Society icon" (Jensen, 2001: 121). Popular with futurists, especially as the director "convened a think tank of experts for a 3-day brainstorming session to help envision a future half a century hence," and the general public for its portrayal of Washington, D.C. circa 2054 as a high-tech and nonkilling, at the outset of the film at least, society—one that most closely resembles contemporary imag(in)ings of the Dream Society—the film follows the personal and professional struggles of John Anderton, whose fall from grace as the chief of precrime sets off a chain of events that eventually brings the entire precrime system, which is on the precipice of going national, to a halt (Wright, 2008: 482).

While *Minority Report* offers the only genuine nonkilling image of the future among the selected films for this project, it is included here as a disciplined imag(in)ing of the Dream Society since, as Shapiro notes, "Spielberg's *Minority Report* plays out the tension between the machines of capture and the micropolitics of escape" (Shapiro, 2005: 29). As Anderton unravels the mystery behind his (pre)crime—a murder for which he has been deemed guilty but which he has not actually committed—he retreats into the subterranean haunts and black marketplaces that underly the futuristic cityscape—some of which he is already familiar with due to an illegal drug habit. In order to abscond from the exacting gaze of ubiquitous monitoring devices, which are mostly advertisements attuned to one's unique retinal signature that the police can use to track one's movement, Anderton undergoes a complete eye transplant, which coalesces the film's micropolitical imag(in)ing of nonkilling as an affect of perception, even if only by the precognitives, who foresee crimes before they are enacted and have become the society's primary crime deterrent. To be a criminal in this scenario is to see and be seen by the monitoring agencies that regulate actions in the present and the future—used here in the singular as the "precogs" imply more than a modicum of metaphysical determinism.

Caption 3 and 4. *Minority Report* directed by Steven Spielberg (courtesy of DreamWorks Pictures)

Although the many and varied technologies at the disposal of the formidable precrime unit, including the retinal-scanning "spiders" that use electric shocks to subdue assailants, inevitably lead to Anderton's capture, the film's counter-balanced take on technologies, particularly those that can and might be used to foster a nonkilling society, including nonlethal weapons, offers a unique purview from which to examine the potentiality for surveillance technologies to be used within a nonkilling future. Losing sight in one of his new eyes after lifting his bandage too early to elude capture, Anderton loses one of his original eyes, which he carries around in a plastic bag, when he tries to gain access to precrime headquarters. Although this scene provides a moment of comic relief as Anderton is shown chasing his own eyeball as it rolls down the hallway and into a grate in the floor as one might lose a set of keys, the micropolitical relevance of this scene centers on "how human fallibility can undermine even the most advanced security," especially as Anderton is able to use his remaining original eye to gain access to an underground entrance to the secure holding area for the precogs (Wright, 2008: 45). In this rendering of the Dream Society, extraordinary surveillance and security technology is beset by its fundamental humanity, and one might imagine an immense bureaucracy built around such mundane tasks as updating security protocols for subsurface points of entry to precrime headquarters, even and

perhaps especially for former police chiefs who have recently become the city's top criminal suspect. While this scene can certainly be taken as a weak plot point in the film, it cements the film's imag(in)ing of technology as being simultaneously ever-present and yet, at times failingly, indiscernible—a continuous reminder of a society whose false security acts as a facade that can be easily breached by agents whose field of vision is unencumbered by the hypocrisy of its own law, which allows criminals to be prosecuted and judged prior to committing the crimes for which they are charged.

Outlining the specific operations underlying intuitive to this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society and its emergence as a form of "Intelligent government," Bullinga (2004: 32) argues:

> In the years ahead, technology will provide government and society at large with tools for a safer world and for automatic law enforcement. Permits and licenses will be embedded in smart cars, trains, buildings, doors, and devices. Laws will automatically download and distribute themselves into objects in our physical environment, and everything will regularly be updated, just as software is now automatically updated in your desktop computer. Innovations in government will enable us to have a safer environment for law-abiding citizens because built-in intelligence in our environment will minimize fraud, global crime, pandemic diseases, accidents, and disasters. Law-abiding citizens will gain privacy, while criminals will lose it.

Describing many of the experiential facets apparent within *Minority Report*, which actually came out two years before his article, Bullinga's formulation presumes a degree of fluidity and effortlessness with regard to anti-crime and nonkilling technologies that the film does not, and as anyone who has encountered difficulties updating software on a personal computer, to use Bullinga's analogy, can attest, such technologies are often not as simple and seamless as one might imagine. Furthermore, he asserts that citizens within this society will gain additional privacy by making their specific results anonymous and granting them more control over the environment around them. As this plays out in the film, it becomes evident that for each and every instrument of control, there exists an equal and opposite counter-measure that effectively negates the intended impact of the surveillance technologies.

However, *Minority Report* makes it abundantly clear that even in a society without killing, as in the beginning of the film, criminal elements conspire and even thrive by making certain sacrifices, such as, perhaps not surprisingly, life without sight. Correspondingly, Bullinga proclaims, "No technology will be visible. The intelligent environment is about living and being comfortable and

having a nice time and relaxing and resting. The technology is embedded" (Bullinga 2004, 36). The invisibility of the technology is precisely what makes it so dramatically visible through the subtle, yet exacting, ways in which it manages the spatial flows of bodies and, as the film suggests, thoughts through the potentiality of precognitive crime surveillance, which has emerged as an issue in the present. As reported across mainstream media outlets, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is currently lab-testing Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) for possible use in airports and other critical infrastructure locales to combat terrorism. Dubbed an homage to *Minority Report*, which Shapiro actually regards as a "notable ideational challenge to the state's surveillance practices," FAST centers on one's mental aptitude toward promulgating a "disruptive act" through various neural sensing technologies (Shapiro, 2005: 29). Ultimately, this announcement portends a clear intent to develop the requisite surveillance technologies to manufacture a nonkilling society, even if the mere apperception that such technologies, which "measures a variety of physiological indicators, ranging from heart rate to the steadiness of a person's gaze, to judge a subject's state of mind" exist and are under development for use (Weinberger, 2011). In this future, surveillance technologies will know more about one's innermost thoughts and feelings than perhaps one's self even knows, and it is clear that what is primarily embedded about these technologies is a sense of complete fear that one's thoughts are no longer private. As it relates to the film, the opening scene introduces one to the workings of precrime through a red ball, which is the code for a murder that is not premeditated and thus barely within reach of the precogs' awareness, which further extends the film's argument that any technological effort to secure a nonkilling society will inevitably produce a small, albeit manageable, degree of chance, whose variability rests with the imperfection of humanity—one of the film's main themes—even within a seemingly secure and perfect environ.

As an introduction to the human side of precrime's chief, Anderton is shown running through a less-then-friendly neighborhood on a rainy night. While a national advertisement for precrime displays across the sides of buildings and underneath overpasses, Anderton is nearly indistinguishable as a cop with a hood pulled low over his head, and the emptiness of the streets implies that there is no crime to perceive anyway. Although one gets the sense that Anderton is simply blowing off some steam, it quickly becomes evident that his route is not chance as he answers the call of a dealer waiting to supply him with his drug of choice. As the two trade pleasantries during the exchange, the dealer catches Anderton off guard by quipping, "sweet dreams, chief," which demonstrates that even outside of the city's surveillance systems, someone is

always watching. Reassuring Anderton that he is not interested in turning him in, the drug dealer brazenly leans forward to take off his sunglasses revealing that he has no eyes and proclaims, "It's like my daddy used to say: In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king" (Spielberg, 2002).

Coalescing the film's take on technology's ability to deter (pre)crime, particularly killing, this scene rebukes Bullinga's contention that the intelligent environment can and might provide complete solace and safety through surveillance, which has again become an emerging issue as it has recently been reported that popular smart phones, such as Apple's iphone and Google's Android line, secretly create files that "contains the latitude and longitude of the phone's recorded coordinates along with a timestamp," which is clearly only a problem if one does not want any corporate or governmental agency—as the latter could supeona such information—to have access to such detailed personal information (Arthur, 2011). In the context of a disciplined Dream Society, technological observation becomes tantamount to the obfuscation of one's private life in the name of safety and security, even though the film makes it abundantly clear that such measures are not completely effective. Whether one is seeing and being seen by retinal scanner or eye-less drug dealers, the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society contends that agency centers on one's participation within an all-encompassing game of eye spy.

Growth: Merrily, merrily, merrily...life is but a dream in *Inception*

> Do they come here everyday to sleep?
> No, they come to be woken up. The dream has become their reality. Who are you to say otherwise? (Nolan, 2010).

Christopher Nolan's ascent in Hollywood over the last decade is a direct result of his expansive and critically-acclaimed oeuvre, including *Memento* (2000), *Insomnia* (2002), and his widely popular reboot of the Batman franchise, particularly *The Dark Knight* (2008). If Spielberg is, as Jensen contends, the closest we have to a Dream Society icon, then Nolan is more akin to a Dream Society prophet as the grandeur and immersive nature of his work often elicits comparisons between the two auteurs. After nearly a decade of planning and development, Nolan released *Inception* (2010), which became one of the highest grossing films of all time as well as a recipient of numerous Academy Award nominations, including Best Picture and Best Original Screenplay. Exploring the impact of a dynamic technology, predominantly within the arena of corporate espionage and by extension

the global economic system, the film follows the story of Dom Cobb, a masterful thief who steals knowledge and ideas from his victim's unconscious minds while they inhabit delicately-crafted lucid dreams. As the technology was created initially by the military to allow soldiers to simulate combat, which is to say killing, the film makes no mention of how the technology was made available to the public, but it does make it abundantly clear that it has become tremendously popular and even a substitute for reality to some, especially as one can create anything one can imagine and dying simply causes one to wake up, most of the time.

Caption 5. *Inception* directed by Christopher Nolan (courtesy of Warner Bros. Pictures)

As an embodiment of the creatively aesthetic dimensions of a growth paradigm for the Dream Society, *Inception's* imag(in)ing of technology offers a lens from which to situate the potential neurological impact of a future in which the blending between dreaming and reality have become seemingly indistinguishable. This trope, which forms the existential crux of the film, offers a complex imag(in)ing of the frailties of the human brain, especially when positioned alongside recent investigations on the impact of image-rich advertising on memory and the Internet on the functionality of human perception, which have a bearing, even if indirectly, on the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society. As someone who spends an inordinate amount of time within lucid dreams, Cobb has lost the ability to dream when sleeping normally, and the film chronicles his struggle to distinguish between waking and dreaming life. To overcome his ailment, he utilizes a totem, which for him is a child's spinning top, that only he has access to so as to know if he is awake or asleep, since the top will spin interminably while dreaming and

feels differently when he is awake. However, the top also symbolizes Cobb's deceased wife, Mol, who haunts his unconscious mind as a projection and subsequently appears while he is dreaming, often as a subversive figure who disrupts his jobs so as to have him all to herself.

The totem, then, reminds one of the plasticity of the brain with regards to its ability to be influenced by mediation technologies, especially those that can and might produce false memories, as is the case when consumers develop "false beliefs about having experienced a brand" that "arise[s] on exposure to high-imagery advertising" (Rajagopal and Montgomery, 2011). In this future, as with Cobb's subconscious mind, one delicately balances the ubiquitous imagery of one's own mind with the dream-like imag(in)ings of an economy requiring incessant consumption as a means to sustain production. In a growth scenario of the Dream Society, all consumers have Cobb's affliction, and just as with the film, the planting and stealing of ideas and knowledge becomes the essential marketplace for a post-information society where perceptions and affects, even if false, are of the greatest significance. As this specifically relates to nonkilling, it is clear that various entities will go to great lengths to cover over the harmful impacts of their products and services so as to maintain the appropriate public perception and appearance. As this model is continued growth, which intimately links it with the present, this trend is apparent within the rise of Apple, which recently surpassed Microsoft as the most profitable computer company in the world and, for a brief time, eclipsed ExxonMobil as "the most valuable company in the U.S." (Ortulay, 2011) and whose brand identity is so strong that MRI results showed that Apple devotees' brand allegiance "was actually stimulating the same parts of the brain as religious imagery does in people of faith" (Riley and Boome, 2011). Although a complete analysis of the ways in which various religions have supported cycles of killing falls outside the scope of this scenario, it is obvious that the totem takes on a decidedly spiritual purpose in the film as the only means by which Cobb can keep from losing himself within his dreams and the darkness of his unconscious mind.

As Cobb and his team take on the arduous task of planting an idea into their victim, which is known as inception, they seek out a chemist who can provide them with the requisite compounds to provide a deep enough slumber to complete the job, which involves many levels of dreaming—dreams within dreams. While connected to the dream machine, which allows one to inhabit dreams communally, one will be awakened if killed unless they are under the influence of a powerful chemical agent, then they are exiled into the unconscious abyss of the last dreamer to fall into this

state. As Cobb confesses to one of his colleagues that he performed inception on Mol, who did not want to leave the comfort and creative power of the lucid dream-state, he intimates the timelessness of unconscious lucid dreaming, which allowed him to build an entire world over 50 years trapped with his wife in his subconscious. Mol's codependent, and ultimately fatal, experience with *Inception's* dream technology is foreshadowed by a scene in which Cobb's team meets Yusuf, the chemist who concocts the sedative necessary for multi-layer dreaming and runs a dream-farm where people pay to come and dream for three to four hours at a time, which they experience as 40 hours of lucid dreamtime.

Caption 6. *Inception* directed by Christopher Nolan (courtesy of Warner Bros. Pictures)

Cobb and his team are clearly awe struck by the sight of the twelve dreamers, even though they are equally impressed by Yusuf's work. When one of Cobb's colleagues casually queries, "Do they come here everyday to sleep?", the old man who watches over Yusuf's clients responds, "No, they come to be woken up. The dream has become their reality. Who are you to say otherwise?" (Nolan, 2010). Encapsulating the film's take on technology as a force of social change, often with severe consequences, this scene contextualizes the popular contemporary argument that "our brains are always in flux, adapting to even small shifts in our circumstances and behavior," which is often used to undergird the claim that the impact of Internet technologies are a-moral (Carr, 2010: 31). From this perspective, the postulate that our brains are fundamentally plastic does little to situate the motives and intent of the (political and economic) forces whose high-imagery

mediation enacts change, and, perhaps most importantly, if such alterations contribute toward a more egalitarian and secure, which is also to say nonkilling, future. Employing a religious metaphor for the fragmentary nature of existence within the nascent Dream Society, Nicholas Carr explains in *The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains* that "the *Net* reroutes our vital paths and diminishes our capacity for contemplation" by, in Heideggerian terms, "welcoming the frenziedness [of technology] into our souls (Carr 2010). In the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, agency is an exercise in salvaging the vestiges of our imperfect humanity, whose ultimate end might become saving itself from thinking that life, even if merrily, is perpetually dreamlike.

Transformation: For a time it was good in *The Animatrix*

> Then man made the machine...in his own likeness. Thus did man become the architect of his own demise (Maeda 2003).

As part of the Wachowski Brothers' immensely popular Matrix trilogy of films, *The Animatrix* is a composite of animated shorts that gives some back ground on *The Matrix*, which chronicles the rise of Neo (Keanu Reeves) as "the one" who is prophesied to end the apocalyptic war with the relentless *machines*. While many of the shorts in *The Animatrix* are ripe for analysis, parts I and II of "The Second Renaissance" are useful for situating technological development, particularly sentient and robotic machines commonly referred to as AI (artificial intelligence), within the cultural conditioning zone of a transformational imag(in)ing of the Dream Society. Furthermore, these two shorts illuminate the social and economic conditions underlying a truly transformational Dream Society as is evidenced within the complex imag(in)ing of the relationship between humans and technology, or "the machines," who challenge directly humanity's monopoly on agency. Capturing the differences between *The Animatrix* and the trilogy succinctly, Silvio notes, "Quite simply, whereas *The Matrix* casts the conflict between humanity and technology mostly in terms of good versus evil, *The Animatrix* presents the struggle as being marked by moral ambiguity and ethical complexity" (Silvio, 2006: 121). Embodying a vastly different ethos from the trilogy of films, the initial scene of the Second Renaissance depicts the trial of B166ER, who fatally turns on his owners, and consciously re-frames the moral high-ground claimed by the machines alongside historical struggles for equality from marginalized groups during the 20th century, particularly the Civil Rights' Movement. For the machines, the trial of B166ER is a "Rosa Parks" moment—one that coalesces the

rising tension between humanity and the artificial intelligence of the machines, who seek equality and protection under the law.

Caption 7. *The Second Renaissance* directed by Mahiro Maeda (courtesy of Warner Home Video)

At his trial, B166ER's argues that his decision to kill his owners was self-defense as they were going to destroy him as they would with any other possession. In response to a guilty verdict that includes the eradication of "all of his kind," the machines take to the streets in a "million machine march" to express their solidarity and dissent, but the past repeats itself as governmental forces enact a calculated and open genocide upon the machines (Maeda 2003). From this point forward, the two shorts chronicle the war between humanity and the machines, which eventually leads to the formation of the Matrix—whose locus centers on the extraction of energy from the ambient heat produced by the human body. Although humanity survives its war with the machines, the symbiotic relation between humanity and technology, which is now exemplified by the superiority of the machines, has been turned on its head: the relation between humanity and technology continues to redefine and change the nature of what it means to be human, although humanity is no longer the primary entity fashioning the definition.

Although the focus of "The Second Renaissance I & II" centers on the how and the why with regards to the impetus for the Matrix, the repetition of explicit and implicit religious imagery throughout both shorts situates the spiritual ramifications of technology in this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society while providing a lens with which to view the economic conditions underlying the cultural conditioning zone. As Buddhists receive blessings from monks before combat, Christians listen to an evangelist urging them to put on "spiritual armor," and Muslims pray at sunrise before fighting against the machines, one gets the eerie impression that a greater evil was necessary to create solidarity among humanity, which has often used religion to perpetu-

ate cycles of violence and killing. Reading this phenomena as a direct consequence of its intimate relation with technology, it becomes easier to articulate the impact of technology, especially artificial intelligence, with regard to the distinctly human constructs, particularly religion, inhabiting the cultural conditioning zone of the Dream Society and nonkilling futures. In this future, technology has usurped traditional religion and other human constructs as the primary force of division to the point where the disassociation of the machines from what it means to be human—apparent in the advent of truly independent artificial intelligence—signals a break within the symbiosis between humanity and technology. It is this systemic rupture that allows for a radical restructuring whereby humanity has lost the capacity to define itself with regards to its relationship with technology, which is depicted as bringing about, in decidedly Judeo-Christian terms, a new Fall of Man, so to speak.

