NONKILLING SECURITY & THE STATE

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In memoriam
Robert Muller
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Foreword

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One is hard pressed to think of a topic more urgent than the subject of this book. In early 2013 North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test, Iran is widely thought to be developing nuclear weapons, Syria is in a condition tantamount to civil war, and armed conflicts continues to ravage Africa. Some extremist groups believe that any deviation from their agenda is cause for a death sentence. And the news in the United States has been dominated by tragic shootings, including one of dozens of school children.

A pessimist would say that global society is headed into an abyss of widespread domestic and international violence that is beyond the scope of governments to control. In one sense I agree with them. On the international scale I believe that we are crossing a fundamental threshold, from a time when only a few countries could wreak widespread destruction to a time when nearly any country that wants weapons of mass destruction is capable of getting them. Never before has the world faced so many major risks at one time.

Things are hardly better on the domestic front. In response to killings in schools, churches, temples, and elsewhere some groups now advocate carrying guns for self-protection. This brings with it the notion that lethal violence is an acceptable solution to threats against persons and property. More serious still, it reverses centuries of progress in limiting authority to take a human life.

Some believe that the solution to these threats lies in technology, that by collecting ever-greater amounts of information and having ever more sophisticated weapons we can identify and circumvent violence before it occurs. I believe that this is a fool's errand. I know of no technology that can see into a person's heart, to divine his or her intentions. I know of no foolproof policy or procedure that can avoid the abuse of lethal force. Simply put, we are looking in the wrong place for a solution to human killing human.

Studies of small societies have demonstrated, conclusively to my mind, that human beings are not intrinsically violent. There are a number of cul-

tures where people have lived together for centuries with very low levels of killing. This is an extremely important finding. If human beings were inherently violent, one would expect all societies to be violent. That this is not so gives us hope. Human beings are not doomed to violence. To think otherwise is tantamount to telling a drug user or an alcoholic that there is no hope of recovery, that they are doomed to self-destruction.

Rather than respond to the symptoms of violence by military intervention, targeted killings, and enhanced surveillance, we must devote greater attention to understanding why human beings are violent. Concurrently, we must rigorously evaluate measures that can be taken to convince people that killing is a value-subtracted solution to grievances. This does not mean that we should excuse or tolerate bullies, tyrants, or extremists. Exactly the opposite: it is a hardheaded recognition that our current methods are not working and that we need to look for new ones.

Glenn Paige began a truly remarkable effort in this direction with his book *Nonkilling Global Political Science* which has been translated into dozens of languages and which has been eagerly read by countless thousands. People around the world are desperate for a solution to killing. Clearly Professor Paige has struck a chord, and we are well advised to listen to him. He does not naïvely believe that we can eliminate all forms of violence overnight. But he does state a convincing case that we can stop lethal violence. The world spends trillions of dollars on instruments of violence—what would happen if we spent a tiny fraction of that on developing practical methods of avoiding violence? The fact that (nearly) all nations espouse a commitment to peace, and yet spend virtually nothing on how to achieve that peace, is a subject itself worthy of study.

The academic community has a special responsibility in this effort. The combined institutional knowledge of anthropology, sociology, political science, philosophy, and history is immense. We understand a great deal about human beings and the institutions we have created to govern ourselves. We know in exquisite detail the stories of successful cultures and of unsuccessful ones. It is imperative that we bring this knowledge to bear on how to reduce to reduce the motivation to kill. There can be no "objective" aloofness in this effort, no delusion that to deal in such matters taints the scientific integrity of academe. Not to engage is to condone. Yes, this engagement will require courage, but I believe that academics are no less capable of heroics than anyone else.

The essays in this volume have a common theme, namely that we need not stand as spectators as our world turns to killing. As we have turned human ingenuity to means of destruction, we must now turn it to means of preventing that destruction. There is no more important problem. None.

Introduction

Teaching Nonkilling to the States*

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There are at least two problems with the topic of this essay besides the problematic natures of both the state and nonkilling. First, based upon the theory of nonviolence from where nonkilling was engendered à la Gandhi and Sharp, nonviolence ordinarily has an oppositional role vis-à-vis the state since it seeks to undermine state power in pursuit of freedom and justice. The question is: does nonkilling locate itself in opposition to the state similar to mainstream nonviolence? Second, due to the nature of the state as the embodiment of violence with the power to kill, can nonkilling be taught to the state? Equally important, perhaps, is the question: even if it can, *should* the state be taught nonkilling?

This article is an attempt to argue that there is a dire need to "teach" nonkilling to states in today's world and that it is easier to teach the modern state to accept "nonkilling" as a policy than "nonviolence". I will begin by pointing out the reasons why it is important to teach nonkilling to the states. The strange relationship between killing and the state using Paige's quest for *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (2002, 2007) as an entry point will be discussed in order to argue that it is not impossible to introduce the state to nonkilling policy. Then I will examine my experience in trying to "teach" nonkilling to the Thai state, especially to its national security agency, focusing primarily on the unique Prime Ministerial Order 187/2546 on "Coping with conflicts through nonviolence policy" (2003). Arguing that it is easier to teach the state to accept nonkilling policy than to be nonviolent, I will then briefly analyze the dilemmas involved in teaching nonkilling to the states.

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* This chapter is a reconsideration and modification of my earlier work, Chaiwat (1999), "Teaching Nonviolence to the States".

Justifications: Why Should States Be Taught Nonkilling?[1]

The most direct and seemingly rhetorical answer to the question of why states should be taught nonkilling is: Because the state kills. But rhetoric aside, there is some truth in this answer. From Beijing to Bangkok, from Rangoon to Jakarta at some points in global history, one can hear stories of state-sponsored violence killing people. The saddest thing about these tales is that they can be told and retold. The plot of these tales is much the same: people without guns demanding freedom or justice in the streets met soldiers with guns in official uniforms authorized by the state to restore order. Sometimes they were ordered not to shoot. But then a shot was heard, a stone thrown, and bloodbath resulted. The day after began with body counts, missing sons and daughters, deep individual wounds, at times mixed with hatred, which later constitute collective traumas that are difficult to heal. Without healing, the cycle of killing could begin anew.

Although it is difficult to ascertain whether in a political confrontation it is the state that starts the acts of killing, it is highly likely that state agents would be the first to use violence.[2] Soldiers and policemen are trained to perform their tasks with violence. In Asia, they are normally armed, many with guns. In a confrontational situation, fed with frustration and anger, sometimes fueled with fiery speeches from the other side, those with guns may be more prone to aggression and use what they already possess (Berkowitz and Le Page, 1970: 132-142).[3] It may therefore be suggested that there are more factors conducive to killing from the state's side, which would contribute to the possibility of state agents using violence first in a conflict situation. If such is the case, to bring about social transformation toward the possibilities of peace and justice only through educating the people's side with theories, strategies, and practices of nonviolence as well as nonkilling may not decrease the likelihood of a situation of violence, where nonviolent protesters are met with

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[1] This part is based on Chaiwat (1999: 186-188).

[2] In a comprehensive, though brief, study of American labor violence, Taft and Ross found that trade-unions violence was reactive because strikers would "virtually always" try to avoid violence and use peaceful means while the employers may not, in which case company guards, the police, or even the National Guard would be brought in (Taft and Ross, 1979: 187-241). They also assert that "The most virulent form of industrial violence occurred in situations in which efforts were made to destroy a functioning union or to deny a union recognition" (Taft and Ross, 1979: 188).

[3] On the anatomy of violence, especially killing, see Grossman (1995: 139-192).

cruel suppression at the hands of the states. The state needs to be educated with nonkilling as well if such a killing situation is to be avoided.

Another reason why the state side needs to be taught nonkilling is its atrocious record. In the latter part of twentieth century, the late peace researcher William Eckhardt compared his estimate of 10.7 million civilian deaths in civil wars from 1945 to 1990 with Harff and Gurr's account of 12.3 million deaths resulting from "organized killing by a government or its agents of a people" during the same period. It was stupefying to find that the states, through their agents, kill more of their own civilians during "peacetime," occasionally shading into the immediate aftermath of civil wars, than they do in time of civil war (Eckhardt, 1992: 52-53). Using Rummel's figure of 83.4 million deaths by governments, 84 percent of these killings took place in China and the former USSR, together with Harff and Gurr's estimate, which he suggested may be closer to the facts, Eckhardt arrived at the estimate of fewer than 48 million killed by the states (Eckhardt, 1992: 53). In other words, during the last half of this century, the states have killed at least 12 million, if the low estimate is used, or up to 83 million, if the high figure is used. I would contend here that it doesn't matter that much which estimate is more nearly correct because these figures conclusively prove two things. First, states do kill people. Second, these figures of several millions are not mere numbers. They represent millions of human beings, with families and feelings, who have perished at the hands of states. It is therefore extremely important that nonkilling be taught to the state if killing by its "hands" and in its name is to be avoided. But whereas teaching nonviolence to the state is difficult, is teaching nonkilling to the states equally difficult?

The Strange Case of the State and Nonkilling

In Paige's influential *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (henceforth *NGPS*), there is a change that has taken place in its several incarnations from the 2002 published version to the 2009 electronic book freely available from the Center for Global Nonkilling (<http://www.nonkilling.org>). This strange change, most relevant to the present discussion, is the presence and later absence of the term "state" in the book that aspires to foster a paradigmatic shift in the discipline of political science.

In the published versions (2002 until 2007), the books' index indicates that the term "state" appears on pages: "3-6, 71, 78-9" (Paige, 2002: 237). Using search engine inside the book, it was found that the term "state" in some forms (for example, including the United States) appear in 93 places throughout the book. But in the 2009 electronic incarnation, the term "state" is no-

where to be seen in the index! Moreover, it would be interesting to explore that when the term "state" appears in Paige's *NGPS*, how does it appear?

The term "state" appears 13 times on pages 3-6, none on pages 71, 78 and 79. According to the index, when the term "state" appears in the four pages in *NGPS*—in fact only on three pages since it cannot be found on page 3 either, they are in the context of Paige's discussion of the violence-accepting history of political thought and its relationship to "the state". As a matter of fact, "the state" as appeared in *NGPS* takes the following forms:

- as the object of honor and power in Machiavelli's thought.
- as state of nature in the thoughts of social contract philoso-phers—Hobbes and Locke.
- as the emerging form of political society with the rights to war and conquest from social contract in Rousseau's thought, and then ele-vated to something akin to the sacred, also in Rousseau's.
- as the "lethal state" that should be disposed of with violence in Marx's thoughts.
- as the modern state with claims to monopoly of the use of violence in Weber's writing.

Reading Paige's discussion of history of political thoughts in relation to the question of nonkilling and the state, I find that it is easier to imagine a nonkilling state from within the conventional history of political thoughts than from a classic nonviolence theory as advanced, most importantly per-haps, by Gandhi. Given the constraint of space, let me illustrate this point by focusing on Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1651), Kant's *Perpetual Peace* (1795) and Gandhi's thought (1935) as examples. It should be noted that Paige's chal-lenge to the world could be formulated in terms of his global quest. He traveled the globe -Sweden, Russia, Jordan, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Can-ada, Colombia, and of course the US, to meet with political scientists and other professionals, including those who were victims of violence and those who had killed others. He met them to ask the question: is a nonkilling so-ciety possible? If not, why not? If yes, why? (Paige, 2004: 4). After his long quest, collecting wondrous data, and thoughtful contemplation of more than two decades, he came to a decisive conclusion that a nonkilling society is possible. Therefore there should be "no more killing". But I am curious that if Paige could conduct his questioning exercise with these three great proponents of politics and ask them "Is a nonkilling state possible?", what would be their answers? I suspect that he might have received very strange answers from them. Here is why.

Hobbes' *Leviathan* and the Necessity for a Nonkilling State

Michael Oakshott (1901-1990), an authority on Hobbes' thought, argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, death itself is not significant in Hobbes' argument in his magisterial *Leviathan* since everyone has some expectations about living and untimely death. Most important for Hobbes' advent of the Leviathan-the artificial Man that is the state- is when a human being is killed by another. It is this very type of death- being killed by another human- that is relevant because it signifies failure in the "race" for precedence which constitutes human life. When killed, people died not in competition with the natural world but in competition with other human beings. Oakshott thinks that this is "the central point; and this is what is meant by shameful death. To be killed by another man is *eo ipso* shameful or dishonourable because it signified that inferiority vis-à-vis other men which is the centre of all human aversion" (2001: 834). In this sense, being killed by another person is "the limiting case" in human life (2001: 835). In addition, what a human wishes to avoid is not merely being killed by another, but also *fear of being so killed*. On Oakshott's reading of Hobbes, the *civitas* (state) exists in order to mitigate the effect of this race for precedence that resulted from the act of killing (Oakshott, 2001: 834-836). If the state exists for this very purpose, it would therefore be easier to convince the state of a nonkilling policy since it is in line with both its origin-to get rid of the phenomenon of a human being killing another- and its primary function for existence- to prevent such a phenomenon from emerging in the state.

Kant's *Perpetual Peace* and the Possibility of a Nonkilling State

Paige wrote: "If Kant (1795/1959) can envision "perpetual peace" deriving from steadfast adherence to a no-war categorical imperative, we can now perceive elements needed to transform a nonkilling imperative into global reality" (2007: 91). In fact, I would argue that Kant's proposal for a no-war world began with the question of killing and nonkilling, among other things. In the 3rd preliminary article for perpetual peace among nations on the army, and there are 6 of these articles, Kant categorically states that "Standing armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall be gradually abolished." This article anticipated what has come to transpire in the twentieth century (Kant, 1983: 45)—and made clear in Paige's *NGPS*—that there were 27 countries without armies in the early twenty-first century (Paige, 2007: 45).

But what is most interesting and relevant to the present discussion is Kant's reason for the abolition of standing armies. He argues that they would con-

stantly threaten other nations with war, influence the military race among countries which will in turn incur exuberant costs on the racing countries in maintaining the armies with peoples and killing instruments, among other things. Finally, the cost for maintaining peace this way would "finally become greater than those of short war, standing armies are thus the cause of wars of aggression that are intended to end burdensome expenditures" (1983: 108).

The next sentence is most important philosophically, however. Kant writes: "…paying men to kill or be killed appears to use them as mere machines and tools in the hands of another (the nation), which is inconsistent with the rights of humanity" (1983: 108). In fact, the standing armies stand in sharp contrast to Kant's ethics since his whole philosophy is based on the notion that no human being should be treated as a means to others in the "kingdom of ends". For Kant, killing another humans for the country, or I would argue—for some other purposes, is to treat them as means and therefore war cannot be accepted or the ethical foundation that binds people into making decisions and deliberating right from wrong will all but disappear. It should be noted that for Kant, a "nonkilling state" is possible and in fact preferable since it is conducive to perpetual peace *among nations* when each nation will no longer "pay men to kill or be killed". However, Kant believes that a state could continue to have periodic and voluntary military training for citizens to "secure their homeland against external aggression" (Kant, 1983: 108).

Gandhi's Thought and the Difficulty of Advancing a Nonkilling State

Gandhi wrote in October 1935 that "The State represents violence in a concentrated and organized form. The individual has a soul, but as the State is a soulless machine, it can never be weaned from violence to which it owes its very existence" (Cited in Terchek, 2006: 212) Later on March 9, 1940, he wrote that: "A Government cannot succeed in becoming entirely non-violent, because it represents all the people. I do not today conceive of such a golden age. But I do believe in the possibility of a predominantly non-violent society. And I am working for it" (Gandhi, 1997: 437). It is rather clear that Gandhi is against the state, not only because he seems to think along the Weberian line that the modern state is defined as an organization that is able to kill with its monopoly of legitimate violence, but also with Nietzsche, because of the idolatry of elevating the state to be something unchallengeable and sacred (Terchek, 2006: 206-207). In addition, the bureaucratic state proclivity to its expertise also means that it does not have to listen to other voices, reasons, and/or "truths". As a result, by claiming neutrality, instrumental reason, and

efficiency, the bureaucratic state depoliticizes the world by relegating sites of contested power to margins of political life (Terchek, 2006: 211-212). Perhaps this is why Gandhi's preference is towards less governance. He wrote: "That state is perfect and non-violent where the people are governed the least. The nearest approach to purest anarchy would be a democracy based on non-violence" (Gandhi, 1948: 292) Influenced also by Gandhi's thoughts and Thoreau's civil disobedience, among other things, an antistate inclination seems to be prevalent among those in the fields of nonviolence.

Following Gandhi's thought on the state, then it is extremely difficult to invite the state to the path of nonkilling, and it is not easy to argue the contrary, since it is a "soulless servant" with embodied and concentrated violence in its entity. Though it could be argued that Gandhi had somewhat altered his view on the state from 1930s onwards since he could also see it as a vehicle for social change (Parekh, 1989: 118-121), some scholars warn that Gandhi would not trust the state since: "To humanize the state and make it the object of love is to put people off guard" (Terchek, 2006: 212) In this sense, it seems that while the creation of a nonviolent and nonkilling *society* is possible for Gandhi, to turn the *state* into a nonkilling machine (?) is much more difficult, if not altogether impossible.

Judging from this reading of Hobbes, Kant and Gandhi, I would argue that it is easiest to introduce the idea of a nonkilling state into the Hobbesian universe whereas it seems most difficult to do the same in a Gandhian political world, while the limited nonkilling state in the Kantian imperative falls somewhere in-between. But why would Gandhi think that it is next to impossible to turn the state to nonviolence/nonkilling? Perhaps it is important to ponder what the state is?

Weber wrote and delivered his speech "Politics as Vocation" in Munich in 1918. He defines the state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 2002: 13) Being so defined, the state has become the *only* social institution that can claim legitimacy when engaging in violence and killing. Moreover, he has turned the state into an institution that is *inherently* violent. As a result, a politics that is locked within the state's mental landscape has been deprived of any salvation but to continue with killing and violence. When charged with the task of maintaining existing social orders, it is generally believed that it could do so because it is a monopoly of authoritatively binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (Mann, 1988: 4). Its occasional use of physical violence induces fear which in turn strengthens obedience to state authority. This is perhaps a most impor-

tant reason why the Weberian understanding of the state as inherently violent is generally agreed upon by modern state theorists (Giddens, 1987: 18-19; Strange, 1996: 5; Hay, 1996: 3-19).[4] As an institution based upon physical violence, it is natural that state agencies and agents such as the police and the military would find it hard to accept nonviolent actions. But does this mean that the state would not accept nonkilling as well?

Inspired by Benedict Anderson's influential *Imagined Communities*, I have argued elsewhere that the power of the state lies, not only in its concrete attributes which includes the monopoly of the means of violence and killing, but also in its abstract quality and artificiality necessary to perform much of its functions (Chaiwat, 1988: 27-41). It is important to emphasize that the state does have other means of enforcement and influence it can deploy, which in fact it normally uses. If I am right in suggesting that the state power lies in its abstraction, perhaps its power lies hidden somewhere while omnipresent in its invisibility. Two decades ago the anthropologist David Kertzer pointed out that because the state power is "invisible", it must be personified to be seen, symbolized so that it can be loved, and imagined in order to be conceived as a state (Kertzer, 1988: 6) Beyond fear-induced obedience, the technology of power at the modern state's disposal makes it possible for the state to be seen, loved and conceived far more effectively than the use or the threat to use physical violence especially killing. Put another way, if its power lies more in its ability to be seen, loved and imagined, then these attributes can hardly be produced by killing or the threat to kill. In this sense, I would argue that it is easier for the modern state to accept nonkilling as a policy with its concreteness and measurability than the much more problematic nonviolence with its built-in conceptualization that could include a negation of direct, structural and cultural violence. Put another way, because nonkilling is a negation of killing that is at once measurable and concrete, the state with its invisible power is likely to accept it as a policy rather than the more amorphous nonviolence, and therefore much more problematic from its perspective. In becoming a nonkilling state, the state might feel that it could retain much of its power to induce not only obedience, but consent when it is seen, imagined in different forms, and even loved.

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[4] An interesting aspect of Hay's formulation is in trying to advance an understanding of "stateness" in two dimensions: moments of stateness, which include the state as nation, the state as territory, and the state as institutions, and levels of stateness from abstract "category" to concrete "state structure" (Hay, 1996: 319).

Experiences: Teaching Nonkilling to the Thai Security Agency?

Let me begin a discussion of the Thai experience with the case of Zambia's Kenneth David Kaunda. This is a case of a former nonviolent movement leader who gave up nonviolence when he decided to go into politics and later became the president of his country. Kenneth David Kaunda of Zambia is known for his role as a nonviolent leader in fighting against the British imperial power (Levitsky and Way, 2012: 877-878). When he felt the anti-colonial struggle was over, he went to his American friends, Bill Sutherland and Matt Meyer who had helped him along the nonviolent course of action, and said: "Look, it's quite clear now that we're going to have an election which will provide for majority rule, and the end of British control. I have been with you all this time. I have been nonviolent in principle and I've appreciated and wanted to thank you for all you have done. But I have decided that I am going to be a politician, and to go into government." He then asked, "How, as a person who is a believer in nonviolence, am I going to defend the country against the South Africans and the southern Rhodesians and all of these people who are coming in with their spies and attempting to destabilize us from the south?" (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000: 96) Quoting a philosophical principle with a distinctive Weberian ring that "he who affirms the state affirms violence", Kaunda noted that all but a few "saints"—who have moved themselves to remote wildernesses—play some role in affirming the state (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000: 98).

Having written about Kaunda and his view on violence and nonviolence in the late 1980s, imagine my surprise when attending a seminar at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok in 1997, when I heard a deputy secretary general of the Thai National Security Council (NSC) characterized the disturbing conflicts in Thai society at the time as a crisis of trust between the Thai people and the Thai state. In my view, it is quite unusual to find such a diagnosis of the situation from a high-ranking Thai security official. Most important, he believed that a dangerous crisis was imminent, and that the National Security Council, with the Thai prime minister as chairperson, was charged with peacefully courting social change in Thai society.

This experience was the beginning of my attempt to "teach nonviolence to the states" which I explained in an article more than a decade ago. (Chaiwat, 1999) There I discussed my experiences with the Thai state when it began to show interest in nonviolence as seen from a number of workshops the National Security Council organized on nonviolence, trainings offered to government officials around the country, and the establish-

ment of a most unique committee, perhaps the only one in the world, the Strategic Nonviolence Committee (SNC), within the National Security Council of Thailand, with the Prime Minister as the Council chairman. The SNC, chaired by a former deputy secretary general of the Thai National Security Council, was a group of people comprising academics, senior ngos, and some security officials. Among other things, its task is to come up with nonviolent alternatives to cope with rising conflicts for the Thai state, through advising the Prime Ministers. Due to changes in governments and the authorities at the NSC, the SNC is no longer within the National Security Council. It has been reconvened outside the security community though continued to be tasked with providing Thai society with nonviolent policy alternatives to problems of oftentimes deadly conflicts and now funded by the independent Thailand Research Fund with me serving as its chairperson.

In 2003, however, the SNC advised the then Thai Prime Minister to mobilize government sectors with nonviolence in preparation for the impending violent conflicts between the Thai state and the people. The result was the historic Prime Ministerial Order 187/2546 on "Managing Conflict with Nonviolence Policy" which promotes the use of nonviolence from within the security community. In a way, in trying to persuade state security agencies to avoid physical violence, this security policy instrument could be seen as a concrete example of nonkilling policy.

Prime Ministerial Order 187/2546[5]

On August 14, 2001, the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawat approved a proposal: "Mobilizing Effective Nonviolence in Thai Society", put forward by the Strategic Nonviolence Committee, National Security Council. The proposal consisted of two components: an official declaration of adopting nonviolence as a national strategy and a Prime Ministerial Order aiming to implement the strategy. The Grand Strategy aims at national security construed as attempt to prevent conflict from turning violent and to nonviolently transform conflict (King and Miller, 2006).[6] Its objective is to enhance trust between the state and the citizens and to reduce prejudices that have adversely affected relationship among peoples of differences in the country.

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[5] This part of the paper is based on my "Advising Leaders on Nonkilling Politics: Lessons from inside the National Security Community, Thailand". A paper prepared for the First Global Nonkilling Leadership Forum, Honolulu, October 31-November 4, 2007.

[6] Though the use of "nonviolent conflict transformation" seems rare, it has become increasingly visible. See for example, King and Miller (2006).

On September 1, 2003, the now deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shin-nawat signed the Prime Ministerial Order 187/2546 called: Managing Conflict with Nonviolence Policy.[7] Reading the future of the country as ridden with various types of conflict especially between the state and the people, it argues that there is a need to reevaluate the ways in which conflicts in Thai society have been dealt with since they have not produced a peaceful and just society where everyone is happy. To continue to use violence would bring about hatred and disunity among the people. The use of violence by the state to deal with conflicts, therefore, would engender extremely high social costs, which would in effect, jeopardize national security.

PM Order 187/2546 maintains that it is the way(s) of life of different peoples who are citizens of the Thai state that needs to be protected; and that by protecting and strengthening the ties that bind them together through nonviolence is a national security innovation needed for a new world facing various types of conflict. It categorically states that "government agencies must give priority to implementing this "Managing Conflict with Nonviolence Policy". But most importantly, perhaps, are its three main principles which serve as the Order's theoretical grounds. They are:

- **Principle 1**: "In coping with conflicts, "nonviolence" is the *only* way that is just and would engender sustainable peace. It begins with the state and government officials."
- **Principle 2**: "The attitude which forms the basis of nonviolence is to reduce prejudices and no hatred to peoples who are different. They must not be seen as enemies, but instead as friends in a shared life of suffering. The end of nonviolent means must be just. The state must accept some burdens for the sake of national security and sustainable peace of the people."
- **Principle 3**: "The atmosphere and theatre conducive to creativity in order that learning and developing appropriate approaches to conflict in Thai society, informed by pools of local wisdom, must be based on the idea that 'cultural diversity and differences of ideas are Thai society's sources of power'. This will, in turn, increase nonviolent alternatives in dealing with conflicts."

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[7] *Prime Ministerial Order 187/2546 on "Managing Conflicts with Nonviolence Policy"* (Bangkok: Strategic Nonviolence Committee/Institute, National Security Council, n.d.) (A published pamphlet—In Thai). The number 2546 is Buddhist Era or 2003 A.D.

These three principles hide three elements extremely important for the constitution of nonviolence policy. They are: inherited nonviolence legacy; local cultural treasures; and political will.

Principle 2 of PM Order 187/2546 has three components: no hatred of anyone; the use of nonviolent actions must be in service of justice; and Thai government officials who follow this Order must be willing to accept self suffering instead of inflicting pain and violence on those who oppose the state. As a matter of fact, this principle is based on a thinly hidden Gandhian legacy of nonviolence. Gandhi once explained that there are four conditions necessary for the success of Satyagraha. They are: no hatred, just cause, acceptance of self suffering, and prayers (Gandhi, 1948: 61). Principle 2 embodies three of these four conditions.

In proposing nonviolent actions and to make global nonviolence work, I have always found it important to look for local elements conducive to the specific context I have to work within. Contrary to mainstream security discourse where differences are often times seen as security threats to a country, principle 3 of the PM Order maintains that cultural diversity is a source of national strength and that there exists sufficient local wisdom conducive to nonviolence policy and practices on Thai cultural soil.

If the Gandhian heritage is the ground on which the PM Order 187/2546 stands, and Thai cultural realities are the local potentials necessary to make this Order work, then principle no. 1 embodies the political will which maintains that nonviolence is *the* direction this country must take for a sustainable national security. I would argue that the uncompromising nature of the statement in principle no.1, that "In coping with conflicts, "nonviolence" is the *only* way that is just", is at once unprecedented and extremely challenging to both those who are against the use of nonviolence and those who have worked hard to nonviolently transform the world, especially in terms of national policy. The question at this point is how do these principles enunciated in the PM Order 187/2546 relate to nonkilling policy?

Let me turn this question around and ask: can there be any nonkilling policy proposed to the state, imagined or real, that does not include these principles or rely on them? From a general security policy perspective, there is a need for a clear direction grounded in firm political will – in this case a will to move along the course of nonviolence. To make this will work, it has to rely on local realities, power relations informed and legitimized by cultures. In implementing such a policy, there will be some costs that the state needs to undertake. In this case, the state declares its intention to allow its security forces and other officials to accept suffering as a result of adopting nonkilling policy rather than to inflict sufferings (read- including killing or threat to kill)

on ordinary people. These three principles, I would argue, contain clear grounds to call the PM Order 187/2546 a nonkilling security policy.

Lessons Learned

One of the first questions often raised about this unusual episode of nonkilling security policy of a country is: why did the Prime Minister who is known for his acceptance of the use of violence accept the proposal by the SNC in the first place and, more importantly, to sign this historic PM Order? (Puangthong, 2010). One way to deal with this question is to be brutally candid and point out that nonkilling security policy in Thailand has come this far not because the leaders understand and accept it, but because they either do not understand it or do not believe that it could pose a threat to traditional security, both in terms of its theoretical grounds and effectiveness. In addition, based on the theoretical understanding of the modern state discussed above, some visionary government leaders such as the former Prime Minister Thaksin might have thought that taking away the force of killing from the state in matters related to imminent conflicts does not mean that the state has lost other means of control which the state could continue to exercise with a better legitimizing principle- that it is doing all it could to maintain peace, law and order without trying to harm, do violence or to kill its own citizens.

Apart from political leaders' perspectives on nonkilling, in recent years I have found that nonviolence security policy that seems to be acceptable to the state has been primarily based on nonkilling, perhaps with the exception of the state's responses to the problems of drugs and southern violence. This could be a result of the dynamics of a contemporary working state, understood as the embodiment of physical violence—epitomized by its monopolization of the use of killing, in the context of increasing democratization and the globalized gaze. By arguing that killing its own people will compromise the legitimacy of the state in a situation where conflicts are on the rise, the space for accepting the proposal on nonviolence security policy understood more and more by the state as nonkilling within the security community has been critically expanded.

More importantly, in my experiences, the work for nonviolence policy from within the security sector is both difficult and challenging for two reasons, among others. First, the degree of resistance to nonviolence policy options depends on changing political contexts. In a democratic setting, if the politicians believe that violent options will be more acceptable to the majority, they will not be hesitant in toeing the voters' line. Second, while the idea of nonviolence security policy is radically different from conventional security

discourse, I found that officials working on security issues would either try to relegate it to marginal importance within the security community or to accommodate nonviolence as a form of their more familiar discourse such as psychological warfare or public relations efforts. In the latter case, it is not difficult to work with them into accepting this new security policy as a nonkilling policy. Again, this is another reason why proposing nonkilling policy to the state might be easier than to teach nonviolence to it.

Dilemma: Is It Right to Teach Nonkilling to the State?

I have earlier discussed the dilemma of teaching nonviolence to the state (Chaiwat, 1999: 193-194). But teaching nonkilling to the state has different problems. First, as indicated in the PM Order, the word nonkilling was nowhere to be found in the policy document. Given its absence, can this be considered a nonkilling policy? Second, if this policy is indeed a nonkilling policy, what does it do to nonviolence? This is a curious issue since it belies the complex conceptual relationship between nonkilling and nonviolence. I believe that these two challenges are profoundly connected and need to be addressed, though the second problem will require a much more careful and critical discussion which is beyond the scope of the present essay.

As discussed above, the principles that govern the PM Order are clearly based on principled nonviolence as advanced by Gandhi. The question is when one transports Gandhi's notion of nonviolence, born from the womb of a nonviolence theory that is deeply suspicious of the state, to inform the national security policy of the state, what would be the result?

The state, especially its policy makers could come to a conclusion that their tasks of ensuring national security could be performed without killing. This possibility is a result of both a realization of its own diverse power bases short of the use of killing as well as a recognition of nonviolent actions carried out by ordinary people as they engage in conflicts in pursuit of justice, among other things. Once the state recognizes nonviolent actions, it is likely that its responses would be less violent despite the state's violent nature. If they could identify people's peaceful collective actions as nonviolent, they may be able to use nonviolent language to characterize or describe them. In a way, this is a process of questioning the normality of violence where nonviolent discourse could enter into a discursive battle with violent discourse (Chaiwat, 1991). An understanding of the communicative quality of nonviolent actions would help the state see that these actions are indeed attempts to communicate in the public sphere, that there are structural

problems such as the lack of freedom resulting from uneven distribution of power or poverty resulting from uneven distribution of wealth.

In addition, the realization of its own power other than killing should strengthen a newfound confidence in the state and its nonkilling power while the recognition of the people's resistance to the state comes with an understanding stipulated in the PM Order that they are not the enemies of the state but those whose lives and well-being are for the state security officials to protect, and to fulfill such a task even if it means to accept suffering on their behalf. The fact that it is possible at all to have a state accepting such a policy could be seen as an innovation both in the field of security policy and an experiment in advancing a nonkilling approach. The fact that it has not been successful attests to the challenges facing anyone who chooses to work on such a project with the state and its security apparatus. But the fact that it has been attempted at the national level also suggests that it is a critical experiment awaiting the genuine test of a state that one day will choose to secure national security by nonkilling.

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Chapter One

Changing the Power Paradigm
From Mainstream to Nonkilling Politics

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> *Where there is no vision, the people perish…*
> (*Proverbs*, chap. 29, verse 18)

Introduction

Politics—and studying about it, political science—centers on power, the essential currency of the field. The discipline poses questions about relations in the public sphere along the lines of who gets what, when, where and how.[1] The aim of this chapter is directed at the question of how power might be organized, wielded and distributed in shifting the paradigm from the mainstream of politics where killing has occurred on a large scale to a paradigm of power that nurtures the construction of a nonkilling society. As long as mainstream politics demonstrates the 'power to' or authority to serve the ontological needs of all of its citizenry, killing will probably be kept to a minimum. When, however, injustice—followed by instability—prevails at the domestic level or the nation-state's sovereignty is threatened by another nation-state, a coalition of nation-states or an outside nonstate body, then the counter use of 'power over' or a confrontation of dominating forces becomes a likely scenario, along with a high increase in casualty numbers. This is a process that Western societies in an organized and legitimated manner have inherited and followed over a span of 2,500 years.

The evolution of systematic killing in the West was generated by a politics of highly organized 'power over' that can be said to have begun during the Classical and Hellenic Ages (510-146 BCE), and can be traced to the contemporary schools of realism and neo realism and even liberal internationalism. Arresting this perpetual history of extreme brutality poses one of humankind's greatest challenges; the history needs to be closely examined so as to better reject it. As the philosopher George Santayana famously observed, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (1906:

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[1] For the classic definition of politics, see Lasswell (1958).

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588). With that judicious thought in mind, the next two sections of this chapter will sketch out the past history of the thinking behind the killing.

Not only must the past be understood, it must be discovered how to transform its 'power over' paradigm to one that fosters nonkilling. As one of the steps in the transformational process, it is proposed to adumbrate the 'power from' and 'power with' paradigm of the doyen of contemporary nonviolent scholars, Gene Sharp. This is followed by outlining the Gandhian power perspective of 'power within,' that links to a multiplicity of power types in a humane way.

The two concluding sections investigate what relevancy the Sharp and Gandhi paradigms might have to the creation of a nonkilling world in the 21st Century. While the two men wrote prolifically, their ideas are encapsulated, for the most part, in a single piece of writing: for Sharp his 1973 tome of 902 pages, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, and for Gandhi his 1909 booklet of 91 pages, *Hind Swaraj* (Indian self rule). Although Gandhi repeatedly stated during his lifetime that the 1909 slim booklet best summed up his political thinking, it is from a wide range of other works that it has been possible to configure the world he envisioned in the constructing of *Ramarajya* (the kingdom of God on earth). Were such a goal in secular form only partly realized, the world would be well on its way to locking nonkilling into a permanent feature of human behavior.

Origins of Human Intra-Species Killing in Western Society

In the Paleolithic, Mesolithic and most of the Neolithic period, human beings generally refrained from killing fellow members of their species. The evidence for this assertion is based chiefly on the studies of archaeologists and anthropologists who have rarely discovered any cave paintings and other artifacts depicting intra-species fighting, and have recorded nonaggressive behavior among isolated migratory hunter-gatherer groups before they became exposed to the impact of so-called civilized societies. These facts help to verify the assertion that human beings are not congenitally killers of their own kind. (See Giorgi, 2001; Montagu, 1963, 1973; and Sponsel and Gregor, Eds., 1994.) The biological evolution of *Homo sapiens* stopped about 30,000 to 40,000 years ago, almost at the same time (in evolutionary terms) as the appearance of the first modern-day humans (Leakey and Lewin, 1977: 249; Lopreato, 1984: 27; Clifford and Plog, 1987: 239). Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the relatively recent killing practices can be attributed to biological changes and not solely to changes in sociological organization and culture.

The social acceptance of killing 'outsider' individuals and groups did not begin until the preliterate late-Neolithic Age, approximately around 9500 BCE in the Middle East and Southeast Europe. The nomadic life of the hunter-gatherer was gradually replaced by crop farming and the domestication of animals. Social stratification soon occurred due to specialization of jobs and unequal accumulations of wealth. Those able to command the most authority became the community leaders, and those who were strongest were entrusted with safeguarding the newly accumulated property from marauders. In all probability the military, political and economic roles were often conjoined in the same person.

Using lethal force, if necessary, to protect and enlarge their private properties and other resources, the community's most powerful members were able to identify their interests with those of the less powerful and powerless. They all shared a common interest in removing, by any means, forces inimical to the stability of their community's life style. They would have seen themselves engaged in an enduring struggle against a ubiquitous and dehumanized 'outsider'. Intra-species killing became a common practice, justified, if need be, under the rubric of defending the homeland.

During the millennia preceding the Christian era, the violence gradually escalated. By the time it reached the last millennium and the beginning of what is considered the birth of Western civilization, warfare acquired a dimension of unmatched heroic celebration expressed in the literate artistry of the early Greek poetic epics and historical writings. During the Classical and Hellenic ages between 510 and 146 BCE the atrocities of bloody warfare became an all-consuming passion, glorified in paeans to the heroes that can be read in the poetry of Homer and the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides. The massacres that occurred during the Peloponnesian War were blandly reported by Thucydides as matter-of-fact events, or else not reported at all.

The glorification of war was bolstered by the philosophers' justification of war. Heraclitus, for example, expounded on its inevitability since "all things come into being and pass away through strife." (Quoted in Barash, 1991: 16.) Most significantly, the horrific practice of killing was incorporated into the political theory of the two great Grecian political philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. Plato's model society in *The Republic* advanced the view that the philosopher-kings exercised their 'power to' or authority in securing societal order, but when stability weakened to the point of threatening the Republic's existence, 'power over' or domination through violence was justified in order to preserve the three-tier system of the established philosopher-kings, the auxiliaries or military, and the artisans or workers. Plato drew the lesson from

the Peloponnesian War that sound organization within his *polis* (city state) was essential in order to survive in a chaotic world in which war was more the natural condition of humankind than its absence.

Aristotle arrived at the same conclusions as Plato in regard to both war and the preferred type of *polis*. Uprisings and military dangers lurked everywhere, and the wise ruler not only needed to possess well honed diplomatic skills but to have a reserve of counter lethal force at his command. In the case of the preferred *polis*, although he shared the view with Plato that governments should be run by intellectual and well educated elites, he came to this finding from a different angle. While Plato conceived or constructed an ideal *polis*, —out of the air, so to speak—Aristotle spelled out the best *polis* in his famous political classification system on the basis of what he observed. He set down two criteria for evaluating the merits of a state or a constitution: "the nature of the end for which the state exists;" and the "various kinds of authority" (Barker,1948: Book III, 110 f). From empirical observation it was possible to state the number of people who could rule—the ONE, the FEW, or the MANY. The other criterion was both normative and empirical. Aristotle proclaimed what he thought ought to be the standard by which one evaluated the merits of a *polis*, namely, whether the ruler gave first priority to the welfare of everyone in the system (good government), or he pursued his own selfish interests (bad government). Since Aristotle feared rule by the MANY, who were poor, propertyless, semi-literate, and easily aroused emotionally, and since he rejected rule by ONE—even a well-intentioned monarch—on the grounds of paving the way to a lack of checks and balances and eventually tyranny (all demonstrative facts), he opted for a morally virtuous aristocracy of the wealthy, leisured and well-educated that would govern in everyone's interest (Cartledge, 2000: 199-210). His advocacy of a meritocracy, based on a top/down exercise of power, was shared by virtually all Greek men of intellectual stature, including among many, Solon, Socrates, Epaminondas, Xenophon, the aforementioned Heraclitus, the two famous historians Herodotus and Thucydides, the poet Homer, and the playwright Sophocles. Despite their belief in aristocracy's explicit superiority, these giants of classicism still contended their system's prosperity and survival demanded—as with all political systems—a willingness to utilize the 'power over' of direct or structural violence whenever its authority was gravely challenged.

The 'golden age' of Athenian proto-democracy did not change the basic formula of elite dominance and its dependence on superior 'power over' to keep the potentially unruly sub-classes of noncitizens in check. The smooth

functioning of the *polis* relied on the persuasive oratory and much acclaimed probity of Pericles. Yet within the democratic system that he championed suffrage was not extended beyond the class of male citizens who in their minority capacity exercised 'power to' and 'power over' the disfranchised women, the residential noncitizens and the slaves. Attendance at assembly meetings of the qualified voters fell to such disparagingly low numbers that monetary inducements had to be offered and increasingly raised to make the democratic system viable. Outside of the *polis* there was little room for the disaffected to express and negotiate their concerns. Defeated enemies in warfare were confronted with 'power over' and the prospect of execution. In some cases the killing is known to have reached genocidal heights —when the opponent had no power chips with which to bargain. After conquering the island state of Melos (because the Melians refused to join the Athenian Alliance), the Athenians are reported by Thucydides to have informed the Melians that they were subject to the following political code:

> (We) are willing to talk only of interests and power, and not of justice, 'since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must (Quoted by Sagan, 1991: 2).

The Athenians then proceeded to put to the sword every adult man, and enslaved all the women and children (Sgan, 1991: 83). While Thucydides wrote at some length about the Melian genocide and the near genocide of Mitylene, he failed to expound on the fate of the defeated Scionians, the Histiaeans, the Toronaeans, and the Aeginetans. Only casually, *en passant*—as if it were a matter of no consequence—did he mention that in Scione every adult male was put to death and the women and children taken as slaves (*Ibid*, 240).

The Greek states engaged more frequently in war with each other than with non Greek foes like the Persians. They seemed to be constantly at war. "Athens, for example, was at war with someone, on average, two years in every three throughout the fifth and fourth centuries (BCE)" (Cartledge, 2000: 104).[2] Heroic deeds performed on the battlefield defined the pinnacle of male achievement, so that considerable attention was given to the devel-

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[2] Not all Greek thought revealed an acceptance of violence. A few of the intellectuals and artists challenged majority thinking with peace oriented views. Depressed by the long drawn out fighting of the Peloponnesian War, playwrights Euripides (*The Trojan Women*) and Aristophanes (*Lysistrata*) delivered telling antiwar messages.

opment of the martial arts, in order "to be better even than the best," as Homer expressed it. His motto for selfless commitment to the glory of the state is reflected in today's parade of top ranking generals weighing in with their chest-full of medals and ribbons. Out of the crucible of Western civilization a political culture glorifying the military deed has been passed down through the centuries. Honoring the brave and their sacrifices serves to strengthen not only the morale of the armed forces but also ultimately the national authority and domination of the political elite. For the ruler, the pillar of military support is usually seen as essential to survival and prosperity.

The Heritage of Killing Is Deep-Rooted and Growing

As has been noted, whatever type of government prevailed in Ancient Greece, it exercised the same dual model of power: namely, the authority of 'power to' and the lethal domination of 'power over'. The resiliency of the model's pedigree can be traced throughout the history of Western society. Highlights of this line of thinking include the 'power over' exercised in creating and maintaining the Roman Empire. The poet Tacitus drew attention to the fact that, more often than not, the victorious Romans "made a desert and called it peace"; in other words, the triumphs of a glorious empire were built on the vacuity of death and destruction. In the end only nothingness prevailed.

Not surprisingly, this proved to be the eventual destiny of a Rome guided by the bellicose doctrine of *si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you want peace, prepare for war). Although the maxim was exercised during the mid Republic period to the early years of the Emperors, it was not verbally articulated until the late 4th century by Flavius Vegetius Renatus (2003) in *De Re Militari* (*Concerning Military Matters*). This influential work, which dealt primarily with advice on battlefield strategy and logistics, was widely read and its ideas consciously put into practice as soon as it was published. Its influence extended into the time of Charlemagne and throughout the Middle Ages. In fact, its popularity as a leading military manual continued up until the Napoleonic era when it was replaced by Carl von Clausewitz's *Principles of War* (1812) and then by the more comprehensive and better known *On War* (1832) which appeared posthumously.

Vegetius elevated the science of war and the art of conquest to a refined sense of callous detachment. He condensed many of his core ideas on how best to subdue an enemy into an array of easily grasped dictums at the end of his tome's Book III. They contained such guidelines as

- Valor is superior to numbers.
- It is much better to overcome the enemy by famine, surprise or terror than by general actions.
- To distress the enemy more by famine than the sword is a mark of consummate skill.
- A point (of the sword) brought to bear is fatal at two inches; for it is necessary that whatever vital part it penetrates, it is immersed.
- Trust no one but yourself.
- Ensure a god inspires the Roman legion.

And finally the immortal saying:

- He, therefore, who aspires to peace should prepare for war.

His dictums of advice have not only served the cause of past carnage but can also be integrated into the strategy of our present day warriors with only a few slight changes in the wording.

In 313 CE, the Roman Emperor Constantine converted to Christianity and issued the Edict of Milan legalizing Christian worship. A few decades later his successors, who also embraced the new religion, no longer tolerated paganism and persecuted its followers. As well, wars were fought against the encroaching 'godless barbarians', mainly the Huns, Goths and Vandals. A dilemma arose. How did one accommodate to the uncompromising pacifism proclaimed by Jesus and at the same time militarily defend the Roman Empire? Saint Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, came to the rescue with the 'Just War Doctrine' in the 4th century CE. Killing was permissible, he said, when "it is the wrong-doing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars," that is, a "war with the hope of peace everlasting." Such a war was justifiable and preferable to "captivity without any thought of deliverance" (1950: 114). The Doctrine, which was further refined by Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, contained two parts: *jus ad bellum* (justice of a war) and *jus in bello* (justice in a war). Its strictures have constantly been violated through the ages, but it has often served the purpose of nonpacifist Christian churches in justifying killing at the expense of justice.

With the collapse of the Roman Empire the influence of the Catholic Church acquired a strong political dimension. Papal authority ruled over a federation of states that began with the papal coronation of the first emperor in 962 CE of what became known as the Holy Roman Empire. After the 13th century the loosely linked states became increasingly more nationalistically inclined until, in 1806, Napoleon renounced the federation's title

of emperor, preserving it for himself. The direct political control of the Vatican no longer officially extended to an empire.

The Popes had followed the script of exercising authority ('power to') over the vast domain of Christian Europe, and when challenged, did not hesitate to call on the killing force of 'power over.' They even went to the extent of initiating or endorsing wars like the Crusades (meaning wars of the cross) undertaken with the intention of liberating the holy places of Palestine, despite the interdiction proclaimed in *jus ad bellum* that wars must be just (i.e. limited to self-defense). The First Crusade in 1095 captured the main goal, the city of Jerusalem, but under the leadership of Saladin the city was recaptured in 1187 by the Saracens (name given by Crusaders to the Muslims). The kings of Europe, including Richard I (called the Lionhearted), mounted a united campaign, the Third Crusade, to regain this most holy of places. Despite a series of minor victories, the besiegers were only able by 1191 to reach a stalemate in the battle for Jerusalem. The combatants agreed to a compromise. Saladin settled on the release of his Christian prisoners and the return of the Holy Cross in return for the withdrawal of Richard's troops. Saladin also agreed to pay a ransom of 200,000 gold pieces, but he needed time to raise the money. To ensure delivery of the money he turned over 2700 of his men to Richard as collateral. However, he was unable to raise the full sum by the allotted deadline. Instead, he offered Richard half the sum and the balance at another fixed date. Richard declined the revised offer on the grounds that Saladin had broken a royal oath, and gave him no choice but to put to the sword all 2700 of the Saracens. Not only was this slaughter clearly in violation of *jus in bello*, but it breached the sacred Code of Chivalry (EyeWitness to History, 2001).

During the reign of the Holy Roman Empire, the Catholic Church engaged in many wars and often did not refrain from maltreating its prisoners. From the 12th Century and persisting into the 19th, persecution and execution of heretics was conducted by inquisitorial institutions given Papal authority. When Popes felt particularly challenged, as at the time of the Reformation, they showed no hesitation in authorizing the fatal *machpolitik* of direct physical violence—for instance in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the Grand Inquisition (Bethencourt, 2009).

Many of the Protestants were no less committed to bloodletting. The self-styled Puritan Moses, Oliver Cromwell, who successfully led the 'Roundheads' against the Royalists in the English Civil War (1642-1649), gave credit to God for his military victories which included the near-genocide of Catholics in Scotland and Ireland and the regicide of Charles I. Another prominent Protestant

leader, John Calvin (1509-1564), believed the degeneracy, depravity and pun-
ishment of human beings stemmed from Original Sin. They deserved to suffer,
even the neonate. They were incapable of doing 'good' until united with God
in heaven. But while on earth, killing each other was God's will.

Among the political theorists who continue to affect openly the thinking
of modern-day political scientists and the field of contemporary politics is
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) whose basic advice to his Prince (Lorenzo
de' Medici) was to treat everyone as a potential rival. One acted with the
cunning of a fox, but when manipulative skills proved insufficient, one
should be prepared to strike with the lethality of a lion (2007 [1515], Chap.
XVIII, 129).[3] The 'realist' in Machiavelli took the sinister view that

> (No matter) how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live with
> integrity and not with craft, our experience has been that those princes who
> have done great things have held good faith of little account, and have
> known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in the end have
> overcome those who have relied on their word (*Ibid*, Chap. XVIII, 129).

Machiavelli may have demonstrated few moral scruples but he clearly
preferred ruling with authority's 'power to' than having to resort to the
'power over' of domination. He argued:

> Despite the beast in man there is also the other part of his nature, the
> human side. The wise and successful prince is he who can shrewdly inte-
> grate nature's two parts in the context of "fortune" which lies outside his
> control unless it is anticipated. Therefore, so as not to be despised and
> hated—but to be seen as human—the prince should show himself not "to
> be rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his sub-
> jects…. (W)hen neither their property nor honor is touched, the majority
> of men live content, and he has only to contend with the ambition of a
> few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways (*Ibid*, Chap. XIX, 135).

A century after Machiavelli, in the mid 17th century, another renowned
theorist, Hobbes (1588-1679), influenced by the widespread butchery he ob-
served during the English Civil War, worked from the premise that the nature
of humankind was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" leading to a con-

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[3] Machiavelli is much more nuanced in his advice to the Prince than many political scien-
tists and his contemporary public image would indicate—for example the observation,
"he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the times, and that
he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be successful" (*Ibid*, XXV, 176).

stant state of warfare and insecurity (Hobbes, 1997 [1668]). To escape this anarchic state of nature, people entered into a social contract that ceded their natural rights to a sovereign who offered the protection of a secure life through a civil contract upheld by his superior power of domination. When that power waned or the sovereign abused his subjects, only under those conditions could the subjects turn to another figure of 'power over.'

Far less stark in their assessment of reality but still operating from a premise of the necessity of outright elite control (not disguised by representative democracy) were the late 19th century Italian school of conservative elite theorists: Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels. Sometimes they are referred to as the 'New Machiavellis' due to their insistence on the inevitability of political elites being set against the irrational masses. Their thinking took on a highly Aristotelian outlook. Pareto (1963 [1893]) spoke in terms of a constant "circulation of elites." The established elite attempted to either co-opt or defeat any challengers to its power; if it failed, however, it faced replacement by the new group that—irrespective of its original intentions—would soon become the newly established elite (assuming it were not simply a factional struggle within the existing ruling elite).

Mosca (1939 [1896]) observed that every complex social order was ruled by an organized minority that exercised authority over the majority, and this ruling elite's power was not necessarily derived from its control of the economy as claimed by Marx and the socialists. Organizational skills in a society that was becoming increasingly bureaucratic paved the way for the dominance of "the political class."

Michels (1959 [1911]) introduced the popular phrase "iron law of oligarchy" to describe how political parties, although professing a set of high-minded principles, soon discarded them in favor of the leadership's material competitive interests, thereby creating hierarchies. With the Italian triumvirate the key political dynamic came down to who was able to mobilize the greatest 'power over.'

The theorists of the 20th century subscribing to the paradigm of 'power to' and 'power over' represent virtually the entire discipline of Western political science. However, the names of a few are especially worth singling out for their influence. The sociologist Max Weber had a particularly influential impact on political scientists around the turn of the 20th century when the term science was first systematically applied to the study of politics. In a famous lecture to his students Weber warned them about entering the field of politics if their aim were the well-intentioned one of contributing to the creation of a better world. His reason for the warning was because politics led to

the sordid business of sacrificing principles to power interests in compromise after compromise. While he later slightly modified this austere view of political behavior, it was the earlier version that was universally adopted by the discipline and continued by the politicians (Weber, 1958 [1919]: 77-128).

When it came to international relations and strategic studies at the time of the Cold War, the power position was predicated on the bleak Hobbesian and Calvinist world view adopted by Hans Morgenthau. Calling himself a 'realist'[4], he contended that the "elemental biopsychological drives….to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men" (1961 [1948]: 33). On the basis of this presupposition the agents of the state act to preserve their society's peace and security against neighbors driven by the same elemental forces and goals. Each party subscribes to the Vegetius maxim, *Si vis pacem, para bellum*. Building up one's power sources, negotiating from strength, maintaining a balance of 'power over,' and speaking softly with 'power to' but carrying a big stick of 'power over,' not only brought peace and security but advanced the society's various interests. Thus the first responsibility of every state leader, whether engaged in domestic or international politics, was to operate on the principle that "all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power" (1961 [1948]: 39).

It was exactly this kind of grand dictum of 'realism' that brought the world to the brink of nuclear exchanges on a number of occasions. Fortunately, movements of anti-nuclear citizenry have arisen at critical moments in history to contain the nuclear 'power over' mind-set of national leaders, who—as Larry Wittner (2009: 222) has empirically shown—have consequently tempered their "ambitious plans to build, deploy, and use nuclear weapons with policies of nuclear disarmament and nuclear restraint."[5]

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[4] Other influential scholars and political activists in the school of realism include Norman Graebner, Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, Henry Kissinger and George Kennan. For a critical assessment of the school, see Wittner (1985: 282-287). Among Wittner's criticisms he asserts that "the bleak Realist assumptions about human beings and nations are based upon a worst-case scenario. Admittedly, people sometimes fail to live up to the level of cooperation and moral development encouraged by civilization, but *most* of the time they do. Realism focuses upon the exception and turns it into the rule. Indeed, it transforms that exception into a normative principle of international behavior!" (1985: 284-285).

[5] The theme of the anti-nuclear movement's role in restraining the realist view of national sovereignty's protection and advancement with nuclear weapons runs throughout Wittner's book, *Confronting the Bomb*.

The earlier austerity and bellicosity of the realist school has been somewhat mitigated and replaced by the leading school of neo-realism, headed by Kenneth Waltz (*Theory of International Politics*, 1979). The neo-realists place far more emphasis on structural and cultural factors, and—influenced at the time by the flowering post modernism movement —reject the essentialism of the realists (e.g., their stark view of human nature as a starting point). Political actors, it is contended, have their own particular concept of national interests. In striving to advance national interests in a global 'anarchical society' (to use Hedley Bull's term), effective state leaders are compelled to take note of the disparate structures, societal values and conditions that inhibit inspirational and enlightened policymaking practices. While a greater focus is directed at the exercising of authority ('power to'), the vital commitment to upholding the sovereignty of the nation state means that 'power over' or domination must always be held in abeyance for possible use or threat.

The theoretical formulations of both realists and neo-realists are based on the evidence of what they observe (an empirical approach that pretends to be value-free). Hence creative initiatives that call for more experimental and dissenting approaches to how power is exercised are rejected out of hand. They are usually dismissed as 'naïve' and 'utopian'—if considered at all. This is the fate that exponents of nonkilling can expect to encounter in dealing with political elites or autocrats, and it poses the question how best to bring a debate on the two different power paradigms onto the public agenda.

Fortunately there exists a third prominent school, liberal internationalism, that holds the promise of a wedge into the issue. The thinking of the liberal internationalist hovers at times over a commitment to pacific-ism—a nonpacifist position which "rules out all aggressive wars and even some defensive ones" (Ceadel, 1970). As further defined by Ceadel, it maintains that

> war can be not only prevented but in time also abolished by reforms which will bring justice in domestic politics too. It can thus be derived from any 'reforming' political philosophy—from, for example, liberalism, radicalism, socialism, feminism or the 'green' ideology… (1970: 4)

Liberal internationalists tend to skirt between the neo-realist stance on building peace with stockpiles of armaments in the 'anarchical world society', and the 'softer' position of the pacific-ist working toward greater dialogue, cooperation and understanding. However, whenever the specter of a critical national interest arises, the liberal internationalists are disposed to joining the 'hard' line ranks of the realists.

Thus, while contemporary political scientists and politicians have hived off into three distinct schools—realism, neo-realism and liberal internationalism—all three groups subscribe to the same view that the subtle threat of exercising lethal 'power over' can never be left completely off the negotiating table. When passions are enflamed and/or calculations determine that killing is the only way to protect or advance perceived vital interests, then one can expect nonkilling to be denounced as unrealistic and the killing tradition of 9500 years invoked.

First Steps in Forging a Strategy of Nonkilling

The first step in openly rejecting our killing past entails that we no longer glorify military victories or defeats (e.g., ANZAC or the Alamo). While not wanting to deprecate the sacrifices of individual soldiers, their feats need to be balanced against the epic tales of extraordinarily brave men and women who have endured great hardship and abuse in the name of nonkilling. In other words, a culture of rewarding nonkilling actions needs to be given a top priority and fully nurtured. Since people tend to respond more fervently to stories about the heroic exploits of individuals than to bloodless cerebral arguments of a theoretical nature, building the nonkilling global society demands a heavy dose of powerful storytelling.

Despite the importance of unearthing the many peace stories that lie waiting to be told, a cultural transformation to nonkilling is unlikely to occur unless a clearly thought-out strategy confronts the well entrenched paradigm of 'power over'. The 'power to' paradigm of authority should also be challenged when it oppresses, humiliates, or deprives people of their human rights. Depriving some one of life or subjecting them to torture or rape are three of the most heinous crimes conceivable. As stated in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." Almost 60 years later in 2006 the UN Security Council's passage of the Responsibility to Protect Act (R2P) clarified the fact that, "States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (mass atrocities)." If a State committed any of these violations against its population, it was "the responsibility of international community to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt mass atrocities." In effect, international law was saying that *inter alia* the 'power over' embedded in national sovereignty was superseded by the humane legal right not to be killed, tortured or raped.

Thus, developing a nonkilling strategy starts from a sound foundation. The UDHR and R2P have 'officially' imposed significant limitations on the sovereignty of the nation-state—the sacrosanct nature of sovereignty being the source of 'power over' that has enabled the killing of people on a massive scale. In my opinion, these two documents constitute the most noteworthy political advancements in the past 60 years. They need to be highlighted and fully explained in various educational programs and through the mass media, so that every citizen becomes aware of—and insists on using—the power s/he now collectively possesses. How to galvanize that power when governments fail to act is set out in the extensive writings and displays of nonviolent political action by Gene Sharp and his growing band of scholars and activists.[6] Grassroots nonviolent power is also enhanced by the technological opportunities opening up in communication.

Power Paradigm of Gene Sharp

Gene Sharp is generally acknowledged as having elevated the theory and dynamics of nonviolent political action to the level of a finely tuned science. He starts from the proposition that no ruler or elite can rule without the consent of the ruled. If a sufficient number of the ruled collectively and nonviolently withdraw their support—that is, refuse to accept an unjust law, policy or direction—the ruler will in all probability be compelled to concede on the issue or else attempt to intimidate the resisters with violence. The violent option ultimately depends on the loyalty of police and military troops to exercise force and even fire on well disciplined resisters, an order that may not be obeyed. Furthermore, when this kind of extreme 'power over' is exercised—providing the brutality is widely known within and outside the society—it will often prove counterproductive. Such an action, as Hannah Arendt (1970: 56) has pointed out, is indicative of weakness. "Power and violence," she notes, "are opposites: where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent…. Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it."

The only way the desperate ruler will create power is if the ruled submit to his violence. However, as Sharp and other nonviolent exponents have shown, there are multiple nonviolent ways to circumvent and counter

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[6] Sharp's classic work, to which all scholars of nonviolence refer, is *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973). See also Sharp (2005, 2002, 1990); Helvey (2004); Martin (2007, 1993); Nagler (2004); Schock (2005); Summy (1994); Stephan and Chenoweth (2008); Chenoweth and Stephan (2011); Burrowes (1996); Zunes, Kurtz and Asher (1999).

the violence without needless human sacrifice. Sharp noted in his three volume seminal work of, *Politics of Nonviolent Action*, that there were some 198 nonviolent methods to draw upon and he has subsequently been informed of about at least another two hundred.

In most cases the nonviolent votaries do not represent a majority of the ruled. If this minority is lacking the power to make the ruler dependent on its support, its members are at the mercy of the ruler who can either ignore their pleas for justice or punish them at will. However, if the ruler responds with excessive brutal attacks on peaceful protesters, his actions may evoke the sympathy of sections of the society that are in a position to take 'power from' the ruler through using conventional or nonviolent methods. Sharp has called this process *political jiu-jitsu* since the power of the ruler has rebounded against himself.

Another way in which seemingly powerless minorities can take 'power from' an unjust ruler is by appealing to a third party that does have the ability to evoke a dependency relationship with the ruler. The third party can be induced to act on behalf of the powerless minority, because the latter does hold a dependency relationship with the former, either in the form of a material interest or moral concern. The well-known peace researcher Johan Galtung (1989: 26-32) has referred to this process as the "Great Chain of Nonviolence." It may be possible to extend the process through fourth, fifth or even more parties.

The power formula behind successful nonviolent action is for the aggrieved party to undermine the opponent's human and material sources of power (taking 'power from' him), while simultaneously engaging in 'power with'—that is, building up the strength of the nonviolent forces. Strengthening a movement entails such actions as fostering solidarity, maintaining morale, developing nonviolent discipline, creating affinity group structures, and promoting an independent culture through music, theatre, art, dance, poetry, novels and comedy. Thus the strategic aim of the nonviolent actors is to increase the ruler's dependency on them ('power from'), while at the same time increasing their independence ('power with'). If one carefully analyzes a nonviolent campaign, its success or failure will be found to relate directly to one or a combination of these factors.

What are the statistical chances of success as measured by past violent and nonviolent campaigns? An important empirical study by Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth (2008: 8; 2011: 7, 72-73) looked at the success rate (success determined by the gaining of the movements' number one priority) of 323 major social change movements, nonviolent and violent, between 1900 and 2006. Armed struggle achieved a success rate of 26% as

compared to 53% for nonviolent campaigns. The study was confined to issues of domestic regime change, anti-occupation, and secession campaigns and excluded social and economic campaigns such as civil rights and strikes. Another study by Max Abrams (2008) disclosed only a 7% success rate for terrorism. Not surprisingly, the transition to democracy at the conclusion of a campaign has been much higher for nonviolence than for violence.

Despite recognizing the important contribution of the Sharpians to the development of nonviolent protest strategy, the more radically inclined advocates of principled nonviolence—like the Gandhians—are often critical of what they consider the limited and short-term pragmatism that Sharp and his adherents promote. While this criticism may be valid about some of the Sharpians, it fails to account for the nuances and wide ranging canvas of Sharp's own position.

In his third book, *Social Power and Political Freedom*, published in 1980, his analysis went well beyond the pragmatics of nonviolent political action. He noted there were four major problems that needed to be resolved before one should even begin to think about designing an ideal world. These problems were dictatorship, genocide, war, and systems of social oppression. Thoughtful questions needed to be posed that "might give us new insights into them (the problems), or might lead us to other helpful questions, facts or interrelationships" (1980: 14). He then proceeded to set out a list of questions for each problem, followed by an appeal to rethink our politics and the unexamined postulates that lie behind it. The next step, he argues, is:

> to develop new approaches to politics and new programs of social change—in short, to create a new kind of politics…. We must develop concrete steps which will, stage by stage, make significant progress toward a more humane society and world (Sharp, 1980: 20).

Coming close to Gandhi, Sharp touches on a vision aligned with his concept of power. That vision, while not articulated as such, entails the creation of a nonkilling politics. The means for getting there is to engage in the methods and dynamics of nonviolent action.

Gandhi's Power Paradigm as Expressed in *Satyagraha*

Gandhi's concept of power begins with the individual. S/he generates a 'power within' that radiates outward as a 'power through' to all the other forms of power. Thus Gandhi subscribes to a 'totality of power', incorporating Sharp's 'power from' and 'power with', and the political scientists'/politicians' 'power to' and even 'power over'. The character of the

'power over', of course, excludes physical violence, and contains some other characteristics that differentiate it from the other two groupings.

Gandhi equates power with both a method and a doctrine that he calls *satyagraha* (best conveyed in English as truth force or soul force). While *satyagraha* serves his purpose as an instrument for nonviolently tackling an issue or eradicating a problem (*à la* Sharp's four major problems), it also acts as a transcendental philosophy to be pursued in one's private life and in the creation of a radically reshaped new and just society. *Satyagraha* is both means and end. Because means determine ends, it is critical if one is striving to build a society committed to *satyagraha* to ensure that the two components converge. As Gandhi expressed the relationship metaphorically in *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Self-Rule), "There is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree…. We reap exactly as we sow" (1939: 64).

Gandhi's depicting of *satyagraha* as both strategic means and principled end leads to the *satyagrahi*'s (an adherent of *satyagraha*) responsibility to advance the new society's four cardinal virtues: truth, love, nonviolence, and self-suffering. These four qualities are integrated and re-enforcing, and constitute the *sine qua non* of authentic *satyagraha*. Without them, any unarmed action will only have the appearance of being *bonafide*.

The first of the virtues, truth, means God or Absolute Truth when spelled with a capital 'T'. Truth is God, not a mere attribute of an Absolute Deity. When it appears in lower case, it refers to the relative truth that human beings, tied to their mortal frames, pursue in good faith, as they attempt to realize the unattainable Absolute Truth. Gandhi contends that this reaching out for Absolute Truth through the unfolding of relative truths becomes congruently "my beacon, my shield and buckler" (1959: xv). Elsewhere he states:

> It is not given to man to know the whole Truth. His duty lies in living up to the truth as he sees it, and in so doing, to resort to the purest means, i.e., nonviolence. Truth is not to be found in books. Truth resides in every human heart, and one has to search for it there, and be guided by truth as he sees it. But no one has a right to coerce others to act according to his own view of truth (in Bhattacharyya, 1969: 293).

They form the critical components of successful dialogue, making it possible to listen to the 'other' and to treat him/her "as a reasonable and reasoning human equal." Therein lies the path to "conducting conflicts along productive lines"—where all parties are "satisfied with the outcome" (Weber, 1991: 133).

Since every person's view of truth is only fragmentary, no one can claim finality or infallibility. They have to be prepared to concede the possibility of other people's opinions being true from their respective standpoints. This being the case, one has to reject violence which is founded on the proposition that my position is right, and I cannot learn from my opponent. The satyagrahi, on the other hand, is committed to an ongoing dialectic of learning in order to discover truth.

Love is the second component that Gandhi attributed to satyagraha. He sometimes even defined *satyagraha* as 'love force.' It provided the answer to stemming the tide of ever more killing. Conflicts were not likely to be resolved without the insertion of love into the mix. It was necessary to not objectify your opponents but see them as fellow human beings. Gandhi's emphasis on the potency of love in the political arena registered a big impact on Martin Luther King Jr. (1958: 96-7) who wrote:

> As I delved deeper into the philosophy of Gandhi my skepticism concerning the power of love gradually diminished, and I came to see for the first time its potency in the area of social reform…. Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful and effective social force on a large scale.

King distinguished three classical Greek types of love. All were critical to building a secure, just and nonkilling world. First, there was *eros*, the deep aesthetic and romantic love between a man and woman that went far beyond just sexual attraction. Next came *philia*, the love of affection and friendship that exists among siblings and among close friends. And lastly the third type was *agape*, which King (1981 [1963]: 50; 1963: 5) described as "understanding and creative, redemptive goodwill for all men (sic)". Of the three types of love, *agape* provided the most reliable foundation for building harmonious social relations, because it was not dependent on the contingent characteristics of others. It was an unconditional love. It broke down the barrier between the "self" and the "other". In King's (1970: 88) words it manifested "an overflowing love which seeks nothing in return… the love of God operating in the human heart."[7]

The third virtue derived from *satyagraha* was nonviolence in thought, word and deed. It entailed a personal life dedicated to nonviolence and, in the political sphere, a planned strategy of action that utilized an adroit com-

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[7] The original Greek meaning as portrayed by Homer was more in the nature of a welcoming. It was later picked up by the Christians and given the more specific meaning of love. See Nygren (1932: 39).

bination of Sharp's (2005: 45) nonviolent mechanisms of change: namely, conversion, accommodation, coercion and disintegration. Rarely, as Sharp noted, do "the opponents have a change of view; that is, a conversion… A much more common mechanism is accommodation" (2005: 46). It calls for compromise on the part of both parties but without sacrificing their basic personal beliefs or political principles.

A more difficult mechanism for the Gandhians to explain is coercion, and yet it is the most common way that nonviolent success is achieved, including most of Gandhi's led victories in South Africa and India. Since the Gandhians argue that means should be compatible with ends, a dilemma arises when they are compelled to resort to nonviolent coercion in order to have any chance of success.

Gandhi justified using coercion by claiming that it was not done to dominate over opponents, but rather to bring them to the negotiating table where a dialectical exchange could resolve the issue. Opponents were never to be humiliated. They were to be treated humanely and without a scintilla of malice. As fellow human beings they were to be involved in the sharing of a common problem that ended in a win/win for everyone.

The fourth and final virtue that Gandhi featured was self-suffering. The *satyagrahi* must be prepared to endure hardship and face the prospect of his/her death. He was adamant about showing courage and fearlessness, "walking into the face of a cannon if need be." Since the English triumphed in India due to the people's fear, their slavery can only end by rising up with the strength of fearlessness. "What is granted in fear can be retained only so long as the fear lasts" (1939: 62). Mental and moral commitment will prove decisive over bodily force, because "(s)trength," he asserted, "lies in absence of fear, not in the quantity of flesh and muscle we may have on our bodies" (1939: 40).

The self-suffering, however, that went with the overcoming of fear had to be functional. Studies have shown that the spectacle of people suffering for a high-minded principle and refraining from striking back can prove to have a moving effect on persons able to apply leverage on the opponent. It obliges these power holders exercising violence against unarmed protesters to explain and justify their action. Examples of protesters' successes abound: Jallianwala Bagh, the Salt Satyagraha, Bull Connor in Birmingham, the Deli Massacre, and the Egyptian overthrow of President Mubarak.

Gandhi insisted he was not advocating martyrdom or deliberate suffering aimed at taunting the opponent to take violent measures. That would only have the effect of brutalizing the opponent further and make his/her

conversion all the more difficult. "The secret of *satyagraha*," claimed Gandhi, "lies in not tempting the wrong-doer to do wrong."

He went on to stress,

> It is not because I value life low that I can countenance with joy thousands voluntarily losing their lives for *satyagraha*, but because I know that it results in the long run in the least loss of life, and, what is more, it ennobles those who lose their lives and morally enriches the world for their sacrifice (1925: 345 apud Bhattacharyya,1969: 297).

Gandhi's Power Paradigm As Expressed in *Ramarajya*

Building and sustaining Gandhi's power paradigm required more than espousing and practicing the values of *satyagraha*. It also demanded a certain social and political structure that would foster the values and, in turn, would itself be strengthened by them. Gandhi had a name for his new society. He called it *Ramarajya*, the kingdom of God on earth. While it focused on the religious, spiritual and moral dimensions of the individual and society, it also welcomed a humane secular approach. It was all inclusive, recognizing that cultural differences open up a more enriching life for all—as long as everyone is prepared to accept the basic framework of augmenting the individual's dignity.

Piecing together the many comments of Gandhi to explain *Ramarajya*, one can discern four main characteristics that stand out[8]:

1) *Purna Swaraj* or complete self rule. Gandhi maintained "that political self-government…is no better than individual self-government" (1968: 440-441). Continuing the explanation, he asserted:

> The outward freedom that we shall attain will only be in exact proportion to the inward freedom to which we may have grown at a given moment. And if this is the correct view of freedom, our chief energy must be concentrated upon achieving reform from within (1968: 441).

2) *Panchayats* or sovereign village communities were to be the focal point of real political and economic decision-making. As Gandhi described the *panchayat*: "…(I)t is a complete republic, independent of its neighbors for its own vital needs and yet interdependent for many others in which dependence is a necessity" (1942: 238). Each village will be committed to

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[8] I am indebted to Michael E. Salla for introducing this dissection (1992: 10-16). He listed six characteristics; I have borrowed three and added one, 'Oceanic Circles.'

producing its own food and cotton for its cloth. The villagers will graze their cattle on a commons, and in the event of any surplus land it can be used to grow healthy money crops for export to other villages or nations. "Any village," he declared, "can become such a republic today" (1942: 238).

The village governing body or *panchayat raj* would comprise five members elected annually by adult males and females, with no preferential treatment given to members of the higher ranking castes. The *panchayat raj* would serve as an integral legislature, judiciary and executive for one year before turning over the governmental reins to a newly elected group of five. Gandhi considered this "pure democracy." True democracy cannot be worked by twenty men sitting at the center. It has to be worked from below by the people of every village (1968, vol VI, 450).

3) *Oceanic Circles*. Towards the end of his life Gandhi was enthralled with his discovery of an apt metaphor to explain the general structure of his power system. Overriding the conceptual centrality of the *panchayat*, he advanced the metaphor of oceanic circles.

> In this structure of innumerable villages there will be ever-widening, never ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom… (I)t will be an oceanic circle whose center will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to perish for the circle of the villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive in their arrogance but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are integral units. Therefore, the outmost circumference will not wield power to crush the inner circle, but will give strength to all within and derive its own strength from it (1946: 236).

The metaphor graphically demonstrated Gandhi's desire to assemble an ever widening collective, one that transcended nation and became universal, yet still depended on and enhanced the individual. Gandhi had long endorsed the view that all power belonged to the individual and that it should also emanate from individuals operating at the center of the multiple oceanic circles.

Davis George has summed up the Gandhian model in the following way:

> While the dynamo of power in a country like India should be the village, the village was only to be "a knot in a system of oceanic circles" in which the remotest circle derived its strength from the center, i.e., the individual. This would mean that sovereignty was not to remain concentrated at any one level. It was to be diffused among units rising horizontally till they reached the national level. In terms of political science, the residuary power remained with the village and the center was there to co-ordinate the work. For Gan-

dhi, each individual and each nation needed to look within. The power was found at the hub, that is, the many dedicated individuals who generated the just and truthful society reaching out to the ever expanding oceanic circles. They, in turn, generated power back to the center (1992: Chap. 1).

4) At the most outer oceanic circle, *Ramarajya* aimed for a *world federation*. Not long after effectively assuming the leadership of the independence movement in the early 1920s, Gandhi believed that the time had arrived for states to give up a vital aspect of their national sovereignty. As he observed:

> The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent States warring one against another, but a federation of friendly interdependent States… I see nothing grand or impossible about our readiness for universal interdependence rather than independence (1968: 481-482).

The goal of interdependence at the global level was essential to the survival of humanity (Gandhi, 1942). Moreover, the credibility of such a goal conformed to his belief in the "basic unity of the human family" (1968: 249). For Gandhi, as outlined by Indian scholar, Anthony J. Parel (2009: 668),

> the state's power is limited to maintaining internal order and external security; it does not extend to achieving domination over other states. The state is a member of a community of independent and interdependent states… In doing so, it has changed the very notion of political power from one that seeks to expand limitlessly to one that limits itself to the requirements of internal order, world peace, interdependence and universal *dharma*.

While the nature of what the new society of *Ramarajya* would look like was sufficiently adumbrated to serve as a vague inspiration, it was never clearly and convincingly shown how the grand vision would be reached. By adherence to a set of vows and the aforementioned values that Gandhi laid down—especially the willingness to suffer in the name of self-purification and truth—the new society would emerge in the process of struggling to replace the old. Beyond that minimal suggestion he offered no definitive strategy for effecting a revolutionary transformation of India's institutions and the culture nurtured under the British raj. That momentous task was left to his successors after his death who chiefly turned out to be Vinoba Bhave (*Bhoodan* and *Gramdan*) and Jayaprakash Narayan (4 vols of *Towards Total Revolution* and leadership of the Janata Party). Instead, over the last decade of his life Gandhi's full attention and energies were caught up in the quotidian demands of the 'Quit India Campaign' and the subsequent communal riots that besieged the two new nation states.

Shortly before his assassination, however, he was led to reflect that his life had been a failure. *Ramarajya* did not appear to be part of the vision held by India's masses, preoccupied as they were with their daily survival; nor was it incorporated into the thinking of many members of his inner circle, including his beloved associates, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sandar Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad. Nevertheless, Gandhi's perennial faith in humankind would probably have assured him—that once events stabilized—the job of building the new society of *Ramarajya*, spearheaded by the philosophy and method of *satyagraha*, could commence and would be successful. A new India would be a guiding light to the other nations of the world, especially those emerging from colonial subjugation.

To the very end of his life he advised inquirers into his moral and political philosophy to consult *Hind Swaraj*. Therefore it might be fitting to cite the succinct summary that his secretary, Mahadev Desai (1990 [1939]: 7), gave to the central theme of Gandhi's philosophy—namely, how nonviolence (and therefore nonkilling), as both the means and end, was to be integrated into Indian Home Rule.

> It will take long to standardize the meaning and content of this term (nonviolence). But the means thereof is self-purification and more self-purification. What Western thinkers often lose sight of is that the fundamental condition of non-violence is love, and pure unselfish love is impossible without unsullied purity of mind and body.

Thus Gandhi was calling for a total transformation to a nonviolent society, and to achieve that goal it was necessary for a critical mass of the society's members to go through a process of self-purification. With the society's institutions and norms then reinforcing the self-purification process, a mutuality of radical conversion would be generated between the society and the individual. This was the closest Gandhi came to setting out what could be called a macro-strategy. Certainly, as already noted, no details were provided.

Relevance of Gandhi and Sharp to Creating World of Nonkilling

First let it be noted that nonkilling is an attribute of Gandhi's vision and of Sharp's methods. In Sharp's case, the method was to diffuse the opponent's loci of power in order to control abusive political power. In Gandhi's, a vision was projected called *Ramarajya*. If the programs that these two giants of nonviolence mapped out ever reach the level of critical mass support, human killing will have passed into the dustbin of history. However, that is a very big "if".

The main obstacle is an insidious one. How does one jettison the power template of top/down authority and domination when it is so deeply entrenched in our way of perceiving human behavior? A large part of this chapter has been devoted to outlining the persistence of the historical tradition of killing, mutilation, rape and torture. That tradition's tenacious grip on modern thinking continues, more than ever, to block the path to creating a global nonkilling society. The academics and politicians almost unanimously subscribe—most of the latter subconsciously—to the enculturated view that humans are driven to exercise 'power over' their fellows. At best the bloodletting can be kept to a minimum. Therein lies the real enemy: a culture attuned to the acceptance of killing.

Sharp's answer to the violence problem is clear and direct. Oppose the ruthless dictators, the genocidal criminals, the war makers, and the social oppressors with nonviolent political action. He offers the theory of consent which shows that human beings collectively and individually in some instances have the power to strike back at the world's evil doers. What they need to help them is an understanding of the theory and how the dynamics of nonviolent political action operates—that the 'power from' and the 'power with' can defeat the 'power over'. The more successes that occur the more convinced others will be to adopt the same course of action until eventually the Rubicon is crossed to a universal acceptance of strategic nonviolence. Nonviolence (and, of course, nonkilling) would become part of the natural order of things. That would be the long term hope of the pragmatic Sharpians, but in the meantime the task is to concentrate fully on the immediate campaigns. The future then will take care of itself.

The empirical evidence to verify this view is gathering momentum. Many of the dictators and other violators of human rights, not to mention the various armed killers and perpetrators of structural and cultural violence, are learning to their regret that they have misjudged the power residing in nonviolent political action.

Dissidents around the world have been inspired and guided by the writings of Gene Sharp, especially by a 93-page booklet *From Dictatorship to Democracy* outlining the strategy to overthrow autocratic rule (2002, fn. 30). At last count the book has been translated into 24 languages. The dissidents who have been influenced by the book—or its message via the internet, word of mouth, or workshops—have come from countries around the world, including Burma, Bosnia, Tibet, Estonia, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Iran and Zimbabwe. In Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Egypt and Tunisia the lessons learned helped to topple the governments. The Sharpian impact on the student movement *Otpor*

in Serbia played a decisive role in the downfall of its murderous president, Slobodan Milosevic. Likewise in Egypt the protesters followed closely and effectively the strategic scenario laid out by Sharp in bringing down the rule of President Hosni Mubarak. There is no doubt Sharp's ideas are striking at the power base of these tyrants, forcing them to exchange their velvet glove of 'power to' for the iron fist of 'power over' where they expose the true nature of their regimes to a wide spectrum of social and political groups both inside and outside the country. Once aroused, these groups and concerned governments may rally to the support of the nonviolent protesters and help apply the pressures that will force the oppressor to capitulate, i.e. have effectively put the 'Great Chain of Nonviolence' into operation.

