To Nonviolent Political Science

From Seasons of Violence

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Center for Global Nonviolence
2001

Political science is a science that can liberate humankind from violence. But first it must liberate itself. This will require five related revolutions: normative, empirical, theoretical, institutional, and educational. The tasks of political scientists at the end of the 20th century are to begin these revolutions. Twenty-first century successors must carry them forward, consolidate them, and extend their influence throughout global society.

From "Nonviolent Political Science"

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ISBN 1-880309-07-6
HM278.P23 1993

To

G. Ramachandran and
Petra K. Kelly

Inspirers of Global Nonviolence
East and West

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PREFACE

This book has its origins in a 1985 request by Mr. Toru Kinoshita of Hiroshima University and Dr. Chung-si Ahn of Seoul National University that I bring together some dispersed writings on my journey to nonviolence to assist thoughtful consideration by young scholars in political science. Thus this belated response.

It is stimulated also by a life-threatening disruption of heart rhythms in late 1990 that led to quintuple bypass open heart surgery and to acute awareness that for me time is running out. It was distressing to think that an important task might be left undone.

The book is subtitled "From Seasons of Violence," and is divided into four parts: winter, spring, summer, and fall. This is intended to suggest cycles of scholarly growth from violence, to nonviolent awakening, to exploration of nonviolent alterna-tives, and to consolidation of resources in preparation for a new season of work for nonviolent global transformation. It suggests that seasons of scholarship, seasons of life, and seasons of global change are interrelated in ways that will progressively bring us out of conditions of violence.

Those who have encouraged and assisted this journey to nonviolence are too numerous to acknowledge here. But I hope that those unmentioned will recall my respectful indebtedness to them if I mention just a few. They illustrate the existence of extraordinarily diverse global sources of supportiveness for the creation of nonviolent political science, once the effort is made. Among them are: Robert L. Burrows, Herbert Feith, Brian Martin, Ralph Summy (Australia), Gedong Bagoes Oka (Bali), Shi Gu, Zhao Baoxu (China), G. Ramachandran, Sister Mythili, N. Radhakrishnan, Acharya Tulsi, Yuvacharya Mahapragya, S. L. Gandhi, Razi Ahmad (India), Seki Hiroharu, Ikeda Daisaku, Kase Kayoko, Kurino Ohtori, Mushakoji Kinhide, Sakamoto

Yoshikazu, Shikano Yoichi, Ishida Takeshi (Japan), A. S. Majali (Jordan), Ham So]k Ho]n, Hong Sung-Chick, Hwang Jang Yo]p, Kang Jangseok, Kim Myong U, Li Dong Jun, Rhee Dongshick (Korea), Syed Adam Aljafri (Malaysia), I. Ochirbal, G. Lubsantseren (Mongolia), Sikander Mehdi (Pakistan), Eremey Parnov, G. Shaknazarov, G. F. Kim, I. Kazakevich (Russia), Danilo Dolci (Sicily), Ulf Landergren (Sweden), Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Suwanna Satha-Anand, Sulak Sivaraksa (Thailand), Elise Boulding, Theodore L. Herman, V. K. Kool, Bernard Lafayette, Jr., Kate Lafayette, Scott McVay, Hella McVay, Michael Nazler, Gene Sharp, Richard Snyder, Marjorie Snyder, Michael True (mainland United States of America), A. T. Ariyaratne, M. Mazzahim Mohideen (Sri Lanka), and Thich Minh Chau and Thich Nhat Hanh (Viet Nam).

In Hawai‘i, among those who have given special encouragement to the exploration of nonviolent political science are: Robert Aitken, James Albertini, Nancy Aleck, Francine Blume, Larry Cross, Karen Cross, James A. Dator, Harry Friedman, Johan Galtung, Sarah Gilliatt, Lou Ann Guanson, Manfred Henningsen, Kareda Henningsen, Philip E. Jacob, Betty Muther Jacob, Dae Won Ki, Jean King, Jin Wol Lee, Werner Levi, Ramon Lopez-Reyes, Douglas Margolis, Anthony J. Marsella, Norman Meller, Terza Meller, Peter Miller, Richard Morse, Romola Morse, Deane Neubauer, Fumiko Nishimura, Richard Paw U, Nahuanani Patrinos, Forrest R. Pitts, Fred Riggs, C. L. Riggs, Jeung Woo Roh, Daniel S. Sanders, George Simson, Marguerite Simson, Jangnai Sohn, Changzoo Song, Robert B. Stauffer, Dae-Sook Suh, Joanne Tachibana, Toshiaki Takahashi, Donnis Thompson, and S. P. Udayakumar. This includes also the contributors to *Nonviolence in Hawaii's Spiritual Traditions* (1991) and the forthcoming *Hawai‘i Profiles in Nonviolence.*

Furthermore affectionate indebtedness is expressed to every graduate and undergraduate student who adventurously has joined in exploring nonviolent political alternatives. May this book help them and others to carry on.

Finally, this book owes its existence to the unfailingly cheerful technical competence of Stanley Schab; to George Simson, Manfred Henningsen, and the publications committee of the Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace; to the providers of material support for scholarly publication; and to the labors of those whose workmanship produced it.

I hope that it will contribute to the emergence of nonviolent political science and nonviolent politics in the global future.

Honolulu
August 1993

WINTER

My undergraduate and doctoral studies in the 1950s were pursued in a still-prevailing climate that can be termed “violence-accepting” political science. That is: while violence is regrettable, it is an inescapable part of the human condition. The best that can be done is to minimize it. Politically, one of the best things that can be done to ensure domestic and international peace and security is to be willing and able to kill. This orientation is deeply rooted in the classics of political philosophy and is characteristic of other social science and humanities disciplines as well.

Therefore it was natural for me, after having served as a young antiaircraft artillery communications officer in the Korean War during 1950-1952, to select the United States decision to fight in Korea as the topic of my senior thesis at Princeton University (1955) and as the subject of my Northwestern University doctoral dissertation (1959).

For a student of international politics these tasks were exciting and rewarding. This was a time of great creativity in American political science, in which pioneers like my profoundly respected principal professor Richard C. Snyder, tried to place the study of politics on a scientific basis akin to that of the natural sciences and other sciences. The spirit of the times can be summed up in a contemporary remark by Albert Einstein when he was asked, “Why is it that we have been able to unlock the secrets of the atom but have not been able to abolish war?” He replied, “Because politics is more difficult than physics.”

In this spirit, with enthusiasm, I took up the intellectual challenge of trying to contribute to the scientific understanding of international politics by applying to a single case Professor Snyder’s decision-making approach to the study of international politics. This approach, still of enduring significance, calls for

understanding organizational, informational, and motivational factors that combine to produce political decisions. [See Richard C. Snyder, Henry W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, *Foreign Policy Decision Making* (New York: The Free Press, 1962.)]

The approach calls for identifying participants in decisions, empathetically trying to understand situations, as they see them, and tracing overlapping sequences of choices and responses as they pursue their political objectives. In the Korean case this meant reconstructing the actions of top American officials from the time news was received of an outbreak of fighting on the Korean peninsula (June 24, 1950, Washington time) to the decision to commit United States ground forces to battle (June 30). It led to interviews with former President Harry S Truman, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, and others among the fifteen high-level officials who participated in a series of five major policy decisions during that period.

This produced a decision-by-decision narrative description followed by an empirical propositional analysis that sought to induce patterns of relationships among the organizational, informational, and motivational variables that would account for the choices made.

The original decision-making approach did not contain a method for ethical evaluation of a decision and the original doctoral study did not create one. The training of the scientific decision-making analyst was to hold one's own value preferences in abeyance—not to "contaminate" either factual description or empirical analysis with them. The decision was to be seen through the eyes of the decision makers.

This is not to say that Professor Snyder neglected the importance of values. He taught their significance for politics and for political scientists as well. Values could serve as "spotlights" to illuminate things that others without such values might not see. In this case, however, values did not enable the political scientist to see things the political and military leaders

did not see, since both were in agreement—both accepted violence.

Even then I was somewhat surprised by former President Truman's response to a question I asked in a 1957 interview in Independence, Missouri. I asked, "As a devout Baptist, after having engaged the United States in what was to become its fourth largest war in history [as of 1993, fifth after Viet Nam], did you pray?" "Hell, no!" he replied. "There's right and wrong going back to Greece and Rome. It was the right thing to do. I made the decision and went to sleep."

In an extended process of revision for publication after completion of the doctoral dissertation, I decided to add two chapters on "Evaluation" and on "Action Implications." The decision to explore a method for evaluating the ethical nature of political decisions was made partly in response to the interest shown in moral judgment by virtually everyone with whom I had discussed the study. As soon as they learned its nature, they would ask, "Was it a good decision?" "Was it right that they did that?" In addition, I believed that a social scientist bore an ethical responsibility in research and teaching.

Similarly I held that if scholarly research was to be socially useful, social scientists should call attention to implications for action arising out of their studies whenever appropriate. Therefore I added a final chapter that contained three recommendations for action by national decision makers in crisis situations: (1) to call for information in organizational memory that might contradict prevailing views, (2) to be especially responsive to criticism coming from persons normally supportive of them, and (3) to be specific about limits of force to be used by military commanders and to devise means for monitoring their compliance.

The following excerpt from *The Korean Decision* therefore serves as an example of violence-accepting political science in a season of violence.

1

Apologia for War: *The Korean Decision*

From narrative description and empirical propositional analysis of the Korean decision, we now proceed to a different mode of analysis—evaluation.[1]

For several reasons an attempt at evaluative analysis seems to be an appropriate task for the political scientist even in the primitive initial stages of developing a methodology for decision-making studies. The first reason is that normative analysis has been a traditional concern of political scientists and there would seem to be no necessary reason to abandon it now. Evaluative concepts such as "right" and "wrong," "good" and "bad," "ought" and "ought not" have engaged the interests of students of politics over the centuries as they have attempted to contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions of human life. Just because such concepts have been used to justify torture and murder (as well as to urge men toward peace and freedom) does not seem sufficient reason to discard them now as tools of analysis and action. Like all concepts, normative concepts simply can have both facilitating and inhibiting implications for the discovery and application of useful knowledge.

In the second place, the political scientist can hardly be insensitive to the fact that he is surrounded by a lively human interest in normative questions. One of the first queries directed at him in the course of an ordinary conversation about something like the Korean decision is, "Was it a *good* decision?" "Was it *right* that they did that?" Unless the political scientist is to ignore the question, or to

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Chapter 12, "Evaluation" from *The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950* (New York: The Free Press, 1968). Author is the copyright holder.

refer the inquirer to some kind of normative counseling service, or somewhat irresponsibly but often very beneficially to advise the questioner to judge for himself, then he needs to devote some thought to problems and methods of evaluative analysis.

Furthermore, the very logic underlying decision-making analysis virtually demands renewed interest in judgments about the achievement of alternative states of affairs. If decision makers in fact have no choice about what they decide and thus are beyond the pale of critical evaluation, then it is a questionable advance to move the basis for understanding the determinants of foreign policy from macro-systemic or institutional variables to the behavior of concrete individuals in specified decisional units. If meaningful political choice is possible, as decision-making analysis implies, then political man can hardly escape evaluative scrutiny of his actions. This abandonment of judgment is not likely to happen in the world of political action and it would undoubtedly be a real loss if discontinued in the world of scholarly political analysis.

The question then appears to be not whether normative evaluation deserves a place in decision-making analysis but rather how it is to be accomplished. The remainder of this chapter is an exploratory search for some answers to this question. Presumably, if the narrative description and empirical propositional analysis have been done well this will aid the evaluative effort, in part because values usually have empirical correlates and implications.

EXPLORATIONS IN EVALUATIVE METHOD

By evaluation is meant the judgment of (assignment of values to) actual or potential empirical states of affairs in terms of certain criteria. The immediate objectives of scholarly evaluation in politics are to improve skills in normative analysis. Longer-range objectives, either explicit or implicit, are to increase the probability of the occurrence of valued behavior and to decrease the probability of the occurrence of disvalued behavior. Other social actors may have different purposes; presumably the motives behind the evaluative acts of contending political leaders are often to discredit and to defeat as well as to improve.

Two questions are central to any evaluation: what to evaluate and what criteria to employ. Ethical theorists usually respond to the

first question by describing the scope of evaluation as "unrestricted;" by this they mean that there is a hypothetically infinite range of things that might be evaluated, including the evaluative act itself. In reply to the second question ethical theorists remind us somewhat despairingly of the ever-present possibility of the "infinite reduction" of evaluative criteria: that is, if we establish certain criteria for judging the Korean decision we are open to the challenge as to what criteria underlie the selection of these particular criteria, and so on *ad infinitum.*

If we are thus faced with an infinite range of evaluative possibilities and a potentially infinite range of evaluative criteria, how then are we to proceed in evaluating a decision such as the Korean decision with some degree of intellectual rigor and social responsibility? In order to narrow the range of hypothetically infinite evaluative possibilities, the student of political decisions, like the decision makers themselves, obviously must choose and live at least for a while with his choices. But to meet the criterion of intellectual rigor (tight integration of ideas that is intersubjectively reproducible) he would do well to approach his task with some degree of relatively nonarbitrary method. Alternatively, he might let his personal and professional intuitions ramble over the Korean case materials, praising the desirable and condemning the distasteful. No behavioral scientist with respect for clinical intuition and for creative thought in the arts as well as the sciences need shrink from employing such a method for identifying normative problems and for defining evaluative criteria. But is there not a more explicit and less idiosyncratic—if not a better—way?

One starting point for the development of evaluative method in decision-making analysis is suggested by studies of "ordinary language" that have been done by ethical theorists in philosophy. That is, rather than impose from outside a set of evaluative criteria that has been created out of professional polemics in political science, we might begin with the ordinary language of moral discourse that is revealed by the Korean case materials themselves. This would mean that we would do a normative propositional inventory of the case at a low level of abstraction, keeping close to the language of the decision makers and other relevant social actors.

There is much to recommend such a procedure as a point of departure. Undoubtedly in the natural world of political decision

making there have been created and transmitted from generation to generation a partially stable and partially changing set of norms by which those in socially responsible positions evaluate political behavior—their own and that of others. Presumably such judgmental criteria have differed from age to age both within and across cultures. And presumably world history has also seen the learning of common norms through processes that have characterized the diffusion of other elements of world culture. This means that in probing the universe of evaluative discourse of political decision makers and their critics, the analyst is beginning at a relatively nonarbitrary, experientially tested, and relatively responsible point.

However, no independent student of political behavior would consider it responsible to close inquiry at that point. Thus we will wish also to explore briefly the possibility of drawing evaluative criteria from at least two other sources: some standards of judgment commonly employed in political science; and, a system of philosophical, religious, or ethical thought. Finally, the writer will take responsibility for presenting his own evaluation of the Korean decision.

NORMATIVE INVENTORY OF THE CASE MATERIALS

In reviewing the Korean case for judgmental statements it will be useful to distinguish between the decision makers and their domestic critics, on the one hand, and their foreign supporters and critics on the other. This will permit the analysis and comparison of two realms of normative discourse—the domestic and the international.

One of the most striking aspects of the Korean case is the high degree of satisfaction and sense of moral rightness shared by the decision makers and the high approbation of the decision expressed by other American leaders. For this reason the Korean decision may not be as fruitful for the generation of normative criteria for decision-making analysis as a more contentious one. Moral conflict can sharpen as well as dull perceptiveness.

Against the background of these considerations let us review some of the major normative propositions related to the Korean decision.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 1. *The President and his advisers were right in opposing an aggressive act which, if unopposed, would have increased the probability of world war.*

In the President's view the Korean decision was unquestionably just since it served moral principles of right and wrong stretching back in history through Christian times to classical antiquity.[2] Human history had shown unequivocally that it was right to resist physical aggression of the strong against the weak. The history of the 1930's provided but a fresh illustration of how aggressive appetites whetted by successful small-scale assaults would lead to war.

Thus, for American policy makers the decision to repel the North Korean invasion was right since it sought a noble end—world peace—and since it satisfied a moral imperative of history: no appeasement of aggression. The sense of moral imperative is suggested by the view of Assistant Secretary Rusk that "the Korean decision was in the process of being made for an entire generation since Manchuria."[3] It is also implied in Secretary Pace's view that the great significance of the Korean decision lay in the fact that "for the first time since its emergence as a world power the American nation very consciously and deliberately chose to shed its blood"[4] in meeting the responsibilities of leadership.

No one who participated in making the Korean decision thought it was wrong. Neither did most domestic political opponents or foreign allies.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 2. *The President and his advisers were wrong in the Korean decision because they undertook military intervention in a civil war on behalf of a reprehensible government and violated the principle of national sovereignty.*

This will be recognized as a criticism arising primarily in the international setting and representing basically a Soviet Communist judgment of the decision. In the views of Communist spokesmen, the Government of the Republic of Korea was not a legitimate one since it had been established through the exclusion of Communist elements who alone allegedly stood for the interests of the Korean people. Regardless of how the Korean fighting began—North Korean and other Communist propagandists first portrayed it

without foundation in fact as a result of South Korean provocation undertaken with American encouragement—the Communist view held that it was a just "people's war of national liberation." The conflict was thus portrayed as a legitimate struggle of the Korean people against "colonialism," "imperialism," and "reaction," and in favor of "national independence" and "democracy." External interference by Americans in this allegedly just civil war, significantly termed "American aggression," was thus judged as wrong and violative of the most fundamental principles of national self-determination. The general Communist view was that it was not "revolutionary wars of national liberation" led by Communists that threatened world peace but rather American aggressiveness in interfering in the internal affairs of other peoples. In this vein, one nationalist Korean argument somewhat sympathetic to Communism has held that the United States was wrong in resisting the North Korean invasion since it prevented the rapid reunification of Korea that a successful North Korean invasion would have accomplished.

In fact, however, most citizens of the Republic of Korea welcomed American and United Nations military intervention. They did not value reunification so highly that they would pay any price for it. The image of North Korean Communism as an alien Stalinist imposition, the betrayal of faith in peaceful unification involved in the North Korean invasion, and crude and brutal treatment of various sections of the populace in occupied areas, served to coalesce Korean opinion strongly in favor of American support for national survival.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 3. *The Korean decision was right, but the President and his advisers were wrong in that their prior behavior encouraged the act of aggression in the first place.*

This judgment was articulated by domestic critics of the Truman administration who variously cited American policy toward China, Secretary Acheson's Press Club speech of January 1950, Senator Connally's interview of May 1950, the existence of intelligence warnings of a possible North Korean invasion, and the inadequate defense budget in support of their position. A few went further to identify the sources of error as a certain "softness toward Communism" expressed in part by the infiltration of Communist sympathizers in decision-making positions, but this was neither proven nor essential to the argument of pre-crisis error.

In general, few of the decision makers were willing to admit of any error in the sequence of events that led up to the North Korean invasion. In Secretary Acheson's view American policy in Asia had been accurately calibrated to the military, economic, and political power potential for execution. He argued that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree to guarantee the defense of Taiwan against invasion, then American diplomacy could not do so. Furthermore, he argued that the Administration could not give expressions of support to Korea that outran Congressional willingness to give them material backing, citing the embarrassing defeat of the Korean aid bill on January 19, 1950, as an illustration. In his view that event was as important for subsequent happenings in Korea as anything that he had said or done. Although this question has not been discussed with military leaders, perhaps most of them would have cited the high priority accorded Europe, the restraints of the defense budget, and the post-World War II slump in American public interest in military affairs as determinants of their positions with respect to the firmness of American guarantees against Communist military expansion in the Far East.

Thus from the point of view of the decision makers, whose attention in the Far East was focused primarily on China and Japan, their precrisis behavior was determined by a mutually restricting set of interlocking factors which precluded issuance of a clear guarantee that the Republic of Korea would be defended in the event of invasion. Furthermore, retrospectively viewed, these factors appeared to them to preclude even defining the contingency of a North Korean invasion in such a way that a decision to give or not to give defensive guarantee could be taken. As Assistant Secretary Rusk later reflected, "I have often wondered whether a staff study could have been prepared in advance which would correctly deal with the contingency of a North Korean invasion."[5]

Yet when the assault came, all the reasons for not defining such a contingency and for not planning the commitment of resources fell away. America fought.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 4. *The Korean decision was right, but the President was wrong in deciding to order American armed forces into battle without Congressional authorization.*

This will be recalled as the criticism made particularly by Republican Senators Taft and Wherry, who argued that the President had usurped powers granted Congress by the Constitution. Other Republicans, such as Senator Knowland, argued that the President did not need such authorization. Administration spokesmen argued that historical precedent, obligations under the United Nations Charter, and the need for a quick decision justified the Presidential initiative. Furthermore, some of the decision makers felt that exposure of the possibility of military intervention to Congressional debate would give a forum to Administration critics and do serious damage to national morale, especially to that of the military. One wonders what in fact might have happened if the President had appeared before a joint session of Congress on the night of June 26 to ask for approval of military force to support United Nations intervention against North Korean aggression. Presumably the President considered it not an attractive risk.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 5. *The Korean decision is an example of American government at its best.*

Most of the officials who participated in the decision expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the processes by which it was reached. "Democracy here proved to be strong," reflected Secretary Pace. "Weakness is not inherent in it. You can have it either way. It can act with division and slowness or it can act swiftly and decisively. I think Korea illustrated the latter."[6] Ambassador Jessup considered the decision to be "an extraordinary example of effective government in action" that illustrated the strength of the American governmental system. It showed that a government that was often "bogged down in endless wrangles" could respond to crisis "without shilly-shallying."[7] Assistant Secretary Rusk cited the speed and unanimity with which the President and his advisers acted as real strengths of the decision. He also pointed to excellent executive-legislative and civilian-military cooperation.