As the machines seek solace apart from humanity, they build a mega-city, called Zero One, in the former "cradle of human civilization" (Maeda, 2003). With superior intelligence and the creation of more advanced AI, the machines begin to dominate the global economic system, which eventually leads to an emergency United Nations (U.N.) summit where the machines peacefully plead their case for inclusion. The meteoric rise of Zero One contextualizes the economy underlying a truly transformational alternative of the Dream Society, and humanity resorts to military action, in the form of a blockade, as a means to subvert the machines' hegemony. The assertion that an economy based on technological development is best managed by technological development itself has roots at present within high-frequency trading (HFT), which is mostly performed by complex algorithms that "compete by making thousands of trades a minute to maximize profit," and has led to the exponential development of bandwidth infrastructure, including the creation of a "Chicago-New York cable will shave about 3 milliseconds off … communication time" (McCabe, 2010). The ability to manage time with such precision for the express purpose of economic gain is paramount within a scenario where reliance upon technology for distributing and producing wealth is absolute, and it is this ultimate end that sets humanity on the path toward a complete redefinition of its relation with technology, which becomes the predominant agent of change, for better or worse, into the future.

As the ambassadors from Zero One seek reconciliation and the establishment of a "stable, civil relationship" with humanity, which is evidenced in part by the gift of an apple, they are mobbed by angry leaders who see their dominion as an affront to the very nature of what it means to be human. While they are violently taken out of the chamber, the narrator solemnly

notes, "But this would not be the last time the machines would take the floor there" (Maeda, 2003).

Caption 8. *The Second Renaissance* directed by Mahiro Maeda (courtesy of Warner Home Video)



As the narrator continues to explain that their admission to the U.N. was denied, the apple falls and as the back ground fades to black, it mutates into a brain that develops a nervous system and finally a human form that becomes surrounded by darkness. This stark transformation speaks to the inevitable inversion of the symbiosis between humanity and technology within this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, and the transformational ascendency of technology, or the machines, along moral and spiritual lines in comparison to humanity—indeed, the machines' economic superiority is a mere addendum to their overt righteousness.

As the machines represent technology completely unfettered from human imperfection, they harken back to the theoretical development of the Turing Machine and the origins of complex algorithms for computation, whose architect spoke about their creation with religious zeal. In *The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention*, David F. Noble notes, "In designing such machines, as in conceiving children, Turing observed, 'we are … instruments of His will providing mansions for the souls He creates'" (Noble, 1997: 152). Compounding the imag(in)e of the apple, Turing's tragic suicide, which was carried out by lacing an apple with cyanide as it was discovered half-eaten next to his body, speaks to another infamous usage of this fruit—Apple's logo, which some think might be an homage of sorts to Turing or an allusion to the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Book of Genesis. The convergence of the apple metaphor cements the contention that in this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society technology takes on the properties of ultimate knowledge and functions to provide humanity with some context for its relationship with a truly higher

power—the machines. Echoing Kurzweil's *Singularity* contention that "Machines, derived from human thinking and surpassing humans in their capacity for experience, will claim to be conscious, and thus to be spiritual," the use of the apple in this scene speaks to humanity's wanton lust for self-actualization, even at the cost of its own humanity, in this transformational imag(in)ing of the Dream Society (Kurzweil 1999, 153). Outlining the roots of this scenario and the troubling social conditions endemic to cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, Noble writes:

> A thousand years in the making, the religion of technology has become the common enchantment, not only of the designers of technology but also those caught up in, and undone by, their godly designs. The expectation of ultimate salvation through technology, whatever the immediate human and social costs, has become the unspoken orthodoxy, reinforced by a market-induced enthusiasm for novelty sanctioned by a millenarian yearning for new beginnings. This popular faith, subliminally indulged and intensified by corporate, government, and media pitchmen, inspires an awed deference to the practitioners and their promises of deliverance while diverting attention from more urgent concerns (Noble, 1997: 207).

This movement is most apparent in recent efforts to advance AI toward and beyond human capacity, and "IBM has unveiled new experimental brain-inspired chips that are able to learn based on experience" (Callow, 2011). With human-like learning capabilities that mimics "spiking neurons and synapses in biological systems," this technology, especially when positioned alongside Kurzweil's contention and the machines of *The Animatrix*, raises a fundamental question as to the nature of intelligence, consciousness, and spirituality and how the advent of AI might impact nonkilling futures. For the purposes of this scenario, the sentient technologies of *The Animatrix* are best viewed as machines of loving grace, who appear to show Christ-like agape, so to speak, toward their human counterparts by eventually imparting a gift of salvation (the Matrix) and, perhaps most importantly, an opportunity for the cessation of hostilities, even though a cabal of dissidents continues to wage war against the machines.

As humanity embarked upon a plan to slow the machines' growing power, they sought to attack their primary energy source—the sun. Enacting "Operation Dark Storm" as a means to geo-engineer the planet to displace all solar energy, humanity ultimately creates the conditions of possibility whereby the machines take the reigns of their symbiotic relation. While it seems difficult to imag(in)e humanity displaying the technological capacity to complete

such a feat while still lacking the requisite humility to accept the machines as equals, this scene affirms the decidedly spiritual interconnection between humanity and technology, especially as the camera pans out to show the earth being engulfed in black smoke as the narrator intimates, "may there be mercy on man and machine for their sins" (Maeda, 2003).

Caption 9 and 10. *The Second Renaissance* directed by Mahiro Maeda (courtesy of Warner Home Video)



As the machines begin to experiment upon the bodies of those captured in combat to exploit the human production of energy, the results inexorably lead to the creation of an alternate virtual reality for humanity—a technologically-driven afterlife of sorts. As the new ambassador for the machines stands brazenly at the podium of the U.N., it holds an apple in one of its many hands and declares, "Your flesh is irrelevant, a mere vessel" (Maeda, 2003). After putting down the apple to sign via barcode what appears to be a treaty as humanity's leaders watch forlorn, the machine continues, "Hand over your flesh, and a new world awaits you. We demand it" (Maeda, 2003).

This final return of the apple, which is now completely virtual, coalesces the codependence upon technology in the cultural conditioning zone of this imag(in)ing of the Dream Society, and in this future, "a newly refashioned symbiotic relation between the two adversaries [is] born: the machine drawing power from the human body—an endlessly multiplying, infinitely renewable energy source" (Maeda, 2003). Whereas the first Renaissance

ushered in a period of extended study and engagement with humanism and the classics of antiquity, the Second Renaissance, on the other hand, challenges the decidedly human limits of technology and signals a complete transformation of agency, which, for a time, was good.

Concluding Imag(in)ings

> No example of a nonkilling society is known in history; it is simply unthinkable (Paige, 2009: 33).

As Paige makes clear in *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, "life in a nonkilling society is characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill, neither technologies nor justifications for killing, and no social conditions that depend upon threat or use of lethal force" (Paige, 2009: 22). A few pages after this weighty contention, Paige outlines some of the objectionable responses—the most ardent of which prefaces this conclusion—he heard over many years as a university professor teaching courses on and researching the parameters for a nonkilling society. While the lack of a historical model would seem at the outset to be a debilitating inhibitor to the creation of nonkilling futures, it is the precisely the unthinkable nature of such a feat that makes it relevant from a futurists' perspective. As Dator's Second Law of the Future contends, "Any useful idea about the future should appear ridiculous." Another equally unthinkable ideation with regards to the future emanates from the four filmic imag(in)ings of technology of the Dream Society, especially as the threads of each can be found in the present, even if only as imag(in)ings. This is not to say that the Dream Society, in any of its forms including those presented herein, is a most likely or even a preferred future, quite the contrary; the unassailable hegemony of further technological development, explicitly as a marker of social and economic well-being in the present, positions the Dream Society construct at the very heart of the cultural conditioning zone that has come to dominate the incestuous mechanisms of capitalistic ideology that drive the contemporary conditions of possibility for nonkilling futures. Although remarking on the scientific, Virilio captures this sentiment succinctly, "'There are perhaps just wars, but there are no innocent armies', or so the saying goes. From now on, it is the same with science as it is with war: there is no longer any really innocent science" (Virilio, 2005: 31).

Positioning Virilio's assertion alongside the analysis of technology as found within the four filmic imag(in)ings of the Dream Society, one can imagine that the primary means by which nonkilling futures can and might emerge rests with the successful decoupling of technological, which is also to say scientific,

development from imbalanced social and economic conditions, which remain endemic to the conditions of Late Capitalism, which Jameson conceives of as "catastrophe and progress all together" (Jameson, 1992: 55). This striking duality, which is exacerbated within the four filmic imag(in)ings of the Dream Society, serves to contextualize the materialist reading of technology offered of each film while situating the integral link between capitalist ideologies and economies of lethality, even and perhaps especially within technologically-driven scenarios for the futures (i.e. The Dream Society). As Paige notes, "Sometime in the future when economic exploitation ends, the class-based lethal state will disappear. But in the period of transition economic factors will predispose to killing" (Paige, 2009: 24). Similarly, Jensen argues, "In the long run, digitizing the information flow will lead to freedom of information and freedom of speech, but in the coming 10 to 15 years, latent conflicts will be mounting" (Jensen, 1999: 216). As the analysis of each film set out to affirm, the economics underling the invention, development, and diffusion of increasingly more complex technologies, especially those challenging long-held notions of agency, does not preclude nor necessarily buttress the potentiality for nonkilling futures to emerge, but as capitalism remains critical to the ethos of the Dream Society construct, it seems apparent that this formulation's beloved free market cannot adequately internalize the costs, to use the the appropriate parlance, associated with nonkilling futures; thus, Jensen takes solace in his prediction that the emerging Dream Society will inevitably produce strife that echoes much of what has been seen surrounding the Arab Spring. However, moments of sanguine reflexivity within the Arab Awakening, especially in the early days of unrest in Egypt, point toward a complete reconceptualization of the nature of social change with regards to the symbiotic relation between humanity and technology. In one of the most widely circulated photos from the Tahrir Square protests, a demonstrator proudly displays a home-made sign drawn on a sheet of notebook paper that states, "Delete Mubarak" and shows the infamous trash can from both Microsoft and Apple operating systems.

Although there have been innumerable challenges following the departure of Hosni Mubarak from his 30-year tenure in power, the most significant and palpable opportunity resulting from his historic egress is apparent within the sentiment of the above photo. From the perspective of the Dream Society, as with imag(in)ings of the present, one can just as easily and carelessly delete a dictator as one would a spreadsheet from one's computer. This sentiment contextualizes the shutdown of Internet technologies during the tumult in Egypt and the complicity of transnational corporations in supporting such authoritarian endeavors, and speaks to the primacy with which tmedia echnolo-

gies emerged as an instigator and accessory to the Arab Spring. "Delete Mubarak" also speaks to the potentiality for the reappropriation of mediation technologies for egalitarian ends as it does to the material economies underlying such calls for revolution; indeed, if there is anything to be learned from Egypt and ongoing revolutions elsewhere, it is the fact that mechanisms of capitalism, especially the nascent dimensions of a truly Dream Society economy, have become entrenched within imag(in)ings of the future(s)

Picture 1. *Delete Mubarak*
(MARCO LONGARI/AFP/Getty Images, January 31, 2011)

As this relates to the imag(in)ings of technology of the Dream Society found within the four films, it is clear that the inherent plasticity of the symbiosis between humanity and technology offers, at the very least, the potentiality for a radical reconstitution of the economies underlying further technological advancements as found and presenced within the cultural conditioning zone of the killing funnel. There might not be a silver bullet, with regards to ameliorating social and economic conditions, but the first step, as Paige points out repeatedly in his treatise, involves jettisoning both the medium (silver representing the technological) and the message (bullet representing the indirect valorization of killing) of such formulations—as such, a sign that condones "deleting Mubarak" is an enormous advance from one advocating "death to Mubarak."

As such, the symbiotic relation between humanity and technology must regain, as Virilio puts it, a modicum of innocence, which is to say a conscious and intentional movement away from its charted course toward catastrophe and progress through the continual modeling of nonkilling futures, including, and perhaps especially, the unthinkable and/or the ridiculous with regards to the futures of capitalism, which remains the predominant imag(in)ing of the

future for many even in the wake of monumental social and economic disparities. As this lies at the heart not only of the four filmic imag(in)ings of the Dream Society presented herein but also the theoretical and practical foundations for a truly nonkilling, which is to say preferred, future, the model for such an endeavor might be found within the technological structures of the present. Elucidating the scope and magnitude of crafting nonkilling futures, Paige observes, "The purposive pursuit of nonkilling conditions of global life portends institutional changes as pervasive in scope to those associated with the global diffusion of contemporary communication and information technologies" (Paige, 2009: 114). This apt analogy succinctly captures the spirit of crafting nonkilling futures, which is first and foremost an exercise in disassociating catastrophe from progress now and in the futures.

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Chapter Six

Envisioning Nonkilling Futures in Film

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Synergistic nonkilling creativity among the arts can uplift the human spirit and imagination for the crucial transformational tasks ahead.

(Paige, 2007: 139)

Introduction

Is nonkilling futures in films an unrealistic dream or an idea whose time has come? Glenn Paige (2007) in his pioneering book began the discussions about nonkilling, and in it he questions whether nonkilling can be viewed as possible, especially by those in his field of political science. Similarly, the possibility of creating a film about a future that does not include killing would, initially, be questioned in its desirability by the film industry and, questioned by by much of the conventional future (sci-fi) film audience. To many people the idea of scenarios of nonkilling futures in films seems impossible, even naïve. And yet, Paige (2007: 139) challenges filmmakers and others in the arts to "find ways out of violence" and participate in the creativity of nonkilling. The ways out of violence in filmmaking are possible *if* the filmmaking process from script development to distribution, including audience and critics' attitudes, can evolve sufficiently to allow nonviolent, nonkilling images of the future to be depicted in film.

To envision nonkilling futures, like any visioning, requires a leap of faith, to what we most want and desire for our communities' futures (Meadows, 1996). For filmmakers to see past the practices and mindset that focus on killing and create a film about the future based on nonkilling is an act of resistance against the hegemonic forces at work in contemporary society, and within their industry. Most films about the future are expensive blockbusters produced in Hollywood studios now owned by transnational conglomerates. The films, as well as filmmaking industry that creates them, are part of a society that is based on militarism and focused on violence. But films about the future, and the filmmakers who create them, can also be part of a purposeful resistance, and begin the envisioning of nonkilling futures. Films,

with their powerful images and stories, contribute to how contemporary society envisions the future. According to filmmaker and film screening innovator, Mandy Leith (Hurley, 2009), film is the "magical fire place, it's the fire, *it's the hearth of our time* that people gather around and that continues the storytelling tradition". Storytelling is a powerful communicator of information and mythology; film has the additional strength of providing images to accompany the narrative.

In this chapter, I will explore why images of the future are important, how Hollywood dominates in films about the future and its connection to the military industrial complex, the gendered nature of films, how film and filmmakers are important to envisioning nonkilling futures. I will also use Glenn Paige's (2007) theory on nonkilling societies to evaluate films about the future and the filmmaking industry relative to his criteria of a nonkilling society, and explore possible ideas for change.

What film images of violent future are telling us, and why it matters

Frederik Polak (1961) analyzed images of the future that a number of societies held throughout the millennia, and found that when a society had a positive image of the future they flourished, and when a society held a negative image of the future the society perished, an indication that the images had agency. He argued that the first step in moving toward positive images of the future is identifying what is wrong with the images of today as a "preliminary clearing of the decks for the great act of purposeful, responsible recreation of images of a still glorious future" (Polak, 1961: 367). Guided by Polak (1961), we will explore images in films about the future as the preliminary phase of working toward the depiction of nonkilling futures in film.

Feature films are a compelling and visceral source of dominant futures imagery that are now global in their reach. Most feature films about the future are created by Hollywood, and are part of the highly lucrative genre of 'blockbuster' science fiction or sci-fi, which is "a significant economic weapon for Hollywood, few others being able to afford to compete at the expensive high end of the latest effects technologies" (King and Krzywinska, 2000: 64). These special effects technologies, in the hands of skilled filmmakers, result in highly pervasive and persuasive images of the future. These films are now globalised through film theatre releases as well as the seemingly limitless reach of television and its thirst for content.

The dominant contemporary images of the future are of bleak ecological wastelands rife with violence and despair (Lisa Garforth, 2006; Slaughter,

1998). These Hollywood films, with their compelling, intoxicating imagery, may be negatively affecting what Elise Boulding (1988) refers to as our *futures image literacy*: our ability to envision our own futures. At the societal level, and as individuals, we are losing our ability to engage our imagination in acts of creating images of the future—visions for our futures—that are unique to our community. But without visions to work toward we do not know what direction to take with our actions (Meadows, 1996). While I make no attempt at a direct causal link between the film images and actions, or inactions, I argue that the powerful, dominating, film images may be interfering with our ability to create peaceful, diverse visions of the future that are unique to our community and country. As Bruce H. Franklin (1985: 85) warns: "With no better vision of the future to offer, the United States may possibly succeed in forcing the rest of the world into one of those futures imagined in Hollywood". We have an obligation to future generations of humans, and nonhumans, to create visions of diverse futures that are more life sustaining than those presently coming out of Hollywood.

The dominant, and repeating, images of the future in contemporary film are of violent conflict, where war or killing seen as inevitable: whether by hand-to-hand combat (*Blade Runner, Star Wars*, *Terminator*, *The Fifth Element*) or fantastical weaponry (*Star Wars* series, *Terminator* series, *Minority Report*) and even nuclear bomb annihilation of the entire world (*Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines*). Much of the violence results in killing, and most is men-on-men, but there are a few examples of sexualized women fighting (*Blade Runner, Alien, Aeon Flux, The Matrix*). In most films about the future, violent conflict or war is underway, or preparations for war are being made, all supported with spectacular, seductive visual effects (Hurley, 2008, 2009). These dominant images of war and violent conflict reinforce themselves from one film to the next. The repeated nature of the images contributes to violence and war being seen as *the* only possible future: the singular future that repeats itself across mediums and over time (Milojevic, 2005).

The repeated pattern of violent conflict in many films about the future, involving guns and other armaments, including nuclear weapons, is not especially surprising given Hollywood's many ties to the US military (Franklin, 1988; Rosenbaum, 2000; Valantin, 2005; Alford and Graham, 2008). Since 1942, when the American War Ministry set up a partnership bureau in Hollywood, which remains active today, "the cooperation between the [US] security system and the major studios functions in many complex ways and has increased over the decades" (Valantin, 2005:6). Recent research has exposed the Pentagon's involvement in reviewing screenplays and editorial

influence in exchange for studio access to equipment and locations including the Navy lending aircraft carriers, planes and pilots, (Rosenbaum, 2000; Valantin, 2005). As Franklin (1999:72) observed "the infrastructures that support the preparations for war and violence are very powerful and deeply entrenched". Filmmakers in the US, and increasingly filmmaking in Canada and other countries, appear to be part of these preparations, as war is glorified and made to seem inevitable and necessary. As Paige (2007: 13) argues "violent media socialization is useful for a state in need of professional patriotic killers". The connection between the film industry and militarism is historical and tightly woven, but the pattern could be broken if many filmmakers are courageous enough to offer less violent ways of addressing conflict, and if audiences support these films by buying tickets.