Sharp's influence in nonviolently combating ruthless regimes has gained the attention of powerful sections of the mass media. *The New York Times*, for instance, in a favorable, featured article on Sharp's work begins with the observation that

> Halfway around the world from Tahrir Square in Cairo, an aging American intellectual shuffles about his cluttered brick row house in a working-class neighborhood here (in East Boston). His name is Gene Sharp. Stoop-shouldered and white-haired at 83, he grows orchids, has yet to master the Internet and hardly seems like a dangerous man.
> But for the world's despots, his ideas can be fatal (Stolberg, 2011).

The article then goes on at length to enumerate the many successes he has influenced. Two and a half years earlier the *Wall Street Journal* wrote a similar lengthy article on the Sharp phenomenon. It noted that this humble intellectual was an "American Revolutionary," a "quiet scholar (who) inspires revolution around the world." To autocrats he evokes the image of a dangerous man.

> In February (2008), the Iranian government showed a fictionalized video on the dangers of foreign plots against the state. One of its stars: a mysterious American named Gene Sharp.
> In June 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez publicly accused Mr. Sharp of stirring unrest in Venezuela. Last year in Vietnam, authorities arrested several opposition activists who were distributing a book written by Mr. Sharp. In 2005, fires destroyed two Moscow book stores selling Russian translations of the same book (White, 2008).

Other print and digital media from the stately *Christian Science Monitor* to the tendentious *Arab Angry News Service* have devoted space to extensive commentary on Sharp's ideas, some of it approvingly and some of it adversely.

Whether positive or negative the ultimate effect is to put nonviolence and nonkilling on the public agenda. Another dimension of politics (nonviolence) has been added to the current three: conventional, violent, and do-nothing politics.

A persistent weakness of many of the nonviolent campaigns lies not in the Sharpian strategy used to overthrow or compromise the tyrant but in the ability of the oppressed to prevent a new tyrant and regime from emerging to fill the political vacuum. This appears to be the case in the Islamist-led government of Hamadi Jebali in Tunisia, who also heads the Nahda party of extreme Islamists. The same can also be seen in Egypt where President Muhammad Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood have violently suppressed the voice of the mainly young protesters who have reacted against the Islamist-permeated Constitution handed down to the people on a 'take it or leave it' basis. In both instances the original nonviolent action focused far too much on the negative, concentrating on removing the existing problem without making provision for participation in the creation of a new and just society. In other words the Arab spring, which opened up the prospect of democratic secular states moving towards nonkilling, has been replaced by a complex opposition of sectarian states engaged in 'power over' lethality.

Turning to Gandhi, his approach is more comprehensive. While he brilliantly conducted strategic nonviolence against the British and South African governments, he also held adamantly to the principles of *satyagraha* and to the creation of a model society along the lines of *Ramarajha*. Neither of his goals, he claimed, would ever be reached if the political process did not mirror the values and type of society he was advocating. Means had to converge seamlessly with the ends.

There are lots of things a contemporary society can beneficially take from Gandhi's nonviolent philosophy, if it chooses selectively. The best account of what can be borrowed is found, in my view, in the writings of Michael Nagler, especially his *The Search for a Nonviolent Future* (2004). He begins, like Gandhi, with the individual's commitment to the self-discipline of mental training (preferably through meditation in Nagler's case) "which enables us to intervene right where violence starts, at the very roots of hostile thoughts—our sense of separateness" (2004: 83). The inner struggle is not easy, as the mind "resists correction." But perseverance has its rewards. Not only does the individual gain a stress-free peace of mind, but the surrounding world gains a harmonic force that unites in the enjoyment of the differences.

The 'power within,' which becomes a pervasive outflowing power when nurtured in a sufficient number of people, is what Gandhi hoped would overcome the violence generated by hate, fear, anger and greed. The contrary

values encased in *satyagraha*—truth, love, nonviolence, and self-suffering—would be the antidote to these negative forces of violence. What Gandhi proposed: the propitious use of his formula is every bit as valid today as it was yesterday and will be tomorrow. However its adoption as a replacement for the habitual and consensual practices of 'power over' faces an uphill challenge that calls for a super human effort. Despite having to surmount this sustained and unbroken history of over ten millennia, both Gandhi and Nagler still retain the Hope it can—indeed expect will—happen.

The structures Gandhi imparted to his idealized society of *Ramarajha* would appear even more difficult to emulate. While there are in first world countries movements to decentralize and place more power in communities (apropos Gandhi's *panchayat* scheme), the forces of virulent nationalism are not abating. Instead, there are increasingly strong rallying cries to inject the exercise or threat of 'power over' into international affairs. All a government need do is raise the specter of national security to set off a populist demand for a hard-line response to a perceived national threat. From that point on it is easy to put in train the killing process.

Undermining the sanctity of state sovereignty poses a major challenge for the advocates of nonkilling. It should be one of the top objectives. It calls for a Gandhi-like strengthening of the federated powers of the UN in conjunction with a devolution of powers to regional and community groups. How we get there requires the educational exposure that killing begins with lower degrees of violence and is inbuilt into the elite's control of state sovereignty over popular sovereignty. However, as is evident, popular sovereignty often rallies behind the symbols of nationalism for greater violence to which the ruling elites are apt to accede.

An educational task needs to be aimed at the citizenry that exposes the long chain to killing along the lines depicted by Glenn Paige (2002: 74-75). The road to killing originates in the 'power over' of the schoolyard bully, the training of the high school football team to hit the opponent harder and harder, the schooling of children that the name of life's game is winning at all costs (even if it means skirting the rules at times), the size of military budgets in comparison to the money spent on our most valuable commodity (our children), the military regalia on display in schools, the lionizing of military heroes, and the introduction into schools of cadet units. All of these and many other seemingly harmless practices lead in only one direction. To prevent the killing we need to stop them at the root.

After the gloom of the storm a rainbow often appears. As rampant and perverse as contemporary killing might seem to be, there are a few signs

pointing in a sanguine direction. According to the evidence assembled by Steven Pinker (2011), an historical trajectory of *homo sapiens* shows he has engaged in increasingly less killing over the past eight millennia. Admittedly, the *per capita* rate has fluctuated widely over short spans of years, but the trend line over the millennia is clearly in the downward direction. In Pinker's findings the post World War II era may be the least violent time of all human existence. It still has, however, a very long way to go to zero killing.

An additional piece of favorable information does fall in line with Pinker's assertion. The UN Development Program has recently released its Human Development Index which measures factors such as health, education, income and the ravages of war. It reported that "no country for which complete data was available has a lower HDI value than it had in 2000" (Callick, 2013). That even included the last two lowest, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the drought-stricken Niger which came in 186th and 187th respectively.

Despite such propitious advances, humankind can in my view do much, much better. The formula is simple. Begin with Gandhi's individual, then build peace through education both in and out of formal schooling, and focus on health and higher minimum incomes. These are the positive essentials. The negative essentials are to gradually disarm the nation's military, especially its weapons of mass destruction, down to zero, eliminate all trading in weapons, and ban all types of guns to the population. In effect, remove forever the violent 'power over' from governments and from those that aspire to challenge them.

The above set of goals may appear on the surface to be ridiculously beyond human reach. However, if we aim high, a slight miss can mean a marked increase in nonkilling.

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Chapter Two

Nonkilling Society as a Lighthouse Narrative

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Thomas More published *Utopia* in 1516. It was his visionary tale of the ideal human society (in which, killing, incidentally, was still very much a possibility). With it, the term "utopia" became common parlance for unattainable perfection. Nineteen years later, in 1535, More was decapitated for refusing to bow to the king's will. The utopia visionary's encounter with the harshness of reality ended in horrific tragedy and a celebratory ritual of killing. Later in human history, an utopist vision for perfecting human socioeconomic social organization resulted in Joseph Stalin's murderous totalitarian regime. Notwithstanding their good intentions, utopian visions acquired such a notorious reputation, to be stirred away from.

Glenn Paige's scheme for a global nonkilling society does have some utopian characteristics. Paige (2007: 1) defines "nonkilling society" as 'a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, characterized by no killing of humans and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society dependent upon threat or use of killing force for maintenance or change'. This surely is not a descriptive proposition, as human society, as we know, endures constant killing and suffering. Yet, Paige insists that his is not a utopian vision. And indeed both he and a growing circle of researchers produce plentiful data and analyses, demonstrating the possibility of achieving and securing a functioning Nonkilling Society.

Between descriptivism and utopia lie several alternative idea entities such as ideal theory, metaphors, and narratives. In this chapter, I propose that we understand Paige's Nonkilling Society as a narrative, or as I term it a "lighthouse narrative". As a lighthouse narrative, the concept of a Nonkilling Society presents novel ideas and imbeds human activity in a meaningful action framework, which can help reorient human society toward a state of nonkilling. Hence, understanding the Nonkilling Society concept as a lighthouse narrative may be a helpful step in securing this desired future.

After establishing that the concept of a Nonkilling Society is a lighthouse narrative I wish to propose a narrative-based tactic for achieving and securing a Nonkilling Society, de facto. A key component of this tactic is the acceptance of an obligation to narrate the life-stories of people who have been killed, especially people killed as collateral damage (CD) in warfare. Narrating their life-stories is a means of generating empathy and concern for human life—a fundamental part of achieving a Nonkilling Society as a reality rather than a theoretical, unrealizable utopia.

I

Paige's aims are not only noble, they embody a lofty vision akin to the utopist visions of yesteryear—of no less than a society that has ridden itself of all forms of killing. His conception (2007: 1) of a Nonkilling Society as a society in which no humans are killed, no threats to kill are made, no weapons are designed to kill human beings, no justification is given for weapon of death, and no conditions of society depend on threat or the use of killing force for maintenance or change. In short, Paige describes a radically new society unprecedented in human history. Hence is the utopist impression that can be conveyed and identified in it.

Paige's scheme is laced with utopist threads. What strikes us is that for this novel, nonkilling society to exist, a new and noble form of politics is needed. Indeed, Paige suggests a new definition of politics. Shedding the conventional concept of politics as a form of public conflict over the allocation of resources, he offers a more harmonious understanding of politics. Borrowing from Korean political philosopher, Hwang Jang Yop, Paige (2007: 91-92) argues that 'Politics means the harmonization of the interests of all members of society on the basis of love and equality'. Conflict management is not the main function of politics, he says, but bringing people together in loving association. It would probably be more correct to call this association a community rather than a society; a communal association of human beings joined by feelings of empathy and love.

This nonkilling community would be a community of individuals whose interactions create communal bonds and a commitment to mutual nonkilling. As Paige (2007: 96) argues, 'The basic unit of nonkilling political analysis is the individual human being. Organizations, structures, and processes are the product of aggregated individual behavior. World politics is the politics of world individuals'. Although it would have been easier for Paige to take a communitarian perspective, he is wholeheartedly committed to the liberal

tradition. And while his liberalism is vigorously augmented by non-Western traditions, liberalism it is nonetheless. On analyzing Paige's argument, we realize that liberalism is essential to achieving a Nonkilling Society and is reflected in several aspects of Paige's vision. Paige (2007: 78-79, 117-119) is anxious to stress, for example, that Nonkilling is no different a value than such values and principles as: freedom, equality, justice, democracy, human rights, and responsibility. To achieve a Nonkilling Society, Paige believes we need a sincere and absolute commitment to liberal values and principles. Moreover, a Nonkilling Society can only flourish in a fully consolidated local or global democracy. The ideals of perfection, totality, and absoluteness to which Paige often returns, and which feature highly in his liberal scheme, reinforce our sense of this being a utopian vision.

The same applies to Paige's conception of the way forward. His program is totalistic and forces us to address and resolve several different problems at once. To achieve a Nonkilling Society no less than four other discrete global problems must all be solved, 'we can engage five problems that are now globally salient: continued killing and the need for disarmament; the holocaust of poverty and the need for economic equity; violations of human dignity and needs for mutual respect of human rights; destructions of the biosphere and the need for planetary life-support; and other-denying divisiveness that impedes problem-solving cooperation' (Paige, 2007: 111). For Paige, these interacting problems, discrete as they are, produce the underlying reasons for killing. Each problem contributes to maintaining contemporary society, which, due to its lack of empathy, and to socialization and indoctrination processes, produces the circumstances and conditions that lead to killing. Humans must prevent the circumstances and conditions leading to killing in order to clear the way to a Nonkilling Society. Paige paints a holistic picture of reality and demands a holistic understanding of it, with holistic action to change it. This again resembles utopist standards—failure to address any of these problems means failure to achieve the ideal Nonkilling Society.

However, and this is very important, Paige does not argue that change toward achieving a nonkilling society is deterministic or easy. What he does say is that with great effort, and despite the dark shadow of skepticism, human beings can achieve Nonkilling Society. As he writes (Paige, 2007: 69), 'To assert possibility, of course, is not to guarantee certainty but to make problematical the previously unthinkable and to strengthen confidence that we humans are capable of nonkilling global transformation'. And elsewhere, 'It's not possible, but it's possible to become possible' (Paige, 2007: 20). Paige also gives several reasons why he believes that this transformation, difficult as it is,

is possible nevertheless. And that is the crux: awareness and intellectual effort are what differentiate Paige's vision from a utopian vision.

In the next section, I wish to suggest that a better way to understand Paige's scheme is as a narrative, or as I term it, a lighthouse narrative for guiding human society along the torturous road to a Nonkilling Society.

II

The human mind conceptualizes itself through narratives and thinks of its existence in terms of narratives that help it maintain a sense of continuity through changing times and circumstances (White, 1980: 5; Sarbin, 1986; Hardy, 1987: 1; Shenhav, 2005: 76; Sheafer, Shenhav and Goldstein, 2011: 316-317). Humans, as Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, 1981) argues, are essentially story tellers, and just as they tell stories they also listen to them. They form their attitudes by listening and learn from stories (be they true or false) they are told. And this is also true in the political realm. Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe (1998: 315) succinctly argue that narratives 'help us understand ourselves as political beings' and consequently are 'an invaluable tool in navigating the myriad of sensations that bombard us daily'. Narratives, are thus not only literary devices, but social and political devices as well. Narratives function as a roadmap, guiding our individual and collective behavior.

But on what plausible grounds can Nonkilling Society, with its painting of a future desirable state of affairs, be considered a narrative? The answer lies in our definition of narratives. Gerald Prince (1982: 4) defines them structurally as 'the representation of *at least two* real or fictive events or situations in time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other.' (See alo Shenhav, 2006: 247.) Therefore, narratives describe two points in time and give meaning to how they are related. Nothing in this definition rejects the possibility that the points in time, or at least one of them, may be located in a future that has yet to materialize. Indeed, when one point is the future the narrative functions to relate the past to the future through the present. In this case, the narrative can shape our expectations of the future and guide our individual and collective behavior, orienting us toward this still unrealized time. Hence, we can term this kind of narrative a "lighthouse narrative" because, in a sense, it shines through the darkness guiding us through obstacles and stormy seas towards the light. The lighthouse narrative depicts the present as but a transitory phase in our efforts to achieve the desired future state promised by the same lighthouse narrative.

Given the vital importance of narratives, I suggest that Paige's scheme is a narrative; a lighthouse narrative that may guide our actions from a killing past and present to a nonkilling future. The difference between a utopia and a lighthouse narrative is not merely semantic. Utopia has been tarnished as a practical action plan owing to its history and popular understanding and its problematic status as an impotent and unrealizable ideal. But this is not the case with the lighthouse narrative which can actually serve as an efficient and serviceable roadmap. This is a lesson of understanding human beings as story-tellers and narrative consumers, and, indeed, Paige and his collaborators offer ample evidence of the feasibility of a Nonkilling Society.

But if that is so how can we, political scientists, be responsible for endorsing one lighthouse narrative over another? Shouldn't we stick to our commitment to moral neutrality and scientific objectivity and leave it to practitioners to guide the world? How can Paige, a political scientist, develop and propose a lighthouse narrative like a Nonkilling Society? Here I want to return to Paige's scheme and wholeheartedly embrace his position that political scientists should be morally committed in their academic vocation.[1] Paige argues that achieving a Nonkilling Society requires many actors, including political science as a discipline. Political scientists, he contends, have a crucial role to play in producing a Nonkilling Society; they should help to problematize the existing commonsense that killing is an unavoidable and inevitable human phenomenon. It is they who can further the understanding of the possibility of change. To make this possibility a reality, Paige (2007: 72) assigns political scientists four scholarly missions: 'We need to know the causes of killing; the causes of nonkilling; the causes of transition between killing and nonkilling; and the characteristics of completely killing-free societies'. At first glance, this does not seem a very radical demand of political science. Allegedly, political scientists must simply add four, interesting, new research questions to their host of routine research questions. However, this superficial reading would be completely off the mark as Paige rightly and forcefully points out. The requirement of political science is radical on two related accounts. First, political science must be fully committed to the task of producing a Nonkilling Society: 'nonkilling political science engages in efforts to end behavioral violence, to change conditions of structural violence, and to solve problems of both in interaction. It seeks to remove support for lethality, to assist existing institutions for nonkilling ser-

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[1] I developed my own stands on committed political science in the following articles: Ish-Shalom, 2006a; 2006b; 2008; 2009; 2010a.

vice, and to create new nonkilling policies and institutions' (2007: 100). Reading these lines, it is quite clear that the scientific study of the causes of killing and nonkilling and the switch from the one to the other cannot be incidental to other, "routine," tasks. Paige wants political science to be a Political Science of Nonkilling—a political science wholly committed to furthering a Nonkilling Society. This mission is so worthy, so urgent, and so demanding, that it must supersede all other ventures. In other words, the project of achieving a Political Science of Nonkilling should revolutionize political science by utterly transforming its research agenda.

According to Paige, and here lies another radical aspect of Paige's program, in order for this revolution to take place political scientists must be morally committed. Political science should not embrace the positivist philosophy of social science. Rather, neutrality and objectivity should be set aside for normative commitments. More precisely, the false positivist belief that science is committed to neutrality and objectivity should be replaced by an understanding that social science, including political science, is, and should always be, morally committed, 'Political scientists cannot evade this responsibility by objecting to value-bias and claiming "realistic" scientific neutrality that in truth translates into readiness to kill. Such neutrality has never been true' (2007: 155). This is clearly a nonpositivist form of political science. Therefore, along with a new comprehension of society as Nonkilling, and politics as achieving harmony and love, Paige advances a new[2] conception and practice of political science—a normative approach committed to moral values and principles and presided over by the principle of Nonkilling.

Paige's proposal has the advantage of understanding that in order to realize the possibility of a Nonkilling Society we should complement its depictions with a new, morally committed, variety of political science; rather than support a positivist political science committed to neutrality and objectivity, we should strive for a morally committed political science which aims to shape the society it studies. Only by reshaping society, politics, and political science at the same time, can we hope to realize the allegedly unrealizable: a Nonkilling Society.

Paige the political scientist follows the scheme he propounds, infusing his political science with values, foremost of which is the value of nonkilling, derived from the value of human life. Paige's proposal has many merits. Based on a combination of these two themes—Paige's ethical political science and the importance of narratives—I wish to argue that this is how we should un-

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[2] Though by all mean he is not alone in it, non-positivism is by now quite common.

derstand the arguments for Nonkilling Political Science and Nonkilling Society: as a lighthouse narrative proposed by a committed political scientist who relates a killing past and present to a nonkilling future. As such, it challenges what we take for granted. We tend not to think of our society as a killing society. Of course, we are aware that people are being killed, and at times we are saddened by their deaths and mourn them. But because we tend to accept killing as a given, we fail to challenge it and do not see it as a problem to be solved. Thus, there is nothing to stop killing from continuing. Paige's narrative of society's past and present is an alarming wake-up call. By relating the killing past to a possible nonkilling future, Paige insists we must not take killing for granted, that it is not inevitable. He thus shatters our serenity and even our slavish acceptance of killing. His ideas, which are best not understood as an utopian vision but a lighthouse narrative, shock and awe us intellectually, urging us to define killing as a real social problem, and a solvable problem that should and must be a paramount human priority, exceeding all others. Essentially, Paige takes a first and vital step toward emancipating humans from the shackles and burdens of killing, and we political scientists should follow him and embrace this lighthouse narrative and help to achieve it.

III

As a lighthouse narrative, the Nonkilling narrative leads to another more tactical use of narratives for securing nonkilling. If humans are indeed storytellers and if stories are (among) those things that shape human attitudes towards their world and environment, then what can be more effective for combating killing than an array of narratives? For the issue at hand, the advantage of narratives for achieving a Nonkilling Society is their ability to arouse empathy. According to Francisco Rios, Allen Trent, and Lillian Vega Castañeda (2004: 6), 'Through the use of narratives, readers situate themselves in the other and then determine degrees of connectedness. Narratives are powerful and accessible'. Accordingly, I want to propose the narration of the life-stories of people who are killed. This can act as a tactical device for banishing killing.

We all have life-stories and those life-stories are a form of narrative because they tell a tale which offers a temporal account of several events. A tale from birth to death, the temporal tale is woven into the life-story of the 'I' in all its richness. This life-story distinguishes and defines each person as a human and a subject—as the "I" that deserves dignity and security. Bringing Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue into the realm of narratives, I would like to argue that narrating life-stories can lead to truly I-Thou relations. Buber argued

that although people live in a state of social alienation and mistrust society can be healed through interpersonal dialogue. (See especially Martin Buber, 1947; 1958). Modern human existence is fraught with grievances, injustices, conflicts, and asymmetric power relations. To overcome these difficulties, interpersonal dialogue has to be founded on presence, true intention, and a mutual opening of hearts. These three traits can be facilitated by true listening; or stated differently and in the terminology employed here, by truly listening to the other's narration of their life-story. By narrating life stories, in other words, by acknowledging our individual humanity and uniqueness, perhaps we can stop instrumentalizing other people's lives, a predilection which has become all too rife in modern social life. By narrating and listening to narratives a true Buberian dialogue of I-Thou quality can be achieved, which arouses empathy and compassion for the individuals whose life-stories are heard.

With this in mind, the following offers an analysis of the merits of narratives by examining the critical case of collateral damage. So called Collateral Damage (CD) has been part of warfare since ancient times, and is now quite a common feature of what is termed 'New War.' (Seminal works on this subject are Kaldor, 1999; 2006.) It has been codified in Just War Theory (JWT), and under certain circumstances can be justified by the Double Effect Doctrine (DED). DED specifies the conditions under which CD may be permissible. The main condition of permissibility is that the victims must not be harmed intentionally. The lack of intentionality condition is fundamental. Even in situations in which harming uninvolved individuals is foreseeable, CD can be judged permissible if their harm was unintended; that is if they were not the target, and if harming them was necessary and proportional to achieving the legitimate objective (the actual military target). This formulation might seem cynical, manipulative, and unjustified, especially to those adhering to the Nonkilling Society and Nonkilling Political Science ideals. Anyone committed to nonkilling would find it difficult to justify such killing.

Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, JWT is a necessary theoretical apparatus that should also be embraced by proponents of nonkilling (Ish-Shalom, 2010 b). We should, of course, work to eradicate war. But in today's world we face situations requiring armed response, either to defend against international aggression, or as humanitarian intervention under the parameters of Responsibility to Protect.[3] We can try to develop as many nonlethal weapons

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[3] Under extreme circumstances, mostly where a national leadership commits atrocities against its own citizenry, the international community may assume responsibility for the defenseless citizenry.

as possible but there will always be situations during war time when we must resort to killing. We should constantly bear this in mind and treat the capacity to kill as a last resort resource, and only in the context of a necessary and just war. Think, for example, of the atrocities now being perpetrated in Libya by the Libyan authorities. I would argue that there is a responsibility of the international community to step forward and defend the Libyan citizens currently being killed by their own government by the scores and hundreds. Against Muammar Gaddafi and his brutal acts of killing, there might be no other recourse than killing to protect the Libyan people.

JWT provides a normative framework that permits exactly this: killing under restrictive conditions and as a last resort. And one of the most important restrictive principles of JWT is the principle of discrimination between combatants and noncombatants and the principle of noncombatant immunity. Those uninvolved in the actual warring must not be targeted. But, of course, war is a tricky dirty business creating complex situations that may regrettably and foreseeably breach the principle of noncombatants immunity and harming innocent bystanders. Consider the following common scenario. A military base is located within a civil community. The base is a crucial military asset of State A that launches a surprise, unprovoked, and impermissible attack against Country B. In order to halt the attack, State B's air force must counterattack A's military base. Foreseeably, an attack will also harm and kill few members of B's civil community. But there is no viable alternative to halting A's impermissible attack on B apart from attacking A's military base and doing so using B's air force. B can either decide not to attack the base and bear the costs in terms of its own citizens' lives, and property and its own sovereignty, or it can decide to launch the attack knowing that it will breach the immunity of some of A's uninvolved citizens.

The current Libyan crisis involves a similar scenario. We can think of problematic and regrettable situations in which the international community's armed forces will have to endanger some Libyan noncombatants (for example if Gaddafi decides to use civilians as human shields) in order to save thousands of other uninvolved Libyans.[4] In such regrettable circumstances DED provides a theoretical apparatus that allows military operations while restricting them through the aforementioned criteria: unintentionality, legitimate objective, last resort, and proportionality. Therefore, in

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[4] Actually, there are news reports of CD inflicted by the international community in its air raids in Libya, exactly when I write these pages, on March 31, 2011. See <http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1101275.htm>.

today's imperfect world, where wars rage and some states kill their own people, CD is sometime tragically permissible within the limits set by DED.

And yet, supportive as I am of DED as a moral principle, CD leaves me uncomfortable. In a way, it is a technical notion that masks and conceals real people who are harmed and killed—harmed and killed without themselves being involved. Note how technical the preceding paragraph is. There are states A and B, there are perimeters, be them military or civil, and there is a language that is comprised of analytical concepts. The technical nature of CD and DED can produce denial and repression mechanisms; a detachment that makes it possible to disregard the victims, designating them as CD: a theoretical category rather than human beings. As Carol Cohn made perfectly clear regarding the technostrategic language of Defense Intellectuals, 'This language has enormous destructive power, but without emotional fallout, without the emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for mass murder, mangled bodies, and unspeakable human suffering'. DED functions somewhat similarly to the technostrategic language of Defense Intellectuals. It functions as a self justificatory principle and, as such, allows collateral killing to persist. Again, using Buber's terminology, use of the term CD reifies the alienated modern social relations of I-It. I-It relations, the obverse of I-Thou relations, refers to the absence of real dialogue. Dan Avnon (1998: 39) describes it as follows: 'in an *I-It* attitude to being, the person tends to distance himself from the other, to create in the interpersonal a quality of relationship characterised by the person's desire to distinguish him-or herself by accentuating differences, by emphasising the uniqueness of 'I' in contrast to the other'. I-It relations are based on the instrumentalization of humans. That is, even in cases when DED is used to save human lives, it does so by scarring the lives of other humans who are instrumentalized by an I-It quality of relations. And once this state of mind and quality of relations has been reached it is also difficult to maintain the strict conditions of permissible harming and killing. It becomes all too easy to slip into negligent, reckless military planning and execution that may produce more victims than DED allows. Furthermore, we start treating CD simply as a bothersome side issue that is part of our life and here to stay. We undermine the strength and viability of the Nonkilling Society ideal as a lighthouse narrative. This is where life-story narratives can come in—as a means of generating I-Thou relations and breaking the instrumentality–technicality spell.

Put differently, as long as people are killed and designated as "CD" it is easier to treat them as "Its", as the means to an end (even a noble end). It is easier to ignore the enormity of the implications of their humanity and categorize them as unavoidable and permissible incidents. When this hap-

pens Killing assumes an aura of inevitability and legitimacy. But what if we narrate the life-stories of individuals who are killed and treated as CD? How could this change the nature of our moral reflection? The answer, as argued above, is that it may reorient the perception of CD victims from a Buberian "It" to a Buberian "Thou" and restore their humanity as ends in and of themselves. Furthermore, according to the Buberian philosophy of dialogue, neither I nor Thou can exist entirely alone, nor can they be fully comprehended separately. I-Thou and the obverse I-It are relational concepts—in Buberian terminology: "basic" or "primary" words (Avnon, 1998: 39). Neither word has complete meaning outside the relationship. Avnon (1998: 39) captures this well with regard to I-Thou:

> The 'I' indicated by the basic word *I-You* is not the same as the 'I' of the basic word *I-It*. The '*I*' of *I-You* indicates a quality of presence that considers self and other as elements of one, inclusive reality: *when* one addresses the other from an inclusive state of being that is present to the unity of creation and of being, *then* the interpersonal is permeated by an *I-You* mode of existence. This 'I' is not sensed as singular; it is the 'I' of being present to being.

Hence, by changing the "It" to a "Thou" you also affect the quality of the "I's" and help to restore the full humanity of the "I's" who participate in military campaigns and in so doing lose part of their humanity inflicting harm and killing the instrumentalized uninvolved. This is another crucial reason for the obligation to narrate CD victims' life-stories and establish a genuine I-Thou dialogue capable of restoring and safeguarding the humanity of both parties to the DED: the killers and the killed.

With this in mind I wish to argue that we have an obligation to narrate the life-stories of the victims of CD. That obligation is incumbent on both the international community as a whole and the warring parties, especially the party whose agents inflict CD by following DED. The obligation to narrate the life-stories is incumbent on the international community for instrumental and substantial reasons. Instrumentally, narrating CD victims' life-stories may, as argued above, increase empathy and encourage I-Thou relations, thus discouraging toleration of CD and the killing its acceptance condones. Narrating the life-stories of CD victims thus serves the international community's interests of making countries and people less indifferent to killing, thus advancing an end to killing. But the obligation to narrate the life-stories of CD victims is also incumbent on the international community because to some extent this community is a proponent of CD. The interna-

tional community is where JWT along with DED was developed and is maintained. Hence, the international community is implicated in the practice of CD and harming (killing) CD victims. Implication in harming substantially makes it incumbent on the international community to narrate the CD victims' life-stories. But the killing party is, of course, more directly linked to harming and killing the CD victims as its agents are the ones responsible for harming and killikng the CD victims. Therefore, because of its direct involvement in killing CD victims, the killing party is more heavily burdened with the obligation of narrating their life-story.

Accordingly, in the balance of obligations, the killing party should publish the narratives. And if it fails to do so the international community should pressure it. But if pressure fails, the international community should narrate the life-stories itself thereby discharging the obligation. Whoever the discharging agent is the important thing is that the life-story must be narrated, and narrated publicly.

IV

This brings us to the final section of the chapter. Here I will broadly (admittedly too broadly) outline several details of the proposed life-story narration approach. By narrating I mean telling the life-stories of every single CD victim. At the very least, basic details about the person, namely their name, date and place of birth, date and place of death, should be narrated, and how they were killed. But where possible, narration should contain far more than basic details. The narrating agent should aspire to a full obituary portraying the victim's life, his/her emotional inner-world, his/her family and social circle, and his/her life plans that were violently and abruptly cut short. A detailed obituary has the potential to raise our awareness of the lost lives, arouse the sought after empathy, and transform the victim from a Buberian It to a Buberian Thou; from an object instrumentalized for some (legitimate and permissible aim), to a genuinely present subject in our minds, able to impress there a cognitive and emotional mark. Only then can the victim of CD regain her/his humanity and allow us to truly feel the agony of the loss. This will place us in a viable position to efficiently militate against the occasional current necessity for CD. We will stand a true chance of fulfilling the potential of the lighthouse narrative of the Nonkilling Society and advance from a killing present to a nonkilling future.

Nowadays it should be fairly easy to narrate the CD victims' life-stories publicly. Obituaries can be posted to the internet on designated websites functioning as interactive archives. And though the internet cannot guaran-

tee wide circulation it can at least potentialize it, and, with smart publication policies, help realize that potential. Narratives should be published in both English and the killing party's language—it is especially important for the life-stories to be available to the killing party's citizens. This is because the narration purpose is to elicit empathy for the CD victims and their lost lives—which is the hardest thing to do among the killing party's public. People have complex denial and repression mechanisms that can deny empathy to victims of CD. To break loose of those mechanisms, the narratives should be available to the killing party, hence the life-stories must be available in the killing party's language. As the current lingua Franca, English can make the life-stories available globally to the widest possible extent. Of course translation into other languages is important and welcome.

On a final note, I would add that there is no inherent reason why the obligation of narration should be limited to the question of CD. On the contrary, the obligation to narrate life-stories should be extended to all victims of killing. This would surely be beneficial and increase the chances of a Nonkilling Society evolving. My proposition deals with CD victims first and focuses on this issue as their plight seems most urgent and critical. They also, probably, come first due to my vocational sensitivity (as a student of international relations) to the harms and killing in the international domain. Once we have instituted procedures and established resources for discharging the narration of CD victims' life-stories, gradually the obligation can and should be widened to other issues. The scope of the obligation of narrating life-stories should be as encompassing as is reasonably possible, and should include victims of domestic killings and those killed due to the negligence and recklessness of different societies and states' organs.[5] These categories should also include people killed through criminal acts; acts that are usually enabled by some degree of negligence or recklessness of state agencies. We can add to this list people who die due to the failures of state welfare systems; who are left by the wayside to perish from lack of social attention and resources. And those who die because of weaknesses and lacunae in our healthcare (especially in the

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[5] My focus is on states' organs, but for those who are more strictly adherents of the Nonkilling Political Science the distinction between public and private killing has no real meaning. Accordingly they would probably want to broaden the obligation of narration to include also those victims of private-domain killing. They might also eschew the distinction between permissible and impermissible killing. In that case they might want to narrate also the life-stories of those who kill, perceiving them as victims of the current killing society.

American case), or our over-pressured public health systems and overburdened physicians (as in the Israeli case). Further down the road we might also narrate the life-stories of people who perish in road accidents due to infrastructure weaknesses and those who are killed in work accidents due to lack of clear safety procedures, etc. Setting priorities for gradually expanding the narrative obligation should be discussed and established democratically and globally according to the different sensitivities and urgencies of different societies and states. I leave this question open for now.

Conclusions

Certain features of Paige's Nonkilling Society convey a sense of unachievable utopia. However, in this chapter I argue that it would be more appropriate to understand Nonkilling Society as a lighthouse narrative that shapes our expectations about the future and guides our individual and collective behavior; a lighthouse narrative which orients us towards this yet to be fulfilled future of Nonkilling Society. Accordingly, I proposed a tactical narrative device to help us create a Nonkilling Society out of our current killing society. In my analysis of Collateral Damage that can be legitimized by the Double Effect Doctrine as a sometimes permissible last resort instrument for securing legitimate just causes, I maintain that sometimes CD victims are instrumentalized to the cipher of a Buberian "It." Such instrumentalization also serves as a mechanism of psychological denial and repression making it difficult to eradicate the practice of CD. The chapter argues that by narrating the life-stories of the CD victims we can encourage society to empathize with them which would help restore their humanity by giving them (dead though they be) the status of the Buberian "Thou", and helping them become genuinely present in our thoughts and emotions. This, I argue, would be a key tool for ending the toleration of CD. Hence the ethical nature of the obligation to narrate the CD victims' life-stories. Widening the scope of the obligation to tell life-stories to other categories of unnecessary death may help us materialize the promise of Paige's lighthouse narrative—of achieving a Nonkilling Society.

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Chapter Three

Nonkilling Institution Building
Departments and Ministries of Peace

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Why Nonkilling Institution Building

Glenn Paige in his book *Nonkilling Global Political Science* writes: "The history of civilization is in large part the history of institutional innovation" (2002: 125). The new institutions arise or the existing ones get adapted in response to human needs and aspirations. To create an authentic and sustainable peace, we need institutions that provide a strategic focus for peace with adequate resources, trained personnel, and a clear mandate for prevention of violence and war-fighting at home and abroad. These are similar in scope and commitment to institutions whose main purpose is to prepare for war.

There are many books and papers on the mindlessness of war-fighting in the past century. Over 200 million people are estimated to have been killed in war during the 20th century (Leitenberg, 2006). We have seen that despite vast commitments of scientific, human, and material resources to suppress violence by violent means accompanied by incredible bloodshed, these have not succeeded in putting an end to global lethality, from war and genocide to homicide.

Demonstration of power through military wars is becoming an outdated concept as we come to realize that there are no longer "winnable wars". British general Rupert Smith, former deputy supreme allied commander of NATO (Smith, 2007) points to the limitations of technology based "interstate industrial wars" as a decisive tool for a clear-cut victory over an opponent. He states that the western forces have not won any war since World War II (unless one considers Grenada and Falkland as wars). Since 1946, Smith argues, every time Western nations have become involved in a foreign war, they have, instead of a swift, decisive victory, got bogged down spending decades struggling to bring the conflict to an end. This was the case in the Balkans, the Congo, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Vietnam. The war in Afghanistan has lasted longer than any other previous War.

Smith concludes that industrialized warfare is no longer a doable option as the conflicts are becoming timeless and fought among the people.

To meet such new challenges of conflicts in the 21st Century, the premise of this chapter is that with right kind of institutions and policy structures, violence and wars are preventable. It reviews the developments in the new millennium towards building of institutions that will promote peace, security and good governance. The chapter describes the evolution of a civil society movement aimed at filling the institutional deficit through creating Departments/Ministries and other infrastructures of Nonviolent Peace. It reviews the status of global movement in this direction and then as a case study examines the campaign for a Federal Department of Peace in Canada and the related legislation introduced in the Parliament of Canada.

Pointing to a potential architecture of nonviolent peace in the machinery of a government, Paige's work underscores the importance of "Public Service Departments of Nonviolence" and "Nonkilling Common Security Institutions" (Paige, 2002: 133-135). He states:

> Needed at all levels of governance are public service departments of nonviolence with cabinet responsibilities. Their tasks are to monitor community conditions related to the logic of nonkilling political analysis, to support professional training for prevention and post-lethal transformative rehabilitation, and to advise on public policies that will facilitate nonkilling community well-being.

Such a Department can

> aggregate violent statistics and recommendations for violence-eliminating actions from all public and private sources, and make periodic status reports with nonkilling policy recommendations to governmental decision-makers and to members of civil society much in the role of an auditing agency.

The Nonkilling Common Security Institution's mandate on the other hand, is "to provide policy alternatives for violence prone nation-states and their lethal allies." The Nonkilling Security Institution will also have its "forces" but trained for "preventive, crisis coping, and restorative actions—and for after-action evaluations of effectiveness". These institutions imply also nonkilling agencies at international level. For example, a nonviolent global common security council at the United Nations "can be formed by nations that rank lowest on indicators of lethality: no nuclear weapons, no armies, no capital punishment, low homicide rates, no arms trade, and so forth."

Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace

The Global Alliance for Ministries and Infrastructures for Peace (GAMIP) —formerly the Global Alliance for Ministries and Departments of Peace—was created in London in 2005 to encourage and support the civil society movement for departments of peace and to highlight specific peacebuilding interests of the host country. (Visit: <http://www.gamip.org>.) It has convened global summits in five countries on five continents. Following the U.K. meeting, summits were held in Canada in 2006, Japan in 2008, Costa Rica in 2009 and South Africa in 2011. Representation from member countries has grown from 18 to over 35 today, worldwide.

The mission of Geneva based GAMIP is:

> To collaborate with and support governments and civil society around the world working to establish national ministries and departments of peace, and also to support efforts to develop local, regional, and national peace councils, peace academies, and other effective infrastructures for peace. In carrying out this mission, the Global Alliance enables and facilitates the capacity of its network to share and provide one another with resources, information, encouragement, and support for existing and new national campaigns for Ministries and Departments of Peace as well as efforts to establish peace academies and other peace infrastructure elements in government and civil society. It also seeks, through the combined activities of the Global Alliance and its broader networks, to increase global understanding amongst civil societies and governments around the world of the need for Ministries and Departments of Peace and civil society counterparts at all levels.

An institution building process for a strong foundation requires support and involvement of populace at local level in formulation and articulation of local needs and aspirations. The Cities and Mayors for Peace are good examples.[1] The International Cities for Peace movement defines itself a "formal association of communities that by history, resolution, or proclamation are doing just this—self-defining their community as an official City of Peace."

Several cities worldwide are members and have some ongoing liaison with their respective City/Municipal Councils. By focusing on cities, through municipal resolutions of support for a department of peace and various UN resolutions dealing with human rights, disarmament, nonviolence etc, the movement is seeking to build a culture of peace in cities where more than half of the world

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[1] Visit: <http://www.internationalcitiesofpeace.org> for the International Cities for Peace movement and <http://www.mayorsforpeace.org> for Mayors for Peace.

population lives and will grow in the future. Often, this work is carried out in conjunction with having the current mayor in each city become a Mayor for Peace. At the time of this writing, there are over 5,000 members from 156 countries and regions part of Mayors of Peace movement. Their major project is nuclear weapons abolition by 2020.

There are three countries where Departments or Ministries of Peace have been formed: the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction in Nepal (2007), the Ministry of National Unity, Reconciliation, and Peace in the Solomon Islands (2005), and the Ministry of Justice and Peace in Costa Rica (2009). Canada (2011) and the United States (2013) have pending legislation for departments of peace. Each of these institutional formulations has been created by government representing its specific peacebuilding need whether this is reconciliation of warring communities, safeguarding of human rights, economic development or peace education for resolution of conflicts through peaceful means.

The Canadian Peace Initiative

The Canadian Peace Initiative (originally the Canadian Department of Peace Initiative), a non-partisan Canadian civil society movement began in 2003, the year that Canada committed 2000 combat troops to the war in Afghanistan (Arbess and Bhaneja, 2013). This was Canada's first combat mission in several decades and represented a dramatic example of a departure from Canada's UN peacekeeping role that had been Canada's major troop deployment until the mid- 1990s. Indeed, this recasting of the role of Canada's armed forces over the preceding decade was never subject to debate in Parliament or any public process.

It began with the formation of the founding chapters in Victoria and Ottawa, and by 2013 the CPI movement comprised 12 chapters in most major Canadian cities. (Visit: http://www.departmentofpeace.ca>.) Early supporters of CPI were the Hon. Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada, and the Hon. Douglas Roche, former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and prominent anti- nuclear activist. Today, many prominent Canadians and globally-recognized peace advocates and spiritual teachers have endorsed the Canadian Peace Initiative (CPI) along with more than 30 organizations, most of them national in scope, representing more that 1.5 million Canadians. With a relentless campaign by CDPI/CPI over a six year period, the first non-partisan Department of Peace legislation as a Private Members Bill C-447 through select progressive Members of Parliament was introduced in the House 40th of the Canadian Parliament

on 30 September 2009, and re-introduced in the House 41ˢᵗ as the Bill C-373 on 30 November 2011. The bill tabled was based on a Model bill included in a CDPI paper, "Towards a Department of Peace in the Federal Government" (Bhaneja, 2005) that had been presented in February 2005 international conference of Civil Peace Service Consultations in Ottawa.

The rationale for a Department of Peace (DoP) revolves around five key areas where greater federal government response is urgently required:

- Increasing the coherence and coordination of peace-related policies and programs.
- Rebuilding Canada's role in international peacebuilding, UN peace-keeping and peace diplomacy, including disarmament.
- De-escalating violent conflict, the risk of nuclear weapon use and the proliferation of these weapons.
- Reversing the recent trend towards militarism as manifested by the growth of military budgets and Canada's aggressive military posture in the world.
- Promoting a culture of peace in Canada and abroad.

The mandate envisioned for the Minister of Peace is to reinvigorate Canada's role as a peacekeeper and peacebuilder as follows:

1. Develop early detection and rapid response processes to deal with emerging conflicts and establish systemic responses to post-conflict demobilization, reconciliation and reconstruction.
2. Lead internationally to abolish nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, to reduce conventional weapon arsenals and to ban the weaponization of space.
3. Implement the UN Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace (1999) to safeguard human rights and enhance the security of persons and their communities.
4. Implement UN Resolution 1325 on the key role played by women in the wide spectrum of peacebuilding work.
5. Establish a Civilian Peace Service that, with other training organizations, will recruit, train and accredit peace professionals and volunteers to work at home and abroad, as an alternative to armed intervention.
6. Address issues of violence in Canada by promoting nonviolent approaches that encourage.
7. Community involvement and responsibility such as Restorative Justice, Nonviolent Communication and Alternate Dispute Resolution.

8.   Support the development of peace education at all levels including post-secondary peace and conflict studies.
9.   Promote the transition from a war-based to a peace-based economy.

As defined by the UN, the culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations (United Nations Resolutions A/RES/52/13: Culture of Peace and A/RES/53/243).

Bill C-373—The Department of Peace Bill: A New Institutional Paradigm

The definition of peace in the preamble of Bill C-373 is succinctly summarized: "Whereas peace is not simply the absence of active hostilities but rather a state of nonviolence, harmony and amity based on a foundation of principles supported by the United Nations". The terms "peace" and "peace-building" are defined here in their widest sense, aimed at prevention of violent conflict within and outside Canada.

The range of interventions includes the moral imperative for the international community to act where responsibility to protect citizens from serious harm is not being met. The continuum of responsibilities from prevention to reaction to post conflict building, with prevention as a key responsibility is thereby emphasized. The term "peacebuilding" in this sense covers peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict Reconstruction.

Bill C-373 addresses gaps and inadequacies prevalent in the existing machinery of the government to deal with the task of promoting a culture of peace at home and abroad. There is a plethora of government programs, for example, on human rights, genocide prevention, democratic governance, post-conflict reconstruction, and more recently on religious freedom, all of which have been created over the past decade in response to a particular crisis. These are buried in the mandates and priorities of large departments such as Department of National Defence (DND), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Poorly funded, these programs have been created without links to a cohesive strategy of peacebuilding. In the absence of an integrated framework, they have made little impact on Canada's peace or security concerns.

On the other hand, as a comprehensive legislative statement, Bill C-373 provides a strategic focus for peace seeking public funds to create competencies, institutions, and policy and programs aimed at preparing Canada for a sustainable peace, in the same way funds are committed to prepare expertise and

structures for fighting wars and other armed interventions. By offering a focal point within the government for peacebuilding, it makes the new department's efforts accountable and transparent in program development and implementation toward creating a culture of peace and nonviolent conflict resolution.

The existing organizational structure to foster peace in the Canadian federal government remains highly diffused. Peace and Security related programs are currently managed in nine federal departments: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Department of National Defence (DND), Citizenship and Immigration, Health Canada, Finance Canada, International Development and Research Centre (IDRC), Public Safety, and Justice. However, there is no department devoted to fostering the general rule (peace) as opposed to the exception (war). In DND, the Department's budget is dedicated to the defence of national security, including Canada's share of peacekeeping abroad, now reduced to less than 60 personnel. There is little work done on the domestic responsibilities for peace in the federal government with the exception of newly created Public Safety Department whose mandate is focused on policing and surveillance, rather than working towards building a culture of peace and human security in its broadest meaning.

The bill states that other ministers of the government, especially the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs must "consult with the Minister [of Peace] with a view to resolving the conflict by nonviolent means." The Minister of Peace should establish a process with the fellow ministers to address any issues that may arise in respect of: (a) any potential or ongoing armed conflict involving Canada and another nation; and (b) the issue of use of Department of National Defence personnel within Canada for maintaining peace and order. The Minister is to be consulted by other Ministers before the Government enters into any treaty or peace agreement.

In a parliamentary democracy when the Prime Minister seeks advice on military intervention or diplomatic initiatives, the experts of such Departments as the National Defence, the Foreign Affairs, or International Development are at his disposal, but when he wants to make policy or program choices around peace, there is a big vacuum. There is nowhere for him to turn – a strategic focus for nonviolent peace and professional civil peace expertise is missing. Bill C-373 calls for a Cabinet-level minister responsible for the management and direction of the department providing both advisory and consultative roles in holding peace as an organizing principle in society, coordinating service at every level of Canadian society.

The Department of Peace will assume a leadership role among federal departments in addressing matters of "peace, order, and good government" and

in carrying out the responsibility to protect Canadians from harm. The five pillars for a sustainable peace offered in the bill are: an office of peace education; an office of human rights; an office of nuclear disarmament; an office of civilian peace service to provide funding and training for developing a cadre of "peace professionals" ready for deployment in conflict areas (more on this below); and an office of conflict resolution in Canada for family and community violence—an acknowledgement to practice at home what you preach abroad. These are identified in the bill through the Department's four broad program responsibility areas: Human Security Responsibilities, Educational Responsibilities, Domestic Responsibilities, and International Responsibilities. Without going into specifics of these portfolios which are described in detail in the 17-page long legislative bill, some of these functions are already performed in the departments such as DND, DFAIT and CIDA. Bringing these programs into a Department of Peace will help build a central focal point for peace in the government, while keeping with a "whole of government" approach to peacebuilding.[2]

Civilian Peace Service Canada (CPSC)

One of the most innovative components in the Bill C-373 is the unarmed Civilian Peace Service aimed at nonviolent interventions for prevention, mediation and reconciliation towards resolution of conflicts. This element has been completely absent from the federal machinery. The sole reliance on conflict resolution until now has been on "suits" and "boots" where suits (diplomats) go and talk to other suits and boots (soldiers) who know what they are best at—fighting wars against other boots. In conflicts at home and abroad, the problems are more complex. There are 192 sovereign nation-states, but they have within their boundaries over 7,000 cultures worldwide (Sponsel, 2010: 18). Most of our supposedly humanizing interventions have failed because of a lack of understanding of issues of the history, language, and culture of peoples at a grassroots level.

The competencies required to understand related issues do not fall within the scope of any of the federal departments described above. Sections 14, 15, and 16 of the bill underscore the importance of a Civilian Peace Service (including a CPSC peace cadet program for youth), from their education and training as certified peace specialists to development of peace-related strategies. They would be deployed at home and abroad in all phases of conflict through "early detection, assessment and response mechanisms". These require, as pointed out earlier, a different skill set and

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[2] For further analysis of Bill C-373, see Bhaneja (2012).

a different type of engagement, than current employed by government.

In November 2011, the US State Department announced a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), which aims to adopt the security of challenges of 21st Century through "integrated civilian-led efforts to prevent, respond to, and stabilize crises in priority states, setting conditions for long-term peace" (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations Fact Sheet, 2011). The new Bureau will seek "sustainable solutions guided by local dynamics and actors and promotes unity of effort, the strategic use of scarce resources, and burden-sharing with international partners". This in its intent bears a strong resemblance to the Civil Peace Service proposed in Bill C-373.

Peace Education

Very little attention has been paid to the need of peace education in furthering a culture of peace. In cooperation with the provincial ministers of education, a Department of Peace will commission the development of peace curricula and make the curricula available to local school districts to enable the utilization of peace education objectives at all levels of education, K-12 to university-level peace and conflict resolution studies in Canada. Showcasing of peace agreements and circumstances in which peaceful intervention has worked is another area to promote development of innovative strategies for peacemaking.

Domestic Responsibilities

Domestic responsibilities of the Department identify a number of important issues pertaining to alleviating forms of violence inside a state. It would promote, for example, restorative justice, violence prevention counseling, approaches to overcome bullying, including cyber-bullying, and peer mediation in schools; policies that address domestic violence, including, elder, spousal and child abuse; inter-faith dialogue, and communal harmony and harmonious relations with the First Nations. The intention here is not that the federal government would offer these services, but that it will fund and otherwise support these community initiatives through education and training materials etc. in conjunction with other levels of government.

Political Parties' Response to the DOPInitiative

The response of Canadian political parties to the DoP initiative has been gradual, except the Green Party that, since 2006 in its party platform, has called for establishing a Department of Peace. The lead, in the House of Commons for introducing the two Private Members Bills in 2009 and 2011, has come from the New Democratic Party (NDP). In the 40th Parliament, Bill C-447 received

support of 20 MPs, the maximum allowable under the rules. This was one of the rare times when the maximum of 20 co-signatories required for a bill's second reading, had signed on to the Bill, from both the NDP and Liberal parties. The second reading however did not take place due to midterm dissolution of the Parliament. For the subsequent Bill C-373 in the 41st Parliament, at the time of this writing, the co-signing is continuing. Despite several meetings of the CPI movement with NDP and Liberal MPs, and assurances from the leaders and members of the parliamentary caucuses of the two parties, the initiative is still waiting to be a part of their election platforms.

The Liberal Party of Canada, since the days of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, has played a leading role in positioning of Canada as a nation of peacemakers and peacebuilders. Department of Peace was one of the 10 "big" ideas chosen for the policy discussion at the 2010 Liberal Thinkers Conference in Montreal. The former Liberal Leader of Opposition, Michael Ignatieff while expressing his views on peace and security in the 21st Century, has in the past speculated about the need for creating a "Centre of Excellence in Conflict Prevention and Resolution" as a federal agency. In his Skelton Memorial Lecture, Ignatieff outlined the tasks of the proposed agency to:

- broker requests for assistance from governments and organizations around the world;
- fund deployments;
- maintain a government-wide roster of our "peace, order and good government" experts, both in government and out;
- have a budget to support innovative programs, research into best practice from other government departments and agencies as well as the NGO sector; and,
- through debriefing, training exercises, and after action review, develop and conserve institutional memory and best practice in the good government field.

Additionally, it would:

serve as a co-ordinating forum for the most difficult task of all: to respond to emerging crises (like Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq) all cases of acute institutional failure accompanied by violence. Canada improvises magnificently but it may be time to stop improvising…."

Ignatieff pointed out that Canada needed to develop:

- a prevention capability: to strengthen rule of law, improve police, conciliate ethno-religious conflict, create political dialogue;

- an intervention capability, not just peace-keepers, but civilian police, administrators, water sanitation and humanitarian experts; and,
- a reconstruction capability: from constitution-writers to contractors and construction engineers.[3]

The above has a great resemblance in spirit and intent to the two Department of Peace bills tabled in the House. More noteworthy is the comment where it is underscored that from a peace, order and good government perspective, the responsibility to protect entails, first, a "responsibility to prevent" ethnic and religious conflicts before they destroy a state, and only second, a responsibility to react when states are either unwilling or unable to protect their populations. This is an important admission of the fundamental importance of *Responsibility to Prevent* in any *Responsibility to Protect* discussion.

Canadian Government Peacebuilding Response

It is difficult to find federal government peacebuilding initiatives, since these have eroded considerably under consecutive Conservative governments over the past seven years with cutbacks in programs and shift of Canadian foreign intervention from humanitarian and UN peace-keeping to war-fighting as part of NATO's ISAF in Afghanistan. Besides bits and pieces in several departments, the only dedicated program developed has been the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) which commenced in 2005. Funds for its activities, the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) and the Global Partnership Program, were to be terminated on March 31, 2013, leaving START without any funds to be allocated beyond that.

START was established within DFAIT to enhance the Government of Canada's (GOC) capacity to respond to countries in or at risk of crisis with a coordinated, whole-of government approach. It was designed to help answer the growing international demand for Canadian support and involvement in complex crises that are conflict or natural disaster related.

START aimed to build durable peace and security in acutely fragile or crisis affected states identified as priorities for the Government of Canada. It was to implement programs and policies by collaborating with other federal departments, multilateral and bilateral partners, and with Canadian and international civil society groups. Its mandate was to:

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[3] See: <http://www.international.gc.ca/odskelton/ignatieff.aspx?view=d>.

> Ensure whole-of-government coherence in policy development and inte-
> grated conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization initiatives with
> respect to fragile states;
> Plan and deliver coherent and effective conflict prevention, crisis re-
> sponse, civilian protection, and stabilization initiatives in fragile and failed
> state situations implicating Canadian interests; and
> In a whole-of-government context, manage the Global Peace and Security
> Fund (GPSF) and its three sub-programs.

GPSF comprises the funding for bulk of START's initiatives. The GPSF was started on October 2nd 2005 and operationalized on September 18th 2006. The initiative is scheduled to end on March 31st 2013. The GPSF's budget for the fiscal year 2010-2011 was $178 million, the last year for which we have figures.[4]

GPSF stresses the stabilization of already-occurring large-scale crises, a mainly reactive and very costly endeavour, due to the high operational risk. From the point of view of peacebuilding, a more effective approach would be to engage in the more proactive work on prevention of conflict rather than post-conflict reconstruction. At the time of this writing, the future of START and the GPSF, or their replacement, is unknown. However, none of these efforts even approximates what is envisioned in a fully-resourced department of peace with a Cabinet-level minister.

Conclusion

Global problems of violence, poverty and environment in the 21st century require new set of structures and processes for resolution. Enormous creativity has been devoted to wars and killing. Similar inventiveness will be needed to demonstrate nonkilling alternative structures that work. The above examples of Department/Ministry of Peace show that alternatives to human lethality are possible through building a well-resourced new set of institutions within the machinery of government at all levels devoted specifically to peacebuilding and human security.

Beyond the three countries mentioned in this paper, there are no additional states that are close to creating departments of peace. Yet, when a critical mass is reached, other countries are likely to follow, similar to the experience of the development of ministries of environment, now almost universal. There are

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[4] See section 1.3 of the report: <http://www.international.gc.ca/about-a_opos/oig-big/2009/evaluation/gpsf_fpsm_haiti09.aspx?lang=eng&view=d>.

however many other examples of infrastructures for peace in countries around the world, and some of these can culminate in full departments over time.

The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that violence and conflict cost the global economy $9 trillion in 2011 (Lee, 2013). The governments of the day must recognize that to meet the contemporary challenges of conflict, the present lack of focus for peacebuilding in the government is financially costly and counter-productive. It is well thought-out structures that would help us define and shape our thinking and behavior in tackling societal problems, capable of developing national and international capacities, as indicated in this paper, and exemplified by the Department of Peace legislation. The argument that peace operations should be the responsibility of UN and its agencies is made without recognizing that absence of nonkilling peacebuilding structures at the member state level in fact hampers the progress to build and connect with parallel structures at the UN. A two-way flow of experience and expertise is needed in capacity building and its implementation. The DoP movement, peace ministries and the bills are important steps toward local to global nonkilling institution building.

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Chapter Four

To Give Life
Possibilities for a Nonkilling Military[*]

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Nonkilling military forces may seem a preposterous contradiction in terms, but there have been, in the U.S. military, components with such mottoes as: "That Others May Live" (air rescue); "Strive to Save Lives" (medevac); and "Alone, Unarmed, Unafraid" (reconnaissance pilots).

Decades ago Major-General Cândido Rondon founded the Brazilian Indian Protection Service and gave it the motto: "Die if Necessary, but Never Kill."

The 1948-49 Berlin Airlift is perhaps the most famous 'unviolent' major campaign carried out by a military force.

Brigadier-General S.L.A. Marshall discovered that in World War II, approximately 85% of infantry soldiers in combat did not fire their weapons:

> Any fighting man ... is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapons secondarily. Having to make a choice in the face of the enemy, he would rather be unarmed with comrades around him than altogether alone, though possessing the most perfect of quick-firing weapons (1947: 43).

These notes are all taken out of context. But they hint at an *esprit de corps* for a hypothetical military service that spurns all weapons but one: courage.

A working definition of "Nonkilling Forces" will be: Men and women effectives forming an entire military command without weapons; well-equipped for mobility and logistics; trained to accept casualties, never inflict them.

While many assumptions can be found in this article, these three are basic:

1. Killing people is the primary and residual duty of all armed forces.
2. There is conflict everywhere, often tending toward military "solutions."
3. Most existing and would-be states have armed forces.

The key distinction emphasized herein is not between war and peace, but between killing and dying. Let us postulate nonkilling militaries that could enter a war as well as prevent one; and that could be global first responders in world-class catastrophes. In all cases, the essential duty of these unarmed services would be: ever to give life, never to take it.

To imagine nonkilling forces across the board, consider three broad questions: What can they do? Whose are they? What do they defend?

Our main focus will be on what they can do—the *military mission*. However, we should also bear in mind that in most cases, any armed (or unarmed) force is established by a *political parent* (or political purpose) and guided by a *moral mandate*. The nominal purpose of any military force is national defense, but of course that is not the whole story. Very seldom, in fact. So we consider a wide range of missions through peace, conflict, and war.

There are hundreds of political/military possibilities. The United Nations is a logical birthplace for a Nonkilling Military, but just for the sake of argument, we could depict one established by Costa Rica or Canada; NATO or the Nordic Council; the US or the EU; ASEAN or the Arab League. The intent of this chapter is to sketch nonkilling military forces as a general proposition, adaptable anywhere, even to the most unexpected origin.

They would be a social invention, a political instrument in a world still afflicted by deadly power conflicts, occasional genocide, structural violence, natural disasters, ecological trauma, nuclear roulette, and the military habits of millennia. Unarmed forces might well be acquired as a deliberate initiative, or through unforeseen mutation, or evolution, by polities that had the vision or nerve or serendipity to do so.

The ideas in this article are grouped according to their military mission

Peace	Conflict	War
1. Rescue Action	4. Friendly Persuasion	7. Defense
2. Civic Action	5. Police Action	8. Expeditionary Action
3. Colossal Action	6. Buffer Action	9. Invasion

and may be considered in terms of the political parent:

1.   A Non-state Organization
2.   A National Government
3.   An International Organization
4.   The United Nations
5.   A World Government

Two Persons of Interest: Major-General Cândido Rondon
and Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Channon

> *Military leaders know a secret: The vast majority of people*
> *are overwhelmingly reluctant to take a human life.*
> — Lt. Col. Dave Grossman (2007)

The career of General (later, Marshal) Cândido Rondon (1865-1958) deserves further study in this nonkilling context; for manifesting a bravery so outstanding it may be the exact prototype of organized nonkilling military missions. He is one of Brazil's towering national heroes, after whom the state of Rondônia is named; he was awarded Brazil's highest military rank, Marshal; he was a Nobel Peace Prize nominee and he is called Patron of Communications (for his early 1900's military-engineering feat of stringing 7,000 km of telegraph wire in perilous and nearly uncharted jungles). In 1913-14, he and former President Theodore Roosevelt led the harrowing Roosevelt-Rondon Scientific Expedition to chart the then-unknown "River of Doubt." As Roosvelt wrote in his 1914 book,

> ...we met a party of [indigenous] Nhambiquaras, very friendly and sociable, and very glad to see Colonel Rondon. They were originally exceedingly hostile and suspicious, but the colonel's unwearied thoughtfulness and good temper, joined with his indomitable resolution, enabled him to avoid war and to secure their friendship and even their aid. He never killed one.

Thus, above all, Rondon could be regarded as the archetype of this article for his renowned Indian Protection Service oath and motto: "Die if necessary, but never kill!"[1]

Rondon had founded the IPS in 1910, to halt 19th century atrocities against indigenous groups. Its task was to win over groups encountered in connection with telegraph lines, surveys, resource development, etc. Rondon's approaches to the most hostile tribes in the Brazilian wilderness can be labeled 'friendly persuasion', but the lessons could be transposed to 'defense', 'buffer action', or other categories, with soldiers at mortal risk to themselves but staunchly unarmed, dying without killing, as happened to scores of Rondon's men.

One technique was to approach (or even fly over) an area dropping gifts or else have foot parties leave such offerings (Phayre, 1929; Price, 1948). *Time* magazine reported such a mission in its issue of Dec. 15, 1941 (Which

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[1] Could also be "Die if you must, but never kill." The Portuguese—"*Morrer, se preciso for. Matar, nunca*!"—can be more literally rendered, "To die, if need be. To kill, never!"

would arrive a week earlier, December 8, 1941: i.e., an article like this might well be overlooked in the commotion of that day.):

> BRAZIL: Die If Necessary
> Up the Rio das Mortes (River of Death), in the Matto Grosso, to the country of the Chavante Indians last month journeyed a seven-man peace commission, sent by Brazil's Indian Bureau. Such commissions have made peace with most of the distrustful tribes of the hinterlands by following the bureau's inflexible rule: "Die if necessary, but never kill."
> But of all the Indians living in the jungles of the Matto Grosso, the fiercest and most unpredictable are the Chavantes. For centuries they have fought a guerrilla war with what they believe is one great tribe of white men.
> At a Chavante village, Dr. Genesio Pimentel Barbosa, head of the commission, called a parley. The Indians silently listened to his offers, brought fruit for the white men to eat.
> In a few minutes six of the white men of peace were violently sick. The fruit had been poisoned. Still no member of the expedition laid a finger on his rifle. Even when the Chavantes attacked them with poisoned arrows and slashing machetes, the white men did not shoot. Only one man of the seven escaped into the jungle.
> Last week the River of Death bore another expedition sent by the Indian Bureau. Its purpose: to find the six bodies, to try once again to talk peace to the Chavantes. There would be no reprisals, for the Indian Bureau still insists "Never kill."

The campaign continued, 1943-46, at the behest of General George Marshall to explore Brazil's natural resources, and claimed a hundred more lives; Rondon refused to allow weapons for self-defense. "This 'crazy notion' was termed suicidal…" wrote journalist Willard Price (1948). "Criticism of General Rondon blazed in Rio de Janeiro, but he stood by his guns—or gunlessness. The Indians were to be won by kindness." The effort succeeded when the Chavantes agreed to a treaty in 1946.

An online biographical essay by Fernando Correia da Silva (2009) states as follows:

> That is precisely why Rondon is so important. He was always strict in the application of his maxim, "Die, if necessary, but never kill!" Tens of officers and more than 150 soldiers and civilians died because they refused to kill. In other words, they let themselves be killed. In them, the strength of an idea overcame their instinct for survival. Humanism, when taken seriously, has a high cost.

The Brazilian government (2010) portal page includes this assessment:

> Also known as the Civiliser of the Backlands, Marshal Rondon managed, with much determination, to attach a rare humanist and pacifist vision to the dream of progress, so that Brazil could establish dialogue in its sheer distances and differences. The close contact with the Native Brazilians inspired the phrase that guided his whole life: "Die, if necessary. Kill, never." It was therefore the Marshal of Peace that went down in History.

Elsewhere on the Web, writer Ben Thompson did an uncouth but otherwise serious and laudatory Web profile in 2012, which starts out this way:

> Candido Mariano da Silva Rondon stood five feet, three inches tall, weighed about a buck twenty soaking wet and ... took an oath never to kill another human being, even in self-defense. He was also one of the most daring and intrepid explorers to ever live, ...

Regrettably, the most thorough English-language study of Rondon (Diacon, 2004) is rather derogatory, and only mentions that key dictum twice, in passing: "Most Brazilians can easily cite the famous motto of Rondon's Indian policy: 'To die if necessary; to kill never.'" He repeats it near the end, with a sneer, by noting in the same breath that Rondon's portrait used to appear on a unit of Brazilian currency, till it was inflated out of existence.[2]

Rondon died in 1958 at age 93. As he was no longer heading IPS, later governments larded it with patronage incompetents and corruption. By 1967 half its personnel were themselves implicated in a long campaign of murder and sadism to terrorize Indians away from Brazil's advancing frontiers (Montgomery, 1968). The 700-member IPS was disbanded and replaced by the FUNAI—Fundação Nacional do Índio.

At an army think tank (Project Delta) in the late 1970s, American army officer Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Channon (born 1948) developed a remarkable set of concepts called "The First Earth Battalion" (see reference section). More in the nature of prophecy than reality, his manuscripts about it put forward ideas similar to ones in this article. 300 photocopies were circulated to Army officers in the early 80s.

He mentions a "rescue company" for natural disaster, eco disaster, and human disaster; a "pioneer company" for space, eco, and urban environ-

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[2] Diacon is sympathetic to a revisionist school which faults Rondon's policies to ultimately assimilate the indigenous tribes, which was certainly part of the State's mission.

ments; and a "counterforce company" to engage in "combat of the collective conscience" aimed at world opinion, with video-oriented humane tactics. Thus, the First Earth Battalion could also be listed under Friendly Persuasion, though it could cover the gamut of missions we are discussing, especially Colossal / Eco Action. Channon, who admits that the First Earth Battalion is a mythical concept, seeks to promote it at least into virtual existence.

A 2009 film farce, *The Men Who Stare at Goats* (from a 2005 book of the same title by Jon Ronson) is based in large part on Channon's work, as is its pseudo-Channon secondary character Bill Django played by Jeff Bridges. Channon hesitated at first to cooperate with the project, but relented in the hope that his ideas would find wider exposure, despite their ridiculous treatment in the script (Channon and Alexander, 2010).

The film's "New Earth Army" is his "First Earth Battalion", and momentary glimpses are seen of Channon's actual manuscript. The movie's fictional narrator also mentions the [S.L.A. Marshall] datum cited at the start of this article, that only 15 to 20% of soldiers fired their weapons in combat, as dramatized in a Vietnam battle scene.[3] But apart from those two relevant aspects (which only get brief mention), the film offers an utterly impausible story line and fails to cast lead actor George Clooney as a more realistic Channon, who should have had the lead role, not a supporting one. But the movie did bring Channon's First Earth Battalion concept back to the fore.

At present, Channon continues to press his ideas, as a speaker, futurist, artist, social architect, and visionary. Under the war cry of "Go Planet!" he has been emphasizing the global scope of needed missions for world military forces, to cope with climate change: e.g., one of many: mass resettlement of populations affected by rising sea levels (see Channon's more recent works).

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[3] The purpose of S.L.A. Marshall's (1947: 43, 50, 54) book was to overcome such reluctance to kill. Channon's aim was similar but more ambiguous. Jon Ronson's (2005) *The Men Who Stare at Goats* book describes Channon's deadly encounter with the Marshall conundrum when his platoon in Vietnam shot-to-miss at a sniper, who then killed a platoon member. So in his earlier real-life military persona, Channon sought to meld New Age notions with battlefield effectiveness, to make soldiers more "cunning". At the same time he "imagined ways to make war less violent and save the lives of soldiers and civilians." (Sims, 2010) While Channon himself might not subscribe to the "nonkilling military" principle advocated in this chapter, he continues to reiterate his far-flung vision of re-purposed militaries on a world scale, which for all practical purposes would mean de facto nonkilling missions across the board.

That very forecast of Channon is echoed by none other than the current chief of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, in the *Boston Globe* on March 9, 2013:

> The ice is melting and sea is getting higher," Locklear said, noting that 80 percent of the world's population lives within 200 miles of the coast. "I'm into the consequence management side of it. I'm not a scientist, but the island of Tarawa in Kiribati, they're contemplating moving their entire population to another country because [it] is not going to exist anymore."

1) Rescue Action

> *True, the Service is an arm of the air force, with a primary job of saving the lives of American airmen, but, one [also] finds it is, perhaps more accurately, an international rescue service, ready to render professional help when and where needed, no matter how impossible the task.... In many zones, in fact, the gold-banded [ARS] aircraft are the only ones permitted to fly across international borders without prior clearance.*
> — L.B. Taylor, Jr., *That Others May Live* (1967)

Rescue action is the employment of military capability for saving lives and setting up disaster relief in times of natural or man-made catastrophe; generally in environments or conditions not manageable by local or civilian resources.

If we can imagine a large-scale military service distinctive for nonkilling, nonpossession of firearms, and dedication to saving lives as its primary mission, the most plausible concept may be Rescue Action. Here we have numerous operational precedents. Consider offhand the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift, or multination response to earthquakes in Peru (1970), Nicaragua (1972), and Italy (1980). Yet except for Berlin, until the 21st century, we mostly saw tokenism. In recent years, more extensive such operations have occurred ad hoc, e.g., for the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricane Katrina (2005), the Haiti earthquake (2010), and the Japan tsunami and Fukushima disaster (2011). Rescue Action nowadays even has the military acronym HA/DR, for "Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief" (or Response).

Meanwhile, in October 2007, the chiefs of the three U.S. maritime services—Coast Guard, Navy, and Marines—co-signed and issued a major new policy statement, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, which elevated HA/DR to become one of six core missions (there previously had been only four, not including HA/DR). To quote that new core mission:

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response

> Building on relationships forged in times of calm, we will continue to mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts, both in a deliberate, proactive fashion and in response to crises. Human suffering moves us to act, and the expeditionary character of maritime forces uniquely positions them to provide assistance. Our ability to conduct rapid and sustained non-combatant evacuation operations is critical to relieving the plight of our citizens and others when their safety is in jeopardy (Conway, 2007).

Of course, conventional armed forces are a blunt instrument in this context which can go wrong. The 1992 Somalia famine and civil war occasioned noble rescue missions by the US, UN, and others, but which degenerated when the rescuer/peacekeepers took sides in the civil war and inflicted heavy casualties before the US withdrew after the "Blackhawk Down" fiasco—and then ignored the 1994 Rwanda genocide. This is not to denigrate the Somalia efforts but to underscore the need for an assertedly nonkilling moral mission as the pride and purpose of such military forces. At present HA/DR tends to serve mainly as good P.R. to burnish conventional militarism.

The need for a permanent world-available Rescue Command has long been self-evident. Each year there are about 30 major natural disasters on the planet, plus various artificial ones. The inadequacy of international rescue efforts—however large and laudable they have been—is almost common knowledge. In the 20th century alone, we need only recall such man-made massacres as in Biafra, Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Rwanda; or, among natural calamities, the Bengal cyclone of 1970 and recurring African droughts. In each case, there were probably deaths surpassing a million and misery beyond accounting. In each case, the sum total of local and world rescue and relief activity amounted to but a fraction of what was required. Help was tardy and fragmented.

Instead of well-meant civilian and military gestures, all of these situations could have been the scene of gigantic militarily coordinated rescue missions, of the nonkilling kind—if only political authority had chosen to summon them. *Any* political authority with ample military means: the UN, or Canada, or the US, or Russia, or an International Rescue Command.

Precedents

The Air Rescue Service, ARS (1946-1993) illustrated, in miniature, what would be the ethos of an entire military establishment whose mission is to safeguard life, and not to kill. Its emblem showed an angel enfolding a globe, above its motto, "*That Others May Live*". If we think a wholly nonviolent military service is beyond belief, the ARS is a tangible example of the con-

trary, where more than 200 service-people have given their lives in the course of duty. The ARS has, apart from battlefield situations, saved more than 20,000 additional lives. The irony is that, as with medics, the main concern of ARS is to "keep the fighting strength." *Tactically* both are the quintessence of a rescue action force. *Strategically* both are used to ensure that the killing continues. Just as the motto of the Navy Hospital Corps had long been "to keep as many men at as many guns as many days as possible."

Military hospital ships are another relevant precedent. Following International Law it is a war crime to attack a hospital ship, its status becoming disqualified from protection if armed. Even though some countries operate hospital ships through civil agencies, most fleets integrate them within their naval military forces. Brazil, for example, has three operating vessels that provide medical care to populations in the remote Amazon regions.

There are currently two US Navy Hospital Ships: USNS *Comfort*, and USNS *Mercy*. Each list similar primary and secondary missions on their websites:[4]

> USNS COMFORT
> PRIMARY MISSION: To provide rapid, flexible, and mobile acute health service support to Marine Corps, Army and Air Force units deployed ashore, and naval amphibious task and battle forces afloat.
> SECONDARY MISSION: To provide mobile surgical hospital service and acute medical care in disaster or humanitarian relief.
>
> USNS MERCY
> PRIMARY MISSION. To provide rapid, flexible, and mobile acute medical and surgical services to support Marine Corps Air/Ground Task Forces deployed ashore, Army and Air Force units deployed ashore, and naval amphibious task forces and battle forces afloat.
> OTHER MISSION. To provide mobile surgical hospital service for use by appropriate U.S. Government agencies in Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA), disaster or humanitarian relief or limited humanitarian care incident to these missions or peacetime military operations.

What we see here is the commendable humanitarian mission, but also, the typical and regrettable "secondary" nature of that mission. (In March 2013, Mercy earned the *2013 National Peacemaker Award* from the National Conflict Resolution Center.) It is interesting to note that the *Mercy* has a hybrid military and civilian crew, according to a different Navy website, the Military Sealift Command:

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[4] <http://med.navy.mil/sites/usnscomfort>, <http://med.navy.mil/sites/usnsmercy>.

> Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS MERCY is currently oper-
> ated by 65 federally employed, civilian mariners. These mariners are re-
> sponsible for the safe operation, navigation and maintenance of the ship in
> support of MERCY's onboard Medical Treatment Facility.
> MSC operates more than 120 noncombatant, civilian-crewed ships that
> replenish U.S. Navy ships, chart ocean bottoms, conduct undersea surveil-
> lance, strategically preposition combat cargo at sea around the world and
> move military equipment and supplies used by deployed U.S. forces.

There is also a Christian charity called Mercy Ships—not to be confused
with the US Navy's *Mercy*—, inspired by the S.S. *Hope* (a private hospital ship,
1960-1974). Their fleet has comprised as many as four ships, but now it is
down to just the m/v *Africa Mercy:* "With six operating theatres and a 78-bed
ward, the *Africa Mercy* is the world's largest charity hospital ship." It provides
medical services and training in various ports of call, and—like its Navy coun-
terparts—makes one lament: what an exemplary endeavor, what a miniscule
blip compared to the over 3,000 warships of the world.

From a military standpoint, rescue operations are standard procedure—in
particular for medics, the Coast Guard, or the National Guard, just to take
some U.S. examples. Also, the Air Mobility Command has been involved in
hundreds of humanitarian airlifts; a remarkable record—and a tiny hint of what
an organization like AMC *could* accomplish were rescue action its *primary* mis-
sion. Nowhere was the tragic under-response of military capability more ap-
parent than after the cataclysmic November 1970 cyclone in Bangladesh.
Within three weeks the U.S. had managed to send six helicopters out of an in-
ventory of over 12,000 and having as of then lost another 6,000 in Vietnam.

But recently there have been more significant HA/DR missions of US and
other forces in recent mega-disasters. There is now a copious analytical litera-
ture and other reports on the Web. Some recent examples can be quoted.

A 2008 SIPRI study by Wiharta et al. reports: "The international re-
sponses to the impacts of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh province,
Indonesia, and to the 2005 South Asian earthquake in Pakistan-administered
Kashmir included the greatest level of engagement by foreign military assets
in the provision of humanitarian assistance to date."

A 2011 Council on Foreign Relations publication says, "From 1970 to 2000,
U.S. forces were involved in 366 humanitarian missions compared with twenty-
two combat-related missions for the same period" (Cropsey, 2011). That is al-
most 17 times the number of humanitarian missions as combat ones, in 30
years, spoiled only by the magnitude of the latter compared to the former.

A 2011 Congressional Research Service report on the Japan earthquake earlier that year says,

> At the peak, approximately 24,000 personnel, 189 aircraft, and 24 Navy vessels were involved in the humanitarian assistance and relief efforts. Major assets in the region were redirected to the quake zone, including the USS *Ronald Reagan* Carrier Strike group (Feickert and Chanlett-Avery, 2011).

A 2011 article by Elisabeth Fischer, entitled *Disaster Response: The Role of a Humanitarian Military,* has this notable quote:

> International experience has shown that major disasters almost immediately overwhelm local emergency services. Humanitarian relief is increasingly a core task for all defence forces, said New Zealand's defence minister Wayne Mapp, adding it should be the main part of "military business, *not simply a secondary task*. (emphasis added)

A 2012 Commentary by US Navy Captain Cathal O'Connor in the *Naval War College Review* has technical discussion; a reprise of three recent operations (small, medium, and large); organization charts; and a bulleted list of key lessons; among them:

- The ambassador sets policy and directs the U.S. government team. The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance coordinate and manage the U.S. government response. The Department of Defense supports.
- Do only what the Department of Defense can and then turn over to the host nation and NGOs, as soon as possible.
- Start with an idea of how the event will end; then determine an exit strategy and what milestones can serve as ceremonies.

Ideas

The concept of a "Great White Fleet" of hospital ships seems to have occurred independently to Dr. William B. Walsh, father of the S.S. *HOPE*, and to U.S. Navy Commander Frank Manson (1959: 1-2, 17-25, 30), as amplified by *Life* magazine. With unusual fanfare, *Life* floated the White Fleet in a July 27, 1959, cover story, to the cheers of high-level and widespread public support. After two more weeks, *Life* abandoned ship, and the whole notion sank without a trace, except for the privately financed *HOPE*, which served from 1960 till its retirement in 1974 (Life, 1960: 74-79).

In the Manson/*Life* version, there would have been six or seven vessels in the Fleet, including a hospital ship, helicopter carrier and cargo ships.

Even if fully implemented, that would have been a trivial effort, compared to existing naval resources. Yet concepts of that type ought to be revived, enlarged, studied, and advocated by researchers and policymakers alike.

The only specific proposal for a *very large* standing multi-service rescue force was by the late Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall (1960 and 1962), a British political-military analyst. Abandoning nuclear arms, the United Kingdom would, in King-Hall's vision, initiate or promote a UN "International Rescue Organization" (IRO). The IRO would consist of three airborne brigades of 10,000 men and women each, deployed on three continents and other worldwide bases. Each would have 25 large aircraft and ten other transport planes, three ships (15,000 tons, 30 knots), helicopters, and hovercraft. Recruitment would be from all nations for periods of 5, 10, and 15 years. The force would engage in exercises, goodwill visits, and highly publicized annual maneuvers in different areas of simulated emergencies.

In 1993, John Paul Lederach sketched a similarly expansive nonviolent standing force (discussed further below), but in terms of peacekeeping. Such bodies could be multi-tasked, for HA/DR as well.