All of the participants paid tribute to the decisive leadership of the President. "The country does not sufficiently understand nor appreciate the lonely and awful role of the President in decisions of this sort," Secretary Rusk later explained. He continued, "This kind of decision is not made *for* the President, it can be made only *by* the

President."[8] In appreciation of the role of President Truman, some advisers speculated on what different presidents might have done if faced with the same situation. Ambassador Jessup reflected, "I think Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Wilson would have responded to the challenge with Truman's vigor and determination. But probably Harding and McKinley would not have acted in the same way. There was no wavering, doubt, or timidity on the part of President Truman." Other advisers commented upon the President's "fine grasp of the sense of history" and his "keen appreciation of the role of the United Nations."

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 6. *The Korean decision illustrates some of the real weaknesses of American government.*

Not all of the President's advisers or close observers of the decision were completely uncritical of the processes by which it was made. One participant was especially critical of the Defense Secretary's "failure to present the President with an accurate picture of the military situation. The nonrecommendatory role of the military might be classic in this case except for the fact that their military assessments were almost completely wrong." The same official was critical of military estimates of situations where actual combat operations were not involved. "If you want to know what's going on, for heaven's sake don't ask the military," he advised. Specifically with respect to the Korean decision, this official thought that the military estimates of the relative capabilities of the North and South Korean forces that were presented to the President were notably inaccurate.

From the viewpoint of another official the Korean decision was "an example of real weakness of our government." The crux of this weakness as this official saw it was "lack of real intellectual intimacy among top people on political philosophy and how you conduct foreign policy." "If you can imagine two such diverse people as Acheson and Johnson on the same team," he explained, "then you can get the idea of what I'm talking about." This kind of criticism is a very deep and penetrating one, going far beyond the particular personalities involved, for it raises questions about the training, selection, and advancement of American public leaders. For example this official questions whether legal training is really appropriate preparation for learning to direct large government

organizations and whether the American political system elevates to the highest positions persons with shared capacity for appreciating highly complex consequences of various courses of action.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 7. *The decision to respond to the attack through collective security measures under the United Nations was right.*

All except one of the officials interviewed were fully in support of the decision to respond to the aggression within the framework of the United Nations. For them, there was a sense of intrinsic rightness about support of the United Nations. Since that organization was viewed as the major instrument for world peace fashioned by man in the post-World War II era, vigorous support for it in a crisis that seemed to threaten everything it stood for, could not be bad. Additionally, and certainly of lesser importance at the highest policy levels as far as this study shows, the engagement of the United Nations in the Korean conflict was deemed correct since it promised to strengthen international support for American action.

NORMATIVE PROPOSITION 8. *The decision to respond to the attack through collective security measures under the United Nations was wrong.*

Although not represented at the Blair House conferences, one informed critic of the engagement of the United Nations in the Korean decision held that it was an unfortunate product of "fuzzy-minded idealism." In this view the North Korean aggression could have been resisted by the United States acting alone on grounds other than support of the United Nations; for example, the obligations of the United States before the world community to insure the peace and security of Japan. It was further maintained that this kind of independent action would have received wide international acceptance and understanding.

The domestic criticism of the involvement of the United Nations as a policy instrument was based not on an assessment of an intrinsic lack of value in the institution itself, but rather on an anticipated loss of American decision latitude. The resort to United Nations action was bad because it would restrict the freedom of American policy makers to pursue the interests of the United States in the Korean action. In this view, the subsequent course of the Korean War was held to confirm this anticipation.

Another source of criticism of American involvement of the United Nations was that of the Soviet Union. Soviet spokesmen argued, it will be recalled, that the United Nations action was wrong because it was taken in violation of Charter provisions that China (defined by them as Communist China) should be seated on the Security Council. The Soviet view thus held that the American action was wrong because it illegitimately engaged the United Nations in the Korean conflict.

The eight propositions identified above do not exhaust the possibilities for a normative inventory of the Korean case but hopefully they encompass most of the major issues and provide a basis for further explorations in evaluative method. One of the important implications of this inventory is that it helps to limit the scope of evaluation by directing attention to certain aspects of the Korean case. Now it will come as no surprise to political philosophers and ethical theorists that these propositions call attention to the *ends* (Normative Propositions 1 and 2) and *means* (Normative Propositions 7 and 8) of the Korean decision. But it may be somewhat less "obvious" that attention is also directed to the *antecedents of the occasion for decision* (Normative Proposition 3) and to the *quality of decisional processes* (Normative Propositions 4, 5, and 6).

A summary of the results of the normative inventory is presented in Table 7.

Even though this summary is crude, it prompts at least three interesting observations. First, contrast between the domestic critical evaluations of the antecedents, decisional process, and means/ends aspects of the Korean decision suggests that in political evaluation a certain collapsing of time can occur (past, and possibly future, into present) with the result that decision makers may be judged at once both right and wrong.

Table 7.

Summary of Normative Inventory.

Evaluator	*Evaluative Aspect*			
	Antecedents	*Decision process*	*Means*	*Ends*

Decision makers	Unavoidable	Legitimate	Appropriate	Just
Domestic critics	Avoidable	Illegitimate	Appropriate	Just
External allies	Unavoidable	Legitimate	Appropriate	Just
External critics	Avoidable	Illegitimate	Inappropriate	Unjust

Secondly, although different in substance there are interesting parallels in the domestic and international criticisms of the Korean decisions. Both sets of critics are agreed in focusing attention upon the pre-crisis behavior of the decision makers. Whereas domestic critics judged that the Truman Administration could have averted conflict by taking a clearer stand against Communist military expansion in Asia, the foreign Communist critics argued that American belligerency and support for an allegedly aggressive ally precipitated the war. Procedurally, whereas domestic critics protested that the President had acted in violation of the United States Constitution, Soviet critics charged that he had acted in violation of the United Nations Charter. These parallelisms are of interest since they represent certain similarities between domestic and international political processes, a subject of constant interest to students of comparative and international politics.

Third, the normative inventory and its summary suggest not only categories that limit the scope of evaluation but also certain criteria of evaluation to be employed within these categories. The following questions are illustrative. *Antecedent behavior:* Was the behavior of decision makers in the pre-crisis period such as to minimize the occurrence of the crisis precipitating event? *Decisional process:* Was the response to the crisis decided in such a way as to gain widespread acceptance of the authority of the decision makers through the legitimacy of the decisional processes? *Ends:* Were the ends pursued of deep and enduring human value? *Means:* Were the means employed such as to receive widespread acceptance as being appropriate for the ends sought?

APPLICATION OF SOME COMMON CRITERIA OF POLITICAL EVALUATION

Another avenue for exploration in evaluating the Korean decision is to invoke certain criteria that are commonly employed, either explicitly or implicitly in political science analyses. This

approach differs from that of the normative inventory in that it brings to bear criteria of judgment that originate outside the Korean case. The illustrative criteria to be explored below are by no means exhaustive of those that might be drawn from the thought of contemporary political science. Neither have they been demonstrated to have a high degree of scientific reliability and validity as guides to action. There is as yet no full-scale systematization of political science knowledge for the purpose of evaluating something like the Korean decision. Yet the categories and style of analysis customarily employed can contribute to our evaluative effort.

Attainability of Ends

A common question about a political act is whether the goals sought lay within the range of reasonable accomplishment. Quite aside from the intrinsic value of the ends themselves, an issue in itself, the political scientist often asks whether the goals were objectively attainable. If not, and if the political actor continues to pursue them to the detriment of other values, such as loss of support or defeat, then he is charged with misjudgment. On the other hand, the political actor is criticized if he fails to appreciate and to strive for goals deemed worthy that are asserted to be achievable. Thus political actors are subjected to judgments about excessive or inadequate goal-striving in addition to judgments about the intrinsic value of the ends pursued. Furthermore it might be argued that although the political actors pursued attainable ends, the costs of reaching them were too high. Applied to the Korean decision it might be said that the long-range goal of world peace was laudable, that the short-range goal of limiting conflict in Korea was right, and that the immediate goal of repelling the North Korean invaders to the Thirty-eighth Parallel lay within the scope of practical attainment. On the other hand, if the American decision makers had decided not to fight, it might be argued that they had failed to appreciate the attainability of a short-range goal that would contribute to the realization of a highly valued end. If they had decided to engage the Soviet Union in general war rather than to make a limited response in Korea, they would certainly have been judged as pursuing an excessively costly, if not unattainable, end.

Suitability of Means

Another set of evaluative questions focuses not only upon the intrinsic value of the means employed to achieve desired ends but also upon the problem of whether the means selected actually permitted goal attainment. Thus, for example, it might be judged that bad means were employed for good ends, that good means were used for bad ends, and that either good or bad means were simply effective or ineffective for goal accomplishment. Appreciation of the range of means objectively available would also be an evaluative criterion. A criterion sometimes proposed is that decision makers should not sacrifice higher values by shrinking from employing objectively required means that in themselves might be noxious.

In the Korean decision it might be judged that although the death-dealing application of American military power was not good in itself, it served intrinsically good ends and constituted the only objectively available means that promised successfully to repel the North Korean invasion. More specifically it might be judged that American policy makers were to be commended since they proceeded only under conditions of demonstrated inefficacy from less noxious to more noxious means toward their goal—e.g., from the Security Council resolution, to arms aid, to air-sea support, and to ground combat. All other things held constant, they would have been judged in error if they had stopped short of measures necessary to reach their goals. From the American combat soldier's point of view, however, the piecemeal commitment of inadequately trained American units against an underestimated and superior enemy force did not represent a laudable employment of means. On the other hand, the employment of American atomic weapons against North Korean forces would certainly have been judged as the use of inappropriate means that jeopardized good ends. So, for different reasons, would limiting American responses to Security Council debate.

Timeliness and Flexibility of Response

A!though analytically separable, these two criteria may usefully be considered in combination. Timeliness is usually viewed as an important criterion for decisional evaluation; the political actor can be seen as jeopardizing his goals by acting too soon or too late, as well as not at all. Furthermore, in the course of solving a political problem or set of them, political actors are usually judged by the degree of appropriate flexibility that they exhibit in pursuing their objectives. By flexibility is commonly meant willingness to modify or to abandon old ends and means as they are found to be unappropriate for coping with new situations.

Here again, as with most criteria of political evaluation, there are subtle judgments to be made that often hinge upon conceptions of value in the specific case. Thus rigidity, relative inflexibility, can sometimes be useful in protecting values while relatively high flexibility, bordering on "opportunism," can sacrifice them. Each individual case requires analysis.

President Truman and his advisers seem to have met the criteria of timeliness and flexibility in the Korean decision. Perhaps the significance of the President's decision lay as much in its immediate effect upon South Korean morale as in its direct military effects upon the combat situation. It will be recalled that small American infantry units did not engage in combat until July 7. This is not to discount the immediate effects of growing Air Force pressure on North Korean aircraft, tanks, troops and transportation or the Navy's deterrence of further North Korean amphibious operations. If the President had delayed as much as a week the Republic of Korea might well have collapsed and have been overrun.

The American policy makers were notably flexible in their response. They were willing to commit the United States for the first time in history to an explicitly defined collective security action under the auspices of an international organization. Then they were willing to make progressively more costly commitments of American strength to achieve their objectives in repelling the attack. If the President and his advisers had not agreed to the commitment of American ground forces in response to General MacArthur's assessment of their indispensability, then the decision makers undoubtedly would have been judged as harmfully inflexible.

To step briefly outside the bounds of the case, but to illustrate questions that might be raised in flexibility analysis, it might be asked whether the American decisions of early fall 1950 that abandoned the initial objective of restoring the status quo of the Thirty-eighth Parallel in favor of the invasion and occupation of North Korea did not border upon opportunistic flexibility. If the earlier limited objective had been adhered to, would not the basic collective security contribution to world peace have been made, would not a widened conflict with China have been avoided, and would not tens of thousands of lives have been saved?

Accuracy of Calculated Support

Another common criteria for evaluation is the extent to which political leaders accurately estimate the degree of potential support for and opposition to their actions. Thus leaders might select the right means for the right ends at the right time but be wrong because they miscalculated the degree of potential support for their actions. The specific nature of potential supporters and opponents differs with the type of political system. Harold Guetzkow has suggested "decision validators" as an appropriate and neutral concept to describe them.

The reasons why miscalculated support is deemed bad are fairly obvious: the ends sought will not be reached; and, the decision maker may lose his position with its potential for achieving other goals. Also, although perhaps not as obvious, leaders can be judged for not perceiving bases of support for ends they would wish to seek or could accept; thus they can be judged not only for failing to realize intrinsically valuable goals within the realm of supportable accomplishment but for exposing themselves to being swept aside by those who could. Again, we encounter the complexities of evaluation. Sometimes, for example, leaders might be judged right in actions that did not receive support, but this is, of course, a different issue from accuracy of calculation.

One of the most salient characteristics of the Korean decision was the accuracy with which President Truman estimated the domestic acceptability of his decision. How different a moment in American history it would have been if the Congress had promptly moved to impeach him for the decision. The President and his

advisers were also accurate in their perception of the degree of international support the decision would receive. What if the Security Council had rejected American action?

Accuracy of Relative Estimates of Own Capabilities Versus Opponents' Capabilities and Intentions

Political leaders are also judged on the accuracy with which they estimate the relative strength of their opponents to resist the pursuit of their goals. Another criterion is accuracy in estimating opponent intentions.

In the Korean case, there seem to have been miscalcula-tions of the intention of the North Korean leaders to invade, the relative strengths of the North and South Korean forces, the efficacy of American airpower against North Korean ground power, and the extent of the buildup of American ground forces that would be necessary for successful counteroffensive action.

On the other hand, the decision makers were notably correct in estimating that neither the Soviet Union nor Communist China would counterintervene and were apparently correct in calculating that the forces available for resistance to aggression were to some extent superior to those available to its likely supporters. The policy makers were also correct in estimating that the military "neutralization" of Formosa would prevent an invasion of the island.

The Long-Term Consequences of Present Actions

One criterion often invoked in political evaluation is that of the accuracy with which decision makers predict and the ease with which they assess the long-range consequences of action. From this viewpoint, it is possible to be right in the short run and wrong in the long run, or vice versa. This kind of evaluation includes an assessment of the objective consequences of behavior whether appreciated by the decision makers or not.

Generally speaking the shorter the period between decision and evaluative analysis, the more questionable this kind of analysis. On the other hand, the longer the evaluative gap, the greater the likelihood of the intrusion of alien influences that obscure the direct contribution of the decision makers to the more distant consequences of their choices.

For the Korean decision one would have to step outside the bounds of the case materials themselves for this kind of analysis and would have to recognize the limitations of less than twenty years perspective at this point. Some vital questions here would seem to be, "Did the Korean decision really contribute to the eventual elimination of wars by national armed forces in world politics?" "Did it increase the probability of future wars?" "Or did it in fact make relatively little difference either way?"

On the one hand it might be argued that the Korean decision has had an inhibiting effect together with the existence of nuclear weapons upon the scale of international conflict that otherwise would have obtained in the past decade and a half. Since the Korean War doctrinal emphasis in the Communist international revolutionary movement upon the independent efforts of national revolutionaries, aided morally and materially but not ordinarily by direct collective military action, may be viewed as at least partially attributable to an expectation of collective counteraction, rooted in the Korean experience. Thus expected effective resistance may have inhibited direct military invasions to reunify Germany and Vietnam. Studies of the significance of the Korean decision in national Communist calculations could help to clarify this. Possibly the Korean decision has made some contribution, however slight, toward a potential shift in the world pattern of conflict from international to intranational war and from limited to expanded

conflict coalitions. The implications of these shifts, if they are indeed trends, for the scale of world conflict, however, are ambiguous. Although the propensity to diminish the incidence of international war may lower the scale of conflict, the tendency to collectivize conflict once initiated may tend to raise it.

The assessment of the consequences of the Korean decision is blurred by the subsequent Chinese Communist intervention and ensuing stalemate of the contending armies in nearly the original geographical position in which fighting began. Thus the "lesson" of the Korean War that is propounded in Communist histories and party indoctrination materials is that national resistance and "proletarian internationalist" collaboration can defeat "imperialist aggression." In this view defensive revolutionary violence successfully resists counterrevolutionary aggressive violence—an approximate reversal of the non-Communist view that counterviolence in the service of peace inhibits aggression. Taking the Korean War as a whole, both coalitions of contenders and supporters thus derive at least partially valid support for their ideological positions, both of which include assertedly justifiable engagement in war.

Looking further outside the Korean case for events that would support a critical view, one might cite the Israeli-Egyptian, Indian-Portuguese, and Sino-Indian conflicts as subsequent examples of small-scale binational conflicts seemingly uninhibited by the lessons in collective security that the Korean decision was to provide. The subsequent engagement of unilateral and collective engagements of national forces in conflicts in Hungary, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam at least illustrate that the Korean decision did not successfully establish the principle of collective security action against the employment of national military forces across national boundaries. But did it establish a symbol of such action to which future statesmen seeking peace might repair and from which they might learn?

EVALUATION OF THE DECISION IN TERMS OF AN ETHICAL SYSTEM

Another way in which to evaluate the Korean decision is to measure it against one or more of the world's great philosophical,

religious, or ethical systems. This may sharpen moral sensitivities and pinpoint moral problems in ways not immediately appreciated in the case materials or in the canons of contemporary political science evaluation. Possibilities for this kind of approach may be found within the various schools of Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other ethical systems. A thorough exploration of implications of the Korean decision for any one of these systems is a major task in itself but only a very brief exploration of one of them will be attempted here.

Given the fact that most of the world's ideological systems condone the taking of human life under certain conditions, that this part of human experience has found expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which legitimates collective self-defense against attack, and that the rationale for the application of this mode of thought to the Korean decision has been rather fully explored, it might be more instructive to examine an ethical system not so easily reconcilable with the case materials. This system is the body of thought known as "pacificism."

In pacifist thought the Korean decision was wrong. The reasoning is simple and uncompromising: any political decision to employ the armed forces of one nation against the people or armed forces of another nation is wrong, regardless of circumstances. It is wrong because such a decision will lead to the slaughter of fellow human beings. Killing is inherently wrong; any decision which leads to killing is wrong, too.

Pacifist thought further appeals to the "lessons of history" in support of the validity of its principles, just as does the thought that underlies the acceptance of the need to kill to prevent greater killing. In pacifism, history is viewed as an escalation of the means and scale of human slaughter. Violence has begotten violence over the centuries to such an extent that contemporary man is faced with the capacity for violence to end all violence: his own extermination by weapons with the power to slay millions in an instant. Only nonviolence can really eliminate violence, it is argued. In the pacifist view, a nonviolent mode of response is a proper one even when a nation seeks by force to impose abhorrent principles upon other nations. Therefore, it was wrong to oppose Nazi Germany by force. Pacifist thought places great faith in human capacities for good to peacefully overcome evil. Pacifism has argued that even if

the Nazis had overrun most of the world, eliminating millions of Jews in the process, their brutality would eventually be tempered by often unexplained processes for the expression of human revulsion and benevolence.

Pacifism is not a doctrine of moral passivity. It has two moral imperatives: do not kill; do something to eliminate evil. The pacifist is not excused from the moral responsibility to resist that which is bad. Among the range of nonlethal responses in international politics it embraces political, economic, and cultural measures.

Some partially pacifist thought distinguishes between international and domestic violence; while the former is to be unequivocally condemned the latter is to be reluctantly condoned. Thus a violent German revolution against Naziism would be judged acceptable, but an international police action against them would not. This view would condone a world of endemic revolutionary and counterrevolutionary violence with-in states but not between states.

Applied to the Korean decision, pure pacifism would argue that the North Korean decision to attack was wrong, that to the extent of their complicity the Russians and Chinese were also wrong, and that decisions to resist—beginning with the Republic of Korea and extending to those of nations that fought under the United Nations—were wrong too. Pacifism would argue that the number of Korean War dead would have been greatly decreased and that a victoriously militant North Korean Communism would probably become more humane and less aggressive through internal and external influences operating over a long time.

Furthermore, in order to meet the requirements of the second moral imperative, it would be argued that the United States should employ all means short of direct or indirect military action to respond to the attack and to maximize its own, Korean, and world values without violence. If these norms were followed, then President Truman and his advisers would have been restricted to such means as saving lives by evacuating Koreans most likely to be murdered by the Communists, educating the world to the facts of the initiation of the aggression and its harmful consequences, seeking international conferences including all parties to the dispute to find nonviolent modes of conflict resolution and ways to help

Koreans achieve their developmental goals, and applying economic incentives and sanctions to influence Korean-Russian-Chinese behavior. If the success of the North Korean invasion coupled with the success of the Chinese Revolution led to the proliferation of domestic and international Communist violence throughout Asia, then presumably the United States should respond in the same peaceful way. Carried to its logical extreme, pacifist thought would have the United States, even though possessing the most powerful military force of its time, accept direct military subjugation by a weaker nation or coalition of nations motivated by resentment against American success in employing nonviolent methods in international politics.

There is no doubt that in 1950 a pacifist mode of response to a clear instance of military aggression was considered unacceptable, either explicitly or implicitly, by the American people and their leaders, by the Korean people and their leaders, and by the peoples and leaders of virtually all nations of the world, including the revolutionary Communist ones. Will a time come in human development when the norm of nonviolence will provide as strong and as generally acceptable a guide to action as the "no appeasement" imperative that guided the Korean decision?

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

It is in the best tradition of political inquiry in a free society that in the end the individual who has conscientiously studied the problem for evaluation arrives at his own conclusions. In this process of judgment, the individual may not be satisfied with the evaluation of political actors, contemporary political science, the great ethical systems or other sources of authoritative interpretation. It is a moral imperative of free men that the individual judges as well as thinks for himself. At its best the evolving moral consensus of a free society ought to emerge out of the convergence of these independently reached judgments.

The writer accepts this challenge here and encourages each reader to do the same.