Another dominant pattern in films about the future is loss of human life due to an apocalyptic event, including films based on environmental disasters (*Day After Tomorrow:* climate change; *The Awakening:* virus/red tide killing humans; *Children of Men*: global loss of fertility, *Aeon Flux*: global virus and global loss of fertility). I worry that these films also impoverish futures literacy by reducing hope for the future.

Films about the future are also highly gendered. Women are highly outnumbered by men as characters in films, and their roles in society are of those of support to the elite men in charge, or the love/sexual interest of the male lead. The journey is masculinised, and the narrative arc of the story is always that of the male lead. Children are rare in films about the future, and when they are seen, they are almost always boys. An exception is *Aeon Flux*, although the girls are in the background of scenes, at least they are visible. The dualistic way that men and women are depicted in films about the future is not healthy for society, for women nor for men. Women are not seen as politicians or leaders in other positions of power in filmic futures, reinforcing the notion that *the* future is the domain of men and where women and girls do not see opportunities for themselves to be powerful agents in society.

In some films about the future (as in some films based in the present and past) women are so invisible, so completely missing from the screen, that these films could be contributing to the notion that women and girls don't matter, that their presence in society is optional. The optional future for women and girls is likely contributing to policies and practices that result in higher women's mortality, including higher levels of mortality in natural disasters (Ikeda, 1995) as well as globalised violence and killings of women and girls. *Femicide* is a gender specific killing that takes the forms of murder by spouses/partners, dowry deaths, sexual assault, 'honour' killings and female infant/child neglect. "Femi-

cide is an extreme form of the gender-based violence (GBV) that many women suffer at home, in the workplace, in the community and in their relations with the state, violence that is intrinsically linked to deeply entrenched gender inequality and discrimination, economic disempowerment, and aggressive or machismo masculinity" (Prieto-Carrón, et al., 2007: 26). Much too often in films about the future, women and girls, if they are seen at all, are victims of male violence, sexual predation, societal oppression, or neglect.

Violence and killing is pervasive in films about the future out of Hollywood. The lead characters in the films are often not the best role models. What are we modeling as futures appropriate behaviour to young people, especially young men and boys, who are the main target audience for films about the future? According to Jo Groebel (1998: 4), the lead scholar of the UNESCO study of 5,000 12-year-old students from 23 countries, "the study revealed a fascination with aggressive media heroes, especially among boys: Arnold Schwarzenegger's 'Terminator' is a global icon, known by 88% of the children surveyed, be they from India, Brazil or Japan". In films about the future, the elite men are predominantly depicted as warriors/fighters of some kind, which narrows role model opportunities for boys to aggressive hyper-masculine roles with little opportunity to witness caring, creative men in their personal lives, as well as in the public domain.

The repeated images of war and militarism in films about the future continue the notion that war is inevitable. Many countries of the world, and certainly the US, have intertwined militarism throughout much of their society. We have disregarded Dwight D. Eisenhower's (1961, my emphasis) caution in his final speech as president: "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. *The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist*". And it has. In 2010, global military expenditures reached $1,630 billion USD—with US 42.7% of the total—and shocking annual increases in South America (5.8 per cent) and Africa (5.2 per cent) (SIPRI, 2011a). Beatrice Fihn (2011) argues that the global military expenditures are having a direct and disproportionate effect on women by keeping them in poverty, and directing funds away from health care and education, and quotes the World Bank's estimate that it would take only 35 to 72 billion USD per year to 2015 to meet the Millennium Development Goals—a tiny fraction of that spent on the military—but those in power, overwhelmingly men, continue to priorize war.

Author Margaret Atwood (1992: 79) argues in a poem that killing is gendered: "Why do men want to kill the bodies of other men? / Women don't want to kill the bodies of other women / By and large. As far as we know… / Men's

bodies are the most dangerous things on / Earth. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully analyse the nature of men and killing, but I suggest that films about the future are contributing to the problem by repeating the future…"

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully analyse the nature of men and killing, but I suggest that films about the future are contributing to the problem by repeating the future as violent and warring, and focusing on male characters solving conflict with violence. There is ongoing debate about the nature of violence and whether it is gendered or not, but it appears to be gendered, and pretending otherwise is not going to help us create nonkilling futures. Richard Wrangham (2010: 30) argues that "men are inherently more dangerous than women and that massive imbalances of power among hostile entities tend to induce violence" and that understanding this violence provides opportunities in reducing it.

> By stressing the particular dangers of male coalitionary behavior *Demonic Males* [Wrangham's book] contributes to an ongoing debate about the prospects for promoting nonviolence through the education of women and their increased representation in legislative bodies. Since *Demonic Males* was published I have participated regularly in seminars with such programs as Women Waging Peace, in which participants represent conflict zones from around the world. I have repeatedly found that they cherish the optimism represented in *Demonic Males* by its identification of some sources of violence that we can do something about—namely, the appalling ease with which men are induced to violence under some circumstances (Wrangham, 2011: 44).

Filmmakers may argue that their films include violence and killing because that is what audiences want, and we will see below that audiences do have a role in changing the nature of films about the future, but films remain a creative act and the filmmakers can create films in a different way, with different stories and images.

As women in the Global North are becoming increasingly involved in public life, business, medicine, education, research—albeit with glass ceilings at the most senior levels (Valian, 1999; Douglas, 2010)—women's roles and creative involvement in film production have narrowed or decreased over time. Contemporary women's film roles are generally limited to wife, mother, sex object, and victim; while women in the 1940's had more diversity in movie roles. Today, the Hollywood filmmaking industry also suffers from a lack of women in the upper creative positions. "In 2010, women comprised 16% of all directors, executive producers, producers, writers, cinema-

tographers, and editors working on the top 250 domestic grossing films"—a decline of 1 percentage point from 1998, and with only 7% of directors being women (Lauzen, 2011: 1). Martha Lauzen (2008: 10) has also documented the domination of men in the reviewing of films and concluded that: "In short, men dominate the reviewing process of films primarily made by men featuring mostly males intended for a largely male audience. The underemployment of women film reviewers, actors, and filmmakers perpetuates the nearly seamless dialogue among men in US cinema". The film industry needs to address the reality that its institutional structures have enabled a small elite of white men to maintain an unequal advantage over women, people of colour and less powerful men. This is an outcome of what R.W. Connell (2002: 142) calls the *patriarchal dividend* where men, as a group, maintain "an unequal gender order". The process of identifying the unequal order in filmmaking has begun. Hollywood producers, Susan Davis, Susan Valdes and Steve Mills, created the 2005 film *Invisible Women* to address women's experiences in Hollywood, and Jennifer Siebel Newsom wrote and directed *Miss Representation* in 2011. I am confident that as the number of women in senior creative positions within the film industry increases to above 50% that the amount of killing in films about the future will significantly decrease.

American/Hollywood global dominance of film industry and images

Another repeated pattern in films about the future is that the story takes place in the US, even when the films are international co-productions (*The Awakening:* India/US; *The Fifth Element*: France/US) reinforcing the concept that *the future* has been fully colonised and it *is* American (Sardar, 1999). This is not to say the US does not have place in the future, rather that the US is only one of many countries in the world, each with their own culture and landscapes that are worthy of futures visioning. But at the present, American futures dominate in the films, and American films dominate the screens of the world.

In 2007, according to the Motion Picture Association of America statistics (MPAA, 2008a), the total Hollywood domestic (US and Canada) box-office gross was $9.63 billion, while the total international box-office was $17.1 billion (64% of total revenues). The international market includes: $8.92 billion Europe/Middle East/Africa, $6.92 billion Asia Pacific, and $1.25 billion Latin America. This translates into a total of *5.54 billion international paid moviegoers* (79% of 7.04 billion world wide admissions) (MPAA, 2008c). Therefore, as Scott (2005) argues, Hollywood may not dominate internationally in the total number of films produced, but they do dominate

in terms of revenue and in the number of people who watch films.

Economists Acheson and Maule (2005: 339) argue, "to our knowledge, no other industry has been persistently dominated in the same manner". These two authors attribute the early historical dominance partially because the US was able to attract talented creative people who were fleeing hostilities during both world wars. They also argue that Hollywood's international dominance is based on the efficiency of a system that provides them with an unfettered free market to the US domestic market (including Canada), which is the single largest English speaking market in the world, as well as Hollywood's success in assimilating large numbers of viewers from different ethnic backgrounds (Acheson and Maule, 2005). This economic efficiency has significant support from the US federal government, which lobbies hard for Hollywood at international economic negotiations, such as World Trade Organisation (WTO) (previously General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arguing that film is a product or commodity like any other and that Hollywood should have open, unlimited markets for their films and television programs in all countries.

> The [US] Department of State, Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the MPA [international arm of Motion Picture Association of America], often referred to as the "Little State Department", are critical to the success of American films and television programs in international markets. The American troika demands that foreign markets are open for Hollywood to exploit, while the oligopolistic nature of the American market makes it all but impenetrable to foreign products. The exportation of cultural products improves the trade deficit, but the US government also argues that "trade follows films," that motion pictures and television programs provide a mechanism through which to advertise American products and disseminate ideologies (Kunz, 2007: 6).

The Motion Picture Association (MPA-Int, 2012) openly flaunts this role on the MPA-Asia Pacific website as a "little State Department" and describes their foreign country activities in "diplomatic, economic and political arenas".

Therefore, the global reach of the blockbuster Hollywood films about the future is significant. The worry in this global nature is that that powerful, intoxicating imagery dominates people's thinking and they lose the ability to imagine a future different than what they see in the films. Without our *futures imaging literacy* we cannot engage our imagination to envision positive futures for our own community—our localised preferred futures (Boulding, 1988). There is also the possibility that with America being seen as *the fu-*

ture that non-US communities and nations will see themselves as lesser, not as valuable now or in the future. But, as Wangari Maathai (2004) wrote about Africa, it is from the love of one's own community and culture that diverse and peaceful future communities are possible.

The way that films are created today also contributes to the movement away from localised ideas because of the global business nature of the film industry. Hollywood films used to be made in studios that existed only to make movies. In today's New Hollywood, film production is only a small part of large companies that, in turn are part of "an increasingly diversified, globalized entertainment industry" (Schatz, 1997: 75). And often, within the conglomerate, the media/entertainment component is small compared to other activities. For example, General Electric owns Universal Pictures[1] as well as 80% of NBC television, many local US television stations, the Sci-Fi cable broadcaster, and a new pay TV company USA Network (Columbia Journalism Review, 2011). GE/Universal/NBC is also extending its reach further into India via a joint venture with the Indian media empire Network 18 (Overdorf, 2007). The film component of the GE conglomerate had box office gross of $933 million USD in 2006, while the total parent company revenue was $149.7 billion USD. And according to a study by the Centre for Public Integrity (Makinson, 2004), General Electric is number 7 in the list of the top 100 contractors to the Pentagon, further reinforcing the ties between Hollywood and militarism.

Hollywood has also changed from making many movies a year to an increasing reliance on the big blockbusters to reach the annual corporate profit projections. Sedgwick and Pokorny (2005) argue that part of Hollywood's success and survival over time is the focus on the hit movie, the blockbuster, with large production values that work to differentiate films from television productions. The reliance on blockbuster films, especially sequels, is more likely explained by the notion that blockbusters are viewed by executives to have significantly less risk, and more opportunity for revenue than other films (Ravid, 1999; Scott, 2005). Blockbusters dominate in films about the future, and high cost/ high revenue sequels have been a consistent pattern (*Matrix*, *StarWars*, *Terminator*, *Star Trek* series).

As discussed above, Hollywood now sells the majority of its tickets in its international market (79% of global admissions and 64% total revenue) so there is financial pressure to keep the international market strong. Violent action films about the future travel well into this market.

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[1] This may be changing as General Electric is in negotiation for a partial sell-off of Universal to a sports media corporation.

> Action movies don't require complex plots or characters. They rely on fights, killings, special effects and explosions to hold their audiences. And, unlike comedy or drama—which depend on good stories, sharp humour, and credible characters, all of which are often culture-specific—action films require little in the way of good writing and acting. They're simple, and they're universally understood. To top it off, the largely non-verbal nature of the kind of films that journalist Sharon Waxman refers to as "short-on-dialogue, high-on-testosterone"makes their dubbing or translation relatively inexpensive (Media Awareness Network, 2011).

To reform or transform Hollywood filmmaking, to move out of the focus on profits based on violent films and into filmmaking that supports nonkilling futures will be challenging, but not impossible if there is the will for change at many stages in the process.

Filmmakers within and outside of the Hollywood studios, have an opportunity to create films with non-US based, diverse, peaceful communities, as images of nonkilling futures. This will not be easy, at least not in the beginning, because Hollywood has become such a dominating cultural force in the world. Juan Mayr (2008) suggests that:

> Throughout human history, dominant powers have imposed their language and their cultural vision on other territories and cultures. It is time to take pause in the present process of globalization while we consider ways of overcoming problems confronting our civilization… We must pursue these efforts in order to protect the heritage of humankind.

The UNESCO (2001) *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* provides principles for protecting cultural diversity, creativity and international solidarity. It acknowledges the current imbalance in cultural products and Article 11 suggests that public policy is required to promote cultural diversity in the world. Convincing Hollywood that they do not have a inalienable right to the theatres and television screens of the world will take time and diplomacy, but the distribution and screening of films is part of the technology of filmmaking that requires reform if nonkilling futures in film are to emerge.

Transforming the filmmaking process to contribute to nonkilling futures

Ursula Franklin (1999) sees *technology* as *systems of practice* that go beyond the things one normally relates to technology (such as cameras, film, editing equipment, lights, computers for creating visual effects) to include also *organisation, the people, procedures, policies, myths, and, ideas*. In the case of

feature films, the systems of practice include: the studios within conglomerates, writers, directors, actors, editors, sound engineers, accountants, unions, marketing people and processes, production assistants, the pitch, the script, merchandising, caterers, traffic and parking attendants, star-system, scheduling, critics and film schools. Franklin (1999) argues that of all the processes and practices that make up the technology the most important of all is *mindset*. It is mindset that can entrench ways of practice without reflection. Mindset can inhibit people from seeing even the possibility that patterns of images or systems of practice can be different. Mindset can tell us that there is no point in examination or protest because nothing will be different. For example, some people have the mindset that war is inevitable because humans are intrinsically violent or that human activity will always harm nature in some way. But we can create a mindset that is open to possibility and change. We could develop a mindset that sees violent conflict only as a temporary phase in human development, and that people can live in harmony with each other and with nonhuman nature. Shifting mindset, however, is challenging and will require recognition of power injustices and shifting to shared power.

> It is my conviction that nothing short of a global reformation of major social forces and of the social contract can end this historical period of profound and violent transformations, and give a manner of security back to the world and its citizens. Such a development will require the redefinition of rights and responsibilities, and the setting of limits to power and control (Franklin, 1999: 5).

Filmmakers could be part of this shift in power by transforming the systems of practice, the technologies of filmmaking, to one of shared power and to depicting nonviolent societies—past, present and future—in their films. According to Riane Eisler (1987) and Marija Gimbutas (1982) humans have been peaceful and nonkilling in the far past, therefore, we have historical precedents to initiate system change; humans have not *always* been violent and warring, as many argue. Filmmakers can provide a leadership role in shifting mindset toward nonkilling futures by depicting communities that solve conflict without violence and where killing does not exist.

Glenn Paige's vision of a nonkilling society is one where there is no killing of humans nor threats to kill, and that this nonkilling may extend to animals. It includes a society where:

> there are no weapons for killing and no legitimizations for taking life; governments do not legitimize it; patriotism does not require it; artists do not celebrate it; no relationships of dominance or exclusion—boundaries, forms

> of government, property, gender, race, ethnicity, class, or systems of spiritual or secular belief—require killing to support or challenge them, and no social conditions that depend upon threat or use of lethal force (2007: 1).

In its present form, the majority of the filmmaking industry does not meet Paige's (2007) criteria of a nonkilling society. It legitimizes killing and war in cahoots with the government; its artists celebrate killing; its racist and sexist practices are based on relationships of domination (Hurley, 2008); and it contributes to social conditions in its glorification of lethal force. Paige (2007: 13) quite accurately identifies mass media, which includes industrialised, corporatised filmmaking, as part of the desensitization of life through violent images that demonstrate "dramatic ways in which people, property, animals, and nature can be destroyed by heroes and villains". And yet, Hollywood also is responsible for some of finest, most joyful and creative films ever made, which celebrate the best of humanity including: joy, love, compassion and empathy. Therefore, there is no reason why films about the future cannot depict positive, nonkilling societies, which include conflict and romance and intrigue, but without violence or killing. It is true that contemporary films about the future sometimes contain moments of love and compassion, but these aspects are overwhelmed by the dominant images of despair and violence. It is time for some filmmakers to claim a leadership role by depicting alternative and diverse futures, including nonkilling futures.

Hans Richter (1986: 163) refers to *progressive cinema*, as a filmmaking genre or style where filmmakers understand their responsibility to "make an incomparable contribution to the welfare, the recovery of humanity". I interviewed filmmakers in my recent research and most agreed with Richter's argument that film can make positive contribution. They were in filmmaking to make a difference in the world, but some did not want to feel an obligation to do so, while others were comfortable with the responsibility to provide a positive way forward. Hollywood publicist, Paula Silver (in Hurley, 2009) suggests that "all films have a social impact, the question is: is it good or bad impact? And that all films can be a *catalyst for change* and challenge filmmakers to ask themselves: what images do we need to create hope—to inspire people to take action—to do something?" Filmmaker/ futurist Kate McCullum (in Hurley, 2009) argues that filmmakers are beginning to understand that they need to be wiser with their craft.

There is a tremendous opportunity for filmmakers to choose to participate in the movement toward positive futures. The films could still contain conflict, drama, spectacular visual effects, even the odd flying machine, but by wielding

the tool, the technology of filmmaking, more wisely, the films could offer hopeful alternatives to a generation of moviegoers who badly need them. Academy Award winning, director/ producer Norman Jewison (2004: 281) understands this need when he argues, "Hope is what we hang on to. It's our anchor in a sea of despair. Hope, like faith, remains constant, independent of evidence. When we lose hope we lose everything. People who have no hope become desperate. But hope is a gift of the spirit". Not everyone agrees that hope is important to creating positive change (Jensen, 2007), but I have witnessed numerous classroom and community situations where individuals without hope are unable to envision positive futures or participate in action planning.