Meanwhile, the burden of world-scale relief and rescue action still falls on a dedicated but deficient medley of civilian agencies, hamstrung by penury and political cross-purposes. Since the thesis originating this chapter was written in 1971, an entire literature has emerged reconfirming these problems in the Sahel famine. Moreover, within a single decade since 1970, we have seen mega-death famine and slaughter in Biafra, Bangladesh, and Cambodia; and later, Rwanda, Sudan, and D.R. Congo.

Rescue action which military services could do in a grand manner is but a dream where noble gestures must be candles in the dark. Thus, to mention but a few, Able Nathan of Israel and Carl Von Rosen of Sweden each broke the blockade of Biafra to fly in relief supplies. Russell O'Quinn of America flew food to Biafra and Bangladesh. Indochina's Boat People were aided by such hospital ships as the French *Ile de lumiere* and the German *Cap Anamur*, by World Vision's *Sea Sweep*, and, for a while, by the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

However, a truly sufficient rescue command, for humanitarian intervention in natural or civil disaster, requires a much greater level of magnitude. It should possess, as an estimate, more than 100 large transport planes, more than 1,000 helicopters, more than 100,000 personnel, plus the equivalent of a U.S. Navy fleet, plus the relevant number of trucks, jeeps, small marine craft, field hospitals, tent cities, and prepositioned supply dumps. A trifling 10% tithe of annual world military expenditures might be a reasonable funding

level. In 2013, that's ca. $175 billion for rescue action, leaving $1.73 trillion for what Buckminster Fuller calls "killlingry" as opposed to "livingry". [5]

Now for a spot-check of reality. During its 1969 cost overruns—the first billion-dollar overrun—, the giant C-5 A cargo plane was touted in a two-page Lockheed ad in *Newsweek*, 1969-09-29, headlined "People Starving. Send Help" (Biafra?). It was said to have impressed President Nixon. But when the C-5A did go into service in 1970, it was for the Vietnam war, and for the 1973 Middle East War arms lift, not the humanitarian emergencies for which it would also be suited (though it has indeed been used that way occasionally).

Fast-forward 34 years: *Time* magazine reported on 2013-02-25, that Lockheed (again!) has been producing "the costliest weapons program in human history"—the F-35 fighter, a grand total of 2,457 jets for $400 billion, with a lifetime cost of $1.5 trillion. Unit price is said to exceed $200 million a pop, as opposed to the kind of "livingry" required to outfit a Rescue Action Command.

However, it is worth noting that—in the wake of the 21st century megadisasters Tsunami / Katrina / Haiti / Fukushima—several proposals similar to *Life*'s Great White Fleet have begun to appear in various venues.

In 2008 the military U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings Magazine* published a considerably enlarged "Great White Fleet" concept by a trio of military officers and writers; they even suggested that it be *international*, comprising the US, Russia, China, India, and Australia (Richardson, Packwood and Aldana, 2008).

In 2011 the conservative *American Spectator*, published an article by James B. Brinton, a retired Navy officer, likewise urging that the US deploy a "Great White Fleet" of up to four carriers (e.g., the *Kitty Hawk,* the *Constellation,* the *John F. Kennedy*, and the *Enterprise*). Brinton writes:

> Now imagine what a demilitarized version of one of these super-ships could do; freed of its usual military load-out, a super-carrier could become a floating city, carrying mountains of supplies ranging from antibiotics to picks, shovels, and everything in between. We still remember the many days it took to airlift meaningful amounts of supplies to Haiti; a single super-carrier might satisfy all needs in a single trip. Thus, a converted super-carrier, especially with a few shallow-draft support vessels, would be the best relief ship possible.
> First, they could carry vast amounts of food and medicine. Holds formerly dedicated to military stores and aviation fuel could be restructured as warehouses, living quarters, and hospital facilities for the homeless and injured.

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[5] Kumi Naidoo, Executive Director of Greenpeace, in "Redirect military expenditure to ensure a sustainable future," *Guardian* (2013-04-17), discusses the $1.75 trillion in annual world military expenditure, as reported by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute.

> On their hangar decks, they could carry quantities of heavy construction equipment—cranes, bulldozers, backhoes, cement mixers, portable generators—to aid in rescue, rubble removal, and initial reconstruction. They could carry larger diesel power plants for onshore use and the fuel to power them.

Brinton suggests they could be ported at Pearl Harbor, Diego García, Mayport, and Argentina or Brazil. He thinks the fleet could be funded by billionaire philanthropists, or else an international program among coastal states.

In 2008, and again in 2010, Lt. Jim Dolbow, U.S. Coast Guard Reserve, urged in the USNI *Proceedings Magazine* for the creation of a fleet of 15 hospital ships, three each based at America's five regional commands. He suggests that 13 more be built to supplement the *Comfort* and the *Mercy*, and states, "Additional hospital ships would speed up the U.S. response to natural disasters around the globe, saving lives in the process. Gone would be the lengthy transit times from San Diego or Baltimore." He further states:

> The new ships could sail with an expanded hybrid crew of civilian mariners, joint forces and coalition medical personnel, non-governmental organizations, and civilian volunteers to include retired military personnel. Also, instead of reducing the Navy's end-strength as currently envisioned, some Sailors could be retrained as corpsmen.

The 2008 USNI *Proceedings* article by Richardson, Packwood and Aldana, stated: "With the elevation of humanitarian assistance/disaster response to a core mission of the Navy in the new maritime strategy, it is time to develop an international humanitarian-centric fleet in the Pacific theater." The authors suggest four steps to be taken to make this vision a reality:

1. Persuade Japan, Russia, China, India, and Australia to take the lead with us in building an international Great White Fleet.
2. Leverage the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to help fulfill the vision of an international Great White Fleet.
3. Develop and execute humanitarian-centric, multi-national exer-cises to train the Great White Fleet and build humanitarian assis-tance and disaster response capability.
4. In pursuing this vision, leverage the resident expertise within the Pacific Command at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) and the Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE).

It is remarkable to see proposals of this scale being mooted in military circles. But it has already been five years since they were published by USNI, etc., while conventional wars and military giga-budgets remain the order of the day.

Sadly, these good ideas are still just dust in the wind. S.S. *HOPE* is but a memory, as is the remark of the Soviet ambassador when he visited the *HOPE* in Indonesia in 1960: "We could all do this if everybody would disarm." (Life, 1960: 74-79) Why wait? A combined International White Fleet could be an introductory stage in a disarmament process. Better yet, a land-sea-air transnational Rescue Command; a goal well within the realm of the possible. (As hinted by the USNI article.) Even if there is no San Francisco earthquake or Philippine typhoon next week, there are plenty of permanent disaster areas where the Rescue Command can practice its logistics. As the Mercy Ships website puts it, "there's a tsunami of deaths in West Africa every day."

2) Civic Action

> *Military attacks on villages and civic action treatment of their wounded inhabitants are getting in each other's way.*
> —Edward Bernard Glick, *Peaceful Conflict* (1967).

Civic action is the use of military forces, especially in less-developed areas, for social service projects such as local construction, farming, public health, transportation, education, communication, conservation, community development, and the like.

Precisely because various concepts of military civic action, plus the Peace Corps, and so-called "national service" are all widely known, this subject is presented briefly. Ever since William James' 1910 essay *The Moral Equivalent of War*, and even long before, the logical substitute for warring armies has been thought to be "peace armies" for any number of civilian-oriented public works (Gandhi's *Shanti Sena* and Abdul Ghaffar Khan's *Khudai Khidmatgar* are relevant historical examples, and so are contemporary organizations such as the German *Bund für Soziale Verteidigung* or the international Nonviolent Peaceforce and Peace Brigades). To an extent that is well and good but here the idea of nonkillling military forces in their primary mission of safeguarding human life will be emphasized: call it 'defense'.

However, so much (yet so little) has been done in the manner of civic action and civilian voluntary service that it can hardly be overlooked in a discussion of unarmed services. These ideas and precedents will be placed in perspective, because all of them are but a slight deviation from the multi-century military norm of war, destruction, and killing. The Peace Corps is about 250 times smaller than the War Corps. Mis-use of civic action has been endemic, what with its shotgun wedding to military intervention. Civic action in Viet-

nam was a red herring. Civic action by the Polish army in 1981 was a warm-up for the martial law which was used to suppress Solidarity.

The civic action ideal is worth noting, but no war or odious regime can be sanitized by it. Likewise, schemes for national service tend to be decoys for a military draft. Only contempt can be felt for so-called "national service" where prison is the alternative.

Precedents

We need only mention the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Peace Corps, the often counterproductive Army Corps of Engineers, the US Navy Construction Battalion ("Seabees") and a host of similar endeavors everywhere: military, quasi-military, and civilian. Several books have adequately covered military civic action including titles by Glick (1967) and Hanning (1968).

The CCC (1933-1942) was one of the most widely hailed New Deal measures, but Congress ended it by a narrow vote with the onset of World War II. Somehow, "relief" had been the keynote—not conservation. At its height in 1935 the Corps had 500,000 enrollees, and averaged 300,000 in units of 200 at 1,500 camps run by the Army in cooperation with the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Labor. In 1940 alone, the CCC planted over 2.8 million trees, put up over 3600 buildings in parks, etc., and built over 900 reservoirs, among many other accomplishments (Salmond, 1967).

On a much smaller scale there now is another CCC, the California Conservation Corps. With 3,000 annual members, since 1976 it has cumulatively had 110,000 participants in nine-month stints. Its volunteers of both sexes serve with much esprit under their motto "Hard Work, Low Pay, Miserable Conditions... and More!"

The current number of active US military personnel, ca. 1.4 million—not including ca. 850,000 Reserves and National Guard[6]—is 7 times the number of *all* the Peace Corps Volunteers who have *ever* served in the 52 years since it began, ca. 210,000. The Peace Corps itself has never exceeded 15,500 in one year, and is now down to 8,000 (Meisler, 2011).

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[6] *Time* magazine 2013-04-25 reported that for the Iraq-Afghanistan wars, "the nation elected to tap into its reserve forces and basically make them part of the operational force ... which essentially has doubled the size of the operational Army—[and] subjected many thousands to repeated combat tours." So the initial math could be revised, to state that *current* active military personnel comprise 10 times the number of volunteers who have *ever* served in the Peace Corps since 1961.

VISTA—Volunteers in Service to America, the original domestic counterpart to the Peace Corps—is now called AmeriCorps VISTA, and currently has 6,500 volunteers (full-time for one year). Its website says that "185,000 VISTAs … have served since 1965". Dividing that total by 47 years shows that the average number of full-time VISTAs has been less than 4,000 a year, or 75 times less than [FDR's] CCC average.

In other words, taking VISTA and the Peace Corps together, the two now have ca. 14,500 volunters a year, still below *only* the Peace Corps itself at its peak; and far below the Civilian Conservation Corps; and far, far below present-day military strength.

Also, beginning in 1971 there has been the United Nations Volunteers (UNV), though on a similar small scale as the Peace Corps: ca. 7,500 a year; and 50,000 in all since the start, for a yearly average of ca. 1,200.

Ideas

These too could be considered at length, but here only in passing. For instance, an "industrial army" was a 19th centrury socialist artifice that has never been built, for better or worse. Strictly speaking, the concept is so altogether rational that it is bedazzling. As Fourier asked in 1822, "How is it that our constructors of utopias have not dared to dream of this one: an assemblage of 500,000 men employed in construction instead of destruction!" Or as Bellamy asked in 1888, why is "the killing of men … a task so much more important than feeding and clothing them, that a trained army should be deemed alone adequate to the former, while the latter was left to a mob?"

Fourier, Bellamy, and others set forth elaborate designs in which an industrial army is the central social mechanism. In 1954, Heinz Rollman's book *World Construction* proposed that Congress "establish a Peace Army of at least three million men and women," draftees, for technical instruction abroad (Rollman, 1954). While not a Peace Corps ancestor, Rollman's idea is sometimes cited among the earlier indications for such a body.

Instead of simply a footnote to the main work of the military, let civic action be a major mission, unencumbered by ambush and defoliation and repression and conscription. (Or be a major, not a miniature, civilian program of any government.) Let a vast new (federal) CCC enroll every young or unemployed person in the land who so desires. And that is just for openers. Let civic action be the merest rehearsal for…

3) Colossal Action

> *We advocate that all standing armies everywhere be used for the work of essential reafforestation … in the countries to which they belong, and that each country … shall provide expeditionary forces to cooperate in the greater tasks of land reclamation in the Sahara and other deserts.*
> — Richard St. Barbe Baker, *Green Glory* (1947)

> *I calculated that the only way to save the biosphere was to take the most available force and assign it to the most important need … I forever replaced the words* National Security *with* Natural Security *… and taught 230 three star general candidates how to plan for restoring the biosphere using all the military assets of the planet.*
> — Lt. Col (ret.) Jim Channon, *TEDx Maui Speaker Spotlight* (2013)

Colossal Action is the employment of military capability, especially logistic, in constructive social and ecological enterprises of enormous magnitude, possibly requiring ships in the thousands, aircraft in the tens of thousands, personnel in the tens of millions, and dollars in the hundreds of billions per year.

In 1808 the French visionary Charles Fourier prophesied that the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and the St. Lawrence Seaway could be built by huge industrial armies of both sexes organized to a fare-thee-well, motivated by love and lust, fun and games. These wonders were all accomplished, if not quite as joyously as Fourier planned. His grandest challenge of all, which he suggested in the same breath, still awaits farsighted political-military leadership: "The conquest of the great Sahara desert... by ten or twenty million workers … [who] will transport earth, cultivate the soil, and plant trees everywhere." (1967 [1808]: 164, 1972: 326, or 1901: 180) Fourier, a self-taught geographer, reiterated the battle plan in 1822. He scaled the army down to a mere four million, who would work six to eight months a year over a 40-year period. Their operations would involve reforesting by stages, so as to restore the water sources, fix the sands, and gradually improve the climate.

A century and a half later the Sahara idea was revived on the same scale (without the other Utopian trappings) by the noted British forester Richard St. Barbe Baker (1889-1982), who was the father of the Civilian Conservation Corps. The same approach as Fourier's—water retention and climate change by massive tree planting—was and is at the heart of Baker's concept for making the Sahara livable: not 100% forest, but a terrain newly checkered with fields and orchards in all directions.

Baker (1954, 1966, 1970) led two Sahara expeditions: the first in 1952-53, a 9,000-mile drive, including 2,600 miles across the desert itself; and in

1964, a 25,000 mile circumnavigation by land, air, and water. In 1954 he sketched a preliminary containment phase: a tree shelter-belt around the transitional zones of the Sahara, half a mile wide for 20,000 miles. In 1959 Baker urged that an army of 20 million be deployed along a 20,000-mile front to stop the "relentless march of the Sahara," the number he gave being "equal to the present standing armies of the world today" (1959: 23ff).

Even then the Sahara was sweeping southward up to 30 miles a year. The immense famines and droughts which have more recently afflicted the Sahel and beyond have lent horrible urgency to his warnings. One person who took his idea seriously was Wendy Campbell-Purdie (1927-1985), who met Baker in 1960. She set off in 1964 to begin planting the shelter-belt herself in Morocco, in Tunisia, in Algeria. Untill then. Baker had been, literally, a voice in the wilderness, pleading with statesmen and diplomats to declare war on the desert. By 1976, Campbell-Purdie and her local vanguards had won the first skirmish, at Bou Saada, Algeria, where 130,000 trees became a life-sustaining barrier, and enabled fruit, vegetables, and grain to grow there (Campbell-Purdie and Brockway, 1967; Graham, 1971: 21).

Since the early 80s there has been a heartening uptick in ideas, pioneers, pilot projects, research, and organizations for Sahara and other desert reclamation in king-size concept. In 1994, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification was initiated. As its website states:

> Desertification, along with climate change and the loss of biodiversity, were identified as the greatest challenges to sustainable development during the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Established in 1994, UNCCD is the sole legally binding international agreement linking environment and development to sustainable land management.

Another protégée of Richard St. Barbe Baker and his Men of the Trees was Wangari Maathi (2003), founder in 1977 of Kenya's Green Belt Movement, and winner of the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize. The Green Belt Movement "organizes women in rural Kenya to plant trees, combat deforestation, restore their main source of fuel for cooking, generate income, and stop soil erosion." Since its beginning, GBM has planted—and sustained—51 million trees, according to its website, Maathi had also been a patron of the United Nation Environment Programme's worldwide The Billion Tree Campaign, whose website says that it has planted 12.6 billion trees, and is now aiming for 14 billion.

And yet another outstanding pioneer in desert reclamation is Yacouba Sawadogo of Burkina Faso, a farmer who since 1980 has been practicing

and demonstrating very simple but very effective planting techniques to restore trees and crops to barren land. He has been the subject of a documentary film *The Man Who Stopped the Desert*.

As well, since 2007, another effort has been underway, the Great Green Wall of Africa (*Initiative Africaine de la Grande Muraille verte*, IAGMV). It involves 11 Sahel countries from Senegal to Djibouti, to establish a transcontinental tree belt 15 km wide; nearly 8.000 km long; and covering an area of 11.6 million hectares. Senegal in particular has been pushing the plan; but some other countries' leadership has been desultory. There is a political structure in place but the finances are vague (Godoy, 2011).

Meanwhile, there was no detailed "Baker Plan" that I know of. His 1966 book *Sahara Conquest* was inspiring but discursive. Campbell-Purdie did offer a six-page blueprint in her 1967 book *Woman against the Desert*. But if we are going to avoid the world catastrophe of famine and desertification—if we are going to attack the Sahara on the scale which Fourier, Baker, and Campbell-Purdie indicate—then it is time for some general-staff and United Nations-level planning on the logistics and theaters involved: the millions of troops, the hundreds of billions of dollars. Icebergs, desalination, solar energy, ecology, wind-chimney turbines (Ley, 1954) must all be considered: This is war!

Baker emphasizes the colossal size of the Sahara, and of the armies needed to replant a desert larger than the U.S. or Australia. He estimates nearly four billion people could live in a green Sahara. Is it technically possible? The Roman army alone had made ten million acres of the Sahara usable, building terraces, walls, and reservoirs. Baker and Campbell-Purdie cite the relatively recent discovery of vast underground freshwater aquifers. Figures on volume and extent vary but are enormous. "We are walking on water," says Campbell-Purdie (Graham, 1971: 21).

Not that the Sahara could simply be irrigated by well; the recharge rate must be known and balanced.[7] Rather, the main prospect is that vast tree-plantings raise the water table, lower the temperature, prevent flash-flood runoffs, and generate humidity and rain by transpiration. (This microclimate assumption has been disputed, but the reverse effect cannot be doubted, thanks to overgrazing and reckless deforestation.) Campbell-Purdie has already proven that crops will grow once the tree-sentries take hold—reversing the usual course of agriculture, which is to slash and burn the trees out.

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[7] *National Geographic* reports that a misguided mega-project of Gaddafi's had been profligately depleting so called "fossil water" (Handwerk, 2010).

A different endeavor, the Sahara Forest Project was instigated in 2009 by environmental activist and entrepreneur Frederic Hauge, with business and diplomatic support, stemming from the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference. It is a private Norwegian company aiming "to create profitable innovation and environmental solutions within the food, water and energy sector" which in 2013 has just completed a 10,000 square-meter greenhouse pilot project in Qatar. It declares in its website that

> The Sahara Forest Project is designed to utilize what we have enough of to produce what we need more of, using deserts, saltwater and CO2 to produce food, water and energy. (…) The Sahara Forest Project is not too good to be true and it is not rocket science, but an innovative solution founded on the premises that we need a more holistic approach towards tackling challenges related to energy, food and water security.

In a negative vein, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was also engaged in some colossal action and city-building in Middle East desert. No Sahara forest; no $7.5 billion Kissinger Plan to roll back the desert; no new cities for the world's homeless: not these, but a prodigal program to build a war machine and military infrastructure for Saudi Arabia. The Center for Defense Information (CDI) in Washington listed $24 billion worth of military construction projects that were being managed there by U.S. Army Engineers, including five military cities, two naval bases, three air bases, two military academies, and three defense headquarters. The CDI's *Defense Monitor* of August 1981 revealed that "nearly one-fifth of all U.S. Army Corps of Engineers activities are in Saudi Arabia."

Ideas

In a 1974 paper, the author discussed over 30 ideas for colossal action, roughly grouped into proposals for:

1) Global Campaigns (e.g., Buckminster Fuller's World Game);
2) Regional Development (e.g., Mekong Plan);
3) Urban Construction (e.g., Tetra City - Bucky Fuller again);
4) Energy Systems (e.g., "sea-vaporation" and Qattara Hydro);
5) Cosmic Cooperation (e.g., Gerard K. O'Neill's L5 space colony).

However, they will not be reprised here, and instead we let the Sahara proposals symbolize the scale of a wide variety of Colossal or Eco Action ideas.

Although from the Pyramids to the present, there have been any number of king-size construction endeavors, the term "macro-engineering" (or "mega-

projects") has recently become a subject in its own right. Richard Cathcart has written extensively on this, including proposals to address the Sahara. One is to pump seawater into Sahara desert depressions—which also addresses the problem of dangerously rising sea levels (Badescu, Cathcart, and Bolonkin, 2008). Another is to pipe surplus water from Amazon outflow to Africa (Badescu, Isvoranu, and Cathcart, 2010). Both are highly technical articles.

Still another technical article (Ornstein, Alinev, and Rind, 2008) advocated spending *trillions* of dollars annually to re-forest the Sahara and the Australian outback, as a climate-change preventive. And among their interesting points was this:

> Such multi-trillion-dollar projects provide lots of motivation for scientifically creative entrepreneurs—as well as for swindlers. International mechanisms for monitoring and managing (without mangling or strangling) such projects will be essential. This may be the most difficult hurdle.

Needless to say, those plans—along with the newer Great White Fleet ideas—have all remained on the shelf for the past several years. (Unlike plans to spend billions modernizing nuclear weapons.)

Last but not least, Lt. Col. Jim Channon (ret.), has also been advocating army-scale re-forestation and Sahara reclamation, as part of his "First Earth Battalion" scenarios. In his 2011 book *Go Planet!* he states "One trillion trees will be planted to recover the atmospheric humidity needed to shield the land and moderate the climate" (2011a: 48).

Elsewhere he puts it this way:

> The army is perfect to head up the replanting efforts. Army officers are trained civil engineers. They could as well oversee the cutting of large canals to move rising seawater back into desert depressions that are lower than sea level (Channon, 2011b).

In another version of his broad sweeping vision (Channon, 2010), on ten steps to global recovery, number eight is:

> we activate the military forces to concentrate all their resources and intelligence on the repair of our biosphere. They have a series of plans available that can put the heavy duty work together with the required forces with resources to get the big jobs done. A trillion trees in the ground, the oceans cleaned up, the water resources protected, the pollution corrected, the melting ice water directed to the deserts, refugee villages created and more.

Which in just a few words is about the most comprehensive Colossal / Eco-Action prospectus out there for an enlightened military—and a nonkilling one indeed. Thus, their essential *defense* mission becomes *defense* of all humanity against environmental collapse.

Cornelis Lely (1854-1929), instigator of Holland's gigantic Zuider Zee Dam and reclamation project, said of it that "the technical side is easy; it is the political which causes difficulty" (van Veen, 1962: 127). The political problems of a Sahara rebirth will be, like the plans themselves, as enormous as those of World War II.

4) Friendly Persuasion

> *Here is a modest proposal for fighting the war in Indochina …: How about dropping goods on Southeast Asia, instead of bombs? … A thousand pairs of boots dropped daily for a week is cheaper than a single one-thousand pound bomb. … I would further propose that we hunt the enemy and bomb with goods first. Keep the communist soldiers busy opening their packages and meanwhile move swiftly in and dump a load on the villagers.*
> — Philip Roth, *A Modest Proposal* (1970)

Friendly Persuasion is the use or display of nonviolent military force during normal or crisis periods for such purposes as goodwill, deterrence, show of strength, propaganda, hostage deployment, and political, psychological or economic warfare; by means such as goodwill visits, public and joint maneuvers, and the delivery of messages, food, equipment, gifts, or hostages, whether requested or not.

The function of Friendly Persuasion could be an essential military mission for any nation which has chosen a strategic nonviolent defense posture. "Political warfare" was the term Commander Sir Stephen King-Hall used. Thus, besides nuclear disarmament, King-Hall (1958: 124, 129) had already been urging on Britain the twin posts of chief of staff for political warfare (on the Chiefs of Staff Committee), and a cabinet minister for the same. King-Hall viewed political warfare as a greatly neglected aspect of Britain's defenses; he believed that the Western democracies should have a sense of mission to rival the Communists'. His program entailed a political-psychological-propaganda offensive by the UK or the West, amply funded and enthusiastically waged.

Such an effort would have many phases; here we only consider the military aspects. Leaflet bombings and loudspeaker aircraft are two minor tactics which might be greatly augmented in connection with others. Generating goodwill abroad would be another essential, which rescue action or

civic action units would do by their very function. Other units trained (perhaps interchangeably with those two) for unarmed defense might want to amplify the traditional goodwill visits of navy ships by soliciting invitations from friend and foe countries alike. Their purpose would be a show of unarmed strength, an ostentatious parading of prowess, demonstratively weaponless: e.g., a visit by a helicopter carrier and unarmed marines.

In any grand design for a nonviolent defense posture there will have to be much attention to the Friendly Persuasion use of unarmed forces and to giving them high visibility. The strong spirit they would demonstrate would counter any false notion that to be unarmed is to be weak and afraid. It would be a friendly caution to any potentially threatening power not to disparage an unarmed nation and assume it lacks the will for defense. Therefore, these remarks are subsidiary to a main doctrine of nonviolent defense.

Precedents

Historical precedents of nonviolent forces include the *Khudai Khidmatgar* (Servants of God) or "Red Shirts", incorporating mainly Pashtuns from the North-West Frontier province of what is currently Pakistan. Under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the trained and uniformed voluntary units formed an unarmed military structure that opened schools, maintained order and carried out public works (see Banerjee, 2001 and Easwaran, 1999). At the same period and also opposing British rule, the concept of *Shanti Sena* (Peace Army) was envisioned by Gandhi (Weber, 1996, 2009), and institutionalized decades later in various settings such as the Gandhigram Rural University or the Sarvodaya Movement of Sri Lanka (Almeida, 2008), and (on a temporary basis) at the the Rainbow Family gatherings (Niman, 2010).

In the West, among the modest beginnings we find Peace Brigades International (PBI) a successor to an earlier attempt, the Shanti-Sena-inspired World Peace Brigade (1961-1963). In September 1981, eleven activists (including this author as note-taker) met at Grindstone Island, and formed PBI to "undertake nonpartisan missions which may include peacemaking initiatives, peacekeeping under a discipline of nonviolence, and humanitarian service" (e.g., in Central America). This can also be considered a species of Friendly Persuasion. Efforts such as PBI may aspire to Police Action or Buffer Action; as yet they are far too small for that. UN peacekeepers have much better logistics. The hope is that nongovernmental Peace Brigades might help in ways or places where the UN cannot. PBI's expertise became that of 'accompaniment' of human-rights workers and the like who were otherwise at high risk by oppressive regimes.

According to PBI's annual reports of 2011 and 2012, it has ca. 100 field volunteers, and 300-400 office volunteers, on a $3 million annual budget. Meanwhile, their approach has been replicated by other similar groups: one is the religiously-oriented Witnesss for Peace, which since 1983 had sent interveners to Latin American countries menaced by US wars and economic policies. It credits itself with having inhibited US support of *contra* rebels in Nicaragua, and perhaps prevented outright US invasion there in 1984. At present it has a yearly budget of $1 million and a staff of 24, acting mostly as an advocacy group for economic justice, rather than sending teams to conflict zones as such.

Another more thoroughgoing venture than the other two is the Nonviolent Peaceforce, begun in 2002, which has developed into a widespread operation with a $5 million annual budget, and 100 plus field staff. It too practices accompaniment of human rights workers, and various other types of conciliation. NP has worked in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Guatemala, South Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, and the South Caucasus. Its website highlights three themes: "Protecting Civilians and Reducing Violence"; "Transforming the World's Response to Conflict" and "Broadening the Concept of Peacekeeping". It also mentions, "Simply by being present at a military checkpoint or in a village that is under attack, unarmed civilian peacekeepers invariably affect the dynamics of the situation and can change the behavior of armed actors."

Indeed, since the early 80s the concept of "Civilian Unarmed Peacekeeping" has gathered a lot of practical and theoretical and UN underpinning, and is very much akin to what is being discussed here, except, as mentioned, that our focus is military, and its far greater orders of magnitude (Schweizer, ed., 2010; UNITAR, 2012; Stockman, 2013).

Ideas

It happens that three of the ideas for Friendly Persuasion by unarmed forces are each in the form of satire.

Riesman's 1949 (1962 [1949]) satire *The Nylon War* concerns a multibillion-dollar U.S. effort to bombard the Russians with consumer goods, thereby causing them turmoil, economic dislocation, and increased demand for consumer rather than military production. Eventually Russia retaliates in kind: caviar, vodka, etc. In a similar vein was Roth's caustic *Modest Proposal*, in 1970, quoted above, or John R. Talbott's article published in the *Huffington Post* during the latest Korean war scare in Spring 2013.

More seriously, in 1993, in a 26 page paper commissioned by the United States Institute for Peace, John Paul Lederach (1996 [1993]), a widely-travelled peace research professor now at Notre Dame University, con-

cluded with a two-page proposal for a "Nonviolent Peaceforce". This one is indeed large scale—about 2.500 times larger than the Nonviolent Peaceforce which emerged almost a decade later. To quote that section in full:

What Is Needed

As a concrete alternative for a nonviolent peacekeeping force I would offer the following simple suggestions, perhaps launched as a pacifist provocation.

1.   Under the auspices of the UN, member nations commit themselves to the development of an international nonnviolent Peaceforce, a body with capacity and preparation to undertake peacekeeping in contemporary conflict.

2.   Peaceforce will number 250,000 members by the year 2000, made up of rigorously trained, smaller, cross-national, and virtually self-sufficient units who are paid and committed to fie-year assignments after a full year of training.

3.   This body will be used to accompany relief deliveries in settings of armed conflict, provide physical presence and protection for vulnerable populations, and actively place themselves in protracted situations to secure and monitor cease-fires, while negotiations are pursued and implemented.

4.   Five major peacekeeping training centers will be established, one each in Africa, Asia, Lation America, North America, and Europe, with capacity for training, deploying, researching, and evaluting the ongoing efforts.

5.   Financing Peaceforce and these efforts will come from a multilateral base.

    a.   Each member state of the UN agrees to divert 1% of its annual military budget to the Peaceforce fund.

    b.   Each year the 10 top arms exporting states will be levied a peace-added tax (PAT) on their gross sales off weapons that year.

    c.   NGO's, PVO'S, donor agencies, and governments agree to a 5% PAT, where 5 cents of each dollar spent for humanitarian aid, relief, or developent in settings of protracted armed conflct is sent to the fund.

    d.   Major religious organizations would create an interreligious Council responsible for establishng an endowment necessary for funding the training centers.

    e.   Under a campaign titled "Peace Makes Better Business," transnational corportions will be asked to contribute 1% of their annual profit to the fund.

While the emphasis throughout this chapter is on *large-scale* unarmed services, such as the Lederach proposal, that is not to disparage smaller vehicles such as those cited above. Historically, a single Friendly Persuader, such as

Gandhi, or Ghaffar Khan, or Wallenberg, or Bernadotte, has been the functional equivalent of several armored divisions. Abie Nathan of Israel had long been a one-man peace army; besides his relief flights to Biafra, he flew three illegal goodwill missions to Egypt a decade before Sadat's trip, and he operated the Peace Ship radio station along the Middle East coast from 1972-81.

5) Police Action

> But, contrary to UNIFIL troops who are fully equipped with military gear, UNTSO troops are bound to enforce their mission without the military strength usually associated with modern peacekeeping. Forty three of their colleagues have been killed since the mission was first established in 1948, yet clad with no more than light blue tabards bearing the letters of the UNTSO and their military uniforms, the soldiers face their task empty handed.
> — Sebastien Malo, "Unarmed peacekeepers…" (2010)

> From the logistical point of view rapid disarmament would not be difficult. A thousand planes each carrying one hundred trained inspectors (or disarmers) could distribute 100,000 of these men at all major centers in Russia and the United States within 24 hours. Using land and water transportation, almost any number of additional inspectors could reinforce these within a very short time. Helicopters and paratroopers could be used to reach remote areas. Properly trained and equipped with blow torches, thermite and other tools, the disarmers could quickly incapacitate the military power of both sides.
> — Earl D. Osborn, "Disarmament within Weeks" (1962)

The use of unarmed military units for law enforcement, peace observation, and peacekeeping duties, in situations beyond the control of local authority.

As used here, Police Action is a term which may either combine, or distinguish among, *peace observation, peacekeeping,* and *peacemaking*—or *peacebuilding*, because "peacemaking" can be a euphemism for conventional war. (Even Rondon's modus operandi was called "*pacification*", a concept which can have horrible mutations: e.g., Vietnam; and the corruption of Rondon's own IPS.)

The first, peace observation, or "Model I" in UN parlance, already denotes small groups of unarmed officers for truce supervision and the like. The second, peacekeeping, or "Model II" force-level operations, remains mired in Big Power politico-legal dispute, despite sudden reappearances of emergency UN troops, even after commentators had pronounced the peacekeeping idea obsolete. The third, peacebuilding, implies the political

and social initiatives that must accompany peacekeeping, lest the blue helmet become disparaged for freezing an unstable or unjust status quo.

The theory and practice of peacekeeping has already attracted a group of scholars and professionals and institutes; their usage generally means host-country-consent type of operations, and not Korea. As Frye (1957: 91) pointed out in one of the earliest studies, "It would be well to keep this distinction between a fighting force and a peace force clearly before world opinion and before governments." In addition, the distinction between an armed and an unarmed peace force must be stressed. Except for "Model I" observer teams, eschewing arms is not yet a deliberate policy and strategy of UN peacekeeping. The weaponry of peacekeeping should at least be a matter of controversy, which it is not.

A relatively modern theme which is not explored here (as it is already covered by chapters of this volume) is that of "nonlethal weaponry". It could be better than the alternative but is still susceptible to abuse, especially in view of all the dubious means of crowd control which have appeared and that have forced the usage of the adjective "less-lethal" instead of "nonlethal" in many cases. In its current state of development, such hardware can detract from the principle of nonkilling. Simmilary, cyber-warfare is a Pandora's box which could well become very lethal in view of the current technological dependence of many of our life-sustaining systems.

Precedents

The original UN peace mission, in 1948, comprising unarmed military officers, is the UNTSO, the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization for the first Arab-Israeli war, and still functional to this day. A recent article in the Lebanon *Daily Star* (quoted above) also says:

> UNTSO has had to remain focused on its original mandate—to observe conflict, but without the assistance of military hardware—while another mission, UNIFIL, has been tasked with a more militarized mandate.
> But while most soldiers might be tempted to see this odd state of affairs as a shortcoming, [Major James] Groessler sees it as a decisive strength which benefits his mission.
> [Captain Andrea] Dainese, sitting at the wheel of his jeep, concurs. Some years ago, Dainese was deployed with UNIFIL, and he noticed that interactions with civilians are more casual since he is unarmed. "Being unarmed gives us, in fact, more strength," he says.
> "Weapons are a kind of barrier. If you are unarmed, you don't represent a threat. It is about respect and trust (Malo, 2010).

Brigadier Michael Harbottle (1970: Ch. 17), a former chief of staff for the United Nations Force in Cyprus, tells of a small, unarmed 174-member multinational civilian police component of the UN Cyprus force, composed of Australians, Austrians, Danes, and Swedes:

> On many occasions it was their efforts rather than those of the military that prevented minor incidents from escalation into something much more threatening and dangerous. They went about their duties unarmed, though in the case of most of them it was normal practice in their own countries to carry side-arms; the Cypriots noticed this and appreciated the adherence to the principle of peaceful intervention.

There is also a scattering of anecdotal material from various UN operations in which lack of weapons (or refusal to fire them) was decisive in dangerous situations. For instance (Gouldthorpe, 1961: 48)

> two unarmed Gurkha officers …, each driving a jeep, blocked both ends of an entire Katanga column that had started off on an unauthorized trip, briskly read off the mercenary officer in charge and ordered the whole column to dismount. Cowed by this show of courage, the column promptly did.

Ideas

Note that Police Action is here being distinguished from Buffer Action in the next section, which would also be a type of peacekeeping amidst incipient or severe hostilities, thus underscoring the somewhat more restricted, discriminate, or person-to-person connotation of police and military/police action. But there is overlap, and the best, most explicit proposal for an unarmed UN peace force (by Narayan and de Madariaga) is cited below under Buffer Action, though it could be here as well.

One of the most unique ideas is that quoted above from Earl D. Osborn (1893-1989), founder of the EDO Corporation (an aircraft and military hardware company), and also the Institute for World Order. I would dub his proposal the IDID, for "Instant Disarmament Inspection Demolition Corps." Osborn raised the concept of "sudden disarmament" in contradistinction to the long precarious phasing-out envisaged by most plans for arms control or disarmament (Osborn, 1962: 11).

If there were in fact a negotiated agreement for "sudden disarmament"—which might take some time to negotiate—ruining the strategic weapons could be done within days, while scrapping and salvaging could take place at leisure. "A sledge hammer, a blow torch or a small grenade applied at the right spot would incapacitate nearly any military weapon." The IDID would

be airlifted to all the relevant sites simultaneously in all the major nations, fan out, and disable the ordnance; small detachments would remain permanently thereafter. This would be army-scale police action, unarmed except for the tools of its trade, which are not antipersonnel weapons.

Among many proposals over the years for some type of international police force (most of them armed), only Arthur Waskow's (1965 [1963]) model for a triplex peace police, written up in 1963 will be mentioned here. This too is not entirely nonviolent except at lower levels; but the plan had a number of sophisticated design features. There would be *three* police bodies (for Disarmament; Borders; and Special Situations), each controlled by separate Councils, in turn responsive to World Court orders. The court would be acting on data turned up by an Inspectorate, a *fourth* police body, unarmed. The force level authorized for any of the three peace police would be according to a preset, time-limited, aye-vote ratio in their respective controlling councils. For instance, disarmament treaty violations would be blamed on low-level *individuals* (such as a factory manager); disarmament police would serve court orders on *him* to cease and desist, not his government. So far the action would be small and unarmed; but with greater council consensus in the face of a persistent violation, greater increments of police units and weaponry would be authorized. As before, this author dissents at the weapons phase.

The British police have long been famous for their customary lack of firearms. But the armed British "peacekeeping" presence in Ulster was all too familiar a quagmire. Their violent or repressive operations earned the enmity of the belligerents and war weariness in the British public. Yet in May 1971, a British soldier in Belfast, Sgt Michael Willets, 27, father of two, died after throwing himself on a terrorist bomb, and saved four civilian bystanders ("Northern Ireland: Shoot on Sight," *Newsweek*, May 31). It is this type of bravery that can be pointed toward in suggesting that his example, and many others, be built upon, so that the very strength and effectiveness of UN or other police action and peacekeeping is precisely due to its use of "naked" force.

6) Buffer Action[8]

> … *the presence of a body of regular world guards or peace guards, intervening with no weapons whatsoever between two forces combatting or about to combat, might have considerable effect. … As an example, if a few thousand of such world guards had been parachuted into Budapest during the*

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[8] For an expanded version of this section, see Keyes (1978).

*five or six days Hungary was free, the outcome of that strug-
gle might have been quite different.*
—Salvador de Madariaga and Jayaprakash Narayan,
Blueprint for a World Commonwealth (1960).

*The deployment of unarmed military force between belligerents before, dur-
ing, or after active hostilities.*

If we can conjure up an unarmed military service of some tens of thou-
sands of otherwise well-equipped regulars who could truly fulfill the Strate-
gic Air Command slogan, "Peace Is Our Profession," then their foremost
function might be Buffer Action. This would seem the most natural, the
most inherent mission of all for a nonviolent military instrument whose
purpose is to prevent or extinguish warlike hostilities, wherever they may
arise. The concept is so obvious that it has indeed cropped up a number of
times since 1931, but only in the most offhand or rudimentary manner. Not
even pacifists have done more than peck at the periphery of the idea.

Precedents

The principle of buffer action has been illustrated ad hoc in a number of
different situations.

In Cyprus and Kashmir UN observers have driven their jeeps right into
the line of firefights to quench them, though superiors regarded such ac-
tions as overzealous (Wainhouse, et al., 1966: 566).

In September 1962, the bodily interposition—between armed combat-
ants—of some thousands of unarmed civilians acting spontaneously helped
to cut short a five-day civil war among Algerian revolutionaries. Two forces
had squared off for a pitched battle at the town of Boghari, south of Algiers.
However, thousands of civilians filled the streets, forcing the commanders
to order a ceasefire, and prevailing upon both sides to fraternize. Else-
where, women lay at various points along Highway 14 to halt advancing ar-
mored columns, and 20,000 union members demonstrated in Algiers de-
nouncing both sides and threatening a general strike in case of civil war. A
political settlement was hastily arranged in the wake of these pressures.[9]

William Hinton's (1972) book *Hundred Day War* is a detailed case history
of one of the most noteworthy applications of mass nonviolent action since
Gandhi's heyday. In July 1968, in Maoist China at the height of the Cultural

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[9] See news accounts (Sept. 1-7, 1962) in the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *New
York Herald Tribune*, *Peace News*, and *Time*.

Revolution, a few hundred fanatical Red Guards in two hostile factions were barricaded at Tsinghua University and battling each other with spears, grenades, and machine guns. Due to the prevailing chaos, the central authorities could not attack their own ultra-Maoist Red Guard heroes, no matter how misguided. So, led by army officers, 30,000 unarmed workers were organized to intervene between the combatants, and "use reason, not violence" no matter what. There ensued a 24-hour muddy, bloody ordeal in which over 700 workers were seriously injured and five killed—but with no retaliation against the Red Guard crazies, who were finally talked into a truce.

Ideas

The classic proposal for an unarmed buffer action force was advanced by Salvador de Madariaga (Spanish diplomat) and Jayaprakash Narayan (Indian politician) in 1960, originally in the form of a letter to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. Though published in several obscure sources, it has lain remarkably unnoticed since that time. The text began with an analysis of the political difficulties hampering UN use of armed force, and continued:

> It follows that an international police should be unarmed. The presence of a body of regular World Guards or Peace Guards, intervening with no weapons whatsoever between two forces combatting or about to combat, might have considerable effect. They would not be there as a fanciful improvisation, but as the positive and practical application of a previously negotiated and ratified Additional Charter binding all UN members. This Charter should ensure:

> (1) Inviolability of the World Guards;
> (2) Their right to go anywhere at any time from the day they are given an assignment by the United Nations;
> (3) Their right to go and intervene in any conflict of any nature when asked by only one of the parties thereto or by third parties or the Secretary General.

> The World Guards would be parachutists. They should be able to stop advancing armies by refusing to move from roads, railways, or airfields. They would be empowered to act in any capacity their chiefs might think adequate for the situation, though they would never use force. They should be endowed with a complete system for recording and transmitting facts, utilizing such equipment as television cameras and broadcasting material. Their uniform should be simple, clear, and appealing.

> The setting up of this institution would no doubt be delicate; the Additional Charter would be difficult to negotiate. Who would launch the action of the Guards? The Secretary General should have permanent power

to do so on his own initiative. It seems, at any rate, that in the negotiations the chief difficulty—fear and mistrust of power—would have been eliminated and the nations that would oppose the scheme would lose much face (Madariaga and Narayan, 1960).

7) Defense

> *This sight of marching, and probably uniformed, nonviolent brigades might give the citizens a sense of security. To the average citizen a nonviolent army of professional resistance fighters would personify the will to resist and give him the assurance that they would in any event do their job and not leave him in the lurch. The existence of a fearless nonviolent army, which would offer resistance to the last man, might act as a stronger warning to the potential invader than an invisible system of resistance cells.*
> — Theodor Ebert, "Organizational Preparations for Nonviolent Civilian Defense" (1964)

The assignment of unarmed maneuver elements to close with and resist invasion troops to the death without killing them; and the assignment of other unarmed land, sea, air, and civilian forces to active duty in accordance with national strategy for guarding political, cultural, and territorial integrity, public security, and civil liberty.

We now consider the military institutions on which might fall the responsibility for protecting a nation or people without killing a would-be foe. Sad to say, the quality and quantity of ideas for unarmed defense forces is not proportionate to the paramount role that armed defense forces occupy in most people's minds. To the extent that the use of nonviolent resistance has gained traction in the past several decades, it is primarily as a vehicle of social struggle against existing dictatorships and oppression, not against external invasion to impose new tyrannies.

There is a developing theory of *civilian* nonviolent resistance (Roberts, ed., 1967), which has received some official attention in Sweden, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. The author of this chapter is one of the exponents of this strategy (Keyes, 1981, 1985, 1991), and Gene Sharp (1973), its foremost analyst, uses the term civilian-based defense. However, by definition, such a posture tends to neglect a military aspect of unarmed defense. While not ignoring the Pentagon or the like entirely, some civilian resistance proponents imply that the military would wither away except for those officers tapped to organize the modalities of political and economic noncooperation with an invad-

ing foe or homegrown Napoleon. Here we propose that civilian resistance doctrine might be also be vested in military organizations.

As stated in US Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (1967: 88) manuals, "Basic Army doctrine emphasizes mobility, flexibility, and staying power, so that the Army is maintained in a state of combat readiness for *any war, anywhere, anytime, and in any manner*." (Emphasis in the original.) Let our unarmed forces adhere to all of these precepts, taking as their cue "in any manner." In the real world, the mission of an Army division is "the destruction or control of enemy military forces and the seizure or domination of critical land areas, and their population and resources." (idem)

Substituting the word *dysfunction* for *destruction*, we could try to visualize, as a general concept, nonviolent ground forces who are assigned to cause the systematic dysfunction of an invading army: by occupying chokepoints; fraternizing with and demoralizing the opposing soldiers whenever possible; guarding strategic or symbolic sites with their lives; detaining quislings; operating or stalling transportation; restoring or disrupting communications; bivouacking on runways, railroads, and highways; and so forth. These are only specimen tactics, and do not really show a big picture; excluded here are air, sea, civilian, political, and diplomatic actions. They are attempts to sketch a single aspect: main-force nonviolent combat (maneuver) units deployed as part of a grand strategy—the shock troops of a nation with strong preparedness for citizen defense against a wanton aggressor.

It is the theory proposed in this chapter that preservation of national morale is the grand strategy of nonviolent common defense (Keyes, 1981). If "nonviolent shock troops" do not reinforce this strategy, then other tactical modes must be developed, perhaps with more emphasis on Rescue Action or Guerrilla Action or Friendly Persuasion, or intelligence and communications. For example, the Danish Army was brushed aside within two hours when the Germans occupied Denmark in April 1940. But Danish Army Intelligence functioned throughout the war as an especially valuable source for the Allies.

Take another situation. A British-French plan to invade Sweden in March 1940 was squelched when the Swedes threatened to dismantle their railroads—which would literally have derailed that particular attempt under those particular conditions (Keyes, 1985). The necessity did not arise. But let us speculate that in such a case, the Swedish Army could have been asked to rip out the rails and otherwise incapacitate the system. The point is that the tactics, whatever they are, must be adjusted to the general strategy and the particular circumstances and the geopolitical realities.

Precedents

There are many improvisational examples of national nonviolent resistance to aggression—Gene Sharp (1973) covers a vast array of tactics and episodes in his work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*. However, there are no cases of military nonviolent defense as set forth here. When Soviet forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, it was the civilians who improvised dozens of ways to harass, slow down, and confound the invaders—for a full eight months. The Czechoslovakian military was helpless. The spontaneous nonviolent defense effort was a wonder to behold, but could not last indefinitely without long range advance planning and preparation.

Likewise in Poland after 1980, the nonviolent struggle of Solidarity achieved over 16 months of astonishing gains for freedom of speech and independent unions, before the martial law crackdown. The Czechoslovak and Polish experiences confirm again and again how essential it is that a given nation, and its military, *prepare the public in advance* for long-term unarmed resistance to alien or domestic power seizure. The fast track to failure in nonviolent defense is to use tactics without strategy, strategy without principle, and principle without tenacity. The slow track to success is problematic but manifestly the opposite. Above all, it requires extensive training and preparation to preserve morale and national integrity. The German *Bund für Soziale Verteidigung* (Federation for Social Defense), founded in 1989 by Petra Kelly and others, is a good example of this sort of organization. It currently has 450 individual members and 40 member organizations.

Ideas

There are few direct proposals as such for unarmed defense troops, although the idea has been raised without much elaboration in a variety of contexts. Gandhi (1942) denounced the Munich sellout in 1938, and exhorted Czechoslovakia to nonviolently resist Hitler's takeover. But it was not until the dark hour of June 1940 that Gandhi first seriously proposed that India—if independent—should gear for nonviolent defense against (Japanese) invasion. Unfortunately, on June 21, there was a basic policy split when the Congress Party executive committee rejected Gandhi's proposal for nonviolent defense against external invasion, and instead offered to help the British war effort, conditional on independence. Gandhi had said that the Congress "should train themselves to defend their country with a nonviolent army," but could not dissuade his colleagues from the first step on a road which led to India's atomic bomb (idem).

Another military proponent of nonviolent defense was General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière (1907-1986), a highly-decorated war hero, who was commander of the French paratroops in Indochina. He resigned his commission in 1957 to protest French use of torture in Algeria. He too had focused on a civilian approach to nonviolent defense, though he told an interviewer in 1972 that a military role need not be a contradiction, "if the army were trained in the technique of nonviolence."

One additional comment: Is it too much to expect that soldiers on active defense duty could give their lives, yet not kill? I argue that the military ethos of courage in facing death is not a function of killing people. To ask whether anyone could be expected to enlist in a front-line unarmed force is to ask why any soldiers anywhere go to war, volunteer for hazardous duty, or lay down their own lives that others may live.

8) Expeditionary Action

> *Let the British government call a constitutional conference in Salisbury, Rhodesia … [and] organize a commonwealth nonviolent expeditionary force … At a time judged to be appropriate, let the British delegates to the constitutional conference go into Rhodesia, covered only by the nonviolent troops of the commonwealth force.*
> — Ralph Bell, *Rhodesia* (1968)

An unarmed military mission across national boundaries with a comparatively limited objective or duration; may involve extraterritorial rather than home-soil defense action, or defense of another nation on its own territory, or temporary intervention in restraint of flagrant injustice, oppression, invasion, or genocide.

Military intervention in the affairs of other states is widely condemned, yet is still a prevailing habit in world affairs. However, let us assume that a humane case can be made for exceptional circumstances into which nonviolent forces should be mandated with or without the consent of a particular state's rulers. As smaller nations and former colonies and satellites come to cherish their sovereignty more and more, it seems arrogant and anachronistic to speak of expeditionary forces, even if they are nonviolent. But the intent here is to see if any military function, including expeditionary action and invasion, could hypothetically be performed by nonviolent forces organized on a comparable scale.

If we grant a moral imperative, a political consensus, and perhaps a legal judgment that a particular state requires expeditionary action from outside to replace its political system or rulers or restrain them from unconscionable barbarism—can nonviolent forces do the job?

Since 2005 and earlier, the UN has been evolving a norm called "Responsibility to Protect" (discussed elsewhere in this volume), regarding need for international action against genocide and atrocious civil wars, notwithstanding the shibboleth of "sovereignty". The UN-sanctioned campaign against Libya in 2011 had mixed results, and is illustrative of a killing machine with alleged good intentions, absent a substantial nonviolent force at UN disposal.

On March 28, 2013, the UN Sercurity Council unanimously passed Resolution 2098, which, in the words of its press release, "approved the creation of its first-ever 'offensive' combat force ... to 'neutralize and disarm' the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups".

The Resolution is extremely long and detailed. Note that it mentions "Chapter VII", the muscle part of the UN Charter. It not only authorizes active military intervention—while denying that this precedent is a precedent—but it specifies the three brigades to be tasked for that. The Resolution also names hostile forces to be taken on, including the Lord's Resistance Army. A far cry from Korea 1950 and Congo 1960 when Russia and China were absent or outmaneuvered, this time the vote was unanimous. Russia was not only present, but president of the SC, and even China was affirmative—because the precedent was not a precedent. Not exactly a nonkilling peacekeeping force but, to some extent, it is progress of a sort in terms of *conventional* military and UN world politics and R2P.

Ideas

There are no precedents, but the only explicit proposal for nonviolent expeditionary action (in fact, one of the very few cogent, detailed proposals for any kind of military-but-nonviolent force) was put forward by Ralph Bell in his 1966 pamphlet, *Outline of a Nonviolent Strategy to Resolve the Rhodesian Crisis*. An updated version with comments and rejoinders was published in 1968. Though it is now moot, the formulation is well worth studying. Bell, a British clergyman, was addressing himself to leadership in church and state. British officials did look at his plan, and Arthur Bottomley, then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, thought the proposal deserved consideration. But it was waived in favor of phony economic sanctions, and then years of British laxity while bloody war raged until Rhodesia legally became Zimbabwe in 1980.

Bell had a clear sense of the order of strategy: *military* action is subordinate to *political* objectives, and both are subordinate to *moral* (nonviolent) means. He suggested that Britain call a constitutional conference in Salisbury to create an unracial government and impose this solution with a

Commonwealth Nonviolent Expeditionary Force. The Force would enter Rhodesia by conventional or airborne transit, openly announced, with persistence, and reinforcements as necessary. Casualties would have to be expected among these nonviolent commandos but not hoped for. The strategy would have included world publicity, constant pressure on the Smith regime to negotiate, and local civilian pressures spearheaded by the Force.

As for the Force itself, Bell stressed its military organization, need for discipline, willingness to accept casualties, pay and training commensurate with regular armed forces, moral prestige, and sufficient numbers for probable success. The following key distinction which Bell (1968) makes re-echoes the central theme of this entire paper:

> A member of the armed forces is called upon to do what he is told, to be killed and to kill to enforce a political solution. A member of a nonviolent force is also called upon to do what he is told, to be killed, but not to kill, to enforce a political solution.

9) Invasion

> *If you meet a Spanish civilian or a soldier, greet him and share your food with him. If he fires on you, arm yourself with your faith and your conviction and continue your march.*
> —King Hassan II of Morocco in a message to 350,000 civilians poised to invade Spanish Sahara (1975).

An unarmed military campaign across national boundaries, with a comparatively long-range objective or duration, in restraint of flagrant injustice, oppression, invasion, or genocide.

The rationale for nonviolent invasion is similar to that for expeditionary action. The distinction, if not precise, is the greater length and scope of an invasion, compared to the other's temporary or limited purpose. When this section was first written in 1971, "invasion" was the wildest of these wild ideas. But, four years later, King Hassan II of Morocco, in an international tour de force, staged a mass nonviolent invasion of Spanish Sahara by 350,000 Moroccan civilians under army leadership, escorted by approximately 20,000 regular troops. Which is not to say King Hassan's rapacity was at all laudable; but it is certainly another proof of Boulding's First Law: "Anything which exists is possible." Hassan proved that a nonviolent invasion is possible, and a useful tool in world politics.

Meanwhile, as stated earlier, a complete theory of unarmed forces must in principle allow for recourse to nonviolent mass attack outside their homeland(s) in extraordinary situations. Besides counter-invasion as a defense tactic, such cases would in general be those where proven genocide, slaughter, or oppression is being carried out in the face of all diplomatic efforts at remedy. The roll call of recent genocides is matched by the roll call of international permissiveness toward them: Armenians, Bengalis, Biafrans, Cambodians, Indonesians, Jews, Kurds, Poles, Rwandans, Russians, Timorese, and Vietnamese are among the peoples 'wasted' by the hundreds of thousands, even millions, just in the past century—not to mention many other wars and slaughters.

Liberation of the death camps was only a fortuitous by-product of the Allied victory in World War II, and by no means the purpose of the fight against Hitler. Besides, the Gulag body count may have been worse. However, in a polity with sizeable nonviolent military forces at the ready, genocide itself—not some infringement of the 'national interest'—would be *casus belli* for an invasion by the unarmed forces. Thus, if India did in fact have a very large Gandhi-style nonviolent army, an invasion of Bangladesh to halt the slaughter by Pakistan there might have been a live option much earlier in 1971. Indeed, nonviolent organizers in India were on the verge of launching large-scale incursions, but their plans were aborted by the outbreak of war in December.

Obviously, as with war itself, nonviolent invasion does not occur in a vacuum but alongside other multiple pressures of diplomacy, politics, and publicity. Which was precisely the case in October 1975 when King Hassan was mobilizing his Green March invasion force.

Precedent

King Hassan's invasion was mostly a theatrical maneuver to fake out Algeria. Ostensibly the Moroccans were facing off the soon-to-depart Spanish troops, which as of November 1975 were still dug in against any premature seizure of their colony by Morocco, Mauritania or Algeria. Phosphate riches and fishing was the prize. From November 6 to November 8, the Green March poured across the border for a few token miles, outflanking Spanish minefields. It was then withdrawn by King Hassan, having generated a media sensation and enough diplomatic turmoil to hasten a deal with Spain which excluded Algeria—and from that day to present, excluded the original Saharawi inhabitants themselves. Morocco subsequently annexed all of Spanish Sahara in two stages, and ever since has been at war against an Algerian-backed independence movement, the Polisario Front, which has established a partially recognized nation called the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. So, while the

context was sordid, the Green March itself was phenomenal. There is nothing to prevent the misuse of unarmed forces, except better-motivated ones.

Recent writings by peace researchers Stephen Zunes, and Jacob Mundy, reveal more of the diplomatic intrigue behind the 'Green March'. They accuse the Kissinger-Ford administration of conniving with King Hassan to seize Western Sahara without the consent of the inhabitants, and also fault the US and France for even now arming and supporting Morocco's repressive occupation of that land. A small ineffectual UN peacekeeping unit called MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) with some 470 personnel, has been in place there since 1991. Morocco has blocked such a referendum ever since 1975, while constantly oppressing nonviolent and human rights activists to the present moment.

Ideas

Bell (1959) is one of the only voices with the temerity to advocate aggressive military nonviolent action. Prior to his Rhodesia plan, he had also targeted South Africa in more general terms as the theater for a campaign against apartheid, to be augmented by a British "active nonviolent resistance force." That can be classified as an 'invasion' on the assumption that South Africa would have been a much more formidable effort than the Rhodesian campaign.

Until Hassan, this section had to be even more conjectural than the rest. But invasion was placed on the agenda because, as Waskow has pointed out, in a disarming world there will be more struggle and conflict, not less. Given a substantial array of nonkilling forces, a 'Just War' need no longer be a moral Frankenstein but instead a legitimate, humane, and essential response by a larger community of nations when an entire people are in danger.

Conclusion

For decades the term 'peace army' has bobbed along like a neglected cork in eddies of pacifist or idealist thinking, and there were even a few efforts to stick that cork into a volcano. Often the term is loosely applied to such vest-pocket symbols as work camps, peace demonstrations, or the Peace Corps. But seldom has there been an attempt to suggest how the main forces of any given military could perform their essential missions in their own right, "armed with courage alone."

This chapter conveys some parameters and possibilities for a nonkilling military, and some of them might come in handy one day. It is not too early for any of us to think big, and to speculate *in detail* on an entire range of contingencies

in which unarmed forces might be at least remotely conceivable. A lot more imagination and research would be helpful and is urgently needed. Of course, such nonkilling forces cannot be regarded as a magic bullet for anything; merely a better human endeavor, focused on giving life rather than taking it.

In the over half century since these ideas were first compiled into a senior thesis, a number of significant developments can be seen, similar to the life-giving, nonkilling military ideas discussed here. To list some hopeful signs:

1. Besides civilian relief efforts, there has been a considerably enhanced use of military assets for Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief (HA/DR) in such major catastrophes as the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Katrina, Haiti, and Fukushima.
2. The US Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard have jointly elevated HA/DR to one of six core missions for those maritime services.
3. Several recent proposals in well-placed military circles and elsewhere have urged establishment of a 'Great White Fleet' of hospital ships and the like, including a proposal for an international grouping of Russia, China, India, Australia, and the US to do so.
4. Major reclamation and tree-planting efforts are underway in the Sahara and elsewhere. Climate scientists have the temerity to urge multi-*trillion* dollar Sahara reforesting.
5. In two non-military spheres, the related civilian theory and practice of strategic nonviolent action has greatly expanded:
   a. Civilian Unarmed Peacekeeping, especially in the aegis of the Nonviolent Peaceforce, has developed its own praxis: i.e., theory and practice working together.
   b. Many recent instances of strategic nonviolent action have unhorsed dictatorships (and brought the work of Sharp to widespread attention and Nobel Peace Prize nominations).
6. Despite absurd distortions in the *Men Who Stare at Goats* movie, the visionary prophecies of Lt.-Col. Jim Channon for a re-purposed military, especially to combat environmental devastation, has likewise gained increased currency on the Web and elsewhere.
7. And finally, a small but significant photon of light in this Internet Age: General Cândido Rondon's doctrine of "Die if necessary; never kill" has been gaining increased visibility on the Web.

It is possible to overestimate these small steps toward a nonkilling military. War machines bestride the earth like a colossus. And if nuclear war does not get us, then climate catastrophe will. But let us soldier on, and

present a challenge for the world's military forces: to embody the plane-tary-security ideals of America's Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Channon, and the nonkilling example of Brazil's General Cândido Rondon.

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Chapter Five

Nonmilitarisation and Countries without Armies
A Necessary Step toward Nonkilling Security Institutions

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APRED

I know all the places where the dove dwells,
The human head is the most natural one.

Paul Éluard, *The face of peace*, 1951.

Life as it stands in dignity: the core of our existences. Shall we design societies in which institutions, individuals respect each other and everyone's right to life, to a good life, in all circumstances and all over the Earth? Design societies that do not kill anymore? The power to kill—it is never a right![1]—has been legally granted to people and societies in only three circumstances.[2] All three of them with very great limitations:

For Self-defence

Individuals have a right to self-defence. However, this right is strongly limited in two ways. First, the use of force is in most cases a total failure of preventive measures. It is structural and cultural violence, within society, that makes it possible for situations of direct violence, where self-defence may be needed, to arise. Secondly, if such a situation nevertheless does arise, it is doubtful that the answer to that threat will be proportional, as legally required, moreover that it will be nonviolent, if it ends up in a killing.

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[1] The right to life is a universal and intangible right, there are no possible limitations to it, one is either alive or not. The granted powers presented here are merely exceptions and for the second two definitively not acceptable. So even if the law may, in some very particular circumstances, tolerate a threat to or even a destruction of the right to life, this does in any way grant a right to kill. And even an exception to the obligation of respecting the right to life is not in any way acceptable without due trial or control, or at the worst without legal permission but even this is very questionable.

[2] The link between the right to life and abortion could perhaps be added to this list. Because the debate and the positions it entails go beyond the scope of this paper, we will not address this issue.

Nations have a right to self-defence as well, but they also have an obligation to abstain from threat and aggression.[3] So, ideally the right to self-defence of the State should never come to be used; there again, prevention and building a peaceful world beforehand are of the essence.

Nevertheless, should self-defence become necessary in international relations, there is still a vast array of tools and possibilities, including the mandatory warning to the UN Security Council, that should prevent the possibility of self-defence from ending in violence, war or casualties and therefore in any breach of the right to life.[4]

In fact, there is so little ground for the right of self-defence to effectively end in killing that effort to prevent war and to promote peacebuilding should enable us to progress towards nonkilling institutions. Moreover, a peaceful and nonviolent culture in which humane and peaceful conflict-solving possibilities are numerous and readily available, in which all basic needs are fairly met, will provide the needed tools to achieve a societal context in which *the right to peace and safety* and the right to life are realized.[5]

By Death Penalty

We hope to overcome this as soon as possible. The death penalty is a good example of what a nonkilling culture is not. For a peace culture to be-

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[3] UN charter § 51 and § 2. § 51 reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security" For § 2, cf. further.

[4] It is noteworthy to quote the "general comment" n° 6 of the UN's human rights committee, 1982, § 2, that clearly recalls that *states have an obligation to do their uttermost* to prevent war, in order to respect the right to life granted by the UN covenant on civil and political rights. This also goes to say that the right to self-defense does not in any way grant a right to war. It only grants a right to proportionate measures to avoid or repel the act of aggression legitimating the self-defense measures. Moreover, abusing of the right to self-defense could as well result in a crime of aggression, as newly defined (but not entered yet into force) by the statute of the International Criminal Court.

[5] Such a political and social context is required and granted as a right by the article the 28 of the Universal Declaration in order to realize all the other rights granted in the Declaration: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a28>.

come part of our mainstream culture there is a need for integrity, a need for the State to be a true expression of fundamental rights and the best "good example" as may be possible. Purposefully killing people is not in any way promoting life and the right to life, the right to a peaceful life.

Through the Power of War

This is what we will look at henceforth, hoping to offer possibilities for superseding one of the worst things humanity has ever committed itself to: war.

Before we move further, there is a need to underline that war is only possible through the existence of an army of some sort. Then there is a need to state that armies—when there is one in a country—exercise great influence on political institutions. Moreover, political choices about having an army or not have been extremely rare in the history of humanity.[6] More often than not, armies simply exist because of the tradition of having one and, as we will see, they do not always exist on grounds of necessity. Therefore, though there is a right to safety and security granted to all,[7] the legitimacy of having an army to protect this right can be questioned. So are there existing alternatives to military systems that could participate in the prevention and further in the total abolition of war? Can we build safe societies without armies and therefore without the risk of war?

If a society decides to give up the power and the tools of war, as well as the power to kill, it opens up the possibility of creating nonkilling political institutions. An overall analysis of this possibility shows that human rights are meant to provide peaceful (nonviolent) relations between the people and institutions within the country. Progress is well underway in this respect. The overall progress of peace, complemented by nonmilitarisation—the absence of a military structure in any given country—and the human right to peace, along with the effective application of the principles of the UN Charter on the peaceful settlement of disputes, could well be the tools needed to provide and ensure such non-violent relations at the international level. Adding peace zones to these two nonkilling institutional

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[6] In the history of humanity, there have been very few votes on the existence of an army in a country: a few constitutional changes voted by parliaments in the countries that do not have armies, a reestablishment of an army in the Maldives and two referendums in Switzerland. See Barbey (forthcoming).

[7] The human right to safety or security, that we call a human right to peace, is present in the purpose of the United Nations charter, but also in all major human rights texts.

mechanisms, to ensure and improve a safe transition towards a peaceful world, will in fact bring us towards comprehensive nonviolent institutions[8].

This will not only lead towards freedom from war; a State that gives up the power to kill gains greater legitimacy. It can therefore become, in a spirit of integrity, a proactive actor in the promotion of peace and of a good life for all. The State can then do what it is meant to do, to serve its people and all the peoples of the world without being burdened by the irreconcilable contradiction of having to promote and pay for war, the worst violence of all times, and, at the same time, to serve humanity and its peoples.

This chapter will focus on one dimension of this process. Presenting specific empirical aspects of nonmilitarisation, it will show that the power of war, a traditional attribute of the nation-state, is not in any way a necessity or a fatality.

Peace or War? It is Up to Us, "We the Peoples...",[9] to Choose

There is a strong need to state as often as possible that war has been illegal since 1945 and the adoption of the UN Charter, specifically article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4.[10] Nevertheless, most States of the world still maintain huge military apparatuses, thus causing tremendous human suffering, losses of resources and threatening the very existence of the human species. Warlike practices and military needs maintain the seemingly perpetual possibility of war and armed conflict. This permanent precondition of war seriously hinders the means and possibilities needed to build a sustainable and lasting peace.[11] This also has a negative effect on the human spirit and on the possibility we have of harmoniously sharing our existences on Earth. For hu-

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[8] For the last decade, APRED, the participative institute for the progress of peace (www.apred.ch), has been working on the concept of "nonviolent institutions".

[9] "We the peoples…", the very first words of the UN Charter, in the Preamble.

[10] Which reads: "Article 2: The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles. 1. (…). 2. (…) 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations".

[11] We do recall that the resources absorbed yearly by military budgets are around four times bigger than the only partly met requirements set to achieve the millennium development goals, notwithstanding the fact that these goals do not even officially include a budget for peacebuilding activities.

manity to give itself a lasting future, peace practices need to be much more present, war and its methods much more absent. As members of humanity, there is a choice we need to make at all times: peace by peaceful means![12]

Should All Countries Ban War?

Indeed, they should! To our knowledge, only four countries have textually banned war in their constitutions. Italy did so in 1946, Japan in 1947, Ecuador in 2008 and Bolivia in 2009. Though many countries simply say they shall maintain friendly relations with all nations, many more should reflect in their fundamental texts the binding ban on war found in the UN Charter.[13]

Yet, however good this constitutional incentive towards reducing the risk of war may be, the examples of Japan and Italy show, as both countries have used their military powers in warlike operations, that even good legal provisions need to be confirmed by the facts. In other words, are there countries that give up having an army and therefore totally renounce the possibility of waging a military conflict? Our study shows that one country out of eight in our present world does so by not sustaining an army.

Should Countries Have Armies?

There is nothing in international law making it mandatory to have an army and there never will be simply because so many countries, recognized as such, cannot have one because they are too small to support it, or better still, because they do not want to have an army at all.

Nonmilitarisation is a new concept but one of the elements of international relations and therefore of peace and security studies. The vulnerability or the peaceful strength of army-less countries, but also the different perspective they bring on security issues will be influential for further strategic thinking and for peace studies, as well as for future generations.

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[12] We hold as a text of great importance the "Seville statement on violence", adopted by UNESCO in 1989. Its conclusion says that the species who invented war can also invent peace. The responsibility rests upon us all. The text also invalidates as "scientifically incorrect" all sayings or theories that claim we received war from animals, that violence is in human nature, in its genes, that evolution is more inclined than not to violence or that there are physical or psychological preconditioning for violence. In other words, our behaviors and attitudes are also made of choices and cognitive issues.

[13] To our knowledge, a list of countries upholding peaceful relations in their constitution is still to be made.

There is nothing either in international law forbidding having an army. The UN Charter goes as far as to indicate a general trend towards peace-building, but even the question of knowing whether general disarmament is mandatory remains open.[14] However, there are numerous demilitarisation treaties, of various sources and scope, including bilateral treaties binding some of the nonmilitarised countries not to have an army because they surrender their military defence to another country.

Nonmilitarisation

The UN is now a universal organisation. Though it came about quite unnoticed, all the recognized States of the world are now members of the UN, with the very small exceptions of the Holy See and a few occupied, disputed or not fully independent territories. Out of the 193 member States of the UN, there are twenty-three countries that do not have an army. To these we can add the Holy See and two territories in the Pacific Ocean, Niue and the Cook Islands living in free association with New Zealand, for a total of *26 countries without armies*.

Why is it that so many countries do not want to have an army? Is it by chance or by choice? Did it happen naturally, an instinctive reaction to the tremendous damages and risks armies and war cause or have caused? Was the choice not to enter into the vicious circle of having an army for unclear reasons, because the neighbouring State also has one or to compensate for some imprecise fears regarding the future? Maybe it is because peace-building alternatives are not yet sufficient to bridge the gap between peace and violence and to renounce military defence. Are the doubts about human nature and about its capacity to live in peace and create peaceful societies too important? Could it be that some countries actually chose not to be accomplices of the military business? After all, is it not logical that alternatives to military systems did appear, spontaneously or purposefully?

Before we look at how these countries became army-less, at how they survive and live and at what this brings to them, to the whole world and to nonkilling security and societies, let us see who they are.

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[14] Since the adoption of the Charter, the "Security Council shall be responsible for formulating plans (…) for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments" (Art. 26). This is not even disarmament, it is only regulation of armaments. Such regulation should indeed include disarmament, however, such plans have never been made.

Nonmilitarisation, where does it apply?

Two criteria were used to identify which countries do or do not have an army. The first criterion, a theoretical one, has the advantage of clarity. Moreover, if the criterion is fulfilled, it creates a structure upholding in time, in any given country, the absence of a national army. This is the legal criterion: *Is there in the constitution or in the legal order of a given country a provision banning the army*? This criterion does not automatically need to be fulfilled. Some countries do ban the army as unconstitutional; there the criterion is clearly met. In other countries, the constitution may say nothing at all on the army or on its absence. Why rule on something that does not exist? But it does also happen that some countries have provisions concerning an army or some aspects of an army that is in fact nonexistent. And there is one country, Japan, where the army is very clearly banned by the constitution whereas on the ground the country has in fact one of the largest armies of the world.[15]

So for a country to be considered as not having army, this legal criterion needs to be confirmed and fully met by a second criterion, a practical or factual criterion: *Are there or not, in a given country, forces and armaments amounting to an army*? Drawing the line between what is an army and what is not is not always easy. The line passes between, on the one hand, police forces, coast guards, border patrols as well as some paramilitary forces and, on the other, military forces. To be sure the forces other than the police are not military forces, one looks at the purposes and the administrative attachment, civilian or not, of these forces and at what type of armaments they have in comparison with the armaments effectively needed to fulfil the types of missions they are assigned to. The intent or claim to have an army or not is usually a good indication, but as we have seen for Japan, it is not always decisive. The purpose of the missions and the armament assigned therefore are; and this is confirmed by the civilian reattachment of the personnel of these forces in the selected countries.

One more factor needs to be taken into account: *Are there, for the country studied, defence agreements with another country and/or the presence of foreign armies in the country?* In fact, 7 out of the 26 selected countries do

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[15] "Chapter II: Renunciation of war Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

have such agreements, more or less restrictive, with a foreign military power. Notwithstanding these agreements, these countries are and remain fully independent, recognized as such by the UN. For what concerns us here, beyond the overall security issue, these seven countries do not produce local military practices or apparatuses. So, though defended or possibly defended by other countries, they are still in fact army-less.

It is beyond the scope of this study to describe in full this selection process. It is presented in another publication (Barbey, forthcoming).

The 26 countries fulfilling the criteria are, sorted by regional location[16]:

- In Africa (Indian Ocean): Mauritius.
- In Central America and the Caribbean Sea: Costa Rica, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Panama, St-Kitts and Nevis, St-Lucia, St-Vincent and the Grenadines.
- In Europe: Andorra*, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco*, San Marino, Vatican (Holy See).
- In the Pacific Ocean: Cook Islands*, Kiribati, Marshall Islands*, Micronesia (Federated States of)*, Nauru, Niue*, Palau*, Salomon Islands, Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

To this list of countries, a vast number of demilitarised territories must be added. Often unoccupied or barely inhabited territories, they are nevertheless larger than all the militarised zones of the world.[17] They also make it impossible for militarisation to expand into any new direction or territory, with the correlative advantage that over time, whenever a new territory is demilitarised, militarisation as a whole retreats and nonmilitarisation progresses. It must also be noted, that regions, cities, local governments or authorities do not have their own armies either.

Why are these Countries Nonmilitarised?

Most of these countries are small or very small: "small countries with great ideals". Some of them simply do not have the means, the manpower, the economical resources or a vast enough territory to support a standing army, however small that army might be. Some of them could nevertheless try to have one. Yet, along with larger countries that could have an army,

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[16] The asterisk (*) indicates a defence or military agreement with another country.
[17] To mention the most important ones: Antarctica, the deep sea bed, the moon, outer space and all the celestial bodies, the Spitsbergen and the Åland Islands.

they made the choice not to do so. All these army-less countries make security choices, taking into account the fact that they have no army. This can be through participation in collective security organizations, regionally and with the UN, having or not a "protecting state", and all proper security measures related to their situation, including—this has happened twice, in Gambia and the Maldives —the re-establishment of an army.

There are only two ways for a country to become nonmilitarised: through a total demilitarisation process or to have been created without an army.

Seven countries (among the twenty-six selected) went through a demilitarisation process. They used to have an army, then chose not to have one anymore. The reasons behind these choices and their effects are of great importance; they are valuable examples for many countries in similar positions that still retain an army.

Monaco was the first to undergo, at least partially, such a demilitarisation process. It started in the middle of the 17th century, for ballistic reasons: the rock of Monaco is such a stronghold, towering over the harbour, that until that time it was impossible to shoot cannonballs onto the palace and the old city. But when the range of cannons became sufficient to shoot directly at the town from the neighbouring mountain, Prince Honoré III of Monaco wisely realized that such vulnerability could not be protected by military means. He renounced an expensive and useless modernisation of the artillery, thus starting the decline of the military forces of Monaco, now limited to the Prince's guard.

Excluding the nuclear powers and the largest countries of the world, all countries are now in a position similar to that of Monaco at the time: facing a massive attack, they are totally vulnerable. In other words, nowadays in most situations, security relies much more on collaborative and collective measures and on preventive peace-building, than on military power or even military balance. Yet for so many countries of the world, it remains difficult to overcome this incurable weakness, to go beyond military thinking and to enter into disarmament as supported by new ways of national and international long-term peacemaking. The following examples show that all nonmilitarisation takes is the will to do it and to proceed cautiously.

The second country to undergo total demilitarisation was Liechtenstein in 1868. It did so for economic reasons. Maintaining an army, though it had only 50 soldiers, was at the time, just too expensive.

How many countries in the world could stop diverting large sums of money to maintain armies? How many countries of the world could put these sums to much better use to reduce poverty, improve education and development, sat-

isfy the basic needs of all and, last but not least, enhance and promote peace, locally and internationally and offer peaceful conflict-solving methods to all?

The third country to demilitarise totally was Costa Rica in 1948. There were three main reasons for this to happen, to which reasons, as we will see, one can certainly add a stroke of genius.

The first reason is that, compared to other Central American countries, Costa Rica has a rather cohesive social population. At the time, this population was mostly made of small coffee planters. There was no major economic elite needing a strong army. For example, there is no mining activity in the country. There is therefore a rather strong democratic culture, over which the small military forces that did exist had little power. Moreover, at the time, Central America was ridden with coups, often military coups amounting to a political tradition, but because of its social and democratic background, Costa Rica was generally spared such a plague. However, it is a sort of a coup, namely the refusal to give up power after lost elections that triggered the demilitarisation process of Costa Rica.

The second reason is typically a strategic issue. There was a bizarre civil war in early 1948 after which peace could only be assured be the disbanding of the army. This is where the stroke of genius comes in. First of all, to consider and attempt such an unusual proposal: not having an army! Then, to find ways to use this disbanding of the military force for higher and more lasting purposes. This was done by including in the constitution the legal grounds needed to avoid the recreation of an army and by effectively reallocating the funds made available to education and development, thus giving the benefit of the abolition of the army to the people themselves and gaining thereby their support for this very special measure. Finally, in a symbolic gesture, a ceremony was celebrated, and the former military barracks were turned into a museum.

Years later, when the fact that Costa Rica has no army started to be duly recognized and accepted, as rumours against this reality and fears about it faded away, Costa Rica began taking a much clearer stand in favour of peace and peacebuilding activities all over the world.

The 1948 civil war began when a right-wing government, associated with the communist party to gain a majority, refused to admit it lost the elections. Because this government included and was associated with the local communist party, the United States, at the start of the cold war, totally refused to give them any support. Forces from the political centre took up arms for a civil war of 44 days (an estimated 2,000 people were killed) that they did win, but with the help of an international brigade of some 600 men, set up previously to topple all the dictators of Central America. Because of this brigade,

the United States also refused to support officially the new people in charge. Therefore, the latter could not rely on the remnants of the defeated official army, nor could they maintain their power against that army without the brigade, but they needed the support of the US as well. Thus, the issue was solved, with the support of the US gained, on the one hand, by disbanding the army and on the other, by sending the brigade away (Longley, 1997).

Finally, the third reason making demilitarisation possible is of vital importance for the future of collective security. It is the coming into effect, by the signing by Costa Rica (the last signature needed) of the security treaty of the Organisation of American States (OAS).

As important as the two other reasons for the demilitarisation of Costa Rica, by signing this treaty a few days before abolishing the army, the government set up an international, collective security net around the country. And in fact, it came to good use right away; the disbanding of the army coincided with one of the first successful peaceful actions of collective security in the world. The Costa Rican political forces that had been defeated and fled the country a few months earlier at the end of the civil war, hearing that the army was disbanded and the brigade gone, attempted an invasion of the country from a neighbouring State. This invasion failed when the border from which they operated was closed and their supply lines therefore cut off by an order of the OAS security commission. No force other than diplomatic pressure was used to repel the invasion.

The nonmilitarised status of Costa Rica was confirmed in the 1949 constitution, and non-militarisation has brought 60 years of peace, democracy and prosperity to the country, while all the other countries of Central America suffered from dictatorships and civil wars. It was Costa Rica that helped to end these wars and to start the restoration of democracy in Central America, in the 80's and at the instigation of Óscar Arias, president of Costa Rica at the time and winner of the Nobel peace prize in 1987. In 1983, Costa Rica unilaterally adopted a "perpetual nonarmed neutrality" regime, thus legally officialising the possibility of neutral non-militarisation and hopefully giving a new impulse to the concept of neutrality, separating it from the need to defend neutrality with arms. Because of these peaceful policies, Costa Rica also hosts the Inter-American courts of human rights and the United Nations University for Peace. It is very active on the international scene in promoting peace in various ways. The country is also now a pioneering country in ecotourism.

The example of Costa Rica is a shining light in human history and in the efforts to end the plague of war. Not only has abolishing the army greatly benefited the people of Costa Rica, but when one talks about not having an

army, Costa Rica is more and more frequently quoted as the leading example. The main example it may be, but by now followed by many.