The Avoidance of Conflict

In the writer's view, the various actors involved in the outbreak of violence in Korea did not do all, or even some of the most important, things that objectively were available to them to avoid violence. In the first place, the North Korean leadership, who planned and executed the invasion of the Republic of Korea, together with those who gave them direct and indirect encouragement, were wrong in taking the initiative to kill their fellow countrymen and in contributing to the record of mass violence in human history. In the second place, the leaders of the Republic of Korea, the primary victim of aggression, did not do all that objectively lay within their capabilities to deter the invasion in the pre-attack phase. As signs of impending invasions multiplied in the spring of 1950, a nonpartisan delegation of Korean leaders led by President Rhee might have sought to mobilize world opinion against it by appearing physically before the United Nations in New York and by warning of it in direct talks with leaders in key world capitals. An imaginative, timely, and vigorous international political initiative was required and missed as Korean leaders concentrated upon domestic political struggle in the spring of 1950. South Korean leaders were also wrong in remarks favoring military means to reunify Korea since this gave the North Koreans a plausible basis for increasing the threat perceived by their followers and for bargaining for increased military support from the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Despite the limits posed by the post-World War II dismantling of the American military establishment and the lack of deep interest in Korea by a budget-conscious Congress, American leadership was also wrong in failing to appreciate sufficiently the significance of the survival and attractive development of the Republic of Korea for American values. Ambassador Dulles was one of the few exceptions to this. The failure to appraise more highly the value implications of South Korean development was accompanied by a failure to clarify before the world community the strength of American will to save the Republic of Korea from military destruction and by failures to mobilize or to create if necessary the moral, military, and material resources that would leave no doubt of American capabilities to carry such a will into action.

Except background materials such as Ambassador Dulles' speech of June 19 and Secretary Acheson's warning that the economic abandonment of the Republic of Korea would be "sheer madness," the materials of the Korea case show remarkably little attention given to the intrinsic value to the world community of the independent, noncoerced development of Korean culture and society. Relatively little emphasis was placed upon the remarkable though difficult efforts of Koreans to create an open society that would contribute to Korean and world efforts at building finer conditions of human existence without Communist or fascist regimentation. The intrinsic value of Korean society itself as well as the significance of the Korean experiment for building a future world polity were not sufficiently appreciated by American leaders.

The low value placed upon Korean experience by American decision makers and other leaders of American society can be illustrated by the fact that in the pre-1950 period, cases of individual violence in Berlin or maneuvers on the borders of divided Germany could claim front-page American attention, while full-scale infantry combat actions along the Thirty-eighth Parallel caused hardly a ripple in American public opinion.

The reasons for the failure to appreciate the significance of Korean development for American values are multiple and possibly instructive for the future. Except for dedicated missionaries, American society had produced almost no intellectuals, journalists, or scholars who could articulate and communicate the meaning of Korean-American relationships as they grew from the late nineteenth century. A Sino-Japanese-centered view of Asia prevailed among American political and governmental leaders and among the articulate academic and journalistic elites. Furthermore, Asia as a whole took a position of pronounced secondary importance to Europe in American policy calculations and Korea suffered from the halo effect of this assessment; in addition, American appreciation of the value and potentials of Korean democracy suffered from the image cast abroad by the Rhee Administration and other Korean leaders. In some aspects the "Korean Experiment" was unsavory and not one to which men who loved freedom could point with pride and affection. All of these represent factors that could have been subject at least in the long run to purposive human manipulation in desired directions.

All these factors may help to explain but they cannot entirely excuse a lack of sensitivity to the significance of Korea in American policy that apparently prevailed among top leaders. For example, a visit to Korea by the American President prior to June 1950 might well have led to an immediate appreciation of Korea that would have reverberated downward and outward throughout American society. Short visits of this kind have had remarkable impacts upon other American leaders who have seen Korea face to face.

The judgment that the value of Korean military security was not sufficiently appreciated by American leaders is separable from, though related to, the question of whether they were adequately forewarned of the invasion. Presumably if Korea had ranked higher on the American scale of values even subtle indications of threat would have been given their attention. Hopefully some day, future historians can prepare a frequency distribution of intelligence reports referring to the possibility of a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The hypothesis of this writer is that it will show a sharply rising curve, even though discounted in evaluation, throughout the spring of 1950.

Had the protection of Korea been valued highly, these reports would have stimulated action to deter the impending invasion and would have brought American officials to raise the question of what the American response would be if the attack occurred, a question that in the absence of great perceived threat to values never was raised among top American leaders. If Korea itself had been perceived of greater significance the applicability of the collective security principle in the event of invasion might have been made clear before, not after, the North Korean attack. Ideally, the perceived quality of the victim of aggression is not a variable in the doctrine of collective security, but this case suggests that it would have been an important element in preventing the act of aggression in the first place.

Prompt, Graduated, and Limited Response to the North Korean Attack

The writer regretfully cannot accept the pacifist view that the North Korean attack should not have been resisted by the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and such international allies as they

could muster. For South Koreans a way of life was at stake: a cherished as well as tragic past, a strife-laden but increasingly autonomous present, and a hopeful future toward which all Koreans could work. For Americans and others who supported the collective military action, Korea was a test of whether a revolutionary global political movement through the action of its various subcomponents was to impose by violence its political, economic, social, and cultural systems in piecemeal fashion upon a doubtful or reluctant world.

The President acted promptly, giving his principal advisers full opportunity to be heard. The decisions taken were timely and yet graduated; one week elapsed between the response of political protest and infantry commitment. At any point the North Koreans might have chosen to reverse course and thus avoid a full-scale collision with American power. They chose to press the attack and thus to escalate the killing. The American decision makers sought limited ends by limited means. They first sought to limit military actions south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel and to restore the status quo at the demarcation line. They succumbed quickly and questionably to military demands to extend air-sea action to North Korea. Initially they did not contemplate the seizure of North Korea. Only when the tide of battle turned decisively in their favor did they add this objective opportunistically and disastrously to their objectives. They also sought to limit the kind of American military power employed. The first week of the war illustrates the taut theme that ran throughout its course—the tension between restraint and demands and opportunities for expansion. Those who confront American arms in battle might well take heed from the Korean decision and its aftermath. Unless prepared to face the full brunt of American power, they would do well to reduce the scale of violence in the very early stages of a conflict so that factors conducive to limitation may prevail over those prone to expansion.

The Failure to Seek Popular Endorsement

In retrospect, as well as in the view of critics at the time, the President was ill-advised not to seek a joint Congressional resolution in support of his decisions. Failure to do so enabled legislators clamoring for military action in June 1950 to condemn

him for illegitimately engaging the United States in a war a year later. It also failed to engage more directly the representatives of the people in democracy's most agonizing decision: to kill and be killed. Eventually, with advances in computer technology, telecommunications, and identification devices such as voice printing, it may be possible to conduct national referenda on this kind of issue within hours, thus engaging the American people in direct judgment. The reasons against exposing the decisions to Congressional debate do not seem to outweigh the benefits of it. The nation was strong enough to stand some criticism of its leadership. The issue was important enough to probe deeply the extent of national consensus and determination.

In the conditions of June 24-26, 1950, the President, an experienced Senator, was probably correct in his judgment that he—not the Congress—should actually make the decision so that delay would not doom the Republic of Korea. But his judgment seems less wise in avoiding an immediate and clear test of congressional approval after the decision had been taken. In this case, overzealous defense of presidential prerogative, oversensitivity to congressional criticism, and inhibition of open consideration of domestic political implications of the decision seem to have combined to prevent a closer approximation to the democratic ideal.

Survival of an Increasingly Autonomous and Open Korean Society in the World Community

Although it is true that the Korean decision contributed to the short-range division of Korea, it is equally true that it did not in itself make long-range reunification impossible under conditions where the needs and values of the Korean people can be freely expressed. Less than twenty years after the event, the Republic of Korea seems to be traversing a far more open and spontaneous path of development than that of its northern counterpart. It seems likely that the more open the society, the more true the expression of national values; and that the more skilled the people in meaningful political choice, the greater the probability that they will make steady and imaginative progress toward their valued goals. The continued democratic development of the Republic of Korea is thus

a guarantee of eventual reunification under conditions where the desires of the vast majority of the Korean people can most adequately be met. Without the Korean decision, this would not have been possible.

As noted earlier, the Korean decision may be judged by its long-range implications as well as its antecedents, processes, and immediate results. The Korean decision has permitted the survival and subsequent growth of an intrinsically valuable, vigorous, creative, and responsible member of the world community of nations. In less than two decades since the tragedies of war, the Korean people in both North and South have demonstrated the resilience and tenacity that have insured national survival over the centuries. In politics, administration, economics, science, and the arts the people of the Republic of Korea have moved steadily, although not without sharp temporary setbacks, toward an open and healthy society that can contribute the fine qualities of Korean culture to world civilization and can draw creatively upon world resources for Korean development. The tasks are difficult, but little by little the pessimism and discouragement engendered by war are succumbing to hope stirred by remarkable accomplishments about which the Korean people deserve rightly to be proud.

Hopefully, in the retrospect of a century ahead the Korean decision will be judged as having contributed to the goal that President Truman envisioned for it—"Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world."[9] And yet whether such a goal will be achieved or not lies beyond the grasp of the men who made the Korean decision. Its achievement depends upon the day to day choices of other decision makers, in nations large and small, whose actions shape the future of the world polity.

NOTES

1. In thinking about the subject of this chapter I have found most helpful Abraham T. Edel, *Method in Ethical Theory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).

2. President Truman, Interview, July 30, 1957.

3. Assistant Secretary Rusk, Interview, August 22, 1955
4. Secretary Pace, Interview, October 24, 1955.
5. Assistant Secretary Rusk, Interview, August 22, 1955.
6. Secretary Pace, Interview, October 24, 1955.
7. Ambassador Jessup, Interview, July 28, 1955.
8. Assistant Secretary Rusk, Interview, August 22, 1955.
9. Truman, Harry S, *Memoirs* vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), p. 345.

SPRING

People arrive at a nonviolent perspective on life in various ways, still scarcely studied and incompletely understood. Some, like Gandhi, may be born into a nonviolent family or subculture where it is taken for granted. Others, engulfed by violence and struggling with whether to respond violently, may independently and instantly receive nonviolent inspiration. Such is the case of the Irish Catholic, later Nobel Peace laureate, Mairead Corrigan Maguire, who quietly sat in a Belfast Chapel, contemplating the Cross and asked, "What would Jesus do?" The answer came, "Thou shalt not kill."

Still others come to nonviolence through a longer process that combines internal uneasiness about participation in violence with vicarious and direct tutelage by respected models of nonviolence. It took more than twenty-five years for Father John Zabelka, the Catholic chaplain who blessed the atomic bomber crews of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (and shortly thereafter even visited horribly suffering A-bomb victims, including children) to adopt a position of principled nonviolence. In this process the Christian example of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the guidance of a nonviolent priest, Father Emmanuel Charles McCarthy, were especially significant.

Yet another path is by reading books on nonviolence and even on violence. The first is illustrated by the ex-Marine Father McCarthy, who departed from the violence-accepting Catholic Church tradition by independently reading the Scriptures, the works of a nonviolent Catholic theologian Father John L. McKenzie, and the writings of Dorothy Day and Thomas Merton.

An example of youthful self-discovery is that of political scientist Mulford Q. Sibley, who told me that he became a pacifist in high school by reading a textbook with pictures of trench war slaughter in World War I. He decided then that war was "simply stupid" and went on to become a much respected professor of political philosophy.

My own awakening to nonviolence has been but one of countless others throughout history. It partook somewhat of the slow process of increasing uneasiness of Father Zabelka combined with the independent, "sudden" clarity experienced by Mairead Corrigan Maguire. It came to me simply as, "No more killing!" I experienced this in a completely secular fashion without any specific religious association, but it was profoundly spiritual in nature and subsequently led to an eager search for the roots of nonviolence in all world religious, philosophical, and cultural traditions. It also led to the discovery of hitherto neglected nonviolent persons such as M. K. Gandhi and Kasturbai, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Coretta Scott King.

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Awakening to a nonviolent perspective took place during 1973-1974. Since the circumstances are briefly explained in the following essay they will not be repeated here. The first major professional task was to re-examine *The Korean Decision* from a nonviolent value position. Since I had written the book from a pro-violent standpoint as a contribution to the scientific study of politics, I asked myself, "What difference would it have made if I had studied the Korean decision from a nonviolent perspective?" The answer is expressed in "On Values and Science: *The Korean Decision* Reconsidered" (1977).

The acceptance of this book review essay for publication by the *American Political Science Review* was unprecedented in the seventy-one year history of that journal since 1906. For the first time an author was given the opportunity to critically review his or her own book. It took two successive book review editors, three anonymous political science evaluators, and about two years for the essay to be printed. As one anonymous reviewer wrote, "Although 95 percent of political scientists will disagree with the author's position, the original book is so widely known in the profession that this reconsideration should be published."

After publication several appreciative letters were received. One was especially meaningful. It came from a West Point graduate, a combat veteran who had served as a captain in the Vietnam War, and who was then pursuing a doctoral degree in

international relations. He wrote that although he was not then fully prepared to accept the nonviolent position in its entirety, he was in complete agreement with the essay's conclusion: "In an age of unprecedented potential for violence the supreme task of political science becomes the creation and application of nonviolent knowledge." Another colleague commented that the essay should be read by every graduate student in political science. In contrast, a few years later at a meeting of the International Studies Association in Washington, D.C., in 1985, a participant in a crowded elevator looked at my name tag and said, "So you're Glenn Paige! I like the old Glenn Paige, but not the new one!"

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In the springtime of awakening to nonviolence it occurred to me that I might try to apply the same logic of criticism of my own book to the discipline of political science as a whole. The result is the essay "Nonviolent Political Science," presented at the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) held in Moscow in August 1979. It was not easy either to gain IPSA permission to present the paper or to find the fourteen hundred dollars needed for Honolulu-Moscow travel and expenses. But finally I was permitted to offer it as a submitted paper in a panel on "New Trends in Political Science Since 1949." After my appeals for travel support were turned down by a half-dozen of America's leading foundations and scientific associations, the then president of the University of Hawai'i, Dr. Fujio Matsuda, somehow found five hundred dollars to help me go.

The responses to this paper in Moscow, especially by Russian and Eastern European scholars, were surprising and profoundly meaningful. This was heightened by the fact that I was fresh from receiving reactions to its basic thesis from American political scientists. It came at the end of a six-week summer seminar on applying political theory to the subfields of political science, held at Vanderbilt University and supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities in June-July 1979. Twenty colleagues participated in the seminar, selected to represent the subfields of political theory, American government, comparative politics, and international relations.

The IPSA paper had not yet been written, but at the end of the Vanderbilt seminar, I was able to ask my colleagues, "Are nonviolent politics and a nonviolent political science possible?" The strong consensus was, "It's unthinkable." Three main reasons were given: (1) human nature—humans are dangerous animals, forever prone to kill, (2) economic scarcity—competition for scarce resources will always lead to conflict and killing, and (3) sexual assault—one must always be prepared to kill to defend women against rape. All participants except one were men. I later learned that the equivalent response of American women is that they regrettably must be prepared to kill if anyone threatens the life of their children.

The Moscow responses to the paper were different. The idea of nonviolent politics and a nonviolent political science were completely thinkable—but there were some serious problems to be solved. A professor from the Institute of General History said, "We admire the humanitarian intention of the author of this paper. Furthermore we fully agree that the goal of politics and of political science is a nonviolent society." "But," he asked, "what is the economic basis of nonviolent politics and of a nonviolent political science?" Another scholar from the University of Kazan introduced his question with essentially the same supportive preliminaries and then asked in a more challenging tone, "But, how are we to deal with such tragedies as Nicaragua, Chile, and Kampuchea?"

In reply I expressed appreciation for the view that a nonviolent political science was possible and for the raising of two fundamentally important scientific questions. "Indeed, since both contemporary capitalist and socialist economies rest upon the threat and use of violence, what kind of economy would not require such lethality?" I agreed that the examples cited were indeed tragic, and added a few others such as Auschwitz, Treblinka, Hiroshima-Nagasaki, and the Yezovshchina. "But," I asked, "should we let these tragedies make us prepare eternally to employ greater brutality than any of their perpetrators? Or should we not devote our efforts as political scientists to discovering nonviolent means for preventing such atrocities, for resisting them if they begin to occur, and for removing their noxious influences upon global society?"

Later that day, an Eastern European social scientist who had participated in the panel session said to me, "You are saying

publicly what we are thinking privately, but we can't say it. But I've traveled in the West. I know your academic freedom. You can say anything you want, but you're completely isolated and have absolutely no influence upon your policy makers." How keen was his insight!

On the following day at an informational meeting for about sixty IPRA scholars at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, I asked a leading Soviet arms control and disarmament specialist whether a newly formed Institute for Peace and Disarmament would take up the scientific study of nonviolence. He did not answer the question directly but nevertheless gave the following surprising response: "Some people say that nonviolent politics, Gandhiism, is some kind of fantasy. But we do not agree. It might become reality tomorrow."

Shortly thereafter in November 1979 I participated in a panel on "War and Politics: Roles of the Intellectual" held at the University of Southern California. There I tried to convey to a group of American scholars who specialized in national security issues the surprisingly favorable responses to the idea of nonviolence that I had received in Moscow. This report was generally dismissed. A leading Soviet politics specialist from M.I.T. opined that I had been "brainwashed."

But just seven years later in November 1986 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev joined with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to issue the New Delhi "Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World." And three years after that in November 1989 a Research and Education Centre for the Ethics of Nonviolence was founded in Moscow as an independent, nonprofit institution by scholars of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences. That same month it convened an international conference on the "Ethics of Nonviolence" in which the leading American scholar on nonviolent politics, Gene Sharp, the author of *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973); and Richard Deats of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) participated, as well as scholars from Austria, France, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In May 1991 the Centre sponsored in Moscow a training workshop on "Nonviolent Resolution of Mass Social Conflicts" for police officers, professors, and community activists. It was held in collaboration with the New York State Martin Luther

King, Jr. Center for Nonviolence (founded in 1986) and the FOR. Also in 1991 the Centre began to publish a series of books on nonviolence, including works by Thoreau, Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King, complete with commentaries. A second international conference on nonviolence was announced for May 1992 with four themes: the origins and development of the concept of nonviolence; human nature, the environment, and nonviolence; the ethics of nonviolence; and the experiences of nonviolent movements throughout the world. A teacher training workshop on "Nonviolence for Schools" was planned for August 1993 to be held at Tolstoy's country estate Yasnaya Polyana.

Many more explicitly nonviolent seminars, publications, training workshops, organizations, and actions have emerged in the former Soviet Union and its successor countries, especially since 1988. This includes the dissemination among opponents of the August 1991 attempted communist military coup of copies of the table of contents of Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* which lists almost two hundred methods. In addition activists have been seeking to apply nonviolent methods to resolve ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics. And the new Lithuanian Department of National Defense has been exploring nonviolent security alternatives.

As these developments testify, the supportive responsive-ness to the idea of nonviolent politics sensed among some Russian and Eastern European scholars in 1979 surely was not mistaken.

The essay "Nonviolent Political Science," however, was not directed specifically to political scientists in the former Soviet Union, but to the world political science profession. At the request of Ralph Summy, pioneering nonviolent politics scholar at the University of Queensland, Australia, it was published in the Australian journal *Social Alternatives* in 1980. Subsequently over a dozen years I was able to discuss its thesis with colleagues in Costa Rica, China, England, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Korea (North and South), Malaysia, Mongolia, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, and Yugoslavia, and with those from a number of other countries. However, partly because it was presented and published abroad, the essay received virtually no American political science attention.

* * * * *

My awakening to nonviolence occurred about midway in a major effort to write a book to urge establishment of the study of political leadership as a new subfield in political science. The idea was conceived while teaching at Princeton University from 1961 to 1967 and was carried forward thereafter at the University of Hawai'i. The results were published in *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (1977).

Political leadership and nonviolence have been the two most exciting "discoveries" of my scholarly life. Both grew out of social science training combined with study of Korea.

Insight into the innovative potential of political leadership was rooted in a graduate seminar at Northwestern University in the late 1950s. There the eminent social psychologist Donald T. Campbell challenged us to find "natural social experiments." These are naturally occurring differences in society akin to those that might be produced by deliberate scientific experiments in a laboratory or in agriculture. That is, look for something divided into two parts, with certain stimuli applied to one part but not the other. Then comparatively measure the results. My seminar exercise involved comparing voting in matched towns where President Harry S Truman did or did not stop on his "whistle stop" electoral campaign by railroad train in 1948. It took me several years to understand that the transformations brought about in divided Korea, North and South, during 1945-1960 were just such an "experiment." Purposive political leadership had produced striking differences between the two parts. This insight was expressed in two essays, "The Rediscovery of Politics" (1966) and "Some Implications for Political Science of the Comparative Politics of Korea" (1966).

In "Nonviolent Global Problem-Solving and the Tasks of Political Leadership Studies" (1986) I have tried to set forth the possibility of combining the creative potential of political leadership with the nonviolent science of politics to assist in solving world problems. This unpublished essay was written at the invitation of the Polish political sociologist Jerzy Wiatr, editor of a special edition on political leadership of the *International Political Science Review* (Volume 9, Number 2, April 1988). It was not published because IPSR general editor Jean Laponce of the University of

British Columbia decided that it did not "fit in" with the other essays in the issue.

However, as more and more preeminent world leaders call for nonviolent solutions to problems that threaten the survival and well-being of planetary civilization, the scientific task of combining knowledge of political leadership and nonviolence becomes increasingly critical.