Elise Boulding's (1988) visioning workshops focused on creating a *World Without Weapons*, and she observed that a *social imaging* process happened when people began to see hope for a peaceful world within the workshop setting. Most people arrived at the workshops feeling ineffective about peace and disarmament and left feeling empowered to varying degrees because they gained hope that a world without weapons is indeed possible (Boulding, 1995). The link between hope and action is created during act of collaborating on desired futures. In addition, as Anthony Reading (2004: 17), argues, "hope depends on being able to predict that a desired future is potentially achievable". Therefore, stories and film images of nonkilling futures are important because they make our desires for peaceful, nonkilling futures plausible, which creates hope for positive change, and actions toward change can begin.

A filmmaker who creates a film about the future without violence, militarism and killing will risk having her or his film being labeled as a 'message film'. But all stories have a message. It reflects the power of the neo-liberal paradigm that *their* messages are not seen as *a message*. Any works that stand outside of the dominant story, or challenge it, run the risk of being belittled or of being the recipient of critical unkindness, tinged with cynicism. As Marge Piercy (2003: 141) argues "contemporary critics often assume that there is something wrong with fiction that has an ideological content, as if all fiction does not". It hasn't always been this way. Hollywood writer Bob Thomas (in Hurley, 2009) described how in previous decades there were many message films that were box office successes. Some of the films were not immediately successful, for example Stanley Kramer (1984) produced and directed *On the Beach* (1959) with the clear purpose of ending the use of nuclear bombs. Many people avoided the film in the theatres because of the theme and the critics derided it as "another message from Kramer, taking a subject too seriously, the do-gooder at work or good intentions swallowed by speculation", but the film went on to have strong success on television "probably due to the activism of

citizens' groups, the clergy and women's organizations in protest of the nuclear arms race" (Kramer, 1984: 118). According to James Goodby (2011) the contemporary global "obstacles to ending the nuclear threat are more political than technical or military". Therefore, filmmakers today have great power to affect change through their films by addressing the public and political institutions, and as Stanley Kramer did, they could chose to be part of a less violent future by envisioning futures without nuclear weapons.

In addition, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2011), "small arms and light weapons are involved in more violent, conflict related deaths each year than any other type of weapon system". Filmmakers could have a major impact on the reduction of small arms by making choices not to include them in their films, not valourizing the use of guns, or not associating guns with masculinity.

Perhaps films about the future that is not based on violent conflict would be derided by most critics, because such films would lack the high action fight scenes that are so common in films about the future, but I hope that those critics would see the dramatic tension in other parts of the films (after all, conflict does not require violence). There will certainly be cynicism directed toward the first brave film that dares to provide an image of the future different from the dominant, hegemonic images. But with luck, some critics will support the film, and audiences will go in large numbers to the film, and a new, more diverse, fan base will emerge.

German film director/producer/writer, Wim Wenders (Dixon, 2011) is considering a futures-based film in 3-D: "I think 3-D is a still unexplored cinematographic story. In my book, it's the ideal medium for the documentary of the future. It's not invented to show us different planets [like in Avatar]. It's invented to show us our own planet". Based on Wim Wenders previous films, and his recent focus on joyful music and dance, I believe there is a good possibility that his futures 3-d film will envision nonkilling futures, and a flourishing Earth.

There is also tangible reason for optimism about a nonkilling film about the future because American author Starhawk (1993) has begun production on the film version of her novel *The Fifth Sacred Thing*. Starhawk's approach to the film diverged from the patterns in Hollywood filmmaking right from the beginning: when she and her team used crowd sourcing (Kickstarter) to gather funds for the development stage instead of pitching the idea to a studio. And congruent with Alfonso Montuori's (2011) argument for a *new collaborative creativity*, Starhawk is creating a community-based, collaborative approach to the images of the future in the film by encouraging people to contribute ideas and designs for the film via the website. The story in the

film will also break with Hollywood patterns by offering a vision of a caring, green, nonviolent, nonkilling society, with women in positions of leadership and heroism. *The Fifth Sacred Thing* juxtaposes a dystopic Los Angeles as a projection of the hegemonic present with water used as tool of control by the elites, with a green, permaculture-based, utopian San Francisco where "No one in this city goes hungry. No one lacks shelter. No child lacks a home. There is sickness here… but no one lacks care. We have guarded our waters well, our cisterns will not run dry, no one thirsts, and our streams run clear" (Starhawk, 1993: 19). It is a hostile world around them, but San Francisco is kept safe by the Defense Council: nine old women with their magic, dreams and vision. Collectively the citizens make a decision not to pursue military style defense, but to focus their resources on healing the Earth and providing high quality of life for all, including no tolerance for violence or sexual assault. One of the Defense Council elders explains, "War is the great waste, as much in the preparation for it as in the waging of it. We learned that, at least, from last century, as that same military drained the country and destroyed our true wealth" (Starhawk, 1993: 154). They are able to save their city by offering the invading soldiers 'a place at their table', a home and healthy work. There are many heroes in the book, but the main hero's journey in the story is taken by Madrone, a young woman who is a healer and community leader. Starhawk's film will depict beautiful, positive images of alternative futures, including a nonkilling city. It will do much to inspire people, especially youth, to envision their own images of nonkilling futures.

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Filmography

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Alien, 1979
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Children of Men, 2006
Day after Tomorrow, 2004
Epsilon (*Alien Visitor*), 1997
Invisible Women, 2005
Minority Report, 2002
On the Beach, 1959
Star Wars - Episode I - The Phantom Menace, 1999
Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines, 2003
The Awakening, 2008
The Fifth Element, 1997
The Happening, 2008
The Matrix, 1999

Chapter Seven

Nonkilling Media from a Gender Perspective

Challenges and Possibilities to Transform Violence Against Women

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Introduction

In 1997 Marian Meyers wrote a book entitled *News Coverage of Violence against Women. Engendering Blame* with the purpose of helping to eradicate the media problem of "blaming the victim and reinforcing harmful cultural stereotypes and myths" (Meyers, 1997: ix) when reporting gender violence, for it seemed that, back then, the media way of tackling the matter helped to justify it instead of raising awareness against it. Unfortunately, more than 13 years later the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in its sixty-fifth session (2 August 2010) had to keep on insisting that among the efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women the media had to intensify its efforts and, as one of the main stakeholders in the matter, had to undertake measures to prevent it. Within the framework of the present volume, then, several questions need to be raised: how can the media help to eradicate violence against women? Can it do it at all? Can a feminist perspective offer new insights in the pursuit of media aiming at the construction of a peace culture?

Following Paige's (2009) need to move towards a nonkilling culture, the intention of this paper is to investigate the possibilities of representing women's stories of violence (or women's stories in general) without contributing to the perpetuation of gendered cultural violence, that is, by going against the grain of representational legacy that frame women within sexist conventions. It is our contention that the attempt to construct a peace culture cannot be pursued alien to the nuances that a gender equality project articulates in conflict transformation. In our case, searching for alternative forms of female representation has also a pedagogical goal: to contribute to visual literacy from a nonviolent and gender perspective.

Framing the problem

Let us start our discussion taking a quick look around: if one googles "violence against women" 7.620.000 results emerge; for "stop violence against women" the count is 545.000; in 1979 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly; in 1993 the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women underwent the same process. The last document on this matter published by the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) of the UN is the *Handbook for Legislation on Violence against Women*, where one can read:

> In 2008, the Secretary-General launched a multi-year global campaign called UNiTE to End Violence Against Women […] on of its five key goals is for all countries to adopt and enforce, by 2015, national laws that address and punish all forms of such violence, *in line with international human rights standards* (DAW, 2010: iii). [Emphasis is ours]

Furthermore, the *Handbook*, in the Prevention section recommends that the law prioritize prevention and provide for a range of measures such as awareness-raising campaigns, sensitization of the communications media, and inclusion of material on violence against women and women's humans rights in educational curricula. Indeed, there have been numerous campaigns carried out from different geographical contexts and undoubtedly the media is everyday plagued by images and reports of violence against women (the counts that emerge from a quick google search testify to the proliferation of materials and sources), but given the endless dropping of murders and news and the continuous calls from the UN for the intensification of measures, it seems that something does not work. Amnesty International denounces on this respect that "despite the obligation of the states to act with due diligence to prevent violence against women, violence against women and girls in many societies is met with governmental silence or apathy or lack of interest".[1] However, we would add that even the states that adopt legislation to prevent and sanction violence against women fail to face adequately and effectively the issue.

Let us examine a sample case: Spain was one of the states participants in the expert group meeting on good practices in legislation to address violence against women whose results the *Handbook* draws upon and, moreover, it is

[1] See: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/campaigns/stop-violence-against-women/issues/state-perpetrators>.

one the countries mentioned, in this document, as an example for its advanced legislation in gender violence. Indeed, in Spain, in conjunction with the Organic Act on Integrated Protection Measures against Gender Violence (2004), a number of other laws have been amended in order to ensure consistency (such as the Worker's Statute, Social Offences and Sanctions Act, Criminal Code, etc). Since then, in 2007 the Organic Law for Gender Equality was also approved to deepen into the project of eradicating discrimination and violence against women. Spanish media has set up gender violence issues (mostly related to domestic violence) in its agenda and audiences are exposed to news reports, talk shows, magazines, documentaries, etc., which tackle the issue.

However, despite all this display of legal measures, advertising campaigns, media reports and programmes, the results on the Spanish public's awareness from the Sociological Research Centre Barometer (Barómetro del CIS) are disheartening, to say the least: when the public is asked how much they worry about domestic violence compared to other social issues, we realize, as we can see in the graphic below, that the awareness of this problem has gradually decreased since 2004 (the year when the Act against Gender Violence was approved). Slowly but surely, this is clearly showing us that something is going wrong since the increase in the political and communicative efforts does not match the awareness raised. One could say that Spanish law does not seem to have had an impact on the transformation of people's everyday lives.

Figure 1. Public concern over domestic violence



Nevertheless, we would like to suspend our belief on this respect and remember that, according to Butler (1990: 1-34), power, through its multiple manifestations (including legal and media), produces and conforms rela-

tions among subjects either by legitimizing them or silencing them. So the question we should focus on is: is what is being legitimized through the media tackling of gender violence issues that does not prompt a positive change on the transformation of the structural and cultural violence that sustains inequality and violence against women?

Undoubtedly, in the general context, a long way has been walked since the approval of the CEDAW in 1979. Gender violence has been made visible through the work of international organizations (such as the UN), nation states, Human Rights organizations (such as the Center for Women's Global Leadership, Unifem, Women Won't Wait, Women for a Change, Women's Aid, Amnesty International…), etc., but it seems that making it visible has not transformed the way women are framed and conceptualized, and most importantly, it has not modified the way the general public views women's "stories of violence". It is not surprising, then, to find that if one searches for images in the internet through the words "campaign gender violence", 16 out of the first 30 images show women bruised, in a violent scene playing the victim role or dead, 4 out of those 30 present a single male character to whom the message of the picture is addressed, 20 out of those 30 images refer explicitly to domestic violence. We are aware that this is a very simplistic exercise to prove any scientific point but it is only symptomatic of how gender violence is being made visible and, thus, legitimized: women as victims of domestic violence.

As Adelman (2009: 194) observes, "the way in which a social problem is framed determines in large part its solution", therefore if gender violence is framed by the media as a situation in which a woman is killed or abused by her partner, and that is what the citizenship is witnessing through the media, the way to deal with the problem is to protect the victim and sanction the victimizer, thus legal and health measures will be implemented. But what remains of the necessity for prevention? Can nonkilling and, thus, alternative media contribute to it?

Nonkilling media from a gender perspective

Lee, in his chapter in this same volume, describes, quoting Kahane (2004), four ways of talking and listening in an engaged manner: downloading (conventional exchanges), debating, reflective dialogue (placing oneself in the position of another) and generative dialogue (experiencing a common purpose and potential for change). It would seem that, in order to transform the hegemonic representation of violence against women, reflective and generative dialogue should be the object of mass media and communicative innovation. However, what we witness most of the times are images of women

abused or killed due to domestic violence whose situation, for being narrated according to certain tragic genre conventions, is very difficult to relate to for the general public. The way situations are presented narratively are analogous to the existing conceptualized patterns of fictional drama, therefore gender violence news are prone to be conceived as isolated tragedies that happen in situations removed from the daily experience of audiences.

The moral of the narrated stories is that domestic violence is something that happens to women in very special circumstances. Usually the mise en scene constructed by news, reports and films goes along the following lines: domestic abuse, almost exclusively heterosexual and physical (resulting or not in death), is the main focus of the stories; female subjectivity and the female body are almost exclusively represented in association to being wounded or killed; physical abuse is never contextualized within the more general framework of human rights, discrimination or structural and cultural violence against women; instead, individual circumstances (drugs, jealousy, illness, etc.) for the victimizer to commit the abuse or crime are searched for by questioning family, neighbours, passer-bys or friends, which, in turn, supports the logic that considers the aggression dependant on a very particular set of individual characteristics; emphasis is placed on the violent and tragic aspects of the aggression (bruises, weapons used, wounds,…) and the victim's acts or omissions which may have contributed to the violence. The message resulting is that women trying to break from violence can only find tragedy, which, on the other hand, as Butler (2004: 34) indicates, implies the idea that women need to be protected in order to live away from violence. No wonder the media coverage is keen on stressing the police and judicial aspects of it, oblivious of society's responsibility underlying the problem. Unfortunately, this, in turn, reinforces the configuration of women as victims in need to be guarded by the system. Therefore, despite good intentions to denounce gender violence, the fact of the matter is that the way it is represented disempowers the very subjects it pretends to help.

According to Andrijasevic (2007) no better outcome is derived from the analysis of campaigns against sex trafficking. In her study of anti-trafficking campaigns carried out since the 1990s in East, South-East Europe and former Soviet Union, she observes:

> […] the representational strategies used in the campaigns in order to convey the danger of trafficking equate women's migration with forced prostitution, encourage women to stay at home […]
> The display of suffering and beautiful victims positions the woman's body as the object of the (male) gaze and mobilizes erotic ways of looking that disclose

> a voyeuristic eroticization and fetishist fascination with a severed/captive female body. The representation of violence is thus itself violent since it confirms stereotypes about eastern European women as beautiful victims, *equates the feminine with the passive object*, severs the body from its materiality and from the historical context in which trafficking occurs, and finally confines women within the highly disabling symbolic register of 'Woman' as to maintain an imaginary social order (Andrijasevic, 2007: 26 and 42). [Emphasis is ours]

Feminist theory applied to visual culture has a long history of stressing the difference between 'woman as representation' and the experience of women. Since the pioneering paper of Mulvey (1975) to the contributions of ciberfeminism (Haraway, 1991), passing through the always enlightening reflections of De Lauretis (1984), feminists coincide in highlighting the violence embedded in the very act of representation and the burden of representational legacy that encapsulates women's experiences into the timeless signifier of Woman. The implications for the project towards a nonkilling and peaceful society are essential: in recent specialized literature on audience response before images of violence against women in relation to acceptance of sexist stereotypes, the results show that the way an audiovisual product presents gendered violence affects gender stereotypes, approval of the objectification of women and rape myth beliefs (Capella et al., 2010; Fernández-Villanueva et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2011). Sadly, we have recently had the chance to check the real transferability of these findings into a global context through the journalistic coverage of the Strauss-Kahn case, where once more the myth of uncontrollable masculinity being the cause of sexual abuse has been displayed. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former managing director of the IMF, was charged of attempted rape to a hotel maid in New York. Independently of any moral judgement we may have on the matter or of the final judicial outcome, what needs to be stressed out is the message put across journalistically: Strauss-Kahn's wife, Anne Sinclair, "stood by her man" (as the media put it) supporting his innocence. She declared that she did not believe a word of the alleged rape and added that, she had always been proud of her husband's sexual reputation (as a seducer).[2]

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[2] "Strauss-Kahn wife Anne Sinclair stands by her man", <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/17/us-strausskahn-wife-idUSTRE74G63Y20110517>; "Why Anne Sinclair is standing by Dominique Strauss-Kahn", <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/03/anne-sinclair-dominique-strauss-kahn>; "Dominique Strauss-Kahn's wife has 'no doubts' he is innocent", <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/dominique-strauss-kahn/8606227/Dominique-Strauss-Kahns-wife-has-no-doubts-he-is-innocent.html>.

Therefore, from a gender perspective, the question goes beyond eradicating media based on killing and violence or media that does not challenge injustices that lead to killing. The project is farther reaching: how can the media contribute, then, from a gender informed perspective, to a paradigm shift resulting in fundamental alternatives to the fabric of society and culture? The question demands a multifaceted approach.

Changing the frame

Opening the scope of what gender violence implies should be a starting point. The representation of violence against women can no longer be represented as a matter of individual destiny; it has to be framed within the human rights context (agreed upon by the international community) and put in relation with other forms of violence, including symbolic violence materialized in everyday sexism. Media and communication agents cannot remain alien to facing radically this issue in its agendas. In other words, gender violence has to be dealt with in conjunction with the violence of gender (Bal, 2009; Butler, 1990).

The construction of a peace culture does not merely imply the absence of war or killing but the absence of violence (Galtung, 1990). In this sense, the most difficult task is to create new representations that do not perpetuate symbolic violence. Symbolic violence manifests itself in the absence of women as agents of their own stories of survival. Women have been granted mainly the place of victims in stories of killing and violence. Nonkilling media urgently needs to break from it. A political and empowered female subject cannot be thought without the possibility of accessing to a visual and communicative culture where women appear as agents. As Halberstam (1993: 190) puts it: "Power and conflict no longer spring from the domain of politics, and resistance has become as much an effect of popular culture, of videos, films, and novels, as of direct action groups". The responsibility is tantamount since media representations not only shape the way ordinary citizens respond to domestic violence but also the possibility of enforcing public policies and legislation reforms (Adelman, 2009).

In this respect, part of our project towards a peaceful society resides in *going against the burden of representational legacy*. Let us remember that, among the prevention measures that the UN *Handbook* recommends, changing the way women are represented is to be found. The problem is that, when faced with the task of creating empowering images of women, politics and popular culture proclaim that women are already empowered (as the Spice Girls, Tomb Raider, Charlie's Angels, etc. pretend to prove) (McRobbie, 2004). However,

as Despentes (2009) points out in plain language, powerful women of popular culture only mirror those whom men would like to go to bed with. From a gender perspective, empowering women in the media does not imply necessarily presenting women in positions of power but offering innovative audiovisual products in which women react to inequality, discrimination, violence or socially condoned sexism (such as the prevailing in commercial advertising, mainstream media, journalism and films) in challenging ways.