The forth country to demilitarise was the small island of Dominica, in 1981. The story of the demilitarisation there is rather simple. Take a corrupt government, as proven, with an ousted prime minister backed by the army. Combat results between the police and the army and for the good of all, the police wins (five persons die). Consequently and out of necessity, the army is disbanded (Phillips, 2002).

Dominica is a good example, among others, of what can happen when police forces and military forces are of equivalent strength and take the risk of fighting each other. These situations are best resolved by integrating all forces, including special forces, into the police, simply because these special forces are never large and because they rarely have real war-like missions. They usually fulfil border and sea security purposes, serve as anti-riot squads and so forth. Sometimes they are also present to prevent secessions.[18]

The example of Dominica shows that small armies, too small to have a potential for war and therefore without a clear purpose, can easily become factors in internal security problems. It also shows that with or without an army, police missions do remain important and require proper management.

The fifth country to demilitarise was Grenada in 1983. The United States invaded the country after a revolution that went awry. The defeated army was simply not reconstituted.

Defeating an army is not necessarily a prerequisite for abolishing it. However, this is what happened in five of the seven demilitarisations leading to non-militarisation. Of course, one would want to avoid going as far as a military defeat to see demilitarisation happen. But if it does occur, it can offer as good an occasion as any for considering the possibility of total demilitarisation. This also shows that the occurrence of a military outbreak does not in any way legitimize the existence of an army. On the contrary, it is often when war or battle has occurred that the people realize how bad armies can be and then make the choice and take the risk of new solutions

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[18] Among countries without armies, similar problems occurred in Vanuatu where what used to be the so called defense force (mostly a special police force used to prevent secession, drug trafficking and to assume coast guard duties) was finally integrated under the same command and in St-Kitts where the politically contested so called defense force was also set up to prevent secession. Similar problems occurred in Timor Leste and certainly in other places.

without them. Total demilitarisation offers great potential in this respect, but to be considered, must be known by the people.

The sixth country to demilitarise was Panama. Demilitarisation started in 1989 when the United States invaded the country and defeated the local army in order to capture General Noriega, then chief of the army and president of the country. Demilitarisation was complete and concluded with the inscription of the absence of an army for the country in the Constitution in 1994 (Article 310). The soldiers that were not decommissioned were, following due security checks, integrated into the police. The war had left very few armaments available, none of them of major strategic importance. These weapons (mostly a few small airplanes) were demilitarized and attributed to the police force. More interestingly, the political party that had been created long before to support the military regime, progressively reintegrated politics, accepting and participating in the demilitarisation of the country, undergoing thereby a major change of doctrine (Harding, 2001).

It must be noted also that the country, though army-less, has been capable of obtaining from the United States not only the full respect of the 1977 treaty giving back the "Panama canal zone" to the country on the 31st of December 1999, but also, during the process, the total closing down of all the American military bases still in the country.

Panama, following the example of Costa Rica, is the best proof imaginable that nonmilitarisation does work, that it is profitable, and that countries can make that choice. It also shows, among other examples, that a small country can resist and obtain much, even if it has no army.

The seventh country to demilitarise was Haiti in 1995. The army was instrumental in the coup that ousted Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. It was virtually defeated by his re-instalment by an US-UN force in 1994, but he nevertheless decided to abolish its remnants in 1995 (Beaulieu, 1996). It is said that he was encouraged to do so by a poll presented to him by Óscar Arias, indicating that the Haitian population was in favour the abolition of the army. However, it seems that the DDR (demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration) was ineffective, and that the same people who were sent home (with their weapons?) in 1995 came back in 2004 to throw Aristide out of power again.

The constitution of Haiti, that has a large section on the army, was never changed to reflect its abolition, partly because amendments require a double vote by two successive legislatures, which has not taken place so far.

There were also talks about re-establishing the army in late 2012.[19] At this point, they have only gone so far as to create a small corps of engineers.

Haiti shows how cautiously demilitarisation is to be done, first in order to gain proper control over weapons and to secure a proper reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Then demilitarisation requires specific measures to make it last in a way that will benefit the country and the people. A constitutional change should be part of that process in order to secure its lasting effects.

These seven cases of demilitarisation ending in non-militarisation show that such a process is possible, that it is not in itself a threat for the future of the country and that it can occur in a time of crisis or post-crisis, though it can also be initiated in times of peace. Five of these cases were located in the Caribbean islands or in Central America. The regional example of Costa Rica, followed by four other countries, is very strong and potent.

The nineteen other countries were demilitarised from the start, at the time of their creation or independence. Thorough local research is required in order to discover and explain fully what really happened to legitimize such a choice. We can however draw reasonable conclusion from the data we do have to explain the phenomenon and list "lessons learned".

It must be noted that the possible reasons for nonmilitarisation often do overlap. First of all, was there a clear decision not to have an army? As is the case for the seven countries that demilitarised, such a decision is known for Kiribati, Mauritius and Andorra.

In Kiribati at the time of independence, there was a political debate on the existence of the army. It ended up in favour of not having one, with the political party in favour of having one losing the final elections before independence (Teiwaki, 1988; Macdonald, 2001). The constitution was then drawn up in such a way as to make the establishment of an army impossible without a change in the constitution. So in fact, it is the people who made that choice.

In Mauritius, there are special security needs due to geographical isolation, to a multi-ethnic society and to the prevalence in the country of high-class tourism. All these factors require more security than what the police force usually ensures. Yet, the country has always made the choice to maintain the whole security system, including special forces, within the police force. This

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[19] See the letter from Nobel Peace Laureate Óscar Arias sent on December 9th, 2011 to President of Haiti Michel Martelly urging him not to reestablish the army: Available online at: <http://www.dadychery.org/2011/12/12/full-text-of-the-open-letter-from-oscar-arias-sanchez-to-michel-martelly>.

policy has been upheld for decades, and it shows that special security needs can addressed properly and fully covered without creating an army.

In Andorra, not having to serve in an army is a seven century-long tradition. Because the country had two rulers, men were not recruited. Who would they serve? Worse, could they serve for one of the rulers against the other? Given also that one of the rulers was a bishop, it is easy to understand that the best solution was to avoid having Andorran men serving in any army. This tradition was not changed when the new constitution was adopted and the status of the country clarified in 1993. Though little is said or known so far about the military aspects of this recent decision, it was somehow made clear that the country should remain army-less. The country officially recognises that it does not have an army.[20]

Then there are the seven countries that are sufficiently protected by another country. They have chose (or it might be said: historically received) a protector. All of them entered, in modern times, into treaties that can be said to have been (more or less) free decisions, and all these treaties can be revised if need be. Cook Islands and Niue are small islands or groups of islands with a low population. Rather early on in the decolonisation process (1965 and 1974), they chose to be freely associated with New Zealand, which agreed to provide for defence if needed, while respecting the islands' independence and autonomy. Monaco as well can benefit freely, for defence purposes, from its treaty with France. Andorra has two similar friendship treaties with France and Spain. These treaties leave full independence to Andorra and mention the possibility of calling upon France or Spain for security purposes if necessary. Both countries are free to respond or not to such a call.

The influence of the United States on the three countries for which it has sole responsibility for defence issues—Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau—is not fully known to us. However, all three of them voted for independence rather than for inclusion in or free association with the US. In Palau there was a very strong and protracted movement of resistance to any nuclear presence, while in the Marshall Islands, the US is still paying massive

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[20] Good examples of this "identity as army-less" are the reports given every four years and a half by all the countries of the world to the UN Human Rights Council on their situation regarding human rights. Quite often, in the introduction of their report, these army-less countries do mention that they do not have an army. And so does Andorra in its 2010 report (p. 2 §6) of its report: <http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session9/AD/A_HRC_WG.6_9_AND_1_Andorra_eng.pdf>.

damage costs for nuclear testing. Could this refusal of nuclear warfare be the reason why they refused to have an army? This is a distinct possibility.

In a different way, Haiti and the Solomon Islands both benefit from international protection. Peacekeeping operations deployed in those countries are not only serving as a form of collective security, but for both, an international mission is supplementing police weaknesses.

There are sometimes talks, mostly in Haiti, about rebuilding an army to replace these international forces. But when the police force is already weak, it is never a priority to build an army. The police, by addressing local and actual security issues, will always be more important than an army addressing more hypothetical threats.

In addition some basic facts must be taken into account when explaining non-militarisation. The sizes of the population, of the territory or the quantity of resources available, if insufficient, are basic reasons not to have an army.

The immensity of a territory, making it undefendable given the available manpower or resources, was certainly an important factor in the decision made by Iceland as well as in archipelagos such as the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa and Tuvalu.

Conversely, too small a territory also makes it undefendable. This is the situation of the continental European countries: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and the Holy See. They are unable to compete with their militarised neighbours, so without the tacit recognition of their existence by neighbouring countries, they would probably not exist anymore. Nauru and Niue are very small as well.

So for half of the nonmilitarised countries, size is of great importance in the decision not to have an army. In Nauru, Tuvalu and the Vatican City, size was totally decisive. But for the other half of these countries, the reasons are to be found elsewhere.

Still, among the smallest countries studied here, there are exceptions to the question of size and capacities. The smallest one, Vatican City, though it could definitely not afford an army, is nevertheless full of guards and police (300 security personnel for a total resident population of 800). The next in size, Monaco, though it was somewhat larger at the time, used to have an army and still has a special guard for the palace.

Meanwhile, many other countries in the world of similar size and possibilities, or barely larger, still have or claim to have armies. Seventy countries in the world, a third of all countries, have armed forces with less than 20,000 persons and twenty of these countries have less than one soldier per 10,000 inhabitants. Most of them could easily consider demilitarising and reintegrating

at least part of their forces into the police, in particular because these forces often already carry out missions regarding internal affairs and security. Fourteen countries have fewer persons in their army than the number of police in the Mauritius Special force (1,500 persons)—Antigua and Barbuda (170), Bahamas (860), Barbados (610), Belize (1,050), Cape Verde (1,200), Comoros (500), Gambia (800), Equatorial Guinea (1,320), Guyana (1,100), Luxemburg (900), Seychelles (650), East Timor (1,300) and Tonga (450).

Some countries decided to augment their police forces to compensate the absence of an army, namely St-Kitts and Nevis, Vanuatu and Mauritius.

The first two were facing secession movements at the time of independence. So for some time they had, though on and off in St-Kitts, what they called small defence forces (Phillips, 2000). Though these forces had no major weapons and served for internal purposes only, the question of whether they really had an army or not remained quite unclear for both these countries, at least until these forces were reunited with the police or placed under the same ministry. For Mauritius, as we have seen, there are special security needs.

Relying on collective security is a choice that has also clearly been made by Costa Rica as we have seen, but also by Iceland through joining NATO. The countries of the Caribbean Sea have joined forces in a "regional security system", as have done Haiti and the countries in Central America in the OAS, as well as all the countries of the Pacific in the Pacific forum and all the countries of Europe in the OSCE. Many of these countries are also members of the Commonwealth and in fact all of the countries without armies except Mauritius are part of a regional security organisation. And except for the Cook Islands, Niue and the Holy See, they are all members of the UN.

A regional factor has also been significant since most of the countries without armies are located in three regions. All the small European States are army-less. All the small independent Caribbean islands are army-less except Antigua, Barbados and the Bahamas, in a region where Costa Rica and later Panama and Haiti are also present. But most of all, it is among the islands of the Pacific that the choice not to have an army is the most prevalent. Out of the thirteen independent countries in the region, eleven are army-less—Fiji, with its numerous coups, and Toga stand as exceptions.

There are also historical factors. The European ones are all rather old and have had no military tradition for a rather long time. It must also be noted that nineteen of the twenty-six countries came into being during the decolonisation process. Were there at the time incentives not to have an army, at least if an army was not evidently necessary? There was perhaps such thinking within the Commonwealth of Nations, the organisation set up

by the British Empire with its former colonies. Half of the countries without armies were former British colonies. In Samoa, there was a very strong nonviolent movement in the 1920's (the "Mau" movement"). This may have had an influence at the time of independence.

Finally, San Marino, as a result of a terminology debate, claims to have an army though to our knowledge it possesses no heavy weapons aside from one cannon on the top of a mountain, offered by the Swiss. This proclaimed army is composed of a ceremonial guard and the border patrol.

All the countries without armies have appeared in one or more of these categories. More research will help us understand the measures taken by the people to maintain their decision and to know better their arguments in favour of nonmilitarisation. Many of these countries and their population are nowadays satisfied about not having an army. At the start of our research on this topic in the late 80s, there was a tendency towards discretion or prudence about not having an army, but these countries are now assuming fairly openly their situation. Their people, when asked, are quite often very proud of being army-free and of participating therefore in the progress of peace. They quite often also realize what it is to be free from the draft, from military political influence and from military spending.

Are Countries without Armies Vulnerable?

Security can be greatly improved by culture and prevention. But never in the world can it be totally guaranteed. The two countries that did remilitarise after being army-less for a while, Gambia and the Maldives islands, felt the need to rearm. Gambia is totally surrounded by Senegal. There is low intensity civil war in Casamance, southern Senegal below Gambia, thus causing turmoil in Gambia and difficulties with Senegal. So the army was re-established and this soon led to a certain number of coups. The Maldives Islands suffered from an attempted coup carried out with the help of Sri Lankan rebels. It also suffered from a lot of internal turmoil, partly because of a weak democratic culture. In both cases, the choice to re-establish an army did not solve the problems. All the other countries without armies live in peace, more or less. They may be, or seem to be, more vulnerable because they are small or because of, as an example, climate change and the sea rise. They are not the only ones facing these problems but they do have more money and credit to handle them than if they had an army to support; moreover, they have a greater potential for handling these difficulties peacefully. Thus, vulnerability has often turned into strength. Two examples, among many, will be useful here: Iceland and Liechtenstein.

In Iceland, independence from Denmark, at the time occupied by Germany, was acquired in 1944 in the middle of World War II, notably the worst war of all times, without even creating an army. Though there were British and US troops stationed in the country during the war to prevent Germany from invading it and to guarantee the northern routes between America and Europe, deciding not to have an army at this very particular time of history, however hard it would have been to set up an efficient army, was a tremendous act of courage. It was reinforced by the Icelandic choice to remain neutral, though this only lasted until the country entered NATO as a founding member in 1949.

This did not keep Iceland from starting a war—a nonviolent war however—against some other NATO members, Germany and mainly Great-Britain. The conflict, known as "the Cod wars", lasted episodically from 1959 until 1982 when Iceland's demand for an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles was recognized and granted to all the countries of the world by the international treaty on the law of the sea. The conflict was about the right of the Icelanders to exploit and to fish in their nearby waters, at the time the main source of income of the country. The nonviolent means used was a trawl-net cutter invented by the Icelandic coast guard. Once cut, such a net sinks; because the nets are big and heavy, there is only one per ship. So the loss of a net means the loss of a fishing season. Nevertheless, many nets were cut. And once, sadly, a cable snapped back at a trawler-boat, thus killing an English fisherman.

The example of Liechtenstein is another example of humanity and courage, of non-violent power in the midst of war. At Yalta in 1945, the major powers had agreed that all Soviet Union nationals found in the territories conquered by any of the Allies should be returned to the USSR. Many Russians or inhabitants of territories occupied by USSR such as Ukraine, the Baltic States and others fought during the war against the USSR, communism or the Stalinist regime. Handed over, they were treated as traitors and often executed. While all the other European countries closed their eyes on this murderous practice, Liechtenstein, in order to preserve the lives of some 500 refugees, refused to bow under the pressure of the USSR. 300 hundred refugees later immigrated to Argentina, while the other 200 hundred who freely chose to return to the USSR, were all executed.

Two things must be noted from these incidents. First of all, that a small country, with ingenuity and persistency, can defeat a major power and win its cause. Secondly and as important: when all wars will kill less than the cod wars in which only one person died, then humanity will have reached a great degree of humanity ... and progress.

Is it better to Live in a Country without an Army?

Beyond what is self-evident, much more research will need to be done to assess that life is better in a country without an army. Besides the lesser risk of getting involved in a war or a military coup, a few very important factors can already be mentioned. Except for the Holy See, all the countries without armies are democratic. Accounting for the fact that most of these countries achieved their independence relatively recently, this is not a minor achievement. It is also a severe critique of the effect armies have on democracies.

A large comparative case study could be made to account for their greater security and stability. However, out of the 26 countries presently without armies, only one major breach of national security and one major breach of the rule of law can be noted since the end of the cold war: a so called ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands and the second ousting of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti. Compared to the number of such events in the rest of the world, the rate of these events in these countries is very low.

In another field, that could be researched through gender studies, the few statistics available tend to show that the situation of women is relatively better in countries without armies, suggesting the negative influence armies may have on masculinity and on the general treatment of women. A similar statistical approach also shows that education levels are better. Though, we have so far only strong indications in this respect, the economical situation is most likely better as well. Risks may be different (sea rise, low resources because the country is small and so forth), but the trends here presented do show that non-militarisation offers more possibilities to handle these risks and that it improves the situation of local populations.

What does Nonmilitarisation bring to Nonkilling Security?

First, there is a need to recall that what is problematic about war and armies, about the tools of war is not so much—as horrific it may be—the number of people killed in wars: poverty or traffic kill a lot more. The danger of war lies with the potential for destruction sustained by armies and with the spirit of violent conflict that they support. In human history, nothing can kill more and more suddenly than war and armies and this is why nonkilling security needs to address war, armies and peace to find and build alternatives.

In practicality, quite a few countries could easily demilitarise totally, encouraging larger ones to do so as well and moving toward nonkilling security. However, it is left to the people of these countries to call for demilitarisation and it is up to their authorities to make the necessary move.

Theoretically, much has been gained and achieved towards the realization of peace. Much more is still to be done.

Worldwide Growth of Peace?

Many hopes were vested in the dividends of peace at the end of the Cold War. Some twenty-five years later, military budgets are higher, disarmament has made but little progress except when people themselves have acted for it, namely for the mine and cluster munitions ban and for the arms sales treaties.

While the constant growth of peace studies and of peace prevention and conflict-solving methods, as well as the founding, progress and influence of numerous NGOs working on many aspects of the maintenance and progress of peace, are evidence of the desire of peace by people and the international community, nation-states still maintain and use armies for war, for power or threat (some call it dissuasion) and for highly competitive or violent national and economical interests.

Nonmilitarisation shows that this is not the only path nations can walk. It provides more than an alternative to military solutions to conflict and security issues; it guarantees that no military means will be used in any case. Moreover, the major security challenges humanity will face in the future, namely the threats to the environment and the peaceful and egalitarian absorption of the growth of the world's population, will need other answers than what the nation-state can do with military measures or alone.

What is the Nation-State?

Countries are meant to be at the service of their population, all their population. If they give up the power of war and the power to kill, the chances and possibilities left to them to mistreat or to risk the lives of their own population or of other peoples around the world greatly diminishes or at best totally disappears. By choosing to reduce, limit or abolish militarisation, countries also enter into a process of permanent prevention of conflict and violence, thus setting the example of political and institutional nonviolence.

This is of course a major change of policy, well expressed by a provision found in the new constitution of the Swiss canton of Vaud: "In all its activities, the State shall see that justice and peace prevail and upholds efforts for conflict prevention" (Art. 6.2.).[21] Opting for such a proactive way of seeing State activity changes the way the State acts and is perceived. It moves the State away from its role as the sole guardian of the use force—and from

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[21] See: <http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/131_231/a6.htm>.

too frequent abuses of force—and it opens up the possibility of having the State acting as a promoter of peace, human values and human rights.

Abolishing war and the risk of war is the only possible way to fulfil all human rights, lastingly and in their universality. Moreover, a nation that gives up the power to kill, in all circumstances, takes a necessary step toward a greater democracy, toward a democracy that does not for any purpose or reason practice the sacrifice of anyone, that does not breach the right to life granted to all, soldiers and others.

The State has to participate in this effort and we need to lead it in this direction. Many more conflicts will need to be prevented and many more nonkilling methods will need to be created and successfully used to replace military means. Yet, nonmilitarisation is a sign that this is possible and it is a sure way to get out of the vicious circle of war and killing.

Peace tools and peace policies

Peace will not happen nor will it last by chance. Peace is a permanent process of growth and experience that must overcome many contradictions and build many new tools and practices to succeed. Having an army to protect peace is not one of the lesser contradictions we face. But peace tools do progress and some of them deserve to be mentioned here.

Peace in constitutions and peace infrastructures. As we have seen briefly, countries without armies have sometimes adopted peace-oriented constitutions. This trend towards more peaceful constitutions is in progress as around thirty constitutions are yearly revised. Including peace, nonviolence and nonkilling in a constitution is a good way to set as an objective the predominance of these values over those of war, violence and killing. By adding concrete means to achieve them in a constitution such as the right to peace, education for peace, nonviolent dispute resolution methods and policies for the prevention of violence and reduction of killings, a country provides important tools for the well-being of its population and for a good relation with its neighbors. It sets peace as an important symbolic value for all and provides tools for the integration of peace practices in the infrastructures of State and society.[22]

The human right to peace. Do people have a right to live in peace and is peace therefore a human right? The UN Human Rights Council is working on the concept of peace as a human right and may eventually come to its

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[22] On peace and constitutions, see <http://www.constitutionmakingforpeace.org> and < http://www.demilitarisation.org/spip/spip.php?rubrique17>. On peace infrastructures see Unger et al, eds. (2013) and visit <http://www.gamip.org/>.

full recognition. Yet, however satisfying this legal recognition may be, we do not need an official proclamation of the human right to peace to know it exists and to claim it. Nor do countries need to wait for a proclamation of this right by an international body to include the human right to peace into their own constitutional order.

Other peace tools. Education for peace, nonviolent practices, including their implementation and use by public and law enforcement authorities, peace zones and so forth: they are many existing tools, many possibilities for peace to progress. These possibilities do lessen the possible occurrences of killings and they do improve thereupon the prevention of war and the full respect for the right to life. The building and implementation of peace policies can be done worldwide. Non-militarisation is only one of these policies, though a very decisive one. Peace policies are a good systemic and political way to improve nonkilling worldwide.

Conclusion

Nonkilling and nonmilitarisation share a common goal: to bring about the emergence of societies where the possibility of killing disappears.

Nonmilitarisation shows that a country does not need to enter into what would be the worst step towards killing people: preparing for war. Applied with nonmilitarisation, nonkilling standard—that is positively the human right to life—wipes out its bitter end. Without the possibility of war, the greatest possibility of killings disappears and the right to life comes to a new bloom.

Nonmilitarisation shows that peace and freedom from war are possible. Yet, the slow betterment of the human condition will not be sufficient in itself to stave off forever the risks and fatalities of war. To achieve nonkilling societies and a world without war, we need to question the existence of armies and to replace them, when needed, by nonviolent security means. Nonmilitarisation provides a very sound base for the design of peace policies and for the implementation of practical peaceful solutions.

Nonkilling and nonviolent institutions, including nonmilitarisation, will help us to fulfil our basic right to life for all. They will also help us to fulfil our right to a decent life for all, because living away from the fears of violence and war will liberate means, will provide goodwill and resources for the betterment of the condition of each and every one. Step by step, human rights bring this ideal of a decent life closer but the efforts remain tremendous to overcome the sheer possibility of war and violence and to turn our minds and cultures towards waging peace, using the tools of peace.

How can we turn from excessive wealth, poverty and wrath, which today impede the gentle and humane sharing of our planet into building a happy and peaceful life, a lasting future for humanity?

The possibility of peace, leaving behind the plague of war is shown to us by the countries without armies and it is brought to us by nonkilling policies. Nonmilitarisation is a step nation-states can take and nonkilling is a choice we can make, our political structures can make, both to heal political violence and to prepare for a healthy, happy and peaceful future for all.

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Chapter Six

Security without Deadly Violence

Costa Rica's Potential as a Nonkilling State

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Introduction

If there is any country that has the near-term potential to achieve its domestic and international security aims through a policy of nonkilling, it may be Costa Rica. Having abolished the death penalty in 1877, the Costa Rican state has not killed anyone in the course of justice for more than 135 years. Having abolished the standing army in 1948, it has successfully defended itself through collective security agreements and a lightly armed public security force. Having declared neutrality in 1983, the country has avoided killing in inter-state armed conflicts. With these achievements, perhaps the main challenge Costa Rica now faces in achieving domestic and international security as a nonkilling state is to abolish the use of deadly violence by its public security forces, an achievable aim given its professionalized law enforcement apparatus.

This chapter is an evaluation of Costa Rica's experience and success with abolition of the death penalty, abolition of the army, and the declaration of neutrality as nonkilling policies that have enhanced the country's security. In addition, it is an assessment of the country's experience with nonmilitary defense and policing to determine Costa Rica's potential to achieve nonkilling domestic security. The policies regarding the death penalty, army, and neutrality were established at different times, under different political circumstances, and in different security environments. All, however, have proven to serve Costa Rica's domestic and international security interests.

As Paige argues in *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, the abolition of the death penalty is a specific policy decisions that advances the realization of nonkilling societies (2009: 51). Currently there is no global ban on the death penalty, but Paige notes that "by January 2009, 94 of 195 world countries and territories […] had abolished the death penalty for all crimes" (*Ibid*.), and Amnesty International reports that "over two-thirds of the world's nations have ended capital punishment in law or practice." As discussed below, Costa Rica has been a leader in international society for the abolition of the death penalty. Its history

as a country capable of maintaining justice and domestic security without re-sorting to killing as the ultimate punishment makes it an exemplar in this case.

According to Paige, there were twenty-seven independent countries without armies in 2009 (2009: 53). Costa Rica is one of them, having abol-ished its army in 1948. Although abolishing both the death penalty and the army are necessary steps to achieving nonkilling security, abolition of the army is much more closely related to state security than the death penalty. While states have historically reserved the authority to apply the death pen-alty in cases of national security, for example for treason or crimes during wartime, abolition of the army eliminates the state institution that typically has the greatest technological and organizational capacity to kill *en masse*.

Neutrality in international relations may also be considered essential to nonkilling state security. The instrument that establishes the legal category of neutrality in international society is the 1907 Hague Convention. While some critics have claimed that a declaration of neutrality is a declaration of isolation-ism and indifference to world affairs, Karsh demonstrates that neutral coun-tries, as members of the United Nations and regional organizations, have con-sidered their neutrality "a valuable asset, enabling them to play an active role in international life by assuming a broad and varied range of functions which non-neutral states could not accomplish" (1988: 6). This is certainly true for Costa Rica. In addition to its efforts to abolish the death penalty internationally, Costa Rica is a co-sponsor of a draft Nuclear Weapons Convention recently intro-duced to the UN as David Krieger mentions elsewhere in this volume.

For Costa Rica, and perhaps for other states as well, eliminating deadly vio-lence from policing practices may be the biggest challenge to achieving nonkill-ing security. Costa Rica maintains an armed Public Force, and although it is professional and held to a high level of public accountability, its members are empowered to use deadly violence. A division of the Public Force, the Civil Guard, was also maintained for many years, though no longer, as a potential defense force in the absence of an army. Still, as I discuss below, it was almost always a small force of fewer than 3,000 members and only ever lightly armed. There is currently no broad movement in Costa Rican political or civil society advocating for policing by exclusively nonkilling means. Without such a move-ment, it seems unlikely that the country will achieve nonkilling security.

Abolition of the Death Penalty

Although it was not the first South American state to do so, Costa Rica abolished the death penalty in 1877, making it one of the earliest abolitionist

states in the world.[1] Its abolition of the death penalty followed other progressive social reforms, including the introduction of free and mandatory elementary school education in 1869. Costa Ricans generally give credit for the abolition of the death penalty to María Emilia Solorzano Alfaro, First Lady to Tomás Miguel Guardia Gutiérrez, who served as president almost without interruption from 1870 until 1882. In recognition of her efforts to promote progressive social policies she received the *Benemeritazgo de la Patria* (distinguished citizenship of the nation award), "the highest honor the Costa Rican state can bestow on a citizen who has contributed in extraordinary ways to the progress and welfare of the country" (Hernández and Hermann, 1997: 84).

As evidence of its unwavering commitment to death penalty abolition, Costa Rica has avoided revival of the death penalty even during the suspension of democratic rule and in cases which elsewhere might be regarded as high treason punishable by death. In the first instance, the country went through a two-year period of dictatorial rule following a *coup d'état* in 1917. Despite this interruption to its otherwise long experience with stable democracy, the military government did not rescind abolition of the death penalty.[2] Neither did the civilian government revive it after the restoration of democracy in order to punish those responsible for the *coup*.

An even stronger test of Costa Ricans' commitment to death penalty abolition was the treatment of Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia. President of Costa Rica from 1940 until 1944, Calderón Guardia fled the country in 1948 after José Figueres Ferrer deposed him in a *coup d'état* that same year. He led two invasions of Costa Rica from neighboring Nicaragua, one in 1948 and another in 1955 *after* the return to democracy. Despite the fact that the second invasion included the bombing of the capital, San José, and other cities, he was allowed to return to the country in 1958 without being charged with treason, a crime historically associated with the death penalty (Bird, 1984).

With its long experience as an abolitionist state, Costa Rica has been a moral leader in efforts to promote human rights and abolish the death penalty internationally. Its leadership in establishing the postwar order of international law began when it served as cochair of the London preparatory conference for the establishment of the United Nations (Brysk, 2009: 96). In addition, Costa

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[1] According to Hood, after Venezuela, Costa Rica was the second state in the Western Hemisphere to abolish the death penalty (Hood, 2001: 333).

[2] Referring to South America, Hood notes, "history shows that, in this region at times of political instability, military governments may reinstate the death penalty for a variety of offences against the state and public order" (1996: 44).

Rica has been a signatory to all of the international treaties and protocols on death penalty abolition, the purposes of which have been to strengthen the right to life acknowledged in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.*

While the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* acknowledged the right to life, it did not preclude states from claiming the authority to use the death penalty as the ultimate means of punishment. According to Schabas, the reason for this limitation on protection of the right to life lies in the historical development of the definition of the right. Specifically, the right to life expressed in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* is derived from earlier national declarations of rights inspired by the *Magna Carta*, the United States Constitution (in particular The Bill of Rights), and the French *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*. None of these early statements, Schabas notes, provided an absolute right to life. Rather, they provided "protection of one's life from arbitrary deprivation by the State, in reality more of a license to the State to execute, providing that procedural guarantees were observed" (2002: 9).

The first international legal instrument to limit the state's authority to administer the death penalty to which Costa Rica was a signatory was the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966. Part III, *Article 6* of the Covenant strongly suggests that abolition of the death penalty is desirable and limits the circumstances under which countries may use the death penalty. In particular, signatories to the convention guarantee the right to seek amnesty, pardon, or commutation in death penalty cases, and they prohibit the death penalty for crimes committed by persons under eighteen years old. In addition, they prohibit carrying out the death penalty on pregnant women. Finally, the *Article* permits the death penalty in countries which have not abolished it "only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime."

Costa Rica further supported universal death penalty abolition as one of thirty-six signatories to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in 1989. The Protocol is a treaty to abolish the death penalty and only allows an exception for countries that signed while making a formal reservation for allowance of the death penalty "in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military nature committed during wartime."

Costa Rica has also participated in inter-American treaties to limit and abolish the death penalty. It is a signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights, which came into effect in 1978. Similar to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention allows for the death

penalty in countries that have not abolished it but only under strict legal conditions. In addition, it prohibits the use of the death penalty for political or minor offenses, and limits its use to people between the ages of 18 and 70. Like the Covenant, it forbids the use of the death penalty on pregnant women and guarantees the right to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of the death sentence. Along with eleven other regional states, Costa Rica is a signatory to the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, adopted in 1990. Building on the aforementioned Convention, the Protocol prohibits participating states from applying the death penalty in *any* peacetime circumstances.

While Costa Rica has abolished the death penalty without exception within its own territory and worked toward universal abolition, as with any other state, it is not able to secure the absolute right to life of its citizens sentenced to death abroad. Costa Rican native Terance Valentine is a case in point. Sentenced to death for first-degree murder in the state of Florida in 1994, Valentine appealed to the Costa Rican government to advocate for clemency on his behalf. The Costa Rican government made a formal clemency request to the United States in 2012, but at the time of this writing, Valentine remains on Florida's death row awaiting execution. Speaking about the case in an interview with Radio Reloj, Costa Rican Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Roverssi said, "Costa Rica cannot endorse or remain silent before a death penalty sentence on a Costa Rican citizen."[3]

Abolition of the Army

Two features make Costa Rica's abolition of its army unique. First, unlike any other state that has abolished its army, Costa Rica enacted the policy as a step toward settling intrastate violence. The decision to abolition the army was part of a settlement to end the Costa Rican civil war of 1948, the country's bloodiest conflict in the twentieth century. The other unique feature of Costa Rica's abolition of the army is that a ruling *junta* leader made the decision to abolish the army.

Apart from a *coup d'état* and two years of dictatorial rule from 1917-1919, Costa Rica had been the most stable democracy in Central America (Katz and Lackey, 2010). The abolition of the army in 1948, however, capped a period of growing political strife within the country. Intensified political rivalries led to

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[3] "Costa Rica asks U.S. for clemency for death row prisoner", *Ticotimes.net*, February 22, 2012.

disputed national elections in 1944, 1946, and 1948 at a time when the army, while relatively small, was taking on increased importance. Although Costa Rica was largely insulated from the effects of the Second World War, in the period from 1944-1948 it had the largest army in its history. Spurred on by the U.S.'s interest in protecting the Panama Canal, Costa Rica had begun receiving modern military equipment and training from the U.S. (Bird, 1984: 99).

Remarkably, the decision to abolish the army occurred in the aftermath of a civil war that resulted from an election dispute, and the country carried out the decision even in the face of the most serious national security crisis, an invasion. The political crisis began with charges that the legislative majority National Republicans committed election fraud in the February 1948 polls in order to prevent opposition leader Otilio Ulate, who had apparently won, from becoming president. In March, the Legislative Assembly annulled the election results, thus officially denying him the presidency. The following month, a *junta* led by José Figueres Ferrer assembled an Army of National Liberation and took control of the country. The *junta* over-ruled the Legislative Assembly's annulment of the election results, naming Ulate president, but Figueres continued to rule, claiming that national security warranted the continuation of martial law. This resulted in a brief civil war in which 2,000 Costa Ricans were killed, but the *junta* consolidated its rule and emerged victorious.[4]

Costa Rica's political crisis of 1948 was not atypical of the region. As Bird notes, there were seven military *coups* in Latin America in 1947 and 1948, and both of Costa Rica's neighbors, Panama and Nicaragua, were ruled by dictators at the time (Bird, 1984: 102). So it was rather improbable when, on 1 December 1948, *junta* leader Figueres declared the dissolution of the national army, and, in a formal ceremony, the Minister of Public Security turned over the keys of the main army barracks to the Minister of Education. The government then converted the barracks into a museum of art (Bird, 1984: 89). One week later, the country held a new election to form a government to replace the *junta*, but just two days after the election, on 10 December, forces led by Costa Rican ex President Calderón Guardia invaded the country from Nicaragua with the backing of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza.

Rather than re-assemble the army in the face of invasion, the government put its faith in the international community to guarantee its security. On the day following the invasion, Costa Rica invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Pact of Rio de Janeiro) thus prompting the Council of the Organization of American States to convene on 12 December. After visit-

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[4] Longley (1993) argues that U.S. assistance was decisive in the outcome of the civil war.

ing Costa Rica and Nicaragua to investigate the conflict, the OAS commission determined that the invasion had, indeed, been organized in Nicaragua and that Nicaragua had taken inadequate measures to prevent Calderón Guardia from crossing the border into Costa Rica. In resolution of the conflict, the two countries signed a Pact of Unity prepared under the auspices of the OAS (Bird, 1984: 110-115). Without resorting to military killing or relying on others to do so on its behalf, Costa Rica was able to guarantee its national security and resolve the conflict in less than four weeks.

Costa Rica formalized its abolition of the army in Article 12 of the 1949 constitution. Introduced into the Legislative Assembly of 4 July 1949, the Article reads,

> The Army as a permanent institution is abolished. There shall be the necessary police forces for surveillance and the preservation of the public order. Military forces may only be organized under a continental agreement or for the national defense; in either case, they shall always be subordinate to the civil power: they may not deliberate or make statements or representations individually or collectively.[5]

Despite the constitution's provision for the organization of military forces for the purpose of national defense, Costa Rica has avoided doing so, even in the face of national security threats. For example, when faced with revolts in 1950 and 1951, the civilian government of President Ulate refrained from reorganizing the army. In fact, despite the revolts, Ulate did away with the Cabinet-level Minister for Public Security and relied solely on the Civil Guard to maintain domestic security and public order during his presidency.

An even greater national security threat occurred in 1955. Figueres, who returned to power by winning the presidential election of 1953, was an avowed anti-militarists and, despite his brief leadership of the *Junta Fundadora* in 1948, an outspoken foe of dictatorship in Central America and the Caribbean. In January 1955, insurgents loyal to former President Guardia, who was still living in exile in Nicaragua, invaded Costa Rica from the northwest and bombed the capital of San José and other towns by air. In addition, the invasion force had the backing of the presidents of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, and Nicaragua (Bird, 1984: 127).

In response to the invasion, Costa Ricans began organizing themselves voluntarily to resist the invaders while Figueres appealed to the Organiza-

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[5] See <http://www.costaricalaw.com/legalnet/constitutional_law/engtit1.html>.

tion of American States for assistance. He even went so far as to request military assistance, though none was provided. As had happened in 1948, the OAS investigated the conflict, sending nonmilitary observation flights over the border area the invasion force had crossed. Once the OAS launched a ground-based observation system, the invasion force retreated into Nicaragua. As a formal outcome of the conflict, Nicaragua and Costa Rica signed an agreement mutually pledging to prevent insurgents from organizing in their territories and from crossing their shared border (Bird, 1984: 127). Again, the OAS was able to assist in eliminating the security threat without using military force or otherwise killing the insurgents, and Costa Rica maintained its abolition of the army.

Declaration of Neutrality

Despite the remarkable circumstances under which Costa Rica abolished its army and maintained its security during the invasions of 1948 and 1955, the country has faced several challenges to maintaining its abolition of the army. One of the greatest challenges was the civil war between the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and the U.S.-backed Contra rebels in the 1980s. The conflict intensified at a time when the Costa Rican economy was reeling from several economic shocks. For example, in 1982, the country experienced 82% inflation, 9.4% unemployment, and its GNP shrank by 11% (Gudmundson, 1994: 4). The economic conditions put pressure on the Costa Rican government to seek increased aid from the U.S. at the same time that the U.S. wanted Costa Rican support for the Contras. The Costa Rican government chose to walk a tightrope between accepting U.S. financial assistance and maintaining its conventional limits on war-making.[6]

The policies of President Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986) illustrate the difficult challenge the country faced. Although Monge permitted the CIA and Contras to operate in Costa Rican territory, he rejected a U.S. offer to send military engineers to Costa Rica to build roads near the Nicaragua border. Furthermore, in 1983, Monge sacked his own Foreign Minister, Fernando Volio Jiménez because of Volio's outspoken antagonism of the Sandinistas (Gudmunson, 1994:2).

In response to the Nicaraguan civil war and terrorist attacks within Costa Rica in the early 1980s, President Monge established the Organiza-

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[6] The U.S. provided $350 million in financial assistance to Costa Rica in 1983 (Gudmunson, 1994).

tion for National Emergencies (OPEN), an all-volunteer civilian organization formed to assist with national emergencies and natural disasters. According to Hopfensperger, critics of OPEN worried that right-wing groups might infiltrate it or that the state might transform it into a paramilitary organization or worse, a revived national military. President Monge, however, claimed that OPEN was necessary to enhance Costa Rica's defenses against terrorism and possible foreign threats. OPEN required volunteers to profess their belief in democracy, and they were trained using "obsolete arms" purchased from the U.S. in 1955 and stored in government warehouses except during training (Hopfensperger, 1983). The government claimed no ulterior motive in establishing OPEN. It is likely that it would have faced serious opposition from civil society if it had attempted to transform it into something more akin to a military organization since 83% of the public opposed the creation of an army at that time (Gudmundson, 1994: 19).

While some citizens warned that the formation of OPEN could be taken as a sign that Monge might enhance the state's capacity for organized violence, the president resisted being drawn more deeply into the U.S.-backed campaign against the Sandinista government. A clear indication of his independence was Costa Rica's vote in the United Nations against the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Even more significant, however, was Monge's Declaration of Perpetual, Active, and Unarmed Neutrality in 1983. The neutrality declaration, an instrument of international law, remains operative today.

Despite Costa Rica's declaration of neutrality, there was some domestic pressure for the government to act in aid of the Contras. This pressure was most obvious in the conservative media, especially Costa Rican television. According to Reding, "since April 1980, executives of the major TV stations and newspapers […] held joint meetings on editorial strategy concerning issues of importance to the Reagan administration, often with U.S. embassy officials attending" (1986: 62). In terms of media content, they advocated formation of an army and attacked Monge's declaration of neutrality (*Ibid.*).

After being elected president in 1986, Óscar Arias Sánchez openly urged the U.S. and other countries to cut off aid to the Contra rebels. He also ordered the elimination of Contra bases from Costa Rican territory, had Contra commanders in the country arrested, and exposed and shut down a secret airstrip being built by associates of Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North. Finally, while promoting a peace plan for the region, Arias publicly refused a private meeting with CIA Director William J. Casey (LeMoyne, 1987). Arias's most important contribution, however, was through his leadership in forging the Esquipulas Peace Agreement. It was for this work in

resolving civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala and bringing democracy, peace, and stability to Central America that he won the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize. He is also credited with prompting Panama to dissolve its army after the 1989 U.S invasion of the country (Brysk, 2009). Panama joined Costa Rica as the second country in the region to abolish its army in 1994.

With the resolution of the Nicaraguan civil war and newfound stability in the region, Costa Rican neutrality did not face any significant challenges until 2003 when the government agreed to participate in the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing in the war against Iraq. Accusing President Abel Pacheco and Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar of violating the constitution and Costa Rican neutrality, Luis Roberto Zamora Bolanos, a third-year law student at the Universidad de Costa Rica, filed suit against them (Katz and Lackey, 2010). The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court heard the case the following year and delivered a unanimous three-point verdict (Ruling 9992-040) against the state.

First, the Court annulled Costa Rica's support for the war coalition stating that such support violated the commitment to perpetual neutrality. Second, the Court ruled that the country's support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq violated the United Nations Charter since the United Nations Security Council had not authorized the war. Third, the Court found that support for the war coalition contradicted "a fundamental principle of 'the Costa Rican identity', which is peace as a fundamental value" (Zamora, 2010).

Because of the Court's ruling against the state's support for the war coalition, the Foreign Ministry contacted the U.S. State Department to request that it remove Costa Rica from the list of countries supporting the war against Iraq. The ruling also prompted opposition to Foreign Minister Tovar from within Costa Rican political society. According to an article in the *Diario Extra* at the time, several members representing all of the parties in the Constituent Assembly called on President Pacheco immediately to dismiss Tovar for "negligence, incompetence, and ineptitude" and for an "action of national shame", namely supporting the war coalition (Valverde, 2004).

Five years after winning his suit against the Costa Rican government's participation in the Coalition of the Willing, Zamora filed suit against the government again in 2008. In what came to be known as the "Arms Decree" case, Zamora challenged the constitutionality of President Arias' 2006 Executive Order 33240-S which regulated the import and manufacture of weapons and set the groundwork for "extraction of uranium and thorium, elaboration of nuclear fuel, and manufacture of nuclear reactors for any purpose" (Katz and Lackey, 2010).

In a unanimous ruling, the Court concurred with Zamora and annulled

three parts of the decree (Ruling 14193-08). In particular, the Court ruled that the industrial activity permitted by the Arms Decree violated the right of Costa Ricans to a healthy environment and posed unacceptable risks to human health. In addition, the Court found that the decree was in violation of international law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Finally, the Court ruled that the decree violated the value of peace and the U.N. Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace (Katz and Lackey, 2010). According to the Court's verdict,

> …[A] state that seeks to promote peace both domestically and internationally must take special care on authorizing the manufacture and/or import of weapons and chemical substances in its territory by rejecting categorically those that, because of their nature, were conceived and designed to encourage the negative value of war (Mata, 2008).

> A state that takes Peace as a constitutional fundamental value cannot conform itself with the limited notion that Peace is just the absence of war, it must go beyond that, preventing and rejecting continuously all decisions and acts which might derive and end in such a circumstance (Katz and Lackey, 2010).

According to Zamora, the Court's recognition of the right to peace and rejection of the "anti-value" of war creates both positive and negative obligations on the state:

> Positively, the State must promote international peace; negatively, the State must refrain from authorizing war-related activities, including entry, production, purchase, sale, storage, import, export, etc. of items, goods or services made or intended to be used in war (Zamora, 2010).

Nonmilitary Defense and Policing

Despite abolition of the army in 1948, Costa Rica maintained Public Forces (*Fuerza Pública*) including a lightly armed Civil Guard which the government disbanded in 1996. In the post-Civil War period, the technological and organizational capacity of the Civil Guard to use lethal force was relatively limited, and until the mid-1970s it stood at 1,200 members. Despite its already limited size, President Mario Echandi Jiménez (1958-1962) took several important steps to limit the Civil Guard's military potential. Despite being a rival to Figueres, who had charged him with treason during the invasion of 1955, Echandi reaffirmed Costa Rica's commitment to unarmed security during his presidency.

According to Bird, Echandi made it clear during his presidency that the Civil Guard would only be used to preserve public order and to aid in law enforcement. He also instituted an "arms for tractors" plan through which

Costa Rica traded approximately 2,000 of the Civil Guard's small arms for a half dozen tractors. Not mere symbolism, he also confiscated all of the Civil Guard's heavy equipment. In addition, he converted Civil Guard barracks throughout the country into police stations in order to prevent the militia from exerting too strong an influence in Costa Rican society and politics. Taking the initiative in regional leadership, Echandi also proposed to the Organization of American States that all Latin American states restrict arms imports and abstain from acquiring atomic weapons. Finally, Echandi helped to end the period of political conflict that pre-dated the civil war by allowing Guardia to return to Costa Rica without facing charges of treason (1984: 129-130).

The size of the Public Forces increased at the end of the 1970s due to political strife in neighboring Nicaragua, which often spilled across the border into Costa Rica. Following the bombing of Costa Rican territory and the injury of its citizens by Somoza's National Guards in September 1978, Costa Rica again reported Nicaragua to the OAS. The Ministry of Public Security also accepted warplanes and helicopters from Venezuela and Panama, a move that citizens severely criticized since the Ministry decided to do so without first allowing the Legislative Assembly to debate the matter (Bird, 1984: 142). In 1979, after nearly a year of turmoil, the size of the Civil Guard stood at 3,500, still a modest force considering the potential for further hostilities (Bird, 1984: 148). As mentioned above, in response to increased tensions with Nicaragua and pressure from the U.S. to cooperate in aiding the Contras, Costa Rica declared neutrality in 1983 rather than reconstitute its army.

Costa Rica's declaration of neutrality, however, did not eliminate debates about the role and function of the Civil Guard and police. While Monge announced a program to "professionalize" the police in 1985, the fact that U.S. soldiers were training 350 Civil Guardsmen drew further criticism from civil society. Monge claimed that the Guardsmen were being trained to fight terrorists as a "lightening battalion" and sent 400 more to be trained later that year. The debate over possible militarization of the police became even more heated when Monge permitted a U.S. C-130 transport plane to arrive with 18 special forces instructors. The election of President Arias in 1986, however, put to rest fears of police militarization and the erosion of neutrality since he ran on a platform of strict adherence to the neutrality policy (Lauderdale, 1986: 239).

Following the peace accords of the late 1980s, the risk of the Civil Guard becoming a military force subsided as did debates about possible militarization of the police. During the 1990s the country became more concerned about drug trafficking than invasion. This led the Costa Rican government and the U.S. to agree to a Counter-narcotics Cooperation

Agreement in 1999 (Costa Rica Law Number 7929) that pertained only to cooperation between the Coast Guard of Costa Rica and the U.S. Cost Guard, which was then a part of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

In 2001, the country had 15,239 police officials or 381 per 100,000 inhabitants (Rico, 2003). According to Eijkman, the country implements strict accountability for its police officers, and illegal use of force can lead to an officer's dismissal (2006: 419). Despite the maintenance of police who are armed and authorized to kill, members of civil society are still weary of any perceived increase in their powers. One example is a 2010 legal suit filed by Roberto Zamora, mentioned above, accusing the government of violating the country's long-standing prohibition of the army. The activist lawyer called on the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court to nullify a presidential decree that allowed police to use military-grade weapons at the discretion of the Chief of Police. Issued by President Arias in 2008, Executive Decree 34580-MSP permitted the police to use weapons typically employed by armed forces such as Uzis, M-16s, and AK-47s. Ruling against the state, however, the Court unanimously agreed with Zamora's complaint that Costa Rica's Arms Law prohibited the use of such weapons except during states of emergency or a state of siege or invasion (Zamora, n.d.).

At the same time that Zamora was challenging the militarization of the police, members of Costa Rican political and civil society protested the patrolling of Costa Rican waters and visits by U.S. military ships. As Marujo notes, "Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the [U.S.] Coast Guard was placed under the Department of Defense, making it part of the military and thus making its presence a violation of the Costa Rican Constitution" (Marujo, 2011: 14-15). The re-classification of the U.S. Cost Guard under the Department of Defense created an inconsistency with the 1999 Counter-narcotics Cooperation Agreement as well. In particular, Article 12 of the Costa Rican Constitution stipulates that the state may form military forces but that they must always remain under the control of the Costa Rican civilian government. To permit units of the U.S. Department of Defense to operate in Costa Rica, therefore, was held to be in violation of Article 12. Despite some public opposition to the continuation of the joint patrols, the government continued to uphold the agreement.

The situation became more complex and drew renewed opposition in July 2010 when Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly voted 31-26 in favor of permitting 46 U.S. warships, between 7,000 and 13,000 soldiers, 200 helicopters, and two aircraft carriers into Costa Rican waters and ports. The introduction of the U.S. military forces was purportedly meant to aid in drug traffic interdic-

tion. Political parties including the *Partido Acción Ciudandana* (PAC), *Unidad Social Cristiana*, and *Frente Amplio* led the opposition to the legislature's move (Sanchez, 2011). Within a month of the legislature's vote, political and civil society groups initiated several lawsuits to overturn the legislature's decision. When the Supreme Court agreed to hear their cases, the U.S. had to postpone the arrival of its military forces. In the end, however, the Court rejected the suits. When it was necessary for the legislature to vote on the sixth-month renewal of the legislation, however, the U.S. only requested permission for the U.S. Coast Guard and not the U.S. Navy to make visits (Marujo, 2011).

Costa Rica's regional neighbors also looked warily on the U.S. military forces' presence in 2010, seeing them as a potential base from which to launch regional strikes (Way, 2010). Despite Costa Rica's long history of unarmed democracy and its declared neutrality, its neighbors' worries stemmed from an intensified pattern of U.S. military activity in the region after several years of being preoccupied with its wars in the Middle East. These activities included the establishment of military bases in Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao and military exercises off the coast of Venezuela (Operation Partnership of the Americas) in 2006, the reactivation of the Fourth Fleet to patrol the Caribbean in 2008, and the establishment of seven military bases in Colombia, the tacit approval of the coup against President Zelaya in Honduras, and the establishment of two naval bases in Panama in 2009 (Vorpahl, 2010). Many members of Costa Rican civil society are still vigilant against the U.S. exerting a military influence on the police.[7]

Conclusion

Without having nonkilling security as its goal, Costa Rica has made remarkable advances toward achieving that end. Its potential to realize nonkilling security, both domestic and international, may be as high as or higher than any other state at present. Its accomplishments in this regard go back to its abolition of the death penalty in 1877. The Costa Rican state has not killed anyone in pursuit of justice for more than 135 years, even after two *coup d'états*, two invasions, and charges of treason. Its abolition of the army in 1948 further reduced the state's technological and organizational means to kill. Again, despite invasions, violent border incursions, and bombings,

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[7] According to Marujo, Costa Rica has sent more than 2,500 police to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the infamous U.S. Army school formerly known as the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia (2011: 14-15).

the Costa Rican government has been able to guarantee the security of the state without reconstituting the army or resorting to war. It has achieved this primarily through the collective defense measures provided through its membership in the Organization of American States. It is important to note, moreover, that the OAS has been able to aid Costa Rica without deadly force each time it has been called on for assistance. Costa Rica's policy of perpetual neutrality has also helped to guarantee the country's security through nonkilling if for no other reason than by preventing the state from calling on its citizens to kill for their nation in war.

Perhaps the biggest and most immediate challenge to Costa Rica in guaranteeing security through nonkilling is to reform the Public Forces. The police organization is professional and publicly accountable by international standards, but its members still retain the authority to kill if deemed necessary while executing their law enforcement duties. In order for Costa Rica to remedy this situation, the Public Force would need to use *only* less-than-lethal weapons and receive special training in nonkilling tactics. Given the political culture of the country, this seems achievable if members of political and civil society mobilize toward nonkilling as a requirement of public policing. In addition, the country's history suggests that breakthrough nonkilling policies (abolition of the death penalty, abolition of the army, declaration of neutrality) are anything but unusual in Costa Rica.

Much of Costa Rica's ability to provide security with a strong, though not yet absolute, measure of nonkilling has to do with the exceptional leadership it has had. Several of its presidents mentioned in this analysis showed bold judgement even under highly threatening circumstances. During dictatorships, invasions, cross-border conflicts, and pressure from foreign governments to involve Costa Rica in others' disputes, its leaders have most often chosen to increase state security by decreasing the likelihood and capacity of killing. At crucial moments when presidents have acted contrary to that dictum, activist citizens and the courts have often stepped in to limit the likelihood and capacity of killing.

While this study focused primarily on the long-standing institutional arrangements Costa Rica has implemented to increase its security through nonkilling, there are more recent developments that scholars might study in order to determine their effects on the advancement of nonkilling. One is the right to peace identified by the Supreme Court. Because, as the Costa Rican Supreme Court and U.N. confirm, there is a right to peace, the state has a duty not just to work toward peace but also to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of that right through belligerent or deadly action. Along with the right to life, the right to peace plausibly necessitates the abolition of war and the develop-

ment of nonkilling policing. Another development worth studying and mentioned by Bhaneja elsewhere in this volume is Costa Rica's establishment of a Ministry of Justice and Peace in 2009. This institution could be the key to making the transition to nonkilling policing. The Ministry can help to achieve this goal by working toward general violence reduction policies throughout society but also by helping the Public Forces to adopt new, nonkilling tactics.

Despite the promising potential for nonkilling highlighted in this study, there are also serious challenges that could undermine Costa Rica's nonkilling security potential. One is the desire of some state-level actors to change Article 12 of the Costa Rican Constitution. According to Marujo, the government recently publicized its intention to amend the Constitution so that it has the authority to call up the army "not just if and when the country is threatened with attack, but under broad conditions to be determined by the Supreme Court," and Foreign Minister Rene Castro has proposed spending 2 to 4 percent of the country's domestic product on a national defense force (Marujo, 2011: 15). If these proposals to loosen the limitations on militarism and nonkilling have been prompted by long-standing border disputes with Nicaragua, then there is hope that cooler heads will prevail since the two countries have already taken three border dispute cases to the International Court of Justice in recent years. Such a course of action shows the confidence the Costa Rican state places in international society to help it achieve its security without killing.

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Chapter Seven

The Role of UCAV, PGM, Nonlethal Weaponry and Cyber Policing

Transitioning from an Armed to an Unarmed Peace under UN Supervision [*]

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A hairbreadth difference and heaven and earth are set apart. (Chinese proverb)

The UN Charter provides for setting up a System of Collective Security; it also envisages a transition from the present state of an armed to an unarmed peace, during which the five Permanent Members will assume the responsibility to see the transition through (Schlichtmann, 2011). In the projected end-stage all nations would have disarmed to the minimum stipulated in Article 26 of the UN Charter, while permitting "each government to maintain adequate land forces to police its territory and defend its frontiers" (Wright, 1942: 279). Members one by one, according to the rule of reciprocity, will have agreed to confer "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" on the Security Council and signed a World Disarmament Pact, in fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT and the numerous resolutions passed in the General Assembly, calling for "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The Charter would have to be thoroughly reviewed in the process. Closely related to the issue of the transition, such a Review Conference was envisaged in the UN Charter and scheduled to have taken place during the first ten years of the UN's existence, intended to kick off or facilitate the process. During the transition, accompanied by active NGO and civil society support and input, the United Nations should develop into a world authority endowed with limited but adequate law-making, judicial and executive powers to maintain and defend peace as well as ensure the development and ecological equilibrium and advancement of the planet and its

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[*] Reworked version of a paper presented at the 2012 IPRA Conference, Japan. UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles; PGM: Precision-Guided Munitions.

people as a whole. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with its state of the art new weapons systems (Müller and Schörnig, 2010) such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), Precision Guided Missiles (PGM), nonlethal weaponry, and cyber policing may provide the necessary powerful instruments to effectively back the transition process and secure safe passage while avoiding civilian casualties and bloodletting.

In my presentation I have relied heavily on Robert Mandel's book *Security, Strategy, and the Quest for Bloodless War* (and his sources) as well as Glenn Paige's (2009) *Nonkilling Global Political Science*. Mandel's book in many respects relates to Glenn Paige's nonkilling paradigm. The "quest for bloodless war," Robert Mandel writes, "has raised absolutely central security and strategy issues, particularly in light of the changing post-Cold War international context." (Mandel, 2004: x) I will put these issues and concerns in the context of the UN Charter provisions for securing safe passage during the transition from an armed to an unarmed peace which the Charter envisages.

Motivations and Means

> The unanswered questions surrounding the quest for bloodless war connect directly to profound questions about both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the use of force in the current disorderly global system (Mandel, 2004: x).

The three most important and frequently applied means of enforcement that can minimize the shedding of blood are precision-guided munitions (PGM), nonlethal weaponry, and cyber engagement (policing). Cyber engagement, combined with peace and development education, could become the linchpin of peacekeeping in the 21st century. Enforcement action that avoids "human harm … without a drop of blood spilled" is the future, and to some "the ultimate political … fantasy." Today's technological advances promise enforcement powers that would "make that age-old dream a reality," and "substantial resources to promote strategies to accelerate its pursuit" are assigned to it. (Mandel, 2004: 1) The "idea of actually being able to impose one's will" and enforce common world law "around the globe without significant human costs" is intriguing and is gaining ground.

> In evaluating modern war, human rights groups, the press, and the public often look to the number of dead and wounded civilians as a meaningful metric. Civilian casualty figures sometimes are used to assess the morality, effectiveness, or legitimacy of military intervention (Project on the means of Intervention, 2002: 2).

Casualty minimization could be a "yardstick for success" (Mandel) in law enforcement action. The "pace of innovation in military technology" (Mandel, 2004: 19) is gaining speed: "The unprecedented carnage of 19th-centtury warfare led … nations to try to mitigate the most unnecessary forms of battlefield suffering" because "innovations in weaponry and the advent of 'total war', which exacted unconditional surrender from the defeated party, had made combat deadlier than ever before" (Greenberg, 2001). According to a report by the humanitarian organization Save the Children "the percentage of civilians killed and wounded as a result of hostilities has risen from five percent of all casualties at the turn of the last century to 65 percent during World War II to 90 percent in more recent conflicts" (Correll, 2003: 51-52). The fact can hardly be overstated that "the barbarism of any period pales before the barbarism of today" (Fuller, 1998 [1945]: ix). Indeed, "there has been continuous, rapid growth in the reach, lethality, speed, and information-gathering potential of armies" (Biddle, 2002: 107) since the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 first attempted to abolish war. Nonetheless, and for that very reason, at the same time the aim was to enable belligerents to fight wars avoiding excessive loss of blood. Naturally,

> [a]ll nations with any degree of responsiveness to their citizens are casualty averse, but wealthy democratic countries have acquired a particularly low political tolerance in this area; their political elites can be said to be risk averse in regard to war casualties (Eikenberry, 1996: 13).

The "bloody record of interstate violence" shows that "84 percent of all military and civilian deaths caused by war since 1700" happened in the twentieth century, during which period also "the quest for bloodless war accelerated dramatically" (Mandel, 2004: 27). As Paige has pointed out,

> at some point in history humans must simply refuse to kill and to cooperate with systems that kill. Otherwise cycles of lethality between vengeful vanquished and traumatized victors will continue ... in retrospect twentieth century atrocities show that late nineteenth century peace advocates who sought to abolish war were completely correct. There is a clear connection among atrocities from World War I to World War II to the Cold War and beyond (Paige, 2009: 95).

The two World Wars "induced foreign security policymakers all over the world to think seriously about the casualty issue," (Mandel, 2004: 28) and—omitted by Mandel—the abolition and outlawry of war. The movement in the

interwar period to make going to war an international crime (Wehberg, 1931) resulted in both the prohibition of the threat and use of force in the UN Charter as well as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which states:

> (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

A number of constitutions pursue similar aims.[1]

Obviously, the prime motivation for introducing nonkilling technologies is noble since it is based on humanitarian concerns, "attempting to reduce death and severe injury among noncombatants, who have inadvertently become more common victims of warfare due to the increased destructive power of many modem lethal weapons technologies" (Mandel, 2004: 103). Making enforcement action in effect less fatal and painful, "[i]ts hallmarks are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. It is heavily reliant on precision firepower, special forces, and psychological operations" (Boot, 2003: 42).

> Several definitional problems are readily apparent. Is a small explosive charge designed for contained demolition of structures and detonated far from known human populations a nonlethal weapon? Is it proper to classify a foam barrier as a weapon at all? How can one discuss the level of damage beneath which a weapon would properly be classified as nonlethal? The context may be critical in determining nonlethality. (Mandel, 2004: 101) Biological or chemical agents that destroy crops without directly affecting people would still be considered lethal if starvation is the likely result; a microwave weapon that disables a truck that subsequently drives off a cliff, killing the driver, would be nonlethal [while] the same weapon used against a helicopter in flight would have to be considered lethal (Cook, Fiely and McGowan, 1997).

Perhaps not surprisingly, throughout the book, Mandel's arguments are based on the assumption that war is still an option, in spite of the fact that the UN Charter explicitly prohibits the threat and use of force. I will therefore use the term 'enforcement action' or 'policing' where Mandel uses 'war', and 'lawbreaker' or 'assailant' instead or 'enemy'. Nevertheless, the importance

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[1] See list online at <http://www.unfor.info/liste24list_en.html>.

of the quest for bloodless war to overall international security should not be underestimated, and Mandel's book points in the right direction.

Regrettably, in view of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations Security System, the USA has traditionally assumed responsibility for enforcing international peace and security in parts of the world, however, apparently with little success (for example if we think of the Vietnam and Iraq wars) and only if it suited its national interest, which is in many respects detrimental to the cause of peace and security.

Instead, Members are under obligation to replace the current set-up still based on the crumbling Westphalian nation-state system, by embarking upon the transition envisaged in the UN Charter, which calls for setting up a workable system of collective security and abolishing war. The necessity to accomplish this had become evident already more than a hundred years ago at the Peace Conferences in The Hague, to which the Russian Czar and the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina had invited. (Schlichtmann, 2003) Historically no doubt the Europeans are largely responsible for this situation still continuing; it is they above all who are legally bound and under obligation to take steps to empower the UN. Empowering the UN would provide a nonkilling perspective that could be "absorbed or integrated" in its "old structures." However, while this would probably be more easily accomplished than other options, some people may prefer a "restructuring [of] the old … [and/or] establishment of parallel transitional institutions, or … creation of completely new or hybrid institutions combining every source of strength for full-force pursuit of nonkilling transformation." (Paige, 2009: 114).

According to analysts casualty aversion can be achieved in a number of ways, i.e. "some focus on the type of target or initiator, others on the form of weapon, and still others on the nature of the military confrontation." Robert Mandel lists "four major clusters of approaches" for minimizing casualties: "banning destructive military action, limiting warfare participants, minimizing civilian exposure to harm, and preventing attack initiation." These are considered among "the most idealistic set of approaches to casualty aversion … [s]ome quite feasible and widely used … others … relatively infeasible and quite rare" (Mandel, 2004: 45-46).

With regard to banning destructive military action Mandel names "[t]wo distinct possibilities," i.e. "inducing disarmament to reduce the devastation resulting from conflict," and a rather old-fashioned "possibility" that has, however, proved ineffective in most instances in the past (Brandt, 1988), i.e. "making the rules of war more stringent and enhancing their enforcement to lessen the carnage that occurs during warfare" (Mandel, 2004: 46). What should ac-

tually be made "more stringent" are not the rules of war but the rule of law. However, the author quite correctly observes that "key obstacles immediately rise to the surface. The first approach violates what appears to be an inexorable pattern across human history of accelerated weapons development and bloody warfare, and the second approach cannot function in an anarchic international system devoid of shared global norms and values on how war should be conducted" (Mandel 2004: 47). In other words,

> the most idealistic approaches—initiating disarmament and expanding and enforcing the rules of war [rule of law]—would be incredibly well suited to minimize loss of life where it not for their complete infeasibility in today's anarchic international system (Mandel, 2004: 64-65).

R. Mandel falls short of the ways and means envisaged in the UN Charter, however, when he states: "Although possible ways certainly exist to move in these directions, such as increased sanctions against genocide or increased efforts to dismantle weapons of mass destruction, generally the feasibility of using this cluster [i.e. Banning Destructive Military Action] of strategies to minimize loss of life is extremely low" (Mandel, 2004: 47).

Yet crisis is chance. One way to escape the predicament of the present anarchic international system is a to establish a universal "Shanti Sena" (Soldiers of Peace) or "Peace Corps," a Gandhian concept (Paige, 2009: 116; Bhave, 1963; Weber, 1996; Ramachandran, 1984; Radhakrishnan, 1992). Ideally, the transition to nonkilling societies would involve "creation of a nonkilling student community service corps as an alternative to military training" (Paige, 2009: 116). Governments themselves should be called upon to set up a Peace and Disarmament Ministry and organize nonviolent, nonkilling Soldiers of Peace as "a disciplined, distinctively identifiable force whose members are trained for nonkilling conflict resolution and reconciliation, community security and civilian defense, paramedical lifesaving, disaster relief, and constructive service in response to community needs" (Paige, 2009: 116). In this way the existing military institutions could be transformed and become constructive peace-building and enforcing agencies starting with the Blue Helmets and the Japanese Jieitai (Self-Defense Forces—SDF) which are prohibited to use weapons on PKO missions. In fact they are already, apart from their designation of defending the country's territory, geared toward becoming a nonkilling international peace force. The fundamental difference between police and military action is that policemen have to account for the dead/casualties while the military does not, (Koppe, 2002) and one gets a medal for killing as many 'enemies' as possible.

Precision-Guided Munitions, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Robots

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) "have been around for the last 40 years," and have been vital for enforcement action in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but it is only quite recently that they have been "aggressively pursued and developed as vital tools" for use in enforcement action ("military operations"). (Rocha, 1997) However, the remotely controlled UAVs used so far have certain limitations, which is why the development of autonomously-piloted vehicles has been much sought after. But "the technology required is still out of reach," although it has been "advocated for years"— the problem being that the technology "require[s] a computer that could 'think' and that would be asked to make life-and-death decisions on the battlefield," (Record, 2000: 21-22) a virtual impossibility.

Largely mechanized or robotic armed forces have become a common feature in science fiction movies depicting future wars. "Once science fiction, today the robots and the attack laser are fact" (Pugliese, 1998). In the future "robotic weapons will be used increasingly," and such conflicts "as can take place without soldiers" (Luttwak, 1994: 27) are likely to play a prominent role. Predominant are "robotic soldiers and unmanned vehicles," which in enforcement action could avoid putting UN Blue Helmets in harms way.

Apart from unmanned aerial vehicles, precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have been given much attention and publicity. "Buttressed by the unprecedented accuracy evidenced in the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, many onlookers are proclaiming that the basic nature of violent conflict itself has changed. Combining the humanitarian potential to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties with the efficiency potential to minimize the number of bombs dropped necessary to hit vital targets, on the surface there appears to be no downside to this development." (Mandel, 2004: 67) The potential change regarding the basic nature of violent conflict seems promising and it is this decision makers need to focus on. Employing PGMs continues to be the preferred option, as it can demonstrate policy makers' "political sensitivity and sophistication" likely to be "appreciated around the world," (Gresham, 1999); and appeasing "public distaste for harming innocents" (Mandel, 2004: 75).

However, "the long-term political and psychological premises behind the development of precision-guided munitions" are complex (Mandel, 2004: 74). In any case, policy makers want to avoid the problems posed by the still remaining "collateral damage and casualties generated by unguided weapons" (Gresham, 1999).

> In recent decades, technologies have been used both to minimize U.S. casualties and to counter accusations that the United States does not care about adversary civilian suffering. One answer to North Vietnam's attempt to exploit collateral damage was the U.S. introduction of more-advanced precision-guided munitions against targets likely to draw harmful propaganda, such as air defense sites in populated areas. When striking terrorist camps in Afghanistan in 1998, the United States used cruise missiles, in part because they posed no threat to U.S. personnel, even though a manned-flight bombing mission could have inflicted greater damage on the terrorist training camps that the United States sought to destroy (Byman and Waxman, 2001: 231-232).

The dilemma is that the US is not the world's policeman and does not represent a global constituency like the UN does. What is needed is to implement the pertinent UN Charter stipulations, including those that provide for policing by air. Political scientist Ralph Goldman stresses the need for the world's "military institutions [to be] converted from competing armies into instruments of internal order and safety ... centralized under civilian control" (Goldman 1982: 122). These as yet unrealized stipulations were developed in the interwar period and supported by people like the British parliamentarian David Davies and H.G. Wells, among others. Besides giving the navy a role in policing the seas, the UN Charter envisages an international air force "as the 'policeman' of the world" (Davies, 1930: 441; Davies, 1945: 82 ff.; Wells, 1908; Schlichtmann, 2007). "The hard fact remains," Davies resumes, that "until the international police are ushered on to the stage, mankind will again be compelled to pass through the valley of bitter experience before it finally resolves to organize its forces" (Davies, 1930: 430). It is high time to take legislative action to achieve the purposes of the United Nations Organization.

Nonlethal Weapons

The perception among the public regarding nonlethal weaponry used in enforcing peace so far has been minimal, yet it is "increasingly becoming available for widespread application" (Mandel, 2004: 99) in defense and to further national and by implication international security. While traditional security policy measures comprise diplomacy, economic sanctions and finally, if and when international peace and security are threatened, enforcement action sanctioned by the UN Security Council, nonlethal weaponry presents something of an alternative "middle option" (Garwin and Winfield, 1999: vii).

"Research on nonlethal weapons for police and military use has been undertaken in the United States at least since 1965, and accelerated in the 1990s" (Paige, 2009: 100). The U.S. Defense Department describes nonlethal

weaponry as "weapons that are explicitly designed to and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel and materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment … unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets principally through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, nonlethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning" (Mandel, 2004: 101-102). Evidently, nonlethal weaponry provides an option of choice during enforcement action, thus increasing the "number of options available to commanders confronting situations in which the use of deadly force poses problems" (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1998: 2-3), or is vetoed—in the event of the transition in progress.

Nonkilling political scientist Glenn D. Paige counts among nonlethal weapons of law enforcement a "wide range of technologies … including laser, optical, acoustical, electromagnetic pulse, chemical, biological, and dozens of other weapons." And "the range of specific nonlethal security instruments is broad and constantly evolving … including such coercive techniques as blunt projectiles, tear gas, traction modifiers, nets or rapid-hardening rigid foam, radio frequency or microwave technologies, noxious smells, and acoustical interference." R. Mandel also gives a 'more colloquial' enumeration, i.e. "slickums, stickums, super acids, goop guns, blinding non-nuclear electromagnetic pulses, high power microwaves, laser weapons, infrasound, computer viruses, and metal-eating microbes" (Mandel, 2004: 101-102). Several of these instruments are already "regarded as a complement to conventional lethal capabilities," and the "fact that nonkilling alternatives are being taken seriously by traditional experts in violent security should encourage no less serious and even more advanced comprehensive efforts by political science" (Paige, 2009: 100). The United Nations' aim of a transition to collective security and a 'minimum' disarmed state corresponds to and provides the legal groundwork for realizing the objective posited by Glenn Paige of a "*transition to completely nonkilling security conditions*" (Paige, ibid.). The establishment of a working system of collective security in particular which has been called for many times in the past, deserves renewed attention.

> When the League of Nations and the United Nations were created, the political leaders of the world were in effect acknowledging that unilateral 'national security' could no longer provide the full measure of safety that it had in previous times. Weapons had become too destructive, alliance systems too unreliable. 'Collective security' became a significant concept following World War I. It was written into the United Nations Charter with a degree of explicitness never before achieved in an international agree-

ment. However, a working system of international collective security has yet to become operative. 'Peacekeeping', with its special contemporary meanings, has become a replacement concept describing what the United Nations undertakes in the security field. For the most part, though, unilateral approaches to national security remain as the predominant technique for achieving national safety. The political leader who speaks of 'national security' usually refers to the assumption that his nation has the primary responsibility for its self-defense (Goldman 1982: 124).

Interestingly, although the author (Mandel) admits that his book's "focus is on wartime casualty aversion," he highlights a fifth purpose of nonlethal weapons, i.e. to "improve the effectiveness" of peacekeeping operations: "Many advocates of non-lethal weapons point to the growth of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations where new military force structures are evidently needed but where, at present, effective alternative non-lethal weapons systems are not available" (Lewer and Schofield, 1997: 128). Again, Mandel finds "nonlethal weaponry … very much in tune with the aims of peacekeeping, where the consent of those involved is critical" (Mandel, 2004: 105-106). In the event of the Charter transition having been embarked upon, a consensus among the "P5" is required for enforcement action.

Figure 1. Classificantion of Nonlethal Weaponry

Defensive disabling access denial functions	***Conterpersonnel nonlethal measures***
Traction	**Blunt or soft projectiles**
Goop ejectors	**Stinger grenades**
Trapping nets	**Stun guns**
Rapid-hardening rigid foam	**Tear gas**
	Pepper spray
Offensive enabling combat support functions	**Noxious smells**
Blunt or soft projectiles	**Blinding laser weapons**
Stinger grenades	**Acoustical interference**
Super acids	
Metal-eating microbes	***Countermatériel nonlethal measures***
	Traction modifiers
Both	**Electromagnetic pulses**
Tear gas	**Super acids**
Pepper spray	**Metal-eating microbes**
Blinding laser weapons	
Stun guns	***Both***
Noxious smells	**Goop guns**
Acoustical interference	**Trapping nets**
Microwave technologies	**Rapid-hardening rigid foam**
Electromagnetic pulses	**Microwave technologies**

Source: Mandel (2004: 102).

Intrinsically this novel tool brings up "many fascinating and important questions about the effective ways of fighting and managing conflict in today's world," e.g. to what extent nonlethal weapons are able "to advance the cause of casualty aversion on a global level." Obviously, "since nonlethal weaponry has been used more in nonwar situations within states, employing it in violent international conflicts is still something of a novelty." A new thinking is required. "Fundamental underlying issues … about the nature of weaponry, the military, and even warfare itself" (Mandel, 2004: 105-106) have to be addressed and brought to a new level and understanding.

Cyber Policing, Information Policies and Peace and Development Education

As Robert Mandel has pointed out, "[c]ompared to the other principal instruments of the quest for bloodless war," cyber warfare—or better: cyber policing—is "distinctive in a couple of ways." The first reason he gives is that the instruments have been "subject to the most rapid change and most speedy global diffusion." Furthermore, "the way in which this approach contributes to casualty aversion is considerably subtler than the methods of the other instruments" (Mandel, 2004: 127). It is likely that added content about peace and development would broaden the scope and enhance the effectiveness of this instrument.

One of the aims of information 'warfare' is to prevent attack initiation. Preventing attack initiation provides two options:

> (1) incapacitating or modifying enemy information systems through the use of disruptive techniques and psychological operations that interfere with or alter a target's command-and-control capabilities over its own armed forces (in place of taking enemy troops out directly); and (2) strengthening military deterrence by increasing one's military capabilities and resolve (and possibly shows-of-force) to such a degree that one's superior capacity [Comment: of UN forces in the event of general and complete disarmament actually being carried out] and will to inflict damage is absolutely unambiguous and credible to all potential adversaries. (Mandel, 2004: 50)

Preventing aggression and armed attack in violation of international law and disarmament agreements (World Disarmament Pact) is also a matter of education, and greatly depends on support by an informed and participating public.

Robert Mandel's assertion that it is "conceptually possible that some new means may develop in the future to allow a state to communicate superiority of overall power and the futility of resistance in some limited circumstances even to highly passionate or irrational targets" is questionable,

since foreseeably only a strengthened and empowered world body could ever succeed to accomplish this.

The author rightly asserts that it would be preferable if "the international spread of moral education could make deterrence more effective without substantial loss of life." The attainable aim is "to induce others to change behavior" (Mandel, 2004: 52). This of course could be provided by an effective global system ensuring distributive justice and equal prospects for all. There can be no doubt, however, that a paradigm shift is required and in the making, seeing that the Westphalian nation-state system is no longer adequate to deal with globalization and complex global emergencies,[2] and since it is not possible to "[s]trengthen … military deterrence" while at the same time "engaging in unilateral disarmament" (Mandel, 2004: 53) New rules of war which "are mere attempts to update an already obsolete international regime" are not the solution since they "neither appreciate, nor respond to, the enormity of the challenge before us: to create new and viable laws of conflict that represent a modern, sentient, and moral response to the human condition known as war" (Allenby and Mattick, 2012). Glenn Paige emphasizes the required paradigm shift: "Methodologically a nonkilling shift challenges new thinking in methods for research, education, applied politics, and institution-building." (Paige, 2009: 83)

Effects—Purposes—Accomplishments

> *A contemporary slogan holds that there will be 'no peace without justice'—implying that violence and war will continue or be necessary to protest or change unjust conditions. But from a nonkilling perspective there will be 'no justice without nonkilling'. For killing and threats to kill have contributed to the creation and maintenance of injustice* (Paige, 2009: 133).

PGMs, nonlethal weaponry, and cyber systems can be "mutually supportive" and are frequently "tightly interconnected." As Mandel has pointed out: "A few examples of the extensive cross-linkages help to illustrate this claim: nonlethal weaponry could serve as part of information warfare to disrupt an electronic command-and-control system; precision-guided munitions could help direct nonlethal technologies to their designated targets." Cyber-informing

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[2] See "Perception of the Global Emergency: the Eight Great Dangers," available online at <http://www.unfor.info/the_reversal_of_tendencies.htm>.

the party, country or group planning or about to launch an attack in violation of international law could have a huge psychological impact, for example by amplifying the disastrous effect precision-guided munitions would have, if the attack was not called off. This would greatly "increase the chances that these foes will lay down their arms" (Mandel, 2004: 53) sooner rather than later.

As Glenn Paige has pointed out, a step in the right direction would be the "emergence of nonkilling political parties that participate in need-responsive processes of societal problem-solving for the well-being of all." In Germany the leftist party *Die Linken* may be moving in this direction. Thus in due course nonkilling parties could "contribute to the realization of nonkilling societies, locally and globally" (Paige, 2009: 118). Already special departments may be created to gather data for "statistics on nonkilling …make periodic status reports … [and] recommendations to governmental decision-makers and to members of civil society..." (Paige, 2009: 119).

Precision-Guided Munitions

With the new Precision-Guided weapons systems it has become possible "to discriminate better among targets" (Mandel, 2004: 19). Both the law-breaking assailant and the law enforcement agency (Meilinger, 2001: 78-79) would benefit from the use of precision weaponry and "reduce harm to both" (Mandel, 2004: 75) while inspiring public "confidence" in (future) UN policymakers who may have to decide to use force in situations where collateral damage may be an issue and could be "either unacceptable or call into question the viability of continued … action" (Hallion, 1995: 77). Not surprisingly, however, "of the 85,000 tons of bombs used in the Gulf War, only 8,000 tons (less than 10%) were PGMs, yet they accounted for 75 percent of the damage" (CNN News, 2001, in Mandel, 2004: 79).

A notable advantage of using precision weaponry is its low cost. As Mandel has cited, compared to the price of a Tomahawk cruise missile, which was "the primary precision weapon in the Gulf War," costing more than $1 million each, "the price of the primary precision weapon in Afghanistan, the joint direct attack munition, was just $18,000 for a kit that used a global positioning satellite system to convert a dumb bomb into a smart one" (Mandel, 2004: 83; Kelly, 2002: 16). Indeed, "rather than being part of an unrealistic pipedream," and "[i]n sharp contrast to skepticism and opposition to this kind of idea in decades past, there appears now to be growing acceptance that robots are an inevitable—and potentially lifesaving—component of fighting forces of the future" (Mandel, 2004: 59).

Already "the use of UAVs may in some ways make foreign military intervention look more like police action than part of a formal war." (Mandel, 2004: 59) There is a clue here suggesting that this new trend in modern technology supports and enhances the transition from the nation-state sponsored war-system to an effective system of collective security where all nations will have disarmed to the minimum stipulated in Article 26 of the UN Charter.