2

On Values and Science: *The Korean Decision* Reconsidered

> *Science itself is not a liberator. It creates means, not goals. . . . We should remember that the fate of mankind hinges entirely upon man's moral development.*
>
> **Einstein**[1]

In *The Korean Decision*[2] I tried to make a contribution to the scientific study of international politics by exploring in a first case study the decision-making approach to analysis that has been suggested by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin.[3] Since the period of research and writing that resulted in publication of *The Korean Decision* I have changed my personal value position toward violence from acceptance to rejection. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to explain the principal differences this makes in the original Korean decision analysis.

The intent of the original study was to describe the series of decisions that led to American engagement in the Korean War; to reconstruct them from the point of view of the decision makers; to analyze them in terms of the interaction of organizational, informational, and motivational variables; to evaluate them; and to seek guidance for coping with future war-prone situations. Thus I devoted two background chapters to explaining pre-decisional domestic and international conditions, seven narrative chapters to describing daily decision-making events from June 24 to June 30, 1950, an empirical analysis chapter to suggest correlations among

From *The American Political Science Review* 71, 4 (December 1977): 1603-1609. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

the decision-making variables, a normative analysis chapter to evaluate the decisions, and a final chapter to suggest guidelines for "crisis management in Korea-like situations." Underlying all—reconstruction, analysis, evaluation, and prescription—was my normative acceptance of the employment of violence in politics, both domestic and international. Although generally to be avoided, occasions could arise in which political violence would be inescapable, just, and even heroic. My views on violence coincided exactly with those of the American decision makers whom I studied and were reinforced by my adolescent socialization during World War II and by a personal sense of just participation in resisting blatant Communist aggression as an antiaircraft artillery communica-tions officer in Korea from 1950 to 1952. Such views on the conditional acceptability of violence were merely the dominant mode of thinking of the mid-twentieth century in which we lived. Almost all political leaders, revolutionaries, counter-revolutionaries, political scientists, and other citizens held essentially the same views. The main political arguments of the age were not about violence per se but rather about the ends of violence and, with the advent of nuclear weapons, increasingly about its scale.

The method of decision-making analysis that I employed did not explicitly require acceptance of a violent or nonviolent value position. Rather it took the form of a value-neutral set of analytical tools. Implicitly, however, in this case it encouraged the acceptance of proviolent value assumptions (a) by stressing that decisions ought to be understood primarily as seen through the eyes of the decision makers, and (b) by not containing methods for explicating researcher values, for comparing them with those of actors, for measuring their effects upon analysis, and for evaluating decisional outcomes. Although actor values were given explicit attention, observer values were not. They were left to vary with the professional conscience of the researcher.

Because I believed that social scientists should make explicit their value preferences as indicators of possible factual and interpretive biases in their scientific work, I recorded my personal judgment of the Korean decision: "The writer regretfully cannot

accept the pacifist view that the North Korean attack should not have been resisted by the armed forces of the Republic of Korea and such international allies as they could muster."[4] Although not made completely clear in the original text, this judgment rested upon two beliefs: (a) that violent extension of their domains by unjust regimes justified counterviolence, and (b) that the state of civil liberties in South Korea was better than that in the opposing North. I wrote in 1968, "Less than twenty years after the event, the Republic of Korea seems to be traversing a far more open and spontaneous path of development than that of its Northern counterpart. . . . Without the Korean decision, this would not have been possible."[5] In short, American violence had contributed to peace and freedom in Korea. Therefore the decision to fight was good.

NONVIOLENT VALUE CHANGE

lt is not essential to accept or understand the reasons why I changed to a nonviolent value position in order to appreciate the effects of this change upon re-analysis of *The Korean Decision,* but since colleagues and students have expressed keen interest in them an explanation is necessary.

At the conscious level, I am aware of the converging effects of three principal factors: public commitment to a proviolent value position, realization that Korean conditions were developing contrary to the values taken to justify violence, and discovery that we Americans who were self-righteously committed to threats of violence in Korea were ourselves obstacles to the creation of nonviolent alternatives in international relations.

By 1973 the repressive nature of the Republic of Korea political regime had become globally notorious, mainly through the activities of the Korean CIA at home and abroad. This included the drugging and kidnapping from Japan of opposition presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung, the persecution of the poet Kim Chi Ha and Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, and the stifling of other voices of legitimate dissent in the press, universities, and the religious community. This has been accompanied by the progressive elaboration of violence-based laws and decrees that make the pacific transfer of power increasingly unlikely.

Growing awareness of increasing repressiveness in Seoul was combined with what was the startling discovery that the main obstacle to the establishment of peaceful cultural relations between Americans and scholars from North Korea was the United States government. Meeting in Paris with scholars from the North Korean Academy of Sciences in the summer of 1973, I invited them on behalf of the University of Hawaii to visit Honolulu. They were eager to come. How shocking it was for me to discover that the American ambassador in Seoul, the Washington Korean desk officer, and the Secretary of State were adamantly opposed to such a visit and refused to give assurances that entry visas would be issued. Although the Department of State was receptive to visits to North Korea by certain Americans such as Professor Jerome Cohen of Harvard Law School and Selig Harrison of the *Washington Post,* it was adamantly opposed to reciprocal American hospitality. This meant no aloha for North Koreans.

Against this background, it was especially disturbing for me, during a visit to the Hiroshima atomic bomb Peace Park in August 1975, to hear on a portable radio a statement by the U.S. Secretary of Defense that the government would not give assurances that nuclear weapons would not be employed in an American response to a renewed outbreak of fighting on the Korean peninsula.

In effect the United States government was threatening nuclear war in defense of a repressive regime, while obstructing the development of peaceful relations between American citizens and those of a potential military adversary. These were definitely not the conditions of freedom and peace to which the wartime killing of 1950 to 1953 had been devoted.

For me, this represented an intolerable situation of cognitive dissonance. Violent means had proved inimicable to peaceful ends. I could attempt to change reality by further commitment to the value of violence; I could elect nonviolence and then seek reality change; or I could deny the conflict and withdraw. In actuality I experienced a profound change in attitude toward violence from acceptance to rejection.

Furthermore, I experienced this change in a general sense, not just in Korea-specific terms. Perhaps this was because I had always approached the study of Korean history and contemporary society as a social scientist seeking to understand the general from the

particular. Partly because of the uniquely intense concentration of American, Chinese, Japanese, and Russian influences upon the Korean people over the past century I have always thought that this convergent experience offered extraordinary possibilities for global insight. Korea thus became for me a broken link in the chain of violence forged by human history, a chain in which the glorification of each preceding link becomes the justification for its successor. But let us examine the implications of such a value change for the scientific single case analysis attempted in *The Korean Decision.*

IMPLICATIONS FOR BACKGROUND RECONSTRUCTION

Review of the two background chapters from a nonviolent value perspective creates awareness that the reconstruction of pre-decisional "givens" contained therein is biased in at least two ways: proviolent propensities are inadequately stressed, and nonviolent potentials are almost completely ignored.

To illustrate the first point, the chapters make no mention of the American decisions to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (August 6 and 9, 1945) as part of the historical experience that may have preconditioned American decision makers in 1950 toward engaging in violence in Korea. This is especially important for understanding the aggressive aspect of Harry S Truman's personality and of the presidential role. *The Korean Decision* cites President Truman's letter to his sister of August 12, 1945, to illustrate that "he was learning to live with difficult decisions." "Nearly every crisis seems to be the worst one," wrote Truman, "but after it's over, it isn't so bad."[6] However the narrative is silent upon the fact that this declaration of growing ability to make difficult decisions without tormenting afterthoughts came less than a week after decisions that had wiped out two urban communities with a horrendous immediate loss of 140,000 lives in Hiroshima and 70,000 in Nagasaki.[7] Japanese violence had legitimated American counterviolence, therefore our consciences were clear.

In accepting counterviolence as justifiable, *The Korean Decision* also underplays the contribution that victims of violence may have made to its initiation. Thus we are told of Truman's disgust with Russia's commitment to power politics (e.g., "Unless

Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand—'how many divisions have you?'"—letter to Secretary of State Byrnes of January 5, 1946),[8] but we are not told of Russian perception of American power behavior in this era of American atomic monopoly. Applied to Korea, the background analysis does not ask if American politics from 1945 to 1950 might have contributed to a North Korean decision that only violence could assure the attainment of Communist political objectives there.

On the other hand, the background chapters are silent on the leaders, ideas, and experiences, both domestic and international, that tried to contribute to a nonviolent world in the 1945 to 1950 period. This is an artifact of proviolent values plus method: seeking to explain justifiable American counterviolence to North Korean aggression we tend not to seek evidence that nonviolent alternatives might have been even remotely possible. This means writing violent history that suppresses awareness of human potentials for nonviolent futures. Not all Koreans, for example, both leaders and other citizens, considered it inevitable or necessary that Kim Il Sung send armies south or that Sygnman Rhee invade the north in order to reassemble the tragically divided nation. Who were they? What ideas did they have? How were they suppressed? What can we learn from them for a nonviolent Korean future? Furthermore, what American domestic or international resources for nonviolent politics existed in the pre-1950 period? *The Korean Decision* is written as if the American Friends Service Committee and Mohandas K. Gandhi, among others, had never existed.[9]

In short, a nonviolent perspective in decisional background analysis should lead to enhanced awareness of both proviolent and nonviolent potentials in the decision makers and their environments.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NARRATIVE RECONSTRUCTION

The principal methodological feature of the narrative chapter of *The Korean Decision,* aside from the effort to operationalize the variables of the decision-making approach, was the effort to "decontaminate" the description from the normative biases of the author. The intent was to treat normative issues independently of factual description. The narrative might be filled with normative

judgments of the decision makers, but those of the reconstructing social scientist ought to be suppressed in that context. Review of these chapters from a nonviolent perspective, however, reveals several outcroppings of proviolent biases and the consequent need for further "decontamination."

For example, describing the Korean military situation just prior to the June 26 American decision to commit air and sea forces to combat, I wrote:

> At this time the Korean Government was withdrawing from Seoul to Suwon, 20 miles to the south across the Han River, as the invaders continued their unrelenting advance. The armored column spearheading their drive in the Uijongbu corridor was voraciously chewing its way through the two full South Korean divisions which hopefully had gone forth to bring it to a halt. *Along the invasion route to Seoul the blood of heroes and cowards together with the blood of those bewildered ones to whom circumstance did not provide a conscious choice between courage or cowardice stained the damp Korean earth the same bright red.* [Emphasis added][10]

From a nonviolent position the author's gratuitous judgment of Koreans who killed as "courageous" and those who sought to escape killing as "cowards" is readily apparent. From such a position the judgment, if any were to be made here, could be exactly the opposite. Readers of *The Korean Decision* can further decontaminate the narrative simply by striking out the italicized sentence.

The cited passage contains yet another example of proviolent bias in its reference to the North Korean armored forces as "voraciously chewing" their way through the southern defenders. This imagery, implying in horror film fashion a mechanical beast devouring human victims, sets the stage for human heroes to vanquish inhuman foes. The same mood is conveyed by an earlier reference to "northern legions" that "swarmed" over southern hills.[11] Northern soldiers were neither the ghosts of long-dead Roman phalanxes nor insects; like their southern counterparts, they were mainly farm boys engaged in the task of killing. These passages thus can be decontaminated further by noting that the northern armored forces "murdered" their way through two

defending divisions and that large numbers of North Korean soldiers advanced across the southern hills.

In the final paragraph of the narrative section, concluding the chapter on Friday, June 30, the proviolent bias of the author is made unmistakably clear. Referring to the efforts that would have been required to carry out the air, sea, and ground combat decisions that had been taken, the passage begins with the statement: "It would be no picnic."[12] Then the bias emerges clearly in the form of a dramatic quotation in which an actor is found to express the method-suppressed view of the author: "As Republican Representative Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey, an ordained Baptist minister, expressed it: 'We've got a rattlesnake by the tail and the sooner we pound its damn head in the better!'" Note again the employment of inhuman collective imagery—North Koreans are "*a* rattlesnake." Note also the implied religious justification for killing.

The passage concludes with two sentences that complete the effect of bias. First, "Most Americans wholeheartedly agreed." In support of this contention I footnoted a Roper Poll of responses to the statement that "President Truman did the right thing in sending our troops into Korea" which showed 73 percent agreement, 15 percent disagreement, and 12 percent with no opinion. This poll, of course, provides no evidence of the degree of commitment implied by the word "wholeheartedly." In view of the abrupt swing of public opinion against the war, contributing to Eisenhower's victory in the 1952 presidential election, the depth of support is questionable. For the purpose of further decontamination let us simply strike the word "wholeheartedly" from the text.

In the final sentence immediately after the assertion that "most Americans wholeheartedly agreed," I wrote: "Not the least of these were those who were committed and were slain on the distant peninsula jutting down between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan." Although the dead are beyond polling, I would now hypothesize that a study of letters written by them to friends and relatives from the combat zone would reveal views more diverse than implied by my gratuitous invocation of their opinion. The value of nonviolence simply raises questions about exaggerated portrayals of human acceptance of violence. In sum,

decontamination of the narrative would be better served if we struck out the whole last paragraph of chapter [10].

IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL RE-ANALYSIS

Reconsideration of the empirical proposition-building chapter of *The Korean Decision* from a nonviolent value position produces a disquieting sense that the original analysis is somehow truncated, stunted, and cut off from lucid engagement with the central problem of the Korean decision: why violence emerged and why it was responded to in kind. Instead the analysis is first diffusely devoted to the effects of "crisis" as an independent variable upon organizational, informational, and motivational aspects of decision-making processes.

The primary emphasis in the original analysis was to take "crisis" as an independent variable and to treat "organization," "information," "values," "internal setting," and "external setting" as dependent variables.[13] Secondarily, I combined all these variables in a set of propositional statements that described four decisional "stages" that characterized response to crisis in the Korean case.[14] Interestingly, the word "violence" did not appear in the analysis: words such as "positive response" and "costly commitment" were used instead.

Since a violent or nonviolent outcome was not the primary focus of attention, I finally concentrated overall explanatory analysis of the Korean decision upon its most outstanding processual characteristic: it was a "high consensus decision." Thus:

> The stronger the organizational leadership, the less the variability in decisional unit membership, the more the shared learning of unit members with respect to the issue for decision, and the less tolerable the decision delay—the less the variability of information and values supplied from within the unit, the less the articulation of alternative courses of action, and the greater the probability of single courses of action that are anticipated to win leader approval.[15]

Combining the initial interest in crisis effects upon decision-making variables with the secondary interest in a high consensus

outcome, the overall logic of the original Korean decision analysis can be summarized as: crisis affects decision-making variables that produce high or low consensus outcomes.

If an explicit concern for violence is introduced into the analysis, however, we obtain the following pattern of analysis: crisis affects decision-making variables that produce *violent or nonviolent* outcomes. From a nonviolent perspective we are challenged to focus attention more sharply upon the substantive content of crisis decisions. The Korean case thus needs to be perceived not only as an example of a "high consensus decision," but also as a "violence-accepting decision."

A complex propositional statement to sum up the violence-accepting aspect of the Korean decision may now be added to the text[16] as follows:

> The more the organizational influence of a violence-accepting leader, the more the decisional participation of members skilled in and accepting of violence, the more the past satisfaction with participation in violence, the greater the availability of instruments of violence, the greater the confidence in overall weapons superiority, the less the anticipated counterviolence, the greater the social acceptance of violence, the less the salience of nonviolent alternatives, and the greater the belief that competing decision makers are motivated by a similar logic—the greater the probability of violent decisional responses to crisis in international politics.

At the end of the original chapter devoted to empirical analysis of the Korean decision, I briefly introduced three propositions intended to "link properties of decisions with problems of their execution by large-scale governmental organizations."[17] These predicted a gap between intent and performance if the decision content is ambiguous; a link between the seriousness of expected counteraction and the degree of decisional specificity; and a tendency to delegate command and control functions to field commanders where severe counter-action is not anticipated. Again, the word "violence" did not appear in any of the statements.

Approaching the same problem from a nonviolent perspective, it appears that decisions based upon the assumption of justified violence are apt to be ambiguous; that the acceptance of violence

tends to preclude attention to complementary and possibly supplantive nonviolent coping alternatives; and that violence-based decisions are likely to be permissive of initial commander autonomy in a violent direction.

While a proviolent value bias in empirical analysis seems not to have repressed evidence of nonviolent alternatives considered by the decision makers, since they all seemed satisfied with violence, this does not mean that it had no analytical effect. For example, no effort was made (a) to develop nonviolent alternatives with which the decisions could be compared, (b) to question the degree to which each decision maker was committed to violence, and (c) to probe through interviews the existence of latent nonviolent alternatives or to obtain a more detailed understanding of why such alternatives were considered infeasible.

IMPLICATIONS FOR NORMATIVE RE-ANALYSIS

The Korean Decision contains a chapter devoted to normative evaluation of the decision. Four different approaches were taken. First, a normative inventory of the case materials reviewed the judgments of the decision makers, domestic critics, external allies, and external critics. Second, some common criteria of international political evaluation were explored. The Korean example was found to fall in the category of good decisions; i.e., decisions that pursued good ends by just means in a flexible, realistic way with beneficial long-range effects. Third, the conditional approbation of violence by major world religions was recalled and a pacifist perspective was entertained and dismissed. Finally I presented my own judgment.

It is the latter which I wish to revise here. I now believe that the American decision to fight in Korea is not a decision worthy of moral justification by a social scientist, any more than that which produced the North Korean attack, that the American decision vastly increased the loss of life in Korea including later many Chinese, that confirmation of the decision by congressional resolution which I originally recommended would not have made it more just even if politically more tenable, and that the long-range effects of the Korean decision have not been beneficial for Korea as a whole or for international political life. The Korean decision did not realistically make international political violence less likely, as

illustrated by the case of Vietnam, to which official American satisfaction with the Korean decision undoubtedly contributed. The international militarization to which the Korean War contributed did not make world peace more secure; witness continuing arms races, increased anxiety over American military security, and nuclear weapons proliferation

The United States' decision to engage in violence in Korea, not "resist aggression" as in the title of a 1958 article jointly written by Richard C. Snyder and myself,[18] has contributed to the unprecedented militarization of both parts of Korea. In 1950, there were 286,091 men under arms in Korea (151,091, south; 135,000, north),[19] out of a total population of about 29,715,000 (20,167,000, south; 9,548,000, north)—or one soldier for every 104 persons. By 1975 this had risen to 1,092,000 men under arms (625,000, south; 467,000, north)[20] out of a total of 50,350,000—or one soldier for every 46 persons. This increase was combined with vastly more destructive weapons, and with the high likelihood that both contending Korean governments will achieve independent nuclear weapons capabilities in the near future.

The threat of violence in Korea, based upon the ultimate acceptance of the possibility of a violent "solution" by both sides and their international supporters, has legitimized the suppression of political freedom in both parts of Korea, a value that the original "realistic" commitment to violence was intended to protect and enhance.

Thus my own judgment is that the Korean decision does not merit praise as a contribution to world peace and freedom. It should rather be judged as a stimulus to search for nonviolent alternatives to resolve human conflict and to realize human aspirations then, now, and in the future.

REASSESSMENT OF ACTION IMPLICATIONS

In the final chapter of *The Korean Decision,* I tried to derive some lessons from the Korean case to guide future American policy makers in crisis situations. All based upon acceptance of violence, these suggestions were: not to underestimate potential enemy military strength; to be receptive to friendly critics so that "force"

might be employed less dangerously and with more political support; and to set clear limits on the employment of force so that it might be employed with surgical precision

From a nonviolent perspective, the best "lesson" to be learned from the Korean decision is that American policy makers should be encouraged to experiment with the assumption that American violence will not be applied in international politics, that American military supplies will not be provided to support the violence of others, and that policy makers should work positively toward nonviolent resolution of the grave domestic and international conflicts that threaten human dignity, economic decency, physical survival, and world peace.

A multinational nonviolent approach to pre-1950 conditions in Korea and to coping with violence if it erupted there would by no means imply that only military measures would be appropriate or effective, either in the short or long run. An extraordinarily versatile combination of political, economic, social, cultural, and communications means might be employed to prevent, resist, limit, and defuse armed aggression including physical resistance to the point of death with intent not to kill but to touch the hearts of the aggressors. A nonviolent policy approach to the Korean decision and its preconditions does not therefore imply passive acceptance of violence but rather more creatively vigorous efforts to end and avoid lethal conflicts than a violence-accepting approach would require.

Analytically we need to add to the repertoire of skills in decision-making analysis the caution that the more the agreement of the scientist with the values of the decision makers, the more limited the likely development of evidence and analysis that would support alternative courses of action. A collegial check upon such biases would be constant encouragement of value diversity among scientists. An individual check would be to prepare comparative actor-analyst value profiles and to seek deliberately to extend the range of congruence-predicted analysis of alternatives.

In conclusion, *The Korean Decision* needs to be re-examined not as a text on how to handle violence better but rather as a challenge to how to avoid it in the first place. If violence does occur, then the best crisis advice is to limit it, compartmentalize it, diminish it, weaken it, calm it, cool it, find alternatives to it, seek

rewards to end it[21]—not to increase it, fuel it, supply it, justify it, praise it.

In an age of unprecedented potential for violence, the supreme task of political science becomes the creation and application of nonviolent knowledge. It will benefit us little if our continued "realistic" acceptance and justification of political violence prevents us from creating alternatives to it. *The Korean Decision* thus needs to be reanalyzed as a contribution to this task and not allowed to stand as a scientific apology for the future continuation and possibly irreversible escalation of violence in international political life.

The original dedication of *The Korean Decision* was "To all who died in the Korean War, and to all who make and study political decisions." To this should now be added, "for a nonviolent future."

NOTES

1. Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden, eds. *Einstein on Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 312.

2. Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950* (New York: The Free Press, 1968).

3. Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, F*oreign Policy Decision-Making* (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

4. Paige, p. 352.

5. Ibid., p. 354.

6. Ibid, p. 24.

7. These figures are taken from the report of an expert commission created by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1976. The losses are estimated as of December 1945, with a margin of error of ±10,000 persons in each case. The Hiroshima figure includes an estimated 20,000 military deaths. By 1950, total deaths attributable to direct bomb exposure are estimated as "more than 200,000" in Hiroshima and "more than 100,000" in Nagasaki. Takeshi Araki, mayor of the City of Hiroshima, and Yoshitake Morotani, mayor of the City of Nagasaki, *Appeal to the Secretary General of the United Nations,* n.p., October 1976, p. 31.

8. Paige, p. 54

9. Only after experiencing value reversal did I begin to seek out and seriously study the excellent literature on nonviolent political alternatives; e.g., Richard B. Gregg, T*he Power of Nonviolence* (London: George Routledge, 1938); Barthélemy de Ligt, *Conquest of Violence: An Essay on War and Revolution* (New York: Garland, 1972), reprint of 1937 edition; Joan V.

Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 1958); Staughton Lynd, ed., *Nonviolence in America* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1966); T. K. Unnithan and Yogendra Singh, *Traditions of Nonviolence* (New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann India, 1973); and Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

10. Paige, p. 157.

11. Ibid., p. 82.

12. Ibid., p. 270.

13. Ibid., p. 281–318.

14. Ibid., pp. 318–21.

15. Ibid., p. 321; emphasis in original.

16. Insert after propositions (i.e., after line 22) in ibid., p. 321.

17. Ibid., pp. 321-23.

18. The “resist aggression” characterization, rather than “to intervene,” was strongly advocated by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and accepted by me in Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, “The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme,” *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 3 (December 1958), 341-78. One problem with the “resist aggression” formula is that it implies total evil of the aggressor and that only military measures offer hope of successful resistance.

19. Roy E. Appleman, S*outh to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1970), pp. 10-11.

20. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1975–1976* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 56.

21. The remarkable experiment by Tsai, in which after 700 trials he got a cat and a rat to cooperate in obtaining food without a coercive security barrier between them, can serve as a stimulus to constructive thought along these lines. See Loh Seng Tsai, “Peace and Cooperation Among Natural Enemies: Educating a Rat-killing Cat to Cooperate with a Hooded Rat,” *Acta Psychologia Taiwanica,* 3 (March 1963), 1-5.

3

Nonviolent Political Science

Political science is a science that can liberate humankind from violence. But first it must liberate itself. This will require five related revolutions: normative, empirical, theoretical, institutional, and educational. The tasks of political scientists at the close of the 20th century are to begin these revolutions. Twenty-first century successors must carry them forward, consolidate them, and extend their influence throughout global society.

Violence means the threat or use of killing force. Without such violence, other forms of structural repression—economic, class, racial, national, international, and ideational—cannot be maintained. A nonviolent society will be structurally nonrepressive.

Nonviolent political science is devoted to the removal of violence from global political life and to the realization of nonviolent alternatives. Both tasks must proceed simultaneously. Constructive nonviolent political alternatives must be created at the same time that conditions previously conducive to violence are eliminated. Nonviolent political science must show that creative human effort can make, implement, and revise political decisions under high levels of material and social conflict, completely without bloodshed (Cenker, 1974). This will require ceaseless innovation based upon a mutually instructive combination of theoretical development, scientific experimentation, and practical nonviolent political theory that can be expressed in mass political action. Therefore the development of applied nonviolent political theory will require a

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From *Social Alternatives* 1, 6/7 (June 1980): 104-112. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. Originally presented at the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Moscow, August 12-18, 1979.

sharp shift in conventional political science practices.

I. NORMATIVE REVOLUTION

The objective of the normative revolution is to proceed from various degrees of acceptance of killing to absolute rejection. The fact that political history has been filled with bloodshed and now threatens to become even more incredibly deadly does not mean that political science, as the social science principally devoted to the study of politics, must itself be violent. That is, political scientists themselves need not base their work upon the assumption that political violence is inevitable, and, more often than not, heroically justifiable. It is as if medical scientists approached cancer as incurable and socially desirable. Political violence and cancer are two of the most vicious diseases threatening the material and cultural well-being of mankind. They need to be approached from the same constructive value position: these diseases can and must be eliminated (Pilisuk and Ober, 1976). The method is not to apply more disease. More cancer will not cure cancer. More killing will not end political violence: capital punishment has not ended murder; execution for treason has not ended coups and revolutions; and military victories have not ended war. Killing humans has not stopped human slaughter. To stop killing we must simply and decisively stop killing and find other ways to solve our problems.

Attitudes toward violence held by political scientists and other members of society can be ranked upon a five-point scale, ranging from positive espousal to absolute rejection. *Proviolent politics* regards killing as necessary, useful, and heroic. Opportunities for beneficial bloodshed are sought. *Violence-prone* politics holds violence to be an inescapable part of political life and stands ready to kill whenever conditions demand. *Ambiviolent politics* proceeds from a midway position that is inclined decisively neither for nor against violence. To kill or not to kill is an open question: sometimes we kill; sometimes we do not. *Violence-avoiding* politics is positively inclined not to kill but will if sufficiently threatened. Finally *nonviolent politics* is completely dedicated not to kill and to create conditions that will make killing unlikely.

Taken collectively, the first four positions can be termed "violent politics" or "violence-accepting politics." "Nonviolent politics" refers to the position of principled, alternative-seeking rejection.

As a social science discipline and profession, political science and political scientists gradually must move to a nonviolent position. No single path can be prescribed. The shift may be abrupt or incremental. It may occur at scattered points throughout the discipline but eventually it must become pervasive. The speed and character of this essential value change will differ according to such variables as personality, role, organizational context, concrete tasks confronted, related values, and objective conditions of culture, class, and political regime as they interact with the political scientist's purposive search for new knowledge to improve human well-being.

A major research task will be to study how changes in value orientations toward violence take place among political scientists, as well as among other members of society, and how such shifts may be purposively assisted in a nonviolent direction (Hartman, 1941; Paige, 1977).

The role of values in creating a nonviolent political science is crucial because, as Professor Richard C. Snyder has taught, values serve as social science searchlights. They spot problems that scientists without such values cannot see. They illuminate some problems and leave others in the shadows.

Political scientists who accept violence give insufficient attention to the existence and potential effectiveness of nonviolent alternatives. For example, political scientists who devote much attention to problems of material needs and to growing shortages of energy resources tend to avoid the enormously significant issue of how military consumption contributes to economic deprivation and to nonproductive waste of energy.

A bold shift from violence to nonviolence in the basic value assumptions of political science will have three clarifying effects: it will illuminate hitherto inadequately perceived human potential for nonviolent individual and social behavior; it will reveal violence as never before; and it will show how violence-accepting attitudes and behavior influence efforts to solve all other problems of pressing human concern. As this nonviolent normative shift occurs, it will contribute to an empirical social science revolution.

II. EMPIRICAL REVOLUTION

The task of the empirical revolution will be to assemble more significant political facts about violence and nonviolent alternatives than ever before. Political scientists with scant interest in nonviolence are not likely to seek out the facts of nonviolence either in their own or in other cultures. Most graduates of American colleges and universities, for example, are likely to be unaware that there are nonviolent traditions in their country's history stretching back to pre-revolutionary times. It is possible, even conventional, to receive a doctoral degree in political science from America's finest universities without such awareness. Most Americans, as well as other persons, throughout the world will be surprised to learn that the United States relatively recently had a [nearly] pacifist Secretary of State who resigned in protest against the bellicose policies of a President who is conventionally praised as being among the great but misguided peacemakers of the 20th century. The Secretary of State was William Jennings Bryan; the President was Woodrow Wilson; the date was June 8, 1915, ten months before American entry into World War I, the repercussions of which led clearly to World War II (Koenig, 1971).

Are political scientists and citizens of other countries equally unaware of their own nonviolent traditions?

The nonviolent heritage in the United States, stretching back over two centuries, encompasses efforts to achieve nonviolent independence from Britain, to prevent slaughter of American Indians in the course of westward expansion, to end slavery without civil war, to oppose armed imperialist expansion in the Pacific and intervention in Latin America, to refuse military service in World Wars I and II, and wars in Korea and Vietnam, as well as to achieve justice for labor, women, and blacks through nonviolent political action (Cooney and Michalowski, 1977). This varied and by no means cohesive nonviolent tradition is nevertheless alive today in movements against the manufacture and employment of nuclear weapons and against military conscription. It is active in the principled nonviolent labor union activities of the United Farm Workers of America led by Cesar Chavez, in training for nonviolent achievement of social justice by the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Social Change led by Coretta Scott King, and in the movement to establish a National Academy for Peace and Conflict Resolution (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1978).

On the other hand, viewed from a nonviolent perspective, the United States of America is a shockingly violent nation (Commager, 1971), even more so than a violence-accepting critical or laudatory posture conventionally is prepared to perceive. The United States is a nation that glorifies its own armed independence struggle, its righteous Civil War, its crusading participation in World Wars I and II, and, until Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam, its unfailing "success" in direct foreign military intervention. The United States has the distinction of being the first nation to massacre two urban populations with atomic bombs so as to prevent anticipated losses of its fighting men (Hiroshima-Nagasaki Publishing Committee, 1978). It is the world's leading manufacturer and exporter of weapons. It has a violent communications media that imprints images of homicide and war upon the brains of its citizens from birth to death, a violence-accepting educational and cultural system, a violence-prone population, fearful for its physical security, and armed with private weapons for purposes of hunting, defense against predatory fellow citizens, and revolutionary offense against governmental tyranny. Preparations for war drain the treasury; divert intellect from peaceful scientific and human pursuits; create psychic tensions; provide killing skills to youths seeking to escape unemployment, family problems, and boredom in military service; and absorb capital, raw materials, land, and labor that could be used productively to improve the lives of Americans at home and those of fellow human beings throughout the world.

Each contemporary nation, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, has its own nonviolent versus violent profile (Brock, 1970; Bamba and Howes, 1978). A worldwide survey needs to be made of the nonviolent and violent potentials of every nation. World political science needs to share these facts so that we will clearly understand the extent of killing and threats to kill as well as past and present resources for the realization of a nonviolent world. Some nonviolent facts are likely to shock violence-accepting political science assumptions: for example, Costa Rica is a nation state without a national army; London is a city that has been able to experiment with an unarmed police force; and Tokyo has a virtually unarmed citizenry. These facts mean that the creation of a nonviolent political community is not beyond human ability.

But neither changed values nor new facts will be enough to create a basic and applied nonviolent political science. They must be accompanied by the development of theory.

III. THEORETICAL REVOLUTION

The theoretical revolution has three requirements: to become more clear about the causes of violence than ever before; to construct at least an equally valid theory of the causes of nonviolent behavior; and, most importantly, to create basic and applied theory that will guide transition from conditions of political violence to nonviolent alternatives.

An enormous intellectual investment has been made in the study of political violence, describing it, explaining it, and justifying it (Clausewitz, 1976; Mao, 1978; Walzer, 1977). The classical interpretations of violence emphasize three major causes: economic (need or greed), sexual (desire or defense), and power-seeking (assertion and defense of dominant status). Modern political theories of violence in war, revolutions, coups, terrorism, and assassination are elaborations of these ancient understandings. Some theorists emphasize "structural" causes; for them the question of "human nature" is not an important issue. Others locate the roots of violence in the biophysical fact of being human; for them violence can be expected in any kind of socio-economic structure. The challenge posed for a nonviolent approach to creation of a causal theory of violent political behavior is rigorously to test hypotheses derived from both structural and biobehavioral interpretations and to construct, if possible, an integrative theory that incorporates the most valid propositions of each.

On the other hand, nonviolent political theory demands answers to some radically different questions. Why have the vast majority of human beings who have lived—despite material and psychological repression—made life's journey without killing another human being? Why have some experienced killers, such as murderers and soldiers, decisively turned their backs upon violence? Why have some humans, despite ridicule, ostracism, imprisonment, torture, and threat of execution, as well as the grandest appeals to patriotism, class interest, economic gain, and family or personal honor, steadfastly refused to be conscripted into killing, even at the

ultimate sacrifice of their lives (Zahn, 1964). Furthermore, we need full understanding of why some individuals under stress shift or regress from a position of principled nonviolence to various degrees of acceptance of violence.

In short we need theories of nonviolent behavior that will realistically undergird political theories of nonviolent alternatives to war, nonviolent revolution, nonviolent containment and removal of malevolent despots, and nonviolent maintenance of community order. We need to know how nonviolent political action can create nonkilling political, economic, social, and cultural structures and how these structures can contribute to productive material and cultural advancement without reversion or progression to bloodshed.

Such theories need to have deep inductive roots in human experience. Furthermore, hypothetical expectations need to be deductively returned to the realm of practical politics. At the same time there is an exceptional need to work out nonviolent political theory on a “pure” theoretical plane. This is especially important to assist breaking out of past violence-accepting inertia, the “gravitational” force field of violence, into a new kind of politics. Therefore nonviolent political ideas deserve full theoretical exploration through all humanely appropriate means, verbal, mathematical, and experimental.

The development of basic nonviolent political theory is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transforming violence-accepting politics into nonviolent alternatives. For this, an applied theory to assist the constructive defusing of violent politics must be created (Roberts, 1969; Sharp, 1973; Keyes, 1978). The task of political deviolencization, from the individual to the global level, may be likened to that of defusing a stochastic time bomb that is ticking ominously with an incompletely understood detonating mechanism. There is an urgent need for more precise understanding of the causes of violence. At the same time the probable effects of nonviolent intervention efforts need to be thoroughly understood. Both long and short range influences of intervention need to be anticipated. The more the indeterminancy in the violent system, the more the scope for nonviolent intervention, but also the greater the possibility of “accidental” lethality.

In working out applied nonviolent theories, the toughest questions need to be faced. These include violent effects of brain damage; the traumatic psycho-historical memories of individuals, groups, and nations; and the lethal potentials that accompany struggle for sheer material survival. The proviolent propensities of biologically undamaged brains; of individuals, groups, and nations who have not directly suffered violence; and of those who are not suffering extreme material deprivation also challenge the most serious applied theoretical development.

One of the most important research focuses for basic and applied nonviolent theoretical development will be the study of German political history from 1845 to 1945 as well as present and future prospects for complete German disarmament accompanied by the development of alternative nonviolent security institutions. The German case study should be treated in a completely global context with attention paid at each point of social decision to the contributions that nonviolence-seeking external forces might have made or still might make to alternative outcomes. Similar nonviolent studies, of course, need to be made of historical and future nonviolent alternatives possible for all the countries affected directly or indirectly by German violence—or whose own violence contributed to the rise and continuation in one form or another of the political violence characteristic of the modern German state.

The search for nonviolent alternatives in the past, present, and possible future politics of countries such as China, Germany, Japan, Korea, the United States, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union makes far greater demands upon the development of political theory than conventional violence-accepting wisdom now requires. It cannot remain comfortable with the conclusion that only superior capacity to kill can cope with undesirable or even pathological political forces. On the contrary, nonviolent political science seeks to test the hypothesis that conventional acceptance of violence is itself a major contributor to such pathologies, regardless of type of regime. If we really fear the potentially murderous effects of pathologically inclined political leaders, groups, and movements, why do we create such lethal military and intelligence institutions, and indoctrinate them to be utterly obedient to central political direction? We cannot answer such questions, of course, only in isolated cases. To end

political violence is a completely global human capability and responsibility.

Nonviolent political science demands vastly improved theories of violence, nonviolence, and of how a transition can be made from violence-accepting politics to completely stable nonviolent political alternatives. To gain such theoretical knowledge will require a revolution not only in values and facts but also in institutional character and relationships.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

The institutional revolution will require liberation from dependent attachment to violence-accepting institutions, through tutelage by nonviolent human experience, to a position of independent nonviolent influence. The result will be a shift from explicit or implicit support for governmental and revolutionary violence to a social role in which political science is effectively engaged in the realization of nonviolent political alternatives throughout the world.

The degree of independence required from institutions related to violence-accepting nation states will depend upon the extent of academic freedom allowed or claimed and upon the degree of genuine commitment by governmental authorities to study and realization of nonviolent alternatives. In some countries such as Costa Rica, which has no army and which recently has invited other members of the United Nations to join it in establishing an International University of Peace, the institutionalization of nonviolent political science may occur in a supportive context. In others, the task will be far more difficult.

In most countries it will take a great deal of courage for political scientists to shift their focus of orientation and expectation of reward, either explicit or tacit, from the institutions of the violence-accepting nation state to those individuals, groups, and institutions—both domestic and international—that decisively reject killing as a global political ethic (Pyronnet, 1965). But only through such a fundamental institutional orientation can political science, as a creative and practical social science, gain the factual, theoretical, emotional, and applied knowledge that is essential for nonviolent scientific development.

The magnitude of the institutional reorientation that is required can be understood by comparison with the way in which the academic social sciences serve three conventional components of the modern nation state: the governmental bureaucracy, the military, and business management. In all three of these areas vast sums on a global scale are invested in social science research, training, and consultation to make administrative, military, and business organizations function more effectively and efficiently. By contrast, how much intellectual talent and resources are devoted by governments, universities, or private foundations to improvements of the organization and performance of those individuals and institutions that seek to realize a nonviolent global political community? These include people throughout the world who are working to abolish nuclear weapons, to limit or abolish conventional armaments, to abolish chemical and biological weapons, to stop the arms trade, to end war, to find nonviolent alternatives for armed revolution and counterrevolution, to resist military conscription, to abolish capital punishment, and indeed to end all forms of human killing. Given the absence of the huge investment of scientific manpower, technology, and capital that is devoted to support the organizational functioning of violence-accepting institutions, it is not surprising if nonviolent movements, largely unaided, encounter serious problems in their own organizational, coordinating, and goal attainment efforts. Is it reasonable to expect persons who seek to create nonviolent alternatives to the violence-accepting institutions that have ruled throughout history to solve their policy, organizational, and implementation problems without social science support?

In the temporary absence of conventional support for nonviolent political action, political science autonomously must seek to reorient its research, education, and public service activities toward the neglected area. The people of the world—including scholars in the social sciences, humanities, natural sciences, and professions—must come to value improvement of the performance of nonviolent political institutions as much as they now accept or seek to improve the performance of military, economic, and administrative organization. Lacking such a commitment, nonviolent political leaders throughout the globe should neither be surprised nor discouraged by problems of personality, faction, organization,

communication, training, or resource management that they encounter.

In establishing institutional relationships beyond the university community, nonviolent political scientists should seek out productive relationships at the international, national, and local levels. The unprecedented final report of the United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament (U.N. General Assembly, 1978), provides a global point of departure for cooperative efforts at all three levels to achieve the main goals of abolishing nuclear weapons, reducing conventional armaments, abolishing chemical and biological weapons, and shifting resources saved thereby to serve the economic and social needs of the vast majority of humankind.

The establishment of strong collegial relationships in the transnational political science community is essential. The growth of nonviolent political science in one social context should assist the advance of all. The understanding and support of political scientists who are not yet able to accept a completely nonviolent approach is also necessary to develop science and to advance academic freedom. Professional and mass support on a global scale will become increasingly important as progress in nonviolent political science comes accurately to reflect human aspirations to end the long historical night of political bloodshed.

Locally, in relation to the academic disciplines and to other sources of community experience, political science needs to shift from its recent role of borrowing concepts, methods, theories, and findings from others to a more positive role of asking others to help solve problems of violence. A social science discipline genuinely dedicated to ending violence will be more demanding and more humble in its efforts to learn from the other social sciences, humanities, biological, natural sciences, and professions. Recently political scientists have been asking other disciplines such questions as, "How can we become better social scientists?" or "How can we become better philosophers?" or "How can we better add psychological or economic perspectives to our work as political scientists?" But a nonviolent shift requires us to pose a new question: "What can you tell us about how we can end human killing?" From this new perspective a more fruitful convergence of concepts, methods, findings, and practical experience can be

expected to occur (Droba, 1931; Pelton, 1974; Unnithan and Singh, 1969).

The same should be true within the discipline of political science itself. Gradually spreading interest in the creation of nonviolent alternatives should bring the disparate fields, subfields, and scattered specialties of political science into a cooperative intellectual community with more mutual supportiveness than in previous academic study of politics. Nonviolent political science in local, national, and international relations should become more cooperative. Having given up the professional option of recommending political violence, this should reflect itself in less hostile, fearful, and anxious relationships among political scientists themselves, although tensions with violent elements in the external community may decrease less rapidly.

In its applied problem-solving efforts, transnational nonviolent political science will be less accepting of war-prone national rhetoric and drifting circumstances than is now the case. For example, a top priority of nonviolent American political science should be the establishment of a program or institute devoted to the study of nonviolent Chinese-Russian conflict resolution; a nonviolent Soviet political science should promote nonviolent Chinese-American relations; and a nonviolent Chinese political science should advance the study of nonviolent Russian-American politics. In addition, each of the three political science communities should promote nonviolent international relations between its own country and each of the other two, as well as with all other world nations. A needed cooperative research project in which political scientists from all three countries can participate, is to study objection to military conscription in all three countries over the past century (Sibley and Jacob, 1952).

The fact that none of these programs seems now to exist illustrates both the distance of contemporary political science from a nonviolent perspective and the necessity for institutional reorientation. In my view, transnational political science does not adopt such a clear nonviolent conflict resolution stance because political scientists are too closely linked—not necessarily by direct ties—to their "national security" communities which still accept actual and threatened violence. From that perspective, actual or threatened violence between power-competitive members of the

American-Chinese-Russian triad might possibly be advantageous. From a nonviolent viewpoint, such is not the case; a determined political science effort ought to be made to avoid both the actuality and the threat of killing among Americans, Chinese, and Russians.

But to create a new kind of world political science community with the values, knowledge, theory, and institutional independence necessary to realize constructive alternatives to global political violence will require a new kind of education.

V. EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION

Nonviolent political science calls for change in the professional education of political scientists and in the contributions they make to education of other members of society (Kumar, 1969).

Nonviolent political scientists eventually must have training at least equal in scientific depth and rigor to that now demanded of physicians and psychiatrists. It is indeed a bold claim to assert that political science can liberate humankind from the ancient scourge of violence. It cannot be done without a radical change in political science education.

Nonviolent political science education must emphasize three things: first, the truth of human violence, emphasizing present manifestations and showing both historical roots and projected future trends; second, the truth of nonviolent human capabilities, again stressing present reality while introducing both previous experience and alternative futures; finally, creative skill in basic and applied research, teaching, and action that will assist transition from present violent conditions.

The most important new subject for nonviolent political science education in the near future should be study of the human brain, especially as it relates to violent and nonviolent behavior and to the possibility of transition from the former to stable forms of the latter. Brain studies should be accompanied by psychological and social psychological studies of the life cycles of individuals and generations from birth to death from the point of view of understanding how to assist learning and reinforcement of nonviolent behavior. Such studies should emphasize the traumatic events that often are correlated with pathological violence: for example, incest, parental neglect, brutal beatings. massive assaults

on self-esteem, peer group pressures, and military training for and participation in actual killing (Daniels et al., 1970). Also to be studied are the violent behaviors of normally "peace-loving" persons.

The new political science education should draw heavily upon the fields of brain science, psychiatry, criminology, social work, and military science. This knowledge must be integrated with or juxtaposed against traditional political science concerns with political philosophy, theory, and ideology; govern-mental institutions; types of regime; political processes such as elections, war, and revolution; and study of the economic determinants of political behavior.

At the same time, political scientists must become more aware of nonviolent human potential. Not only must they become more knowledgeable about how vicious and brutal human beings can be, but they must also learn about nonviolent human capability, both individual and collective. This will require study of nonviolent biography, group experiences, comparative anthropology and history, and case studies of both successful and unsuccessful efforts in nonviolent conflict resolution. General understanding and clinical action skills must be developed through combinations of simulation, role-playing, field observation, and internships under experienced supervision.

An extremely important part of professional political science education must become the discovery and "working through" of each person's attitudes toward human killing. Such training must be conducted under the highest standards of respect for individual integrity akin to the finest psychiatric education. Each political scientist must confront his or her attitudes toward political violence and achieve a thorough understanding of how these attitudes are likely to affect teaching, research, institutional development, and the effects of political science upon the society as a whole.

The goals of this kind of emotional and cognitive education will be to assist as many political scientists as possible to achieve a completely nonviolent outlook, and to assist others who cannot reach such a position to understand a nonviolent approach and the ways in which their own professional contributions might differ from it. The educational objective in the early stages of nonviolent political science transformation would not be to decertify political scientists who cannot completely accept a nonviolent value position,

or to force them into false role-playing behavior to achieve professional accreditation, but rather to assist greater awareness and truthfulness about individual and collective political science attitudes toward killing.

Clinical and field training in nonviolent political science must include experience in both violent and nonviolent institutions. On the one hand, students and supervising professors must gain observational and interview knowledge of military, police, revolutionary, guerrilla, terrorist, and homicidal behavior. This will provide direct human experience with killing, preparations to kill, conventional defense against threats to kill, and reflections upon killing by experienced killers and other persons intimately associated with it. Admittedly this will be gruesome training, radically different from the polite textbook education that most political scientists receive who have not experienced military, police, or other combat action.

On the other hand, professional political scientists must have direct experience in organizations, communities, and conflict situations that involve participants who are dedicated to principled nonviolent political behavior. A third kind of experience will also be necessary: experience gained from the perspective of third-party mediators, themselves either violent or nonviolent, who seek to resolve conflicts between and among violent and nonviolent participants (Hare, 1975; Yarrow, 1978). Training simulations should prepare for field training experiences and later provide opportunity for integrative reflection upon them.

New nonviolent political science education will require new forms of intradisciplinary, interdisciplinary, and community cooperation. An unusual combination of skills needs to be brought to bear in the educational process: these include those of brain scientists, psychiatrists, social psychologists, anthropologists, homicide experts, police, military combat veterans, guerrillas, terrorists, murderers, and peace movement activists. All these need to be placed in a context of comparative violent and nonviolent history, political economy, and anticipatory studies of probable global human futures.

The new professional education should subsequently be reflected in new political science influences upon primary, secondary, collegiate, advanced, and adult education. Students at

all these levels should be assisted to understand the facts of human violence, the existence of nonviolent human capabilities, and the possibilities of present and future change toward nonviolent alternatives. The overall objective will be to have knowledge and skills required for nonviolent political action permeate the entire general and professional educational system in much the same way that conventional education now prepares for acceptance, support, and, if necessary, direct participation in killing.

Through new nonviolent political education human beings of all classes should be assisted to understand violence, to appreciate nonviolent alternatives, and to acquire the knowledge, skill, and realistic confidence necessary to remove violence as an obstacle to the improvement of the material and cultural conditions of global life.

More specialized professional education in nonviolent political action will also be necessary. Each college and university should have a nonviolent student brigade (a creative adaptation of the Gandhian "Shanti Sena") as an alternative to conventional military training units. Nonviolent political action training should be included in the curricula of existing institutes of public administration and national military academies. Additionally an alternative set of educational and administrative institutions will be required from the local community through the national level to the international community in order to assist a decisive shift from violence-accepting to nonviolent world conditions.

VI. REVOLUTIONARY SUBFIELD IMPLICATIONS

A nonviolent shift in political science will make sharp new demands upon each of the four conventional subfields of the discipline: political philosophy and theory; the single nation state and its institutions; comparative politics; and international politics.

A major demand upon philosophy and theory will be to rediscover and articulate alternative nonviolent political traditions, drawing upon all world cultural resources (Nakamura, 1974). Partly this can be helped by a critical reevaluation of the violence-accepting and legitimating dominant Western and other philosophical traditions. The results of these traditions can be seen in the contributions that Western nation states have made to the

intensity and scope of violence within and between nations as it has diffused throughout the world in the 20th century, reinforcing violent propensities in other societies. It will help to be more clear about how violent the Western political traditions really are from Plato and Aristotle, through Machiavelli and Hobbes, to Locke and Marx. Wherever nonviolent potentials can be found in them these need to be more fully explored (Lenin, 1964; Schaff, 1974).

Overall, however, the main challenge to conventional political philosophy will be to be more innovative and less imitative. It is not true that where nonviolence is concerned everything of importance has already been said by classical or modern theorists. Even the rediscovery of earlier nonviolent political traditions throughout the world will not adequately address itself to the political needs of violence-plagued humanity on the threshold of the 21st century.

The main nonviolent demands upon the conventional study of national governments are to ask if there have been any significant nonviolent individuals, groups, movements, events, or opportunities, in past national development; and if there are possibilities for realizing and strengthening nonviolent politics and institutions in present and future national life.

All nation states are creations of political violence. Their violent pasts predispose them to prepare for violence in the present and future. To ask them whether they have a truly nonviolent political potential is a revolutionary political science question. Therefore nonviolent political science asks whether nations can create institutions that will provide nonviolent common defense, train for nonviolent domestic and international conflict resolution, and provide for nonviolent community order in both urban and rural areas. It asks whether national politics can permit the activities of nonviolent parties and movements that sum up the political will of national populations to liberate themselves from physical, economic, environmental, and psychological effects of violence.

The principal challenge to comparative politics is to discover which factors are most conducive to nonviolence by comparing societies with high and low levels of violence (Fabbro, 1978). Such comparisons must be made of individuals, groups, parties, and classes, as well as whole nations and regions both within and across different periods of time. Through comparison across time we can discover how objective political, social, economic, and cultural

factors contribute to the rise and fall of violent behavior—and also how purposive nonviolent political initiatives may contribute to changes in objective conditions.

The most important revolutionary task in the study of international politics will be to show that the present system of seeking peace and justice by superior or equal readiness to kill can be transformed by completely nonviolent means into a stable nonviolent alternative system. This means a shift from seeking "peace" and national advantage through a "balance of killing" to progress toward a nonviolent global community with increasing benefits for all participants (though not in all matters—some must give for others to gain) achieved through nonviolent political processes.

A major research emphasis should be on how less violent nations can interact with more violent ones to reduce rather than reinforce their violence as is now customary. Reduction in arms consumption is one important means, something that itself can be promoted by increased capabilities for nonviolent conflict resolution within and between less violent nations and their neighbors.

The burden of creating a nonviolent world should not, of course, be placed upon the militarily weaker nations. If a nation that is central to the world military system, such as the United States or the Soviet Union, for example, undertook substantial or preferably complete disarmament combined with the establishment of alternative nonviolent international security institutions, this would have a far-reaching impact upon world political, military, economic, social, and cultural development, greater than that of any previous war or revolution. Therefore a central research task of nonviolent political science in the field of international politics is to discover how the world's most violence-prone nations can liberate themselves and each other from violence. History gives scant hope that this can be accomplished by killing even if the "last capitalist" is killed in the "last capitalist country"—or if the "last communist" is killed in the "last communist country."

Even if nuclear weapons had never been invented, nonviolent political science would be challenged by the task of contributing to realization of a nonviolent world political community. The idea has roots in ancient thought and common sense that have both preceded

and survived modern violent political history (Sibley, 1963; Weinberg, 1963; Mayer, 1966).

VII. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO A NONVIOLENT POLITICAL SCIENCE REVOLUTION

Four convergent contemporary factors create conditions favorable for a nonviolent revolution in world political science: progress in human moral development, the inability of violence to provide physical security, economic deprivation that can be traced directly to diversion of resources for violent purposes, and increasingly better understood biochemical human capacity for nonviolent behavior.

In social science it is possible to have a "moral paradigm shift" akin to the "theoretical paradigm shift" that has been described for the natural sciences by Thomas S. Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1970). That is, in social science it is possible to develop a moral revulsion against certain facts of human experience that will lead to the creation of alternative theories and practical action to ensure that such facts do not reoccur. For example, if conventional acceptance of violence in politics leads to such atrocities as six million Jews destroyed by Nazi racism, twenty million Russians slaughtered in a surprise German invasion, 210,000 urban Japanese incinerated by two American atomic bomb attacks, and countless citizens killed in postrevolutionary betrayal of peaceful prerevolutionary aspirations in cases of violent political change—then such empirical facts cause us to suspect that there must be something wrong with the violence-accepting and even violence-glorifying moral assumptions upon which such political murders and threats to murder are based. Violent facts, therefore, can lead to a nonviolent moral paradigm shift, at least for some social scientists who are prepared to question conventional moral and theoretical assumptions that only greater killing can stop political violence and advance human welfare.

Human moral development affecting social science has already been seen in progress away from acceptance of such "natural" political facts as slavery, capital punishment, racial and gender inferiority, and the inevitability of poverty. It needs to be extended to reject war, armed repression and revolution, terrorism, assassination, and all forms

of political homicide. The role of moral progress in scientific advancement that benefits humanity has been stated lucidly by Einstein: "Science itself is not a liberator. It creates means, not goals. . . . We should remember that the fate of mankind hinges entirely upon man's moral development" (Nathan and Norden, 1960, p. 312). This should be true of social science as well as physical science.

A second impetus for a nonviolent paradigm shift in political science is the fact that weapons cannot guarantee the physical security of those who possess and intend to use them. Although the development of nuclear weapons and belated diffusion of information about their effects beyond military circles into the mass public (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1979) have increased awareness of this fact, the existence of nuclear weapons technology is not essential to its truth. For eternal physical insecurity a rock, a stick, or hands or feet will suffice.

Another condition that favors a nonviolent revolution in political science is the fact that military consumption of vital resources is gradually coming to be perceived as a major cause of economic deprivation within nations and throughout the world (Sivard, 1979; The Boston Study Group, 1979). The people of the world are not likely to be endlessly tolerant of tax burdens and other sacrifices that produces world military expenditures of more than one billion dollars a day ($400 billion annually) when a shift of even 5 percent ($20 billion dollars) would radically improve the health, housing, and education of the world's most impoverished citizens. Nor will they long be tolerant of nonproductive annual military consumption of irreplaceable world fossil fuel resources that could help meet civilian energy needs for decades into the future while the search for alternative sources of energy continues. Both the world economy and the world ecology can no longer tolerate the lethal luxury of national and international militarism.

The moral, security, and resource arguments for nonviolent politics are not new. What is new is the intensity of their convergence. Fundamentally more important are advances in the biological and behavioral sciences that permit a revolutionary reconceptualization of violence-seeking and violence-accepting "human nature" upon which political science conventionally has been based. The optimism of medically trained

psychiatrists that the physical and psychological causes of violence can be eliminated (Daniels et al., 1970) is radically opposed to the pessimism of political scientists whose science rests mainly upon study of the Western philosophical tradition and its violence-accepting antithesis. While changes in economic institutions may assist reduction of certain forms of violence, they cannot be expected entirely to end it. It must be remembered that the world's most economically favored nations, regardless of type of economic system, are also its most dangerous nations in terms of capacity to kill. If on the other hand, biochemical science promises to enable pathological brain-damaged killers to lead productive and peaceful lives, then why should comfortably educated world political scientists with "normal" brains continue to cry for actual and threatened political killing to make life meaningful?

A nonviolent paradigm shift in political science will require a radical departure from past conventions. The need to abruptly question habitual violence-accepting, disciplinary responses inherited from the past is aptly stated by Krishnamurti: "We are machines, second-hand people. We repeat what others have said. We read enormously. We are the result of thousands of years of propaganda" (Krishnamurti, 1970, p. 165). If, as Whitehead has observed, "A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost" (quoted in Kuhn, 1970, p. 138), then without a fundamentally different point of departure political science is likely to flounder and be lost with everyone else at the violent end of history's most violent century.

Political scientists must learn to face violence truthfully, our own and that of others. But this will not be enough. We must also come to understand and educate nonviolent human potential. Then, with every scientific tool that can be created we must devote ourselves and our profession to the realization of an alternative nonviolent world community.

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4

Nonviolent Global Problem-Solving and Tasks of Political Leadership Studies

CONFRONTING GLOBAL PROBLEMS

Five related problems confront humankind at the end of the twentieth century. These are the achievement of enduring peace, economic justice, freedom of expression, a life-sustaining environment, and effective problem-solving institutions. Stated negatively we seek to abolish war, poverty, oppression, ecocide, and destructive human divisiveness. No political scientist of whatever specialty or ideological persuasion can escape the powerful challenge to act or the deleterious consequences of failure to act to improve human ability to solve these problems.

The major international conferences that have attempted to focus attention upon them with increasing frequency since World War II have arrived at similar conclusions. That is, we understand the seriousness of the "problems," we know at least some of the things that should be done to "solve" them, but we lack the "political will" to make the necessary changes. We lack the will to change even though failure to do so will *threaten the very survival of humankind,* in the judgment of those who best understand the seriousness of the global condition.

Customarily we attribute the lack of political will to the selfishness of the few (national, corporate, class) plus the ignorant

Prepared on request for a special issue on "Political Leadership" of the International Political Science Review, 1986. Unpublished.

apathy of the many. Each international conference customarily ends with a call for governmental and nongovern-mental leaders, communicators, and educators to arouse world opinion to demand effective problem-solving action. We end up by calling for leaders to lead, and for followers to demand leadership action or to lead themselves if formal leaders fail to do so.

The major problem-solving conferences thus end on themes that are readily translatable into terms of political leadership studies. The action world of politics issues a clear call to the scholarly world of political science. Can we assist both leaders and followers at every level to solve problems that threaten the survival and well-being of humankind? Can we help to overcome the selfishness, ignorance, apathy, fear, and inertia that contribute to the deepening of global crises?

NEED FOR A NONVIOLENT PARADIGM SHIFT

I believe that political scientists can help, especially by developing political leadership studies, but that in order to do so we must undergo a profound transformation of our traditional acceptance of political violence. In short, the problems we face increasingly call for a nonviolent paradigm shift.[1] For failure to solve effectively the great problems—disarmament, creation of an equitable global economy, liberation from repression of human rights, saving the biosphere, and finding ways to cooperate throughout planetary space—results not only from selfishness and ignorance but also from reliance upon violent modes of problem-solving that tend to make things worse.

Our conventional social and scientific acceptance of violence, shared by both leaders and followers, produces and is produced by the conditions that threaten survival. We seek peace by preparing for war. Armed threat produces armed threat. We cling to increasingly deadly and costly military technology as a national security blanket. We refuse to shift military resources to rescue tens of millions of fellow human beings from economic holocaust. Our commitment to lethality creates economic disparities and scarcities that are then used to justify killing or threats to kill. We inflict

agony in expression and repression of human rights. Our human rights violations produce counterterrorism and armed rebellion. We destroy our environment through military industrialization—and through direct nuclear and conventional weapons assaults—then our environment threatens to destroy us. Our political violence creates and erupts out of hateful social distance: "we" against "them;" the republic of "good" against the empire of "evil." Unforgettable atrocities, however righteously perceived by their perpetrators, are not the way to achieve the cooperative well-being of humankind.

To enter the twenty-first century with dignity we must learn to liberate ourselves from the violence-prone gravity of our social and intellectual traditions. Assuredly this is not and will not be an easy task. The roots of social and academic acceptance of violence as an inescapable and often celebrated fact of political life lie deep in the cultural heritage of humankind. (This is not to deny, however, the existence of nonviolent roots as well.)

Plato's philosopher-rulers in *The Republic* are to be recruited from the military guardian class (reminiscent of the Hindu kshatriya caste), which he apparently assumed would be needed forever. In the *Politics,* Aristotle similarly seems to assume the eternal need for armed forces, since he explicitly argues that the preferred form of polity should include a military component to keep domestic order and to prevent enslavement by outsiders. Machiavelli's advice to the Prince to be prepared to kill like a lion when foxy wit fails has been eagerly taught and absorbed by generations of professors, students, and other political practitioners. Hobbes's argument in the *Leviathan* further advances the ideological acceptance of violent state power: by creating a violent peacekeeping monster, individual violence-prone individuals can achieve greater security. In the *Second Treatise of Government,* Locke accepts the Hobbesian premise and advances to justify a doubly violent dialectic. Surely the sovereign has the right to kill to maintain social order in accordance with the principles of natural law. But when the sovereign violates these principles, the people are justified in killing him. Both governmental and antigovernmental violence are justified. Marx and Engels carry Locke's argument forward in class struggle terms. Surely the bourgeoisie can be expected to employ violence to gain and maintain political supremacy, but so can the rising proletariat when the materialist processes of history make

bourgeois dominance and proletarian submission untenable. In long-range terms the Marxian vision of the political future seems to differ from its predecessors, since it foresees the possibility that violent state power will “wither away.” But in part because nonviolent processes of transition are not given much theoretical elaboration, practitioners of Marxian politics have not yet been able to make a sharp break with the violence-prone classical philosophical tradition. The effect of the violence-accepting philosophical tradition is so strong that conventional political science tends to consider a nonviolent/nonkilling society to be unthinkable. Violence in politics is both inevitable and necessary. As argued by Max Weber in his influential essay “Politics as a Vocation:”

> Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means available to it, as to every political association, namely, *the use of physical force* . . . the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e., considered to be legitimate) violence. [Emphasis added][2]

For Weber, and for many of us, a nonviolent/nonkilling politics is by definition impossible.:

> He who seeks salvation of the soul, of his own and of others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite different tasks of politics can be solved *only by violence.* The genius or demon of politics lives in an inner tension with the god of love, as well as with the Christian God as expressed by the church. This tension can lead at any time to an irreconcilable conflict. [Emphasis added][3]

To this philosophical tradition which makes violence seem so natural and acceptable must be added the recent political experience of humankind over the past 250 years, which can be interpreted as violence-affirming efforts to achieve universally the goals of the French Revolution—liberté, egalité, fraternité. We may translate them in contemporary terms as freedom, economic justice, and peace. The violent success of the American Revolution for freedom; the violent successes of the Russian, Chinese and related revolutions for economic justice; and the violent success of the anti-

Nazi, anti-fascist, and anti-Japanese World War II coalition all tend to make violence seem to be a reasonable means for achieving and defending humankind's most deeply held values. Hence violence is commonly accepted as an irreplaceable means of global problem-solving.

ROOTS OF NONVIOLENT ALTERNATIVES

Despite our powerful violence-accepting heritage, signs of vigorous nonviolent alternatives are beginning to spring up in thought and action throughout the world. The process is two-sided: a reaction to contemporary material conditions combined with reaffirmation or rediscovery of nonviolent values. They arise as a reaction to the material illogic of continued reliance upon violence as a means of physical security that has produced the homicidal-suicidal possibility of global nuclear war; and to the intolerable tension between military waste and the rapidly intensifying economic needs of a vastly multiplying world population (Thorsson, 1983; Sivard, 1985). Secondly they grow out of ancient nonviolent traditions that are present in virtually every culture (Unnithan and Singh, 1963) and have kept the light of peace, love, and truth shining throughout humanity's darkest hours. The courageous voices of caring for life that have spoken from generation to generation for millennia are now heard with increasing respect for their fundamental wisdom (Weinberg, 1963).

In the world of political action, mass movements based in part on nonviolent principles, or at least essentially unarmed in nature, are arousing cautious respect for the efficacy of nonviolent political power. Recent examples include salient political influences exerted by mass nonviolent actions in Haiti, the Philippines, Chile, Poland, and South Korea, as well as in Western Europe. In other contexts, nonviolent movements for rural development, such as the Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement of Sri Lanka led by A. T. Ariyaratne, invite attention. To varying degrees these movements draw upon the practical experience and principles associated with leaders such as Mohandas K. Gandhi, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and Martin Luther King, Jr. But the case for nonviolent politics, of course, by no means rests upon the achievements or failures of these figures alone.