We are aware of the burden of images that have configured the collective imagination. A few popular examples from the history of American cinema, for example, teach us that *Gilda* (Charles Vidor, 1945) legitimises violence against the erotic femme fatale; *Who Framed Roger Rabbit?* (Robert Zemeckis and Richard Williams, 1988) presents the female character of the desirable Jessica Rabbit as a threat to male subjectivity; *Psycho* (Alfred Hitchcok, 1960) epitomizes the dangers of having a powerful mother (the same happens with the fairy tale stepmothers), and in *King Kong* (John Guillermin, 1976) rape in the hands of a gorilla can be framed in seductive terms. Indeed, the feminist critique of imagery has always insisted that western film tradition has constructed images of women bond to the pleasure of the male heterosexual gaze.

Fortunately, there have been film and documentary initiatives attempting to tell women's stories of violence from a different angle or/and to uncover and deconstruct the representational conventions sustaining women's images of being killed or violated (in cultural or physical manner). Strategies have been diverse: *The Secret Life of Words* (Isabel Coixet, 2005) breaks from the sadism implicit in western narratives (De Lauretis, 1984) which allows the camera to linger upon images of women's tortures or murders due to war (in this case, the Balkans). The film never shows such images and, thus, fails to please the inquisitive male protagonist's gaze who attempts to disclose the female protagonist's enigma (related to sexual violence and torture). *The Hours* (Stephen Daldry, 2002) uncovers the cultural violence surrounding women's lives through different decades and exposes its consequences on women's health and relationships. *Shrek* (Andrew Adamson and Vicky Jenson, 2001), in a more humorous way, exposes through a recourse to exaggeration the limitations of western fairy tale conventions for female protagonists. *King Kong* (Peter Jackson, 2005) teaches us that sexist myths, such as the beauty and the beast that underlines this movie, can be re-told by empowering the female protagonist. The character played by Naomi Watts, far from being seduced by the threatening masculinity the gorilla embodies (as it happens in the 1975 version mentioned above), confronts it firmly and makes use of her professional abilities as a vaudeville co-

median to avoid being killed. *I Am the One Who Brings Flowers to My Grave* (Hala Alabdalla and Ammar Albeek, 2007) is a documentary that allows the Sirian female director Alabdalla to be in front of and behind the camera. This enables her to consciously and reflectively manage her own image and disclose in a non victimising way the complexities that have shaped her own identity within a context of war and violence against women.

The examples described constitute a few but symptomatic and important challenges to tradition since they avoid images of women killed, abused or violated to raise awareness on: the complex ways women can confront any kind of violence, the subtleties of cultural violence and the relations between representations, violence and identity. In this context, we cannot avoid mentioning other strategies that feminist theories such as Halberstam (1993), Despentes (2009) or Lord (2006) have put forward, despite controversy. They advocate for representations that break from the dichotomy of men as violent victimizers and women as passive victims in stories of violence and propose that imagined narratives where women react violently against their abusers and potential killers have the potential to transform the fabric of the collective imagination. Examples can be found in films such as *The Brave One* (Neil Jordan, 2007) and *Death Proof* (Quentin Tarantino, 2007). In these cases, the women protagonists respond with violence to the violence inflicted upon them. In both cases is not a mere question of role reversal but a conscious strategy to go against the grain. In the first case, both producer (Susan Downey) and leading actress (Jodie Foster) wanted to explore (as they state in the bonus material of the DVD edition) what would happen if women reacted differently to aggression, what if they would not remain silently traumatized and, instead, would take action to find revenge. In the second case, *Death proof* makes very evident that the motive of the narrative is to break from the conventions of the psycho-killer genre that entrap women in the position of the dead victim. The first part of the movie follows the usual plot of a psycho-killer who murders several young women only to break the audience's expectations in the second part. From that moment the potential girls to be killed next surprise both spectators and male protagonist alike by putting a violent fight against him and finally wining.

At this conjuncture a question needs to be raised: is fictional violence perpetrated by women who have been victimized a necessary fantasy in a transition society which searches for equality and nonviolent relations? Niman (2010), in his contribution to the volume on *Nonkilling societies*, poses the same dilemma by quoting Dentan (1994: 95): "pacifist ideals that appeal only to those already safe from violence are not going to transform society".

It is a matter that needs further examination, but in any case we need to clarify that, following Halberstam (1993):

> […] role reversal never simply replicates the terms of an equation. The depiction of women committing acts of violence against men does not simply use "male" tactics of aggression for other ends; in fact, female violence transforms the symbolic function of the feminine within popular narratives and it simultaneously challenges the hegemonic insistence upon the linking of might and right under the sign of masculinity. Women with guns confronting rapists has the potential to intervene in popular imaginings of violence and gender by resisting the moral imperative to not fight violence with violence […] Women, in other words, long identified as victims rather than perpetrators of violence, have much to gain from new and different configurations of violence, terror and fantasy (Halberstam, 1993: 191).

We are aware of the lines of debate that this theoretical perspective opens but it could not be overlooked in the search for alternative media. Indeed, the representation of women committing acts of violence would go, by definition, against the project towards nonkilling media. However, if as Lee proposes in this same volume, only on equal footing one can take part in engaged dialogue directed to transform people's lives, first, equality in representational terms has to be achieved. Products from the media should provide, then, similar agent positions for male and female spectators. Undoubtedly, "choosing stories that value nonkilling responses to conflict" (Lee, in this volume) is not only legitimate and valid but pursuable to transform gender relations in society and eradicate violence against women. Nonetheless, feminist theoretical contributions explaining the necessity for images of women reacting with violence to violence cannot be disregarded within the possibilities of a "politics of dissent" (Lee, in this volume).

Another line of work is to be concerned with *re-thinking the way women's stories of violence have been appropriated and translated by the media*. We explained above the mise en scene that characterizes media coverage of domestic violence but the question now is to uncover what is being concealed. The representational "translation" (Spivak, 1988) of women's experiences of violence is made on the basis of law enforcement technologies –police and justice- (Foucault, 1979, 1981). This obviously feeds in turn media's necessity to narrate what can be visible: there is no better story to be told than a story of violence. It is easy to tell and enjoys a long representational legacy. Even in the well meaning stylebooks with recommendations on how to inform about domestic violence, police and judicial sources are

prioritized. This fact not only reinforces media's focus on the image of woman as victim and in search of protection, but hampers the intelligibility and visibility of any instance of female empowerment not coinciding with the prescriptive intelligible matrix that legitimates women as long as they are victims placing an accusation against their aggressors.

What is behind this visibility based on judicial facts?

- Gender violence is set on a matrix of intelligibility that implicitly or explicitly seeks to find the causes that have led to aggression.
- It only punishes the offender that takes his acts to the extreme of observable aggressions.
- It focuses on the lawbreaker, but not in the social fabric that enables violence against women to happen.
- It hides the daily violence against women carried out by the family, school or state.
- Thus, there is an implicit message to the public: women, whose status and characteristics do not match those of the reported abuse, do not have to worry because they will not be punished through violence. So, the rest of men and women can continue playing sexist patterns.

Adelman (2009) expands on the political ramifications of this problem by saying:

> In case studies of the United States, Canadian, and British battered women's movements, scholars have observed a pattern of institutionalization that involves translation, appropriation, and, for the most part, gender neutralization of woman battering […] This is seen through the naming of the problem as family or domestic violence and the criminalization and medicalization of domestic violence as a social problem […] translation process resulted in the subsequent appropriation and absorption of wife-battering into two distinct but related and competing discourses on family violence and wife assault […] The wife assault discourse triggered a criminalization of wife-battering aimed at state-based punishment of individual batterers and protection of individual battered women, while the family violence discourse triggered social services aimed at treating problems within the family unit. […] However, gender is accentuated in the transformation and globalization of domestic violence from social condition to a violation of women's human rights (Adelman, 2009: 194-195).

Voices from other geographical contexts coincide in underlining the problem of neutralizing gender violence through its criminalization and medicalization (Cabruja 2004; Finley, 2010; Grin Debert and Gregori, 2008;

Mestre, 2006; Schmal and Camps, 2008). It is agreed that the typification of violence and its resolution by juridical means avoids holding the social structure responsible for the inequalities that lead to killing women. In this sense, nonkilling media should make an effort to convey the message that killing women and violence against women (being symbolic, cultural, economical, physical, etc.) results from holding positions of unequal gendered power supported and reproduced by society. In this context, corporate media social responsibility should very deeply look into the paradoxes and contradictions involved in campaigning against gender violence but placing sexist commercials (or programmes) in the same TV channel, journal or radio.

Challenging the future

Despite what has been said so far, it cannot be denied that the feminist struggle to achieve international agreement on the criminalization of gender violence as a human rights issue and the implementation of measures to prevent it has provided women with a normative framework that was crucial. However, a next step should be taken and the media as producer of the fabric of culture and society has an important role to play. As Butler notes: "no doubt we need a punitive legal institution, but the question is whether, once legal responsibility has been assumed, this means that full responsibility has now been apportioned" (Butler, 2008: 3). It is from this perspective that nonkilling media can contribute to gendered literacy in order to transform violence against women. So far, the way gender violence has been made visible has not modified the sexist fabric of culture that enables it, instead such a way keeps on "fail[ing] to analyze the terms of its own enquiry, especially terms such as family, power and gender" (De Lauretis, 1989).

Needless to say, in order to transform the way media operates communication professionals need to be trained in gender issues. Also, society in general has to be educated in visual literacy from a gender perspective. Therefore, strong governmental efforts should placed in introducing gender mainstreaming in media education at all levels and journalism training curriculum at tertiary level.[3]

To sum up, nonkilling media from a gender perspective should aim at:

[3] An enlightening study of how this has been implemented in African Universities can be found in Made (2011).

1. Opening the scope of what violence against women is by reporting domestic violence along with other more subtle kinds of cultural violence and contextualizing it as a human rights issue.
2. Avoiding the victimisation of women and the focus on the particular circumstances or results of the aggression or murder.
3. Exposing the symbolic violence embedded in the burden of representational legacy.
4. Creating film and TV products that uncover the nonvisible but violent ways in which women live everyday and have lived through decades, echoing the idea that "[t]here are moral frames that can make the violence of an intervention 'disappear'" (Jenkins, 2010: 104-105).
5. Disclosing the contingency of the socially accepted gender norms of patriarchy and the violence they inscribe in the subjectification process, to remove its alleged universality, inscribed in our everyday lives.
6. Presenting empowering ways in which women have faced any kind of violence or discrimination.

Time has come for radical representational gestures that indeed transform the visual culture from a gender perspective and "undo the capturing effects of norms [...] that give the appearance of being forms of necessity" (Jenkins, 2010: 106). Social responsibility of nonkilling media is to bear witness to visible and nonvisible forms of violence. Indeed conflict cannot be avoided but the media's responsibility relies in occupying it in a nonviolent and nonkilling way (Butler, 2009: 175).

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Chapter Eight

Counternarratives to the *intelligentsia*

Understanding impediments to aspirant public peace intellectuals

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What do peace educators do when they see governments committing lethal actions, or planning to commit acts that will result in killing, and those peace educators know from their study, from their expertise, that the actions are both unjustified and poor alternatives to more adaptive policy and behavior? Do they write commentary or analysis and send it on to the press? Do they contact television and radio programs to offer informed analysis to then become part of the public discourse? Do they speak publicly?

If they make the attempt, it frequently fails. Few peace intellectuals were heard from during the September 2002-March 2003 period in the US, despite the widespread knowledge in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies and amongst the dedicated peace activist community that the nominal reasons for war were false.[1] There were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. None of the hijackers were Iraqi. Osama bin Laden despised Saddam Hussein; Saddam Hussein had outlawed and persecuted al-Qa'ida in Iraq. We all knew all these things and few of us managed to convey any of that to the American people. We might have made a difference and we did not.

What is a public peace intellectual and how do we make more?

The term public peace intellectual was coined by Johan Galtung in 1976 (2002a). What he meant by that was that the academics who published peer-reviewed articles and books should also be accessible to nonacademic citizens in order to help create new social norms and eventual policy changes. Todd Gitlin (2006: 123) calls the public intellectual "someone seasoned and knowledgeable who thinks out loud and is in the business of pub-

[1] See <http://www.alternet.org/story/16274/>.

lic enlightenment". Sadly, the peace side of our academic expertise has largely remained untapped, while the war side is routinely featured in our public discourse. This unfortunate situation is due to a number of related and unrelated factors. The three primary problems:

- Mainstream media is corporate, war system media and is inimical to a peace analysis.
- Even with academic freedom, some sanctions can still be applied against a professor who writes about controversial topics.
- Many universities are so pressurized to generate student credit hours, research grant monies and serious amounts of academic publishing that professors simply have no time to write for mainstream media.

These problems are persistent and are exacerbated by a positive feedback loop with negative consequences, requiring a reversal of direction, a sort of reset on what citizens are primed to believe. Glenn D. Paige (2000: 12) gives some perspective on the scope of the illogic that fights a nonkilling argument:

> Examples are when guns in the home kill more family members than intruders, bodyguards assassinate heads of state, violent revolutionaries become oppressors of the liberated, armies for defence oppress the defended, and the ultimate victorious weapon and its associated technology become the most dangerous threat to the continued existence of life on earth.

Despite the urgency, it's almost as though peace educators must intellectually feed the public such small bites that it is a challenge to chop the content. Arguably the most important public peace intellectual extant, Noam Chomsky (2001: 145), has a style is low key but powerful. "I'm a Deweyite from way back," he said to David Barsamian, "from childhood experience and reading. You figure out how to do things by watching other people do them…The right way to do things is not to try to persuade people you're right, but to challenge them to think it through for themselves". George Lakoff (2004) stresses the need to frame issues to reflect values the public intellectual regards as valuable, not to reflect values that are harmful to people. It is to be hoped that good educators already have these skills, since students with a wide diversity of values and positions on a range of issues study and challenge these professors every day. Public peace scholarship is education by other means. The slow accretion of the possibilities of a nonkilling world into the public discourse makes possible the imagination necessary to convince the public to support elements of the process

(Bourne, 2011). Stretching the mind is a probing, gentle, low pressure, incremental approach at which peace educators should be adept.

In my research into this welter of questions and concerns, I am confronting a nest of issues, beginning with three primary problems.

First, war is not inevitable, as public peace scholar Margaret Mead observed in her germinal 1940 essay, Warfare is only an invention—Not a biological necessity. Her assertion has been borne out by succeeding anthropologists (Gregor, 1996; Fry, 2006) and by numerous academic professionals from many disciplines, most saliently in the Seville Statement on Violence. Media research reveals, however, that violence is privileged as realistic and normal (Gorsevski, 2004). Second, war often occurs based on lies and incomplete conflict analysis, both of which could be corrected by peace academics participating enough in the public discourse. Third, there has been little research into why peace academics have such a seemingly low rate of participation in national conversations.

Based on interviews with a fairly diverse group of scholars and high-level activists, my preliminary results are showing several strands of thinking, informed by a richly diverse experience, disciplinary background, ethnicity or country of origin, gender and age. While it is too soon to reach conclusions, some pieces of grounded theory have begun to emerge. The individuals were mostly self-selected (of course all were volunteers, but a few were participants of convenience) from an association of peace educators, the Peace and Justice Studies Association. There is little random, then, about the selection of participants, nor was that an intention. The preliminary results show some emergent coalescence around the following:

- Fear of impact upon career. This included both fear of reprisal and of subjecting nonacademic writing to criticism.
- Lack of time to prioritize participation in public discourse.
- Assumption of rejection for dissenting viewpoints from corporate mainstream media.
- Weariness at perceived lack of public interest.
- Little faith in efficacy of striving to become a public peace intellectual.

The remainder of this chapter will be my effort to explore facets of these problems, to discuss inspirational public intellectuals past and present, and to justify the effort to engage in public peace scholarship. I will attempt to write it in a fashion that is academically informed yet accessible to the public. This is how we who have a foot in both worlds can help bring them together in a dialog toward peace and the prevention of killing. My effort here is to bring in

strands of thinking about this and to join them around the central notion that both our research and academic analysis on the one hand, and public explanation of problems of violence on the other, are vital to any hopes of a nonkilling world, one society at a time. In the US, our public discourse is mostly around the advisability of violence from the standpoint of the world superpower and all the obligations presumed attached to that. Elsewhere, peace educators more often confront convincing groups in conflict that violence is a poor choice, in part because it's the method that the oppressor is best at (Sharp, 2010).

This is not to claim that intellectuals must come from the ranks of professors, nor are all my research participants professors. As Thomas Merton (1968) showed when disciplined for his public expressions opposing the war in Vietnam, institutional pressures on intellectuals are not limited to colleges and universities, though that is my current primary focus. Religious organizations, corporations both profit and nonprofit, and even the community zeitgeist will affect the engagement and output of intellectuals into the public conversations of the day. If those intellectuals are promoting a nonkilling philosophy, they are most often in the disadvantageous position of the challenger. In her germinal discourse on nonviolence as it relates to numerous political philosophies, Joan V. Bondurant (1965) demonstrates that the nonkilling philosophy finds no friends in most schools of political thought. Indeed, the intelligentsia are usually quick to attack the challenger and can make career advancement nearly impossible. In most cases, an intellectual employed by an institution with something of a built-in challenger stance is a refuge for the scholar with a nonkilling message. Quaker, Mennonite, historical African American, and other colleges and universities can harbor the intellectual who expresses public opinion on policy that runs counter to the philosophy of the institution, as we have seen with careers of several notable public peace and justice intellectuals. Careers may thus be stalled, but not ended in those cases.

Peace educators MIA

When you are an activist, you work with media, unless you are an unsuccessful activist. You may work with mainstream media, social media, or alternative media—the most effective work with all three—but it is simply bread and butter for any normal social activist or community organizer.

This is why I earned a minor in Writing as a part of my Peace and Conflict Studies bachelors degree. This is why I earned a masters in Mass Communication. This is why I have written hundreds of editorials plus other writing over the years. It is all toward peace, justice and environmental sustainability.

And so, when I saw so little of the peace analysis in popular press during the September 2002-March 2003 period of selling the invasion of Iraq, I was increasingly dismayed. I was especially disappointed in the lack of peace educator participation in the press. We were rarely interviewed as articles claiming to be about this decision process streamed past us daily. Generals were interviewed. The Secretary of Defense and infinite Assistants were interviewed. Politicians and agency people were interviewed. The peace perspective was virtually nonexistent. And peace researchers and educators were missing in action on the editorial pages. It was hard to have a national conversation when in reality it was a national monologue from the war system, pouring content into the empty vessels of the public. Yes, there were many perceptive and helpful editorials in the peace press and in alternative media in general, but few in the media that affects the vast majority of public opinion in the US.

So the research project I'm working on tries to look at the perceptions of the academic about this phenomenon. I'm learning that time pressures are a piece of this puzzle. Jerry Jacobs and Sarah Winslow (2004) noted that most academics work 55-65 hours per week, whether they have earned tenure or not. My interview participants report enormous time crunches, especially if they also have families. Other perceptions help fill in the picture.