While modern air enforcement using precision-guided munitions can project "an increasingly efficient, effective, and humane tool of foreign policy," (Meilinger, 2001: 78-79) criticism has been that although "PGMs make it possible for fewer aircraft to destroy more targets than in the past … this enhanced efficiency makes little difference to the coercive effectiveness" of a whole variety of lethal enforcement strategies: "Bombing knocked out nearly all power generation in North Korea (90 percent). North Vietnam (85-90 percent), and Iraq (over 90 percent), but in no case caused the population to rise up against the regime. ... [I]f modern nation-states can withstand so much, they will not give in under the relatively bloodless harassment envisioned by today's [precision] strategic bombing advocates" (Pape, 1996: 319-320).

Nonlethal Weapons

Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro have insisted:

> Killing, even remotely or robotically, is what we want to avoid as much as possible. From this realization springs the growing interest in nonlethal weapons. Dozens of goos, sprays, traps, and noisemakers are being developed to disable enemy equipment and personnel. In this kit, we hope, is (or will be soon) just the alternative we need for those times when a lethal encounter is undesirable (Sapolsky and Shaopiro, 1996: 119-127).

Obviously these weapons are expressly media-friendly. Thus the positive image presented to the outside world, in a (future) situation where a unanimous decision of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council to initiate enforcement action has been reached, would ensure public support, including from civil society organizations and actors, whose input and active participation will also be sought in the process. Peace researchers, nonkilling political scientists and civil society movements have to take into account and understand that nonlethal weapons provide decision-makers with a new, legitimate instrument for resolving complex political situations. If in peacekeeping operations "work to conduct humanitarian assistance could be overshadowed if because of circumstances deadly force must be applied," nonlethal technologies would "provide a means for precluding

such deadly confrontations." At the same time it would deny the adversary "the opportunity to exploit them for propaganda purposes," (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1999: 2) and "reduce the chances for the creation of martyrs," which aggressive groups or parties may wish to exploit for their own aggressive purposes. Still, noncombatant casualties are bound to occur, in spite of the fact that "they are immediately and graphically reported worldwide by networked media organizations." Obviously these reports can create "considerable local, international, or domestic … opposition," causing "loss of perceived legitimacy and severely limit[ing] the utility of military force as a policy option ... Clever opponents are quick to recognize these constraints and will seek to turn the situation to their own advantage" (Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 1998). Nonlethal weaponry employed by UN forces and "positively motivated" great powers (if there is such a thing) is likely to "circumvent this predicament," (Mandel, 2004: 104) especially if general and comprehensive disarmament is in the process of being implemented.

Cyber Policing, Information Policies and Peace and Development Education

> *The current sophisticated level of propaganda and database penetration systems outstrips the capacity of those with vulnerable systems to protect them, and so the feasibility of this approach is quite high. If accomplished successfully, the potential to save allied and enemy civilian and military lives is quite significant..."* (Mandel, 2004: 50).

As I have already indicated this category should be broadened to include general peace and development education, implicating the media, the internet, educational institutions, schools and universities as well as government-affiliated agencies. As Paige has repeatedly pointed out, "political science education must become a significant contributor to nonkilling global change" (Paige, 2009: 82).

> Nonkilling political science training will require extraordinary self-knowledge among participants ... Nonkilling political scientists should seek mutually supportive lifetime advancement, personally and collegially, in expressing profound respect for life, however diverse we may be in other matters. These needs do not differ from those of all other members of society. [...] The contributions of political scientists to nonkilling societies should become no less important than those of medical professionals for individual and public health. They both share life and death concern for the importance of diagnosis, prescription, and treatment based upon the best new knowledge. At the same time, *every member of society can become a contributor to nonkilling global transformation*. The educational task of nonkilling political science is to offer each participant-colleague at every level

opportunities for personal development, and acquisition of knowledge and skills that will assist life-time amplification of nonkilling leadership and citizenship. All teach; all learn (Paige, 2009: 90, 82).

Peace activist and author Andrew Greig has declared a similar objective: "Education is probably one of our most powerful tools. If we educate our children and young adults about peace issues, we will be building a community for the future that will be much better informed about peace than today's generation." Referring to Stuart Rees, the Director of the Sydney Peace Foundation and Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney's Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, he calls for "literacy about non-violence," (Rees, 2003: 160) asserting the necessity "to make peace studies a compulsory part of the school curriculum from early grades" (Greig, 2007: 258).

An introductory course or core seminar should confront participants vividly with the most horrific evidence of historical and contemporary human capacity for lethality that can be presented. Together we then confront a lifelong challenge: the task of our discipline is to contribute to the end of human killing. A second educational experience should introduce just as vividly global evidence for nonkilling human potential. A third component introduces individual and social transformations and oscillations. The fourth core experience reviews human inventiveness in devising political institutions for desirable societies and challenges creativity in envisioning characteristics of killing-free societies and possible ways in which political science can contribute to them. Local to global knowledge and needs, as well as global-local interactions, are introduced in each component. Upon such foundations, nonkilling educational innovations can build" (Paige, 2009: 82-83). At present we have many highly esteemed military colleges like Sandhurst (UK), West Point (USA) and Duntroon (Australia). With their structures and traditions they are well placed to transform themselves into institutions concerned with Non-lethal Warfare. Perhaps in the not-too-distant future, we might just possibly be sending our brightest and best young people to study at the Duntroon, West Point and Sandhurst Peace Academies (Greig, 2007: 259).

Together with such a feasible, appropriate program of peace education at all levels, in the context of the application of cyber systems for conflict resolution and prevention, what are the "essential prerequisites" which must be fulfilled to achieve "a less blunt mode of communication and force demonstration to have a chance to be effective across the wide range of threats confronting the world today?" (Mandel, 2004: 52). No doubt, to be counted among the prerequisites are additional steps taken to strengthen the international legal order and abolish war, as the Japanese Constitution suggests, which stipulates

that the "right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." The non-recognition principle is well conceived to become the guideline for the international community to follow in the future (Schlichtmann, 2009).

Unfortunately, "[o]n the political side, the ambivalence of Western governments about the nature of their international responsibilities in a post-Cold War environment" creates serious problems about the legitimacy and frequently also legality of their actions, which obscures the original intent and right purpose. "In comparison to the relatively clear mutual understandings between the two blocs during the Cold War, today's degraded communication system in a global anarchic environment makes it unclear how casualty aversion strategies can work best to signal resolve" (Mandel, 2004: 63) to the adversary. Authors like Jean Ziegler speak out for global justice, and lament the "permanent duplicity of the west" (Ziegler, 2008).

Criticism—Dangers

"The spread of technologies useful for casualty aversion could … trigger a destabilizing new arena of international technology competition," if the UN provisions for establishing a genuine system of collective, common security are not realized. Indeed, "the widespread use of these technologies could accelerate the sophistication of techniques that could be used so rapidly that offense would outstrip defense, meaning that no state would be able to protect itself from intrusion from the outside" (Mandel, 2004: 161). Information warfare is "the only one of the three instruments that is widely available and heavily used by both the great powers and the unruly rogue states and terrorist groups," opening the prospect that "[t]he impact of this situation is a potential stalemate" (Mandel, 2004: 127). Similarly, measures to control and counter activities by right-wing groups on the internet even if implemented, may be circumvented.

Some authors have warned that a contest "to develop expensive countermeasures" could be the result: "As the non-lethal arsenal expands, threatened states will be driven to acquire protective or counter-measures to strategic non-lethal technologies" (Siniscalchi, 1998). It has been argued that "[a]s the United States moves toward using information warfare, so do its opponents; in fact, many say that the more the United States uses cyber-technology as a weapon, the more it exposes itself to cyber-attack by foreign governments, free-lance hacker/terrorists and clever cyber-criminals" (Regan, 1999: A1). In fact "[i]nformation warfare has had considerable effectiveness when launched against the United States by its enemies. Although sophisticated computer network attack technologies may be very challenging for

some, the low-tech information warfare toolkit is essentially open for anyone to use" (Mandel, 2004: 127). It is likely that nonlethal weaponry will "in some instances indirectly trigger a destabilizing new arena of international arms competition," (Center for Defense Information, 1995) unless of course a general world disarmament treaty has been agreed upon and the United Nations endowed with limited but real enforcement powers.

Yet by far the greatest danger is that no steps will be taken to empower the United Nations, i.e. by initiating and embarking on the transition. What would then happen apart from the "impact of this situation [becoming] a potential stalemate," (Mandel, 2004: 127) is that the capacity for generating widespread destruction would be, as is already happening, "gravitating into increasingly less responsible hands" (Garwin and Winfield, 1999: 78) such as powerful international and inner-state insurgents, including terrorist and criminal networks. It is mind-boggling to think that at present, apparently, "[f]or the first time since the emergence of the nation-state, more military weapons are in the hands of private citizens than in the hands of national governments due to the uncontrolled spread of arms" (Mandel, 2002). As "nations are losing their traditional monopoly on military technologies, non-state actors and even individuals are gaining the ability to impose damage on a far larger scale." Also, "[t]he geographical assumption that ties combatant status to a particular physical battlefield, core to the existing framework of the laws of war, is questionable in a world of global terrorism and cyber-space confrontation" (Allenby and Mattick, 2012). Another extremely worrisome development we are seeing is the "eroding of the clear differences between a state of peace and a state of war, creating substantial institutional confusion." There is a clear necessity, "to develop a sophisticated and adaptive institutional capability to recognize critical change as it happens, understand the implications across multiple domains, and respond in ways that are rational, ethical, and responsible," since "technological evolution and concomitant changes in military, cultural, and social domains have rendered virtually all of the fundamental assumptions underlying the laws of war at least potentially contingent." (Allenby and Mattick, 2012) Giving the United Nations a sovereign authority of its own obviously is the way to go.

Critique has also come from such prominent international analysts as Javier Solana and Ian Bremmer, warning that UCAVs, "[b]y lowering the costs and risks of attack, these technological innovations make military action more likely." The authors warn:

> Perhaps the lowest-cost way to undermine rivals and attack enemies is to launch attacks in cyberspace. That is why so many deep-pocketed governments—and some that are not so rich—are investing heavily in the technology and skills needed to enhance this capability. This form of warfare is especially worrisome for two reasons. First, unlike the structure of Cold War-era "mutually assured destruction," cyber weapons offer those who use them an opportunity to strike anonymously. Second, constant changes in technology ensure that no government can know how much damage its cyber-weapons can do or how well its deterrence will work until they use them. As a result, governments now probe one another's defenses every day, increasing the risk of accidental hostilities (Solana and Bremmer, 2013).

Criticizing nonlethal weapons technology some authors think they may "provide an authoritarian state with more means of oppressing and controlling people, and give police more tools for the abuse of power" and to "bolster its own power and influence" (Lewer and Schofield, 1997: 97-98, 133-134) and thus to become an instrument for torturing its own people. "Of course, it is possible to misuse virtually any type of munitions in this way" (Mandel, 2004: 114). What is true is that without measures taken to empower the United Nations, to achieve general and complete disarmament and abolish war, international security will remain a pipedream and the arms race accelerate further, as it has already done after a brief spate of arms expenditure reductions in the final decade before the turn of the millennium. Between 2000 and 2010, world military expenditure has once more increased by about 50%. We must get away from the friend-enemy paradigm that perpetuates international antagonisms and move toward a UN endowed with real powers to enforce world law.

Mandel's critique regarding the present state of affairs, i.e that employing nonlethal weaponry may "foster unrestrained interventionism," (Mandel, 2004: 116) loses its persuasion once the UN transition and Charter Review has been initiated. As soon as that happens, the veto powers will control and decide unanimously, together with the other powers, on the need for enforcement action, if and when the need arises.

The natural candidate to initiate the transition from an armed to an unarmed peace envisaged in the UN Charter, is—because of its history and post-war Peace Constitution—Germany. Without Germany taking action to abolish war it is likely that there will be no progress. Germany today is a peace-loving country. While at the Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and 1907 one nation, Germany, could foil the effort by vetoing the institution of obligatory arbitration (binding international jurisdiction), today, with the UNO and

so many international organizations and peace movements in place, the opposite is true: one nation can trigger the process of the transition, for example by "seconding the motion" of the war-abolishing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. I expect Germany to play its part toward this end. It stands to reason that in today's anarchic environment policy makers must be aware that "[c]onflicts are … likely to arise or persist when those with the means to prevent or end them cannot or will not do so" (Solana/Bremmer, 2013).

There is a dilemma, however, because the role of the five Permanent Members during the transition, when they will assume the responsibility to see the transition through, has not been well understood and communicated (Schlichtmann, 1999 and 2011). While it is the victorious powers of two world wars who fought against the forces of militarism, nationalism and racism, ideally, during the transition, aspiring countries like Germany and Japan should be co-opted, while India would get a permanent seat without delay. In the process, eventually the EU could replace 'colonial' proxies France and Britain.

In spite of the obvious benefits of nonkilling policies, when arguing in the context of the current, still rampant war system, criticism comes "from both the left and the right of the political spectrum." Right-wing critics argue "that the quest for bloodless war replaces battlefield courage with cowardice and prevents the military from undertaking the concerted use of overwhelming force in foreign confrontations necessary to achieve decisive victory and overall national security." (Mandel, 2004: 2) Again, within the present configuration, critics from the Left argue that "the quest for bloodless war is just a deceptive hypocritical sham, a pretext for military adventurism, degradation of public health" or "a warped ethnocentric justification for saving one's own people while indiscriminately slaughtering others" (Mandel, 2004: 2). The

> accuracy of "smart weapons" does not guarantee the safety of civilians, and it may even tempt field commanders to attempt to hit targets very near civilians. The tactic of "shock and awe" will cause catastrophic damage to essential urban infrastructure. "Collateral damage" is a euphemism for systematic disregard for the medium and long-term public health effects of destroying lifeline infrastructure, essential civilian services, and forcing the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians (Wisner, 2003: 2).

Also, there is "the possibility that, in interfering with military communication and information systems, one inadvertently disables such systems necessary for the survival of the civilian population" (Mandel, 2004: 50-51). On the issue of sanctions the question concerning the "ability of elites to pass on the costs of sanctions to their poor" must be resolved, as "[m]any

suffer under sanctions, but rarely the intended." Enforcement agents must avoid situations where they might "kill militarily and economically without achieving desired results" (Sapolsky and Shapiro, 1996: 122). Thus "casualty minimization deficiency could be particularly problematic in a couple of situations: wartime missions whose goals are humanitarian, … and wartime missions whose goals are simply regime change or decapitation of leadership" (Mandel, 2004: 48). But it is unlikely that these problems will persist once the transition has been initiated, a world disarmament treaty agreed upon, and the United Nations been empowered. Again, obviously, it is necessary to get away from the friend-enemy stereotype and move toward a UN policing status. Paige (2009: 90) stresses

> the assumed realizability of a nonkilling global society requires attention to the well-being of each individual who shares life on earth from birth to death as generations come, intermingle, and pass on. The basic unit of nonkilling political analysis is the individual human being. Organizations, structures, and processes are the product of aggregated individual behavior. World politics is the politics of world individuals. A nonkilling global society depends upon individuals who do not kill. If no one is to kill or be killed, the interests of all human beings must be taken into account.

Questions also persist about "how technology affects the humanity of warfare" (Mandel, 2004: 22). For example, it has been reported that "[d]rones are terrorizing an entire civilian population" in North Waziristan. (Gibson, 2012; Stanford University Report) In view of the historical advancement of weapons technology one must be aware that the "inventive genius of man" may in some ways have "obliterated his sense of moral values" (Fuller, 1998: x, xiii). This development that has given man the power to destroy on a large scale could negatively affect his mental attitude and disposition. "In other words, as increasingly sophisticated armaments increase the technological capacity to achieve military objectives without killing a lot of people, at the same time they may inadvertently decrease the moral desire to do so" (Boot, 2002: 328). The question is: "Will technology be used to make war more humane?" "If we read the question to mean, 'Will technology result in wars that have fewer casualties and less collateral damage?' the answer is yes, almost certainly. If we read the question to mean, 'Will technology result in less frequent wars fought for more *noble* ends?' the answer is no, with an even higher degree of certainty" (Musgrave, 2003: 1). Similarly, Mandel also makes the point: "Advanced weapons technology distances initiators of violence from witnessing the direct suffering of targets, lessening the probability of moral inhibitions entering the pic-

ture" (Mandel, 2004: 22). Again, it is likely that this would change once war has been abolished in favor of a just and equitably disarmed and effectively policed world. This would likely bring the morality back. There are also technical problems because mechanization poses "challenges of its own, such as issues of control, breakdown, and repair," in spite of the evident "potential to advance the bloodless war agenda" (Mandel, 2004: 59).

One thing is certain, "unless we stop killing not only freedom and equality are in jeopardy but our very survival—individual, social, and ecological—is imperiled. We have reached a point where the science and practice of politics must be aligned with the life-supporting forces of society and nature. It is not only good morality and good practicality, but it is also this era's imperative…" (Paige, 2009: 134).

Implemetation and Feasibility during Transition

> *The history of civilization is in large part the history of institutional innovation.*
> *The time has come to set forth human killing as a problem to be solved rather than to accept enslavement by it as a condition to be endured forever (Paige, 2009: 113 and 127).*
> *However, closer examination of certain historical trends and their extrapolation into the future may leave us with some hope that systems of institutionalized trust and collective security may yet emerge in time to head off holocausts and catastrophes (Goldman 1982: 132).*

The question is whether we believe a "nonkilling society is possible" or not. As Paige (2004: 99) so aptly describes: Nonkilling political science must provide "credible security alternatives against lethal aggression at the individual, local, national and international levels". This should include strengthening the United Nations Organisation and its branches. History gives us a clue:

> If Machiavelli can prescribe skills for violence-accepting dominance, it is now possible to work out the strategy and tactics of nonkilling political power. If Hobbes can propose a monster state coercing social peace by a monopoly of violence, new modes of governance responsive to human needs can be explored where no lethality is needed. If Locke can envision violent revolution to displace despotic rule, we can now perceive the strategy and tactics of nonkilling democratic liberation. If Marx and Engels can envision class struggle with violence as the ultimate arbiter, we can now envision processes of nonkilling struggle to realize age-old aspirations for economic justice. If Rousseau can prescribe a social contract based

> upon lethality against violators, and if present leaders continue to speak of violence-based 'contracts' and 'covenants', we can now begin to explore mutual commitments to well-being in nonkilling communities. If Kant (1795/1959) can envision 'perpetual peace' deriving from steadfast adherence to a no-war categorical imperative, we can now perceive elements needed to transform a nonkilling imperative into global reality. If the American political tradition bequeaths a classic declaration of violent independence and a violence-affirming constitution, it is now possible to envision a nonkilling declaration of independence from American societal violence and a new nonkilling constitution. And if Weber can prescribe politics as a vocation that must accept the inevitability of killing, we can now envisage politics and political science as vocations that assume the possibility of liberation from violence (Paige, 2009: 86-87).

So, how can we "move towards an effective and democratic *world government* in which … nations recognise a higher authority on issues of war and peace? … How do we bring about these profound changes that we have been discussing?" (Greig, 2007: 244, 257, emphasis added). Most people may think that

> war is wrong, but it can seem hard to do much about it as an individual. Progress may seem very slow. However, with the huge growth in electronic communications we are also almost certainly more aware than we have ever been of all the efforts for peace (Greig, 2007: 257).

In fact Paige suggests setting up "common security councils and nonkilling intelligence agencies at national and transnational levels [and especially] … at the United Nations level." Initiators could be "nations that rank lowest on indicators of lethality: no nuclear weapons, no armies, no capital punishment, low homicide rates, no arms trade, and so forth." (Paige, 2009: 120) Nations that have a special historical debt to pay to the international community in this regard, or whose constitution stipulates that the country should "serve the peace of the world" (as the German Constitution stipulates) or who are in a propitious position from a geopolitical point of view, should also be able to qualify.

> Nonkilling intelligence agencies are needed, in conjunction with investigative mass media of communication and citizen alerts, to reveal all forms and threats of lethality and to identify capabilities for countervailing public and private transformational action. Nonkilling specialists in diplomatic establishments are needed no less than conventional military attachés or officers responsible for economic relations. Nonkilling cultural attachés seek to build bridges of discovery, mutual learning, and cooperation between all sources of nonkilling well-being in home and host countries. Global Inter-

> net capabilities promise worldwide citizen sharing of common security in-
> formation with potential for producing concerted nonkilling actions that
> are not dependent upon conventional governmental, corporate, or media
> definitions of the situation (Paige, 2009: 120).

The author continues: "Conventional security theory and practice ulti-
mately derive from the threat of lethality: 'I/we want to make it absolutely
credible to you that I/we will kill you'." In contradistinction nonkilling secu-
rity starts from the opposite assumption: "'I/we want to make it absolutely
credible to you that I/we will not kill you. And you must make it absolutely
credible that you will not kill me/us.' In short, 'We must make it absolutely
credible to each other that we will not kill'" (Paige, 2009: 99).

On the other hand it can not be overlooked that the threat and use of
force, prohibited by the UN Charter, continues. Has the "advent of the nu-
clear era" really "reduced the utility of total war," as Karl W. Eikenberry, a
former US Army Lieutenant General and U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and
present lecturer at Stanford University, assumes? (Eikenberry, 1996: 109-
118). Apart from its "utility," in spite of everything, the predicament of total
war is still with us. Indeed, as Albert Einstein proclaimed after the war: "The
unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of
thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." Total war lin-
gers on, as is evidenced by some of the belligerency seen in Africa and else-
where. The only way out, it seems, is by embarking on the transition, stipu-
lated in the UN Charter, and empowering the people (Schlesinger, 2002: 88).

> Complementing what may be termed "top down" nonkilling political institu-
> tions (for example, parties, public service departments, and common security
> institutions), "bottom-up" consortia of powerful nonkilling transformational
> forces are needed. An example is the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
> Organization (UNPO), a coalition of peoples with distinctive identities explic-
> itly committed to nonkilling action to influence the United Nations, govern-
> ments, and other institutions to recognize their collective human rights. …
> Eventually a powerful global citizens consortium for a nonkilling world, a part-
> nership of women and men, should emerge as a force for universal well-being.
> Such consortia need to be developed within and across zones in the funnel of
> killing and in the major problem-solving areas of violence, economics, human
> rights, environment, and cooperation (Paige, 2009: 122).

As John F. Kennedy wrote to a friend as a young journalist attending the
San Francisco UN Conference: "Things cannot be forced from the top …
The international relinquishing of sovereignty would have to spring from the

people—it would have to be so strong that the elected delegates would be turned out of office if they failed to do it" (Schlesinger, 2002: 88). This is not at all utopian or far-fetched. With regard to the issue of bloodless and nonkilling policies, the history of conflict and war shows that "technological advances … have on occasion yielded unexpected consequences," (Mandel, 2004: 77) including empowerment of the people. However, we need to be aware and take into consideration that, "contrary to the illusion of precision and calculability conveyed by advanced professional management ... total war [is] … far more intractable to intelligent decision than … expected" (Osgood, 1971: 94). It may be precisely the predicament of lingering total war and the nuclear dilemma that make implementation of bloodless conflict resolution and nonkilling policies possible and inevitable.

Psychological operations, too, can "prevent needless loss of life, needless casualties," (Glaser, 2003) and prevent total war situations where any and all means may be employed to end war (victorious), even if this means a high score in civilian casualties. "This approach may soften the repercussions of war, as such operations can reduce casualties by encouraging opposing troops to surrender, and they can help win civilian support" (Dittmann, 2002: 32). The law-enforcing or aggression-averting coalition of UN police forces will be encouraged "to use every means at its disposal to build up its powerful image in the eyes of its enemies so that foes would capitulate without much loss of life. This 'muscle-flexing'," Robert Mandel observes, could demonstrate to potential law-breakers and aggressors that "resistance is futile because one's military technology is so superior to theirs that any action on their part can be stymied before it is even launched." They would become "painfully aware of the awesome capabilities of specific casualty-minimizing weapons technologies," i.e. precision-guided munitions, nonlethal weaponry, and cyber information and education tools, which would intimidate, caution and restrain potential aggressors. In addition: "Nonkilling common security implies engagement of entire populations at local, national, and international levels," (Paige, 2009: 120) to facilitate the transformation of the Security Council into a Common Security Council possessing effective authority and overall legitimacy. Political scientist Ralph M. Goldman has called this the "critical transition," the aim of which is to set up "the central institutions of conflict resolution and promotion of political trust," (Goldman 1982: 121) required for the effective organization of peace.

Politicians and political scientists, peace activists and researchers must ask themselves precisely "what kinds of institutional changes" are required to bring about the "transition to a nonkilling global society." Because of the per-

vasive nature of the international environment, obviously, the "purposive pursuit of nonkilling conditions of global life portends institutional changes as pervasive in scope to those associated with the global diffusion of contemporary communication and information technologies" (Paige, 2009: 114). It would be wise, besides being proficient, to make every possible use of the already existing legal provisions in international and constitutional law that are meant to and likely to guarantee the desired outcome if backed up by civil society movements, conscientious diplomats (e.g. Stéphane Hessler) etc. This includes following up on the Japanese war-abolishing Article 9 (Schlichtmann, 2001 and 2009).[3] Following up on Article 9 would mean taking legal action to abolish war, and starting a debate in the UN General Assembly and other fora as well as among the general public, at the end of which a (possibly worldwide) vote would decide the issue (Schlichtmann, 2011: 26).

The "prospect of developing nonkilling common security forces" should not be dismissed lightly. This is certainly true "in view of current trends in some military and police establishments toward violence prevention, engagement in lightly armed peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief, exploration of usefulness of nonlethal weapons, and receptivity to training in nonkilling methods of conflict resolution" (Paige, 2009: 120).

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[3] Based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution a world-wide movement to abolish war has been launched: <http://www.haguepeace.org>. See also the Global Article 9 Campaign to Abolish War at <http://www.article-9.org>, the Movement for the Abolition of War at <http://www.abolishwar.org.uk>, and the McCloy-Zorin Accords at <http://www.nucleardarkness.org/solutions/mccloyzorinaccordstext/>.

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Chapter Eight

Nonlethal Technology in International Security

Helping to Prevent Nuclear War

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The concept of nonkilling is valid for a number of reasons. Leaving aside any moral imperative—which must be for individuals to judge on the basis of their personal beliefs—nonkilling is in the best biological interests of the human race in that it reduces the loss of skills which might help us to survive. By reducing grief and anger, it tends to increase the sum of human happiness—which again is a net benefit to all of us.

There is, however, an overarching reason for the adoption of nonkilling and that is that it could be a major agent in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in moving us towards their abolition. In the event of even a minor nuclear conflict, these horrific devices could kill or injure hundreds of millions of people and cause generations of cultural and genetic damage. A major nuclear war could wipe the human race off the face of the earth.

Despite significant progress in recent years in reducing the stock of nuclear weapons in the world we are still at very significant risk of nuclear war. If there is further proliferation—for example into Iran—nuclear weaponry will become increasingly accessible. Despite alarmist statements to the contrary it seems very unlikely that Iran, for example, would launch a first strike nuclear attack (or would any other of the current nuclear powers)—but the possession by Iran of such weapons could well encourage surrounding nations to join the Middle Eastern nuclear club (Israel of course, being the founding member). More bombs in more places increases the possibility that rogue organisations might acquire such weapons. It has been pointed out that since terrorists are not affiliated with any nation, the principle of a mutually assured deterrent cannot apply to terrorists.

There is significant urgency in this matter. Within a few years, if we cannot halt proliferation, we might be faced with nuclear bomb threats from rogue nations, rogue terrorist groups—or even disturbed individual rogues.

The arms race with conventional weapons meanwhile continues and maintains the expectation that international conflict should be resolved through lethal force. A nonkilling culture has the power to counter that expectation.

A Global Parliament

One way to stop nuclear proliferation, or any other international conflict that might escalate into nuclear war, is to turn the world into 'one nation'. As in today's nation-states, deliberate killing of people within that 'nation of the world' would be a crime. This crime would have strong deterrents and very severe penalties for transgressors, enforced by an international police force.

A nation of the world implies a government of the world —'world government'—and this concept still worries many people. They reason that if their country surrenders its power to a world government, their freedom might be at risk. There is some cause for this concern. All too often through history, nations have been absorbed by empires and then lost their freedom.

Given time though, it will certainly be possible to achieve a world federation of peoples which will ensure the freedom and independence of its members while at the same time reducing and eventually eliminating war between states. A World Parliament could be the governing body of this federation.

There are various institutions already in place that work towards cooperation across the planet. The most notable of these is the United Nations. The UN with its various agencies has been very successful in many respects. Its peace keeping activities have prevented much warfare. However, its present structure—with a veto prone Security Council and an Assembly where every state from China to Liechtenstein commands an equal vote—prevents it from taking meaningful action when large wars erupt. The failure to act on the present (2013) civil war in Syria is the most recent example.

Various models have been suggested for a world parliament, including a restructured United Nations. The concept of 'world citizenship' is also being explored by a number of individuals and organisations. Even though a global parliament will probably be achieved sooner or later—indeed perhaps quite soon—it is not at present a reality and alternatives are needed.

There is significant urgency. While we still employ lethal force to try to resolve international conflict, we will continue to be at risk from ever more dangerous technology, the most dangerous of which—as we have mentioned—being nuclear weapons, which could cause the extinction of us all.

Until we have nonkilling common security institutions that effectively prevent lethality at an international scale—such as a global parliament or a

similar federation of world peoples—war between nations will almost inevitably continue—as will lethal civil wars. Various individuals and organisations around the world, from the United Nations downwards, work tirelessly to prevent war but they are continually frustrated. A range of factors continue to drive states into conflict. These include the demand for oil and other minerals, the pressure on agricultural land and water and from time to time the ambitions of psychopathic political leaders. We have to accept that warfare will continue in the immediate future at least. So what can we do to stop the ongoing wars which could so easily escalate into nuclear conflict?

The central argument of this chapter is that a technological approach could be the key, namely the adoption of nonlethal technologies (NLTs). These to date have been underrated, but their great benefit is that they reduce the damage of war. They protect but do not kill—or at least significantly reduce the possibility of lethal injury—supporting a nonkilling culture.

Nonlethal Technology (NLT)

Let us briefly review some aspects of NLT. Nonlethal approaches to war have probably been around since war began. The taking of prisoners is a nonlethal approach, as is siege warfare. Armour is a NLT as are all the other protective technologies such as castle walls, bunkers and trenches. A number of the battles fought by our ancestors were conducted with the aim of minimising casualties. Prisoners sometimes offered a useful return in ransom money. Warfare could often be avoided by appropriate displays of power on each side, which would allow adversaries to calculate the outcome of a battle. Negotiation could then take place which might lead to some material expenditure but with great saving of life on either side.

The modern concept of nonlethal warfare appears to have arisen in 1960s, when the term nonlethal weapon (NLW) came into use. During the latter part of the 20th century enthusiasm increased. Several nonlethal weapons research centres were founded. Defence forces around the world began to take an interest. The most prominent of these was the US Defense Force's Non-Lethal Weapons Program located within the Marine Corps.

By the early 2000s, there was some reversal in enthusiasm for NLWs. It was realised—as might have been expected with new technology—that there were a number of problems. First among them were doubts about the effectiveness of the technologies. They were a long way from being able to compete with lethal weapons in repulsing an aggressor. A number of so

called nonlethal devices, if wrongly applied, could be lethal. NLWs in a civil setting could be used for torture.

Hand-in-hand with the development of military NLWs had been the development of NLWs for policing, such as in crowd control. There were a number of unfortunate incidents in this area. Rubber bullets used by police and troops in Northern Ireland caused many injuries and a number of fatalities. The incorrect use of Tasers resulted in several deaths. Many of these problems were eventually resolved. For example, the redesign of rubber bullets into properly engineered baton rounds and better training of police and troops meant that after 1994 there were no more fatalities in Northern Ireland from this technology.

Better training in the use of Tasers has greatly reduced lethal outcomes —although as recently as 2012 the overzealous use of Tasers by police in Sydney, Australia, caused the death of a young man who was affected by drugs. Despite the improvements, the poor reputation persisted. But, so far the idea that nonlethal technology can ever replace lethal weapons is far from taking hold. It is a low priority in most defence forces, even though the US Defense Force Non-Lethal Weapons Program has survived and continues to be active. Lethal warfare still remains deeply embedded in most cultures.

The Culture of Lethal Warfare vs Nonkilling Culture

Up until the industrial age, war was mostly confined to battlefields far away from the population centers. It was very unpleasant and caused great damage and huge grief, significantly incremented by disease and famine, but still isolated compared to what was yet to come. World War One was probably a turning point. Repeating rifles, advanced artillery and the machine gun allowed killing on a vast scale. The bravery and prowess of the individual warrior was often irrelevant. This new style of war has been termed industrial warfare. The technology developed further in World War Two, with the sophistication of aerial bombardment. In March 1945, some 100,000 people could be killed in the firestorm bombing of Tokyo. Warfare ceased to make sense even in the context of struggle between nation-states. The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki shortly afterwards, which claimed over 200,000 lives either immediately or within a few months, confirmed that the stakes had been changed forever.

Even though humanity's recent history evidences a strong propensity for warfare—namely since the late-Neolithic and increasingly during the last few millenia—this does not necessarily mean that individuals are prone to kill each other. In fact the opposite is generally the case. A number of stud-

ies have shown that individual humans find it very hard to kill another person. Military training concentrates on over-riding these personal scruples. It is generally groups of humans—mainly through the State—rather than individual people that have the propensity for war. Accepting and understanding our nature may help us to develop strategies for preventing war.

Although many people still support a culture of lethal conflict between states, it is interesting that inside those same entities we have already advanced quite far along the road towards a nonkilling culture. A commonly overlooked fact is that in almost every State in the world, murder—the unjustified killing of another human being—is against the law. Those who are convicted of murders, face very severe penalties.

In many countries there is agreement that every effort should be made not to take human life while maintaining the law. In most of these nations police carry guns but they are only permitted to use them in self-defence and as a very last resort. In a very few countries, such as the United Kingdom, police officers on general duties do not even carry guns. Death from shooting by police in the United Kingdom is in fact very rare.

Murder rates in countries which have a low level of gun ownership and/or strong gun control laws tend to be low—that is relative to nations which have a more lax approach to firearms. Further to this, in a high proportion of nations of the world the death penalty has been abolished. In summary, around the world nonkilling within a nation is mostly accepted.

Nonlethal Technology in International Security

Although the vast majority people on this planet potentially agree with the idea of nonkilling, killing still continues. Most of these deaths take place in war between nations or in civil wars within nations. There is also some killing by criminals. So, although nonkilling is generally accepted within nations, it has not yet been accepted in the international sphere. Under international law, a nation that is attacked can defend itself with lethal weapons.

Certainly, we all have a right to defend ourselves. And many will consider the possibility of taking other people's lives to do this, if necessary. In this regard, the great advantage of nonlethal technology is that it has the potential to remove such dilemmas. It allows us to protect ourselves from aggressors—and to constrain them—but without killing them. In the international arena, nations employing nonlethal technology may be able to resist and constrain invaders but without causing death and injury.

There are further benefits. In addition to preventing the huge tragedy and grief which results from taking human life, nonlethal methods make ongoing peace much easier. If you kill an individual 'enemy' their kinfolk will be saddened and angered. That anger may be carried on from generation to generation. Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland in January 1972, where a number of unarmed protestors were killed by British soldiers, was long remembered. It triggered violent protest and resulted in the death of hundreds more people in the following years. Expressions of anger at the outcome of the 1389 battle of Kosovo, in which the Serbs were defeated by the Ottomans, were still evident during the Balkan Wars of the late 20th century.

Where Next?

At the present time, the early part of the 21st century, the basic tenets of nonkilling are already supported in principle by a substantial majority of the world's population. Most people across the world believe that murder is wrong. They would also agree that killing even in war is not desirable and should be avoided if at all possible. Many groups and individuals around the world are doing excellent work in supporting and promoting these views.

A big stumbling block however to the complete adoption of a nonkilling approach to security is the persistence of lethal technology in the international arena in conflicts between states. Development of nonlethal protection technology has begun and is beginning to accelerate. But this is not happening quickly enough to keep pace with nuclear weapons proliferation and the threat that this raises. A major problem is the lack of knowledge about an NLT approach. The challenge is to make the world more aware of the possibilities of NLT in reducing the nuclear threat.

It is probably fair to say that currently there is a very low awareness of nonlethal protection technology around the world. Most people—if they have heard of them at all—associate nonlethal weapons with the police—with Tasers, rubber bullets and tear gas. The general public for the most part is unaware of either the nature or the potential of NLT.

How do we change this situation? In summary we need an effective communications program which will engage the major stakeholders—the military, the peace activists, the politicians and the general public. The key message would be that NLT has huge potential in achieving world peace.

In terms of outcomes we need to work towards endorsement by the United Nations of a nonlethal/nonkilling approach, a changed culture in the military to strategies which would avoid killing and injury wherever possible,

training in nonlethal approaches in military colleges, vastly increased investment by governments in research and development in nonlethal protection technology and widespread conversion by armaments companies to the production of nonlethal technology. Overall, we would hope for an understanding of these approaches and strong support for their adoption.

NLT is only in its infancy, although there have been some significant recent advances. If only a modest proportion of the hundreds of billions of dollars which are currently invested in lethal technology research each year were instead devoted to research and development in NLT, we would very soon begin to see to safe and effective protection able to match and—before long—outperform the lethal hardware.

As a nonlethal approach began to gather momentum in the area of international security, we might reasonably expect that this would be mirrored in a less violent culture on the domestic front. The task of changing our habit of lethal conflict, which has been embedded in our culture for millenia—and to do this in time to prevent a nuclear holocaust—may seem massive.

But we can be cautiously optimistic. Humans embrace technology. Technology, while causing many of our problems, has also provided the solutions to many of those problems. We only have to look at such areas as agriculture, health, transport, education and communication. Change through technology can proceed at extraordinary speed, as we have seen —and are seeing—in the dramatic changes arising from this digital age.

It will certainly be some task to move ourselves to a nonlethal nonkilling culture, but it will be worth it—and there is no alternative if we humans are to survive.

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Chapter Nine

Nuclear Weapons and A Nonkilling World
The Goal is Zero

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It takes great vision to imagine a nonkilling world, a world in which humans do not settle their conflicts by killing other humans. Such a world seems far removed from the world we live in today, and yet it seems within the realm of the possible. We are not forced like Sisyphus to continue the arduous task of rolling a rock up a mountain day after day. We are capable of changing our patterns of behavior. We can be better than the projection of our violent human past into our common future portends. At every moment we have the opportunity to imagine, design and plan for a future rebuilt on a foundation of peace, a world in which security does not rest upon force of arms. In such a future, the prospects for peace will be strengthened by new institutions fostering dialogue and cooperation for human security, well-being and happiness. Such a future will build strong safeguards against the dehumanization of "the other" that makes war possible.

In such a future, people may look back and view the creation and use of nuclear weapons as the "turning point," when people throughout the globe realized the potential for killing was all-encompassing and that a turn toward peace and nonkilling was essential. The future equivalent of Homer's Iliad may begin, "One day the people awakened to the omnicidal threat of nuclear weapons, and they said, 'No more, no more nuclear weapons, no more war, no more killing….' And the power of the awakened humanity could not be denied. The world changed and killing was made taboo. Nuclear weapons were dismantled and were put in museums as reminders of that brief but intense period of human history when humankind reached its apogee of collective insanity."

The Nuclear Age

The Nuclear Age is 65 years old. The first test of a nuclear device took place on July 16, 1945 at the Alamogordo Test Range in New Mexico's Jor-

nada del Muerto Desert. The Spanish name of this desert means "Journey of Death," a fitting name for the beginning point of the Nuclear Age. Just three weeks after the test, the United States destroyed the city of Hiroshima with a nuclear weapon, followed by the destruction of Nagasaki three days later. By the end of 1945, the Journey of Death had claimed more than 200,000 human lives and left many other victims injured and suffering.

Over the past 65 years, the Journey of Death has continued to claim victims, not from the use of nuclear weapons in war, but from the radiation released in testing nuclear weapons. We can be thankful that we have not had a nuclear war in the past 65 years, but we must not be complacent. Our relative good fortune in the past is not a guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used in the future. Over the years, the power of nuclear weapons has increased dramatically. They have become capable of ending civilization and complex life on the planet. What could possibly justify this risk?

We remember the anniversaries of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as cautionary tales. The survivors of the bombings, the *hibakusha*, have been strong proponents of "Never Again!" They have spoken out about what they experienced so that their past does not become our future. They have warned us repeatedly, "Nuclear weapons and human beings cannot coexist." We must choose: nuclear weapons or a human future. The choice should not be difficult. Humanity should shout out with a single voice that we choose a world free of the overarching nuclear threat, a world free of nuclear weapons.

The people must lead their leaders, choosing hope for a far more decent human future. The United States alone has spent more than $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons over the span of the Nuclear Age. The world currently spends more than $1.5 trillion annually on weapons, war and the preparation for war, while spending only a small portion of this on efforts, such as the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, to meet human needs and achieve social justice. Clearly, change is needed. Bringing about this change could begin by joining together to eliminate the nuclear weapons threat to the human future.

The future is now. Sixty-five years of nuclear threat to humanity is enough. We continue to rely upon the theory of deterrence at our peril. The theory requires rationality from leaders who are not always rational. The higher rationality and greater good for humanity would be to eliminate the threat by eliminating the weapons. The time to raise our voices and demand a world free of nuclear weapons is now, before it is too late. On this demand we must be both insistent and persistent.

The Hiroshima Challenge

Hiroshima, as the first city attacked by an atomic weapon, was transformed to a city of ashes and death. From this devastation, it would be reborn to challenge humanity to a higher destiny.

Hiroshima became more than a place; it became a symbol of the terrifying threat of a new age of virtually unlimited destructive power. One bomb could destroy one city. By implication, a few bombs could destroy countries and a few dozen bombs could reduce civilization to ruins. As the nuclear arms race gained momentum, the future of life on the planet was placed at risk. Eventually tens of thousands of nuclear weapons would be created and deployed. We humans, by our own scientific and technological cleverness, have created tools capable of our own annihilation. Hiroshima was the opening chapter of the Nuclear Age.

Hiroshima was destroyed in August 1945 and by the spring of the next year blades of grass and even flowers had returned. The city engaged in the arduous task of rebuilding. But Hiroshima could never again be just a city. It became something deeper, rooted in the human psyche: a symbol of devastation and potential extinction, but also a symbol of hope and rebirth.

The power of Hiroshima is as a symbol to awaken humanity to the threat of its own demise. More than 200,000 died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but there were survivors who lived to tell their stories. These were stories from the inferno, fierce cautionary tales of what the future portended for humanity should this technology be allowed to go unchecked and uncontrolled. The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the *hibakusha*, tell us, "We must eliminate nuclear weapons before they eliminate us." And by "us," they mean all of us. The *hibakusha* have been courageous in confronting and revealing their personal tragedies. They have faced their fears and vulnerability and have spoken publicly in an effort to prevent their past from becoming the collective future of humanity. The *hibakusha* are modern prophets. They have looked into the abyss and returned to sound a warning.

Like other American children, I learned in school the lesson that the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were needed to end the war and save the lives of American soldiers. What I didn't learn in an American school setting was that the use of the atomic bombs violated the laws of warfare as weapons that were indiscriminate and caused unnecessary suffering. Nor did I learn that the victims of the bombs were mostly civilians. The emphasis was on the scientific and technological achievement of creating the bombs. The use of the atomic bombs was not challenged, but celebrated. The US per-

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spective was from above the bombs. We dropped the bombs. We saw them fall and fulfill their purpose of massive destruction, and we justified their use.

In Japan, the bombs were witnessed not from above as a technological achievement, but from below as a fiery hell on earth. At the Peace Memorial Museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the lesson was one of human suffering and death. The bombs killed men, women and children. They did not discriminate. They subjected the survivors of the bombs' blast and fire to radiation and lingering illness and death. The radiation exposure would take tens of thousands of additional lives and would affect future generations. The bombs kept killing.

The Hiroshima challenge is to put the nuclear genie back in its bottle, protecting all humanity, including future generations, by regaining human control over its most deadly tools of destruction. To meet the Hiroshima challenge, the perspective of those who were beneath the bomb must be shared and understood. The best teachers are the survivors, those who experienced the bomb firsthand. But the survivors are growing elderly and they cannot be the only teachers. Others must step up and join them in their quest to abolish nuclear weapons.

It has been six and a half decades since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and most people cannot imagine what it was like to experience the bomb. The challenge of Hiroshima requires igniting the global imagination. If we can imagine the terror of the bomb and the silence of extinction, we can respond to it with political action. If we allow ourselves to be lulled into complacency and fail to imagine nuclear weapons erupting in global conflagration, it will be unlikely that sufficient numbers of people will stand up to demand an end to the nuclear era.

In the immediate aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima, Albert Camus, the great French novelist and existentialist philosopher, wrote, "Peace is the only battle worth waging." Humanity must stand in solidarity against nuclearism and against the militarism in which it is embedded. We must choose: to wage peace and seek an end to the nuclear era, or to be docile in the face of this existential threat.

Some of the greatest scientists of the 20th century signed the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto, in which they stated, "There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death."

In 1982, I was a founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The meaning of the Foundation's name is that peace is an imperative of the Nuclear Age. The Foundation was created at a time when the leaders of the two most heavily nuclear-armed countries in the world, the United States and Soviet Union, were not speaking to one another. We were founded in the belief that citizens, all of us, can and must make a difference. Our goal has been to meet the Hiroshima challenge, to awaken humanity to the necessity of abolishing nuclear weapons. We have strived to educate and advocate for a world free of nuclear weapons, to strengthen international law and to empower new peace leaders.

In recent years, we have focused on attaining US leadership for a nuclear weapons-free world. In early 2009, we delivered more than 70,000 signatures to the White House urging President Obama to demonstrate that leadership. We have been encouraged by the President's statements, particularly his speech in Prague in April 2009, in which he said, "I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." In his speech, he stated that America, as the only country to have used nuclear weapons, has a "moral responsibility" to act and to lead. Unfortunately, President Obama also said in the same speech, "I am not naïve. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime."

It is not enough for President Obama or other leaders to call for action. These leaders must actually take action, and this will require the support of the people in their countries and throughout the world. The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons will be met with opposition that can only be overcome by a strong and sustained demand from the people of the world. Too often leaders speak of a world without nuclear weapons as the "ultimate goal," meaning a goal to be achieved in the far distant future or perhaps not at all. We must work now to see that the word "ultimate" is replaced by the word "urgent," and that this change is converted to action.

We live in an astonishingly beautiful world and we share the miracle of life. As citizens of our unique, life-sustaining planet, we also share a responsibility to pass on our world intact to the next generation. To succeed in doing so, we must meet the Hiroshima challenge. We must accept the struggle of this challenge, and never give up until our world has been freed from the nuclear threat to humanity first revealed at Hiroshima.

Preventing Omnicide

Omnicide is a word coined by philosopher John Somerville. It is an extension of the concepts of suicide, homicide and genocide. It means the

death of all, the total negation and destruction of all life. It is what Rachel Carson began to imagine in her book, *Silent Spring*.

Can you imagine omnicide? No people. No animals. No trees. No friendships. No one to view the mountains, or the oceans, or the stars. No one to write a poem, or sing a song, or hug a baby, or laugh or cry. With no present, there can be no memory of the past, nor possibility of a future. There is nothing. *Nuclear weapons make possible the death of all, of omnicide*.

From the beginning of the universe some 15 billion years ago, it took 10.5 billion years before our planet was formed, and another 500 million years to produce the first life. From the first life on earth, it took nearly 4 billion years, up until 10,000 years ago, to produce human civilization. It is only in the last 65 years, barely a tick of the cosmic clock, that we have developed, deployed and used weapons capable of omnicide.

It took nearly 15 billion years to create the self-awareness of the universe that we humans represent. This self-awareness could be lost in the blinding flash of a thermonuclear war and the nuclear winter that would follow.

If omnicide is possible, which it is, we must ask ourselves: What are we going to do about it? Can we be complacent in the face of this threat, or will we find a way to confront and eliminate it? This is the responsibility of all of us alive at this time in human history. It is a human responsibility. We created nuclear weapons. It is up to us to end their threat to present and future generations.

The unfortunate truth is that we humans have been far too complacent in the face of the omnicidal potential of nuclear weapons. There are many reasons for this. For some of us, the threat is too painful to face, and we deny it. For others, nuclear weapons are rationalized as a positive force in preventing wars, despite their omnicidal potential. For still others, the threat is real, but they feel too insignificant to bring about change.

Those who justify nuclear weapons generally do so on the basis of *nuclear deterrence,* the threat of nuclear retaliation. The theory of nuclear deterrence is based upon the belief that all leaders will act rationally at all times and under all conditions, a very shaky proposition at best. One reason that Henry Kissinger and other former leaders are now calling for a world free of nuclear weapons is that they understand that deterrence has no power against terrorists in possession of nuclear arms. There can be zero tolerance of nuclear terrorism; but, if terrorism means the threat to injure or kill innocent people, aren't all countries in possession of nuclear weapons actually terrorists?

Carried to its extreme but logical conclusion, deterrence became Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). This is the threat of omnicide in the name of security. It is a very risky form of security. Today MAD may be thought

to have a new meaning: Mutual Assured Delusions—delusions that nuclear weapons can provide security for their possessors.

Nuclear weapons do not and cannot provide physical protection for their possessors. The threat of retaliation is not protection. Unfortunately, the control and use of these weapons, like other human endeavors, are subject to human fallibility. With nuclear weapons in human hands, there are no guarantees that nuclear war will not be initiated by accident or human error.

The starting point for ending the omnicidal threat of nuclear weapons is the recognition that the threat is real and pervasive, and requires action. Each of us is threatened. All we love and hold dear is threatened. The future is threatened. We are called upon to end our complacency and respond to this threat by demanding that our leaders develop a clear pathway to the total elimination of nuclear weapons and to the elimination of war as a means of resolving conflicts. These are critical steps on the path to a nonkilling world.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Human Survival

In the vastness of the universe there is only one place we know of where life exists. That place, of course, is our planet, our Earth. Our planet has been hospitable to the evolution of life, resulting in the development of complex life forms, including Homo sapiens, the "knowing" ones. We are "knowing" because we have the capacity to perceive and reflect upon our surroundings, our vision reaching to the far ends of the universe itself.

We humans are nature's mirror. We were created by the conditions of the universe, but in a sense it is also true that, by our perceptions and reflections, we create the universe. A well-known philosophical riddle asks whether a tree falling in the forest would make a sound if there were no one there to hear it. In the same way, but on a larger scale, we might ask if the universe itself would exist if there were no creatures like ourselves capable of perceiving and reflecting upon it.

Our human capacities are rare and special. In the long span of universe time, the appearance of humans is just a few short ticks on the cosmic clock. Yet, in that short span of time, we have achieved remarkable intellectual, spiritual and artistic heights. But we have also created tools capable of destroying much of life, including ourselves. By our cleverness in creating nuclear weapons, we have placed our own future on the planet in jeopardy.

With the existence of the future of our species in question, we are faced with a choice. We can confront this existential threat with ignorance, apathy and denial, or we can join together to end this threat of our own making.

Choosing the latter route would mean accepting responsibility for our common future and acting to assure it.

The diplomats from many nations of the world who negotiated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) had a solution to the nuclear weapons threat to humanity. They sought to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, and they also sought to eliminate the nuclear weapons already in the arsenals of those states that possessed them. Their efforts resulted in Article VI of the Treaty, under which the nuclear weapon states were required to engage in "good faith" negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

The NPT was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, and we are still waiting for those "good faith" negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament. In 1995, on the 25th anniversary of the Treaty entering into force, an NPT Review and Extension Conference was held at the United Nations in New York.

Many civil society organizations argued at this conference that the NPT should not be extended indefinitely, since it would give the equivalent of a blank check to the nuclear weapon states that had so badly failed in fulfilling their Treaty obligations for its first quarter century.

But the United States, along with the UK and France, argued for an indefinite extension and, in the end, prevailed. Unfortunately, the warnings that they would approach their obligations for "good faith" negotiations with the same disdain or indifference with which they had approached them in the past have proven true.

Since 1995, at the five-year NPT Review Conferences and the Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) in between, the United States and its allies have distributed slick public relations brochures that gloss over the lack of progress in complying with their Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations. They have resisted accepting even the responsibility to engage in the good faith negotiations to which they have committed themselves. Their goal seems to be to deflect criticism, while actually doing virtually nothing to promote a world free of nuclear weapons.

At the NPT Review Conferences and PrepComs, civil society organizations come to plead on behalf of humanity. They are given a few hours on the program to make their impassioned pleas, but often find that the official delegates to the conference are unwilling even to come to hear what they have to say. Over the years, the expectations that the delegates to the NPT will achieve any substantial progress have continued to diminish.

I am not interested in the charades that are played by the delegates to the NPT representing the governments of the nuclear weapon states. I want to

see some meaningful action on their part. We have a right to expect and demand such action. It is time for countries to stop playing cynical games that seek to avoid existing NPT obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Mutually Assured Destruction is unacceptable, whether it be between the US and Russia or India and Pakistan. Mutually Assured Delusions are also unacceptable. It is time for the UK and France to stop relying upon nuclear weapons because these weapons make them believe they are still important world powers. Israel needs to end its nuclear weapons program before other Middle East countries follow its example. Other countries, for example those in NATO and Japan and Australia, need to step out from under the US nuclear umbrella and stop being enablers of the nuclear addiction of a small number of states.

The only way out of our nuclear dilemma is for the countries of the world to demand that the Article VI obligation for "good faith" negotiations for nuclear disarmament be fulfilled. The US will have to provide leadership or it is unlikely that substantial progress will be possible. If the US doesn't act, it is unlikely that Russia will do so, and without Russian participation, it is unlikely that significant progress will be possible with the UK, France and China.

The NPT, with its membership of nearly all the world's countries, provides an appropriate forum for the countries of the world to negotiate a new treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. Once negotiations are planned, the non-NPT states (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea), all nuclear weapon states, should be invited to join. Alternatively, the United States, as the world's most militarily powerful country, could use its convening capacity to initiate negotiations among the nine nuclear weapon states, leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention with universal participation.

Civil society organizations have already prepared a draft Nuclear Weapons Convention. It has been introduced to the United Nations by the Republic of Costa Rica and Malaysia. The draft treaty is feasible. It is desirable. It could be accomplished relatively quickly. All that is required is the political will of the nuclear weapon states. Without this political will, the human future remains in peril. It is the 21st century equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns, but with far graver potential consequences for our common future.

The Ultimate Weapon of Terrorism

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapon of terrorism, whether in the hands of a terrorist organization or in those of the leader of a country. They are weapons of mass annihilation that kill indiscriminately—men, women

and children. Most people fear the possibility of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organizations, but never stop to consider that in any hands they are terrorist weapons.

Given the terrorist nature of nuclear weapons and their capacity to destroy civilization, what makes them acceptable to so many people? Or, at a minimum, what makes so many people complacent in the face of nuclear threats? These are questions I have grappled with for many decades.

The acceptability of nuclear weapons is rooted in the theory of nuclear deterrence, which its proponents argue has kept and will keep the peace. This theory is based upon many assumptions concerning human behavior. For example, it assumes the rationality of political and military leaders. It is evident that not all leaders behave rationally at all times and under all circumstances. The theory requires clear communications, and the threat to use nuclear weapons in retaliation must be believed by opposing leaders. But as we know communications are not always clear and misperceptions may influence beliefs.

There is a "madman" theory of nuclear deterrence. It posits that to be truly believable, the leader of a nuclear-armed state must exhibit behavior that appears sufficiently insane to lead opposing leaders to believe that he would actually use the weapons. Thus, insanity, or at least the impression of it, is built into the system. Can anyone doubt that the reciprocal threats of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) are truly mad, as in insane?

Another aspect of deterrence theory is that it requires a territory against which to retaliate. Thus, the theory is not valid in relation to a nonstate terrorist organization. If a country has no place to retaliate, there can be no nuclear deterrence. If a terrorist organization acquires a nuclear weapon, it will not be deterred by threat of nuclear retaliation. This places a fuse on the nuclear threat, and it means that there must be zero tolerance for a nonstate terrorist organization to acquire a nuclear capability.

There should also be zero tolerance for states to possess nuclear weapons. I am not limiting this observation to states that seek to develop nuclear arsenals. I mean all states and, most importantly, those already in possession of nuclear weapons. Current nuclear arsenals may be used by accident, miscalculation or intention. And so long as some states possess nuclear weapons and base their security upon them, there will be an incentive for nuclear proliferation.

Widespread nuclear complacency is difficult to understand. Most people are aware of the tremendous damage that nuclear weapons can do, but perhaps feel reassured that the weapons have not been used since 1945. The weapons are largely out of sight and out of mind. It is also possible that people feel impotent to influence nuclear policy and thus defer to experts and policy makers.

This is unfortunate because until large numbers of people assert themselves on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, the countries with nuclear weapons will continue to rely upon them to their peril and to the world's peril.

The New START agreement between the US and Russia is a modest step forward, providing for reduction of the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700. The greatest value of the treaty may be the restoration of inspections of each side's nuclear arsenal by the other side. But these steps provide only meager progress. At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation we advocate the following next steps forward:

- Reducing the total number of nuclear weapons – strategic, tactical and reserve—to under 1,000 on each side.
- Making a binding commitment to "No First Use" of nuclear weapons and to never using nuclear weapons under any circumstances against nonnuclear weapon states.
- De-alerting all nuclear weapons so that there will be no use by accident, miscalculation or in a fit of anger.
- Placing limits on missile defense systems and banning space weapons.
- Commencing multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, which would ban all nuclear weapons worldwide in a phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent manner.

These steps would be indications that the immorality, illegality and cowardice of threatening to use nuclear weapons were being met with a seriousness of purpose. It is not necessary for ignorance, apathy and complacency to dominate the nuclear arena. With due regard for the sanctity of life and for future generations, we can do better than to live with such inertia. We can eliminate a weapon that threatens civilization and human survival; we can move to zero, the only safe and stable number of nuclear weapons. This is the greatest challenge of our time, a challenge that we must respond to with engagement and persistence. It is time to replace Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) with Planetary Assured Security and Survival (PASS).

From Omnicide to Abolition

Nuclear weapons present humankind with an immense challenge, one far greater than most people understand. Many people realize, of course, that nuclear weapons are dangerous and deadly, and that in the past they were used to destroy the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with a single

weapon demolishing each city. But few people have grappled with the proposition that these weapons are omnicidal; they go beyond suicide, homicide and genocide to omnicide, the death of all.

In a cataclysmic strike, resulting in the destruction of present life forms on the planet, these weapons would also obliterate the past and future, destroying both human memory and possibility. They would obliterate every sacred part of being, leaving vast ruin and emptiness where once life, love, friendship, decency, hope and beauty had existed.

Despite the omnicidal capacity of nuclear weapons, leaders of a small number of countries continue to maintain and develop nuclear arsenals and to rely upon these weapons for national security. They justify this reliance on the basis of nuclear deterrence, arguing that the weapons prevent war by the threat of retaliation with overwhelming destructive force. This argument has many flaws, the most important being that deterrence is only a theory and is subject to human fallibility.

Unfortunately, leaders of the major nuclear weapon states are continuing to drag their feet on nuclear disarmament, sometimes rhetorically expressing the vision of a nuclear weapon-free world, but resisting serious actions toward the abolition of their arsenals that would provide assurance of their commitment. The leaders of the nuclear weapon states should bear in mind the following points in seeking a comprehensive solution to the omnicidal threat of nuclear weapons:

-   Nuclear weapons continue to present a real and present danger to humanity and other life on Earth.
-   Basing the security of one's country on the threat to kill tens of millions of innocent people, perhaps billions, and risking the destruction of civilization, has no moral justification and deserves the strongest condemnation.
-   It will not be possible to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons without fulfilling existing legal obligations for total nuclear disarmament.
-   Preventing nuclear proliferation and achieving nuclear disarmament will both be made far more difficult, if not impossible, by expanding nuclear energy facilities throughout the world.
-   Putting the world on track for eliminating the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons will require new ways of thinking about this overarching danger to present and future generations.

At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation proposed the following five steps for priority action:

1. Each signatory nuclear weapon state should provide an accurate public accounting of its nuclear arsenal, conduct a public environmental and human assessment of its potential use, and devise and make public a roadmap for going to zero nuclear weapons.

2. All signatory nuclear weapon states should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies by taking all nuclear forces off high-alert status, pledging No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapon states and No Use against nonnuclear weapon states.

3. All enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium—military and civilian—and their production facilities (including all uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technology) should be placed under strict and effective international safeguards.

4. All signatory states should review Article IV of the NPT, promoting the "inalienable right" to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in light of the nuclear proliferation problems posed by nuclear electricity generation.

5. All signatory states should comply with Article VI of the NPT, reinforced and clarified by the 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion, by commencing negotiations in good faith on a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and complete these negotiations by the year 2015.

None of these steps were agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The most important action going forward would be an agreement to commence good faith negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Such an agreement would demonstrate the needed political will among the world's countries to move forward toward a world without nuclear weapons. If the United States fails to lead in convening these negotiations, I urge other countries to do so. Regardless of which countries provide the leadership, however, I propose that the opening session of these negotiations be held in Hiroshima, the first city to have suffered nuclear devastation, and the final session of these negotiations be held in Nagasaki, the second and, hopefully, last city to have suffered atomic devastation.

If agreement could be reached to begin these negotiations for a new treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, we would be on a serious path to-

ward a nuclear weapons-free world, one that would allow the *hibakusha* of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to know that their pleas have been heard.

Perhaps the most urgent contemporary challenge confronting humanity in the 21st century is to end the nuclear weapons era. To move from the threat of omnicide to abolition will require a major outpouring of support from people everywhere. The task cannot be left to political leaders alone. Without a strong foundation of public support, political leaders are unlikely to be courageous and persistent in seeking to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Ordinary citizens must overcome their disempowerment and propensity to defer to experts in order to act for the benefit of all humankind and demand the change they seek, in this case the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Implementing Change

The path to achieving change in the Nuclear Age starts with the use of powerful traditional human means for bringing about change: conscience, compassion, courage, cooperation, creativity and commitment.

Conscience is the voice inside that distinguishes right from wrong, and moves us to take action for what is right. It is a capacity that is uniquely human. We can recognize right from wrong and choose our course. With conscience there is always choice.

Compassion is the force of love put into action. Along with poet John Donne, we must recognize that we are "a part of the continent, a piece of the main." We must care for the Earth and all its inhabitants. Compassion does not recognize borders. We all share a common Earth. We are all created equal. We are all diminished by nuclear threats or any other threats to the well-being of people anywhere.

C*ourage* is required to think differently, to break away from the group-think of the tribe. It takes courage to express compassion and to embrace the world. It takes courage to wage peace rather than war.

Cooperation is needed to solve the world's great problems. There is no significant global problem—war, abuses of human rights, environmental degradation, climate change, nuclear threat—that can be solved by any one nation alone. It takes not only a village, but a world to bring about the changes that are needed.

Creativity is also essential to change. It will take new and creative ways of thinking to prevent the ultimate catastrophe to ourselves and our fellow inhabitants of Earth. Einstein said prophetically, "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift

toward unparalleled catastrophe." We must change our modes of thinking, and replace the old patterns with new ones. We must become world citizens and peace leaders and use our human powers to stop the drift.

Commitment will keep you going when the goal seems distant and the obstacles seem overwhelming. No great goal is easy to attain, but some goals – and I place the abolition of nuclear weapons among these – are challenges that cannot be ignored or cast aside. The future, which cannot speak for itself and has only our voice, deserves our commitment.

The Power of Imagination

Albert Einstein, the great 20th century scientist and humanitarian, wrote, "Imagination is more important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and understand." Let us exercise our imaginations.

Imagine the horror and devastation of Hiroshima, and multiply it by every city and country on earth.

Imagine that a nuclear war could end human life on our planet, and that the capacity to initiate a nuclear war rests in the hands of only a few individuals in each nuclear weapon state.

Imagine that nuclear weapons threaten the future of humanity and all life.

Imagine that we are not helpless in the face of this threat, and that we can rise to the challenge of ending the nuclear weapons era.

Imagine that together we can make a difference and that you are needed to create a nuclear weapons-free world.

Imagine a world without the threat of nuclear devastation, a world that you helped to create.

There is an Indian proverb which states, "All of the flowers of all the tomorrows are in the seeds of today." We must nurture, with all our human capacities, the seeds of peace and human dignity which have been so poorly tended for so long.

The time has come for renewed energy and leadership to end the nuclear weapons threat to humanity, to restore and maintain peace, to live up to the highest standards of human rights, and to pursue a nonkilling world. Change is coming, if we will use our imaginations, raise our voices, stand firm and persist in demanding it.

Chapter Ten

Reverence for Life and Reverence for Death

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Even in victory, there is no beauty,
And he who calls it beautiful
Is one who delights in slaughter.
He who delights in slaughter
Will not succeed in his ambition to rule the world.
The slaying of multitudes should be mourned with sorrow.
A victory should be celebrated with the Funeral Rite.

Lao-tse, *Dao de Jing*

In *The Book of Tea*, Kakuzo Okakura (1964: 63) writes: "He only who has lived with the beautiful can die beautifully." A profound thought, a thought worth reflecting about in our age, in the age in which we neither live beautifully nor die in that way. Have we forgotten the ancient wisdom of living and dying beautifully?

Perhaps it is not all our fault. How to live beautifully when we are surrounded by wars, violence, and destruction? According to some statistics by the UN, in the entire twentieth century there were only twenty-eight days without wars. Only twenty eight-days without destruction and killing, without one group of armed men competing in hatred and brutality with another group of armed men. 170 million human beings have died in these wars. That makes 4630 casualties a day, 193 every hour, and three persons every single minute.[1]

As the bloodiest century in recorded history unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the most frequent victims of wars are not armed forces but civilians: bystanders, those happening to find themselves at the wrong

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[1] For some of the relevant statistics, see Glenn D. Page, *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (2009). See also "Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the Twentieth Century," Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2006) and Dunnigan and Bay (2008).

place at the wrong time. This century invented not only the means of mass destruction—"the weapons of mass destruction," as we call them—it has also perfected mass destruction itself. Its symbols are the barbwire of concentration camps and the atomic mushroom cloud towering over obliterated cities. This century of murder, the century of genocide, left behind its scars on almost every body, on every soul.

By any measurable statistics, there is an upsurge of violence virtually everywhere in the world. Wars or no wars, the number of assaults—aggravated, sexual, or of any other—is in drastic increase. (See Grossman, 1996: 299-305.) How can we die peacefully when we cannot live peacefully? How can we live peacefully when we can be victimized at any time, at any place?

Recent history appears to justify the suspicion Thomas Hobbes harbored a few centuries ago—that man is a wolf to any other man. *Homo homini lupus*, claimed Hobbes, and as a solution he proposed a strong, virtually tyrannical government. But tyrannical governments turned out not to provide comfort either. Tyranny does not show much concern for humanity. It defends its hold on power with a single-minded pursuit, the pursuit which ignores the piles of maimed bodies and crippled souls. Tyranny blossomed in the twentieth century. Humanity did not.

Although recent history makes it look inevitable, the conclusion that our nature is murderous should be taken with caution. Even when armies are involved in most murderous encounters called wars, things are not as straightforward as they appear in Hollywood movies. According to the American military historian S.L.A. Marshall (the U.S. Army Brigadier General), in WWII the firing rate among American soldiers involved in combat was only 15-20%. This number included the firing rate in close combat, when the facial expressions of the enemy soldiers could be clearly discerned over the barrel of the gun. Of course, this statistic was of the most disturbing kind for the military, for the soldier's job is to fire and disable the enemy. So General Marshall was appointed the head of a team that would examine the problem and offer a remedy. The result of their study was astonishing: the same low firing rate was valid for all other armies involved in WWII, and for all the armies of the past. The result of this study led to a conclusion unfavorable for the military establishment but encouraging for the rest of humanity: human beings display an innate resistance toward killing other human beings; even a standard military training does not break up this resistance.

As astonishing as the finding of Marshall's team was, a new training designed by the US military to weaken and eliminate this resistance was nothing short of miraculous. It consisted in three forcefully imposed steps: desensitiza-

tion toward killing, operant conditioning to fire at every opportunity, and a defense-denial mechanism to break the sense of guilt for killing other human beings. (See Grossman, 1996: 249-295.) The improvements were soon visible. In the Korean War, the firing rate increased to 55%, in Vietnam it was 90-95%, and now in Afghanistan and Iraq the firing rate has reached the virtually magical number of 100%. Our soldiers now fire before they can see the faces of their victims. They fire first and check the identities of their victims later. The military accomplished its task, and that is what matters. The fact that the number of cases of "collateral damage" has also drastically increased—the increase only comparable to the proliferation of the amount of waste produced in the Western world—has received far less attention. As long as we can dump our waste somewhere, far away from home, and as long as dead bodies are piled up in other countries, not here, they are somebody else's problem. Not ours.

As great as this military achievement was, it led to two unforeseen effects which could not be dumped into someone else's yard. The first was that the soldiers trained to kill were still conditioned to kill, even after all combat was over, even after they returned to live in a "normal," nonmilitary environment. Soldiers conditioned to kill needed to be reconditioned from killing, and no one knew how to reverse the original process. In technical language, they suffered from "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder." In ordinary parlance, there was a high price to pay for killing: a war veteran either could not stop killing, or—in less dramatic situations—he could not live with the images of his dead victims.

There was also a price to pay not only by war veterans but by the rest of society. Inspired by the successful military techniques of desensitization and operant conditioning, the media and various manufacturers started using a similar *modus operandi* on the youth in order to sell their products. Our children do not learn much about Gandhi and have probably never heard of Schweitzer, but they are quite familiar with Rambo, or James Bond. Through violent movies, video games, and violence in TV programs, coupled with the lack of positive role models and the modern disintegration of family (the divorce rate in the US is over 50%), violence, destruction, and even killing become widely accepted. Associated with "fun," they led to a high degree of desensitization of the entire population toward violence, destruction, and killing. In the US alone, guns are present in one-third of the households. More than 44 million adults posses firearms, and they are easily accessible to children as well. According to the Children's Defense Fund, "135 thousand children take guns and other weapons to school each day" (Paige, 2009: 29). Keeping in mind that the youth has no drill sergeant to control the release of

violence, it is easy to see why the problem has become so rampant, and why violence and the number of assaults have been in constant ascent. It is, then, clear why there is an impression that we, human beings, are brutes always ready to fight and harm each other. And it also becomes understandable why it is so increasingly difficult to live a beautiful life. As the recent Italian movie, "*La vita è bella*," intimates, to experience life as beautiful in our age requires a steady dose of deception. In the age of killing, in the age of mass murder, beauty comes with an expensive price tag as well.

This dramatic upsurge of violence, destruction, and killing is not an accidental phenomenon. Nor should the military take all of blame for it. This change is ultimately traceable to the deeper seismic shifts occurring within the European and American civilizations. To shed some light on these shifts in the consciousness—and unconsciousness—of the Western mind, we will briefly refer to the works of Mircea Eliade, Phillip Hallie, Erich Fromm, and Albert Schweitzer.

Eliade describes the monumental shift occurring in our civilization in terms of the lost sense of the sacred, of turning the sacred into the profane. Unlike the word "holy," which refers to something belonging to, or coming from God, the world "sacred" has a broader meaning and does not refer so much to the origin of something as to our attitude toward it. "Sacred" is what we need to set apart, to consecrate. It is something we should not violate, make profane, or make common. In the world in which nothing is sacred, there is no taboo, nothing that cannot be violated.

The experience of a radically desacralized cosmos is a recent discovery. Its main consequence is that, for the nonreligious human beings, for those for whom nothing is sacred, the cosmos has become opaque, inert, and mute; it transmits no message, it has no meaning.

Why does this change occur? According to Eliade (1959: 203):

> Modern nonreligious man assumes a new existential situation; he regards himself solely as the subject and agent of history, and he refuses all appeal to transcendence. In other words, he accepts no model for humanity outside the human condition as it can be seen in the various historical situations. Man makes himself, and he only makes himself completely in proportion as he desacralizes himself and the world. The sacred is the prime obstacle to his freedom. He will become himself only when he is totally demysticized. He will not be truly free until he has killed the last god.

In the spirit of Nietzsche, Eliade argues that in the process of disfiguring gods, man wishes to promote himself into a new Master. Yet Eliade sees this change in an even larger context than Nietzsche: despite our proclaimed inten-

tions, we cannot but accept something as sacred, we cannot but be religious. We must believe in something. The only question is whether we are going to believe in authentic gods or in plastic deities: Are we going to believe in those gods who stimulate us to rise to a new level in human development, or in the fabricated idols of the present culture which sink us deeper into a black hole?

No such "new god" inspires any confidence. If he wants to, if he cares to, the man-pretending-to-be-a-new-god can learn one lesson from recent history: even when he acts with the best of intentions, what he fabricates, what he "creates"—he can no longer trust. He cannot trust especially that which he himself creates. All of man's great designs and ingenious inventions turn out to produce more damage than good. There is no greater irony—and no greater folly—than to believe that man, a creature that, upon the irrefutable evidence of his own history, cannot control himself, should be put in complete control of an entire nation, or—God forbid!—all life on earth.

Let us also not forget that for every lunatic tyrant who imagines himself to be a god, for every Adolf Hitler, there are thousands of Adolf Eichmanns, thousands and millions of little bureaucratic rats working hard to turn the sick vision of their inspirational leader into a tangible reality. Fortunately for the human race, even in the worst of times there are those who never lose what Phillip Hallie (1994: 277) describes as "an imaginative perception of the connection between the preciousness of my life and the preciousness of other lives."[2] In an even broader context, we can call it a perception of the interconnectedness with all other life, a sense of participation in a larger scheme of being, and a sense of brotherhood with everything that exists. For Hallie, the perception of this interconnectedness is the root of morality. It is something that underlies the principle of morality and gives it meaning and vitality. Without "keeping that perception [of the preciousness of life] green," a principle of morality is a mere form, a precept as abstract and detached as the soulless and impersonal letter of law (ibidem).

The belief in the sacredness of human life is not based on (deductive or inductive) reasoning. Nor is it something that can be proven by scientific or any other kind of evidence. Hallie talks about an "intuitive perception" of the interconnectedness of all human lives and our sense of brotherhood. Not blood, not the same language, social customs, political alliances, or even religious practices make one a brother. Compassion does. We perceive life as

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[2] Although Hallie talks explicitly about the preciousness of human life, many of his remarks indicate his appreciation for nature as a whole and life as such. This is even clearer in Hallie's later book (1997).

sacred, or we do not. The Nazis did not perceive Jews as brothers, they did not see the lives of Jews as sacred. The citizens of a small French village, Le Chambon-sur-Lignon, did. One night during the winter of 1940-41, a woman knocked at the door of the village's Protestant pastor, told him that she was a Jewish refuge fleeing from the Nazis, and asked for help. After her came more Jewish refugees, mostly children. The villagers opened their doors for all of them, with simple words: "Naturally, come in, and come in" (1994: 287). No resident of Le Chambon turned away, denounced, or betrayed any of about 5,000 Jews that found their way toward that remote mountainous place. Not one Jew was taken by the Nazis from the village of Le Chambon. (In the rest of occupied France, by comparison, collaborators delivered about 10,000 children, and altogether about 83,000 Jews to the Nazi concentrations camps. Only about 3,000 survived the camps.[3])

The treatment of human life as sacred must not be imposed from the outside, but has to grow from inside, from one's insight concerning the preciousness of all life. Let us try to clarify this by another example. When medical doctors accept the Hippocratic Oath, they are asked to display their respect for all human life: in every situation, under all circumstances. The ethics of medical practice demands a separation of harming from curing: the first duty is not to harm any human life, and then to try to help as many as doctors can. Symbolically speaking, doctors are asked to treat all human life as sacred.

Unlike professional obligations, and unlike law, both ethics and our sense of the sacredness of life must grow from inside out. For the villagers of Le Chambon, the conviction that we must be our brothers' keepers was part of how they perceived reality around themselves. When something like that is part of how we perceive the world, then, as Hallie says, "goodness is the simplest thing in the world … like opening a door." For Hallie, who participated in WWII as a soldier and who perceived himself as a "decent killer," learning about what occurred in that small village became a ray of hope, a possibility of something sacred in his world that previously included only the combative "either—or" mentality: either I kill you or you kill me (literally or symbolically). The experience of the villagers of La Chambon shocked him all the more when they explained to him that they were motivated not just by the desire to save the refugees but perhaps even more by the yearning to prevent German soldiers from committing even more evils, from hardening their hearts completely. For the villagers of Le Chambon, the sacred consisted in a vision that we are all brothers and, consequently,

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[3] See <http://www.auschwitz.dk/Trocme.htm>.

that we all have to be our brothers' keepers. That is what made the opening of their doors so easy and the sacrifices on behalf of strangers so natural.

Decent and indecent murders, as well as those who perceive everyone else as their brothers, are all part of the same world. What differentiates them so fundamentally are their perceptions of the same reality. Just as a building can be seen either as a house or as a home, another human being can be perceived as being "with us or against us," as our brother or as a stranger. Life can be seen as mere life—as a mechanical process unfolding according to the laws of nature—or as far more than mere life—as the greatest miracle of the universe. How we see it will determine what we value and what kind of choices we make. What we perceive depends not only on our physical organs but on our hearts and our minds. What we perceive depends on whether or not we regard anything as sacred.

Similar thoughts have been further developed by Erich Fromm.[4] Although Fromm's initial teachers were Marx and Freud, he tried to overcome the limitations of their views by insisting on the opposition between "biophilia" and "necrophilia." Fromm defines good as "all that serves life; evil is all that serves death. Good is reverence for life, all that enhances life, growth, unfolding" (1964: 47). The consciousness of the biophilous person is not one of forcing oneself to refrain from evil and to do good. Fromm criticizes Freud for defining goodness in terms of the suppression and control of our natural drives and impulses. In the case of a biophilous person, it is not the superego described by Freud, employing sadism against oneself (repression) for the sake of virtue. The biophilous person is motivated by a spontaneous attraction to life and joy. The moral effort of such a person consists in strengthening the life-loving side in oneself.

Fromm also criticizes Marx for focusing too much on the economic aspect of life, on the wrong side of the dilemma which he terms as "to have or to be." Fromm dissociates biophilia from the hoarding tendencies of modern man and our obsession with the sacredness of material goods. He relates biophilia to a productive orientation of the character. This creative orientation does not manifest itself in fabrication of new things but in loving interaction with others, with a sense of brotherhood with everything alive. For Fromm, love of life is the foundation of all positive values. The person who fully loves life is attracted by the process of growth in all spheres of life. Such a person prefers to construct rather than to retain. The biophilous

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[4] Martin's rendering of reverence for life is motivated by similar concerns. See his *Albert Schweitzer's Reverence for Life: Ethical Idealism and Self-Realization* (Martin, 2007: 4).

person wants to mold and to influence by love, reason, and personal example; not by force, not by mutilating bodies and poisoning souls, nor by the bureaucratic manner of administering people as if they are things.

Unfortunately, it is not biophilia which dominates our contemporary world. It is its dark twin: necrophilia—the love of the dead and the obsession with dead things. By the term "necrophilious" Fromm does not refer to a perverse act (in the traditional meaning of this term) but to a character trait, to an increasing fascination of contemporary culture toward mechanical, nonliving artifacts. This approach has become our normal way of dealing with things, our standard, our pride: "The bureaucratic-industrial civilization which has been victorious in Europe and North America has created a new type of man; he can be described as the *organization man*, as the *automaton man*, and as *homo consumens*. He is, in addition, *homo mechanicus*; by this I mean a gadget man, deeply attracted by all that is mechanical, and inclined against that which is alive" (Fromm, 1964: 57-58).[5]

Although Fromm's initial teachers were Marx and Freud, he discovered his deepest inspiration in the life and work of Albert Schweitzer. The phrases 'biophilia' and 'necrophilia' are Fromm's attempts to render Schweitzer's distinction between reverence and irreverence for life. Fromm knew that Schweitzer started his career as a brilliant theologian and an excellent organ player. He was also a budding philosopher and an established scholar when (in his thirties) he decided to enroll into a medical school. After obtaining his medical degree, Schweitzer left his promising career in Europe and went to Africa. He opened a hospital in the most malaria-infected part of Africa (the area which today belongs to Gabon), with no doctor in the radius of one thousand miles. In this way, Schweitzer thought, he can serve life and follow the example of Jesus: by dedicating his life to the poorest of the poor, by serving those who are the least privileged, Schweitzer lived in Africa for over fifty years and died there at the age of ninety, as a fulfilled man.

Despite his medical and missionary work, Schweitzer never stopped writing. His main philosophical work is *The Philosophy of Civilization* (*Kulturphilosopie*). Its first part, "The Decay and Restoration of Civilization," concurs with Eliade, Hallie, and Fromm's assessment of the dangerous—Schweitzer says: "suicidal"—course of our civilization. He takes the mechanization of the world and the depersonalization of humanity as the main symptoms of the decaying civilization, of our irreverence for life. Even when we are able to ap-

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[5] See Fromm (1992), especially Chap. 13: "Malignant Aggression: Adolf Hitler, A Clinical Case of Necrophilia." For valuable discussion, see also Yutang Lin (1943: 159-216).

preciate anything as beautiful and live with it, that beauty is something super-ficial and harmful. We have turned away from nature, away from spirituality. We appreciate what is artificial and unhealthy, against what is natural and cul-tivated. And yet, the word *Kultur* (somewhat inaccurately translated into Eng-lish as "civilization") is based on the cultivation of our natural predispositions, on the spiritual ennoblement of that which is given us by nature.