Even at the elite level, where persons have achieved and maintained positions of prominence by acceptance of political violence, wise voices are questioning its continued viability. One such voice is that of the late U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, former army general and a Republican, whose principal reflections on the need to reexamine traditional assumptions about state violence can be recast readily in terms of the slogans of the French Revolution:

> *On Liberty:* In the councils of government we must guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted.[4]
>
> *On Equality:* Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. . . . This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the cloud of war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.[5]
>
> *On Fraternity:* Indeed, I think that people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of their way and let them have it.[6]

To the peaceful ideas of leaders like Eisenhower, whose commitment to nonviolence is latent, must be added, of course, the extraordinary principled advocacy and practice of nonviolent politics by leaders like Petra K. Kelly and other “Green” colleagues who have achieved election to the West German Bundestag and other world legislative bodies. Their nonviolent approach to the issues of war, economic justice, feminism and human rights, environment and transnational responsibility provide a prototype for nonviolent global problem-solving action.

As world leaders in every profession begin to question the consequences of continued commitment to violent traditions and institutions, added momentum will be given to the needed

nonviolent global paradigm shift. An example is provided by the "Manifesto of Nobel Prize Winners" (1981) signed by fifty-three Nobel laureates in such diverse fields as literature, physics, chemistry, economics, medicine, and peace. After lamenting the "unprecedented holocaust" of preventable hunger and economic deprivation that kills each year as many persons as perished in purposive exterminations in the first half of the twentieth century, they declare: "All those who denounce and combat this holocaust are unanimous in maintaining that *the causes of this tragedy are political."* [Emphasis added][7] Then after calling upon established world leaders and other citizens to take prompt rescue action, they call upon the dispossessed to engage in nonviolent self-liberation:

> If the weak organize themselves and use the few but powerful weapons available to them: *non-violent actions exemplified by Gandhi,* adopting and imposing objectives which are limited and suitable; if these things happen it is certain that an end could be put to this catastrophe in our time. [Emphasis added][8]

Independently the call for nonviolent revolution by these Nobel Prize recipients has received confirmation as to its plausibility by recent American, Chinese, and Soviet writers (Sharp, 1973; Zhang, 1981; Plimak and Karyakin, 1979). The idea of nonviolent socioeconomic transformation increasingly demonstrates varied cultural roots.

NONVIOLENT SCHOLARLY RESOURCES

Concurrently with the rise of increasingly self-conscious nonviolent action in the social world of politics, we are witnessing the emergence of powerful social science theoretical and empirical analysis that takes seriously the possibility of nonviolent political, social, economic, and cultural transform-ation. Three complementary classics in this regard are Gene Sharp's *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973), Johan Galtung's essay "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" (1969), and John Burton's *Deviance, Terrorism and War* (1979). Sharp's thesis is that political power rests more upon mass acquiescence than upon lethal threat; therefore nonviolent politics that withdraws support from violent policies, institutions, and structures and commits support to

constructive nonviolent alternatives is possible. The processes are through "conversion," "accommodation," and even "coercion," for nonviolent politics does not mean powerlessness, quite the contrary.

Galtung's thesis is that there are two forms of violence, "personal violence" and "structural violence;" that they are in a relationship of mutual causality; and that efforts to remove the one must necessarily include efforts to remove the other. The efficacy of nonviolent political action for both tasks is assumed. In effect, Galtung puts Sharp's purposive nonviolent political action analysis into a broad context of socioeconomic structural change.

Burton complements the Sharp-Galtung analysis by providing a penetrating analysis of the causes of violence, a prescription for nonviolent transition to peacefulness, and an explicit role for political scientists in assisting that process. Burton's thesis is that violence results from failure to respond to human needs, such as for "identity," by individuals, governments, and other institutions. This produces such things as homicide, terrorism, and war. The way to remove behavioral and structural violence is to create processes of problem-solving in which all whose needs are unfulfilled can participate in satisfying them. The role of the political scientist is not to suggest solutions to problems but rather to understand and assist processes by which needs can be expressed and realized.

The ideas of Sharp, Galtung, and Burton provide a constructive theoretical basis upon which to develop a nonviolent global problem-solving approach to political leadership studies. Their work is illustrative of a growing literature in various academic disciplines that take nonviolence seriously. Even in the United States, which has not been noted for nonviolence in its international security policies, over sixty doctoral dissertations on nonviolence have been accepted since World War II. They include studies in anthropology, education, history, language and literature, philosophy, political science, psychology, religion, sociology, and speech communication. In addition some unusually significant books of interest to both specialist and general reader are appearing. An excellent example is Ross and Kanthi's *Gandhian Economics* (1983), a formulation of a nonviolent theory of economics that can be compared with classical violence-accepting theories.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP RESOURCES

Paralleling the growing salience of nonviolent political action and analysis is the rise of interest in developing political leadership studies, especially since the late 1970s.[9] One impetus is the need to improve understanding of the capacity for purposive change as compared with more static structural analyses. In a dynamic world of decolonization, new nations, and revolutionary change, leadership thrusts itself upon our attention. The dramatic example of differential change since 1945 in the divided nations (especially China, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam) cries out for more adequate social science description and explanation. For such purposes, the more familiar concept of "elites" is found to be of limited usefulness. This was pointed out in a pioneering essay on the concept of leadership by Wiatr (1973) that received powerful convergent validation from anthropological literature (Lewis, 1974).

In recent years many significant contributions have been made to the foundations of a field of political leadership studies that can be combined with nonviolence studies to assist nonviolent global problem-solving. T o mention only English language resources, these include works by Adair (1983), Blondel (1980), Burns (1978), Bunce (1981), Dror (1985), Greenwood (1977), Heider (1986), Hermann (1977), Kellerman (1984), and Peters and Waterman (1982). It is hoped that members of the International Political Science Association will bring outstanding works in other languages to the attention of the world social science community.

Tucker (1981) clearly provides a global problem-solving orientation: leadership means diagnosis of problems, prescription of solutions, and mobilization of support for needed action. He calls for Soviet-American cooperation in solving global problems, supported and inspired by a world-compassionate "Party of Humanity." Jean Blondel provides a pioneering study of social backgrounds and turnover rates of 1,028 heads of state in 135 countries over a thirty year period from 1945 to 1975. He gives a challenging pilot demonstration of what advanced studies of macroscopic leadership effects upon the global polity might accomplish. Valerie Bunce grapples theoretically, empirically, and comparatively with the enormously important task of measuring political leader influences upon certain policy-making processes in

both capitalist and socialist systems. Taken together, the contributions of Tucker, Blondel, and Bunce alone offer promise for development of a field of political leadership studies that can respond to global problem-solving needs.

The studies by Kellerman, Hermann, and colleagues are important because they demonstrate variety in disciplinary perspectives and in research methods. No single political scientist can command all the theoretical insights and research competencies that are needed to advance understanding of complex leadership processes. An essay in the Kellerman volume by Susan J. Carroll importantly surveys “Feminist Scholarship on Political Leadership.” A combination of both male and female perspectives on leadership is essential.

The studies by Peters and Waterman, Dror, and Adair are very much in the applied consultancy and leadership training tradition. They want to understand how effective leadership works and how others can learn to be more effective. There is much obvious influence from business leadership and military leadership experience which it would be unwise for political leadership studies either to ignore or to accept uncritically as prototypes.

The studies by Greenwood, Heider, and Burns are major challenges to rethinking the concept of leadership in a nonviolent direction. They plant moral and ethical seeds from which new nonviolent global leadership can grow. Greenwood’s concept of the “servant leader,” is exactly the kind of responsive leadership implied by Burton’s call for a global problem-solving process that is responsive to universal human needs. Heider’s application of ancient Taoist principles to modern management offers a needed, right-brained holistic complement to the left-brained linearity of leadership ideas derived from military models. Finally Burns makes a major contribution to nonviolent transformation of thinking about leadership. He does this by denying recognition of violence-based authority as “leadership,” by asserting that bargaining—or contractual leadership—is an inferior form of problem-solving, and by affirming confidently that true leadership is characterized by a process of morally transforming, mutual need satisfaction in which neither followers nor leaders are bought or coerced.

TASKS: RESEARCH, EDUCATION, APPLICATION

To assist global problem-solving, the resources of political leadership studies and nonviolence studies need to be combined in significant tasks of research, teaching, and applied utilization of knowledge.

Necessary research tasks include: review of document-ation and experience in the five main global problem areas to identify recommendations for leadership action; review of theory and findings in leadership and nonviolence studies that promise to assist problem-solving action; case studies of effective and ineffective leader-follower attempts to solve global problems at different levels in various contexts; a special comparative effort to understand the problem-solving perspectives of the world's most nonviolent leaders and movements as compared with those that are most violent; and finally applied research to improve efforts to use the resulting knowledge in problem-solving action. The objectives of the research program are simply to focus upon leadership requirements that emerge from practical problem-solving needs, to survey useful knowledge resources, and to assist efforts to apply knowledge to overcome problem-solving obstacles in a nonviolent manner.

The broad educational task is to increase understanding among actual or potential leaders and followers about contributions they can make to nonviolent global problem-solving. This needs to be supplemented by more specific training activities. Special attention needs to be given to the unique needs of each "student" and to the matching capabilities of each "teacher." Five groups merit educational attention: incumbent leaders, aspiring leaders, younger leaders, persons engaged in formal educational institutions, and persons attentive to nonformal educational processes of political socialization. The approach to incumbent leader education can be patterned in part upon the best in-service training in the fields of business, public administration, and the military. Small informal seminars such as those of the Aspen Institute will be essential. Most important will be to create learning programs for individual leaders and their key advisers that are short, impressive, and useful. An example would be a one-hour, audio-visual presentation and discussion of leadership capabilities and limitations for nonviolent global transformation—suitable for

individual tutelage. The same approach should be taken to education of aspiring leaders most likely to displace present leaders, or those whose competitive action most affects them. Knowledge needs to be diffused by salient individuals throughout the entire leadership community.

Special attention needs to be given to preparation for nonviolent global problem-solving by younger leaders. This is an area in which an Institute for Leadership and Nonviolent Global Problem-Solving, created by the United Nations University or other global educational institutions, could be especially effective. One approach would be to form small travelling seminars of global leadership fellows, both men and women, representing the spectrum of ideologies, parties, and socioeconomic conditions, North-South and East-West. After an introduction to the global condition by world thinkers, the seminar would travel to countries most illustrative of successes and failures of problem-solving efforts for direct study of lessons to be learned. On the basis of this experience and additional study each participant would write a globally relevant problem-solving thesis to be shared with other participants and made part of the knowledge resources of the Institute. The effect of such seminars over a period of years would be to create a pool of globally oriented problem-solving leaders dispersed among the world's national and ideological communities.[9]

Finally in purposeful education for political leadership the need for educating constructive followership that is capable of taking leadership initiatives must not be forgotten. This is a major difference in political leadership education as compared with education for military or business leadership. The educational objective is the enhancement of problem-solving competence in the interest of all. Therefore special courses and teaching materials that enhance critical understanding of political leadership capabilities for nonviolent global problem-solving need to be introduced in all world colleges and universities. This is a task that can be assisted greatly by UNESCO by sponsoring a series of five problem-related textbooks with a sixth overview volume that would be of interest to general readers throughout the world.

Diffusion of research findings into nonformal education should be a major subsequent task of global political leadership

studies. The media of mass communication and government information agencies are now creating images of the nature of global problems, the advantages and disadvantages of violent or nonviolent problem-solving action, and the capabilities of various leaders. This needs to be supplemented and sometimes corrected by the understanding and critical awareness of the interrelations among these subjects that can be contributed by the international scholarly community.

The problem-solving approach gives both research and teaching a strong applied social science orientation. In addition, direct efforts to make combined knowledge of leadership and nonviolence useful need to be undertaken. This will require development of special consulting skills by political scientists. Efforts should be made to assist individual leaders and groups of leaders to solve the five crucial global problems. This will require political scientists who are knowledgeable about requirements for leader action as perceived by problem specialists—and also about impacts upon follower welfare of leader problem-solving behavior. They also must know the dynamics of political leadership life that impede problem-solving action.

The demand of consulting relevancy will require a continuous review of research findings on leadership and nonviolence from the point of view of their problem-solving relevance. Then the results need to be tested and transformed into guidelines for action, communicated to responsible actors, and monitored for beneficial or deleterious effects, both anticipated and unanticipated. Teams of consultants should be prepared to make recommendations to improve nonviolent contributions by leaders to solve problems raised by major international conferences and in the ongoing work of the United Nations and its agencies.

The need for such consultancy can be appreciated by recalling that there is little evidence that political scientists tried to understand and assist the efforts of major nonviolent leaders such as M. K. Gandhi and M. L. King, Jr., while they were actively engaged in problem-solving action. Or stated negatively, how many political scientists attempted to use their knowledge of leadership to change the behavior of Hitler and his cohorts? This implies, of course, the need for political scientists to develop advanced applied professional skills.

NECESSITY FOR COMBINATORIAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION

If we are to make scientific and social progress in linking the emerging fields of leadership and nonviolence to assist global problem-solving, some form of institutional capability to facilitate their convergence must be developed. Such an institution must be able to encourage scholarly research, teaching, and applied activities on a world scale. In short, we need a global institution that will support development of political leadership studies with a peaceful, problem-solving orientation. Perhaps some combination of concerned professional societies such as the International Political Science Association, a global scholarly institution such as the United Nations University, and a world facilitator of scientific and cultural development such as UNESCO can cooperate to carry out the needed tasks. Creation of an Institute of Leadership for Nonviolent Global Problem-Solving associated with the United Nations University[10] would be an appropriate response to present needs. Or perhaps some other institution with a global problem-solving orientation and with the possibility of universal participation, supported by nonviolent philanthropy, will take up the challenge. In any case political scientists in this era are faced with the task of developing political leadership studies that are responsive to the need for nonviolent solutions to problems that increasingly threaten the survival and well-being of all.

NOTES

1. For an example of such a shift see Glenn D. Paige, "On Values and Science: *The Korean Decision* Reconsidered," *American Political Science Review,* 71, 4 (December 1977), 1603-1609. The scientific implications of such a transformation for political science as a whole were explored in a paper presented to the XIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Moscow, August 12-18, 1979. See Glenn D. Paige, "Nonviolent Political Science," *Social Alternatives* (Australia) 1, 6/7 (June 1980), 104-112.

2. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," *From Max Weber,* trans. and eds. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 77-78.

3. Ibid., p. 126.

4. Transcribed from a sound recording, Dwight David Eisenhower, "Farewell Broadcast, January 17, 1961." *The Spoken Word,* SW-9403.

5. Excerpt from a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16, 1953, reprinted by Joan B. Kroc in a full-page advertisement in *The Wall Street Journal,* May 30, 1985, p. 29.

6. From a BBC TV interview on August 31, 1959, with Harold Macmillan as quoted in Peter Dennis and Adrian Preston, eds., *Soldiers as Statesmen* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976), p. 132.

7. "Manifesto of Nobel Prize Winners," *IFDA Dossier,* 25 (September/October 1981), p. 1 (61).

8. Ibid., p. 3 (63). In the interest of nonviolent cultural transformation I would prefer use of the word "means," or other nonviolent equivalent, rather than the term "weapons" in this quotation even though Gandhi himself sometimes used military terminology.

9. For a broad survey of intellectual resources and a case for further field development see Glenn D. Paige, *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1977).

10. Preliminary discussions of the idea of some form of advanced global leadership project were held under the auspices of The United Nations University between 1981 and 1984 but failed to gain the support of the then Vice-Rector E. Ploman and Rector K. Soedjatmoko. Among the most active contributors to constructive thinking on this subject have been J. V. Abueva, J. Blondel, J. M. Burns, A. S. Majali, D. O. Mills, W. P. Shaw, C. Soysa, and R. C. Tucker. They formulated a proposal for an Institute for Advanced Study in Leadership together with a detailed plan for a one-year exploratory travelling seminar for younger leaders. It is hoped that visionary leaders, educators, administrations, and philanthropists will someday put these plans into action.

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SUMMER

The awakening of spring was followed by the eager explorations of summer. In December 1975, for example, I journeyed to India to study the nonviolent Gandhigram Rural Institute (Deemed University) and its military training alternative, the Shanti Sena [Peace Brigade], under the inspired leadership of Vice-Chancellor Dr. G. Ramachandran, chief organizer Professor N. Radhakrishnan, and their colleagues. This was done at the invitation of Dr. Ramachandran, who said on a visit to Hawaii that year, "Come to India and I will show you Gandhian principles of education in action." A whole university dedicated to nonviolence was a revelation to me. Its model of training for nonviolent community security and service is one that every university in the world eventually should emulate.

Journeys of nonviolent discovery were given extraordinary encouragement by colleagues whose kind initiatives offered inspiring opportunities for new learning, writing, and reflection. In the summer of 1978 Professor Hiroharu Seki, then director of the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, provided the opportunity to write my first essay, "On the Possibility of Nonviolent Political Science," in the victim-city of the world's first atomic bomb attack. In 1980 Ralph Summy of the University of Queensland made it possible to discuss nonviolent political science with scholars in a month-long nationwide visit to Australian universities.

In 1982 G. F. Kim in Moscow and Shi Gu in Beijing enabled me to exchange ideas on nonviolence in successive two-week visits with scholars of the then USSR Academy of Sciences and of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Thus I could visit Tolstoy's estate Yasnaya Polyana as well as challenge the search for nonviolent alternatives with the violent realities of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. In June 1984 Mrs. Gedong Bagoes Oka provided an uplifting environment for writing in her Gandhian Ashram Canti Dasa [Servants of Peace Ashram] on the island of

Bali. Two years later this served as the venue of an enlightening international seminar on "Islam and Nonviolence," of which I was privileged to serve as temporary convenor, with the support of the United Nations University. In 1989 Dr. G. Lubsantseren and colleagues of the Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP) made it possible to convene in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, an international seminar on "Buddhism and Nonviolent Global Problem-Solving." This was the fourth in a biennial series on Buddhism and Leadership for Peace begun in Hawaii in 1983. It brought together in Mongolia scholars from China, Japan, Korea (North and South), Mongolia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States as well as other countries to share ideas on nonviolence in relation to problems of common concern.

After some years of reeducation in the literature, history, institutions, and practice of nonviolence, I ventured to offer first a graduate seminar (1978) and then an undergraduate course (1980) on "Nonviolent Political Alternatives" in the Department of Political Science of the University of Hawai'i. As an experimental undergraduate course, at first there were fewer than the ten students that were administratively required to sustain a regular offering. But with the special support of the then departmental chairperson Professor Manfred Henningsen, the innovation was gradually able to establish itself as part of the curriculum. Subsequently the syllabus for the course was selected for publication, along with three others in the field of nonviolence by Gene Sharp, Harry G. Lefever, and Stephen Zunes in Daniel C. Thomas and Michael T. Klare, eds. *Peace and World Order Studies: A Curriculum Guide* (Boulder: Westview, 1989).

I became a student as well as a teacher. In the summer of 1985 I entered the extraordinary two-week course on "Nonviolence—Meanings, Forms and Uses," organized by Professor Theodore L. Herman (Director of Peace Studies, Colgate University) and Nigel Young (Peace Studies, Bradford University), at the Inter-University Centre for Postgraduate Studies in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia. There we were able to benefit from the inspiring experiences and subsequent friendship of Danilo Dolci ("the Gandhi of Sicily"), Dr. Bernard Lafayette, Jr. (gifted trainer for nonviolent action in the Martin Luther King, Jr., tradition), Dr. Lynne Jones (with other veterans of the Greenham Commons

Women's Peace Camp against nuclear weapons in England), and other young nonviolent activists from Europe and the United States.

In addition I met the young nonviolent Muslim political scientist Syed Sikander Mehdi from the University of Karachi, who was the second scholar to enlighten me about the nonviolent inspiration of Islam. The first was Chaiwat Satha-Anand, from Thammasat University in Bangkok, who wrote the first University of Hawai'i doctoral dissertation in the field of nonviolent politics in 1981. His subject was *The Nonviolent Prince,* a nonviolent reconstruction of Machiavelli's *The Prince* to seek new insights into political leadership without violence.

Later, in 1987, I entered a week-long training course in New Delhi to study the science-based Jain system of Preksha Meditation ("Perceive the self through the self"—"Search the truth thyself and be a friend to all"). The method uses energy from the brain to connect the endocrine system with the nervous system. It results from a synthesis of the philosophical wisdom of the 2,500-year old Jain tradition with modern science made by the brilliant contemporary Jain Terapanth leaders Acharya Tulsi and Yuvacharya Mahapragya. At the same time I discovered the well-conceived M.A. program in Nonviolence and Peace Research offered by the Jain Vishva Bharati (Deemed University) in Ladnun, Rajasthan. The degree requires preparation of eight papers: the history of war and peace; conflict resolution; economics of peace and nonviolence; sociology of peace and nonviolence; peace education; peace technology and disarmament; methodology of peace research; and a dissertation based on practical field work related to nonviolence and peace.

Further explorations in nonviolence naturally tended to be related to Korea, political leadership, and global politics. Three illustrative essays are included here.

* * * * *

After viewing Korean history and politics from a violent political-military standpoint, it was surprising for me to discover among some scholars in both Seoul and Pyongyang confirmation of the hypothesis that indeed there are nonviolent roots in the Korean

tradition that can be cultivated for Korean and global well-being. Three experiences stand out.

The first was a meeting in 1982 at his home with the late revered teacher-scholar Ham Sok Hon, a member of the Seoul Quaker Meeting and a courageous voice for freedom, justice, and nonviolence. In response to my question about the Korean roots of nonviolence, teacher Ham explained that they are evident in the creation myth of the Korean people. There is no violence in it: heaven and earth combine peacefully to create them. The same answer to the same question was given in Pyongyang in 1987 by the preeminent professor of Korean history, Pak Si Hyong, who added—as did teacher Ham—that Koreans had never been aggressors against their neighbors but rather had been victims of foreign violence. As the Korean example suggests, a comprehensive study of the nonviolent characteristics of any culture poses a critical task for interdisciplinary research.