"In the past, I would be earnest and eager to weigh in on an issue I knew about," said one participant. "I'd feverishly write a commentary and then wait for a response from a paper while the piece grew colder and colder. I stopped trying to publish in the newspapers with anything time urgent. I never knew if some corporate influence stopped my piece or what." For a busy professor, even one whose research or teaching focused on understanding issues that often are in the news, there is the fear of wasting very limited spare time trying to say something that is never going to be heard because of unspoken editorial bias.

Then, if some piece does finally get published, a tenure track professor may get derailed because colleagues and administrators believe she is speaking outside her area of expertise, though the fear of the peace educator is often that, since it cannot be admitted that public expression of a partisan view for peace is alienating to corporate interests or to conservative political powerful institutional players, other justifications for critique are required. Hence, "She is not a political scientist. She is writing outside her discipline." There is a fear that this blocks tenure and, if a professor is denied tenure, they are sometimes simply then fired. One participant recalled a conversation with the departmental Chair following the then-young tenure-track professor's participation in a teach-in about a war. "He told me

he was not going to recommend me for tenure. He said I wouldn't really fit into the needs of the Department." That professor then told me that he went on to a "very enjoyable and fulfilling teaching and researching career" at another institution more welcoming to public peace scholarship. The intelligentsia who declaim on public intellectualism, e.g. Richard Posner (2003: 167), attempt to associate intellectual legitimacy with numbers of scholarly publications, but this is unhelpful in most cases, since the idea behind public scholarship at the service of nonkilling needs the participation of as many peace educators as possible, not simply the tiny handful who have published academically more than anyone else. A kindergarten teacher whose direct work is with shaping the educational culture of children toward a nonkilling philosophy and set of competencies, and who simply reads credible material that obviates a casus belli is doing a great public peace intellectual service by producing commentary for the public in newspapers, on the radio, on television, or in mass social media postings.

I was told by another participant that institutions wishing to enable their peace, justice and environmental sustainability faculty to help raise the level of public discourse should consider finding ways to make sure that academic freedom precedes tenure, that public scholarship count toward tenure, and that time spent with this type of civic engagement counts as part of those 55-65 work hours. That would not solve the problem of the corporate media blocking countervailing opinion, but it would break up part of that logjam that leaves us with an increasingly war-accepting, if not war-promoting, public discourse.

In an effort to address some of the aspects of this lacuna in public peace scholarship, I launched PeaceVoice in 2006. PeaceVoice is a free service to both peace professionals and editors. When a peace professional—a professor, an institute intellectual, a staffer for a nongovernmental organization, or a high-ranking activist—writes an analysis or an op-ed that meets some basic criteria (e.g., promotes positive peace) and sends it to me, I distribute it to editors across the US, who then have the option to use that piece. Students have gathered the contacts for editors and our web manager posts all the pieces that we distribute as soon as they are published, at which point they are available for free republishing. This works. Each piece is printed someplace, and most are multiple placements. So we have a working system, the goal of which is to begin to enrich our national conversation toward peace and away from war. But this is actually a tiny subsystem of what is necessary to produce a paradigm shift. To alter the phenology of conflict methods, we need to first change the climate.

Dialog toward truth: Educators and the public

In his call for scholars to become public scholars in the Buberian dialogic model, Ish-Shalom (2011: 839) writes, "Truth is a living entity constructed in an engaged and dynamic process and should be treated accordingly". What does this mean for those who live in the teaching and research world?

Gandhi also called for an ongoing and collaborative search for truth, which is to say, everyone has a piece of it and no one owns it all. Martin Buber (1878-1965) asked for three levels of dialog and search for the truth: intrapersonal, interpersonal, and the public dialog that helped scholars and civil society more completely help each other learn those larger truths. Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Buber disagreed about Israel, though they did so before Israel was founded, which was interesting, because Buber seems far more reasonable than does Gandhi in their 1938-9 disagreement, yet Gandhi proved correct in his assumption that founding Israel would require violent conquest, which it did.

Truth is infinitely complex, of course, because it is natural. Anyone claiming to completely understand any natural system is overestimating his knowledge, just as is anyone asserting he understands the absolute truth about any matter. There are always more factors and more complexities in any natural system and in any human reality.

Does this lack of total certitude about the truth stop us from acting? That is another question, of course, since the first order of business is to seek enough evidence from enough sources to justify action. But no, it wouldn't stop a person of conscience from acting on belief. Belief, supported by a preponderance of fact, crosses that threshold when it does—when the individual believes it does. Whether we have belief in violence, nonviolence, a Gaian Bona Dea or a retributive patriarchal Sky God is part of the dialectic, and will feed the self-fulfilling prophesies we create.

Buber understood what happened when scholars either supported the state or were silent. He fled Germany and his academic appointment in protest of Hitler's election, eventually teaching sociology and anthropology at Hebrew University. While he was a Zionist in Germany and in pre-Israel Palestine, he was not a Greater Israel Zionist and took withering blasts of criticism for his staunch support of a binational, or two-state, solution that was both sovereign Israel and sovereign Palestine. His life is an exemplar of what it means to be a public intellectual unafraid to pose dissenting views and seek greater and greater truth.

Time to speak out against killing

When is it time to speak out against killing? What did a German minister say?

> First they came for the communists,
> and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a communist.
> Then they came for the socialists,
> and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a socialist.
> Then they came for the trade unionists,
> and I didn't speak out because I wasn't a trade unionist.
> Then they came for me,
> and there was no one left to speak for me.

Pastor Martin Niemöller (1892-1984) is the man to whom those lines are attributed. They are "about the inactivity of German intellectuals following the Nazi rise to power and the purging of their chosen targets, group after group." He spoke against Nazism, was sent to concentration camps, survived, and lived as a pacifist leader into his 80s and the '80s.

When is it time? The time to speak out against killing our fellow humans is always and forever now, though it's often a tough sell. After all, as Mark Kurlansky (2006: 5-6) reminds us, when it comes to introducing the notion of nonviolence as a practical alternative to killing, "the Caesars and Napoleons of history have always used their power to muffle the voices of those who would challenge the necessity of war—and it is these Caesars, as Napoleon observed, who get to write history". Peace educators are generally working with a citizenry lacking in historical knowledge, and even more pronounced is the US public school lack of history texts that encourage critical thinking, since most are missing salient information about basic debates in our past democratic controversies (Loewen, 1995). The deficit is daunting.

On back in 1976, our now longest operating peace and conflict forensics scholar, Johan Galtung, wrote a piece on intellectuals published in the academic journal, *Higher Education in Europe*, which then reprinted it in 2002, as well as a follow-on piece. Galtung discussed intellectuals, their public role, and their intentions and loyalties. He predicted what others have since documented, the growing silence of the intellectual:

> Ultimately one might even imagine a society [in which] the means of intellectual production are so monopolized by an intellectual élite, so solid and loyal to itself, that no such thoughts would ever emerge, either from the intellectuals [themselves] or from the masses left dull by insufficient exposure to problems beyond the most trivial and by over-exposure to solutions produced for them by others (2002a: 62).

His basic typology for intellectuals is that they either are completely independent and publicly critical of whatever is wrong with public policy, corporate policy, or academic policy—or they are not true intellectuals, but are rather what he calls the intelligentsia, in service to elite interests.

While the distinction is valuable, I think Galtung is more than a bit unrealistic and simplistic in his rudimentary typology in these two pieces. He fails to acknowledge where he has himself been a member of the intelligentsia by his definition. Or, if he can make the case that he has never succumbed to those depths, he needs to acknowledge that there are some academic superstars who need not fear sudden and chronic unemployment from the academy. He has always been at the top, deservedly so, but his scorn for those of us who fail to adequately attack our own academic institutions is perhaps too Manichean and easily delivered from someone whose talents are simply overwhelming. Speaking personally, I do not write op-eds for our local newspapers excoriating the university president for his massive and rapidly increasing salary even as the rest of us suffer freezes at best. For this failure on my part, Galtung would label me as part of the intelligentsia, even though I have been arrested, jailed, tried and imprisoned many times for my nonviolent resistance to our nation's militarism, including six times in direct local publicized opposition to Oregon's US Senators who voted for funding for the war in Iraq. I choose my battles because I am not a superstar who would easily find other work so fulfilling as teaching about nonviolence to hundreds of students each year. So, I am on the wrong side, according to Galtung.

Galtung finally tell us how to fix this: "The remedy? Obviously—the freelance intellectual, free to follow his and her leads wherever they lead" (2002b:. 67). Sure, that would fix it all, but what would happen to the numbers involved and their abilities to reach and teach? Without institutional support from the academy or foundations, who would pay the rent, or is Galtung suggesting we who might be trying to develop intellectual goods should simply sleep under bridges and bring our mendicant bowls to the corner to remain pure? After all, his freelancer still needs a sponsor, a publisher, someone to keep the intellectual freelancer fed and clothed. Is that freelancer then pandering to the organization who hires her or him to speak? Is that freelance intellectual spinning her or his writing to try to sell a few books to survive? Who is that freelancer trying to please enough to live another day in order to be able to offer those intellectual products to more people?

I think Johan Galtung may have to return to his essays and refine them or he is going to write off all of us, even possibly himself, as mere intelligentsia. I suspect he'd acknowledge there are degrees and types of intellec-

tuals in a far more complex taxonomy than the binary model he has created, if he wants to maintain his credibility and the deep admiration so many of us feel for him and his work over the past 50+ years.

Public peace intellectuals and public opinion

The struggle by some academics to give solid information to the public in digestible form is long and interesting, with some career casualties and reactionary institutions playing antagonistic parts along the way. One interesting strand has been the peace scientists that began their braided journeys of social science research and public peace intellectualism half a century ago in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

These pioneers in peace science include David Singer, Elise Boulding, Herbert Kelman, Paul Kimmel and others. They launched many journals, longitudinal studies, professional associations and have done enough public scholarship—that is, translating their research findings into informed opinion for public consumption—so that the war system's impact has been at least slightly blunted, from Vietnam to Iraq to Afghanistan to nuclear weaponry to military budgets.

If a certain amount of that scholarly activity has been brought into our public discourse with the effect of helping all of us to learn more, how can we encourage them to continue and offer more? We obviously need it.

Academic freedom is clearly crucial. One respondent in my study, who taught at one of the original Seven Sisters colleges, was fired some years ago for nominally unclear reasons. It was no coincidence, he felt, that he had just written an op-ed for nuclear disarmament. After all, peace science ultimately collides with war profiteering and the entire military-industrial-Congressional-media system. Attempting to get transformative conflict forensics into public discourse is not akin to Carl Sagan explaining the stars to the public, nor like Oliver Sachs helping demystify migraine headaches, two uncontroversial topics that do not collide with corporate or government policy. A public peace intellectual is out there as a countervailing force to the war machine; the same owners on the boards of directors of the Pentagon contractors are on the boards of directors of major media conglomerates. The nonkilling message is perceived as hostile to what Daniels and Walker (2001) aptly label "the conflict industry."

Research, of course, is dismissed by ideologues unless it matches their worldview, but most people are still not so polarized that reason cannot reach them. Time to help bring more science to the service of more peace, which will require the translation services of the public peace science intellectual.

Peace intellectuals under pressure

In the aftermath of World War II, German intellectuals were pilloried for lack of backbone in standing up to the Nazis. Intellectuals everywhere tried to demonstrate better behavior to show the world that academics can also be courageous. They frequently became involved in peace and disarmament movements. Yes, there were the intelligentsia who seemed almost a logical extension of the German academics in service to Hitler. Herman Kahn, Edward Teller, and many who devoted their intellectual talents to aggrandizing American power could be found doing the work of the elites. But there were also many who courageously resisted.

Intellectuals were first challenged by the McCarthy witch hunts. Some folded and testified, gave names, joined the rat system and sprouted sudden rightwing ideology. Some, like Paul Robeson, stood against the House Un-American Activities Committee and some stood defiant of McCarthy on the Senate side. Some just raised questions, countervailing opinions, and analysis, even in that generally stultifying political atmosphere of red-baiting response to critical thinking.

Public peace intellectuals like Linus Pauling and his wife Ava Helen Pauling were keys to achieving the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and were strong through many campaigns before and after that. Linus was a chemistry professor and was asked by Robert Oppenheimer to lead that aspect of the Manhattan Project, which Pauling refused to do, as a pacifist. Oppenheimer would later learn about the loyalty of the elites to their intelligentsia, when his security clearance was stripped during the McCarthy period of hysteria. Ava Helen Pauling was Linus's conscience and prompter toward his battles. She led him to their anti-internment activities during World War II, another stance by a public intellectual that defied the zeitgeist. The times of peace and prosperity without conflict and enemies are the times when intellectuals are more active, but the times of hot conflict, security paranoia, xenophobia and jingoism are when intellectuals really earn their stripes.

Peace journalism and public scholarship

Peace journalism? What is that? Why do we need it? Some of the problems created by mainstream journalism that peace journalism can seek to remedy:

- inadequate appreciation for alternatives to violence
- poor contextualizing of both violence and nonviolence
- exceptionalism allowing for our violence and condemning theirs

- assumption that we all must choose between violence and apathy
- poor grasp of structural violence
- no appreciation for structural nonviolence
- sacralizing violent warriors
- ignoring nonviolent warriors
- valorizing violence
- ignoring nonviolence or treating nonviolence as misguided, naive, quaint, or publicity seeking stunts
- bypassing nonviolent experts and immediately sourcing military or adversarial politicians (now a mere redundancy)

So our remedies are to do what fixes all that, including but not limited to:

- understanding violence in order to facilitate reconciliation
- highlighting nonviolent initiatives
- recruiting nonviolent citizen involvement
- featuring nonviolent case studies that show nonviolent success
- comparing costs and benefits of violence and nonviolence
- gatekeeping in favor of experts in nonviolence, conflict resolution, restorative justice, mediation, conflict costs, conflict transformation, ethical advantages of nonviolence, and more
- positive regard for nonviolent leadership and organizers
- framing nonviolent initiatives as cost-reduction measures
- marking nonviolent success anniversaries and engaging in background educational pieces
- crediting quiet transformational workers (e.g. intercultural reconciliation staff and activists) with conflict mitigation achievements
- featuring a broad set of options to conflict rather than the simplistic 'do you want to bomb someone or just do nothing?'

These are the short lists, of course. There are excellent, helpful, and more detailed examinations of this strand of journalism. One of the mistaken canards about journalism that features the qualities that promote peace is that it is all kumbaya and insipid, when the reverse is the case. It looks harder at conflict and honestly appraises the weaknesses in our human responses while looking earnestly for components of what might actually work to help us evolve as a species, culture by culture, community by community, away from the destructive conflict management methods that eviscerate our economy, devastate our ecology and dim our hopes for a better future for our children and grandchildren. Peace journalism does not advocate an end to conflict;

that is a fast path to discredit and dismissal; peace journalism promotes the escalation of conflict but in a constructive nonviolent transformative method that peace research is featuring (Alger, 2000; Kriesberg, 2007). Peace journalism is the hard look that avoids easy credulity and breezy cynicism alike. Peace journalism takes journalism seriously.

Peace educators and our public discussions

Public peace intellectuals are from many disciplines—Chomsky to Zinn, Mead to Shiva—and Peace and Conflict Studies is a good place to synthesize the peace strands of those disciplines. One in current hot discussion about matters quite close to peace and nonviolence—and when I use peace I use it in the context of the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, which is to say, positive peace, or peace and justice by peaceable means—is from Anthropology.

Gavin Smith (2011) observes that the Gramscian notion of an intellectual's mission as a dialectical process with the public is bent sideways frequently by the desired results of the funding of the ethnographic fieldwork, especially if that funder is the government in a time of war and the human geography is where that war is occurring.

Researchers require funding and those who do their work with teams in foreign places require a great deal of funding. Sometimes the funding comes free of contaminating interests of powerful players, state or corporate, but when it comes with strings they can be strong binding wires. That is one way junk science happens and is how public intellectuals become little more than purchased puppet intelligentsia.

A critical thinker, trying to decode all this, is helped by finding the independent ones, those who cannot be purchased, even when they apply for and receive funds from parties with interests beyond objective science. Yes, results may be ignored, but they cannot be flipped unless that researcher allows it. And no researcher should sign away the ability to speak freely except, obviously, to protect research participants.

It has been very important to corporate and imperial designs to control intellectual interface with the public. Peace intellectuals are challenged to overcome the painted picture of the ivory tower pointy head, of lack of realism, of lacuna of disciplinary rigor, and of blinding bias. These images are created by our own faults and by war propaganda—recall Goering's admonition to blame the pacifists first. We can eliminate the former and work to counter the latter. Is research too expensive? Go get arrested for peace and

make that part of your research. Take a stance, timid or truculent, observe what happens, and report it to the people.

Public peace intellectuals did not stop the invasion of Iraq, and my dear departed Dad, who was our Pee Wee hockey coach, said, "Always change a losing game." If we are peace educators, let's think about how we can reach into the national discourse rather than wait too long and in vain for it to come to us.

Stop the funeral music

Can peace academics influence public opinion? Who listens to them? Who reads them in the op-ed pages? Who watches them on TV?

Apparently, it's decided. There are no more public intellectuals, let alone public peace intellectuals. Bates (2011) notes that there has not been even one intellectual on the cover of *Time* magazine in more than a decade. Richard Posner wrote an entire book proving that public intellectuals are a washed-out breed. End of story. Stick to your classrooms, professors, and your academic journal articles. No one wants you on TV, radio or in the op-ed pages.

I guess that covers one strand, then, of the five main strands in our braided public fora. After all, there is local media, alternative media, the blogosphere, and social media. Are they worth considering? Ask Hosni Mubarak. Ask Ben Ali. Before that, ask Slobodan Milosevic—whoops, too late. In Mubarak's and Ali's cases, social media greatly hastened their downfall. In the case of Milosevic—long, long ago, before Facebook, waaay back in 2000—his Achilles heel was local media.

Look at those four arrays of outlets for your public peace intellectuals. They are in play. I can't keep up. Michael Nagler and Cynthia Boaz of the Metta Center for Nonviolence just put up pieces in Facebook on their recent workshop on nonviolence in the infamous San Quentin prison in California. It's spreading around Facebook and off onto digests of interesting pieces. Alternet, Common Dreams, Truthout, Antiwar, and numerous other alternative media digests are shipping out provocative pieces from an array of public intellectuals, including peace intellectuals, many of whom are lighting up the blogosphere constantly. Small town media are not quite as active in utilizing the voices of public peace intellectuals, but some are and the numbers are growing.

So the reports of the death of the public peace intellectuals are greatly exaggerated. The obstacles are sometimes quite formidable, but those peace academics just keep plugging away. Let's give them a listen.