The core problem that leads to the decay of our civilization Schweitzer rec-ognizes in the lack of ethical ideals and ethical energy. With the mechanization of nature and the depersonalization of humanity, we have lost our ethical guid-ance and a sense of ethical orientation. Our mantras are "practical realism" and "pragmatism," which Schweitzer compares with children sliding down a hill in their sleds, never knowing what the next curve brings and whether we will be able to manage it. This is how our economists and our politicians "lead" us: from one economic crisis to another, from one war to another.

In the second part of *The Philosophy of Civilization*, Schweitzer proposes his own ethical vision, "the ethics of reverence for life," which he believes can heal our sick civilization. Our contemporary ethics—the "ethics of conduct," as it is also called—focuses too much on our choices of correct actions and on the avoidance of what is considered impermissible. Among numerous modifications of this ethical approach that Schweitzer proposes, the following are the most essential. Instead of concentrating so narrowly on what is per-missible, beneficial, and efficient, we should turn attention to the spirit in which we perform various actions. Not the "what" question but the "how" question is the key for ethics: what matters the most is not just what action is performed, but in what spirit. Schweitzer's (1987: 306) own proposal as to how we should behave and in what spirit we should act, is captured by the phrase "reverence for life" (*Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben*): "The basic principle of ethics … which is engaged in constant, living, and practical dispute with real-ity, is: Devotion to life resulting from reverence for life." As he also puts it:

> It is good to maintain life and further it; it is bad to damage and destroy life. However much it struggles against it, ethics arrives at the religion of Jesus. It must recognize that it can discover no other relationship to other beings as full of sense as the relationship of love. Ethics is the maintaining of life at the highest point of development—my own life and other life—by devoting myself to it in help and love, and both these things are connected (2009 [1934]: 83).[6]

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[6] See also Schweitzer (1936: 260; 1987: 309).

Schweitzer's refreshing approach captures Eliade's concern for the recovery of the sacred, Hallie's belief in the preciousness of all human lives, and Fromm's urge toward biophilia; it implies a devotion to life, by which Schweitzer means an affirmative, thoughtful, and loving attitude toward life. Besides redefining good and evil in terms of promotion and destruction of life, Schweitzer introduces another radical proposal. When talking about promoting life, he has in mind our ethical behavior toward all life, toward every form of life. Not only that our behavior affects all forms of life, in every living being there is the same fundamental impulse to live, to preserve and enhance its existence. The recognition of this truth is for Schweitzer the foundation of his ethics: all life should be treated as sacred.

When we attempt to master and control nature, when we behave as if we are the Lords of the world, we focus on the differences between humans and other forms of life. This emphasis on differences leads to separation, depreciation, and irreverence for life. Schweitzer instead invites us to recognize the fundamental interconnectedness of all life. He emphasizes the importance of integrating ourselves into a larger whole of being, the whole we can neither explain nor control. He urges us to develop a spiritual relationship with this whole, of which we are but a part, and to show our reverence through a thoughtful and loving affirmation of all forms of life and of the environment.

Schweitzer does not attempt to create (or fabricate) a new plastic idol but to revive an imperative that has been known for all ages: "Thou shalt not kill." He considers this proclamation to be one of the most important events in the spiritual history of the mankind. (See Schweitzer, 1936: 80 and Hesse, 1971: 123-27.) Reverence for life is but a reformulation of this ancient wisdom, promoted by all religious traditions. Similarly, the recognition that love is the most important force in the universe does not have to be reinvented either—it has been known to all cultures and at all times. The ethics of reverence for life—which unites the negative command not to kill and the positive command to love—signifies a recurrence of the values which have always been there, but which we in our carelessness or blindness refuse to recognize and respect.

Schweitzer defends the highly controversial view that killing another living being is never morally permissible—under no circumstances, regardless of the motives or the kind of living beings involved. This view provokes immediate reactions: Can Schweitzer possibly believe that all killing can be eliminated? If killing is sometimes necessary, how can it never be morally permissible? Can the line between necessary and unnecessary killing ever be drawn in a nonarbitrary manner?

Let us first give Schweitzer a chance to clarify his position, by quoting from one of his letters (Letter to Jack Eisendraht, in Bähr, Ed., 1992: 218; See also Schweitzer, 1987 and 1998: 236; and Seaver, 1963: 102):

> I have just killed a mosquito that was buzzing around me in the lamplight. In Europe I wouldn't kill it even if it were bothering me, but here [in Africa], where mosquitoes spread the most dangerous form of malaria, I take the liberty of killing them, although I don't like doing it. The important thing is for all of us to properly reflect on the question of [whether] damaging and killing are permissible.
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> Most people are not yet truly acquainted with this issue. They still approve of thoughtless damage and killing and enjoy the sport of killing (hunting, fishing, with no professional need to pursue them). Some people who came up the river to my hospital shot, purely as a sport, at all the creatures they saw: the pelican (which still has to feed its three chicks), the caiman, which sleeps on a branch looming into the water, and the monkey peering at a boat.
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> I try to make all such people think about their actions. Much will be achieved once people become reflective and wisely realize that they should damage and kill only when necessary. That is the essence.

Schweitzer does not hold that killing can be eliminated from the world. In his books on Africa he describes how, besides mosquitoes, he also killed poisonous snakes, traveler ants, scorpions, cockroaches, and viral bacteria. (See Schweitzer, 1963: 30, 60, and 108-110.) At no point in his life does he believe that all killing can be eliminated.

When Schweitzer kills a mosquito, he does not do it out of irreverence. He kills it "out of a necessity." This necessity is not logical but practical, a necessity within the realm of expediency. He is not a philosopher sitting in his office, pondering amusing theoretical "lifeboat" dilemmas. Schweitzer strongly opposes not only the "possible worlds" scenarios, so popular in contemporary philosophy, but also the illusion of a detached and value-neutral moral agent. It is an idle thought experiment to guess what a moral agent ought to do "in the original position." Adam Smith's idea of an "impartial spectator" and John Rawls' "unbiased unborn" are deceptive fictions. (See Smith, 1976: 161-62, 228-29; and Rawls, 1971: 12-22.) Schweitzer understands ethics in terms of an unavoidable participation in the drama of reality. We are always in the midst of life, pressed by practical problems which demand our judgment and action. A mosquito is attacking him and he has to decide what to do. In Africa, he kills it. In Europe, he does not.

Schweitzer urges us not to confuse the necessity of killing with ethical permissibility. If killing is evil, it must remain evil in any kind of situation, regardless of the motives or consequences. When it means the destruction of another life, even killing for food or in self-defense is evil. In the situations with such conflicts of values, no guiltless escape is possible.

Ethically speaking, in those kinds of circumstances our choice is between one negative value and another negative value. Of this tragic aspect of life Schweitzer (1988: 55) is fully aware: "For the ethical person there is no such thing as a good conscience, but always only battle with oneself, doubting and questioning." (See also Hartmann, 1932: 76.) The tragic dimension of life offers no excuse or ethical justification for killing. Facing two evils and choosing the lesser does not transform the chosen one into something good. A lesser of two evils is still an evil.

Which of the two evils we choose is ethically relevant in another sense. There are significant differences between various ways of killing. This is the point in which our motives are important. In Europe, we kill mosquitoes because they are annoying; in Africa, because they spread a dangerous disease. Schweitzer considers the first avoidable and the second necessary. Later in the quoted letter he cites even more irreverent cases of killing: for fun, or, as he calls it, for sport. Animals killed this way are not even annoying, as mosquitoes may be. Their existence need not interfere with ours in any way, or only marginally so, yet we feel righteous about shooting them.

Thoughtless, careless, and irreverent behavior is precisely the problem that leads Schweitzer to advocate the ethics of reverence for life. Even if we cannot eliminate it all, we can at least eliminate needless killing. And not just the killing of animals and plants, but the killing of human beings. For years, Schweitzer and other missionaries in Africa struggled to explain Jesus' ethics of love to the natives who, in confusion, would point to the white people (the French and the German) killing each other on their soil. Are they not all Christians, the sons of the same God who preaches love, the natives asked Schweitzer. Are they not civilized? (See Schweitzer, 1963: 104-105.)

When Schweitzer's critics complain about his ethics, they concentrate too much on his contention that all life, without difference, is sacred. Perhaps this could have been avoided had he made clearer the distinction between "holy" and "sacred." It would have also helped had Schweitzer stated that the emphasis in the phrase "reverence for life" should be more on the first word, rather than on the last. We believe this is what he has in mind when he claims, after complaining that one existence holds its own at the cost of another: "Only in the thinking human being has the will to live become con-

scious of other wills to live and desirous of solidarity with them…. As an ethical being … one tries to end this division of the will to live insofar as it is in one's power. Such a person aspires to prove one's humanity and to release others from their sufferings" (1998: 158). Schweitzer appeals to our rationality and to our sensitivity toward others. Such aspirations are united together in our unavoidable confrontations with the "ghastly drama of will to live divided against itself" (1987: 312). Translated into practice, he urges us not only to avoid killing whenever possible, but also to be as humane as possible.

Schweitzer's critics argue that his ethics of reverence for life is too naïve, and that there are good reasons why we have turned away from the ancient religious traditions. They point out that life is a cruel struggle for survival in which it is inevitable to destroy and kill other forms of life. It is foolish and counter-productive to consider all forms of life as sacred. It is dubious, they argue, whether we should consider even human life as sacred. Killing and death and hatred are as much a part of reality as life and growth and love are.

Schweitzer does not deny that killing is sometimes inevitable, that death is part of reality. Yet he has two important replies, the first dealing with the distinction between necessary and unnecessary killing, the second with our irreverent attitude toward killing. The spiritual crisis of our civilization exists because we kill so easily and carelessly. We kill for sport (e.g., hunting), or we kill because we may find other forms of life annoying and can afford to dispose of them. And we also kill—not only other forms of life, but even human beings—when we find it convenient for us. We kill other human beings because of our shortsighted political and economic interests. We kill to convince others and ourselves how free, democratic, and peace-loving we are.

Schweitzer never used the phrase "reverence for death," but he should have. His theory and his practice indicate that, despite the prevailing view to the contrary, killing and reverence need not exclude each other. Even when indispensible, killing can still be done in a reverent way. Keeping in mind Schweitzer's conviction that what matters the most is not what deed is performed but in what spirit, Frank Kendon writes (apud Seaver, 1963: 102):

> [Reverence] is not an arbitrary and willful definition; it is a mental attitude, it is the opposite of ruthlessness, and of thoughtlessness. One can weed a garden reverently, or ruthlessly. One can even kill a poisonous snake reverently or ruthlessly, necessarily or unnecessarily. This principle does not say: Be kind to your neighbor because this ensures the solidarity of society; it says: Be universally kind, whenever the choice occurs. It does not say it is a sin to pluck a flower or kill a moth; it says: Do not pluck flowers or kill moths without first greeting the divine principle in them.

Such an attitude is found in various cultures all over the world. We find it in American Indians, and we can be sure that Schweitzer observed it in the natives of Africa. Did he himself subscribe to such a view? According to Robert Payne, "When a native of the Ogowe [region] cuts down a tree, he says a prayer to it and asks its pardon. Schweitzer would do the same" (Payne, 1957: 179).[7]

We can see from Schweitzer's praise of Gandhi, who stood against the long-maintained Hindu tradition and argued in favor of administering a killing injection to a hopelessly suffering animal, that these are not just passing remarks. Both Gandhi and Schweitzer recognize that, in some circumstances, more damage can be done by the "slavish [obedience to] command not to kill" than by breaking it:

> When the suffering of a living creature cannot be alleviated, it is more ethical to end its life by killing it mercifully than it is to stand aloof. It is more cruel to let domestic animals which one can no longer feed die a painful death by starvation than to give them a quick and painless death by violence…. True reverence for morality is shown by readiness to face the difficulties contained in it (1936: 83-84).[8]

Schweitzer is not concerned about the life after death, "another world," the salvation of the soul, or personal immortality. His energies and thoughts are directed toward this life and this world. He is concerned about not losing his soul here and now (1988: 61). This does not mean that he ignores the issue of death, or that he has nothing to say about it. Schweitzer harshly criticizes the widespread religious practices of using "fear of death" to "frighten people into eternal life." Instead, he urges us to develop a "calm and natural" approach to death. Yet the focus should never be on death but on life, on a "true love for life" which accepts every day as a gift and creates an inward freedom from bodily needs and material things (1988: 125-126).[9] As Norman Cousins (1960: 220-21) paraphrases Schweitzer,

> The tragedy of life is not in the hurt to a man's name or even in the fact of death itself. The tragedy of life is in what dies inside a man while he lives—the death of genuine feeling, the death of inspired response, the death of the

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[7] The view of the American Indians is masterfully summarized in the letter that the Chief Seattle wrote to the US President in 1852; it is quoted, for example, in Campbell (1988: 42-43). See also Grossman, 1996: xxii-xxx, 323-32; and Woodruff (2001: 222).

[8] For further discussion, see Bentley (1992: 146-47). See also Erikson (1969: 422-23).

[9] For further discussion, see Brabazon (2000: 484-503). See also Davis (2005: 133-36).

awareness that makes it possible to feel the pain or the glory of another man in oneself. Schweitzer's aim was not to dazzle an age but to awaken it, to make it comprehend that moral splendor is part of the gift of life, and that each man has unlimited strength to feel human oneness and to act upon it.

Schweitzer himself laments that "it is becoming ever more difficult to be a personality" (1987: 88). The way we live, the way our civilization is developing, we are increasingly turned into machine-like things—spiritually insensitive, numb, dead… Our rush of life—for more money, for more efficiency, for more successful careers—has made it more and more difficult to appreciate life as a gift. It has made it more difficult to experience anything as beautiful and to live with the beautiful.

The key to the healing of our civilization is neither in the further development of technology and science nor in the further acquisition of power and wealth. It is in the strength of the spirit. "If the spirit is strong," maintains Schweitzer, "it creates world history. If it is weak, it suffers world history" (2009 [1934]: 77). We live in the age of weak spirit; we suffer world history. Perhaps the surest indication of this weakness of spirit is the declining significance of religion in our time. Instead of being the pillar of spirituality and endorsing the highest moral standards and the ideal of peace, religion regularly joins forces with politics and economy during the recent wars; religion puts itself in the service of short-sighted goals of the so-called "practical realism."

Besides religion's betrayal of its spiritual and ethical calling, Schweitzer argues that the spirit of our age is weak because Western civilization has squandered its moral capital. The West has wasted its moral credibility both in its own lands, and in its dealings with the rest of the world. In addition to the never-ceasing battles for political power and economic gain, the history of the West includes the two most brutal wars the world had ever witnessed. As if the insanity of these wars was not enough, Western civilization has involved itself in a maddening—morally unjustified, economically counterproductive, and potentially self-destructive—nuclear arms race. If it cannot establish peace in its own house, what example does Western civilization provide for others? On what ground does it pretend to be the moral authority for the rest of the world?[10]

The moral credibility of the West is further ruined by the centuries of attempts to colonize and exploit the rest of the world. The usual ways of colonization do not lead to the development of the natives but to their devastation. The colonizers are oblivious to the tradition, the interests, and the well-being of

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[10] For further discussion of this important point, see Lin (1943: 87-93).

the natives. Instead of searching for the roots of modern terrorism in Islam and wondering: "Why do they hate us?," it would be more appropriate to admit our ruthless imperial ambitions and the damage inflicted on the rest of the world.

Schweitzer's program for the healing of civilization consists of three points: (1) spiritual transformation of the individual; (2) establishing healthy co-operation between the material and spiritual aspects of life; (3) renewing faith in humanity and in the power of truth. These three points suggest that, according to Schweitzer, the difficulty in establishing a positive conception of peace consists not only in the absence of peace *among* people, but more importantly in an absence of peace *within* people. These two factors are interrelated, but our duty is primarily to try to develop peace within ourselves. This is the task of spirit, of the spiritual development of every individual. From a spiritual individual, the spirit will spread toward the entire community and toward the world as a whole. This is how Schweitzer believed that, when we make the spirit strong, it creates world history and promotes reverence for every life. To have reverence is to be sensitive and caring, thoughtful and loving. To have reverence is to appreciate life as the most beautiful gift that can be bestowed on us. To have reverence is to be in awe of the mysterious beauty of life.

Schweitzer makes life—the sacredness of life and our need to treat all life as such—the focal center of his ethical and spiritual endeavors. Whether or not he was familiar with what we now call the "Gaia hypothesis"—which was originally proposed in 1785 by James Hutton as an idea that the earth is alive—he holds that the nature-alienation is the hallmark of modern culture. To this mentality which, combined with an absence of an alternative positive vision, is ultimately responsible for our decay, he opposes the conception that all life has to be treated as sacred, and that the ultimate goal of culture is to attain a spiritual unity—a harmony—with the living being as a whole. The German *heilig* —"sacred"—comes from the same root as *heile*—"to heal." The sacred is what heals. The acceptance of life as sacred is the way to heal our sick culture.

The acceptance of life as sacred has to be carried on to what looks as most ordinary activities, from socializing with our friends to drinking tea. Everything we do can be done with reverence, or without it. Everything we do can be done with grace and the appreciation of beauty, or without them. For Okakura, to live with the beautiful and the sacred is to live with tea and tea ceremony. A cup of tea symbolizes for him a cup of humanity, while the tea ceremony manifests the celebration of what is the most cultivated, the unique blend of what nature provides and the spirit ennobles.

The appreciation of the tea ceremony is Okakura's way of drinking from the ancient cup of wisdom—the wisdom instructing us how to live, and also how to die. Schweitzer's reverence for life reaches back to the same fountain, although he resorts to a different metaphor to express this wisdom. Despite different metaphors and symbols, Okakura and Schweitzer have the same message: let us live in a way that is attuned with what commands our fullest devotion and our fullest love. And what commands our fullest devotion and our fullest love is life itself: our own, as well as life of others—all life. To be devoted to life and love life is to live with the beautiful. And only those who live with the beautiful, who live beautifully, can also die beautifully.

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Chapter Eleven

Privilege, Torture and Nonkilling

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Introduction

In a nonkilling society, members would neither kill nor threaten to kill one another. Nor would they kill or threaten to kill outsiders. There would be neither armies, navies and air forces, nor shadow forces. Arms industries, which both depend upon and drive violence and killing, would lack conceptual, economic and political raison d'être and would be consequently neither sustainable nor profitable. The resulting economic and political incentives towards the militarization of workers, managers and communities similarly would vanish. Those struggling to create nonkilling societies must work towards their elimination by finding ways to eliminate the relationships of domination and exclusion which make their existence possible and which therefore enable killing (Paige, 2009: 21-22). We can appreciate a great deal about these relationships from an analysis of the institutional and causal conditions underlying torture. For example, careful analysis demonstrates that torture is not and cannot be a consequence solely of the behaviour of so-called bad apples; its occurrence depends upon complex social dynamics and, in particular, requires the existence and promotion of masculinist attitudes within the perpetrators, their society, and its institutions. In the following I focus specifically on the foundational role played by masculinism in enabling torture. I argue that its centrality in torturing and killing societies demonstrates that the elimination of masculinism is central to the development of a nonkilling society.

Male privilege

We can conceive a society of domination and exclusion as promoting male privilege. For Peggy McIntosh, privilege is an unearned advantage arising from a dominance structurally conferred upon a specific advantaged group (Mcintosh, 1997: 297). This is a social situation in which members of specific groups are given social, political and economic advantages solely in virtue of group membership, and independent of any choice or merit, while members of other groups are assigned corresponding disadvantages, similarly in terms

of their group membership. In privileged societies, individual choice plays little role in the life possibilities of individuals compared to the influence of unjust social structures. The advantages of the privileged arise as a result of positions of social dominance allocated to, and imposed by, the advantaged group. Privilege is a complex phenomenon and much has been written on the intersecting and multiple axes on which it is played out. For instance (but not exclusively): sex, sexuality, race and ethnicity, age, ability and class.

Privilege and oppression, unfair advantage and disadvantage can themselves overlap, so that one can be privileged in virtue of being male, for instance, but oppressed in virtue of being poor. Male privileged societies are arranged to guarantee the dominance of males over females, and the 'strongest' males over 'lesser,' or more 'effeminate,' men.

Privilege matters in thinking about violence and killing, as the unjust nature of the allocation of advantages and disadvantages imposes complex economic, political, psychological and sociological damage to nonprivileged groups. It thereby creates incentives for counter-violence against the privileged. Moreover it creates a dialectic whereby privileged groups must exert further violence in order to preserve their privilege. While all of the axes of privilege and oppression contribute to suffering, violence and killing, male privilege lies at the core of all the others.

There are a number of reasons for this, of which considerations of intra-group violence form an important set. White privilege arises from the allocation of unfair advantages to Caucasians, for example. But there are many cases of killing and violence which involve Caucasians killing other Caucasians. In such cases, dominant and subordinate groups perceive themselves as sharing in race but confer advantage and disadvantage along other lines. So in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, the involved groups were all Caucasian, but Protestants were advantaged and Catholics were disadvantaged. In this case racial privilege was not a specific problem, although religion and ethnicity formed an alternative dividing line. What both groups shared was their belief in the rationality, legitimacy and necessity of violence and killing in the pursuit of their goals. As such they were both heavily masculinised.

In a remarkable study of former police torturers and death squad members in Brazil, Martha Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros and Philip Zimbardo describe patriarchy as a system of male domination that shapes men's views of themselves, their privileges and prerogatives, their relationships to one another and to women, as well as their relationship to physical force. In particular it views men as fundamentally domineering and violent, as well as, ideally, coldly rational and dispassionate in their use of force. It identifies

models of ideal male behaviour which glorify male violence as morally appropriate action. They could have added that it also works to shape women's views as well, albeit asymmetrically, since women are oppressed in male-privileged systems. In order for a patriarchal system to work, male violence must be used to compel both weaker males, and all women, to internalize the 'naturalness' of the violence inflicted by males upon men and women, for women to conceive themselves as naturally weaker and less rational than men, and in particular to see themselves as needing the protection of a dominant male for their own well-being. So, for example, it requires 'real' men to dominate 'lesser' men and women, as well legitimating the domination and control of 'weaker groups' on the part of the dominant masculine groups (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo, 2002: 84-85).

Patriarchy is a system of male privilege. Violence, whether in the form of torture or murder, is the central means for securing privilege, since in situations where advantages are conferred unfairly the dominated group cannot be expected rationally to accept the unfairness of their disadvantaging and so must have the unfairness imposed through force.

Torture as soul murder

It is crucial to understand that torture is fundamentally an exercise in domination aimed at the preservation of privilege and thus is oppressive by nature, whatever surface justifications might be offered in its name (for example, state of emergency or ticking time bomb arguments commonly encountered in both popular and scholarly arenas). It is a form of killing in its own right, albeit an example of what psychologist Leonard Shengold, in an analysis of child abuse and neglect, calls 'soul murder,' a form of violence that severely damages or destroys the identity of the victim while commonly leaving the body to continue (Shengold, 1989: 2).

In popular thinking, people routinely, and inadequately, associate torture with the surface violation of a body. So they would commonly recognize *falaka*, the beating of the soles of a person's feet with a pipe, or burning someone with a cigarette or a hot poker. While these are obviously instances of torture, the problem is that focussing on the physiological aspects of torture leads us to neglect its core element and thus to misunderstand its nature. It is unusual to see public recognition that sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation, isolation, sensory overloading/deprivation, sexual taunts and insults, nudity and hooding as themselves also, in the right circumstances, torturous. This is due to a failure to appreciate the psychological nature of

torture. 'Torture' refers to a family of physical and psychological processes aimed at imposing the will of torturers on their victims. It is concerned with trying to compel victims to accept the dominance of the torturer and thus to make the torturer's will their own. These psychological aspects are crucial, since its core goal is to break down a victim's identity and replace it with one amenable to the interests of the torturer.

Over-focus on the obvious physical cases also contributes to the neglect of its complex social properties. For example, again in popular consciousness, the myth seems to hold that torture is inflicted by a single individual, a James Bond or a Jack Bauer, on another individual. Alternatively, when torture is 'bad,' i.e. either publicly disavowed by the state on whose behalf it was deliberately done, or in whose institutions it inadvertently emerged, it is typically attributed to the actions of a few isolated 'bad apples,' who act as they do because of some malign evil personal qualities (Zimbardo, 2009: 6-7; Butler, 2009: 82). It is of course true that the immediate site of violence involves individuals, whether a specific male perpetrator of domestic violence against his partner, or a team of torturers working on a group of victims. It is also true that some of these may possess or develop vicious personal dispositions. But it is a mistake, as Zimbardo convincingly argues, to attribute this to individual weaknesses of character or genetic makeup. While these occasionally play a role, by far the over-riding influences are social, involving complex relationships between systems of power, specific situations, and the complex dispositions of individuals as modified by such contexts (Zimbardo, 2009: 8-11).

Additionally, focussing on surface invasions of the body encourages a failure to appreciate that torture is, above all, an assault on identity and selfhood, whether its means are surface-scarring or noninvasive. In either case, its point is the destruction of a self. Kate Millett describes it as 'an imposition of the body upon the mind' (Millett, 1994: 92). Psychologist Bahman Nirumand maintains that

> The goal of torture is to destroy personality and annihilate identity. Torturers know that people without identity – people with shattered personalities—lose their capacity for resistance and give in to the demand that they reveal secrets and practice betrayal (Nirumand, 2001: xi).

In the course of this attempted destruction, torturers attempt to compel their victims to internalize a new set of norms and beliefs and indeed a radically new identity. Consequently torture involves, as Elaine Scarry argues, the attempt to wholly reshape a victim's social world into one suited to the inter-

ests of the torturer (and ultimately, since torturers in conflicts between states and between states and nonstate opponents, are always merely functionaries, to the dominant interests that the torturer represents) (Scarry, 1985: 29). That is to say that it is about entrenching systems of privilege and domination through the violent destruction and transformation of personal identity.

Recognition that torture assaults identity allows us to recognize some of the points upon which torturers may focus, for identity is a complex phenomenon which includes the following nonexhaustive list of properties:

- sex
- sexuality
- race and ethnicity
- age
- class
- ability
- the body
- sense of continuity in time
- family members, friends and relatives, social relations generally

Not coincidentally, many of these map on to the various privilege-oppression axes that characterize patriarchal, racist and other oppressive societies. In torturing an individual, as analysis of survivor and torturer narratives demonstrates, combinations of these are routinely the focus of the violence. In torturing, the torturers seek to inflict terror on specific victims, and the terror inevitably has to spread across the social body, even though it is initially inflicted on the mind and body of the primary victim (Matthews, 2008: 62). It is never merely about the domination of the discrete individual. Inflicting extreme violence upon individuals is simultaneously about compelling whole groups to accept the existing privilege situation (or, when disadvantaged groups employ torture, to overturn a system of privilege and replace it with a new one).

As Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo argue, masculinism is the central underlying ideology driving torture(and killing). They describe masculinism as a class of identities consisting of at least three overlapping types that they term 'personalistic,' 'institutional,' and 'blended' masculinities. Personalistic masculinities involve those individuals who conceive their identity individualistically. Such individuals see themselves as lone agents acting violently, sometimes in violation of existing law, in order to achieve perceived justifiable goals. Institutional masculinities subordinate the individual to the needs and institutional structure of the masculinist organizations to which they belong, and

blended masculinities have properties of both personalistic and institutional types (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros and Zimbardo, 2002: 88-89).

Here, gender is to be understood performatively rather than genetically (Kaufman-Osborne, 2007: 153). It is not a consequence of chromosome allocation, but refers rather to modes of differentiated behaviour that shape personal and social identity. In patriarchal societies, gendered identities are assigned to the various gendered groups as the dominant male values allocate. In competitive masculinist power structures, masculinist norms determine the structure of competitions for advantages and success, and thus also lay down the pathways that individuals must follow if they are to try and be successful. Masculinist power structures thus do not just impose burdens upon the disadvantaged groups; they also severely discipline and constrain members of the advantaged groups as well. Privileged members also have to internalize the violence and killing inducing norms of their group, and thus experience a violent shaping of their character.

The torturing society shapes both torturer and tortured; victims are tortured in virtue of their (perceived) individual identities. Women are tortured as women (Lorentzen, 1998: 197); male victims are first feminized and then tortured in terms of their alleged failure as men (Khoshaba, 2007: 184-185). As Kate Millett argues, torture is patriarchal conquest. To torture

> is to defile, degrade, overwhelm with shame, to ravage. In this it resembles rape. And the tortured come to experience not only the condition of the animal caged by man, but the predicament of woman before man as well. A thing male prisoners discover, female prisoners rediscover. Torture is based upon traditional ideas of domination: patriarchal order and masculine rank (Millett, 1994: 34).

The line between rape and torture is blurry, given the omnipresence of gender in torturing. Indeed, while a number of commentators have remarked on the ubiquity of rape and other sexual assaults in the torture of both male and female prisoners, Eric Stener Carlson argues that the centrality of gender in torture, and in particular of the choice of taunts, and the body parts upon which the torturers focus, means that every instance of torture has a sexual assault element. Indeed he suspects that sexual violence may be integral to war making (Stener Carlson, 2006: 16). In the patriarchal conquest that is torture, males are feminized, and women doubly so.

Masculinism and the making of the torturer

The victim, then, is humiliated, marginalized, dishonoured and stigmatized by their gendered torture (D'Amico, 2007: 45). But torturers themselves are compelled to be highly masculinised. Here, the biological sexuality of the torturer is irrelevant, since the performative nature of masculinised gender means that players within such a system are compelled to act in masculinised ways regardless of whether they are biologically male or female (Davis, 2007: 25; Brittain, 2006: 215; Zurbriggen, 2008: 308). Masculinism is a behaviour-shaping ideology that determines the possibilities of success and failure unfairly, violently, and without any regard for actual sexual differences between people. In order to torture, perpetrators have to align themselves with the masculinist norms of the torturing system and thus take on the gender violence that is endemic to torturing systems (Hillman, 2007: 112-113; Marshall, 2007: 55). Although torture embodies a view of male strength as essentially violent and models a certain image of what 'good' male behaviour is, a model which says that to be a 'man' one must act with extreme violence in defence of a masculinist social order, the reality is, as Darius Rejali notes, that torture breaks both torturer and victim (Rejali, 2007: 151-2).

Torture is a skill. It is not something that human beings do by nature. It is not written into anyone's genetic code. Rather, it must be learned and thus requires considerable training. This does not mean that it requires complex or sophisticated scientific knowledge. Quite the contrary, as Rejali convincingly demonstrates, it is in fact most commonly a rather crude family of violent practices that develops along the lines of a craft. The contributions of experimental science to torture, while real, are comparatively small. The vast majority of torture carried out with tools and techniques which are crude, simple and, crucially, which offer plausible deniability to those who use them (Rejali, 2007: 18-19). Although torture is not scientific, torture still has to be learned. Even where the methods are simple—for example, *falaka*—a great deal more goes into training someone to torture than is commonly assumed. In particular, and most importantly for thinking about nonkilling societies, torturers have to be made violent. States typically do not desire sadistic torturers and try to avoid them whenever possible. Rather, they desire obedient zealots who will do exactly as they are told; ideally neither more nor less (Wantchekon and Healy, 1999: 607).

Consequently, the desired talent pool consists of ordinary people. Neither saint nor Satan is desired. Ordinary human beings, as American military psychologist Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman notes, are prosocial in

their orientation toward other human beings and thus have very strong psychological inhibitions against torturing and killing. States and other violent organizations have to work hard to get individuals to develop violent dispositions (Grossman, 2009: 4). A key means of doing so, as both Ervin Staub and Philip Zimbardo argue, is the importance of sexist, racist and other propaganda to turn in-group members toward an antisocial and violent orientation (Zimbardo, 2009: 10-11; Staub, 1989: xi).

This violence is itself about masculinised identity reconstruction, both of the allegedly hostile enemy, but here particularly about transforming the identity of the individual from prosocial and empathic to antisocial, nonempathic and violent (towards specified enemies). It concerns the creation of violence workers, both torturers and killing soldiers, sailors, air personnel, as well as police and intelligence units. It also includes reshaping their social and economic support networks so that they accept the legitimacy of the violence inflicted on their behalf. Thus, torturing institutions model the violence that the torturers will inflict upon the victims by first destroying and reshaping the identities of the torturers themselves. Although torturers are taught a range of torture techniques, and modify them over time as they get experience, the crucial training involves disposition and identity transformation. Thereby, how ever they conceive themselves initially, they are forcibly turned into hyper-masculinised individuals both capable of and disposed to the infliction of intolerable suffering on other human beings.

Torture training is thus, in its own right, a form of character assassination insofar as it requires the destruction of the capacity for empathy along with coerced modification of the standard moral norms of ordinary individuals. In their place, the state or counter-state organization seeks to implant a range of sexist, racist, and classist ideological norms that legitimate torture and justify, in the minds of torturers, the victimization of the tortured. Extreme violence and cruelty become central to the altered moral horizon of the torturer. Insofar as states and other torturing institutions succeed, they eliminate the influence of individual conscience, minimize the likelihood of disobedience, and maximally ensure the infliction of torture. Whether the torture then happens as a direct consequence of higher orders, or unplanned on the basis of small group initiative, considerable planning and training has to occur to make it possible.

Violence enabling processes

Herbert Kelman, Ronald Crelinsten, Staub and Zimbardo, among others, have identified the following core means by which violence is enabled:

- routinization
- desensitization
- dehumanisation
- in-group/out-group dynamics

Routinization involves breaking a task down into discrete, simple and mechanical steps in ways that divorce the action of its moral significance. Instead of reflecting on what the torturers are doing to their victims, they focus instead on repetition of the task and on carrying out their job well. The consequence is that normal empathy flow and moral reflection become subordinated to the dictates of the task in which one is engaged (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989: 18). Routinization results in the subordination of the normal moral conscience to the dictates of authority (Staub, 1990: 60), along with the development of a sense of morality based upon one's professional actions working on behalf of that authority (Crelinsten, 2007: 211). Furthermore, torturers are rewarded and/or punished in the exercise of their craft and thus are provided with an incentive structure according to which they have to restructure their behaviour for success. In such restructuring, they come to internalize and endorse the new 'moral' norms of the institutional culture to which they now belong.

Where routinization works to disengage moral reasoning in the perpetrator, torturing institutions and states have to systematically desensitize their violence workers. It is through desensitization that their empathy for their victims is diminished or eliminated. Mika Haritos-Fatouros, in her study of Greek torturers during the Greek dictatorship period, describes how the torturers were first brutalized and tortured in their own right as part of their basic training and initiation into torturing (Haritos-Fatouros, 2007: 121-122). As they worked their way through their training structure, they would become "upperclassmen" and acquire the privilege of torturing and degrading the new class of recruits. They became accustomed to being humiliated and degraded themselves, as well as become comfortable with the infliction of pain and suffering upon others. Ultimately, Haritos-Fatouros argues, the point was to turn the inflicting of pain into either a neutral or a pleasurable stimulus for the torturers and thereby eliminate existing moral inhibitions.

Torturers are also required to, and need to, dehumanize their victims. In order to kill and torture, the elites who organize such violence have to create, in their followers, what Zimbardo calls a 'hostile image (Zimbardo, 2009: 10-11). Such an imagination is one which conceives of the members of other human groups, whether mature adults, elderly people, children or even infants,

as fundamentally frightening and threatening. Such groups may be conceived as being 'not like us,' irrational, different, 'hating our freedoms,' immune to negotiation and dialogue, fundamentally evil, subhuman, dirty, or the like. The crucial point is to create, in the mind of in-group members, the sense that members of a different group constitute a terrifying threat and therefore need to be annihilated. Sexist, racist and classist language is the crucial means by which this is done, as out-group members are gradually perceived to be deserving of any and all of the things that are done to them. In-group members thereby legitimize the suffering, violence and death inflicted upon out-groups.

In in-grouping, then, torturers are taught to conceive themselves, and the population they understand themselves to be defending as, morally superior. This is necessary because it creates the necessary psychological distance by which they can then torture their victims, as well as terrorize the out-group(s) generally. Consequently, armies routinely dehumanize their opponents and teach their troops to see them as deserving of the violence inflicted upon them (Grossman, 2009: 91), all as a means of ensuring that they can kill and commit other forms of violence while preserving some form of psychological stability. Racism and sexism are core means of such dehumanization, since racism construes the Other as lesser and hostile, while sexism feminizes male out-group members and doubly harms females. In either event, Kate Millett (Millett, 1994: 90) and Yves Ensler (Ensler, 2007: 18) argue that racism is a routine component of the training of soldiers. The same is true, but more generally, of masculinism and sexism.

Male (and occasionally female) perpetrators are conditioned to commit violence in hyper-masculinized environments. Such socialization presupposes the following:

1. an emphasis on hierarchies of domination. These hierarchies establish orders of credibility and violence that privilege the desires of the highest levels of the hierarchy over the lower, and enforce this privilege through violence upon the weaker levels
2. the identification of weakness with feminized others. This includes less 'successful' men within the hierarchy, as well as out-group males and all women.
3. an over-emphasis on abstract nonemotional reasoning combined with the discrediting of empathy as a means of knowing and engaging with others.
4. the valuation of current masculine virtues of violence, control and emotional freezing. Men are expected, if they are to be properly

masculine, to exercise violence in a controlled fashion, where their emotions are to play no significant role in their behaviour and choices. They are neither to be empathically inclined towards the objects of their violence, nor sadistically impelled.

Therefore, any decisive action made in the context of the previous four commitments is to be valued above considerations of community with those upon whom one inflicts violence (Zurbriggen, 2008: 305). This structure describe what Kathleen Barry calls 'core masculinity,' a masculinity which designates males as expendable, women as weak and in need of the protection of 'their' males from the aggressions of other expendable males, and therefore which builds a commitment to violence into the nature of masculinity (Barry, 2011: 12-13).

As wars are carried out by states against other states or against nonstate actors, torture recruits are further masculinised through indoctrination into a belief in the supreme importance of their actions for the safety and security of the nation, and are taught therefore that, however difficult it might be emotionally and morally, it nonetheless serves the higher good of the preservation of the state. Furthermore, the masculine virtue of toughness is specifically played upon and inculcated. The torturers are those who have the right '*cojones*' (Atkinson, 2007: 106), or 'balls,' the right toughness to do what more 'effeminate' men (and women) are incapable of doing.

Torture and the bystander population

The number of people who actually kill and otherwise inflict violence is small in comparison to the total population of which they are a part, and yet that larger population plays a crucial facilitating role in the occurrence of violence. Just as masculinist violence has to be inflicted upon the victims of torture and killing, and just as the torturers and killers themselves have to be hyper-masculinized in order to torture, maim and kill others, so their supporting community must be psychologically and sociologically refashioned to enable violence and killing. Torturers do not act in a vacuum, but typically do so with the active and/or tacit consent of a broader community in whose name they act. In the absence of such community support or acquiescence, the violence and killing simply do not happen. Parents, children, relatives, neighbours, and fellow citizens all need to be manipulated into generating support for violence and killing. In the absence of such social supports and pressures, prosociality is likely to win out and individuals will not kill.

Bystander populations are no more disposed to inflict violence on others than are individual torturers. Consequently they also have to be reshaped in order to permit torture and other violence, or worse, support it outright. They too must be compelled to internalize the same masculinised beliefs as the torturers and their victims. Furthermore, many of the same dynamics that are crucial in the creation of the torturer are also employed to ensure bystander acquiescence, if not support. Consequently, in-group members are pushed to over-empathize with the lives and suffering of their own members while becoming desensitized to those of out-group members. Similarly, they are encouraged to dehumanize out-group members and to believe that these women, children and men deserve the violence that in-group torturers and other violence workers inflict upon them. Sexism, racism and classism play key roles in ensuring that the in-group population is disposed to support the ensuing violence (Enloe, 2007: 233). The Iraq war and its various atrocities and tortures, for example, were justified to the American and other supporting populations as a means by which enchained Muslim women could be 'freed' to be like American women. Here an in-group/out-group fiction was deployed to justify the oppression of all Iraqis (Maddock Dillon, 2007: 168). In this case the Iraqis are out-grouped as an oppressive misogynist culture that enslaves its own people (hence they are dehumanized and cast out from the sphere of moral significance) while the coalition forces, and Americans in particular, are, ironically (given the extent of misogyny and masculinism in the United States and other coalition countries), portrayed as the 'good' liberators of Iraqi women and the bearers of Western 'freedoms'. This is, as Katherine Viner notes, a deliberate, cynical and hypocritical deployment of the language of liberation to mobilize a population in support of violence (Viner, 2007: 174). Although she does not say so explicitly, what is particularly ironic here, given the centrality of masculinism to the infliction of violence, is that it is the cynical misuse of feminism to support masculinist objectives and culture.

In the absence of such group mobilization, neither torture nor killing happens. Violence systems, and the institutions, situations and personal dispositions which function within them, ultimately depend upon both conscious and tacit consent of bystanders. These populations also have to internalize the norms which legitimate and justify the tortures and killings. Without such internalization, a range of killing- and violence-enabling institutions, policies and behaviours do not develop. The following is just a small range of examples:

- public monies do not flow to economic, political and military institutions;
- training programs and expertise do not develop;
- recruits do not join killing institutions;
- violent individuals are sanctioned rather than publicly honoured for their actions;
- communities do not develop an interest in attracting arms industries for the sake of the jobs that they provide

In short, the complex systems of rewards and punishments which underpin acts of violence in specific cases do not develop. So if a community or state intends to employ torture and to kill, it has to deploy considerable economic and political effort, in particular in the form of propaganda, to ensure a supportive population as well as to minimize the likelihood of serious public opposition. Insofar as the community internalizes violent norms and dispositions, the ground is then prepared, in advance, for the actual occurrence of violence. That community or state is already masculinised, already violent and actual cases of torture and killing become nothing more than a matter of relevant political and economic opportunity.

Conclusion

Torture is an extremely complex social, psychological and moral phenomenon. Its causal conditions extend well beyond those assumed by precritical thinking about violence. In particular, careful analysis demonstrates the institutional and cultural manipulation and violence that has to be inflicted in order that any specific instance of torture might happen. It also shows that those damaged by torture extend well beyond the primary victim to the torturers, whose characters are violently reshaped, but also the institutions and the larger culture in which the torturers are embedded. All of these have to be masculinised and disposed to accept the inevitability and necessity of extreme violence, cruelty and killing.

Moreover, we have to understand that this violence concerns the preservation of complex systems of privilege at the apex of which stands the wealthy privileged male. Such a privilege system assigns greater privilege and legitimacy to the voices of such elite males (along with suitably masculinised others), and in particular depends for its continuation on its disadvantaging of women, other genders, other ethnic groups and races, among others. The system of privilege ultimately underpins and drives specific cases of violence, in particular through masculinising men, women, children.

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The consequence, when combined with other privilege markers such as race and class, is the legitimation of violence, out-grouping, dehumanization and desensitization that drives atrocity and violence systems. This masculinist hierarchy lies at the heart of violent social systems. In its absence, people are neither torturers nor killers. Consequently, the struggle to develop a nonkilling society has to place the elimination of patriarchal privilege and its masculinism at the center of analysis and action.

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Chapter Twelve

Diplomacy in the Service of Nonkilling Objectives
The Imperative for a US-Iran Rapprochement

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During his presidential campaign and since the elections victory, Barak Obama promised to engage "in aggressive personal diplomacy" with Iranian leaders to resolve the controversy surrounding the country's nuclear program. Later, in his first interview with an Arab television he said "it is important for us to be willing to talk to Iran, to express very clearly where our differences are, but (also) where there are potential avenues for progress."[1] President Obama's remarks was preceded by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's congratulatory letter to the then Senator Obama, in what was viewed as Iran's openness to re-establish ties with the US. President Obama may had a clear declared intention to change direction in U.S. Middle Eastern policy but the path of that 'new direction' seems even more complicated in the beginning of president Obama's second term. There remains also opposition in the U.S. Congress by powerful conservative members and Pro-Israeli lobbyists in any U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. There are also those in top Iranian political leadership who remain skeptical about whether renewed ties with the United States can best serve the national interest of the country. From this perspective, Iran thirty four years after the revolution is stronger than ever in its more recent history, with an independent foreign policy and respectable amount of influence in regional and international affairs. From this perspective, the achievements of the past 32 years owe a great deal to Iran's anti-US stance, and even forcing the country into a national strategy of self-reliance. Consequently, they see risks and threats associated with renewed ties with the United States that can actually 'derail' Iran's hard-achieved national independence and development. There are serious difficulties on both sides in mobilizing enough support among policymakers to launch such a campaign.

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[1] Press TV, "Obama sends message of peace to Iran," Tuesday, 27 January 2009.

Iran's dynamic society, itself the product of past thirty years of socioeconomic and political change, is a lot more open to cordial relations and even cooperation with the United States. The young, post revolution population is highly cognizant of how technology and globalization of ideas and economic and financial relations is reshaping the world. The state-society relation remains united in the post revolution slogan of self-reliance and national pride but it diverges on mechanism and method necessary to follow such goals. The state remains steadfast on the primacy of the 'Islamic' foundation of the Republic, while society at large has come to realize the merits of democratic values in resolving national and international disagreements. Ironically, the state economic policies relie on market economics, privatization, and open trade, all exacerbating economic hardship for the working class population. Economic pressure, also intensified by sanctions, in combination with restrictive social policies has created a deep gulf between the Iranian state and its people in their beliefs and visions for the present and the future of the country.

A successful U.S. strategy in engaging Iran must take into consideration not only the complexities of Iranian political system but also understand the political culture of its people. Iran has a long and proud national history with great historical accomplishments registered to its name but with a wounded national pride due to foreign interventions and manipulation. Whether Iran's national ambitions and its declared intentions match its capabilities is a legitimate question and some in Washington may believe the United States should not consider negotiations with Iran on equal footing. But, ignoring Iran and its place and significance in regional development or simply declaring Iran a threat because of political rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad or Ayatollah Khamene'i, would be a grave mistake. Iran's ambitions to become a regional power can be realized without undermining U.S. national interest in the Middle East. On the contrary, a 'partnership' between Iran and the U.S. is not only possible but is necessary for regional stability and development. This is even more urgent, given the 2011 Arab uprisings.

Iranian perspectives on what constitutes its national interest are not so far-fetched and anti-American. There are actually shared areas of interest with the long term prognosis for a rapprochement very positive. There is strong popular support for political democracy and the future of Iranian political system is democratic, albeit with religious inclinations. A partnership with the U.S. can secure the place of the Islamic Republic in regional and global relations. A cautious and patient engagement can also pay dividend for the United States in multiple areas, including: more security in the Persian Gulf through Iranian cooperation in Iraq (and Afghanistan) and 'the more le-

gitimate' U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf; a more, stronger prospects for the resolution of the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict; competing with Russian influence in the Caucuses and Central Asian region; competing with Russian and Chinese economic and military ties with Iran; and, better economic and investment opportunities for U.S. companies in vast Iranian oil and natural gas industries. Needless to say, the stronger U.S. position will also serve the European and Japanese interests. Conversely, a confrontational U.S. will find a nuclear armed Iran in the future with strong ties with the Russian federation and China who will continue to challenge the legitimacy of U.S. presence in the region and damaging its efforts in support of still-clinching conservative Arab states and Israel, weakening U.S. position in the Middle East as a whole.

This chapter will have a comprehensive look at sources of Iranian foreign policy decision making and propose under what conditions rapprochement between the United States and Iran is possible. We will then look at the specific areas of dispute between the two countries. We will argue that a successful U.S. approach necessitates first a rethinking of its traditional 'patron-client' approach in negotiating with Iran; and, second, a comprehensive approach to deal with major issues separating the two parties. *A Three-Tiered inter-linked incremental approach* is proposed for better management of complex areas of disagreement and confidence building purposes. Otherwise, the Iranian leadership would continue resisting a U.S. 'carrot and stick' policy approach and will pursue a *haphazard policy* of cooperation and noncooperation—cooperate in limited fashion in areas that can promote its own national interest but not necessarily leading to the resolution of issues to the satisfaction of the U.S. interest. The way Tehran sees it, 'carrots are for rabbits and the stick for donkeys.' In the absence of a US-Iran rapprochement, continuing hostility can develop into a military confrontation engulfing regional countries, with loss of lives on all fronts. To remove the possibility of killing, diplomacy is the primary tool in the service of nonkilling.

Determinants of Iran's Foreign Policy

Feared Intentions

Thirty four years after the revolution, the Iranian political leadership is in much stronger position in dealing with its domestic foes and external challenges. The turbulent past 34 years has witnessed drastic political and socio-economic restructuring in Iran's political economy and with it, a more effective and dominating state. While the state is yet to establish the ideal 'Islamic Republic,' it enjoys popular support among many who are willing to give the sys-

tem the benefit of a doubt for espousing a brighter future. The political leadership has over the years consolidated its institutional foundation of the state, increasingly relying on popular elections and fierce public debates among rival political factions to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the ordinary citizens. The social and economic changes in Iran have also broadened the popular basis of support for the government. The regime's relative success in promoting the quality of life for rural residents and lower class poor, the *Mostazafin*, and noticeable advancements in technical and scientific fields, and particularly the nuclear program, have also heightened national pride and nationalism.[2]

The regime remains secure in its control over social and political opposition through both persuasive and coercive measures. There are, however, widespread popular dissatisfaction with increasing cost of living and inflation, social restrictions on private life, and inadequate access to public space for self-expression and personal advancement. The most serious challenge to the state control occurred after the 10th Presidential elections in June 2009. Millions of people across the country demonstrated against the election results, believing that the leading opposition contender, Mir-Hossein Mousavi had won the election. In the pursuing months emotions ran high and riots and violence led to loss of lives. In the end, President Ahmadinejad won the blessings of Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i but at the expense of a fracture in the top political leadership. The state proved its resiliency.[3] Iran has also remained immune from Arab uprisings that first sparked in Tunisia in December 2010 and has engulfed important Arab countries in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Prospects for widespread 'anti-regime' movement in Iran remains weak, although widespread legitimate desire and demand for the expansion of individual rights persists. Iranian regime also remains very concerned about foreign infiltration and sabotage, instigated mainly by the United States and its support of different range of anti-Iranian regime activities and aimed at regime change.

The Iranian government feels more vulnerable to externally-supported opposition, compounded by a historical political culture which sees a 'foreign hand' in almost any popular or widespread opposition to the government. In this view, political opposition in Iran is inspired by Western liberal ideas, personalities, organizations, and governments, and even supported through covert

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[2] See foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi's summation, "Salehi: Iran pioneer in Muslim world," Press TV, Saturday Jun 4, 201.

[3] For a detailed analysis of 2009 Presidential election, see Abootalebi (2009).

operations. If blaming outsiders for all societal ills is a convenient scapegoat, there is also a long history of Western interventionism in Iranian affairs. There are legitimate concerns about the intentions of major powers in their relations with the Islamic Republic, be it the US, Russia, the Europeans or China.

Iran's modern history is filled with instances of foreign interventionism, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that reinforces the national instinct and experience for a careful foreign policy. The modern Iranian history is filled with examples of foreign intervention and betrayal despite promises of good will and cooperation. Iran in the past two centuries has been humiliated by military defeat and territorial losses in the hands of the tsarist Russia, seen its 1906-09 constitutional movement defeated, occupied by foreign troops following WWI and WWII. It has experienced foreign-directed military coup d'état in 1953, ruled by foreign-installed Pahlavi regimes (1925-1941; 1945-1979) and has fought off a foreign invasion, 1980-88, and has been under severe sanctions in the past thirty four years. The portrayal of the Iranian regime as part of an 'axis of evil' and state sponsoring terrorism has also damaged Iranians' national pride.

The ultra-conservative Sunni movements like al-Qaeda or the Taliban and conservative Arab regimes are also added external concerns to the Shi'a Iran. The political leadership feels that Iran's geostrategic location—connecting East, Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and Europe—vast oil and natural gas resources, and its status as the only Muslim Shi'a-State with populist, anti-imperialist stand makes it a target of both Western powers and conservative Sunni Arab regimes. Given the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity and the historical experiences, the threat to national integrity and sovereignty is taken very seriously. The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and other neighboring countries has only made political leadership in Tehran more nervous.

The Obama administration's Iran policy has been disappointing. As Stephen Kinzer, author of "All the Shah's Men" has observed, "For the US to shape a peaceful relationship with Iran will be difficult under any circumstances" and "If the American negotiating team is led by (Dennis) Ross or another conventional thinker tied to dogmas of the past, it will be impossible."[4] What is therefore needed is a fresh approach with new players in

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[4] Az Kinzer also mention, Ross has called for more draconian sanctions against Iran and backs the covert support for proxy groups and (maybe even) the alleged clandestine campaign by Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, to assassinate Iranian nu-

center stage to think strategic changes without fearing short term internal political losses and constituencies.

Foreign policy decisions by consensus

In foreign policy, statesmen are expected to behave rationally in promoting national interest. But, political elites' calculation of what really constitutes national interest is contingent upon innumerable political, economic, and social considerations. To ignore or downplay historical memory, culture, and national pride, especially in dealing with nations with long historical memory, can prove very costly and resulting in failure. Like India and China, Ian has a long, proud history, enriched by a culture that values family, respect (*ehteram*), personal pride (*ghoror*), self-sacrifice (*javanmardi*), friendship (*refaghat*), and Justice (*edalat*) as much as it despises betrayal (*kheanat* or *namardi*).

Iran has a long tradition of prudent statecraft that the current regime is striving to renew. As the veteran observer of Iran' foreign policy reminds us, this statecraft "has been created by centuries of experience in international affairs beginning with Cyrus the Great more than 2,000 years ago." It is inextricably linked to the expectation of *respect;* a fierce sense of independence and resistance of the Iranian people, regardless of political and ideological differences, to direct or indirect pressure, dictation, and the explicit or implied threat of force; and a *negotiating style,* created, molded, and honed by long diplomatic experience, Iranian diplomats combine a range of tactics in dealing with their counterparts: testing, probing, procrastinating, exaggerating, bluffing, *ad-hocing*, and counter-threatening when threatened (Ramazani, 2009: 13-14).

The national historical memory in the recent past, however, is one of distrust of foreigners and their intentions, including: The territorial losses to the Tsarist Russia, the presence and occupation of British, Russian, and other foreign forces during the two world wars, the foreign 'installed and supported' two Pahlavi Shahs, and the failure of nationalist/constitutionalist movements in 1906 and 1953. As R. K. Ramazani (2009), sees it, "For Iran, the past is always present. A paradoxical combination of pride in Iranian culture and a sense of victimization have created a fierce sense of independence and a culture of resistance to dictation and domination by any foreign power among the Iranian people. Iranian foreign policy is rooted in these widely held sentiments. Consequently, the G. W. Bush administration's failure in dealing with Iran through a policy of carrot and stick, and sometimes

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clear scientists. See, "Iran is the key," *the Guardian*, January 26, 2009. Available at: <http://globalexchange.org/countries/mideast/iran/6034.html>.

open 'bullying,' must not come as a surprise. Iranian political leadership, when asked and believing beneficial, cooperated and effectively helped the Bush administration setting up a new post-Taliban government. The betrayal came with the January 2002 designation of the country as a member of the 'axis of evil'. The portrayal of the regime leaders as fanatical, untrustworthy, and irrational *mullahs* sponsoring and promoting terrorism only has deepened the gulf between the two countries.

Iranian foreign policy to outsiders may appear at times as ideological, incoherent and even contradictory, where many voices sending different signals about the same issue. The truth, however, is that Iran's foreign policy, aside from the usual confusion over important national issues that is due to political factionalism, is not difficult to understand. The seemingly multiplicity of voices speaking for Iran's foreign policy is a strategy keeping options open for the political leadership in dealing with such complex issues as the nuclear dossier, balancing relations with the moderate Arab States while keeping its defiant, anti-U.S., pro-Palestinian rhetoric and stance, and reputing a "neither West, nor East" foreign policy while relying on both sides for national development.

Iran's foreign policy is for the most part pragmatic and in the service of national interest. However, personal and factional rivalries among powerful individuals with different visions for the evolution of the 'Islamic republic' create different 'tendencies' in the conduct but not the substance of foreign policy objectives. Political elite in charge of foreign policy often speaks with one voice in the end, although disagreements and debates between the 'conservative' and 'moderate' camps can prove fierce, and even damaging, to the cause of national interest. Ultimately, it is the leader, *rahbar,* with vast constitutional power and vested personal legitimacy by the virtue of his Office, who brings consensus to divergent tendencies. However, the *rahbar* does not act alone in initiating or defining foreign policy objectives. He may have ears for all voices relevant in the foreign policy circle but building in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is his main function. The SNSC is the institutional foundation of Iran's foreign policy establishment and is bigger than the office of the *rahbar* although ayatollah Khamene'i' may seem to outsiders as the sole individual responsible for Iran's foreign policy.

Articles 176 of Iran's Constitution sets up the Supreme National Security Council, and charges it with "preserving the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty." Its members include: the president; speaker of Parliament; the head of the judiciary; the chief of the combined general staff of the armed forces; the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence; and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the

regular military, among others. The president selects the secretary of the council. The decisions of the Council are effective after the confirmation by the Supreme Leader. Iran is the only country whose executive does not control the armed forces, but as head of the Supreme National Security Council, the president helps coordinate the Supreme Leader's foreign policy directives.[5]

Iran's foreign policy is not drastically more centralized than that of the United States. True, the sub-nationals, e.g., interest groups, the media, and the public are more intimately ingrained in the *process* of foreign policy decision making, reflecting the interests of a wider audience. Still, the end result is that a handful of policymakers set the tone and build consensus in foreign policy in both countries. So, President Ahmadinejad's remarks about the holocaust and his administration's overall confrontational foreign policy have been condemned not only by outside powers but also within the Iran foreign policy establishment. Ahmadinejad's defensive-nationalistic view regarding Iranian nuclear dossier, however, reflects a wider, popular and nationalistic view held by the population.

Iran as a Regional Power

Iran in 2013 suffers from widespread economic hardship and social restrictions and an imperfect political democracy. The inflation runs at near 28 percent point and is expected to further rise, and the unemployment rate among the young population remains high. Social restrictions on anything from dress codes to segregation of sexes in public space to athletic opportunities to shortages of recreational facilities are making life difficult for many Iranians. Yet, the Iranian state today is in its strongest position since the revolution.

Far from being either a 'Republic' or 'Islamic' the Iranian leadership has combined elements of both with Iranian nationalism, crafting *'Islamo-Iranian' nationalism*. Major national plans, including the Azadegan oil and South Pars Natural gas projects, missile, nuclear, and satellite research and development are promoted in nationalistic terms. Iran's accomplishments in uranium enrichment and nuclear technology have been compared with the oil nationalization efforts of the late Prime Minister, Dr. Muhammad Mossadiq that was resisted and eventually derailed by Western powers, namely the U.S. and Britain. The legitimacy and power of the state has also been enhanced because of its proclivity to an evolutionary approach to change in certain areas without drastic ideological resistance. Women after the initial setbacks have

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[5] See <http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_power.php>.

seen improvements in areas of education, economic participation, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. The primary goal of the state now is economic privatization and foreign investment, reversing the earlier years of nationalization policy, although the public sector still heavily dominates the economy. The leadership since the beginning has held regular elections and with high political turnouts. Despite shortcomings in the design and institutional deficiencies in creating an 'Islamic Republican,' the regime has popular support from different segments of the population due fundamentally to its populist socioeconomic policies and independent foreign policy.

Since September 1, 2001, two of Iran's neighboring foes have fallen and replaced by governments who need Iran's cooperation in their stabilization and rebuilding efforts. Despite the Sunni-Shi'a divide, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq also share the vision that Islam is central to their governance efforts and that the threat of militant Muslims, spearheaded by Taliban and al-Qaeda is determinant to their long term national sovereignty and development. Iran's influence over Iraq's central players also will endure for years to come. Shi'a religious centers, *Hawzehs* in Qom and Najaf, have been, contrary to some earlier predictions, cooperating and not competing with one another. Iran keeps multiple lines of connection with Iraqi Shi'a political parties and personalities, including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Dawa party; Ammar al-Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Moqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Movement, and the grand ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Iran's connection to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian Hamas organization serve political and ideological interests of the three parties. Iran helped with the creation of Hezbollah after Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, around the same time it began its offensive inside Iraq. Iran's support for the Shi'a movement in Lebanon has helped counter the U.S. and Israeli pressure and to set the tone for further Iranian-Syrian cooperation.

Iran's connection with the Sunni Hamas is a marriage of political convenience and not a religious connection, placing Iran at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Iran, nonetheless, share the core value with Hamas that, regardless of the Sunni-Shi'a divide, Islamic resistance is the 'solution' to Israeli occupation. Iran has tried hard to abridge the Sunni-Shi'a divide through not only diplomatic efforts but also through public diplomacy and international conferences.[6] The so-called Sunni-Shi'a, remains in its core a politico-ideological divi-

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[6] For example, the two-day international conference, which opened in Tehran on March 11, 2007 attended by scholars from 30 countries including Turkey, Syria, the UAE, Ghana, India, South Africa, Kenya, Sudan, China, Qatar, Kuwait, Nigeria, Bangladesh and

sion between the conservative, western leaning Arab States, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, and the more radical *non pro quo* view of domestic sociopolitical arrangement and a more independent and assertive foreign policy.

Iran views itself as a rising regional power whose historical accomplishments, geopolitical location, natural resources, and young and talented population entitles it to such a role. This national perspective is not accidental or fabricated by some delusional and unsophisticated clerics, unaware of the complexities of global affairs. Nor is it because of national narcissism propagated by the dominant Persian segment of the population. The nationalist reawakening is the outcome of political leadership pursuing the central messages of the revolution: neither East nor West; self-reliance; and, *Islamo-Iranian* nationalism. Therefore, the United States should recognize the legitimacy of the Iranian Revolution and should realistically assess Iran's projection of power in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, where Iran seeks acknowledgment of its role as a major player and a partner" (Ramazani, 2009).

An Incremental, Interlinked Approach to Negotiations

A prudent U.S. approach in dealing with Iran dictates an incremental approach since the list of grievances between both countries is long. There is also the matter of overcoming the mistrust on both sides and the need for taking confidence building measures prior to engaging in serious negotiations. What rests at the heart of the matter for Iranian leadership, however, is the long-term U.S. plan in its Middle Eastern, Caucasus, Central and South Asian policy.

An incremental approach to bilateral and direct negotiations can work, provided a roadmap to deal with the wider security and regional issues is drawn out. Iran would look at any piecemeal approach to what it considers its legitimate national interest as attempts by the United States to extract what it wants without committing itself to recognizing Iran's full and legitimate right to full national sovereignty and its role in regional politics. Iran, however, may agree to an incremental approach in dealing with relevant is-

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Iran. See <http://www.presstv.com/Detail.aspx?id=2298&sectionid=3510101>. In yet another conference, the Second International Mahdism Conference, organized by the Bright Future Institute, McRoy gave a paper about the Mahdi, the Messiah and the Antichrist. See, "A visit to the friendly people of 'The axis of evil" at <http://www.mahdaviat-conference.com/vdcfiedmaw6dx.7rw.html>. A Sadrist-organized Sunni-Shia conference on March 24, 2008 in Baghdad also was attended by Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a leaders who, among other things, demanded US withdrawal, at: <http://arablinks.blogspot.com/2008/03/sadrist-organized-sunni-shia-conference.html>.

sues provided a broader understanding of what its role after the negotiations will be. That is, an incremental and yet interlinked approach in negotiating the areas of dispute can prove fruitful.

Areas of Dispute

Issues separating Iran and the U.S. have only grown in numbers and magnitude after thirty years of no official diplomatic contact and changes inside Iran, the U.S. and the parameters of global relations. There is overwhelming consent among Iran observers that a U.S. coercive containment policy is ineffective and counterproductive. Ideally, a comprehensive approach in dealing with all these issues might be desirable but it can hardly be practical. The proposed approach here is one of both incremental-ism and holism. That is, both sides must be clear on what can be achieved through negotiations with clear feasibility for reaching all goals. An incremental approach would allow for a better management of disputes and help with confidence building while improving the chance of success for an optimal holistic result. Initially, the U.S. can incentivize Iran to cooperate by recognizing the Islamic system as legitimate and acknowledging Iran having a role to play in its immediate neighborhood. But, any reward package would not work as long as the US insists on the "use of force as an option of last resort," if negotiations fail (Amirahmadi, 2009). Iranian culture and history tells us that bigger sticks are unlikely to force Iranian leadership into submission. As James Dobbins, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, has remarked, "Iran is not a donkey, bigger sticks won't work" (Jooshani, 2009).

Tier One

The Tier one includes those issues that have bargaining leverage but without dire national security concerns. The United States have used these issue areas to exert pressure on Iranian government in the past thirty years to stave off the revolutionary steam of the new regime and to influence its behavior to conform with the 'norms of international behavior.' Although the harsh revolutionary rhetoric of the earlier years has long been abandoned, the United States continue upholding these pressure areas without tangible results impacting regime behavior in Tehran. These include: the frozen Iranian assets in the United States; protecting and legitimating the Mujahedeen Khalq Organization (MKO); the harsh rhetoric from Washington, especially in the GW Bush administration years portraying the regime as run by fanatical, illegitimate, and dictatorial *mullahs* who support international terrorism and are grave violators of human rights; and, funding the

Iranian exile community and the intelligent services to undermine the regime. The Bush administration even publicized its funding of more than $70 million to promote regime change in Iran.

The few billion dollars of frozen Iranian assets and some lingering legal disputes over Iran's earlier nationalization of foreign assets has not seriously hurt Iranian regime and has not served the U.S. national interest. Iran's economic troubles are numerous but certainly cannot be crippled in the absence of few billion dollars. The support for MKO and the Iranian exile, likewise, cannot succeed in whether seriously weakening or toppling the regime. The result of such pressure on Iranian governments has been more defiance and has actually helped strengthen the Iranian conservatives who believe sanctions have made Iran more self-reliant. These are used as examples of a 'bullying' United States, commonly referred to as 'the Great Satan,' or 'the arrogant state' whose intention is to destroy the Islamic Republic and its message of Islamic revivalism and progress. As insignificance these areas of conflict are, they sting Iranians' national pride and in turn leading to more defiance by the regime and its main supporters, an estimated 12 to 15 percent of the population.

While Iran's human rights record leaves a lot to desire, the structural changes taken place since the revolution also promises a more open society and a more moderate foreign policy behavior in the future. Besides, attacking Iran's human rights record and naming the regime as the most dangerous in the world without acknowledging its legitimate national interest and contributions , e.g., stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, helping with Iraqi and Afghani refugees for over three decades, and fighting drug trafficking, are damaging policy directives.

The removal of the Tier One dispute areas would not undermine U.S. national interest and can greatly enhance prospects for cooperation in the more serious areas of disputes. This is true, especially with the Obama administration earlier promise to 'reverse' policies of the Bush years. Iranian historical memory would recall that the United States was the first Western country who came to its help to counter European colonial ambitions, be it the American support for of their first attempt to establish a democratic representative government in 1905-1911or its championing of Iran's rejection of the British bid to impose a protectorate on Iran after World War I, or its support of Iran's resistance to Soviet pressures for an oil concession in the 1940s. Above all, Iranian would remember American efforts to protect Iran's independence and territorial integrity by pressuring the Soviet Union to end its occupation of northern Iran at the end of World War II (Ramazani, 2009).

There will surely be some opposition from the human rights groups, religious and social conservatives in the Congress, and pro-Israeli lobbyists who

would accuse the administration as going soft on human rights violators who are also untrustworthy enemies of Israel. However, these areas of dispute are also one-sided pressure points that are not only in violation of international law but also in violation of U.S. moral leadership in unjustifiably punishing the entire population of Iran without serious prospects for success in its intended purposes. As such, they should not be looked upon as concessions to the Iranian regime. Furthermore, it is only through this first step that hopes for further negotiations may be realized. The broader cooperation must await the first phase of confidence building starting with these 'low politics' areas.

Tier Two

The areas of concern at this level can enhance the national security of both countries, as well as the broader regional and global interest, while further developing the level of trust between the two governments. Such areas of mutual interest includes fighting terrorism and drug trafficking through shared intelligence along the Iran-Iraqi and Iran-Afghanistan borders and in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Such cooperation can be extended to Iran's deeper commitment and involvement in rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan infrastructure, facilitating the eventual total removal of the U.S. sanctions.

Iranian government is as much concerned as the United States with militant Muslims and their undeclared war on Shi'a Muslims. The radicalization of political Islam since the early 1970s has increasingly turned violent and has polarized politics in and among Muslim countries. The Islamic movements in Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, have differed in their message, vision, and tactics in wrestling power away from mostly authoritarian regimes. The mainstream Islamic movements are and will continue for the foreseeable future challenging the ruling states in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Muslim world. The sociopolitical and cultural impacts of such movements are significant and will bear consequences for the U.S. national interest for years to come. (See Enayat, 2005.) However, the near term challenge to the U.S. national interest lies in threats from such groups as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other *Salafi*-inspired militant groups across Muslim world. While the mainstream Sunni and Shi'a population have a history of peaceful coexistence for centuries, the Shi'a population in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan has been targeted in bloody attacks. Iran is a key regional player in combating militant extremism and the United States needs to cooperate with Iran in this regards. A potential point of disagreement on this point would be over the 'designation' of groups as militant and/or terroristic. I will address this issue below.

Cooperation in combating drug trafficking can prove easier. Afghanistan is responsible for 90 percent of world opium and major heroin production and the U.S. population is a major consumer of illegal substances. Iran makes 85 percent of the world's total opium seizures and since 1979 has lost more than 3300 of its security forces in its war against narcotics.[7] There are also estimated four million drug- dependent people in Iran, costing the country hundreds of millions in lost productivity, medical care, and rehabilitation. Iran can benefit from its cooperation with the U.S. through access to surveillance material, better equipment and technology, while Iranian familiarity with the local culture and physical terrain can prove invaluable to the United States.

Iran's cooperation with the United States in combating militants and drug traffickers will not be without its cost. Iran will risk being targeted by al-Qaeda and militant groups' suicide bombers and operators. There is already in some circles among militants and even in popular opinion the idea that the 'Shi'a-Iran' has been cooperating with the United States and Israel to undermine Islam. This threat to Iran's national security should not be minimized as rapprochement with the U.S could unleash the wrath of al-Qaeda and other extremist militant groups against Iran.

Tier Three

The most difficult areas of dispute include Iran's nuclear program and its regional policy. The core of the nuclear problem is over the elements of national rights and trust. The Iranian people, not just the political leadership, feel that the United States has politicized its nuclear dossier unfairly to add political pressure for Iran's anti-U.S. rhetoric and policy. So, their view is that the United States and its allies would not be satisfied short of Iran surrendering its nuclear program to Western powers and companies and abandoning its enrichment activities, with all its medical, scientific, and industrial applications. That is, the U.S. is trying to bully Iran away from its nuclear rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and using proliferation threat to rally support for its policy.

The problem is compounded by the United States' silence over Israeli nuclear program and its possession of nuclear weapons while targeting and punishing Iran for its more generally transparent nuclear program. True, Iran's nuclear program was clandestine and in violation of NPT for years, but its previously undeclared nuclear sites has been open to inspections by the Interna-

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[7] Press TV, "Iran allocates $150M for border security," Thu, 26 Mar 2009 at: <http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=89694&sectionid=351020101>.

tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2003. Iran has even partially agreed to and voluntarily implemented the IAEA's additional protocol that demands tougher inspections. There is also no concrete evidence that Iran has a separate, secret nuclear program for purposes of a weapons program. The U.S. National Intelligence Estimate has attested that Iran stopped its weapons program in 2003.[8] Israel's nuclear program, however, has been an open secret for decades but without repercussions. Israel's nuclear weapons are also a major concern to the Arab States who have repeatedly called for a nuclear-free Middle East but to no avail. The 2007 U.S. nuclear agreement with the non-NPT member, India, has further eroded U.S. nonproliferation position, damaging its nuclear strand with yet another non-NPT nuclear ally, Pakistan.

The United States strategy in securing the Persian Gulf region and the flow of oil is grounded on direct military presence that relies heavily on local Arab States in providing the logistical needs. The problem, however, is that Persian Gulf Arab States continue to be vulnerable to social upheaval and external threat in the forms of militant Islamic movements and radicalization of Arab public opinion in the face of frequent Israeli acts of aggression, whether in legitimate acts of self-defense or not. Saudi Arabia's government had to ask for the withdrawal of U.S. troops after 2003 because of increasing political instability and its vulnerability to pressure from forces of Islamic opposition, be it the militant Muslims or the mainstream Islamic reformers. The more conservative Yemen continues facing major socioeconomic and political upheaval, with an illiteracy rate of 50 percent, and a lower GDPPC of $2600. The political leadership after the oust of president Ali Abdallah Salih continues facing serious challenges. Yemen has a history of tribalism, anti-Americanism and remains vulnerable to militant Muslim activities.

The economies of the smaller states, e.g., Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman to a lower extent, are highly dependent on immigrant and foreign workers and the global financial crisis since 2008 has also revealed the vulnerabilities of these small city-states to financial markets located and controlled outside their sovereign power. The total population of these five states stands at just over 12 million.

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[8] National Intelligence Estimate report, "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," November 2007. The report states that "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. See <http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf>.

The Persian Gulf Arab States and those of Egypt and Jordan continue be-
ing vulnerable to popular pressure for a more steadfast policy of resistance to
Israeli, and by implication, the U.S. influence. The Shi'a Iran is therefore por-
trayed by these regimes as the main enemy of Arab solidarity and stability in
the region. Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal even called for "a uni-
fied and a joint vision" to face up to "the Iranian challenge," stating: "In order
to cement Arab reconciliation we need a common vision for issues that con-
cern Arab security, especially the Arab-Israeli struggle and how to deal with
the Iranian challenge," including Iran's uranium enrichment and the security of
the Persian Gulf region.[9] King Abdallah of Jordan also in late 2004 warned of
the "Shi'a Crescent," that went from Damascus to Tehran, passing through
Baghdad, as a threat to his country and the wider Arab world.

The trouble is that the Arab population has for long viewed Israel as the
main obstacle to peace in the region and Iran's support for the Palestinian
Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon as legitimate and effective in resisting Israel.
The Arab States' anti-Iranian posture in the aftermath of Israeli incursion in
Gaza in December 2008 only damaged the legitimacy of governments in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and helped the popularity of Hamas and Mus-
lim Brotherhood in Jordan and Egypt. The failure of Israel to counter Hezbol-
lah in 2006 and Hamas in 2008-09 operations has given further credibility to
the resistance option and has made the *Tehran-Hezbollah-Hamas-Damascus
Quartet* a formidable pole in regional politics and a challenge to the United
States. The still-going Arab revolt since December 2010 is re-aligning regional
politics with Turkey now playing a central role and competing with Iran in in-
fluencing events in the region. The removal of the old pro-US regimes in Egypt
and Yemen has only further complicated U.S. regional position.

The far-less-than legitimate and authoritarian nature of Arab regimes
and their vulnerability to domestic and external forces of instability along
with the unpopular U.S. military presence can translate into policy disaster
for the United States. The United States remains the dominant military
power in the region, practically acting as a bodyguard for the hosting Per-
sian Gulf Arab regimes but also as an uninvited guest to the displeasure of
local population. The U.S. under prerssure from Iraqi government had to
remove its combat troops by the 2011 deadline. There are, however,
around 6,000 of its troops stationed in either the Persian Gulf States or

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[9] Press TV, "Saudi Arabia lobbies for anti-Iran union," Wednesday, 04 Mar 2009 at
<http://www.presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=87492&sectionid=351020101>.

aboard amphibious ships or closer to the region in Egypt.[10] The popularity of political Islam as a viable alternative to governance, minus the widespread corruption present in many Arab States, has actually grown in recent years. With Egypt already gone the Islamist way, a total collapse of regime and their takeover by Islamist movements in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, is not in the realm of impossibility, especially with opportunities for the Palestinian dream of a two-state solution increasingly looking improbable. Israel despite all rhetoric is not ready or willing to make the sacrifices necessary for the two-state solution to emerge.[11] The failure to materialize a viable Palestinian State in the face of Israeli resistance to a two-state solution can easily lead to further violence in the occupied territories and spill over into these neighboring Arab States. The United States' veto of UN recognition of a Palestinian state in September 2011 only further damaged U.S. national security, especially since the majority of world governments have already recognized a future Palestinian State based on 1967 UN resolution 242. The United States in 2013 continues to support al-Qaeda linked militant insurgency in Syria to appease the Sunni Persian Gulf Arab States and to boast Turkey's regional position and to seriously undermine Iran's regional influence. This is while U.S. is officially at war with al-Qaeda and its supporters. The duplicitous policy is bound to hurt U.S. national interest in the long run by empowering *Salafi* and *Wahhabi* militant Muslims.

Beyond Hopes and Fears: The Common Grounds

Iran naturally feels threatened by massive U.S. military buildup and the seemingly friendly and yet 'unpredictable' Arab regimes. Iran has dispute with the United Arab Emirates over three islands in the Persian Gulf and cannot fully rest assured that these states would not become a launching pad for the U.S. military action against it. The Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) spends billions of dollars on arms to counter Iranian advancement in missile

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[10] The U.S. military in 2005 had more than 6,000 active troops stationed throughout the Middle East, including in Bahrain, where the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet is headquartered, and in Qatar, home to a large U.S. Air Force base, about 415 U.S. personnel. There were also around 400 are based in the continuing multinational observer force, created in Egypt's Sinai Desert. Another 2,000 troops, most of them U.S. Marines, were stationed on amphibious vessels in the Persian Gulf. See CIA World Fact book at <http://www.worldfactbook.org>.

[11] There is increasing belief among Middle East observers that the two-state solution is practically dead. See, for example, Cook (2008).

technology and armaments and they are considering nuclear cooperation with France and other countries.[12] Iran's influence in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza and its radicalizing impact on Arab public opinion is a major concern to the GCC countries, as well Egypt and Jordan and some states in North Africa.

The Arab regimes are concerned with Iran's increasing power but are also caught 'between a rock and a hard place': To counter Iran's threat they need the U.S. military and political support and this stands against the popular will in Arab countries.

Iran is also concerned with Central Asia becoming a theatre for Russian, Chinese, and the U.S. competition over control of oil routes and geostrategic purposes, especially since NATO now has become a player in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The U.S. nonmilitary assistance to Central Asian states stands at around $2.67 billion annually and its military presence in the region makes Russia and China uncomfortable. Iran has been trying hard to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to receive protection from its core members, Russia and China, both at odds with Washington's Central Asian policy. Russia views the U.S. presence and the eastward expansion of NATO with suspicion, especially after uprisings in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan unseated leaders loyal to the Kremlin. Beijing sees the U.S. military presence along its western border as part of Washington's strategy to contain China. Energy is another major Chinese concern, especially securing access to oil and natural gas from the Caspian basin located roughly 1,500 miles to the west (Beehner, 2005). Russia and China have become Iran's major trading partners and arms and technology suppliers. The trade volume between Iran and China stood at over US$20 billion in 2007.[13] A previous gas deal with China signed in 2004 was worth $100 billion to supply China with LNG, to be extracted from Iran's Yadavaran field over a 25-year period.

Russia has provided Iran with nuclear technology in the $800 million Bushehr nuclear power plant deal. Overall volume of trade between Iran and Russia was 2.294 billion in the first nine months of 2007, which was

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[12] Arms sales to these countries worth billions of dollars and besides the United States, Russia and European nations are major suppliers. With oil and gas exports providing $2 trillion in revenue, Anthony Cordesman at the Center for Strategic and International Studies predicted in 2008 that "southern Gulf arms sales will be 50 to 100 percent higher over the next four years." The United States will supply only a quarter of the weapons; Russia and European nations also will push to make sales. See Pincus (2008).
[13] Source: <http://www.iran-daily.com/1387/3263/html/economy.htm#s342852>.

double the value of the same period in 2006.[14] Russia also has provided Iran with the Tor M1 missile system and may even supply the S-300 missile defense shield that would drastically improve Iran's defense capabilities in light of an Israeli or U.S. attacks. Iran is bound to increase its level of trade with these two major countries, although the level of Iranian trade with Japan, South Korea, and major European powers like Germany, Britain, France, and Italy also remain significant and is bound to increase substantially once sanctions are removed. Thus far, the United States has been the major loser in the trade game, as other countries, including the European, have continued their trade with Iran despite the U.S. and the UN sanctions.[15]

The resolution of disputing issues at Tier Three level requires a holistic approach and must be interlinked with negotiations over issues in Tier One and Two. The United States, for example, cannot expect Iran to abandon its nuclear enrichment program as a prerequisite to negotiations and in the meanwhile continue threatening the regime with further actions, including military actions. Or, it would make little sense for Iranian leadership to help the U.S. fighting terrorism or to cooperate with NATO in Afghanistan or discontinue its ties with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza while taking an overtly pro-Israeli stand in almost all issues pertinent to peace in the region. It would still make no sense at all if the U.S. insists upon keeping a large contingent of troops, ships and equipments in the region and continue to pour billions worth of advance fire jets and anti-missile defense systems and equipments into Arab States in the name of securing oil shipments and fighting terrorism while depriving Iran from a role in the management of Persian Gulf security.

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[14] Source: <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8609220260>.

[15] Germany's exports to Iran were expected to total 4 million euros in 2008; in April 2007, Austrian oil company OMV signed a 22 billion euro agreement to produce liquefied natural gas from Iran's South Pars gas field; Swiss energy giant EGL signed a 25-year deal with the National Iranian Gas Export Company to buy 5.5 billion cubic meters of Iranian natural gas per year, starting in 2011, for approximately $20 billion; Iran and Turkey have agreed to continue their relationship and hope to increase their bilateral trade revenue to $20 billion per year. On December 2, 2008, Malaysia signed a $14 billion deal with Iran for the construction of two natural gas liquification plants as well as two gas fields. The two countries signed a multi-billion dollar gas deal in 2007. In January 2008, Iran and Italy's electric company, Edison International, signed an oil exploration deal for $107 million. See the Jewish Virtual Library, "Fact sheet 63: The Failure of Iran Sanctions," February 9, 2009, at <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/talking/63_Sanctions.html>.

What is needed then cannot be achieved with the same old policy of carrot and stick since that implies a 'superior-inferior' bilateral approach instead of 'partnership.' The Obama administration "should reconsider its reliance on more than three decades of containment and sanctions, which have not weakened the regime, but have grievously harmed the Iranian people, whom America claims to support" (Ramazani, 2009). A new partnership must slowly develop as cooperation in Tiers one and two areas builds trust between the two disputing parties, while both countries commit to cooperation in all aforementioned areas as equal partners. A partnership does not imply equality of power, prestige, or influence but it implies mutual respect in negotiations and formulating 'win-win' scenarios.

Otherwise, Iran is highly unlikely to forego its uranium enrichment program and its nuclear activity will grow bigger and more sophisticated. A unilateral freeze of nuclear enrichment as a precondition for negotiation can only deepen Iranian mistrust of the U.S. A military solution cannot resolve the issue since it cannot totally derail Iran's nuclear program, the knowledge and technical skills. It would instead aggravate the situation by convincing Iran to pursue a military program and a more hostile regional policy. This is something the U.S. and Israel can ill afford.

Short of the military option and with all its unintended consequences, a possible resolution might be to revisit the 'freeze-for-freeze' option. This would freeze Iran's enrichment activities while UN sanctions on Iran are also simultaneously frozen while negotiations continue. Ultimately, the creation of a 'nuclear consortium' involving the United States and other nuclear club members can satisfy both parties. Iran's nuclear enrichment activities come under direct supervision of its foreign investors, and the IAEA, ensuring the civilian nature of the program while allowing Iran to experiment, in a limited fashion, with nuclear technology and also providing for its nuclear fuel for Bushehr and future power plants. This scheme can allay the neighboring countries' concerns especially with the United States' involvement in the program. The resolution of the 'Iranian nuclear threat' should deescalate the concerns over the threat of nuclear proliferation among the neighboring Arab States. This formula should also be acceptable to Israel as it would bring Iran's nuclear program under a closer scrutiny and could over the years help moderate Iran's foreign policy behavior as the regime would become more secure.

Iran has invested significant amount of resources making itself a central player in the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict and cannot be persuaded to sever its ties easily. To do so will be a major setback for Iran in the Islamic world where it enjoys popular support for its tough stance against the 'bul-

lying' United States. But, the satisfactory resolution of Iran's nuclear dispute would drastically improve chances of cooperation with the U.S. and the global community at large. Iran's relations with its Arab neighbors is bound to improve significantly once the United States removes its sanctions, begin trade and investment, and paves the way for Iran joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). A more secure and confident Iran will be bound to cooperate in other central issues facing the region.

It is possible for the United States to tie the resolution of Iran's nuclear dossier to Iran's policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but without making it a precondition to the resolution of its nuclear dispute. Iran has insisted for years that it is, in the end, up to the Palestinians to decide their future although Iran's preference is a national referendum scheme in Palestine to decide on the future course of action. In this light, Iran can be persuaded to withdraw its objections to a two-state solution if the U.S. persuades Israel to agree on a resolution based on UNSC 242 or something close to that formula. Most Arab States have already accepted this solution openly or implicitly and Iran's tacit approval can significantly improve its chances of success. A strong U.S. pressure can go far in convincing Israeli political leadership of the impossibility of a military solution in resolving either the Iranian nuclear dispute or the Palestinian national cause. This is especially true, given the popularity of Islam in politics, the threat of militant Muslim groups, and changes in the structure of global political economy.

The long term Persian Gulf security cannot be safeguarded without active Iranian cooperation. The creation of a Persian Gulf Security Alliance (PGSA) can bind Iran, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the U.S. with common interests in security and cooperation. China, Russia, Pakistan, and India are other major parties with shared interest in PGSA and can have limited or extensive participation, pending on future negotiations. The inclusion of these states can avert these countries' possible negative response to this yet another "western" security alliance. Iran as the largest and most populated country in the region and has to play a secure and respectable role but in cooperation with the GCC countries and the U.S. forces. An added bonus for the United States is the opportunity to significantly reduce the presence of its naval and aerial forces, saving billions of dollars. The U.S. will also have the opportunity to compete with Russian and Chinese investments in vast Iranian oil, natural gas, and current and future pipelines construction, and other sectors of its economy.

The future flow of oil and natural gas to both Asia and Europe is bound to create some tension as the rise in energy consumption in Asia will leave

Europe short-handed and even more dependent on Russia. By 2030 Asia will import 80 percent of its total oil needs and 80 percent of this total will come from the Persian Gulf. As the Russian Federation Security Council and the State Council's new national security strategy statement says the primary focus of the struggle over the next decade will be on hydrocarbons[16]

Conclusion

In his first National Security Strategy (NSS), President Barack Obama pledged to maintain Washington's "military superiority" but stressing that the persistence of U.S. global power will depend more on the health of its domestic economy and international cooperation. The 52 page document underlines the limits of military power and unilateralism that characterized President Bush's first term. President Obama wrote in the introduction, "The burdens of a young century cannot fall on American shoulders alone—indeed, our adversaries would like to see America sap our strength by overextending our power…We are clear-eyed about the challenge of mobilizing collective action, and the shortfalls of our international system. But America has not succeeded by stepping outside the currents of international cooperation." (See White House, 2010 and Lobe, 2010.) Fighting foolish wars in order to convince people that U.S. is the "strongest horse" is an obvious way to make Bin Laden's fantasies more likely. After all, his greatest achievement to date is not the damage that al Qaeda inflicted on September 11. Instead, his real achievement was helping convince the Bush administration to adopt the neo-conservative program in the Middle East-most notably in the 2003 invasion of Iraq-a set of self-inflicted wounds from which we are still laboring to recover. And one way to avoid such blunders is to disregard Bin Laden's ill-informed notions about equine diplomacy (Walt, 2010).

The long term Israeli security can only be secured within a wider regional approach to peace and security, not from a U.S.-sponsored peace settlement that might only bring about secession of local violence. A US-Iranian rapprochement can go far in achieving regional peace and cooperation. The long term Middle East peace also demands the resolution—not the settlement—of the Palestinians problem but within a wider regional agreement that would include a new Persian Gulf Security Alliance. This would strengthen both re-

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[16] Russian national security strategy until 2020: Main rival is the United States again in the next 12 years. See: <http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=94381>.

gional, including Iranian, and U.S. national interest in the still emerging multipolar world with increasing competition over energy resources.

Iran is highly unlikely to forego its uranium enrichment program and its nuclear activity will grow bigger and more sophisticated. A unilateral freeze of nuclear enrichment as a precondition for negotiation can only deepen Iranian mistrust of the U.S. A military solution cannot resolve the issue since it cannot totally derail Iran's nuclear program and its possessed knowledge and technical skills. It would, instead, aggravate the situation by convincing Iran to pursue a military program and a more hostile regional policy: "A military strike would likely have worse consequences. Even if a strike was an operational success, it would only set back Iran's nuclear program by several years—while giving the regime a new incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent and build better hidden and defended nuclear facilities. In response to an attack, Iran might well seek to obstruct shipping in the Persian Gulf, potentially triggering oil shortages and soaring prices" (Kupchan, 2010). This can only lead to bloodshed and killing and is something the U.S., Israel, and the world community can ill afford.

The resolution of disputing issues between the United States and Iran demands a holistic but gradual approach, ranked here into three tiers based on the significance of issues involved and their contribution to confidence building, resolution of differences and thus avoid killing. This three-tiered approach also needs to begin without stated preconditions on either side, as objective confidence building preconditions in negotiations are truly rare.

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Chapter Thirteen

Islam and the West
The Possibility of a Nonkilling Future

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Introduction

All of Islam, despite its complexity as a world religion, is being vilified and construed as militant today, particularly in the West. This raises the question, "Is a nonkilling relationship at all possible between Islam and the West?" The irony is that it is the homogenising spread of Western Civilization across the globe that is confronting all other cultures and thriving at their expense. This unrelenting hegemony is increasingly provoking angry and violent responses as more cultures become alienated and homogenised under what are the end results of rampant globalisation: consumerism and capitalism on a global scale. The forces of unrestrained free trade, deregulation and privatisation have created "The Market", a powerful entity whose laws seem to go too easily unquestioned by its corporate servants. Globalisation is creating, across the broad sweep of nations, an ever-deepening rift between the rich and the poor not only in terms of wealth but also in terms of human rights (George, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002; Oxfam, 2004). In so many societies the spread of globalisation is consequently resulting in the social exclusion of the 'Other', those who are poor, marginalised or who do not conform. We seek to explain in this paper how this process of exclusion is taking place. As Galtung (2002: 51) says, 'we cannot globalise the marketplace *ad infinitum* without also, sooner or later, globalising our souls . . .' In this respect, Islam is of great significance in the world today because it stands at the cutting edge of new thinking: Through its gathering resurgence, it is levelling a challenge at the moral integrity of globalisation. How is it doing this? While nonkilling principles can be found in all world religious faiths, Islamic Civilization actively embraces diversity and rejects discrimination based on race, ethnicity and colour. Based on such high standards of equity and moral integrity, it *once* stood foremost among civilisations where it had built upon a principle of social inclusion (Saikal, 2003: 29-31; Ahmed, 2001: 62-63). This feat continues to hold relevance in our world today for

its insight into the establishment of a nonkilling ethic and verifies that we can engage the perceived 'Other' with the most ethical care.

The need to respect diversity and the need to include the 'Other' is essential for ethically-orientated nonkilling relations between peoples and cultures in the world today, set here within the context of globalisation and Islamic resurgence. We discuss two civilizational *possibilities* that are more inclusive than existing civilizational realities: (1) Islam is able to contribute to a rebirth of a multicultural global culture and (2) The West is able to initiate dialogue with Islam in the Islamic endeavour to realise this rebirth. Firstly, we explore Islam's confrontation with the West with reference to the nature and effects of globalisation and how globalisation imposes a monoculture upon recipient societies. Following this we examine examples from various other historical periods in order to demonstrate the inherent violence of a monoculture where identities have been forcefully imposed upon a society and a monoculture created with adverse consequences. In contrast, the flowering of multiculturalism in medieval Islam is described as being part of the Islamic Golden Age where invention and discovery flourished. We then argue that Islam, through its resurgence, could sponsor yet another intercultural renaissance which could help to educate the world in recognising that a sustained peace requires a multicultural global culture and not a global culture that is the sole product of Western cultural homogenisation or any other one-dimensional cultural and economic system. Such a multicultural global culture exemplifies the adaptability of human nature, a prerequisite for the transformation from a killing to a nonkilling society. We emphasise the role that Islam, promising in its resurgence, can play in promoting a peaceful coexistence across cultures in the difficult times that we live in today when the tragic events of 9/11 have finally awakened us to question more deeply the values upon which Western civilisation is rooted. Instead of trying to understand these events in terms of 'global terror' and as a problem created by less-civilised religious fundamentalists as many critics tend to do, we examine more closely how western behaviours are implicated in perhaps even provoking such violent and tragic responses as 9/11 by extremists. In fact what we are doing is turning the focus upon those of us in the West as we address the violence of globalisation. At the same time we highlight ways in which a progressive humanistic Islam can counter and challenge both the fundamentalists within branches of its own religion as well as those pushing the market through economic followed by socio-cultural globalisation.

We are dealing in our paper with Muslims as people who are increasingly being politically and culturally disempowered by the views of the West and by globalisation itself, which is a Western construct related to neoliberalism and the so-called free market. Hence we are critically examining the homogenising influences of globalisation and comparing this with other homogenisation attempts in history to point out its marginalising potential for the peoples of Islam. When people are marginalised or forced into changes with which they are not comfortable, a nonkilling society becomes by the very logic of the situation, less possible, especially when direct violence is used as the response to the perceived violence of globalisation, which then works as a catalyst to promote perpetual war. In this context, the question of who started this violence first, we believe, is a moot point.

Islam and the West

> We live in a world where "Muslim" equals "terrorist".
> Mambuay, cited in *Scarboro Missions Magazine* (2005: 3)

The chasm between Islam and the West is deepening. The suspicion and distrust that existed a few decades ago have been replaced by a more identifiable and volatile conflict. For example, Seyyed Hossein Nasr described the confrontation of World Views that existed between Islam and the West over thirty years ago. Nasr wrote eloquently of the plight of the contemporary Muslim who must contend with the values of modern Western civilization, which seemed to be the very antithesis of the Islamic principles Muslims cherished. Nasr claimed that from an Islamic perspective, Western Science was reducing the universe to a single level of reality—'a spatio-temporal complex of matter and energy': an atomistic universe that was devoid of the sacred (Nasr, 1975:19). More recently Max Rodenbeck (2004: 3) had this to say in a review in which he discusses 'Islam Confronting its Demons':

> The world looks rather threatening as seen from the Muslim perspective. It is not merely a question of colonialism, or of the fighting taking place on what Samuel Huntington describes as the present 'bloody borders' of Islam—what most Muslims view as liberation conflicts in places such as Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, Palestine, and now, some would say, Iraq. Like many smaller religious communities that have turned inward, traditional Islam feels itself mortally challenged by a dominant global culture that is ebulliently hedonistic and irreverent.

Today, it is not merely a difference in philosophical outlook that character-ises the variance in opinions between these two adversaries. The events of September 11, the subsequent Global War on Terror and continuing 'terrorist' attacks around the world, many of which are authored by Islamic Fundamentalist groups, have fuelled hostility and opposition between Islam and the West. One viewpoint that is gaining acceptance in the West is that militant Islam is employing an aggressive ideology in order to seek world domination (Lechner, 2004: 327). Many people in the West therefore see 'Political Islam' as a threat that must be contained at any cost. In particular, the United States of America, under the Bush Administration (2001-2008), controlled by neo-conservative ideologues, was seen as leading this crusade of fighting a war against militant Islam 'on behalf of the civilized world' (Frum and Perle, 2003: 273). It is understandable given the preceding arguments that to Muslims this logic may be seen to exaggerate the idea of an Islamic threat which could in fact work to maintain or increase Western hegemony over the Muslim world and its particular Islamic culture. Saikal (2003: 1) contends that this fear is not only borne by radical and fundamentalist Muslims but by many mainstream Muslims as well. Islam sees itself as being demonised by elements in the West, which is allowing all of Islam to be construed as being similarly militant and violent. This has made Islam become more fearful, more protective, and more distant. There are various political, cultural and historical interpretations as to why a schism between Islam and the West exists at all[1]. We contend in this paper that globalisation is a principal cause in exacerbating the conflict in deteriorating relations between Islam and the West today because as a process it is challenging the organisation of life in society, as we know it; more so, it is challenging the very possibility that a nonkilling society may emerge, a society where equality flourishes in place of dominance and exclusion. In order to understand more fully this connection, it is necessary to examine briefly the upsides and downsides of globalisation.

Upsides of Globalisation

What exactly is globalisation? Joseph Stiglitz, one of the world's most renowned economists and a supporter of globalisation, defines globalisation as 'the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows

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[1] See, for example, Ahmed (2003). Here Ahmed writes from within the Islamic tradition. For contrast, see also, Lewis (2002), who takes a Western perspective.

of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders' (Stiglitz, 2002: 9). The great hope of globalisation is that by raising living standards it will bring benefits to those in both the developing and the developed world. It has been argued that by giving less affluent countries access to overseas markets, globalisation will allow these countries to sell their goods, permit foreign investment that will make new products at cheaper prices, and open borders so that people will be able to travel abroad for education, work, and thence to be able to send home earnings to help their families and fund new businesses (Stiglitz, 2006: 4).

Indeed there are positives to globalisation and this cannot be refuted. These positive aspects include life saving technology and most importantly, rapid developments in communications and information technology. Communications, information and knowledge empower people and lead to growth creating possibilities for the improvement of living standards. People who have internet access, for example, simply have learning advantages over those who do not. Globalisation has also led to the reinvigorating of certain intergovernmental institutions such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) itself as well as the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and international justice movements. This development has brought knowledge and medicine to vulnerable children in the developing world as well as international attention to human rights abuses around the world thus helping to foster social change. Media can also be seen to be an upside of globalisation. It has the ability to convey a message and reach people throughout the world which can facilitate intercultural exchanges as can international travel which has been made available to many more people.

Downsides of Globalisation

We are not denying these positive aspects to globalisation that many of us may take for granted in our day-to-day lives especially those of us who are living in the West or the more 'developed' North. However, the principal downside is that the cornerstone of globalisation is based upon unrestrained economic growth and we believe this benefits corporate power over the needs of people. This is in direct contradiction to Glenn Paige's argument. Paige, seminal thinker on nonkilling, contends that nonkilling is not only about the rejection of killing but also means the 'abolition of poverty' and the 'nonkilling expression of human rights and responsibilities' (Paige, 2009:102). The message of globalisation at all costs and by any means opposes Paige's thesis in that economic progress is seen to only take place if we are willing to em-

ploy the powerful human drive of individualism and selfishness, from which ironically religions and traditional wisdom universally calls upon us to desist (Schumacher, 1974). The leaders of our nation-states have also echoed their concerns. For example, in 1999, the leader of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, warned that globalisation would interfere with age-old values that had held his country together (Saul, 2005: 167). The way the economy is organised often means that economic growth is oblivious to concerns of - the environment, religion, the weak and the poor. Undeniably, there are spin-offs to be had such as greater access to certain consumer goods for *some* people but unrestrained economic growth *at any cost* also means that what ultimately matters is "The Market" and the Market determines the fate of millions of people across many different cultures as it is doing now in 2011 in relation to the continuing global recession that is creating the worst global economic crisis since the great depression. The Market in this globalising role is in fact in total control and it can be relentless (Saul, 2005: 33,150). Neo-liberal ideology unequivocally promotes the free market as 'the fountainhead of human freedom' and compels all nations, 'on pain of extinction' to be complicit in its globalising role (Gray, 2005: 2). Therefore there is no choice as to whether a nation wants to be globalised or not. The right to say "no" does not exist. John Feffer, a writer on the global economy, expresses the power of the market in the following definitions——'Globalisation is the same answer to a multitude of problems: "Let the market decide". Globalisation is TINA (There Is No Alternative), which Margaret Thatcher declared victorious after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe' (Feffer, 2002: 1). John Ralston Saul describes globalisation as 'an inevitable form of internationalism in which civilization is reformed from the perspective of economic leadership, where this leadership is provided not by people, but by the innate force of economics at work—the marketplace (Saul, 2005: 19). Globalisation is thus an economic force that moves across borders with ease in order to create and expand a global capitalist market and in doing this, maximizes profitability for corporate interests, businesses and certain individuals who benefit from these profits, over and above concerns for the general welfare of people and their needs. Paige (2009: 102) makes a salient point which can be applied to this context by suggesting that contribution to problem-solving processes must respond to *human needs*. Doing so will evoke creative potential in individuals and in humankind as a whole (Paige 2009: 102). Globalisation, however, is benefited by problem-solving processes that respond to corporate interests at the expense of human needs. Hence much of humankind is robbed not only of welfare but also of creative prospects which impacts on future human prosperity.

Even so, if globalisation is purely an economic force, then how does it affect relations between Islam and the West? This question is addressed by showing how the economic forces of globalisation are impacting upon the world followed by a brief look at Islam's encounter with the West in recent times. The reality is that economic might has severe political and therefore cultural implications. The possibility exists of a single culture seizing a global hegemony and imposing a particular brand of monoculture unalterably on indigenous and local cultures around the world. Such has been the case with Western culture, and particularly US culture today. The possible responses to this homogenization of culture may be an initial and unthinking measure of acceptance—'a Nike trainer on every foot . . . a Coke on every table' (Feffer, 2002: 1). This superficial receptiveness may later be accompanied by a deeper reaction of resistance amongst recipient cultures. Why? Not only does globalisation create a suitable environment for the international trade of goods and the exchange of services and finance, rendering it attractive to consumers, globalisation has 'inexorably transferred wealth from the poor to the rich' and 'increased inequalities both within and between nations' creating many more losers than there has heretofore been in capitalist enterprise (George, 2003: 18). Hence, it is undeniable that great wealth for the few co-exists with terrible poverty for the many. As an index to this inequality, George compares the widening North-South differential. In the 18th century it was about 2 to 1; in 1965 it was 30 to 1; now it is over 70 to 1 and rising. Such a disparity, George (2003: 18-19) claims, is indicative of a breach of human rights. Neo-liberal globalisation is not, indeed, conducive to the maintenance of human rights. Its philosophy does not meet the criteria of Article 25 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which relates specifically to standards of living and rights of security with regard to unemployment and lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond a person's control (United Nations, 1948).

The leading agents of globalisation are culpable of misconduct. They have not created a unified, rights-based world. As Oxfam (2004: 189) point out, all people do not enter the market as equals and the outcomes of market performances reflect the power relations inherent in the capitalist system. The state could intervene in order to compensate for these power imbalances by fixing employment and wage standards or by providing the poor with opportunities to produce and invest. However, the governments of nation states usually do not intervene; they are not allowed to interfere with mechanisms of the so-called 'free' market. Ironically in the current economic crisis some governments have been injecting large sums of money into their economies in a bid to stave off recession. This does not al-

ter the fact, however, that they are locked into a target of economic growth without the concern of equity among peoples. The globalisers, which include multinational and corporate entities, international financial organizations and development institutions as well as many governments of mainly the OECD nations, are thus in moral deficit. For example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) prioritises to help global corporations rather than the poor so there is not a level playing field between rich and poor countries. Stiglitz (2006: 4) claiming that globalisation has the potential to have great benefits states that, however, the evidence is 'overwhelming' that it has failed to fulfil its potential. He claims that the way in which globalisation operates has been largely set by the advanced, industrial countries and by special interests within those countries which have acted to further their own interests at the expense of 'a fair set of rules' (Stiglitz, 2006: 4) The well-being of those in the poorest countries in the world has thus been entirely compromised.

It is appropriate to ask here whether there is an identifiable link between the negative effects of globalisation, excessive consumerism and materialism, and possible retaliation of terrorism by fundamentalist Muslim groups. As Steger points out, Al Qaeda's ideology reflects on globalisation as a Western project that aggressively exports a hedonistic lifestyle devoid of any spiritual values. He goes on to explain that as a result of its views on globalisation and its negative effects on Islamic culture, Al Qaeda sees as one of its goals to overthrow secular governments in the region and create in their place Islamic republics that are free from the corruption and seduction of Western culture (Steger, 2005: 111). Within the framework of terrorism, Fukuyama (2006: 72) recognises that there are several affiliations of Islamist extremists, but among these he considers the so-called 'Jihadists' as being the most dangerous and out of these, Al Qaeda the best organised and structured of them all.

Islam is but one culture, among many, to have borne the impacts of globalisation and be subject to the resultant homogenising effects of Western culture. For example, Ziauddin Sardar, a committed Muslim and celebrated author, believes that a dominant set of cultural values and practices have been imposed by the West upon the rest of the world creating 'one vision of how life is to be lived, at the expense of all others' (Sardar, 2003: 251). This universalisation of Western culture as projected across the globe by the corporate media is contested by many recipient societies including those in the Islamic world. However, the brand of consumerism that globalisation promotes cannot offer a meaning to life that by its very nature has a spiritual and moral basis. A life that is centred on consumerism must eventually become a spiritual desert to a Muslim whose faith is the very edifice

of how to live. What is more, as Sardar (2003: 251) claims, not only does globalisation erode non-Western local traditions and practices, it 'kills' non-Western future alternatives, locking the future into 'a single, linear projection'. Thus homogenisation of global cultures into a monocultural Western consumerist mould is a direction that many people, including Islamic peoples, may initially embrace through its allure of possibilities only to be alienated in the end by its superficiality and spiritual bankruptcy.

In relation to the confrontation between Islam and the West today, Dr Seyyed Hossein Nasr, in an interview in 2003, offered a solution to the problem of social exclusion when he said that the challenge is to have the empathy to be able to break through to the world of the Other without vilifying the Other (Nasr, 2003: 2). Dr Nasr's solution is rational and just. However, the question is whether a globalised world dominated by an uncompromising Market is capable of responding to such a human challenge. The response from Muslims is interpreted by some analysts[2], to be an eloquent re-articulation of Islam; a re-articulation that is directed from across many and varied geo-cultural frontiers. Such an Islamic resurgence is not so difficult to understand given that the social exclusion of the 'Other' is not only an economic or social concern but also of religious significance. It is also a concern that is rooted in self-image, how we see ourselves in terms of identity. Mustapha Kamal Pasha touches on this concept when he describes the current phase of Islamic resurgence as "the articulation of hidden or suppressed *sensibilities* [our italics] in Muslim collective consciousness" (Pasha, 2004: 332). As Pasha (2004: 332) notes, this suppression stems from an unsuccessful decolonisation process, one that is exacerbated by processes of neo-liberal globalisation.

Akbar Ahmed also links globalisation and identity but in a different way. Ahmed (2003: 51-52) contends that globalisation challenges the fundamental forms of identity that surround people—family, tribe, state and religion. Identity is lost when individuals must leave home to search for employment thus threatening the cohesion of the family. When sections of the tribe, usually males, are forced to migrate to urban areas for work, the genealogical principle of common descent deteriorates. Therefore political and economic changes that globalisation brings, result in profound and destabilising changes in state and society. The materialism of globalisation thus invariably

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[2] Various analysts have linked globalisation and the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. Mustapha Kamal Pasha is more illustrative of our point here for he discusses the rise of Islamic social movements as a reaction to neoliberal globalization in an attempt to link globalization to resistance in the Islamic world overall.

effaces 'the spiritual core of religion' (Ahmed, 2003: 51). However, while various aspects of identity are weakened by globalisation, ideas of morality and justice grow to be ever more important in the vacuum created, for they represent order, God's order. Religion becomes then an additional source of identity (Ahmed, 2003: 52). The dire problems of globalisation thus paradoxically bring about a spiritual reaffirmation. This shows that such spirit cannot be quashed in human beings. It will re-emerge if lost. Paige's profound question 'Is a nonkilling society possible' is related to and can be seen to act in synergy with the question, 'Is a spiritually reaffirming society possible'. The answer is "Yes". Human beings eventually seek to return from spiritual exile. This sets the stage for resurgence.

As has been argued, globalisation produces a monoculturalising effect, working against cultural diversity. Therefore, before exploring the dynamics of Islamic resurgence, it is useful to examine selected periods of history in which attempts have been made to produce monocultures as singularities in ideological meaning that override all other meaning and ideologies in existence. In order to establish the extent of violence surrounding such homogenising social constructions or social-change experiments the following brief case studies are presented.

The Need To Respect Diversity: Inclusion of the 'Other'

Amartya Sen argues that the main hope for peace in the world today lies in recognising and accepting the plurality of our identities, identities that intersect with one another and form a bulwark against the formation of an impenetrable uniformity. To Amartya Sen, our shared humanity flourishes in the differences between us and not, as it would seem, in the similarities (Sen, 2001: 11-12). When there is one dominant and overarching system that "unites" us, it is a historical fact that tensions ultimately arising within that system eventually cause it to breakdown. Accordingly, we will examine several examples from history of failed attempts at homogenisation, of trying to make things all the same in a particular place or context. These global strategies demonstrate how conditions deteriorated when certain identities were forced on a society and a monoculture was either created or attempted. We specifically wish to highlight in these examples that the consequences of failing to respect diversity ultimately results in exclusion of the 'Other'. This is, in effect, an act of violence as the examples reveal below. Why is it violent? In excluding the 'Other', we have proclaimed ourselves the sole possessors of truth and knowledge. By exclusion, we dismiss the

fact that we can be enriched by alternative viewpoints and deny the multiple ways of seeing and knowing the world and being a part of it. In failing to understand the 'Other', we try, without reflection, to *impose* an identity 'upon them' with which *we* are comfortable. This type of violence can result in physical violence as the following case studies will show. It is as if homogenisation destroys the nonkilling ethic that is present in spiritual and humanist traditions and makes killing a much more realisable and rampant act.

The first of these historical examples is about the process and period of colonialism. The target culture is re-invented during colonisation. In the first stage of globalisation, the age of colonial discovery (1450-1850), globalisation was directly related to European expansion, invasion and conquest; during the second stage (1850-1945), European empires spread further and wider, and became entrenched, influencing colonised societies and modifying cultures in various ways; and in the third stage following World War II, globalisation is linked to the spread of new technologies, development, trade liberalisation and the computer age from about 1960 onwards (McGrew, 2005: 28). Going by these three stages of globalisation, we have only discussed the influences of the third stage thus far. However, the first and second stages of globalisation coincide with what we know as colonialism. The spreading of European civilization across the globe was termed the "Civilizing Mission". The Civilizing Mission brought civilization, enlightenment, Christianity and law and order to the supposedly primitive peoples of the world. The colonisers represented this process as being a duty to the rest of humankind, often by virtue of their national, racial and cultural superiority. As Anghie (2004: 4) claims, the Civilizing Mission has been used to justify colonialism as a means of redeeming backward peoples by incorporating them into the universal European civilization. Rudyard Kipling's poem, *The White Man's Burden,* identifies the Civilizing Mission as one to be assumed by every right thinking European. The Civilizing Mission brought improved methods of administration and health care to colonial countries. However, it also brought exploitation and dehumanisation.

Although the subject cultures may have been given something of value, mutuality was considered to be out of the question (Said, 1994: 47). The relationship between coloniser and colonised was in many ways akin to a master-slave relationship[3]. Colonised peoples were subsequently left to suffer their

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[3] This was also reflected in the colonisation of Australia under the argument of Terra Nullius where reconciliation or recovery from alienation is still regarded as unfinished business, with no real independence for indigenous Australians in sight, in spite

anger and humiliation and come to terms with the grief of their displacement. Many of these colonised countries subsequently gained independence after World War Two. Gandhi, for instance, had to wage a nonviolent struggle against the British Empire in order to gain independence for India. It is important to note the similarities of what we call globalisation today and what took place in the colonial period; they both reflect different forms of imperialism.

Another epoch in history which saw the development of a monoculture was Nazism. This epoch witnessed an attempt to destroy the Jewish people. NAZI was the acronym for the National German Worker's Party which was a fascist movement having its roots in European nationalist and socialist movements. However, Nazi ideologues built into it a biologically determined vision of "Aryan" supremacy. A key feature, which in fact, distinguishes Nazism from generic fascism, is a fixation with racial theories of superiority (Chip Berlet cited in Bellant, 1991: 4). Basic to Nazi ideology is the concept of a *master race* which holds that Germanic and Nordic people are not only superior to peoples of other races but are, in fact, a "pure race". Adolf Hitler claimed: '[Historical experience] shows with terrifying clarity that in every mingling of Aryan blood with that of lower peoples the result was the end of the cultured people' (Hitler, 1925, Chap. 11, Vol. 1). When the Nazi Party took power, Heinrich Himmler sought to create an Aryan knighthood in the shape of the SS which ultimately became the private army of the Nazi party (World Socialist Web Site, 1999). The SS became the instruments of terror to all who opposed the policies of the Nazi regime.

In order to perpetuate the pure race, the 'Other' was barbarised and threatened with extinction. To the Nazi regime intent on creating Aryan supremacy, the enemy was the 'Other' and included Jews, Gypsies, Poles and other Slavs, people with mental and physical disabilities, homosexuals, Communists and Socialists and those who dissented. The enemy was dehumanised. Seeing them as inferior or subhuman possibly made it easier to justify eradicating them. They were sent to concentration camps where death ultimately awaited. Nazi genocide policy was responsible for the deaths of approximately 11 million people including 6 million Jewish people (Florida Center for Instructional Technology, 2005: 1).

The Communist system of Eastern Europe is another example of an imposed monoculture. Galtung and Ikeda (1995: 45) in speaking of the fail-

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of the recent sorry speech by ex Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Aboriginal Australians suffered the stolen generation, an attempt to force cultural change. They were massacred in a number of genocide attempts with many being forced into missions.

ure of Stalinism, illustrate how Stalinism sought to unify the people. Firstly there was massive planning: 400 people planned macro-economic and even micro-economic strategies for roughly 400 million people who made up the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Communist Party monopolized power and compromised truth, neglecting the civil and human rights that had been won in other parts of the world. The Party defined what the people's identity would be and did this independently of them, and thus a kind of monoculture was imposed by direction from the party centre. This system ultimately collapsed in nonviolent revolutions in the late 1980s and in 1989 this end was symbolized by the dismantling of the 'Berlin Wall.'

Cambodia is another country that provides a striking example of imposed identities and ideologies resulting in a monoculturising agrarian social experiment. Cambodia's revolution at the hands of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1978 attempted to transform Cambodia into a completely self-sufficient agrarian communist state. Khmer society was to be re-invented. A new identity was to be imposed on the Khmer people. The Khmer Rouge proclaimed it to be "Year Zero". The cities were evacuated. People made their way into the countryside to begin a life of continuous toil. Even the hospitals were evacuated, when doctors performing surgery were ordered at gunpoint to abandon their patients (Ponchaud, 1977).[4] The solutions used in 'Democratic Kampuchea' were insane; the idea of a city was totally abolished, individual rights were extinguished, individual creativity, initiative and originality were condemned, and individual consciousness was systematically demolished as part of Pol Pot's plan for a new Cambodia (Short, 2004: 11). This social experiment to create a new society under a system of agrarian communism involved such measures as forced labour, starvation, lack of medical care and execution (Curtis, 1998: 4-5). The Khmer Rouge social experiment left in its wake three million dead and four million impoverished people, and today includes widows and orphans, the maimed, children who have learned to kill and those who have succumbed to mental sickness (Lafreniere, 2000:153).

More recent examples of drastic homogenisation are the genocides of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Here homogenisation took the form of attempts at complete elimination of the Other. War in Former Yugoslavia spread from Slovenia to Croatia in 1991and then to Bosnia in 1992. Three major ethno-religious groups were involved: Roman Catholic Croats, East-

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[4] Ponchaud's account of the Khmer Rouge approach to Cultural Revolution is graphic and detailed. Ponchaud, a missionary, observed at first hand the evacuation of Phnom Penh and later collected testimonies from Cambodian refugees in other countries.

ern Orthodox Serbs and Muslims. In the midst of continental Europe, without any regard for the rules of war established at the end of World War II, ethnic cleansing raged. Concentration camps were set up. The main goal of the military offensives was the cleansing of unwanted population groups and communities so the terrorization of civilians was commonplace (Rigby, 2001: 173). Basically, each faction fought the other with a ferocity that is hard to comprehend. There was no 'innocent' party. Naturally, none of these groups wanted elimination and there was no chance for a peaceful coexistence so they fought each other. The refugee crisis grew continually as more and more people were forced from their homes (Shawcross, 2000: 127). During the four-year war approximately 250,000 died, 90 percent being civilians while some 2 million were displaced (Rigby, 2001: 173).

Rwanda's two principal peoples are the Hutu and the Tutsi. They share a common culture. For centuries the minority Tutsi ruled over the Hutu. The processes of history reversed this dynamic, however, and in 1959 Hutus overturned the monarchy and took government, imposing a system of totalitarian rule that savagely discriminated against the Tutsi. Tutsis were excluded from all positions of power (Shawcross, 2000, p.105). From October 1990 until August 1993, the Hutu government of Rwanda and a Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front engaged alternately in civil war and peace negotiations. Although a UN peacekeeping force was sent to help implement a transitional period of power-sharing and free elections, in April 1994 the reconciliation process degenerated and the four-year civil war culminated in a three-month period of genocide. Hutus murdered more than 800,000 Tutsis (Rigby, 2001: 174). It has been estimated that the daily killing rate was five times that of the Nazi death camps (Shawcross, 2000: 104). Once again the solution was to eliminate the 'Other' leaving no room for compromise or reconciliation processes.

There is, moreover, a basic human need to choose one's own identity, to express who we are and to have the freedom to do so. As the examples of Colonialism, Nazism, Stalinism, the Cambodian experience, and ethnic cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have showed, the imposition of an unthinking identity is an assault against subjects who have been rendered docile and made receptive to accepting the new identity by force or by coercion. There is no inner unity in such a constructed monoculture. In fact, the selected case studies show that more often than not it leads to killing on a grand scale. The loss of life however is not the only aspect involved with such monocultures. There is also the mental pain and anguish of the survivors who are left to rebuild the society. Accordingly, we there-

fore need to examine carefully the possible negative socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-economic effects of globalisation in the light of these examples and especially in relation to its homogenizing influences. For instance to start with, we need to be aware of the exploitation of the majority world that is considered to be the 'not yet developed world' many of whom are Muslims where people are ultimately facing death or poverty as an end result of the hegemony that developed countries have over them, all in the name of globalisation. For these reasons alone, a conflict between Islam and the West is inevitable. Add to this the bid by western coalitions to control oil-producing nations in the Middle East, again involving Muslim nations and peoples divided in their allegiances to their own people or to regimes supported or propped up by the West to gain access to oil. What all of this does is to intensify the violent conflict between Islam and the West and thereby stand in the way of a nonkilling future emerging.

We contend that in contrast to cultural homogenization and imposing an ideological monoculture on diverse human beings in diverse human systems, it is more probable that tolerance and the acceptance of diversity in the accommodation of the many varied cultural expressions of humankind are more likely to yield a stable social solution and promote peaceful coexistence. There is one religion and associated culture, which has centuries of experience in a heritage of hosting and administering a vast and diverse cultural community. We are referring here to the religion of Islam. Multiculturalism in medieval Islam was alive and well at a time when Christian dissenters were being persecuted as heretics in Europe (Arbabzadah, 2005: 2). It is posited here that there are crucial lessons to be learned for today from medieval Islam.

Multiculturalism in Medieval Islam

Purely from a nonreligious perspective, Islamic Civilization has contributed in numerous ways to the world from such diverse accomplishments as magnificent architecture in buildings to the basics of what would bloom into the scientific method. Its doctors pioneered practices of medicine, cure and prevention. Its mathematicians created algebra and algorithms that eventually facilitated the coming of the computer age. Its astronomers developed the astrolabe, which was used to determine latitude by looking at positions of the stars and sun, paving the way for space travel in a later century (Mann, 2005: 1-4).

Many of these events and discoveries occurred in the "Golden Age" of Islam, from around 800 to 1400 AD. To compare, this is about as long as the period of globalisation if we were to start with the expansion of Europe at

around 1450 and continue to the present, which is approximately 600 years. In order for these developments to eventuate, there must have dwelt an urge for invention, discovery and knowledge within Muslim Civilization itself. This must have been facilitated by a freedom to enquire and learn. The development of Arabic into the language of international scholarship provided a medium for translations from Greek, Latin, ancient Egyptian, Chinese and languages from other parts of the world (Mann, 2005: 3). What this meant was that knowledge could be freely given and freely received by scholars from all over the Islamic world. In most of the arts and sciences, medieval Europe was only a pupil in this respect and thereby dependent on Islamic Civilization.

Islamic civilization has also served as a bridge to the European Renaissance. Muslim scholars brought back from Europe handwritten manuscripts, predominantly of Greek origin but also encompassing other cultures as well, for translation into Arabic. Without these translations and corresponding research that they instigated, it is likely that much of the Greek, Latin and Egyptian knowledge would have been lost to the world (Tehranian, 1997: 2-3; Mann, 2005: 1). It is indeed very possible that the Renaissance of Europe may not have taken place without these cultural borrowings. The long-term salvation of the knowledge of the Ancient Greeks, knowledge which was lost in the West throughout the long European Dark Ages was reverently restored and preserved in Islamic hands and respectfully given back to Europe to help form the foundation of the European Renaissance.

The Roman Empire notwithstanding, a special gift that Islam has given to the secular world has been the multicultural paradigm. The Pax Islamica created legitimacy in the way it granted safety to non-Islamic peoples living within the Islamic Empire. So hand in hand with the flowering of knowledge, inquiry and learning was born an accommodation of many different creeds and ethnic origins in a super state that consisted of hundreds of millions of people. Of particular importance, other religious groups the Muslims encountered, such as Hindus, were included as legitimate members of what was called the *dhimmi* community. The earliest usage of the term *dhimma* is in the Constitution of Medina. Dating from around 622 CE, it regulates the status of the Jewish clans of Medina after its conquest by the Prophet Muhammad and states that: "The *dhimma* of God is one". The implication here is that all people of Medina, whether Jew or Muslim, were protected by the new Muslim rulers of the city (Arbabzadah, 2005: 2). Thus the heterogeneity of the Medina population was clearly marked both ethnically and religiously. On the whole, the Constitution regulated the status of non-Muslims 'quite vaguely but in a spirit of equality' (Arbabzadah, 2005: 2).

Ahmed (2001: 63) states that there was 'a great deal of give and take on all levels'. However, some inequalities did persist. These inequalities were not harsh enough to be called persecution. For instance, the only law that had a functional impact on the *dhimmi* was a tax called the *jizya,* which was paid if the option to convert to Islam was not taken. In addition to the *jizya, dhimmi* had to obey a number of other rules that were related to their public conduct but these rules were often suspended in practice (Arbabzadah, 2005: 2). Although these restrictions imposed on the *dhimmi* were unpleasant, Christians and Jews lived peacefully with Muslims throughout the centuries in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Muslim tolerance was not perfect but in comparison to other civilisations at the time, it was uncommon; it demonstrated compassion for the Other.

Thus Islam offered a globalising movement or influence that brought together people of heterogeneous races, religions and ethnic origins where diversity among people flourished in stable political and social environments. Ahmed (2005: 106) states that Islamic history has had long periods of what we would today call globalisation—'societies living within different ethnic, geographic, and political boundaries, but speaking a language understood throughout, enjoying a common cultural sensibility, and recognising the same overarching ethos in the world-view'. Ahmed provides the example of how a man could travel from Granada in Europe to the Maghreb and thence to Cairo and on to the Arabian Peninsula and end his journey in Baghdad which would mean traversing three continents and remaining in one familiar culture (Ahmed, 2005: 106). These facts illustrate that Islam's record for its behaviour toward minorities and other cultures it encountered whether they have been religious or ethnic has been tolerant and progressive. They did not cast non-Muslims living in their midst into potential enemies for believing in or subscribing to different ideologies about the world, reality, being, and religion and how to live.

How, then, does this differ from globalisation today? It reveals a significant contrast in how the 'Other' was treated and accommodated to live alongside Muslims. Why then is it not possible for us to accommodate Muslims and their religion and culture in similar vane today? Why are those who follow a different ideology seen as potential enemies if they refused to adhere to a particular economic system? Globalisation in its present form is the result of the spread of the values of Western Civilization where materialism is the global mobilising principle. It grants an unprecedented right to capital penetration which ultimately results in the devaluation of human worth. In the wake of such a Leviathan, multicultural possibilities are unfortunately extinguished.

Islamic Resurgence: The Possibility of Islamic Renaissance in a Multicultural Global Culture

Islamic Civilization has been challenged in recent centuries, as was Western Civilization in the Dark Ages. Nevertheless it was still operating until the 20th century, under a multicultural paradigm although weakened in nature by the influences of colonialism. However, with the onset of World War I, influenced by the colonial pressure from the West, the Muslim world adopted what Imam Rauf (2004: 2) calls, the racist[5] and nation-state paradigms[6]. As a result, traditional Islamic systems of rule ended. These systems had up until then ruled over multicultural groups of peoples including the Ummah[7], based upon functional concepts of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual society that was not defined by any geographical boundary. Thus the Muslim world effectively lost its dynamic multiculturalism. However, a long and intimate history with multiculturalism has it firmly embedded in the Islamic psyche. This is of significance today because Islam is undergoing a positive resurgence that is not recognised or understood by many in the West possibly and partly because Muslims have been silent about it.

Esposito (1983: 11) claimed that Islam's resurgence resulted from an identity crisis and disillusionment with the West concomitant with newly formed pride. It is a great mistake to see this resurgence happening only as a fundamentalist resurgence. Islam is not a monolithic block. It is a significant religion in the world. It possesses a diversity of religious outlooks which are expressed in a multitude of ways. The basic divisions can be roughly seen in terms of fundamentalism, traditionalism and liberalism which represent a range from a conservative, doctrinal approach to an oftentimes abstract interpretation of scripture. Sufism is Islam's mystical dimension which explores spirituality as opposed to a formal juridical approach to following the faith. It is apparent therefore, that Islam is not monolithic. Islam is a living, breathing religion which is sometimes characterized by elements of orthodoxy, and at other times by those of radicalism and yes, at times also by the voices of violent extremism. To fail to acknowledge this spectrum of religiosity with its nuances and complexities is to prevent an understanding of Islam.

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[5] The adoption of Western culture was encouraged as superior.
[6] This paradigm sought to homogenize human identity within a geographic boundary.
[7] The Ummah of Islam is not based on language, race or ethnicity but encompasses everyone who believes in Allah and in the Prophet Muhammad. It can be likened to a community or nation of believers.

Progressive forces within Islam are connected with the term *Ijtihad*, a system of progressive reasoning, which was originally a technical term of Islamic law that describes the process of making a legal decision through an independent interpretation of the sources of the law, the Qu'ran and the Sunna. The opposite of *ijtihad* is *taqleed,* which means imitation (Grohol 2005: 1). Doogue and Kirkwood (2005: 241) claim that there is an ongoing conflict within Islam between the forces of progressive *ijtihad* and the conservative forces of both *taqleed* and conservative *ijtihad.* These concepts are philosophical in nature and not legal. Progressive *ijtihad* is innovative, future-oriented thinking. It is independent thinking that endeavours to apply Islam to the present time, the present situation with all its concomitant problems and challenges and ultimately seeks to accommodate the evolution of Islam. *Taqleed* is conformity to past Islamic tradition and teachings. Conservative *ijtihad* comprises activists who want to return to a sense of pure Islam, or utopian form of Islam, that existed at the time of the Prophet. Thus Islam is undergoing a transformation. Whether progressive *ijtihad* can prevail is a vital issue that will determine the ultimate profile of Islam. Of special significance in this transformation is the ability and responsibility of mainstream Islam to curtail the influence of violent extremists. This is a task that must be broached by all serious-minded Muslims. However, as Esposito (2002: 128) rightly points out, Islamic history makes it abundantly clear that mainstream Islam in law, theology and practice has ultimately rejected or marginalised extremists and militant fundamentalists. This has been the case from the Kharijites[8] and Assassins[9] to radical movements such as Al-Qaeda which operate today.

Contemporary Islamic reform is being addressed by Muslims of various callings, by religious leaders as well as activists, intellectuals and most importantly, officials in government, where they can canvass their ideas through their positions. Such spokespeople include former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim who served six years of a prison sentence for what is believed were his dissenting political activities[10]. Others include former

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[8] The Kharijites were the first Muslim dissidents and rebels. They were radical fundamentalists.

[9] The Assassins had a militant basis as a Muslim sect and were active from the 8th to the 14th century.

[10] Anwar Ibrahim was initially convicted on charges of abuse of power and sodomy. The trial was widely condemned by the international community because it failed to meet international fair trial standards and violated Ibrahim's right to due process.   On

president Mohammad Khatami of Iran and former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid. Esposito (2002: 134) contends that Ibrahim, Khatami and Wahid have played important roles in laying down the terms for an intercivilisational dialogue, each taking a position that is reflective of his own culture and political setting. A feature of such an active dialogue has centred on opening communication channels between Islam and the West.

The West's reaction to Islamic dialogic initiative has not been as responsive as it could have been. This can be seen to be partly due to the militant and negative picture that the West has bestowed on Islam. Islam and the West exist in an accepting of killing mode. That is, they passively live with the deaths that each has occasioned in different parts of the world, e.g. in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, the Phillipines, Palestine/Israel and Lebanon. They have not yet reached the transcendence of a nonkilling spiritual ethic which could realise peace. In effect, Islam and the West continue to live imprisoned in the 'acceptance of killing' relationship they have mutually created. Islam is withdrawn and resentful while the West is becoming increasingly more Islamophobic.

Being partners in an ongoing, sincere global dialogue could change this situation; the West would not only benefit in itself but would convey legitimacy on Islam to people of the West which would hopefully improve the relationship between these two protagonists significantly. Such improvement would manifest not only locally but also globally. The time is more pressing than ever. The Muslim populations in the United States and Europe have increased significantly over the last ten years (Akram, 2006: 3). John Esposito, world-renowned professor of Islamic Studies, claims Muslims are becoming more ready to participate in dialogue and that the momentum of dialogue movements is increasing (Akram, 2006: 4). The objective of dialogue, to arrive at mutual respect and understanding is a most worthy one. It is a universal requirement for a nonkilling relationship. There are, of course, similarities and differences between human beings in the two societies. Living with the differences is the challenging thing but not an impossible thing; it can be an enlightening experience. A continuing global dialogue could start with the similarities and in the course of time broach the difficulties. Such a dialogue might astonish in demonstrating nonkilling human capabilities in the long term. A global dialogue on the part of the West, and a nonviolent Jihad on the part of Islam could replace the War on Terror approach in which killing and violence is promoted as a path to peace.

September 2, 2004 Ibrahim was released from prison following a decision by Malaysia's highest court to uphold his appeal (Committee on Human Rights, 2005: 1).

Based on Islam's multicultural heritage with its intercultural sensitivity and the current focus of reform in resurgence, it is a possibility that Islam has the potential to meet the challenges posed by the normalising powers of globalisation and possibly initiate another shift in human history. It is undeniable that Islam faces a powerful challenge in setting up a multicultural global culture that will endure in the 21st century. It is somewhat of a different project than that which prevailed in the medieval centuries of bygone eras given the present dominance of Western based globalisation with its homogenising consequences. This is all the more reason for the West to become involved dialogically. It may help Islam with its own rebirth whilst learning about itself. If successful, this would represent a paradigm shift from lethality accepting encounters to an ethically-orientated nonkilling future.

Conclusion

While Western-led globalisation ultimately forces a monoculture upon the world, history itself, has shown that monocultures and attempts at homogenisation are inherently violent and sustain lethality accepting societies, bringing out the worst in human interactions. The gathering resurgence of Islam around the world represents a challenge to the moral integrity of globalisation. It is a possibility that a global dialogue between Islam and the West can help facilitate an Islamic response with a renaissance of a multicultural global culture. Just as Islam was once foremost among civilisations in the world and served as a bridge for the preservation of precious knowledge to set alight the European Renaissance, can Islam look back, in its resurgence, to its rich cultural past and apply what it has learnt to the present century integrating the conditions required to counter the ill effects of Western led globalisation? Medieval globalisation as embodied in medieval Islamic societies cannot be replicated today—they were far simpler societies than complex contemporary society. However, cannot the principles that governed these societies be extracted from the practices and applied to Muslim civilization today so Muslims can strategise the search for a solution to the challenges they and the world concurrently face? Such strategising is in line with Islamic thinking in the concept of *Ijtihad*. The integrity of Islam's multicultural heritage would serve it well in facilitating such a re-strategising to make it possible for a 21st century Islamic renaissance which would challenge the prevailing assumption that war and violence is the answer to the growing conflict between Islam and the West.

Across the broad sweep of nations around the globe, there is a growing resurgence, a re-articulation of Islam, not just at the fundamentalist level, as commonly portrayed by the media, but across all levels from fundamentalist to traditional including a more liberal Islam as well. This multi-tiered resurgence can be seen as a positive response to the inequity inherent in Western based globalisation. Islam is articulating through this response and in very strident terms that it has more to offer than radical fundamentalism. Through this reform and resurgence, we see Islam striving to make more meaningful engagement with the world and challenge the destructive consequences of both Islamic as well as Western led free-market fundamentalisms. It is our responsibility in the West to back that part of the mission of Islam that is a progressive civilisational possibility by first acknowledging the problems associated with economic globalisation. To do this and create a more egalitarian society, we need first to stop viewing society through an economic prism (Saul, 2005: 97). Jacques Chirac, the former President of France articulated this well when he declared: "the world is not only a market, our societies need rules; the economy must be in the service of man and not the reverse" (Saul, 2005: 219). Above all else, the West must not respond to an Islamic society that opposes economic globalisation and the free market by threatening or strategising a campaign of perpetual war against them in a bid to force the peoples of Islam to reconsider and conform. This kind of bullying would only lead to another cold war stand-off and perpetuate a pro-killing culture.

In the introduction to this paper, we defined two civilisational possibilities. They were: (1) Islam is able to contribute to a rebirth of a multicultural global culture and (2) The West is able to initiate dialogue with Islam in the Islamic endeavour to realise this rebirth. If these possibilities were able to be realised, what does this mean for relations between Islam and the West? The present lethality accepting relationship that the two protagonists share could change. Nonkilling could become an actuality and not merely a possibility between them. It might be thought that the two possibilities outlined above are too fanciful, too far-fetched. Indeed these possibilities are revolutionary but justification for confidence in the realisability of a society without killing abounds in all the spiritual traditions of humankind. We need to reach to the depths of our common humanity to access our courage and faith in order to attempt to realise these positive aims, which would enhance the possibility of a nonkilling future between Islam and the West and thereby avert more killing or war.

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Chapter Fourteen

Nonkilling Approaches to the Politics of Self-Determination and National Liberation

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Introduction

The scope of this chapter is focused on liberal-democratic States[1] with federal structure. All are making efforts to overcome previously accepted practices of violent and lethal repression when dealing with territorial disputes.

For over three decades certain Regions—namely Provinces, Federal States, Länder, Autonomous communities—of liberal-democratic States with a federal structure want self-determination for a number reasons. At a certain point, these regions might propose the *secession* from their States. Undoubtedly, those who promote these movements are not the Regions themselves, but mostly their politicians, on their own initiative or under popular pressure or support. A major issue lies on how politicians interprete the support of their people. The trend towards self-determination can also be called *centrifugal tendency*. Quebec has already held two referendums (1980 and 1995) to define their relations with the rest of Canada. The Basque Country wanted to hold a referendum in 2008 to obtain the "right to decide", that is, set their own rules on administrative competences. However, Spain's Constitutional Court declared it illegal and it was never implemented. The island of New Caledonia in the Pacific, also wants

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[1] The liberal-democratic States are those that are governed by the principle of supremacy of law (or rule of law) and the principle that society should be governed by institutions that were created from the decision of the people of the State. This decision is based on political pluralism, which recognizes the different interests involved (democratic principle) and the role of citizens. The principle of legality is absolute, therefore, the democratic principle is subject to the laws governing the participation of citizens as well as the rules of each of these forms of participation.

a referendum to settle the relation with France. Faced with these demands, States are aware that they have to confront this new reality but they do not know, sometimes, the appropriate way forward. It becomes especially difficult when any given group in the concerned region resorts to violence.

This chapter will present several examples on how some States are making progress in this sense.[2] However, some Regions sometimes trigger violent processes to achieve certain goals. Consequently, and in some cases, State authorities resort to political violence in order to restore "social peace", which is the fundamental mission of the liberal-democratic State (as established by Locke, Adam Smith et al.). For example, in the case of violence unleashed by the terrorist *Front de Libération du Québec* (1963-1970) the Canadian government used police and military force to defeat the group (Linteau, et al., 1989). There are, broadly speaking, two major variants of violence (Letamendía Belzunce, 1999): irascible violence that erupts in reaction to abuses and represive conditions; and instrumental violence that is coldly used by terrorist groups and law enforcement authorities with premeditation, treachery and continuously with the intention to discourage the other party (Braud, 1993)[3]. It seems that these States have understood that the use of violence can induce violent reactions (including *bloody* forms) from the repressed groups and Regions sides. Therefore, the federal States

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[2] The bloody conflict in Northern Ireland began to be settled through the Stormont Agreement of Good Friday, 1998. This process has been consolidated with further integrative measures such as the formation of a unity government composed of former enemies. Quebec has been recognized as a nation by the Canadian Federal Parliament on November 27, 2006, which equates Quebec to the Anglophone nation that constitutes the rest of Canada, reducing the tension between these two entities. The conflict among the Belgian Communities and Regions was decided on September 15, 2011 with an agreement to reformulate the judicial and electoral district Brussels-Hal-Vilvoorde. The country remained for 14 months without central government because of this conflict. The terrorist group ETA in Spain, which claims to fight for the independence of the Basque homeland declared on October 20, 2011 "the permanent cessation of armed activity." Moreover, not one of the existing territorial conflicts in liberal-democratic States has experienced any deterioration in recent decades. These are conclusive evidence that the liberal democratic system is making significant interventions to channel the aspirations of their regions, in a peaceful nonkilling approach.

[3] During the second administration of Aznar (2000-2004) Spain's Popular Party systematically demonized any Basque nationalist protest over the statements of its top leaders, through institutional statements and using the State media. This Popular Party attacked with verbal violence political proposals and the licit movement of the Basque nationalist parties and leaders. See Idoiaga and Ramírez de la Piscina (2002).

are responding positively to the big question: "Is a nonkilling society possible?" (Paige, 2009: 21) proposed by Glenn D. Paige a decade ago.

This research aims at showing that violence is not even functional to achieve its goals. It is also condemnable from a liberal-democratic and moral point of view. The question is, if violence is not the way forward, we must delve into what some countries are doing to fix their territorial problems.

In the absence of inner peace, governments feel confused and even lost when certain political leaders get involved in ungrateful duties with the consequent emotional exhaustion associatied when coping with territorial disputes. The related disorders require allocating certain instruments and personnel to deal with them. A climate of peace, by contrast, excludes bloodshed, allowing the expression of various options, an open debate in society, and the search for alternative proposals, among others. This requires great respect among different groups and the various policy proposals for society. Fear grips people affecting different facets to express one's opinions, when joining groups of open debate, when expressing opinions contrary to those that hold the majority and, especially, when adopting a certain position at the time of casting vote. One of the most striking consequences of a climate of violence (not necessarily lethal) is that freedom is constrained: the will sometimes acts vicariously, individuality does not dare to emerge at the right time. People seem to be mentally castrated, their will constrained, and, paradoxically, freedom is restricted to those who perpetrate violence and manage the climate of fear.

The right to self-determination can be considered a democratic right. However, in a liberal and democratic context, this right can only be exercised without violence (Capella Hernández, 2000); otherwise, those who resort to violence to achieve an aim lack the legitimacy to prevent others from using it to attain the same goal. Therefore, it is imperative that all forms of violence are eventually banished from the territory that launches a process of self-determination in a democratic manner, namely, coercitive verbal violence, threats, belittling, disqualification, libel, slander, and others.

It is worth noting that regions sometimes have pushed their politicians to make progress using nonviolent methods when dealing with territorial issues. People get tired of suffering the brutality of war and killing as it is always them who end up loosing their life, property, quality of life, expectations for themselves and their children, among others. Nevertheless, eminent social scientists have been blind by the supposed value of war and killing. Perhaps the paradigm of this trend is Max Weber. In contrast, we know that some of the most illustrious men of the past century, namely, B. Russell, A. Einstein, M. Gandhi, started significant initiatives that greatly influ-

enced popular peace movements. We cannot forget the efforts that governments and citizens of countries such as Switzerland or Costa Rica made to walk in a diametrically opposed direction to the dominant trend in the world. Switzerland was declared neutral State in 1815 and has never violated that neutrality. Costa Rica abolished the army in the 1949 Constitution (Aguilar Bulgarelli, 2004), which represented a twofold merit: it was the first State in the world to do so and, moreover, at the time it bordered the Nicaragua ruled by the violent regime of Anastasio Somoza.

However, despite these important advances, lethality is still deeply anchored in various liberal-democratic societies. The understanding of discriminatory criminal violence can be manifested in two ways: firstly, by direct statements made by those who understand violence as a "they must have done something", used sometimes when someone is executed by terrorists; this "something" refers to issues that are against the ideas supported by terrorists. Sometimes when an attack kills several people, it is said that, "it is the price to be paid to settle certain issues". Secondly, by the electoral support to political parties ideologically positioned close to the violent groups; or those who do not openly condemn lethality. These are indicators that citizens of a territory do not understand the scale of human values on which a liberal-democratic society is based.

Some of the consequences of the use of lethality in the processes of self-determination are that citizens are prevented from freely learning the proposals presented and defended by the various political parties and movements, and that citizens will be reluctant to show publicly their opinion in polls, referendums, public demonstrations or debates.

Lethality restricts fundamental rights, including the right to freedom of movement, the right to freedom of expression in any circumstance and place, the right to form and join groups (religious, political, cultural, unions) according to personal choice, etc. Consequently, an unquestioned postulate is that in liberal-democratic States, all lethality is executed against the rules set out in the basic laws, and thus, it is by nature, illegal.

Another important postulate is that all regions have the right to determine the relationship they want with the rest of the world, including the State of which they are a part of at a certain time. Obviously, this right must be employed by mature regions, those whose population is properly informed. This is in theory the case for liberal and democratic States.

A third postulate concerns the regions who are part of liberal-democratic States, whose status is recognised as such and who enjoy self-government. The United Nations has not yet developed a legislative framework for exter-

nal self-determination processes in these cases. It is possible that this organization will never actually assume this task. Meanwhile, the practice is that if the secessionist region and the concerned State mutually agree on the process toward independence, the international community should accept the result. Therefore, other States will wait until the process is assumed by both parties (region and state) with clear and democratic developped rules.

A fourth postulate states that the desire for a free and united nation, which is respected by other nations, is certainly a legitimate aspiration in relation to all regions in the world (Fernández Manjón, 2006: 9). However, it is important to indicate that, at present, to establish an independent country cannot be mistaken with the wish to have an independent nation. It has more to do with the ability to develop their own goald within the concerned State. Perhaps the centrifugal region wishes to fit differently, and thus achieve a more appropriate level of accommodation. It is possible that this region has already considered the advantages of membership to a particular State: external outreach facilities, consolidation of networks of interests maintained by the State in the world, and so on (Fernández Manjón, 2001). And, by virtue of these advantages, some regions prefer to maintain certain ties.

However, the design of the "constitutional enclosure" in which the territories have to fit, must be necessarily flexible as, nowadays, the reality is highly versatile. There is a permanent expansion of new administrative competences. Subsequent adjustments motivated by the evolution of the whole system and each of the local authorities within it can not be prevented.

Some Regions try to secede from their States (Fernández Manjón and Torrado Sancho, 2009). However, most leaders of liberal-democratic States seek to maintain the State's borders. Secession is the rupture of certain dependency links regarding the State in which they are incorporated; if all ties are broken then there is independence. It is a legitimate and respectable aspiration. But today, secession is not regulated completely in any State—Canada has begun to regulate in 2000—and, therefore, is not legal. For this reason some people may think that violence is the only means to achieve independence. This assessment should be rebutted since all liberal democratic systems have mechanisms to review and correct their Constitutions. A different issue is that the actual implementation of these mechanisms may occur only in the very long term.

It is also convenient to distinguish between internal and external self-determination. External self-determination could sometimes culminate in independence. Therefore, external self-determination allows a wide range of appropriately graded stages, some regions being satisfied reaching a given degree within the continuum. However, secession is the rupture of de-

pendency ties held between a region and a State. But this rupture does not necessarily lead to independence. It can propose a new kind of tie between the region and the State in which it is incorporated in the form of co-sovereignty, partnership or free association. Sometimes the objective and the horizon pursued is independence directly (Elazar, 1987).

The choice of intermediate positions for the future of certain Regions, between dependence and independence, has emerged after World War II. There are Regions that, for various reasons, claim new kinds of relations with the rest of the State by the action of prominent political forces. The regions that are paradigmatic of this phenomenon are Quebec and the Basque Country, which do not necessarily demand a complete rupture or the declaration of independence followed by integration in the international community.

At present, federalism offers great advances to autonomous regions without reaching the level of independence. In some cases the important issue is to have a State framework that allows each region to develop their own goals, including strengthening their language. It seems that the most important trend today is not to apply *divissio ad infinitum* and allow the number of independent States to grow but, instead, establish appropriate cohesive blocks of territories (European Union, Caribbean Community, UNASUR and others). The maintenance of large territorial States (such as the BRIC countries) is actually showing some advantages.

It is possible that regions with significant centrifugal tendencies seriously start appreciating the advantages entailed by membership to a particular State, especially if the State is relevant in the international arena. Some regions might expect mechanisms for their outreach. This framework has associated mechanisms whereby the region can gradually achieve a suitable accommodation within the State (Fernández Manjón, 2001), but perhaps in a different manner from the one maintained at present.

Spain, with a strong culture of almost two centuries of a very unique federalism, has contributed significantly to this new federal approach. Tocqueville (1854: 83) admired the Spanish Federal style saying that in Spain, certain provinces had the power to establish their own customs system, which is an essencial faculty of national sovereignty. Tocqueville refered to the statutory regime enjoyed by the three Basque provinces (Araba, Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia) and Nafarrora in the first third of the nineteenth century. The asymmetric treatment of the Spanish regions (according to their will and capacity) was one of the great successes of the Constitution of the Second Republic and the current Constitution of 1978. In relatively recent times, there have been other impor-

tant moments in this development, although some Regions (mainly the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galiza) ask for more powers.

In this sense, Federal style States should be open to multiple developments in their constitutional framework so that the uneasiness and discomfort that are generated in certain regions are properly channeled. The design of the enclosure in which the territories have to fit—the constitutional framework—should be necessarily flexible, because reality is versatile and rapidly evolving. Design should be properly agreed by all concerned parties and subsequent constitutional adjustments should not be prevented: firstly, because they can be motivated by the evolution of the whole system and each of the local authorities within it; secondly, because the fact that the State model is flexible does not mean that it responds quickly enough to new demands from certain regions; thirdly, there should be a supervisory institution (possibly the most appropriate institution is the Senate or an equivalent institution) to prevent differences between the State and its regions (or between regions) resulting in conflicts. Switzerland is in this regard, an interesting example. Belgium, however, has the institution of federal consensus and, since 1981, has done remarkable steps to fit territorial differences and interests.

Meanwhile, we should remember that there are some States, like Spain, whose regions face enormous difficulties to use referendums to define future relations with the rest of the State. However, as it will be shown later on, not everything is lost, as there are important moments in a process of self-determination (i.e., development of regional competences) that do not require a referendum. For example, when through political negotiations, the regional government can achieve the appropriate legislative and regulatory measures that advance their own development. This requires that regional politicians are constant, persevering and skillfull, while state politicians show some courage to support those developments.

Nonkilling is Possible: Overcoming Violence in the Relationship between Regions and State

We will analyze four types of nonkilling means that are used in many liberal democratic States, which undeniably contribute to self development in certain regions: the evolution of federal models, the use of the democratic force, the involvement of civil society, and the courage of certain politicians.

A new culture of territorial dispute resolution within the liberal-democratic States through the federal approach is developing: federal arrangement. In this chapter, federalism is considered as a political tendency.

The advantages of the federal approach to overcome violence when solving territorial disputes and prevent conflicts have been evidenced. Also, and this is particularly encouraging, it has enable to channel the conflict of Jura in the Canton of Bern (Switzerland) since 1974 (Conseil fédéral suisse, 1977; Girard, 1977; Rapport Widmer, 1993; Haenni, 1993; Pichard, 2004). Among the issues that have been definitively solved, it is interesting to mention the demarcation of the boundary between the Canton of Bern and the new Canton of Jura and the creation of various mechanisms of cooperation between the Canton of Jura and the Autonomous Region of the Bernese Jura. On the other hand, the boundary between the Flemish and Walloon space in Belgium has been eventually traced reasonably well (1968-1993), although there are still pending issues to be solved (Senelle, 1989; Uyttendaele, 1991; Mabille, 1997). The Federal Territory of Nunavut in Canada was created (04/01/1999) and, also in Canada, the internal boundaries in the Northwest Territories were drawn with ethnic criteria (Morse, Ed., 1989; Sanders, 1989; Crowe, 1997; Commission royale sur les peuples autochtones, 1996). Currently, there are other issues that are in the process of being solved by peaceful means. One of them is the case of Northern Ireland, which was deeply rooted in the past and surrounded by great violence. Others, such as Kallaalit Nunaat (Greenland) and the Sami of northern Scandinavia, did not undergo violence, but had been dragged for several decades. The resolution of the conflict of the island of Bougainville, which still depends on Papua New Guinea, is well advanced. Other succesful examples in the deep Pacific are the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori in New Zealand, the native Kanaky in New Caledonia and the natives of the Cook Islands, among others. They are all located in States with consolidated liberal-democratic systems.

Federalism is continuously enriching different ways to give optimal solutions to the territorial dissensions. It does this, mainly, in two ways: one, by inviting new States to assume this structure—this is the case of several States from different continents, such as the Republic of Sudan and Ethiopia in Africa, the emerging federal structure in Bolivia in South America, the progressing federalism in Indonesia in Asia, among others. Secondly, when States with a federal structure evolve into forms of federalism that are more suitable to the expectations of the Regions incorporated in that State. The State grants different competences and responsibilities to the Regions based on unique characteristics (asymmetrical federalism).

The impulse of asymmetrical federalism—which is a great historical development of Spain—is making headway in several federal States. Indeed, in recent times, after the 1978 Constitution and the deployment of the Statutes

of Autonomy later on, Spain has consolidated two unique models of regional development: the Basque Country—since the Statute of Autonomy of 1979, through which it has obtained very high competences—and Navarre with its "Foral" Statute of 1982, by which retains high-level competences, namely regarding taxes. Furthermore, the Constitution of Spain (1978) has recognized clear distinctions in the development of civil law in some Regions and the development of language policy powers in others. It is worth mentioning the case of Belgium with its unique model of two sub-types entities since 1981—Communities and Regions—and the recognized variants within each of them: the Germanic linguistic community (*Deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft Belgiens*) has even less powers that the Flemish and Francophone communities, while the Brussels Region has particular competences in relation to the other two Regions—Wallonia and Flanders. It has also allowed differentiation between the relationships some Regions have—the Flemish—with some Communities—the Flemish also—merging and forming the *Vlaamse Gemeenschap*. (See Mabille, 1997; Delpérée, 2000.)

Canada applyed the asymmetrical model when, on 27 November 2006, it recognised the status of nation to the Province of Quebec, which is fully in control of the impulse of its French policy, declared sole official language throughout its territory.[4] Additionally, Quebec has, contrary to the rest of the Canadian provinces, wide powers to control migration and integration policies after a Canada-Quebec Agreement signed in 1991 following the principles of the Agreement Cullen-Couture. With the 1991 agreement, the Province of Quebec assumes the sole responsibility for the reception, integration of new immigrants into Quebec society and controls that immigration levels remain proportional to the Canadian population (Juteau, 2005). On January 1, 1994 the *Civil Code* of Quebec came into force, which is specific to this Province and based on continental law and not on Anglo-Canadian common law as in the rest of the country. This new Civil Code has also been provided with a flexible system to review and update, which is directly governed from Quebec without any interference from Canada. With these innovations, the old Civil Code of Lower Canada from the British colonial era (1866) was definitively exceeded. Quebec also has his own *Charte des droits de la personne et Libertés* since 1976. Canada has also supported the development of other federal territories to which it has granted more levels of autonomy since 1983.

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[4] Members of the English-speaking community are entitled to services in English in the areas of justice, health, and education; some services are offered in English to municipalities where more than half of the residents have English as native language.

Its advantages include a type of peaceful settlement achieved through the development of a territorial organization where different levels of government coexist, each of which enjoys certain autonomy comprehensive enough to manage certain competences. Each territory has a high degree of choice in the development of these compentences and should only be accountable of its activities to the Parliament. Federalism is, by nature, a system where dynamic relationships prevail. The dynamics of a federal arrangement aims at finding an accommodation that is acceptable to these Regions. This means, among other things, that the various territories that integrate a State feel confortable because on the one hand, they enjoy state recognition as well as the recognition of other territories. On the other hand, as they are autonomous, they can develop different aspects of their personality. Thirdly, because they can participate with the rest of the territories of their level and state powers in the analysis of appropriate policies and in deciding how many jurisdictional issues affect them (Fernández Manjón and Torrado Sancho, 2010: 106). Federalism tries to fit each Region in an optimal way so that the region feels comfortable.

In general, the territorial arrangement implies that the powers of the State establish a dialogue with relevant regional powers to prevent a discomfort. This potential problem, increased in size, could lead to conflict. It should be recalled that often the mere accumulation of quantitative elements produces new qualitative aspects (Hegel, 1968). Once a conflict is generated, attitudes become harsher, uncompromising and might even escalate to violence. The concept of internal resolution of territorial conflicts refers to the successful disappearance of the causes of conflict and the conflict itself motivated by the aspirations of certain territories in order to achieve political autonomy or independence. Territorial settlement can be reached in several ways: by direct dialogue (compromise and conciliation) between the parties; or by the advice of an external agent, mediator, arbitrator, or by an international Court ruling, that the parties have previously recognized, called judicial settlement. The parties solemnly declare to abide by its ruling (Díez de Velasco, 1994: 816-884).

The peaceful set of arrangements in a liberal-democratic context (mentioned in previous studies such as Fernández Manjón and Torrado Sancho, 2010) allows an increase hope that the advancement of democratization in the world will provide, in line with what we are showing, progress in solving territorial disputes rooted in the past. However, risks and setbacks may still occur. The task is difficult and therefore progress is slow in spite of the efforts of many Regions.

We have showed the frustration experienced by some Regions because they believe that self-determination can not be achieved without killing. How-

ever, there are ways to unlock the apparent rigidity of the States that do not allow self-determination. For instance, the Constitution could be amended. By-laws could also introduce significant changes in the *status quo* in some areas. Spain, for example, could make improvements so that the Basque Country achieves higher levels of self-government from a new interpretation of the First Additional Provision and Fourth Transitional Provision of the Constitution. Belgian constitutionalism can do so through negotiations by consensus. Canadian constitutionalism is already doing it based on the Clarity Act (known as Bill C-20) since 2000. Swiss constitutionalism could do it using the referendum.

However, in the Spanish case, it is not easy to unlock the *status quo*, but not impossible. ETA violence, perpetrated for fourty years, gained nothing. It is either easy to unlock certain entrenched problems in the Belgian case as it has recently highlighted their last territorial conflict: the District of Brussels-Hal-Vilvoorde largely solved in September 2011 after fourteen months of negotiation. The big question, in general, is how to unlock certain issues and get the parties concerned (the Region and the State) forward.

One may wonder what to do? There are nonkilling approaches that bear fruit on these issues in the long run. There is what can be called democratic force. This force arises from the democratic principles of representation in the institutions and the exercise of freedom of opinion and expression. Some relevant instruments are the general strike or sectoral strikes, mass demonstrations, citizen protests of various kinds, the use of propaganda and the so-called people's legislative initiative by a number of supporting signatures. Thus, the democratic force uses methods supported by citizens and excludes violence.

In short, the liberal and democratic system has significant means to produce decisive effects as time goes by. It is the only system of governance that allows true control of the society, the latter being subordinated to the current rules, because "to obey is not endure, but on the contrary, estimate the leader and follow him, in solidarity with him, fervently standing under the waving flag" (Ortega y Gasset, 2005: 206). Liberal and democratic systems can overcome this fateful inertia that in other conditions and under other rules of operation, prevents human beings to be agents of their own history. Every citizens tacitly signs a contract with their own system whereby the individual agrees to respect majority decisions even when they oppose their particular interests. In return, the liberal democratic system provides social peace, respect for individual rights and free mature participation in decisions that affect them. It also allows to put into question what it does and even try to change the rules in force at any time. Killing does not allow these advantages, on the contrary, it further legitimizes future lethal forces establishing instability in the society and a spiral of violence.

Democratic force: A Tool for Advancing
Nonkilling in Liberal and Democratic Contexts

Democratic Force in Federal States

The rules of the liberal and democratic game are those allowed by law. We can agree with them or not. If not, we can make efforts to reform them. It is not easy to achieve this goal, but it is possible. Its feasibility depends on many factors, which require to be vigilant at all times in the course of events in the relevant territory and to work towards the support of social majorities of other political parties in the same region or other regions and even, parties who operate across the state level. On that basis it is likely to achieve succesful results. The support of the masses and the skilful combination of political forces in the institutions are permitted and efficient tactics. These tools could be called *democratic force*: coalitions of political forces in Parliaments that allow obtaining support for political proposals, governmental coalitions where any of the coalition parties gain concessions for their region, short-term coalitions for the passage of a particular piece of legislation or the approval of the budget in return for some improvements to the region itself, political action before international institutions recognized by the State itself, contesting certain state laws or other regional legislation before the Constitutional Court, people's initiatives, and other actions (Requejo Coll and López Hernández, 2009).

The fall of the Berlin Wall, on November 7, 1989, and subsequent "revolutions" of the Eastern bloc States led (or dominated) by the USSR, was based exclusively on mass demonstrations in the midst of extreme circumstances. These demonstrations and the swift and decisive victories, left repressors unarmed. These have been, without doubt, the most striking examples of the effectiveness democratic force methods are capable of.

Some measures of democratic force employed in different parts of Spain during the Transition period (1975-1978) are also paradigmatic. They started to be adopted in Catalonia a few months after the death of the dictator and had a major impact in other Regions. Moreover, several regions made significant legislative and political developments since 1980 because they achieved very favorable judgments of the Constitutional Court. We can also recall that the great progress made in Canada for the new coupling of certain provinces and territories and ethnic groups (especially Quebec and First Nations) were achieved in an ideal climate of peace and serenity: Meech Lake talks of 1987, Charlottetown Accords of 1992, recognition in the Parliament of Canada of the nature of the nation of the Province of

Quebec (November 27, 2006), among others. The same applies when Quebec determined its future with regard to Canada (referendums in 1980 and 1995), which took place in the midst of a remarkable social peace.

Nevertheless, the aspirations of certain groups of citizens in the secessionist Regions might never be fulfilled. They might be hardly satisfied because the only desirable future is that of independence. In a liberal and democratic political scene, anxieties are only cured by enlisting the support of the majority: if you get their support, there is high probability that the evil will disappear, otherwise we must wait patiently for the results in the polls to be favorable, and meanwhile we will strive to obtain the necessary majority.

The lessons that Quebec nationalists have given in this regard are laudable: they did not unnerve by a relatively small failure (in the 1995 referendum for secession, the "Yes" won 49.42%). Simply, the leader of the consultation, Jacques Parizeau, resigned the same day to continue leading the fate of the province and the Quebec Nationalist Party. Many of his followers, on the night of the failure, simply began to look forward for another chance. You might come up to the conclusion that to some extent, regional nationalists do not want their own purposes and projects of secession to be successful, that what really matters to them is that the "fire of the regional homeland" is not extinguished and, through it, they ensure political gain in his fief. Could any Region that chose the adventure to plot their own path, for example, achieve international recognition and levels of spiritual, cultural and material wellbeing higher than Canada?

Similarly, in Canada the first nations have made significant progress, without ressorting to killing, especially since Judgement Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1973] S.C.R. 313, [1973] 4 W.W.R. 1 complemented by many other statements, especially Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. Delgamuukw v. 335 and British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. DC. Thanks to these advances all Canadian courts have been considerably changing their sensitivity regarding the aboriginal peoples. Indeed, Article 35 of the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada (Part II of Constitution Act [1982]), added to the Constitution of 1867 an explicit recognition of the rights of the first peoples for the very first time in Canadian history. As a result, the Northwest Territories of Canada made a major refurbishment to establish a form of governance properly suited to the characteristics of their ethnic identity. In addition, on April 1, 1999 an important part of the Inuit people (Inuit nation) of Canada was proclaimed as the new Federal Territory (Nunavut).

In Belgium there has been an important step, in September 2011, for the resolution of an old land dispute: the consolidation of power of Flanders

over the French-speaking population in several communes of the area around Brussels (District of Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvoorde (BHV); Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde in Dutch) that, geographically, is located in the Vlaamse Gemeenschap. It should be noted that the delimitation of this area had been postponed in the various Belgian constitutional reforms (since 1968) regarding territorial geopolitical delimitation. It was the only territory of Belgium where the rigid separation of linguistic and cultural Flemish/Walloon areas did not apply (Senelle, 1972, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1985 and 1990). But the language policy and electoral definition were still pending. As a result of this recent agreement, out of the 35 municipalities in the district BHV, only 6 with a strong French influence, are allowed to use the French language in their relations with the Public Administration. All other municipalities remain under the Dutch-speaking Flemish area. Nonetheless, this issue is not yet resolved completely because it will be subject, over time, to the demographic evolution and nationalist trends on both linguistic-cultural sides. In addition, the controversial enclave Fourons/Voeren (Flemish enclave in French-speaking province of Liege)[5] is still to be solved. There have been also significant progress by peaceful means in Switzerland: the Constitution of January 1, 2000 recognizes that the Cantons are nations ("peuples" in French), each Canton being a nation (peuple). In the seventies, the big problem of discerning the Jurasian area started to be dealt with with the eventual creation of the new Canton of Jura. In addition, the Canton of Berne acknowledged the formation of the Autonomous Bernese Jura Region in its interior.

We could continue mentioning the important constitutional recognition achieved by native ethnic groups in recent decades in countries such as Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina and Chile. They are examples of this strong tendency to grant fair rights to Regions that demanded those with firm voice and relying on the mere rule of law.