Chewing gum and... taking a step

If there is one thing that some disciplinary academicians despise, it's a polymath. Take a Noam Chomsky and toss him into a river known for schools of political scientists and they frenzy him with their bites at anything he does outside his circumscribed role, professor emeritus of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

It's tough to be good at any work, so some people tend to get defensive and dented egos when an outsider does as well and does it in addition to her own work. It can get quite ugly in the academy when these traits are evoked by the work of a Renaissance woman or man. It can be very nasty when someone who is an excellent academic also speaks out publicly. This seems to trigger the outrage of those who have all they can do to keep up in the cloistered halls of academe. When a historian comments learnedly but negatively on the invasion of, say, Cambodia by Nixon, there may be a slashing attack on his tenure process (this happened to a friend of mine all those years ago, but he prevailed, thank goodness). When a psychologist helps organize a teach-in on a war he may also be suddenly derailed off the tenure track (also happened to a wonderfully accomplished academic who went on to a brilliant career elsewhere). Or there is another friend who is a historian, wrote a letter to the editor, and was dismissed from an Ivy League school on other, bogus, grounds. Speaking for peace or against war from the standpoint of someone who has actually made a study of it, or is an expert on one aspect of it, is turning oneself into a target.

These are not new issues. There is the case documented by Alexander Olson (2011: 53) of Mary Hunter Austin's public scholarship and two friends of hers, Henry Smith of Southern Methodist University and B. A. Botkin of the University of Nebraska.

> Austin was an inspiration for both men. As Smith put it, she found ways to bridge the domains of "botany, geology, archaeology, the psychology of genius, history, anthropology, literary history, sociology, prose fiction, regional culture, religion, and verse for children.

It does seem that if Austin could do all that back before women were even supposed to achieve anything intellectually, we who teach some aspect of peace from any discipline ought to be able to engage in our public discourse and offer some considered commentary that might counter the hegemony of the politicians, generals and war profiteers. We can walk our talk and chew gum simultaneously, right? Or work for peace and bike...

Freedom is not free

> Our data suggests that recourse to violent conflict in resisting oppression is significantly less likely to produce sustainable freedom, in contrast to nonviolent opposition, which even in the face of state repression, is far more likely to yield a democratic outcome.
>
> —Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman (2005)

Those who support war and war budgets tell us that "Freedom is not free," claiming that freedom is correlated positively to how much we spend on war and how willing we are to wage it. These people often ask what they regard as a crucial question about a candidate: Does s/he have the stomach to do what must be done? The costs will be high in blood and resources. We may lose many lives and take many lives, and we will spend ourselves into extreme debt if necessary, even go broke for generations if we must, but we will never waver in defense of freedom.

Except that war and violence are the stupidest, costliest, most immoral, and least effective ways to seek freedom or defend it.

We had no real idea of this pre-Gandhi. Even post-Gandhi, since it took him 28 years to liberate India, we assumed nonviolence was always slow, and allowed for ongoing occupation until the occupier sailed away at his own timeline. The AK-47 looked good to the decolonizing world. The Bomb looked best to the US.

Then came the lightning fast campaigns of the Civil Rights movement as they added the prong of civil resistance to the long, slow NAACP legal work. Suddenly, victories were coming in months or a year, not decades. And at the national level, as the study by Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman shows, speed and effectiveness ramped up, often tossing out dictators in months or just a couple of years, but sometimes even in weeks or even days.

What does freedom cost using nonviolence?

It still requires risk to life and limb by nonviolent resisters, though casualties are never as bad as when violence is used by the challengers.

It costs freedom for the nonviolent resisters who are incarcerated.

Campaigns and movements still need funding, though one Trident submarine could fund all the social movements described in all the 67 regime changes in the Freedom House study. Freedom is not free, but nonviolence is certainly the blue light special for humankind.

Don't point that head at me

Intellectual pointy heads. That's what many military troops seem to feel about academics who express respect for indigenous peoples and different cultures. But in 2007 the US military launched a Human Terrain Systems project that recruited social scientists, including political scientists and sociologists, but primarily anthropologists, in order to make the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan easier.

Human Terrain: War becomes academic, is a 2010 film from Udris, and it examines this problem using 25 interview participants—some far more than others—and telling the story of one young anthropologist's tragic seduction and death by IED.

Michael Bhatia tells a fellow HTS embed that he always felt that he should have served in the military. "What do you think you're doing right now?" was the response. Bhatia even asked questions of the locals about how many men were off getting training to join the insurgency, something that effectively gathered intelligence for the military, which is what he swore they were not doing. The viewer senses that Bhatia really genuinely wants to help the locals, wants to honor and protect them, but he is just another infidel to many, since he is there under the protection of the US military and to serve that military and that occupation. His research in Afghanistan was clearly tilted toward security issues.

While Montgomery McFate and other enthusiasts for more anthropology service to the military make their excellent points, Catherine Lutz makes the clearest points of all when she sums up by noting that the basic question of whether to go to war is skipped by those who are involved. The job of the social scientists is not to help make war and occupation more humane and more successful, but to devote ourselves to figuring out how to stay out of war in the first place. McFate and those who argue for more academic service to military ends are operating downstream from that question and therefore miss the true center of this issue.

The film is well worth seeing, with points and counterpoints belying any facile analysis, but which ultimately does suggest that we may not be able to change the game, but we can at least stand as firmly as possible against the game changing us. Jarat Chopra, one of Bhatia's mentors at Brown University, threaded complex viewpoints into a multitextured opinion, as he is also a military culture expert, but on behalf of the UN peacekeepers rather than any national military. Even the US military HTS members are kinder, gen-

tler, more professional killers (one of them refers to himself almost exactly like this) rather than just bloodlust killers of civilians.

For the peace side, for the nonviolent side, these questions roll over into Lutz's far more profound challenge to the decision to go to war in the first place. It is all about human agency, about never ceasing in our efforts to change that master narrative, to push the conflict toward negotiation and discourse, dialog and collaboration, rather than escalation, bigger guns and more cleverly concealed IEDs. The film is worth watching and, I hope, will show our young budding scholars that embedding with the military is simply serving an agenda of coercion and occupation. It is an effort to warp hearts and minds, not to really help create conditions that will foster friendship. I will never be friends with the troops who are from another nation and who have big guns and occupy my country, never. It doesn't take an anthropologist to understand that human universal. What it takes are many citizens offering nonviolent resistance in host and client states both.

Public peace intellectual #1

All greater and lesser militaristic demagogues and genocidal dictators share a gene for persecuting intellectuals. Pol Pot, Hitler, Stalin, Lenin, Pinochet, Milosevic—all the Fun Kids from History's Hellspots shared this proclivity. University professors teaching critical thinking, liberal judges, institute scholars trying to research and publish on how to create a more just and egalitarian society were in the crosshairs. This is well known.

In the last few months of Richard Nixon's reign one of the marks of just how close he was to dictatorial rule was that there were rumors sweeping just below the surface inside the Beltway in many insider Washington DC circles that he was going to stage a military coup of some sort to retain and strengthen power. People who worked in those circles at that time were, for once, actually lending some credence to such conspiracy theories. Nixon made one of the most credible US moves toward becoming a militaristic demagogue in our modern democracy. Indeed, those moves in that era were enough to guarantee his ouster—the corrupt anti-democratic tactics uncovered in the Watergate investigation doomed his regime in the America of the early 1970s. There were two episodes that viscerally gripped average Americans and many of their elected representatives.

One, the break-in at Democratic party national headquarters campaign offices at the Watergate hotel.

Two, the break-in to steal files from Daniel Ellsberg's therapist.

Daniel Ellsberg is first an intellectual. Yes, he put in time in the Marines. But his primary life's work was to cognitively engage insoluble problems and work on solving them, familiarizing himself with the research, learning how to conduct research and doing so, and then applying his results and that of others to actual problems of public policy. His intellectual capacity was and is quite impressive and his thinking was tapped at the highest levels, including spending the days of the Cuban missile crisis at the White House with a handful of strategic thinkers advising the highest level policy makers, and including his role in formulating and promulgating US policy in Vietnam. Ellsberg is no pacifist and certainly had no intentions in those years of ruining his own insider career.

But he did, once that inconvenient and all-too-rare special human phenomenon called 'the conscience' escaped the inner cage in which we keep it in order to 'get by.' Ellsberg agonized over his role in lying to the American public about a war that we should never have entered and one that many were working to end. He was in turmoil about what he knew and how that knowledge might shock and galvanize the American people into finally insisting on the end to that war. He also knew that all the others with that insider knowledge were not afflicted by a powerful conscience—and even if they had twinges, those nagging little problems were not rising to the level of actually spilling the beans. It was him or no one. It was his career or no one's. It was his freedom or no one's. It was his family life or no one's. And the war slogged on, running through the usual long lugubrious litany of lies to justify it.

Ellsberg made up his mind to reveal these mendacities and took the steps necessary to get the volumes of information to the public. His insider information was all about the massive theft of lives from my generation of American youth—I turned 18 during the Tet Offensive and knew, along with my entire American cohort, that we were the meat being grabbed by the draft to be fed to the war—and far more from all generations alive in Vietnam. It was secondarily but importantly about the justification for the preposterous amount of money taken directly from the paychecks of all working Americans, and finally it was about the war system itself, which lives on lies and other people's lives and always has. Ellsberg recognized what Gandhi noted long before, "The science of war leads one to dictatorship, pure and simple. The science of nonviolence alone can lead on to pure democracy" (Gandhi qtd. in Fischer, 1983: 291).

Ellsberg faced 115 years in prison as soon as the papers hit the presses. Nixon sent out orders to silence him by any means—he was literally in physical danger. But our democracy proved robust enough to protect Ellsberg. It was a bet he made despite the evidence about Nixon and his whole

corrupt and vicious team, from Attorney General John Mitchell to Spiro Agnew to Robert Ehrlichman to minor thugs like G. Gordon Liddy. While the victory was not assured, and in fact looked dubious at the time, Ellsberg made the right decision by all lights. He will be recorded as a great American hero and judged quite favorably by history, despite all Nixonian efforts to label and eliminate 'the most dangerous man in America' (see the film).

A public peace intellectual is the precise opposite of the imperial intelligentsia, and rogue dictators have always had their pet geniuses. Hitler had Goebbels. Nixon had Kissinger. These are the bright ones without conscience who place self-aggrandizement above all else and act in service to the worst rulers. Both kinds of intellectual can be found on every campus, but the tendency of the most maniacal despots is to treat intellectuals much as the 13th century papal legate advised the military to treat the people who could be Catholic or Cathar alike: "Kill them all. For the Lord knows them that are His."

Daniel Ellsberg would have died roasting on a spit in previous eras or in other countries. We are fortunate to have him in our pantheon of truthtellers. May other intellectuals find their consciences and speak out.

Imperfect intellectuals and other redundancies

Franz Boas (1858-1941) was a public intellectual during the halcyon days of public scholarship. He was far ahead of his time in several respects and a product of his time in others. He is credited with moving the entire field of anthropology away from an assumption of racial superiority to racial equality, and with going to the public with his findings. He has been criticized by some feminists for his chauvinism typical of his day. Both assessments are valuable and, one hopes, do not cancel each other out. No one is above critique and no one can survive inspection for perfection. Boas arguably did more to eliminate racism inside and outside the academy than virtually anyone in his era except perhaps his friend, W.E.B. DuBois (1868-1963), so it is hoped that acknowledgement will be afforded him by those who note his sexism, just as it is hoped that the notes on Boas will avoid uncritical hagiography.

Indeed, some academic women and men organized a conference discussing Boas in December 2010. From the report:

> An interdisciplinary conference on "Franz Boas: Ethnographer Theorist, Activist, Public Intellectual" was held in London, Ontario, Canada 2–5 December 2010, organized by Regna Darnell, Michelle Hamilton and Joshua Smith (Western Ontario) together with Robert Hancock (Victoria) and sponsored by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Can-

> ada. Boas' Americanist anthropology crossed the academic disciplines of anthropology, linguistics, folklore, American Indian Studies, education and many others. Twenty-three papers reassessed his contributions in these and other disciplines and highlighted his political and social activist commitments in both North America and Europe. Papers crossed the social sciences and humanities fields and ranged from literary studies to philosophy. (Darnell, 2011: 253)

Whitfield (2010: 430) asserts, "Boas was decisive in changing public discourse on the often radioactive subject of race. He honored the ideal of the scholar as activist and as social conscience, and virtually no one in modern American history came closer to satisfying that standard". At the remove of a century, it is almost inconceivable to us in the new millennium that racism was so overt and ugly in the late 19th and early 20th century period, but that was the case. Women's movements were discriminating against women of color, as we saw in some of the sordid episodes during the suffrage struggles. Academics were teaching racial superiority and inferiority. Few intellectuals were saying, as did Boas, that the Native American mind was fully as sophisticated as the European mind, something that is long settled by science nowadays but which was bold and even dangerous for him to say then. "His bibliography lists 625 titles, and runs forty pages. The best-known work is undoubtedly The Mind of Primitive Man (1911), and no text of its era lent such scholarly authority to the struggle against racism and jingoism" (Whitfield, 2010: 430). So it's been precisely one century since Boas tossed down that gauntlet.

Fortunately, feminists have proven entirely capable of carrying the torch of public intellectualism forward to advocate for nonviolence, women's rights, children's rights, and have not done so despite Boas and others, but rather standing on his shoulders, on the shoulders of his protégés such as Margaret Mead, and are moving the ball steadily forward. Martha Nussbaum (2003) asserts convincingly that public scholars who are intimately familiar with the problems of public and corporate policy "provides a badly needed counterweight" to poor policy.

Cole-powered dissent

Juan Cole (2006) writes, "The role of the public intellectual is my career." The University of Michigan professor is an expert on the Middle East and is a prolific blogger with as many as 250,000 readers daily, making him a public intellectual with some effect. The public and policy makers alike read his blog.

How is it that Juan Cole can manage this and so few other US intellectuals offer routine public comment read by many?

He is devoted, he is brilliant, he is determined to share his professional knowledge rather than lock it into lengthy scholarly journal articles read by few and never in a timely fashion, and he is tenured. Except for an unwillingness of other institutions to hire him, he does have job security and a measure of immunity from sanction from his institution.

Cole is modest about the effect he may have and he is modest about his certitude regarding people and events in the region of his expertise, but he is not falsely modest about being one of those experts. He notes the years he has spent in the region, his linguistic abilities, his recognized expertise, and his track record of being a lone voice or the first voice to warn about the dire consequences of poor US policy, such as his pioneering caveats about the inevitability of guerrilla insurgency against US invasion of Iraq.

We need more like Cole. There are more, but not enough. Indeed, it should be the policy of institutions of higher education to reward their intellectuals who speak, write and demonstrate publicly for peace and justice by peaceable means. Would this pit the universities against the political rulers? Sometimes. And that is exactly what a robust democracy should support. The history of yes-men regimes is not one of success. Yes, we have plenty of fighting in our polity, but we need more of that actually informed, rather than driven by Fox Factoids from the Sarah Palin-Michele Bachmann types who are only expert at self-aggrandizement and literally nothing else.

Positive public peace intellectuals

Positive peace is peace and justice by peaceable means. Negative peace is an imposed peace, usually an oppressive reality maintained at threat of violence. The overwhelming need is for positive peace public intellectuals. Historian Kent Shifferd (2011) is one. He looks at how our war system came into existence, what the consequences of that system have been and are today, and what it takes to transform that system into a peace system. A nonkilling society would need to transform social norms to invalidate killing, which would make organized killing a thing of the past and would also blunt killing by the minority of humans who naturally favor killing, since they would be normally deterred by sanctions, including opprobrium (Collyer, 2003).

This long public educational process that makes the citizenry more amendable to the messages of public peace intellectuals can only be done on a sustained basis or it is ineffective in the crisis period that first worried me.

So, for example, Glenn Paige (2002: 21), in his discussion of what it would take to create peace on the Korean peninsula, includes: "No conditions of Korean society—political, economic, social, and cultural—or relationships between Koreans and foreigners that can only be maintained or changed by threat or use of killing force". Paige is essentially noting here that eliminating structural violence is key to creating peace. It is this sort of assertion, made publicly, frequently, in many ways by many peace intellectuals, that will begin to shift public opinion, create a stereoscopic depth of vision and public readiness to receive the messages needed to create a nonkilling society.

Exegeting and confronting our academic role

Reframing history will change the future. This is a battle with existential consequence when we think of how perceptions of the past color conflict today. Convincing people that someone is good and someone else is bad is how these lines get drawn and adversarial conflict can erupt. This is how propaganda works and it is the province of the academicians to correct bad propaganda, or at least to make the attempt.

Janet Martin-Nielsen (2010: 138) writes about Cold War linguistics:

> This was an era in which language came to be seen and wielded as a tool—a tool for America's diplomatic and scientific interlocutors, a tool necessary for securing America's coveted place as the leader of free nations.

Here we see revealed the biased language of the intelligentsia, those who serve the cause and case of the empire. The leader of free nations? How can we still be referring to the US during the Cold War in those terms? We helped to make sure that Iranians, Guatemalans, Congolese and others were not free. We took away their freedom. We overthrew their democratically elected leaders.

The brutality of the Soviet Union and Red China under Mao is well documented. Their people weren't free and they created buffer states without freedom. Few rational people would have chosen to live in those countries rather than in the US. The duty of those scholars who wish to effect a nonkilling world is to take the creative, third position, aligning with life instead of with the left or right. Only when we take this distinct stance can we make a distinct mark. We can change the elite debate into a public dialog. The reconciliation process cannot properly begin without this reorientation.

Conclusions

The interviews I've conducted have shown that public peace scholarship, that is, scholarship advocating nonkilling, justice-seeking public policy and social norms, is perceived by many peace educators and activists to be too daunting to achieve. The presenting prohibitory problems range from fear of negative impacts on careers, lack of time to write for the popular press, fear of editorial rejection (and the perception, then, of wasting valuable time producing content for public consumption with the nested fear that the public would not be prepared to believe the peace scholar), and fear of collegial criticism for lack of expertise (usually related to credentialed expertise in other areas). Preliminary policy recommendations include but are not limited to the following:

Academic institutions

Never punish but rather reward public scholarship for peace with praise, course release, credit toward tenure.

Media organizations

Seek and publish perspectives from peace educators and researchers.

Political institutions

Seek and listen to perspectives from peace educators and researchers.

Further research might include:

- Correlates of public scholarship, public opinion, and public policy.
- Survey and analysis of public attitudes about public intellectuals.
- Survey of journalism texts, especially texts used to teach editing, to determine how public scholars are regarded, if at all.
- Research into levels of knowledge and attitudes amongst media editors relating to public peace intellectuals.

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Chapter Nine

Contemporary Peaceful Societies

Evidence from the Press *

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Introduction

When I read an ethnography, I often find myself intellectualizing other people's lives. The anthropologist may recount interesting incidents and describe unique individuals, but I just focus only on the major arguments of the work. It is tempting, for me at least, to concentrate on the social or cultural conditions that foster peace in a society and lose sight of the complexities of the people themselves. Others may share a similar failing. However, news stories in the press, such as coverage of natural or man-made disasters, can serve as a useful antidote to that tendency.