We could close this set of data and reflections around the concept of democratic force by posing the following scenario: the generality of state political parties have the ability to prevent (reactive force) people from moving in a certain direction. However, it is characteristical of some political parties of certain Regions to use efficient mechanisms for channeling the active force to achieve change. What could happen in this game of thesis and antithesis, in this game of action and reaction? Probably, a synthesis may be obtained which would be beneficial to the concerned Region.

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[5] A very partial view of the subject, from the French-speaking side, is provided by Happart (1984). For a more objective view see Hermans and Verjans (1983).

Federal Mechanisms to Solve Differences and Regional Conflicts

This section will look into which mechanisms have been adopted by some liberal-democratic States so that their Regions fit comfortably within the State framework. By regional differences we understand different ways of approaching certain territorial relations between central and regional governments. Territorial differences are territorial disputes in the form of tensions that occur between the regional and central governments. Unsolved territorial differences might deteriorate into territorial conflicts which originate due to tensions, misunderstandings, breaches of ties or even animosities between populations.

Reciprocally, the concept of internal resolution of territorial conflicts refers to the successful disappearance of the causes of conflict, and conflict itself, motivated by the aspirations of certain territories in order to achieve political autonomy or independence. While territorial settlement alludes to compromise and conciliation which prevails before conflict arises, the territorial settlement is the process whereby the state authorities take steps to foster dialogue with the powers of the concerned Region. In the liberal-democratic States this arrangement must be solved at the administrative and jurisdictional levels. However, once the conflict has been generated, attitudes become harsher, uncompromising and might probably turn violent. In that situation, the only thing to do is to appeal to an International court (judicial settlement by conciliation, arbitration or sentence) that the parties have previously acknowledged to abide by its ruling (Díez de Velasco, 1994).

It is possible to distinguish various types of territorial settlements with a political background to solve disputes peacefully, which are ultimately ratified by appropriate legislative development: firstly, the so called federal arrangement, which is a concept used by Elazar (1998: 29-30). The typical institution of Spanish historical constitutionalism is called "*arreglo foral*" (local statute arrangement). This figure consists on the construction of an institutional legal status for Navarre and the three Basque provinces which was used after 1839 (Agirreazkuenaga, 1998: 171). It was further developed during the nineteenth century until an almost definitive arrangement (not yet achieved) was established by the Spanish Constitution of 1978. The legal foundations are the First Additional Provision of the Spanish Constitution, the Fourth Transitional Provision of the Constitution and the First Provision Basque Statute of 1979 (Fernández Rodríguez, 1988: 285). These provisions explicitly recognised the historic rights of the Basque regional territories and the referendum whereby Navarre could one day join these Provinces.

There are still certain political movements seeking territorial arrangements by the use of terrorist actions. However, it is important to remember that any arrangement is, in essence, peaceful; the differences are to be solved through dialogue and negotiation. Federalism is a form of peaceful settlement achieved through the development of a territorial organization where there are different levels of government, each of which enjoys certain autonomy for the complete management of certain competences, i.e., a high degree of decision power whereby they are only accountable to the local Parliament or other local instances. When speaking of development we are suggesting, implicitly, that federalism is, by nature, a system where dynamic relationships prevail. The dynamics of federal arrangements aims at finding an accommodation that is acceptable to these Regions. This means, among other things, that the various territories that make up a State feel comfortable. This is because, firstly, they enjoy state recognition as well as acknowledgment of the other Regions; on the other hand, they also enjoy autonomy, i.e., they can develop the different aspects of their personality. Thirdly, because they can participate with the rest of the territories of their level and state powers in the study of policies and in deciding how many jurisdictional issues affect them.

To achieve the territorial accommodation of these Regions, several relationships can be established such as an increased bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism. As a result, the asymmetry of competences is enhanced in the federal model. Several genuine federal systems seek to achieve a dynamic balance through proper linkages among the various territories in the State that allows them to feel comfortably. Some concrete measures to enhance the accommodation of the Regions within their respective States are the following:

1. The reinforcement of bilateralism between Regions and State powers. This is a mechanism that may seem strange for several Compound States but it is, nevertheless, one of the most widely used mechanisms among certain Spanish Regions (especially the Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia) under the "*principio dispositivo*".

2. The Senate or the equivalent representative Chamber of the Regions, must be, indeed, a Chamber of Regions. The Spanish Senate has not fulfilled this task yet. In Canada, for several decades, some provinces demand a redistribution of the number of members from each Province and the Federal Territories in this Chamber. In Switzerland, despite being one of the States with the highest degree of satisfaction in this House, there are discrepancies due to differences in population among some half-cantons, Appenzell Inner Rhodes especially, and the canton of Zurich. The Senate (or equivalent Territorial Chamber) is the most appropriate institution to legislate, exclusively

and without interference from any other Legislative Chamber, on territorial issues: compentences of the Regions, strengthening and monitoring of certain joint projects that concern the general interest, etc.

3. The establishment of forums to discuss issues relating to the general interest of the Regions and the State, such as Sectorial Conferences, where regional authorities meet with the Minister of the respective area, and the Conference of Presidents where the Central government President meets with the Presidents of the Regions. Both forums periodically review the projects that each Region has launched, the implementation of the projects specific to each Region, problems, funding, any impact on other Regions and how to deal with them. The President of the Central government and the Presidents of the Regions should hold regular meetings to discuss issues to be addressed in the sessions of the Senate and Sectorial Conferences, so that they facilitate the decision making process before those federal institutions.

4. The sharing of headqurters of the official federal institutions. In a federal state, the capital should not monopolize all government agencies and their respective headquarters. An equitable distribution can help to attract the affection of the Regions. The headquarters of a leading agency can always generate a large flow of money to the benefit of the city itself and enhance the outreach of the city.

5. The support to certain demands of the Regions to be known internationally. Some Regions are particularly interested, for various reasons, to be known abroad. The central government should support them in these legitimate activities as they do not harm the State, on the contrary, the State might benefit of that outreach.

The Role of Nonkilling Political Leadership in Territorial Arrangements

The question is whether it is desirable that nationalist polititians remain inflexible regarding claims of some of the Regions that want to fit better in the common State project. As a reaction to inflexible positions, some Regions might experience stress and become exasperated with some groups being ready to adopt violent attitudes. One of the obligations of the State political parties towards their own citizens and the world is to ensure the territorial integrity. Multinational States, such as Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Spain, among others, must adopt mechanisms that whow willingnes to talk and negotiate.

It is possible that certain regional politicians suffer from tensions and frustrations as a result of the rigidity shown by state-level politicians. This attitute might influence and extend the state of anxiety, distress and a ten-

dency to tension and exacerbation to an important part of their people. Some leaders might choose forms of pressure that allow for violence behaviour. Some people might agree with those leaders believing that a brighter future can only be attaigned through violence. However, violence shows a degree of insecurity, immaturity and naïve voluntarism. Nothing can legitimize the use of criminal violence for any purpose (including the use of verbal violence) in a liberal-democratic system.

There are exemplary cases of state-level politicians that are worth to be remembered for developing flexibility approaches which have benefited certain regions. Politicians can play with stiffness in a certain historical moment and, at the same time, can show flexibility at other times. Anyhow, without the will of politicians is impossible to change their constitutions or fundamental laws. For example, an important measure taken by the Canadian Premier Brian Mulroney in 1987 was to convene a meeting of all the provinces and the federal government to deal with each other and mainly, to agree on the accommodation of Quebec in Canada through five key reform points in the Canadian Constitution.[6] He failed to approve those reform points because several Anglophone provinces rejected them; but he was not discouraged and five years later, in 1992, the discussion resumed in the city of Charlottetown, where they agreed on new concessions to Quebec (Elkarri, 2002: 74-81). However, the text was not approved because, on this occasion, it was rejected by Quebec itself among others. But every step was consolidated and nothing was in vain. They were crucial steps that helped to open a new way for the settlement of the differences between Quebec and the Rest of Canada. This shows that nothing remains unchanged over time, everything is eventually reformed. This is an important sign of hope for nationalists keen on achieving constant advances in self-determination.

For the implementation of possible federal solutions, there is need of awareness and sensitivity among politicians and public officials. A constitutional reform might be necessary to allow such kind of progress. If these conditions are not met, progress can not be achieved. It is obvious, moreover, that such measures tend to be politically risky. It is convenient that politicians act as soon as possible to deal with the problems of their regions.

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[6] These points were: the explicit recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, the granting of a total or partial veto on constitutional guarantee of increased powers over immigration, the federal spending cap in certain domains such as education and health, and a certain right in the nomination of judges to the Supreme Court of Canada (Nouailhat, 1992: 197-199).

Similarly, the central government should be constantly alert to any movement of territorial discomfort, especially, if there is a risk that could threaten the inner peace and efficiency of public administrations.

From the secessionist Region's point of view, it should be added that its insertion in the State can not be achieved at once and for all. In order to avoid permanent unrest, it is advisable to establish regular reviews of this framework. One element that characterizes the federal structures is their ability to mobilize energy, create new constructs, and transform reality and humans relations. This undoubtedly affects personal networks, as well as commercial, cultural, scientific, technical, financial, etc. Moreover, each State has the obligation *vis-a-vis* with their citizens to maintain inner peace. A climate of instability will drive people, families and groups to exile in other States for reasons such as safety, harassment, discrimination, etc., creating a climate of instability beyond the State's borders causing a negative impact on security of the international community.

As a conclusion, this study provides data and relationships that show that nonviolence and nonkilling produce more fruitful results than violence and killing within liberal-democratic States. Violence and lethality are real obstacles to progress in improving relations between Regions and the relevant State beacause they create pernicious consequences for the society.

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Chapter Fifteen

Political Killings and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria

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Introduction

Since independence in 1960 political killing and violence have characterised the political process in Nigeria (Igbafe and Offiong, 2005). Violence itself in its various forms—physical, structural and psychological—and magnitude has been a regular phenomenon in the political space of many countries. Whether in the form of war, political explosions, personal conflicts, crime, election violence, inter-community and intra-community conflicts, struggle for political power, ethnic and religious clashes, and so on, fundamentally, killing of humans has been a part of the history of the political process in Nigeria. Sometimes political killing may manifest itself as political assassination, ethnic violence, corruption, policy related public problems such as poverty, lack of access to basic social amenities and extreme inequality and so on in society, for which peace and conflict research analyses have incorporated in certain contexts. Incidentally as a multilateral institution, the United Nations is also worried about political killing and violence on the global level. This concern was shown when the present decade was declared "A Decade of Global Peace". Adequate and systematic attention has yet to be given to how this declaration by the United Nations has been reflected in specific national cases in the context of emerging theoretical formulations such as one associated with Glenn D. Paige. Paige and a number of scholars have raised similar questions about the possibility of a global nonkilling society that might have implications for analyses of political killing and violence in Nigeria. Of particular concern in this chapter is the issue of political assassination or killing resulting from struggle for power. Both contradict and undermine basic values of nonviolence and social justice associated with modern democracy which Nigeria claims to have operated since 1999. Both violate essential human rights of citizens.

Against this background, this chapter examines the trend in political kill-ing and violence in Nigeria's political processes since 1999 with an aim to understand the reasons for political killings and violence. Although several studies have explained aggressive behaviours and use of violence in address-ing conflicts, this chapter takes a fresh look on the issue and argues that the lack of a culture of nonkilling is at the root of preference for violence by the political elite in Nigeria.

Some Conceptual Issues

When is political killing said to have occurred? According to Amnesty In-ternational and the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (2000), there are three main features of political killing, namely,

- They occur at the bidding, or with the support of authorities;
- They violate national laws against murder and international human rights regimes. They represent infringement on the right to life;
- They are not accidental, for self-preservation or in ignorance.

As commendable as these characteristics are in their focus on the evil of deprivation of the human life, mention is not made of killings resulting from policies, actions and inactions of government and nonstate actors—what some scholars refer to as structural violence. Focus on state authorities as major supplier of political killing seems to edge out nonstate political aspi-rants who use private and informal strategies of political killing without di-rect involvement of state authorities.

In spite of the different ways in which political killing manifests, this paper focuses on political assassination. Assassination is the "premeditated murder of a person who holds a position of public importance, for reasons associated with the victim's prominent political perspective, or for revenge or earning a reward, or a combination of these." (Sani, 2007: 1). As a form of political ac-tion, its origin is often traced to the *Ismali Islamic* sect associated with the *Old Men of the Mountains* who had their headquarters in Persia, south of the Cas-pian Sea around AD 1090 (Sani, 2007). These were men committed to killing political and religious opponents. The *Ismaili Islamic* sect consumed the hemp plant (in form of hashish) and killed their opponents under its influence. This was why they were called *hashashim,* from which the word *assassin* is derived.

Lethality in human and political relations may be very difficult to com-pletely eliminate but it certainly can be significantly reduced. This can be achieved through the establishment and promotion of nonkilling ideas and

emergence of nonkilling leaders—peace-minded and nonviolent leaders—and institutions that can act as agents for nonviolent change. This involves creating and building the capacity of these institutions and their leaders to inspire followership practices that respect the sanctity of life and human rights (Morales, 2004). From this perspective the underlying assumption is that political killing and violent conflict in Nigeria are the result of lack of visions of nonkilling security and conflict management and resolution.

A nonkilling approach to security, conflict management and resolution extols the sanctity of the human life, a thesis that runs contrary to conventional notions and practice of security that emphasize security of the state (Hyden, 2007; Omeje, 2006, Allen, 2006). This approach to security rationalises state violence against citizens and groups in so far as it serves the purpose of preserving the state from threats. Moreover, not only is the socioeconomic and political well-being of citizens undermined by this notion, the logic of violence as an instrument of securing the state is well supported by an age-old array of theoretical formulations in sociology and political science, especially of the radical extraction. It is then clear that state security contradicts the logic of nonkilling security, conflict management and resolution.

Paige makes the point that the logic of nonkilling security draws from a four-part framework political analysis that focuses on the need to understand the causes of killing; he causes of nonkilling; the causes of transition between killing and nonkilling; and the features of completely killing-free societies (Paige 2002: 73). As he defines it, a nonkilling society, is a society

> local to global, in which there is no killing of humans, and no threats to kill, no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society dependent upon threat or use of lethal force for maintenance or change the (Paige, 2002: 1).

This thesis repudiates the idea of legitimisation of killing by governments and endorsement of it by patriots. No discipline should endorse killing as did radical or revolutionary sociology and political science for several years.

Cases

The political history of Nigeria is beset with incidents of political killings and violence. Beginning with the colonial state, colonialism was basically violent, hard-nosed, dehumanising and insensitive to the plight of the colonised. In fact, the Nigerian colonial state was that of domination and exploitation (Rafiu et al., 2009). This was because, the goal of the colonial state in

Nigeria, as in other parts of Africa, was not to develop the colonised. The goal of economic exploitation which characterised the colonial state in Africa implied the kind of politics and administrative systems that would help to realize its goal—irrespective of the consequences on the poor and for the future of the people. Eventually the stage for violent politics was set when the departing British colonizers injected the culture of a violent Nigerian state into the consciousness of emerging indigenous political leaders.

The 1964 general elections of the *First Republic* in Nigeria was characterised by violence that led to killings and counter-killings. In fact the unrest and violence associated with political events between 1960 and January 13, 1966, when the first military coup took place in Nigeria, created the background or excuse for intervention of the military in politics. The coup staged by young officers in the Nigerian military, took several human lives including the Sardauna of Sokoto, Premier of the Northern region, Ahmadu Bello and his spouse. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, then Prime Minister of Nigeria, was also killed, along with the Minister of Finance, Festus Okotie-Eboh, as well as the Premier of the Western Region, Samuel Ladoke Akintola. A counter coup on July 29, 1966 took more human lives. The Head of State, General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi and Lieutenant Col. Adekunle Fajuyi were killed at Ibadan. One of the reasons advanced by the masterminds of the first military coup was the instability of the political system and violence of actors in the political process. The overthrow of the government of Tafawa Balewa by the military started a cycle of violence which culminated in a three-year civil war. The war, which took over a million lives and brought untold hardship to many, was in part the result of unwillingness, refusal or inability of the parties to resolve the conflict nonviolently. A counter coup on February 13, 1975 resulted in the killing the Head of State, General Murtala Muhammed.

The Third Republic—1979-1985— by comparison did not experience much bloodshed. However in 1986 after the coup that removed Head of State General Muhammed Buhari, who had taken over in 1983 through a bloodless coup, Dele Giwa was killed by a letter bomb; many believe the government was responsible. The then Head of State, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida denied any involvement in the killing.

The coup of November 17, 1993, which brought in General Sani Abacha as Head of State, began another era of political killings. Several politicians or prominent political figures were victims. For example, Babatunde Elegbede was killed by unknown gunmen in 1994. Alfred Rewane, a prominent statesman opposed to the then military government, was shot in his bedroom by assailants in 1995. Marshal Harry, a prominent political figure in Rivers State,

who decamped from the People's Democratic Party on grounds of principle and enlisted in the opposition All Nigerian Peoples' Party (ANPP), was killed on 5 March 2003. The list is endless. The news of the assassination of Bola Ige, whom I had met and exchanged greetings shortly before his death at the Murtala Mohammed airport in Lagos on arrival from Abuja was especially shocking. Ige, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Nigeria, was killed by unknown assailants in his home on 23 December 2001 in Ibadan. Andrew Agom, a member of the Peoples' Democratic Party Board of Trustees, was killed in 2004 in the convoy of the Governor of Benue State, George Akume, who was the target of the assassins. Aminosoari K. Dikibo, national vice-president of the PDP was killed by assailants in 2004. Victims of political killing in 2005 included Patrick Origbe, Alhaji Lateef Olaniyan, Alabi Olabi Olajoku and Anthony Ozioko: all with connections to the PDP. In 2006, a pre-election year, the number of political killings included Jesse Arukwu, a gubernatorial aspirant in Plateau State, assassinated on 25 June, 2006. Funsho Williams, another gubernatorial aspirant under the platform of the PDP in Lagos State, was killed by assailants on 27 July, 2006. Also, Ayo Daramola, a PDP gubernatorial aspirant in Ekiti State, was killed on 14 August, 2006.

At the time of writing, news about gruesome murder of a Kaduna-based lawyer and chairman of Niger Delta Peoples Forum, Chief Omogbereme, in Kaduna was reported in the Sunday *Vanguard* of 19 September 2010.

No sooner had the federal government of Nigeria granted amnesty to militants in the Niger Delta who had used violence to pressure the government to address key issues of development in the region, when the rate of kidnapping of citizens in the eastern states of Imo, Abia and Enugu increased. Some of the kidnappers claimed they acted because of being sidelined in the amnesty programme of the government. Although the aim of kidnapping is basically to extract ransom from victims, a few cases have resulted in killings or deaths due to resistance by victims or their failure promptly to pay ransom requested by the kidnappers.

As Sani (2007: 110) notes, "the number of killings leaves no doubt that political assassinations are far too common occurrences, and action by the government and the police to stem the problem has been insufficient and ineffective." From the foregoing three historically related trends can be identified in political assassination since 1960 in Nigeria: namely, 1960-1992; 1993-1998 and 1999 to date (Sani, 2007). The first period was characterised by assassination of heads of states in Nigeria. Within the period, political succession in the political system was mainly violent and restricted to killing of heads of states.

Since 1999 about 4,000 people have been killed by Boko Haram, a religious sect, in a series of bomb attacks and shooting of victims (Johnson 2011). Between 2009 and the time of writing alone, several hundred were killed, including 150 from bomb attacks on the United Nations Building in August 2011. On Christmas Day, a church in Madala, Suleja, Niger State, near Abuja, was bombed killing 43 and maiming others. In fact recent attacks have targeted the Nigerian police, army, mosques, churches and public institutions.

> Power-hungry politicians from the North are using indoctrinated young militants, drawn from the ranks of the poor unemployed and educated Islamic schools as foot soldiers in a battle over who should control the country. This minority is very focused, very powerful, and very rich. They used to be in government, they have accumulated billions; they are the ones who unleashed this monster on the nation. They have articulated their conviction that it is their turn to rule Nigeria (Afrique en ligne, 2012).

This is how Wole Soyinka's lecture on the issues was analysed by *Afrique en ligne* recently. Allegations, as above, are rife that politicians from the North of the country being responsible for the attacks by Boko Haram. Whether this is true or not is immaterial. What is significant is that these attacks and killings are directly related to the political process in Nigeria.

As can be deduced, the picture is that of insecurity in the political process and failure by government meaningfully to address the issue. Scholars have explained in various ways why the trend in political killing has continued. The next section discusses the nonkilling imperative as the way out.

The Nonkilling Imperative

Not only is the rising trend in politically motivated killing in Nigeria an indication that government has failed to comprehensively address the problem, but it also suggests the need for an alternative approach to security, conflict management and resolution among the political class or operators of state institutions. Lack of visions of nonkilling security and conflict management and resolution among the political class and institutions of security and management of conflicts are observed in the political behaviour of politicians and institutions of security.

For example, often the Nigerian police and other formal security agencies, saddled with responsibility for fighting crime in Nigeria, appear helpless in apprehending assailants after every successful political assassination. Usually, innocent citizens are apprehended several hours after a crime has been committed and are sometimes freed after investigation begins to prove their inno-

cence. The Nigerian police are not only an institution of violence, but also are an instrument in the hands of the political class in political killing. The failure of the Nigerian police to unravel and prevent killers of key political figures in Nigeria is not merely the result of its inefficiency and ineffectiveness in fighting crime. It partly results from the interests of the dominant political class whose disposition is dependent on political motive of an act of killing. This is why the police are habitually accused of collaborating with criminals in the perpetration of certain crimes in Nigeria. Certainly, an alternative nonkilling police institution is required in this case. This means a complete reform of the security sector, such that the political role of violence and killing which presently characterise the Nigerian police will be addressed by developing a more humane and life respecting institution with constitutional moral abhorrence for killing in all its ramifications. It will require decentralisation of the institution in ways that give local communities constitutional rights to be a part of the legal and crime fighting processes in which incentives for murder and political killing provided by injustice and political patronage will lose their appeal. As yet seldom are the police accepted as a friend of the society by innocent citizens whose relatives have fallen victim to crimes of political killing. Kudirat Abiola, wife of the supposed winner of the presidential election of 12 June 1993 which was annulled by General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida, was killed by unknown gunmen in front of her residence in Lagos. She was fighting for justice for the death of her husband when she met her death from the hands of assassins. She was able to mobilise Nigerians to demand democracy from the Nigerian military state. To date as with several other cases, including the killing of Dele Giwa pioneer editor of the *Newswatch* magazine, the police and other security institutions have not found the killers of Kudirat. While this chapter does dos not intend to give the impression that the police are the killers, the political class in power at the time is assumed to have had knowledge of the killers or even orchestrated the killings. It is no wonder why and how some politicians recently in struggling for political power have recruited private militia police in the form thugs, gangsters or cult groups to compensate for their inability to access the formal police services for security and fighting opponents.

Therefore alternative police and security sector institutions should be well-tutored in nonkilling values. Primary is deep respect for human life. As yet from discussions held with some members of the Nigerian police who participated in this study, the police do not work outside of the dictates of orders from the ruling political class. Of course this is not out of place when it comes to carrying out and ensuring protection of life and property in society for which chief executives at different levels of government in Nigeria have re-

sponsibility. However when political considerations that differ from this role are at work, the outcome is usually in direct opposition to the interest of citizens. Withdrawal from morally justifiable acts such as arrest, detention and prosecution of known political assassins by the police in cases of political killing where a member of a powerful political class is involved poses a serious threat to security. Only a patriotic police institution with nonkilling values will hold out against such injustice. Security is a public good that demands democratic control. The nonkilling dispensation of police services and security systems should therefore be citizen-driven and devoid of a top-down orientation.

A clear manifestation of lack of visions of nonkilling security is the manner in which political executives, especially at the state and local government levels manage and utilise *Security Votes*. This is a statutorily guaranteed amount of money for security provided to political executives at the different levels of the federal system of government in Nigeria. Mainly, *Security Votes* are corruptly diverted to personal funds. This may be why political executives appear to be generally disposed to violence and chaos so as to be able to justify huge annual allocations of *Security Votes*. Regrettably the provision of Security *Votes* in Nigeria intended to protect the state from threats provides no element of security espoused by nonkilling theory.

Even worse, expenditures of *Security Votes* by political executives are not subject to democratic scrutiny or control by the legislature. Again this ought not to be the case if accountability in the area of provision of comprehensive security of lives and property is considered. While this could be handled in the court of public opinion, the docility of the average Nigerian citizen, the fact that colonial laws of secrecy in public administration remain active, and the absence of any strong or effective law on freedom of information remain obstacles to extracting accountability from political executives in the way *Security Votes* are utilised.

Theoretical explanations of causes of violence and political killings are diverse. Some point to the role of social and political structures in the subculture of violence. The nonkilling imperative presupposes changes in public policies that cause or fail to address problems that create conditions leading to death. The government has the responsibility to respond to the needs of citizens, such as for security and reduction of poverty. Poverty can sometimes constitute a key factor in the ease with which many, especially youth, become victims of recruitment by the political class to kill for money. Violence is then seen as business. Government's role in stemming the tide of violence through reduction of poverty and creation of employment opportunities in Nigeria is apt. As yet the rate of unemployment is rising. Poverty

has not declined. Nonkilling management of political violence and killing will therefore require provision of alternative economic opportunities for those who see political killing as business. If unemployed youth who have been employed to kill find an alternative means of livelihood through legitimate economic opportunities, the political elite may have to create an alternative culture of nonkilling nonviolent conflict resolution.

To my mind, compelling political office seekers to secure certification in nonkilling life-styles, to be issued by a legitimate moral and ethical nonkilling institution, established by the government and managed by men and women of integrity in civil society, is needed as part of nonkilling transformation of the political process in Nigeria.

Although political killing in Nigeria lacks any large scale historical evidence in the years before contact with early European invasion, its intensity in recent times, precisely in the post-colonial state, requires what Mushim (2004:164) refers to as multicultural governance. A multicultural nonkilling governance approach will ensure that multicultural groups receive just recognition and a just share of economic and political power. Nigeria's economic and political powers are derived from the oil economy. This is why its federal system is basically distributive in character in near disregard for multiculturalism. Instead, the political class seeks political power on the basis of multicultural identities but falter in recognizing multiculturalism for equity in the distribution of benefits from the oil economy. For example, the Niger Delta people, who have agitated for just economic benefits from the production of oil found in the Delta, require multicultural governance. Nonkilling affirmative policies, programmes and institutions are needed to address the environmental consequences of many years of oil exploration and production in the region. Not only has oil shown to be destructive of the environment and its resources on which communities in the region had depended for livelihood, it has caused economic conditions leading to early deaths of people from the affected communities.

Ending ethnic-based oil-related violence in the Niger Delta which has already taken several lives since the early 1990s requires a nonkilling problem solving approach by the government and groups struggling for just economic and political power. Already the federal government has made efforts to address the concerns of the Niger Delta by creating affirmative institutions such as the Oil Mineral Producing Commission (OMPADEC—moribund), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of the Niger Delta. The question is to what extent these institutions have been able to address the major grievance issues around violent conflict in the Niger Delta? In fact unemployment has continued to rise (Table 1) alongside increasing poverty, while

public infrastructure remains secondary to policy makers. At best contracts are awarded to politicians who appear to be predominantly interested in how much money they can make from such contracts. From the foregoing it is clear that structural violence is at work in perpetuating poverty in the Niger Delta. Prevention of killing and violence by the state and nonstate actors depends therefore on a nonkilling approach to policies and programmes of government that aim to reduce poverty and unemployment and seek general improvement in the living standards of groups in Nigeria. This will be a multicultural nonkilling approach to governance. In the final analysis the multicultural state of Nigeria will provide rallying opportunities for mobilising and deploying campaigns for fair distribution of resources. Once given the right attention by the government, this will create a nonkilling base toward peaceful co-existence.

Table 1. Unemployment rate in the Niger Delta

State	Comp	Urban	Rural
Abia	10.6	8.70	10.8
Ak-Ibom	36.9	29.8	37.1
Bayelsa	23.6	20.7	24.1
C-Rivers	16.6	7.30	18.3
Delta	23.3	23.5	19.0
Edo	14.3	24.0	11.8
Imo	22.3	23.8	32.8
Ondo	17.0	14.0	19.8
Rivers	34.2	27.5	35.2
All Nigeria	18.1	14.2	19.8

Source: *Federal Office of Statistical News, 2001*

Unemployment and general unresponsiveness of the government to social and economic needs of society are related both to killings by Boko Haram and violence by armed Niger Delta groups. They must be seriously considered as part of the analysis of a growing culture of killing in Nigeria. Therefore the answer lies not in the approach of returning violence or killing to them, but rather consciously responsive policies toward social and economic transformation of these societies.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the problem of political violence and killing in the Nigerian political process. As yet the post-colonial state of Nigeria, beginning from 1960 has been characterised by various forms of political kill-

ing, including structural violence and assassination of prominent political figures and ordinary citizens. There are several reasons why political killing and violence have remained high, including struggles for power. The chapter argues that in various forms such as political assassination, bad policies and governance, political killing results from a number of factors which include lack of visions of nonkilling security and conflict management among the political class. Despite existing nonkilling institutions such as age-old cultures of respect for life among various ethnic groups, and several religious groups that preach nonkilling and democratic institutions for adjudication, a culture of political killing is growing in Nigeria.

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Chapter Sixteen

Political Conscience
for Future Generations
State and Nonkilling

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It is noted that people are living in the most revolutionary era in human history. While we may not have time to right the wrongs of the past 500 years in human history, it is high time for us to get out of a past-oriented comfort-zone. In this comfort-zone, state, democracy and development have become symbols of power, success of humanity and happiness in life. In fact, this comfort-zone, to some, is a coffin of holistic humanity, tomb of innovative ideas, and graveyard of the future generations. In this comfort-zone, millions have been killed as human beings, and millions more are still being killing.

Jim Dator (1999), in his "Future Generations: They Are Our Conscience" refers the "future generations" as all of the humans who "will live after us who we will and can never know but whose lives our actions impact." He reminds us that "future generations will never meet us, and they are not able to tell us what they believe their needs and preferences are, or what they think of the world we have mindlessly given them." Dator, in his comment on *While Mortals Sleep,* states "Future generations have informed me that (they) do not accept our apologies. That we are selfish, disgraceful twits who are better off dead and forgotten."[1] Things are indeed bad. According to the Children's Defense Fund, thirteen children under the age of 20 are killed on a daily basis across the United States. Recall numerous school shooting incidents since 1966, killing teachers and classmates by "troubled" kids seem to be one of our accidental ways of life, horrific but not unimaginable.[2] News on body counts of killed soldiers from war zones no longer disturbs us, we accept that just like the ups and downs of the Wall Street Stock Market numbers. Americans have killed more of each other in the last fifty years than any foreign military combined since the

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[1] Dator's email to Wendy Schultz, copied to the futures groups on June 15, 2011.
[2] From a conversation with Shaylene High Elk, a native Indian, who experienced a school shooting when she was in high school, September 13, 2011.

beginning of this nation. Information on killings is taught in schools, projected on television and shown in museums throughout the nation that hardly any place is safe, since accidents can happen in the road, people can be robbed in the street, or someone can break into your house and kill you. In a class discussion on the political impact of school shootings, a college student says that "(M)any killings in America are caused from the media and contemporary music. With our generation being so young, we look for a cause to fit into; therefore we admire movies, music and even the evening news that can inspire someone to become violent."[3] It requires no further observation that the violent nature of American society has had major repercussions in the American homeland. In his "Dr. King Weeps From His Grave," Cornel West (2011) takes us to the state level of the violent nature of the United States:

> Militarism is an imperial catastrophe that has produced a military-industrial complex and national security state and warped the country's priorities and stature (as with the immoral drones, dropping bombs on innocent civilians)…The age of Obama has fallen tragically short of fulfilling King's prophetic legacy… The absence of a King-worthy narrative to reinvigorate poor and working people has enabled right-wing populists to seize the moment with credible claims about government corruption and ridiculous claims about tax cuts' stimulating growth. This right-wing threat is a catastrophic response to King's four catastrophes; its agenda would lead to hellish conditions for most Americans… King's response to our crisis can be put in one word: revolution… Like King, we need to put on our cemetery clothes and be coffin-ready for the next great democratic battle.

Seventeen years ago, in 1994, Dator posed a question to the Future Generations Alliance Foundation Symposium, "As we get more democratic, are we less future-generations concerned?" While one wonders how many people today come to think about that question, Dator's logic does not stop at the hypothesis that the less democratic society is the more concerned we are for the future generations. The growing number of school shootings since 2006 in the US alone portrays the fact that we are still "democratic," but, at the same time, we seem to encounter increasing school shootings in the hands of children who we thought hold our and their own futures. The following table does not intend to verify Dator's legitimate concerns on the ones who are coming from the future, rather, it proves that our school systems in this democracy are failing.

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[3] From a class discussion at Creighton University, August 30, 2011.

Table 1. School Shooting Incidents (1966-2012)

#	Year	No. of incidents	Victims	Killer's Age/ Average age
1	1966	1	16	25
2	1974	1	3	17
3	1976	1	7	37
4	1979	1	2	49
5	1982	1	1	14
6	1983	1	2	13
7	1985	2	2	14
8	1986	1	0	n/a
9	1988	3	3	23
10	1989	1	6	47
11	1991	1	6	28
12	1992	5	8	20
13	1993	6	7	17
14	1994	3	3	37
15	1995	2	4	17
16	1996	4	8	23
17	1997	3	7	15
18	1998	3	8	14
19	1999	3	13	17
20	2000	3	4	13
21	2001	2	2	22
22	2002	2	3	29
23	2003	4	6	33
24	2004	3	2	19
25	2005	2	9	15
26	2006	6	12	23
27	2007	7	38	18
28	2008	9	16	23
29	2009	11	7	22
30	2010	11	12	23
31	2011	5	4	15
32	2012	3	5	29

Note: Data collected by author and Daisy Liberato with references of online sources.

Conventional theories, philosophical hypothesis and empirical guidance rooted in the past-oriented or history-bound management are no longer in any position to hold up the retaining walls of a falling apart world system. In fact, it only makes the process of falling faster and faster. Killings among people, genocides at State level and wars in a global scale manifest the failure of the old, outdated and cruel social systems. Neither democracy nor other existing ideologies seem to be able to introduce or maintain peace for a long time. In other words, we have come to the moment that much "progress"

and "development," ironically made in our hands, have left us to cope with our crises with far less therapeutic means or helpful institutions. We are forced to look at our time, NOW, from the future. George Owen's *1984* was applauded because he presented a future society, which mirrored the former Soviet Union vividly in many ways. However, the totalitarian state that he envisioned for the year of 1984 was precisely as ugly as the ones of the past, based on which he recognized in the first place as the source of monopoly in the hands of the state. We need a worldview, a nonkilling vision, and a perspective from the future, which is coming to us from nowhere and beyond our knowledge, a thing that has never been thought of, experienced and impossible to comprehend, but, it is surely different from what we have gone through or turn out not properly the same as imagined and prepared for.

Conventional criticism of our modern world usually involves the rejection of science and technology. However, it does not depart its ontology from the modernist view of linear time logic, with events happening only one after the other, and continuingly within the boxed framework. Dian (2009: 63) states that "Linear time is the progression from the past to future, moving only in one direction. It is an integral part of the current, although fading, Newton/Descartes paradigm highlighted by linear, mechanistic and rational thinking. It is the pervasive world view upon which industrial society has supported itself for over three centuries." Dian pertinently calls that we are currently dominated by linear time. Future remains blind to most people with their linear-orderly ontological perspective both at the physical and social level. When the society is planned to move ontologically from yesterday to today, and today to tomorrow, there is no political conscience for the future. Human society is hijacked by its own means, thus stuck in the trap it creates.

Facing increasingly pressures of political conscience for the future generations, one must look for alternatives from the future, not solutions generated from the lessons of the past. While other disciplines are also trying to rescue the current crises, the Futures Studies appears making more sense with potential alternatives in preparing us for the future.

Defining Futures studies is not an easy thing, as Dator (1999) states, "the need for thinking and acting that is explicitly future-oriented is relatively new." Unlike other disciplines or sciences, such as education, political science or chemistry, Futures studies does not fall into the category as either an art or a science. According to some futures field practitioners, Futures studies is a discipline that concerns a much bigger and more complex world system. Therefore, it is crucial that one needs to know how the Futures studies defines things. Generally speaking, Futures studies focuses on

the process of changing, it transcends momentary now, defines events when they are more of the known impossibility or best of the unknown possibility. Unlike other disciplines, Future studies un-does things, including un-learning our past history, un-training our mind, and un-educating anyone who is to be interested in the studies of futures.

To approach alternative futures, Dator (1993) considers that any emerging futures may rise from the interaction of four components: events, trends, images, and actions. Based on these components, he develops four images of the future: 1) Continue growth; 2) Societal collapse; 3) Discipline; and 4) Transformation. These applicable scenarios become necessary conceptual futuristic framework, not just as preferred futures. In order to address futuristic components from historical events, moving trends, transforming images and changing actions, one has to be with an innovative mind of forward-looking vision for changes.

How to interpret the interaction of these four components, from which we see an emerging future, is in fact an important tipping point between a futurist and a non-futurist. Among these four components, *events* and *images* can be understood either as something that had already happened/appeared or as something that will happen/appear. The other two, *trends* and *actions*, shall be considered neither as something in the past or something from the future. While *trend* is seen here as nothing stagnant, but something of the process with beginning from the past, idling at the present, and departing to the unknown future, *action* is a moving form of all three other combined with a consequence, which, depends how one looks at it, can be an action that is done, as well as an action undone yet. Two different ways of looking at *events*, *trends*, *images* and *actions* result in different visions of the future. One can be a reflection of the past, and the other is a wonder for the future. The past can not provide us with a repeated "future," or a "future of the past." It is the wonder of the futurists, with unlearnt lessons from the past, that there is a world coming to us from nowhere and beyond our knowledge. In his 1997 article "As If I Virtually Said This to Pepsi Executives During a Futures Discussion at their Headquarters," Dator said that "(A)ny useful statement about the future should appear to be ridiculous and to elicit responses of disbelief, shock, horror, or disgust. If you nod your head in agreement about some statement about the future, then forget it. It may be true, but it is not particularly useful to you. What you need to know about the future is what you don't already know, and which you find difficult if not repugnant to hear." This seemingly Unitarian statement consists of Dator's profound philosophical urgency: For an affordable future, for either ourselves or future generations, we must exodus from the past.

Transforming Nation-State *Action* towards Nonkilling

A nation-state is composed of a territory, a population, a state, and is sovereign. Max Weber saw that a state is nothing but a "sole source of the 'right' to use violence." In his 1919 address to the Free Students Union at Munich University, Weber elaborated more on the state power:

> "Every state is founded on force," said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of "state" would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as "anarchy," in the specific sense of this word. Of course, force is certainly not the normal or the only means of the state—nobody says that—but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. In the past, the most varied institutions—beginning with the sib—have known the use of physical force as quite normal. Today, however, we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory.

Thus, from conventional perspective, the state maintains the right to kill in the name of any given nation. Hammarlund (2005) puts it rightly in a modern sense that the state "stands in the way of a peaceful and prosperous cosmopolitan world order. It is a war organization, levying excessive and unfair taxes, hampering international communication and exchange."

A nonkiling society needs to move nation-state action friendly by shutting down its murderous machine. Do we have a trend for this development? Can we transform the state and make it friendly towards humanity?

Coughlan (2004) defined the nation in the context of democratic principles:

> (…) democracy can exist normally only at the level of the national community and the Nation State. The reason is that it is within the national community alone that there exists sufficient solidarity, mutual identification and mutuality of interest among people as to induce minorities freely to consent to majority rule and obey a common government based upon that. Such solidarity is the basis of shared citizenship. It underpins a people's allegiance to a government as 'their' government, and their willingness to finance that government's tax and income-transfer system, thereby tying the richer and poorer regions and social classes of the Nation State together. The solidarities that exist within nations do not exist between nations, although other solidarities may exist, international solidarity, which becomes more important with time, as modern communications, trade, capital movements and common environmental problems link all nations together in global inter-dependence as part of the modern 'global village.'

Coughlan conveys two strong messages in the above statement. First message is that all nations are comminutes of people; the second is that "the nation which gives up its sovereignty or is deprived of it, ceases to be an independent subject of international politics. It is no longer able to decide even its own domestic affairs. It literally puts its existence at the mercy of those who have taken its sovereignty into their hands and who decide the policies of the larger body." His specific understanding of the nation, state, democracy and sovereignty can be summarized as follows:

1. Insistence on the sovereignty of one's own State is a natural right as well as a social duty.
2. The national sovereignty of a democratic State is analogous to the freedom and autonomy of the individual.
3. State sovereignty is a result of advancing political culture and is an achievement of modern democracy.
4. Without sovereignty a nation's politics become provincialised, dealing only with marginal and unimportant issues.
5. Maintaining State sovereignty alone guarantees the political independence of a nation and creates conditions for its members to continue to assert their right to self-determination.
6. The sovereignty of a democratic State means at the same time the sovereignty of its people.
7. The end of the sovereignty of a State is at the same time the end of the sovereignty of its people.
8. The sovereignty of a State and of its people are democratically inalienable. No government, no parliamentary majority, has the right to alienate it, for they have no right to deprive the next generation of the possibility of choosing their own way of life.
9. Therefore the only mode of international cooperation that is acceptable to democrats is one which will not demand of a State the sacrifice of its sovereignty.

While completely ignoring his first message, i.e., nations are made of people, Coughlan focuses primarily on the authority (sovereignty) of the state. However, Coughlan's second message, albeit with a strong defensive tendency, points out something remarkably significant for the future, that is, the crisis that the state is confronting at our current time. In a futuristic wording, the trend of change is taking place. The nation-state is moving to crisis, which can be both a risk and chances in the eyes of futurists. Delbrück (1994) defines the state as the dominant form of political organization and the nation state as the universally realized form of political organization of societies. Af-

ter reviewing the history and development of the nation-state, Delbrück thinks that our modern political and social environments have altered the traditional notion of the nation-state. Delbrück acknowledges that there is a "growing concern about the future of the traditional concept of the nation state," and "there are indications that could suggest that nation state may become obsolete" (1994: 45). In the midst of this change, Delbrück points out that "Politicians are becoming concerned about a serious loss of State authority and power, both externally and internally." (Id.)

While the nation-state is moving into crisis, society is losing authoritative figures. This action should be perceived as transformation of power shifting from state to individuals. A historical image should be reawakened. Despite its distance from our reality, it represents an event that can be emerging from the action that the state is undertaking, with the underlying loss of authority.

Gandhi was an advocate for nonviolence at an individual level. He understood that one's needs and interests are the core of the conflict among people. Gandhi strongly believed in the idea of social communication and personal engagement with others. He thought that any forms of violent interactions among people would not allow a broader view of the truth by opening our personal perspectives and appreciating others' points of view (Juergensmeyer, 2005: xi). It was not necessary, as Gandhi pointed out, that people must choose violence to overcome or avoid cowardice, weakness, differences and opposing viewpoints. "An eye for an eye will only make the world behind." Gandhi claimed that "we, as individual human beings, are violent because of life in our bodies, so that is why we should aim to be rid of it or at least train ourselves to become imperious to its needs." The essence of Gandhian approach to conflict is called Satyagraha, an idea of "grasping onto principles," or the "truth force." (Juergensmeyer, 2005: 3) Satyagraha can pose itself many challenges as many people struggle to step outside of narrow mindedness and see a dispute or disagreement in the viewpoint of others, but this challenge is indeed the effective tactic behind Gandhi's approach. Satyagraha is the idea of finding a new position more inclusive than the old one and move into it through three steps:

1. Through examining of the other conflicting side in search of the valid principles, then create a resolution plan that might also satisfy the interests of the other party as well as one's own.
2. Sorting through all imaginable options in looking at a mutually beneficial alterative that fits best to both sides.
3. Move forward by taking the alternative actions that avoids the violence for the sake of both (Juergensmeyer, 2005: 9-10).

Gandhi and the Gandhian approach emphasize alternative to avoid violence among people. Gandhi had reasons to do that as he feared the power of the state. He believed that the state "does the greatest harm to mankind by destroying individuality, which lies at the root of all progress." Gandhi wished "each individual is (her) own ruler," and that "government is the best that governs the least." Gandhi claimed that "India had been a country right from ancient time," and India was unified centuries before British thought that its railways that made India a nation (apud Gier, 1996). Considering building India as a village-based republicanism, Gandhi encouraged Indians "study (their) Eastern institutions in (a) spirit of scientific inquiry… (to) evolve a truer socialism and a truer communism." (id.) Gandhi wished that his village republicanism would not act like a modern state which, in his belief, would swallow up individual persons. However, Gandhi came to realize the fact that many Indians were losing their moral autonomy in a dehumanizing bureaucratic state. Gandhi's vision of nationhood was based on decentralized local control, assimilation and tolerance of cultural differences and above all, nonviolence. Gandhi's position did not go with what Bhikhu Parekh puts that the state abstracts "power from the people, concentrates it in the state and then return it to them in their new (abstract roles) as citizens." (id.) This was Gandhi's principle fear as to see that individual people would not have enough self-determination, under the state monopoly, to perform acts of civil disobedience. From Gandhi's five distinctive human powers, self-determination, autonomy, self-knowledge, self-discipline and social cooperation, one realizes that Gandhi's "soul force" is from the individual, not from the state.

Although our human societies seem to be still stuck inside a circle, neither with a beginning to end killings, justified by the *de facto* existence of the State, nor with an end to begin nonkilling, a nonkilling future does not seem to be remote in the change of powers from state to individuals. Paige (2009: 21) manifests his nonkilling philosophy in the actions he prescribes:

> Governments do not legitimize it; patriotism does not require it; revolutionaries do not prescribe it. Intellectuals do not apologize for it; artists do not celebrate it; folk wisdom does not perpetuate it; common sense does not commend it. In computer terms of this age, society provides neither the 'hardware' nor the 'software' for killing.

To echo Delbrück's point that "Politicians are becoming concerned about a serious loss of State authority and power, both externally and internally," French futurist Fabienne Goux-Baudiment (2006: 81) offers a prom-

ising trend to compromise the two way-traffic, i.e., the state authority shrinks while the role of individual people increases:

> In the beginning of the twenty-first century, two strong trends are manifesting themselves: the empowerment of individuals and the weakening of the nation-state as the best representative of a democratic regime. As a way perhaps to escape the State-octopus and the old institutions that are linked to, individuals have built new clans, bringing them together whatever the geographic scale (from the smallest area to the world diasporas) and giving them more power (through NGOs) and the feeling of more freedom.

Goux-Baudiment (1996: 85) continues,

> The nation-state is indeed challenged by globalization and the related interdependence. With, on the one hand, expanding diasporas and, on the other, an increasing number of foreign populations inside the country, the notions of nation and state are less clear. Between devolution to local authorities and a less explicit, but equally restrictive devolution to regional (e.g. European Commission) and global (WTO, UNO) authorities, nation-states have entered a slow but real process of weakening. They are probably no longer the most efficient place to govern in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

While it is going to be an emerging issue if one looks into any problems of a society in which the state has less authority than individual powers, it is certain that the state action of the murderous nature will first become much less dangerous to humanity. This is a huge progress for a nonkilling society we envision. Paige's dream of that society relies on his first condition that "governments do not legitimize" the killing.

Growing Democracy for Nonkilling Future

In our political life, most people seem to be certain that our systems in the United States are democratic, and the democracy that we embrace here at home and promote to abroad is real. However, if someone, most likely not a historian, says that democracy is weakening, democracy is a myth, a failure, not real, or, there is absolutely no democracy of whatsoever in the US or anywhere in the world, one can not image how many people will be shocked, get angered, or feel sad or even become hopeful.

Conventionally, democracy can be defined in a few different ways. Generally, all seems to accept that the word democracy comes from the Greek words "*demos*" meaning "people" and "*kratos*" meaning "authority"

or "power." The ancient Greeks established a direct form of government in Athens. Democracy meant originally rule by a mob of land-owning citizens. People gathered in the Agora and whoever yelled the loudest won. Common understanding of democracy is that it is a system where people can change their rulers in a peaceful manner and the government is given the right to rule because the people say it may.

Goux-Baudiment (2006) thinks that democracy occurred due to the fear of totalitarianism. She states that the invention of the modern State, and of the Nation which supports it, has led to a new step in its evolution. Based, during the last two centuries, on the idea of the human progress and the fear of tatalitarism, democracy occurs today as the indisputable best political regime.

Love (2005) states that "democracy as we understand it today is a product of the Enlightenment, based on what Kant termed *autonomy*, again from the Greek, a law (*nomos*) that you impose on yourself. In short, "government of the people, by the people, for the people." Love continues, "Today, many people see democracy as a form of modern civilization…Some see democracy as a form of identity and a byword for market freedom, which is not just to be shared, but protected and spread as a counterweight to tyranny." (id.) In other words, democracy exists to provide a way for people to live and be together in a way that is beneficial to all. In addition to this basic meaning, there is wide agreement on the empirical conditions that either give substance to what democracy means or must be present for democracy to exist. Democracy is based on the people, and it works well in proportion as the people are enlightened and informed about what goes on both in peace and in war. However, for many, especially those in newer democracies, it is a complex term and coming to grips with its practical meaning takes a long time. The specific form that democracy takes in a country is largely determined by prevailing political, social, and economic circumstances and it is greatly influenced by historical, traditional, and cultural factors.

In the introduction section of the *Democracy and Futures*, Mannermaa (2006) has two concerns, one is that he thinks that the "western democracies are suffering from a certain chronic short-sightedness, and the other is that western democracies are under increasing challenges." He states that "the models of democracy will face prominent challenges in the traditional democratic western societies in the future. The main reason for that is the general societal development from industrial nation-state into global information societies…One can even speak of a paradigm shift from the concept of democracy of the industrial age into the one of the information age."

Goux-Baudiment (2006) mentions that democracy occurred due to the fear of totalitarianism. However, she accepts the idea that democracy is "soft tyranny," coined by Alexis de Tocqueville more than a century ago. Democracy is a tyranny in such a way that the democratic experiences from the late 18th till the end of the 20th century, as Goux-Baudiment states, "have resulted in not the extinction of the State but, on the contrary, its strengthening to the point of totalitarianism…as we know well from history, whereas Mussolini comes to power through a coup d'etat, Hitler gains it through elections, in a very democratic way" (2006: 80). Goux-Baudiment continues that "…in the best case, liberal democracy has failed to protect society against arbitrary power; in the worst case, there is something rotten in modern society itself, either because of the industrial model of mass consumption according to Arendt or because of the very nature of human beings, and the democracy can't change it, liberal or not" (2006: 81). Goux-Baudiment also points out that our modern democracy is to be jeopardized by the challenges ahead. These challenges include "the nature of the next generations, the increasing demand for another world, the consequence of globalization and the development of the noosphere." Is democracy still the best model to face 21st century, asks Goux-Baudiment?

Dator has been at the forefront of efforts to channel our criticism on some vital political paradigms, ranging from modern science, nation-state, to the liberal democracy. Author of numerous articles, books and other groundbreaking works, Dator was one of the first scholars to anticipate and critique democracy and governance in various forms. In "Will America ever Become a Democracy?" Dator, as bluntly as he was 20 years ago, points out that "The United States is not a democracy, has never been a democracy, was not created to be a democracy, and will not become a democracy without substantial changes in the structure of government and the understanding and will of the American people." Portending a future nonkillong society, Dator makes it utmost clear that "Until it is fully understood and recognized that America cannot possibly be a model for democracy anywhere since it is not democratic itself, neither America nor the rest of the world will be able to move towards the kind of peaceful self-governance that democratic theory and practice promises."

White it may sound pessimistic to many people, Dator thinks it as a startling and liberating thing that US was not intended to be a democracy. Optimistically, the very absence of a real democracy, as Dator points out, "should enable Americans and all others to strive towards creating a form of government that does not yet exist anywhere as fully as it can and should." It should be noted, as Dator clarifies, that he extends the term democracy to more

than just formal government. He makes it clear with belief "it is not possible to have effective formal democratic government unless we have routinely informal democratic governance as well." To echo Gandhi's concern that "liberal democracies do not empower individuals," Dator thinks similarly that "in the US and generally elsewhere, governance structure are designed to prevent, or to make extremely difficult, participation in policy making (and policy implementation, which is often completely overlooked) in any effective way." However, Dator envisions that if an informal governmental structure can make political participation easy, fun, and effective, more citizens will participate in formal government just as they participate in religious, sports or other activities that they are interested in. In other words, Dator's combination of any formal and informal governance in a growing democracy will enable individuals to be his or her own ruler, as Gandhi wished. With or even without any imagination, one can not foresee the possibility of mass killings in a society where political power of the state is in the hands of each individual people who are empowered through their participation in formal and informal governmental decision-making process. The reality seemingly is calling for that participation along with societal development, as Mike Mannermaa points out, is shifting from industrial nation-state into global information societies. We have in fact witnessed that future through the handling of the Katrina disaster during the Bush administration. Halal (2009: 103) states that "Bush's response to the Katrina disaster in New Orleans highlighted the problem of unresponsive government run by the old boy network…We are likely to see more failures as the old system topples slowly over the next few years. With the constraints of a collapsing world order and Nature's hard reality pressing in, the excesses of the industrial age will be sloughed off like an animal shedding its outworn skin." Halal sees today as a historical transition time in which we should address profound institutional shortcomings. Nevertheless, he is "afraid we have slighted the need for a guiding vision, powerful new strategies, or even a clear understanding of what is taking place and what it all means. We lack a sense of what would constitute a good society beyond the present one that is now failing." However, for preferred futures, Halal's concerns provide us a platform in which we envision the coming of the lacking we suffer at the moment. The failing cases on the part of the national governments, despite otherwise viewed as negative incidents, can serve as a promising scenario for us to work on the power changes, or, in Mannermaa's words, a paradigm shift, from formal government to the combination of formal and informal government decision-processing, as Dator envisions.

Image *Collapsed*: an Empirical Case on Nonkilling Scenario

In a discipline for which no statistical analysis was performed to confirm the styles a few years ago, Natalie Dian began her study on Foresight Styles Assessment (FSA) as to question if there is a way to gauge whether one person is more proactive than another about the future. The FSA, as Dian points out, "attempts to describe the variety of behaviors ensconced in our human ability to plan and visualize the future and how they react to external change." It also, in Dian's words, "fills a gap in understanding the range and qualities of foresight competency." In responding Dian's FSA, Gary (2009: 1) claims that "Future orientation is recognized as a critical competency of leadership, but few studies have empirically examined the construct of foresight. This is in part due to a dearth of quantitative research on foresight as a construct. Academics need validated scales to relate foresight to organizational theory. Foresight professionals need reliable measures that might tell us whether one individual has more foresight than another."

While realizing the importance of different foresight styles, this section attempts to verify the functionality of the projected alternative futures based on one and half case(s). The first one is on a regional case about the alternation of the China-Taiwan relation, and the half of the second one is on a larger scale about the on-going falling process of our political and economic systems. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, the one and half case(s) call for a theoretic study on the methodology in verifying the empirical practicality of one or any other once preferred futures. Dator cautions that "It is the duty of futurists to support and provide an audience for those who have 'stupid' ideas in the sure expectation that some of them will turn out to be revolutionary truths while others will not." Theoretically, Dator's statement requires a methodology as to differentiate the revolutionary truth or otherwise. As Dator aptly warns that "there is great harm done in squelching something that turns out to be valuable." In addition to the lack of empirical study on cases where great harm done as Dator indicated above, there is no theoretical framework under which many revolutionary truths have been verified.

As mentioned above, the first case focuses first on the scenario posed by two killing-ready political entities for the sake of their nation-states, and its transformation from a deadly political hostility to an assured economic integration within a decade-long period. The vital cause for the change lies on the collapse of the antagonistic image from both sides. A nonkilling situation is cultivated through zig zag detours, which end in no vain.

The trajectory of the China-Taiwan relations in the recent past takes us into several vital theoretic concepts, such as nationalism, democracy, national state, as well as related empirical experiences, such as rough relationships, security crisis and economic consequences.

As Richard Bush III (2010) pointed out that China and Taiwan was hostile neighbors, "each feared that the other was preparing to challenge its fundamental interests." In so doing, mutual suspicion was deepened. Bush continued that "Beijing increased its military power to deter such an eventuality. Taiwan feared that China wished to use its military power and other means to intimidate it into submission to the point that it would give up what it claims as its sovereign character. Taiwan's deepening fears led it to strengthen and assert its sense of sovereignty." The vicious circle of mutual fear started from the remarks made as a conclusion by the then ROC President Li Denghui at the 13th meeting of National Unification Council on July 22, 1998.[4] On August 3, 1998, Li made his point again that there was but a divided China across the Taiwan Strait. He said:

> The path to a democratic China must begin with a recognition of the present reality by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And that reality is that China is divided, just as Germany and Vietnam were in the past and as Korea is today. Hence, there is no 'one China' now. We hope for this outcome in the future, but presently it does not exist. Today, there is only 'one divided China,' with Taiwan and the mainland each being part of China. Because neither has jurisdiction over the other, neither can represent the other, much less all of China (*Central News Agency*, August 4).

Prior to Li's argument on a divided China across the Taiwan Strait, the relations between Beijing and Taipei had suffered from the issue of sovereignty since 1949. The official positions stipulated in both constitutions, respectively of PRC and ROC claim that the Beijing and Taibei governments were supportive of the reunification of China, and they both argued that they each had sovereignty over the other's territory.[5] According to this argument, either Beijing or Taibei should concede its sovereignty to the other side. This was therefore a zero-sum game, which had brought the two par-

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[4] A closing remarks delivered by the former ROC President Li Denghui at the 13th meeting of National Unification Council on July 22, 1998.

[5] The ROC constitution implies the concept of "One China" as denoting a single political entity by encompassing the Republic of China's claim of sovereignty over both Taiwan and the mainland.

ties to a deadlock. While claiming to have the sole sovereignty over China, both Beijing and Taipei fought over political ideologies. Most notable at that time, PRC and ROC were on absolutely the same page in their solid commitment that there was one China, and Taiwan was part of it, although they clashed over whose political system—the authoritarian developmental state of the Nationalist Party (GMD) or the Communism of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For an example, on April 8, 1995, President Li Denghui addressed to the National Unification Council and repeated ROC's long and continuous mainland policy. He stated that "at this time when all of humanity longs for peace and is pursuing conciliation, all Chinese should work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve our common goal of national unification." He reaffirmed his long time stance that "both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory," and believed that "helping to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of all Chinese people." He faithfully concluded that,

> It is my firm belief that the most direct and effective contribution the two sides can make to the entire Chinese nation at this time when the international situation is more and more relaxed is for them to respectively develop democracy and their economic systems through engaging in peaceful competition. By doing so, both sides will not only be able to reach a genuine solution for China's unification, but also enable the Chinese people to take pride in themselves on the world stage. This is the essence of Dr. Sun's Principle of Nationalism; it is a responsibility leaders on both sides can never shy away from as they face the 21st century.[6]

From a futuristic perspective, the change of Li's arguments from "one unified China" to "a divided China" reflected the trend that had been going on for a decade inside the Island of Taiwan. Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has undertaken a radical transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. The democratization process produced major changes in the Taiwanese political system. These changes hold significant implications for the content and direction of its policies. Democracy has brought about multi-party politics, [7] and it be-

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[6] See President Li Denhui's address to the National Unification Council (1995).

[7] During the first three decades since ROC relocated in Taiwan, the ROC political system was dominated by a single Leninist-style political party—the GMD—and the views and activities of a single paramount leader—first, Jiang Jie-shi from 1949 to 1975, and then his son Jiang Jin-guo from 1975 to 1988. GMD and its predominantly mainland Chinese leadership controlled the major activities of all key governmental agencies and supervised a network of cadres charged with carrying out its policies. The party remained under the

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came the driving force behind Taiwan's policy toward the mainland. Taiwan's democracy has, since its birth, begun with the quest for political independence. The democratization of Taiwan has thus created a dilemma. On one hand, Taiwan's democratization helps foster a strong sense of political identity, enhance the legitimacy of Taiwan's independence, and discredit the PRC's claim over the island of Taiwan. One the other hand, it has also served to increase the possibility of intervention by the rival regime across the Straits. These developments suggest that as long as the PRC stands ready to infiltrate Taiwan's domestic political process and threatens to subvert, or even to thwart, with the use of force if necessary, any democratically elected government that allegedly promotes Taiwanese independence, Taiwan's new democracy will have a difficult time on its way to consolidation.

Mainland China has never ruled out the possibility of the force against Taiwan if the latter declares independence. However, despite the fact that mainland China presents an immediate threat to Taiwan, and yet the Taiwanese feel that they can afford to fight to a stalemate, mainland China, therefore, has to think twice before it resorts to force, for it simply cannot do so without incurring a potentially dangerous response from the United States. Thus, without a convincing prospect of victory, China dares not initiate any military action.

The Taiwan issue involves complex combinations of military and political factors. The United States has remained concerned with the security of Taiwan, and would retain its long-held position that the settlement of disputes between Taiwan and mainland China must be peacefully arrived at. A stable relationship between Taiwan and mainland China depends on the balance of military power in the region. From this scenario, threat of China's military action against Taiwan is most unlikely to achieve its goal over the sovereignty issue.

It is known as a fact China was a culture long before it was a nation. Like John King Fairbank, many Western scholars prefer to use "culturalism" rather than any other existing concepts, such as nation-state, to depict China's national ideology. Lucian Pye (1996: 109) simply calls China as "a civilization pretending to be a nation-state."

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ultimate control of mainlanders and hence the regime reflected the interests of this minority segment of the population throughout most of this period. During this time, the GMD-led ROC regime was a highly personalistic political system. The undemocratic GMD also relied on brute force to ensure obedience, suppress resistance and prevent the emergence of genuine opposition political movements. For more of GMD rule in Taiwan, see Keith Maguire (1998: 32-33); Hung-mao (1989) and Gold (1994: 197).

It is also known that Mainland China had been unable to think of its conflict with Taiwan outside of two boxes, box one: the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan and box two: its "long desired" goal of unifying a whole country with dignity. People inside these two boxes shared one image, e.g., a great China, with the PRC having complete sovereignty over its territory, to which Taiwan properly belongs. They thought that they should shoulder the unification mission in the name of national security, including protection of Taiwan from foreign invasion. For this mission, freedom and liberty were less pertinent than national unity. Any political innovation or institutional infrastructural changes would be harmful to the image of a sovereign China if the political agents were non-Chinese or pro-West. The PRC would be harmed as well. On top of that, as a unique and ever enduring culture, Chinese has been very much past-oriented, and bears significantly less interests in the future than the past. To be specific, not long ago, China was not expecting anything from future, instead the future seemed to them that it oftentimes has had unexpected and fearful events that again and again devastated the country in many ways. A short list of these events that had been China's future resulted in only mostly hard-core humiliation imposed by the Westerners and its close neighbors such as Russians and Japanese. This explains in part why the Chinese was, if not still is, fearful of future while even the latest past within the last one hundred fifty years were so unforgettable to them. Only the far past still hosts the most comfort zone in the heart of the Chinese culture. Not surprisingly, Chinese learned to adapt itself to the modern world designed and manipulated in the hands of what they used to believe "barbarians." Consequently, in the period of 1980s and 1990s, PRC embraced as its righteous mission maintaining its territorial integrity and national security. As an authoritarian state, it viewed its sovereignty and related global issues primarily from its domestic political goals. The Beijing government, in various white papers then, emphasized the paramount role of sovereignty in protecting its national dignity. With historic colonial impositions in mind, sovereignty was indeed viewed as the foundation from which to resist Western encroachment. Its ongoing political conflicts with Taiwan, Tibet, and Islamic ethnic groups in Xinjiang loomed especially large among the factors shaping its domestic policies. The PRC took a hard line, allowing no room for any compromise on its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. The Mainland Chinese people and their political elites alike firmly believed that the implications of Taiwan's independence were unimaginably dangerous. To them, Taiwan's permanent separation would signify nothing but a lead domino in the dissolution of mother China. In other words, if Taiwan was allowed to remain separate indefinitely, this would set an ex-

ample for potentially rebellious parts of China such as Tibet, Xinjiang, perhaps Inner Mongolia, and even Hong Kong. That is to say, Taiwan's future as a part of China was perceived to be inseparable from the integrity of a unified Chinese state. Tom Plate (2004) pointed out timely then that the "Chinese military is ready to 'Saddamise' any effort in that direction."

Arguably, one might insist that China's stance on sovereignty is as rigid as it was in its current political thinking. There is no doubt that China, on one hand, is trying to adapt itself with the international norms; on the other hand, it has been in the process of defining western concepts in its own understanding. However, in front of the rapid changes resulted from the globalization during the time when China was (is) using the Western concept to survive the "un-Chinese" world order, it finds itself once again falling behind. While the concept of nation-state and the national security still remains foreign in their cultural mind, the West has begun to study the economic impact of globalization upon the "modern" concept of nation-state. While China started to market itself as an ultimate sovereign state in the 80s, Dator asked "Show me one nation that is big enough to control its own destiny?" As it was late for the oldest civilization to embrace the modern notion of nation-state, it is now also so sudden for it to confront the fact that sovereignty is but obsolete. China is stuck in the dilemma between protecting its national sovereignty and accepting outside intervention. Traditional notions of sovereignty are evolving. While respect for the territorial integrity and political independence remains fundamental to the stability of the global system, globalization and increased transparency of borders associated with it will require nations to adapt to these changing circumstances. The concept of sovereignty, which has been the major issue affecting the Mainland China-Taiwan relations, is in need of alteration. Regional and global stability depend on a peaceful resolution of cross-strait tensions.

Realizing the improved situation across the Taiwan Strait after the 2008 power return to GMD from DPP, Bush thought that this transition "created the possibility of reversing the previous negative spiral." In his analysis of the presidential campaign strategy, Bush pointed out that "Ma (Ying-jeou) campaigned on the idea that Taiwan could better assure its prosperity, dignity, and security by engaging and reassuring China rather than provoking it." Although neither a peace deal nor a diplomatic truce is formally reached, the relationship between the People's Republic of China in the Mainland and the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan has come to a stage where two half Chinas share the sovereignty of an ancient concept of a unified state (Jiang, 2009: 52). As one follows the decreasing of the rhetoric from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, Dator foresaw the coming trend of changes resulted from

the economic integrations, which has gradually made Beijing and Taipei calm down and started to share things in common, albeit under two different political systems. Bush depicted the relation as follows:

> Since Ma took office in May 2008, the two sides have undertaken a systematic effort to stabilize their relations and reduce the level of mutual fear. They have made significant progress on the economic side, removing obstacles and facilitating broader cooperation.

However, the most unusual undertaking by Beijing government is worth special noting here. Bush continued,

> There has been less progress on the political and security side, but this is partly by design…The Beijing leadership recognizes the importance of building mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges after a decade-plus of mutual fear. It is emphasizing what the two sides have in common—economic cooperation and Chinese culture—and agreed to reduce somewhat the zero-sum competition in the international arena.

What Bush presented above serves an excellent example of the empirical futures studies case. It is noticeable that Bush considered the lacking of the key conceptual issue, sovereignty in particular, is internationally designed. At this time, one may ask how political theorists, either from liberal camp or realist camp, have to design a "wait and see" strategy, either for the purpose of winning the balance of power or doing something for the sake of morality in the China-Taiwan case. The case scenario is in no contradictory to what Inayatullah (2007: 44) described: "The political right, for example, focuses on security, disowning freedom; economic growth, disowning distribution. The political left focuses on structure and blame, disowning innovation and agency. The empiricist focuses on data, the bottom line and disowns meaning and imagination. Finally, the visionary focuses on the image, the metaphor, disowning the real world."

Expecting what can be a trend from which one would see the future, Dator posed THE question on the concept of sovereignty in 1993, "So what do we mean by 'National Sovereignty' any more? Show me one nation that is big enough to control its own destiny?" He continued:

> The 'Pacific Century' looms, dominated—by whom? Japan? Perhaps. More likely China with nearly 1/3 of the world's bloated population not only on its very diverse mainland and across the straits in prosperous Taiwan but also, as so-called 'Overseas Chinese,' spread worldwide, and soon, perhaps to embrace the other Confucian powers—the reunited Koreas, Singapore, perhaps even a subdued Japan itself (Dator, 1993).

Reflecting the current economic situation across the Taiwan Strait, Dator's above vision turns out to be an optimistic reality. It does give hope for a nonkilling scenario, at least among Chinese, Taiwanese Chinese, or Chinese Taiwanese.

As only half of the second case, the following discussion aims briefly on the on-going process of the systems failing. Acknowledging China is no longer a socialist state, Dator (1997) touched a long shot on the fate of capitalism,

> Neither capitalism nor socialism seems to me to have a bright future. As I have said repeatedly, it is not that capitalism triumphed over socialism. It is that really-existing socialism collapsed before capitalism did. Neither system is sustainable over the 21st Century and beyond.

Dator's view is reflected on the political systems in the words of George Salzman, a physicist and political activist, as quoted by Bageant (2010):

> Everyone in these 'professional' institutions dealing in money lives a fundamentally dishonest life. Never mind 'regulating' interest rates…We must do away with interest, with the very idea of 'money making money'. We must recognize that what is termed 'Western Civilization' is in fact an anti-civilization, a global social structure of death and destruction. However, the charade of ever-increasing debt can be kept up only as long as the public remains ignorant. Once ecological limits have been reached the capitalist political game is up.

Dator provided the reason, albeit three decades ago, for what Gorge Salzman talked about today. "For almost three decades now," Dator (1991) said, that "government has failed miserably to perform its basic functions, from preserving order in public spaces to dispensing justice to providing decent education in its schools. But the reasonableness of the motives does not diminish the danger of the potential consequences." Joe Bageant, in his two essays, "Our Plunder of Nature Will End up Killing capitalism and Our Obscene Lifestyle," and "The Battle for the American Soul is Over and Jay Leno Won," provides some of the reality-show consequences that Dator included in his remarks in 1991. For a meaningful verifying of Dator's accurate foresight, the author quotes a few of Bageant's points:

- Like the term populism, the people have no idea what democracy really is, but has something to do with the free market capitalism that issues forth such things as bass boats.
- Nature has no place in contemporary economics, or the economic policy of today's industrial nations.

- Capitalists, however, remain unimpressed by global warming, or melting polar ice caps, or Southwestern desert armadillos showing up in Canada, or hurricanes getting bigger and more numerous every year.
- When the U.S., and then the world's money economy started to crumble, the first thing capitalist economists could think of to do was to monkey with the paper. That's all they knew how to do.
- The main feature of capitalism is the seductive assertion that you can get something for nothing in this world.
- Not that most Americans can see the big picture. They were blinded at birth, so as not to view the monstrous system that has taken on a life of its own.
- One that rules their lives through the small elite class it created and governs.
- Blame it on water fluoridation, lousy education or degraded breeding stock, but not one in a hundred Americans can grasp that monolithic ideo-economic systems can become intelligent entities of their own sort (although capitalist state indoctrination has conditioned Americans to readily accept that Soviet Communism did just that).

Futurist Halal cries out that "The future has arrived." On the shoulder of Dator, he concludes, "Just as the collapse of Communism resulted from an over-controlled planned economy, today's 'collapse of Capitalism' is the result of an under-controlled market economy." Dator proclaimed in 1993 that neither socialist system nor capitalism is sustainable over the 21st Century and beyond. The reasons (for Dator's 1993 rational) proved valid against today's reality, albeit in Halal's words of 2009:

> The financial collapse of 2008 and its cascading business failures is certainly daunting, but the truly frightening thing is that the financial meltdown is part of a larger 'global crisis of maturity'—energy shortages, climate change, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and other yet unforeseen threats that are escalating as accelerating technological change and globalization strain old systems to the breaking point. These mega-crises are interrelated elements of a failing global order that looks like a train wreck in slow motion. If not sub-prime mortgages, some other flaw in today's aging economic system would likely have caused roughly the same failures.

Conclusion: Paige's Nonkilling Society in Dator's Preferred Futures

The proceeding sections serve as a tool, like paralleling switchgear, in the discussion surrounding Dator's major components, such as, action/transforming, image/collapsing and trend/growing, in exploring Paige's nonkilling society. Technically, paralleling switchgear (PSG), according to Maurice D'Mello (2008), is a combination of protection, metering, control-

ling and switching elements, acting as an integrated system, to control the distribution of power for the following systems:

- Emergency system
- Legally required standby system
- Critical operation power system
- Optional standby system

Maurice D'Mello ends his study on the paralleling switchgear this way,

> Paralleling Switchgear can be built as simple as possible with minimal control or as complex as possible with complete control, load management and redundancy. At the lower end, hardwired relays are used but at the higher end, complete digital control is adopted…The trend is towards Digital Control as it can handle complex algorithms that enable multiple scenarios for load management and redundancy. It provides flexibility for system upgrades and enhancements. It also permits operational modifications to be done outside the equipment and then uploaded after complete testing. Digital controls have extensive diagnostics that can enhance reliability.

Maurice D'Mello's description on building the paralleling switchgear really mirrors the other two building blocks in Dator's alternative futures principle. One is the *event*, and the other is *discipline*. These two building blocks can be interpreted as Paige's nonkilling society, as an *event*, and Dator's preferred futures, as a *discipline*.

Paige defines his "nonkilling society" as "a human community, smallest to largest, local to global, in which there is no killing of humans, and no threats to kill; no weapons designed to kill humans and no justifications for using them; and no conditions of society that depend for maintenance or change upon the threat or use of lethal force. There is neither killing of humans nor threats to kill." Paige's nonkilling society, literally, can be a metaphor, or an episode, or an event with a transcendental nature. It is an unprecedented undertaking, a divine transformation and a glorious collapsing.

Although Paige's nonkilling society is not yet the one like Maurice D'Mello's paralleling switchgear, the vision presented in his book N*onkilling Global Political Science* serves as both means and end towards killing-free future. James Robinson personifies Paige's spirit embedded in the book. Sharing Paige's vision, Robinson (2009: 13) calls for a global endeavor for the humanity towards a nonkilling future,

> The promotion of evolutionary biases in favor of nonkilling depends ultimately on more than will and dedication, more than the goodwill of public

opinion, but also on secure bases of knowledge from which alternative courses of action may be designed, implemented, and appraised. Hence, the immense importance of a political science of nonkilling.

Therefore, respected reader, you have presented to you a work of science and policy. You are entitled, indeed urged, to suspend judgment until you have encountered the case for a nonkilling global political science. If unconvinced, you can take comfort amid a silent but continuing effective plurality who explicitly or implicitly accepts killing and threats of killing as constitutional. If persuaded, you will find a niche in the complex panoply of opportunities suggested in this book to join in mobilizing the enlightenment and energy of men and women of similar perspectives among every culture, class, interest, and personality type in situations of whatever level of crisis or stress in promoting and favoring strategies of persuasion over those of coercion in every arena affecting all the values of a potentially global commonwealth of human dignity.

In the process of transformation of literally everything in this digital age, a nonkilling society will remain as "a vision of the mind," a human attribute, competence, and process that "pushes the boundaries of perception forward." (Gary, 2009: 2) Paige's nonkilling society embraces Dator's political conscience for the future generations. However, fundamentally, Dator's political conscience facilitates all preferred and ethical futures for Paige's nonkilling society. The future generations are our destiny. Do not kill them before they are even born.

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As an Epilogue

The Right Not to Kill[*]

Robert Muller (1923-2010)
Former UN Assistant-Secretary-General
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In every epoch of history there are a few exceptional human beings who are blessed with a correct vision of the place of the human person on earth and in the universe. This vision is always basically the same:

- it recognizes the oneness and supremacy of the human family, irrespective of color, sex, creed, nation or any other distinctive characteristics;
- it recognizes each individual human being as a unique miracle of divine origin, a cosmos of his own, never to be repeated again in all eternity;
- it rejects all violence as being contrary to the sanctity and uniqueness of life, and advocates love, tolerance, truth, cooperation and reverence for life as the only civilized means of achieving a peaceful and happy society;
- it preaches love and care for our beautiful and so diverse planet in the fathomless universe;
- it sees each human life and society as part of an eternal stream of time and ever ascending evolution;
- it recognizes that the ultimate mysteries of life, time and the universe will forever escape the human mind and therefore bends in awe and humility before these mysteries and God;
- it advocates gratitude and joy for the privilege of being admitted to the banquet of life;
- it preaches hope, faith, optimism and a deep commitment to the moral and ethical virtues of peace and justice distilled over cons of time as the foundations for further human ascent.

Only people with this simple vision, unmarred by political and personal interests, do ultimately survive in the memory of humankind. They are the great religious leaders, saints, philosophers, artists and humanists of all times. They sing a breath-taking hymn to life, to our planet and to the universe. They deal with the fundamental truths.

Our time has been fortunate to count several such great people, whose number might well be on the increase. We were blessed with a Gandhi, an Albert Schweitzer, a Sri Aurobindo, an H. G. Wells, a Teilhard de Chardin, a Toynbee and, nearer to us, Dag Hammarskjöld, U Thant, Pablo Casals and Mother Teresa. Last but not least, it was the turn of the American soil to produce such a great human being, Martin Luther King. It did it in the true American way: Martin Luther King had his roots in Africa, bore the name of a European and professed a Christian faith born in the Middle East. His life and work overflowed with the unmistakable accents of true vision. One could quote endless thoughts and words of his which make one's heart vibrate, which inspire, which elevate, which make us feel better, greater and proud to be human. Everything he did and said bore the stamp of that same great human dream which is also being sought under the cupola of the UN. This is why he was described as a first citizen of the world, a man of all ages and of all continents. We find in him the same ultimate message left to us by Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant, namely, that love is the secret of secrets, the great transcending force which alone can break the nemesis of war and violence. These were his words in this regard.

To the crowd gathered outside his bombed home in Montgomery: "We must love our white brothers no matter what they do to us. We must make them know that we love them." In an address to a huge gathering in Washington in 1957: "We must never be bitter—if we indulge in hate, the new order will only be the old order. We must meet hate with love, physical force with soul force." After being jailed in Montgomery: "Blood may flow in the streets of Montgomery before we receive our freedom, but it must be our blood that flows and not that of the white man. We must not harm a single hair on the head of our white brothers." In the sermon "Loving Your Enemies": "To our most bitter opponents we say: Do to us what you will, and we shall continue to love you. Throw us in jail, and we shall still love you. Bomb our homes and threaten our children, and we shall still love you."

Martin Luther King and Pablo Casals were foremost in reminding us of a fundamental human right which is not often heard of in UN debates: the right not to kill and not to be killed, not even in the name of a nation.

Many facets of human rights have indeed been studied, defined and codified over the years, but that one has remained surrounded by a strange silence!

During our human evolution and especially during the last few decades it has become increasingly clear that each individual human life is an astounding miracle. Scientists stand in wonder before their genetic discoveries and the functioning of the human being. The more they discover, the more each human appears as an incredible cosmos which has never existed before and will never exist again in the same form in all eternity. All great visionaries, religious leaders, prophets, philosophers and ethical luminaries knew that by intuition thousands of years ago. Great artists, poets and writers have proclaimed it throughout the course of human history. Pablo Casals and Martin Luther King were two of the latest to proclaim it in the most moving terms and in visible action. Now science is confirming it in its own astonishing ways. There is no doubt that, of all life forms on our planet, humanity is the only one that can elevate itself above its condition, uncover a reality which was closed to its senses, comprehend outer space, inner space and ever larger and smaller infinites, conceive God and transcend itself continuously above its earthly abode. This is why, the more we advance, the more we stand in awe before this miraculous, mysterious, incomprehensible, mindboggling cosmos called ahuman person.

What conclusion must we draw from this? Pablo Casals had the artist's straight answer when he said: "If I am a miracle that God or nature has made, how could kill? No, I can't. Or another human being who is a miracle like me, can he kill someone?" He was thus restating a fundamental truth which has been advocated by all great religions and moral codes: "Thou shalt not kill." This law of civilized society is as true today as it was throughout our past history. To break it in any way is to break the fundamental law of civilization. Therefore, at a moment when the entire question of human rights is being so forcefully debated, we must have the courage to place the right of each human person not to kill and not to be killed at the top of the list. This should be the most sacred law of humanity. As one of the most urgent topics for world ecumenism, I would suggest a meeting of the world's religions to agree and proclaim that no human being shall be required to kill in the name of a nation, a religion or any other group.

The time has come to start anew history in this respect. We must establish reverence for life as the cornerstone of civilization: reverence for life not only by individuals, but also by institutions, foremost among them nations. Institutions were created originally for the good and survival of the people. This is their main justification and merit. They have no right to kill

or to develop and stockpile incredible arsenals of weapons meant to kill millions of people, possibly all humanity. And the same nations come to the UN and dare to speak about human rights! Do these include the right to life and the right not to kill? Perhaps if we approach the question of disarmament from the fundamental principle of reverence for life, we might achieve better progress. As a humanist and as a member of the human race who has seen so many killings and violations of human rights during his lifetime, I just cannot conceive and accept the idea of a peaceful and orderly planet of armed nations. As we approach the new global age of humanity, we must unequivocally proclaim and enforce this fundamental, sacred and inalienable right and obligation of all human beings on our planet:

THOU SHALT NOT KILL, NOT EVEN IN THE NAME OF A NATION.

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