For instance, readers of Dentan's (1968) classic *The Semai: A Nonviolent People of Malaya* can get quite involved in his absorbing descriptions of Semai peaceful life. They might forget the problems of an indigenous people living in the Cameron Highlands of Peninsular Malaysia. A tragic landslide at 5:45 in the afternoon of August 7th this year, and the many news stories in the Malaysian press, reminded me that the Semai are much more than just a people struggling to remain peaceful.[1] The news, of very real people frantically helping each other dig out of the mudslide, emphasizes their humanity.

Harun Bahsoon, a 41 year old Semai man living in the village of Sungai Ruil, near the resort town of Tanah Rata, told a reporter how he rushed out of his house when he heard the roar of the landslide. He witnessed the mud burying the homes of his neighbors. He told a reporter, "we ourselves were standing in waist deep mud and soil while trying to pull the victims out." Seven Semai died and two others were badly injured. Such news reports, I would argue, bring a sense of intimacy to those of us who live far away

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from Peninsular Malaysia, even if they failed to mention whether or not the Semai of Sungai Ruil blamed the tragedy on Ngku, the thunder spirit.

The objective of this paper is to explore the virtues and liabilities of using news reports to supplement the scholarly information gathered by anthropologists. Some of the 25 societies portrayed in the Peaceful Societies website are still visited by scholars frequently, others less often, and some almost never since they were most recently described, decades ago.

The Peaceful Societies website, which started in December 2004, has tried, through its News and Reviews feature, to keep up to date with important news and scholarship about each society. As might be expected, scholars write tons of article and books about some of them, and little or nothing about others. This paper will examine the news stories that have appeared in the website over the past nearly seven years to see how effectively the media has portrayed the peaceful societies, and if anything useful can be gleaned from those news reports.

Several questions guided this study. Do popular news reports provide any useful information about the social conditions, educational practices, cultural and religious issues, and factors that promote peacefulness in the peaceful societies? How useful are those older scholarly works for understanding the current news? And overall, is the news worth reading if one is interested in peaceful societies?

News stories about four societies were examined to see how these questions can be answered. The Birhor, formerly a foraging society who live primarily in Jharkhand and West Bengal states of northeast India, have mostly abandoned their forest based subsistence economy and taken up wage labor and farm support work. They have received tons of news coverage over the past three years—but more about that in a moment.

The Buid (also spelled Buhid) are a horticultural society of southern Mindoro Island in the Philippines, one of the so-called Mangyan Societies. An indigenous highland people, the Buid are one of only a few indigenous groups in the Philippines that preserve their own ancient writing system. Their ambahan, the poetry they write in their own script, still serve a Buid man as a far better way to court a woman than making simple, oral declarations of his love.

The Fipa, or Ufipa, a very large farming society of southwestern Tanzania, was described by the British anthropologist Roy Willis as a peaceful society, but he has not published any recent works about them. A couple other scholars have written works about these people in recent years, but the extent of their peacefulness is not at all clear.

The Tristan Islanders live on reputedly the most remote inhabited island in the world, some 1700 miles west of Cape Town in the middle of the South Atlantic Ocean. An English crown colony, when the first British sailors opted to leave their squadrons and stay there to found a colony nearly 200 years ago, they formed a remarkably peaceful society. Norwegian sociologist Peter Munch studied them extensively in the late 1930s, and again in the 1960s, but only a scattering of scholars have visited the remote island since then.

Some useful economic, social, cultural, religious, and educational information can be gleaned from the news about these four societies—and, by extension, the other 21 covered in the website.

Economic Information

Economic information about these societies is probably the easiest to update from news reports. A news story from November 2005 indicated that the forests in Jharkhand, on which the Birhor had previously depended, are being cut down and the people are suffering severely.[2] Two years later, another story blamed a lot of the destruction in Jharkhand on the opening of huge new industrial mines.[3] A story in August 2008 pointed out that the Birhor, as a result, are trying to become agriculturalists,[4] but another in March 2010 described the wage laboring jobs many have taken in order to survive.[5]

News about economic changes among the Buid is harder to find—they probably still farm as they did in the 1980s when Gibson was writing about them. It is clear from news stories that while techniques may have changed, the Fipa still farm very profitable lands.

A news story in May 2011 about the agricultural output from the Rukwa Region of Tanzania showed that the region, a part of which was originally Fipa territory, still has the agricultural richness that Willis described in a 1989 article.[6] He had suspected that the Fipa use of raised bed, composting, horticultural techniques had fostered the social stability that helped them form a peaceful society. This kind of additional news is useful.

The Tristan Islanders (or Tristanians as they also call themselves) have thrived on the few foods they can grow on a patch of level ground a short walk away from their settlement. They also keep animals, harvest sea birds from nearby islands, fish, and trade with people on passing ships. Over the past 50 years, the British government has licensed a South African firm to construct a processing plant on the island to process the rock lobsters that can be harvested from nearby waters. A number of news stories have covered the progress of that small industry, including, in March this year, the

crash of a huge ship that released 8000 tons of bunker fuel into the sea.[7] The oil might have a severe impact on the fishery. But, hopefully, a story this July 28 indicated that an international agency has certified the Tristan lobster fishery as "sustainable," a measure which may help their economy considerably.[8]

In sum, economic information about these four societies, though reported sporadically, is available and useful.

Social Information

Information about social conditions, social structures, and social problems is a bit harder to glean from the news reports. Perhaps the most extreme example of news coverage of social conditions in a society occurred as a result of a tragedy in a Birhor village in early October, 2008.[9] As news stories emerged over the next couple of weeks, apparently eight Birhor in one hamlet died of food poisoning, and five others were mysteriously sickened the same night. Since the community is in the heart of Naxalite Territory, district and state officials and medical personnel did not send in coroners to investigate. News stories blamed officials and corrupt politicians—of the other party, of course. Ignorant reporters also blamed the Birhor themselves for eating wild foods they had gathered in nearby forests, something they had been doing for millennia, of course.[10]

The tragedy pointed out, to the media, that they had been ignoring this society, and most of the other so-called "Primitive Tribal Groups." The Peaceful Societies website found no news reports in the Indian press about the Birhor in 2006, and only two in all of 2007. But after the tragedy, news coverage exploded. The website carried seven stories in 2008, and 11 in 2009. Some of the stories have been ignored by the website news feature since other societies needed to be covered as well. It is as if the *Telegraph* of Calcutta, the *Times of India*, *The Hindu*, and the other major papers of the subcontinent suddenly discovered the existence of this poverty-stricken society, felt guilty, and decided to make up for it by frequent reporting. Some of it was quite good. A news report only a couple weeks ago about a suspicious death in a Birhor village referred back to the tragedy of October 2008. It is clear that that story still reverberates in India.[11]

Some interesting social information has turned up about the other societies as well, such as the Tristan Islanders. For instance, a report in January 2009 described the annual Old Year's Night, the last day of the old year and a kind of midsummer festival. During the festivities, elaborately costumed and masked Green Men, or Okalolies, move around the village attempting

to scare women, children, and dogs with their antics.[12] Later, in November 2009, a news story discussed the fact that the islanders have a complete freedom from fear, since there is no crime.[13] Many people have traveled to Cape Town, and some to London, and they have access, now, to the Internet, so they are quite aware of the benefits, and problems, of modern city life. Other than that, most of the news in the *Tristan Times* reports the sporadic births, deaths, and marriages—news that is important for the Islanders but would not mean much for visitors to the Peaceful Societies website.

Cultural and Religious Information

Cultural and religious information about these societies is more often in the news. Some of it verifies that the traditions reported earlier by anthropologists are still practiced. Sometimes the reports show that things have changed. In other words, news sources have some real value for cultural and religious topics.

A news report about the Birhor in April 2008 showed that, despite changes in their economy, they still have a lot of knowledge of nature and natural forces.[14] Another news story a few months after the Birhor tragedy, in December 2008, described a Birhor hamlet in Jharkhand state where there is a 47 percent rate of literacy among the women, a figure that is as high as much of the rest of rural India.[15]

Since anthropologist Thomas Gibson reported on his field work among the Buid, one of the major sources for up to date information has been news stories generated by interested Philippine NGOs. Uses of the *ambahan*, the indigenous Buid poetry, have captured the attention of a couple reporters. Stories in Jan. 2006 and May 2011 have reaffirmed that they continue to use their indigenous written and spoken language for courting women and for uniting their communities in the face of invading lowlanders.[16]

A news story in December 2010 described a controversial government policy designed to help the lowlanders, the majority Filipinos, expropriate indigenous lands—a familiar story, of course, from all over the world.[17] The novel twist on the story was the use of a traditional rite, called the "Swinging pig ritual," to help peacefully drive away the evil spirits that threaten them—the lowlanders in this case. It would be far better if an anthropologist would visit a Buid community, spend a year or more and describe what is really going on. But in the absence of another Thomas Gibson, the news sources, at least for the Buid, have been fairly informative.

In Tanzania, the news media have been fascinated by some of the things that go on in the Sumbawanga area of Rukwa Region. The Fipa were converted to Catholicism in the late 19th century, so some of the stories of practices in the Church, and dissent from it, have been potentially useful. The evangelical versus the Catholic approaches to traditional culture appear in stark contrast in a news story of July 2008.[18] The Roman Catholic church in Tanzania wants to syncretize their church teachings with the traditional beliefs of the people of the region, while a Christian evangelical group working in the area clearly wants to destroy the indigenous beliefs—free people from their pagan beliefs and convert them to their true faith.

Witchcraft and traditional healing practices in the area also have fascinated the news sources in Tanzania. People in the Rukwa region, despite their Christianity, still utilize a variety of healing practitioners, some of whom, according to reports, can successfully effect cures, though some of them are clearly frauds and thieves.

A horrifying witchcraft practice that is especially popular in Tanzania is the capturing and killing of albino children, or women in some cases, so the victims can be butchered and their body parts sold for special healing practices. Several new stories have covered this awful crime. One, in November 2008 described how a man tried to sell his albino wife to a dealer from the DR Congo.[19] Another in March 2011 described the practice of capturing albino children and spiriting them away.[20]

An interesting aspect of the witchcraft practices among the Fipa is how often the anthropological publications of Prof. Willis from many years ago still relate to the news reports of today. A news story posted on the website in August 2011 discussed two different murders of suspected witches in rural Rukwa, as reported in the Tanzania press the previous week.[21] Two articles by Prof. Willis (1968, 1968a) many years ago helped untangle what may have happened and the cultural context of witchcraft beliefs in the region. Of course, the Willis articles did not answer all the questions anyone would reasonably ask, but they still would help a reader understand, despite the changes of four decades, the cultural background of witchcraft in the area. Sudden, unexplainable illnesses are still thought to be the result of witchcraft, and poisoning may still be a tool of witches, at least in the minds of some people. But the observations by Willis on other aspects of the issue do not appear to be relevant today. He observed that witchcraft accusations would usually not go public, which is clearly no longer true. He also said that accusations of witchcraft were normally not made between generations, and that too no longer seems to apply.

Traditional healers have also received news coverage for their sometimes bizarre actions. For instance, a couple news reports in August 2007 covered a healer who purposefully strode into a stream to demonstrate to his village how he could travel to the gates of hell and return successfully.[22] The people became alarmed a few days later, and the police found his body snagged downstream. The Tanzania news media appears to enjoy, perhaps a bit nervously, reporting these stories from the Rukwa Region, about people who, strangely, persist with their traditional beliefs and practices despite the supposed modernization of the rest of the nation.

Another story just a few weeks ago in AllAfrica.com, a major news amalgamating service, provided additional cultural information about the Fipa.[23] It described, for instance, a traditional dance called the Nsimba, in which the performers balance iron pots upside down on the ground on their lids. Then they balance stools on the pots. During a performance, they twitch the stools with their legs, which agitates the pots on their lids, each pot making a different melodious sound depending on its size. The dancers keep time with their shoulders, their feet, and their body movements. In sum, while the anthropological writings of Willis supplement our understanding of current news reports, contemporary stories update the information that Willis so carefully presented decades ago.

Educational Practices

One aspect of the frantic coverage of all things related to the Birhor, several news accounts have described the education of their children. A story in May 2010 reported quite positively on the schooling of Birhor children in one district of Jharkhand state. This hopeful story described a teacher who had to learn the Birhor language in order to start teaching and the progress he has been making since then.[24]

Another news story six months later, however, pointed out how some of the older Birhor boys, as their educational accomplishments increase, have become more and more intolerant of the ways of their own communities.[25] Do they really want to leave the comforts and material pleasures of the dorm rooms where they live while attending school, and go back to the mud huts, blasting heat, and backbreaking labor of their home villages? Can they just stay in the dorms and continue to be privileged youngsters on the way up and out of poverty? Several other articles in the press over the past couple years have focused on the initiation of sporting teams, especially boxing, in one Birhor hamlet in Jharkhand.[26]

Several news stories covering the founding of schools among the Buid people have also been enlightening. A news story in 2006 celebrated the life of a Buid elder named Laki Iwan, who had a passion for founding schools.[27] He loved to see children getting an education, and he enjoyed just as much growing foods that he could then take into his schools and give to the kids. A benevolent farmer philanthropist. Two years later, a couple more news stories in the Filipino media described the progress of those Buid schools.[28]

The stories made it clear that the teachers in the lower grades were teaching the children in their own language, focusing on teaching them to read and write in it, so they would continue to appreciate their culture and their *ambahan* poetry. Many of the youngsters were doing well in the lower grades, but some of them who had advanced and gotten a higher education were reluctant to go back to their villages and sleep in the mud huts, in the heat and the dirt—disappointing to Buid elders. The same situation as the Birhor.

The news sources about Tristan da Cunha have not given much information about the schools on the island, but at least one story from the Rukwa Region of Tanzania, perhaps about the Fipa, did indicate that the schools in the Mpanda District of that region were responding to the crisis of kidnapping albino children. The school system is building a separate, and quite secure, primary school, plus a hostel, just for the albino kids.[29]

Persistence of Peacefulness

With all of these useful bits and pieces of economic, social, cultural, religious, and educational information coming out about these four societies, the big question remains? How really peaceful are they today? Are they as nonviolent as anthropologists had indicated earlier? We have some useful clues.

The giving spirit, call it generosity perhaps, is an important element in many of the peaceful societies and it was certainly evident in the philanthropy of Laki Iwan, the Buid elder who founded all those schools. His giving was clearly in the spirit of the earlier Buid practices described by Thomas Gibson in his writings some decades ago. Similarly, the generosity of the Tristan Islanders appears to be a continuing aspect of their peacefulness. Their spirit was confirmed by a resident Brit who wrote, in a blog post in January 2007, about the giving spirit of the islanders toward him and his wife.[30] Several other news posts since then, such as one in March 2011, have reaffirmed the hospitality of the Islanders toward shipwrecked sailors, a tradition that goes back to the founding of the settlement nearly 200 years ago.[31] A spirit of generous hospitality continues to be a defining aspect of is-

land culture. Islanders identify themselves as people who always take into their homes shipwrecked people, for as long as necessary.

Actual descriptions of peacefulness, not surprisingly, are much harder to find. No news reporter is going to write, as so many of the anthropologists have done, about spending many months doing field work and not witnessing anything more violent than children fighting. Journalists only stay for an hour or two, or perhaps a whole day. Furthermore, peacefulness is just not very newsworthy, unlike violence, persecution, environmental destruction, land rights issues, and so on.

We really have only brief mentions, at best. One, in June 2010, mentioned how a Birhor man had given up his association with the Naxalites and turned in his rifle to the police.[32] This gives us the clue that some of the Birhor, much like people from the other "primitive tribal groups" of northeaster India, may have joined the murderous Maoist rebels. These tribal people face severe discrimination from the mainstream Hindu people in that part of India. Similarly, a news story from Tanzania suggested that some farmer/rancher violence had developed in the Rukwa Region. But whether the individuals involved were Fipa or not was unclear.[33]

On the other hand, recent materials available from the Mangyan Heritage Center on Mindoro Island attest to the continuing peacefulness of the Buid.[34] Despite the tensions caused by their lands being taken away from them, it appears as if the Buid continue to resist the incursions of lowlanders in a peaceful manner. They use protests, educate themselves, form associations, and cooperate with outside NGO that are trying to help them secure their rights.

The absence of crime on Tristan da Cunha has already been mentioned, but a news story in *The Guardian* in January 2010 gave some additional clues about peacefulness on the island.[35] The story was about the Tristan policeman, Conrad Glass, who was in England for some training. The article indicated that there had been only one violent incident in recent decades, back in the 1970s. A fight broke about among some fishermen on a foreign fishing vessel in the harbor. This policeman's major duty, evidently, is to occasionally intervene and calm tense situations. Normally, he avoids going into the island pub during his patrol—he is too busy reading. Besides, everyone knows everyone else, so he feels it is best to just let people solve their own disputes—which they still do quite well.

Conclusion

Some of the conclusions will surprise no one. The press report many absurd stories. One of the tasks of the Peaceful Societies website has been to filter out the more ridiculous information and try to interpret the rest. Also, some of the reporters show abysmal ignorance about the societies that they are covering. In the scores of news stories examined for this report, not a single journalist has shown the slightest familiarity with published ethnographic works. Except for stories about the well-known Amish, one of the societies included in the Peaceful Societies website, reporters rarely if ever consult prominent scholars, much less read their works, when significant events occur.

It is probable that some of the smaller, more isolated, more conservative societies have retained their peacefulness, and much of the rest of their cultural values, over the intervening years since the major ethnographies have been published and which established, at least for the purposes of this website, their relative peacefulness. Societies that have been more highly impacted by modern civilization (an oxymoron, perhaps), have had a harder time adjusting and keeping their traditions.

Acknowledging this, the news media sometimes provides some quite useful clues about the developments and changes in the four societies mentioned here. It is clear that many of their traditions persist fairly strongly, and clues in the news media indicate some of the changes that are taking place. It appears as if some of the peaceful characteristics may survive. Of course, to repeat, it would be best if good anthropologists would revisit these societies.

And there's an added benefit. The news stories in the website provide a useful updating service for students who read the classic works of anthropology. A student sent a "contact us" email to the website on September 1st, 2011, to say that she had just finished a class project relating to the Mbuti but she was frustrated in her search on the Web for more current information than the 1980s. Then she found the news stories in the Peaceful Societies website and was appalled at the brutal treatment the Mbuti have suffered in recent years. With all the enthusiasm of youth, she wanted to help the Mbuti and sought guidance as to what she could do—other than just send money. It is heartening to learn that sometimes these news reports, culled from relatively obscure sources, may at times reach people who care enough to want to help.

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