A second extraordinary experience, also during my first visit to Pyongyang in 1987, came in response to the question as to whether a nonkilling/nonviolent society was possible. I posed this question to scholars of the Korean Association of Social Scientists (KASS), who are responsible for developing North Korea's social science and national philosophy, termed Juche (a concept stressing autonomously creative human social initiatives). As expressed by Professor Hwang Jang Yo]p, KASS president, a nonviolent society can be considered completely possible because: (1) humans are not animals, violent by instinct, but are endowed with consciousness, creativity, reason, and capacity for love, (2) scarce resources should not be used as an apologia for lethality because human needs can be met by a combination of creative productivity and equitable distribution, and (3) rape can be eliminated by education and the provision of a proper social atmosphere. As will be recalled, these responses are virtually a complete reversal of the opinions of my American political science colleagues when I first asked this question at Vanderbilt University eight years earlier in 1979.

A third experience, in late July 1990, also was profoundly moving. Together with gifted KASS scholar Professor Kim Myong U, I found myself standing on the rim of the magnificent volcanic mountain Paektusan on the Korean-Chinese border. The spectacular site is one of breathtaking beauty as well as of profound

significance in the national consciousness of the Korean people. How was it that all the killing force of the United States and the seventeen-nation United Nations Command in three years of war (1950-1953) had not been able to place a single soldier atop this mountain? Yet some forty-nine years later, here stood an ex-soldier become scholar together with a dearly respected Korean colleague. Surely the spirit of nonviolence, the common heritage of humankind, had brought us peacefully to the mountaintop.

Reflecting these experiences in both North and South Korea, the essay, "A Nonviolent Perspective on Korean Reunification Proposals" (1990), explores an approach to problem-solving that differs from conventional violence-accepting, political-military analysis. It emphasizes common humanity and respect for life. To develop such an approach to public policy formation presents an enormous task for political science.

* * * * *

Another task of nonviolent political science is to learn as much as possible from nonviolent political figures, social movements, institutions, and public policy initiatives. Just as Machiavelli studied such figures as Cesare Borgia, Pope Julius II, the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian, and others in formulating his analysis of violence-prone political leadership, nonviolent political science needs to be based upon keen understanding of nonviolent leadership experience. Through such knowledge it can assist nonviolent global transformation.

In the "Introduction" to Petra K. Kelly, *Nonviolence Speaks to Power*, I have listened to the voice of one of the world's most significant nonviolent political leaders. It may be contrasted with earlier research on President Truman and other American national security officials in *The Korean Decision.*

As co-founder of the Green Party in Germany, an experienced legislator, social movement activist (peace, environment, feminism, and human rights), international civil servant, writer, and world traveller, Petra Kelly set forth a broad agenda for nonviolent politics at the end of the twentieth century. As Green parties and movements continue to spread throughout the world, and as green principles are adopted by other parties, her voice and experience are

increasingly important. So are those of nonviolent persons in every field of global life.

Petra's tragic death in October 1992 was a tremendous shock and loss for me as for all her worldwide friends. Although unfortunately she did not see the final published volume of *Nonviolence Speaks to Power,* sent to her in September 1992, through it her vision, experience, and inspiration live on.

* * * * *

As a violence-accepting political scientist, I had given scant attention to extraordinary nonviolent leaders such as Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. But in the summer of awakening I became their eager student, as well as of nonviolent experience throughout the world. Subsequently it was a completely unexpected inspiration to be invited to serve as a member of the national advisory group of the New York State Martin Luther King, Jr. Institute for Nonviolence (1989) and to give the Third Gandhi Memorial Lecture in New Delhi on October 26, 1990. Other expressions of encouragement and challenge came from the unexpected receipt of the Buddhist Seikyo| Culture Prize (1982), the Dr. G. Ramachandran Award for International Peace (1986), the Princeton University Class of 1955 Award (1987), the Jain Anuvrat Award for International Peace (1987), and an honorary doctorate from So|ka University (1992). No words can express adequate appreciation for the kindness of these friends and the importance of their uplifting moral support.

"Gandhi's Contribution to Nonviolent Global Awakening" reflects upon the Gandhian legacy and focuses it upon global problem-solving. It calls attention to some nonviolent world resources and points to the need for institutional development to assist nonviolent global change.

5

A Nonviolent Perspective on Korean Reunification Proposals

Two broad proposals for Korea's peaceful reunification now stand before the people of Korea and the world community. One is the proposal for a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK) advanced by President Kim Il Sung on October 10, 1980, from the North. The other is the Korean National Community Formula (KNCF) set forth by President Roh Tae Woo on September 11, 1989, from the South, including provision for an interim Korean Commonwealth.

These proposals merit broad discussion from varied perspectives by all Koreans and by all who seek peace throughout the world. In this respect the organizers, supporters, and participants in the present conference are to be warmly congratulated. Among them is our respected colleague Professor Hiroharu Seki, whose creative efforts for peace sustained over many years have won for him in the hearts of all who know his work the scholarly equivalent of the Nobel prize for peace.

The purpose of this paper is to respond to these historic proposals from a nonviolent perspective. This means to reflect upon them from a viewpoint that considers it spiritually and scientifically possible eventually to realize a nonviolent world community. Such a community will have three characteristics. First, no killing and

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Prepared for the Third International Conference on Korean Studies, Section for Politics and Law, held in Osaka, Japan, August 3-5, 1990, sponsored by the Institute of Asian Studies, Osaka University of Economics and Law, and the Institute of Korean Culture Studies, Peking University.

no threats to kill. Second, no weapons specifically designed to kill and no ideological justifications for killing. And third, no conditions of society (whether political, economic, social, or cultural) that must be maintained or changed by threat or use of killing force.

At the outset we must realistically recall that both the DPRK and the ROK were created and have been maintained by violence at the cost of countless lives and enormous suffering. And we must also realistically recognize that continued reliance upon such violence, in Korea as throughout the world, threatens not only direct physical destruction of humankind but also political instability, economic deprivation, psychological illness, and ecological catastrophe.

Therefore, for Korea's reintegration a profoundly important scientific and practical question to ask is, "What kind of society can be created by Koreans that does not depend upon the threat or use of killing force?" If such a society can be created in the process of Korea's reunification it will be of epoch-making global significance. To assist this process, interdisciplinary and multicultural scientific research is needed on four additional questions: the causes of violence; the causes of nonviolence; the causes of transition from violence to nonviolence; and on factors favorable to a completely nonviolent human society.

The two current reunification proposals are not based specifically upon nonkilling principles. But they both declare commitment to "peace" and represent creative steps forward in finding cooperative nonmilitary means to remove the barriers that divide the nation.

Let us now review briefly these proposals from the perspective of nonviolent principles, noting first commonalities; next, differences: and then proceeding to explore some of their implications for constructive contributions to the process of nonviolent reintegration.

COMMONALITIES

1. Both affirm the unity and oneness of the Korean people, transcending all other divisions. This is an important principle of

nonviolence which extends to all humankind. Violence divides, but nonviolence unites.

2. Both affirm that reunification should be achieved by peaceful means. And both refer to the desirability of concluding a peace agreement. This emphasis upon peaceful means is in accord with the fundamental principle of nonviolence that ends and means are one. If a united Korea is to be peaceful, both domestically and internationally, the process of reintegration should be characterized by strict adherence to nonviolent means by both governments and both peoples.

3. Both proposals refer to confidence-building measures in the military area. These include such things as reduction of armed forces, controls on arms to prevent an armaments race, replacing the current armistice agreement with a peace treaty, and conclusion of a treaty of mutual nonaggression. These and other disarmament proposals currently being discussed in DPRK-ROK-USA informal trilateral talks (Institute for Disarmament and Peace, 1990), although still rooted in violence-accepting political systems, nevertheless represent constructive steps in the direction of nonviolent common security.

4. Whereas conventional violence seeks security by instilling fear of violence in the opponent, a nonviolent common security approach seeks to make it absolutely credible that there will be neither killing nor threats to kill. Nonviolent common security is the radical opposite of violent deterrence; it means maximum nonkilling credibility.

5. Both Korean governments declare their intention to establish peaceful relations with all nations of the world. This is fully in harmony with Korea's historic tradition of nonaggression. Such expressions have appeared at crucial moments in Korean history, such as in the *Samil* [March 1, 1919] Independence Movement and in political manifestoes that appeared immediately after the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945. These Korean declarations of universal peacefulness are important symbolic contributions toward realization of a nonviolent world.

6. In the DCRK and Korean Commonwealth proposals each government recognizes the existence of the other (although not as sovereign states) and expresses willingness to enter into an interim process of cooperation leading to some form of reintegration of the

whole Korean nation. This may be contrasted with previous denial of the legitimacy of the other as a negotiating partner combined with readiness to destroy and dominate the other by violence. A key principle of nonviolent political theory holds that violence results from denial of identity and other human needs combined with exclusion from participation in decision-making processes through which such needs can be expressed and met. Denial of dignity leads to lethality. Conversely the greatest hope for reintegration in a nonviolent political community is to create a process of problem-solving in which everyone with unfulfilled needs can participate (Burton, 1979).

7. Both call for openness and an ever widening range of contacts among all sectors of social life. Through such contacts both sides can learn about the true humanity of the other to which those who have been privileged to have dear friends in both North and South Korea can testify. Violence is associated with dehumanization of the other and inability to see the world as the other sees it. Nonviolence is associated with empathy and ability to recognize the precious gift of life in the other. Gradually such contact should help everyone to understand how best to recombine the divided nation for the well-being of all.

8. Both proposals and subsequent initiatives reflect growing creativity in seeking peaceful means to achieve unification. Creativity is an especially important principle of nonviolence. Whereas violence requires extremely high degrees of creativity—as witness that required by high technology weapons of mass destruction—nonviolence requires even greater creativity. For the task of nonviolence is not only to detach support from and to reverse the means of violence, but also to create nonviolent social alternatives that make violence unthinkable and unnecessary.

9. Finally both sides have tended to blame the other for failure to make further progress on reunification issues. This is a common characteristic of cultures of violence that tend to see the opponent as wholly bad and the self as completely good. Nonviolence, however, tends to see the self in the other and the other in the self. The process of nonviolent reintegration will be vastly facilitated when all parties, domestic and foreign, to the violence that divided and continues to divide Korea recognize their own responsibility for it. Also they must come to recognize the

nonviolent potentialities in each other as well as in themselves. All must find the strength to proceed beyond simple condemnation of the other to engage in realistic processes of nonviolent problem-solving. It is likely that research into the concepts of "apology" and "forgiveness" in Korean culture will make an important contribution to this process.

DIFFERENCES

Let us turn now to consider some differences in the reunification proposals as seen from a nonviolent viewpoint.

1. Whereas the southern proposal emphasizes the value of freedom as means and end, the northern proposal refers to the necessity to provide for the economic well-being of all the working people, something about which the Korean Commonwealth proposal is relatively silent. These differences are reminiscent of the insightful observation of the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff some thirty years ago that the greatest weakness in the socialist system is the freedom of the individual—whereas the greatest weakness of capitalism is the question of economic justice. From this perspective the problem of Korean reunification may be summarized as how to combine concerns for freedom and economic justice for all Koreans through nonviolent means based upon truth and love.

2. The two proposals differ in their vision of the final political-economic structure of a reunited Korea and in the political form best suited to achieve final reintegration. This is a problem area of great complexity, containing issues that include overall conceptualization, legal technicalities, and the extent of popular participation in the reunification process. There are differences within as well as across the two parties. Having failed to impose their political, ideological, and economic system upon the other by war, each side is determined not to come under the domination of the other in the peaceful reunification process. In attempting to recognize this reality, the North proposes to leave the existing systems as they are, but to establish a third overarching governmental structure with a rotating presidency between North and South. This structure, the DCRK, is expected to formulate policies in the interest of Korea as a whole. An authoritative

interpretation in Pyo]ngyang is that the DCRK is not just a stage on the path to some final form of unitary system, but is in fact the final form of reunification. Legally state sovereignty would be considered to reside in the DCRK and it alone would become a member of the United Nations. Meanwhile regional governments in Pyongyang and Seoul would continue to administer their areas with different ideological, political, social, and cultural characteristics. Other views envision the gradual peaceful evolution of the two regions into a more homogeneous society reflecting the best features of both systems.

By contrast the Korean National Community Unification Formula proposed by the South envisions a unitary “democratic republic” with a homogeneous political, economic, social, and cultural system to be achieved through a general election by all the Korean people. The form of the unified state is to be specified in a Constitution to which both sides will contribute. In the Korean Commonwealth stage there will be dual partici-pation by prime ministers, cabinets, and legislatures to draft the Constitution and to plan the general election to ratify it.

From a nonviolent perspective the most important response that can be made to these complex differences is to emphasize nonviolent participatory process. Violence arises when needs are not met or are suppressed. The needs of both governments, both peoples, and of those who identify completely with neither government all need to be expressed and responded to in a process of gentleness based on reason. Admittedly this is not easy to achieve in political cultures based on violence. But it is the only way in which the interests of all the Korean people ultimately can be satisfied.

2. The Korean National Community Unification Formula is relatively silent on the DCRK proposals for declaring Korea a nuclear-weapon-free zone of peace, phased withdrawal of U.S. military forces, abrogating foreign military alliances, reducing armed forces to one hundred thousand men or less, and explicitly committing Korea to a policy of permanent neutrality in world military affairs. From a nonviolent viewpoint all these proposals are in a desirable direction.

But looking ahead, these proposals need to be carried even further into research and development to create a nonviolent

common security system. Such a system is not yet developed fully in any nation, but will be entirely possible in a future Korea that has decisively rejected violence on the basis of its wartime suffering and subsequent violence. A nonviolent common security system would include several elements: a joint nonviolent common security council and staff college, specially trained nonviolent forces for land, sea, and air operations, a civilian population fully trained in methods of nonviolent conflict resolution, common security, and common defense, and training for nonviolent service throughout the educational system, including training for nonviolent leadership to replace military training in colleges and universities.

Serious consideration of developing a nonviolent common security system of course is not only a task for Koreans but also for all those who have contributed so much to violence in Korea: Americans, Russians, Chinese, Japanese, and others.

4. In discussing obstacles to the respective reunification proposals, the DPRK emphasizes the external factor of American military intervention and continued presence. The ROK stresses what is perceived as the regimented military belligerence of the North that might repeat its effort to achieve reunification by violence. While both views are rooted in frightful historical reality, genuine nonviolent reconcilia-tion will require mutual apologies and forgiveness combined with radical commitment by present and future generations of all concerned to a new nonkilling ethic. This nonkilling ethic should become the heart of the Korean reunification process.

IMPLICATIONS

One of the most important implications of a nonviolent approach to Korean reunification is intensified awareness of the urgency of reuniting the most elderly parents with their children before death separates them forever. As of 1990, parents who were 30 years old in 1945 are now 75. Children born in 1945 are now 45 years old. Parents who were 40 then are now 85. Children who were 10 then are now 55.

Since respect for family relations lies at the heart of Korean culture, it is entirely appropriate that urgent action be taken to reunite the most elderly with their children before it is too late.

Since much preliminary work has already been completed by the North and South Korean Red Cross societies, all that is needed is top leadership commitment and the expression of political will to bring it about.

If North and South cannot cooperate to reunite the most elderly parents with their children, then confidence is weakened in their ability to accomplish the more complex tasks of reunification. Therefore if this problem is not solved in the forthcoming prime ministerial meetings scheduled for September and October 1990, it is suggested that this problem be made the subject of a single agenda presidential summit to be convened as soon as possible. For time is rapidly running out. It is further suggested that an appropriate venue for such a meeting would be atop Mt. Paektusan, which has such deep cultural meaning for all Korean identity. A Paektusan Presidential Summit on Elderly Parent-Child Reunification would be remembered forever in Korean and world history.

In conclusion—for the restoration of national and international community—as in a family—great evil must be followed by great love. And the greater the evil, the greater must be the love. If Koreans refuse to kill each other, no foreign power can force them to do so. If Koreans refuse to kill each other, no foreign bases or military bases are necessary. And if the great powers (mainly the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan) refuse to kill Koreans and instead offer them the love and respect that they richly deserve as the creative descendants of one of the world's great civilizations—then the peaceful reunification of the Korean nation and its contribution to nonviolent global transformation will be assured.

The heart of the matter lies in just three words: "No more killing!"

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6

“Introduction” to Petra K. Kelly, *Nonviolence Speaks to Power*

Since all of us have power, Petra Kelly speaks to each of us. She speaks to power of the top and bottom; of the Left, Center, and Right; of the inside and outside; of women and men; of the old and young; of the individual and society; and of nature and humanity. She speaks of, in, and to a planetary circle. She is not always critical; she celebrates as well as censures. Her voice is well worth listening to because we are all dependent for life upon each other and upon our planetary home.

Like Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., from whom she has drawn nonviolent inspiration (Kelly 1989), however, she has a special sense of the beings for whom she speaks. Amidst the formal institutions of political power she is the voice of the voiceless, those whom she calls “the victims of established power.” “To my mind,” she explains, “the purpose of politics and of political parties is to stand up for the weak, for those who have no lobby or other means of exerting influence. . . . I view my political work as acting for and with people” (p. 125; unless otherwise noted, page numbers refer to *Nonviolence Speaks to Power*). Thus she speaks on a global scale for cancer-ill children, victims of nuclear radiation, the impoverished, indigenous peoples, and women—as well as for trees, plants, animals, and all the “offspring of Mother Earth.”

From *Nonviolence Speaks to Power,* by Petra K. Kelly, edited by Glenn D. Paige and Sarah Gilliatt (Honolulu: Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 1992), pp. 1-14.

She speaks as a human being and a worker for a nonviolent world out of a specific context and experience. This includes keen awareness of being in the economically favored "North" as contrasted with the impoverished "South." She speaks as a German, mindful of Germany's violent past, experienced in peaceful efforts to transcend the East-West division, and knowledgeable about violent aspects of German reunification at the end of the USA-USSR superpower confrontation. Like other political innovators she is bilingual (German-English), has lived in another culture (the United States), and has travelled extensively to other countries (e.g., to Australia, India, Mexico, Turkey, and many others). Her travels aid her in finding alternative ways of being in the world.

She is an experienced European Community civil servant, a cofounder of the German Green Party (Die Grünen), a veteran social activist and electoral campaigner, and an experienced legislator who knows parliamentary life from the inside as a two-term member of the German Bundestag with special service on its Foreign Affairs Committee.

As a woman she can understand and explain things beyond the ken of men. As a grieving sister, she knows the painful loss of her little sister Grace who died of cancer at age ten.

Petra Kelly speaks in and contributes to an era of growing global consciousness. This includes awareness of the threat of nuclear annihilation, ecocide, economic injustice, and massive violations of human rights produced by nationalism, ethnocentrism, racism, patriarchy, and fundamentalism—as well as by greed, hatred, and ignorance. Amidst unprecedented threats to survival and well-being, she calls for unprecedented nonviolent cooperative action to remove them.

TO WHOM DOES SHE SPEAK? AND WHAT DOES SHE SAY?

She speaks to governments and their leaders, to ministries, parliaments, and parties. She addresses them in Germany and across national boundaries. Her conscience as a nonviolent human being transcends both her role as a government official and the diplomatic niceties of national boundaries. She uses neither her

official position nor her nationality as an excuse for silence. For her, sovereignty is no defense against nonviolent truth.

She tells governments to stop exploiting their own and other peoples; to stop lying, secrecy, deception, and inaction; to open up decision-making processes for debate and popular participation on crucial issues; and to critically examine the global consequences of their actions. She especially condemns governments for failures to protect the earth, public health, and human rights as well as for failure to stop the spread of nuclear and other lethal technologies. As she explains, "the superficial way in which vital issues are dealt with in Bonn often shocked and angered me" (p. 133).

She praises as well as criticizes. For example, she lauds the Indian government for providing a refuge for Tibetans in exile (p. 29), while at the same time she questions its human rights policies toward Sikhs, opposes its missile testing programs, and calls upon it not to develop nuclear weapons. She praises the Australian government for proposing to establish a World Wilderness Park in the Antarctic (p. 54), while protesting its missile tests and appropriation of Aboriginal lands for military use.

She speaks to globally powerful domestic and multinational corporations and calls for an end to profit-seeking actions that corrupt governments, exploit the poor, devastate the environment, spread lethal technologies, and poison people. She praises the Gerber and Beech-Nut corporations for removing noxious substances from baby foods (p. 46). She speaks also to labor unions, praising their defense of the environment, as in Australia's Green Ban movement (p. 58), while criticizing them for complicity in life-threatening governmental and corporate actions such as the mining and export of uranium for use in nuclear weapons and nuclear power.

Speaking to the press and mass media, she appeals for more courageous reporting of truthful "counterinformation" that spotlights problems and conditions contrary to official interpretations, thus providing bases for greater responsiveness to human and ecological needs. She also asks them to stop the mislabelling and misquotation that create unwarranted conflict and misunderstanding.

Speaking to the consumers of rich countries and well-off classes, she asks us to reduce our consumption of energy and other

global resources so as to stop destruction of the environment (e.g. rain forests), impoverishment of people ("the poor are feeding the rich"), and military aggression to control sources of supply.

Speaking to men, she calls for an end to patriarchal domination and exploitation. Speaking to women, she urges assertive solidarity in feminist restructuring of male power. She praises courageous feminist leadership in the antiwar, economic justice, ecological, human rights, freedom, and other movements for the well-being of all—while recognizing also the contributions of "many brave and courageous men" (Kelly 1990, p. 15). To all adults she asks that we consider how our political and economic policies and practices affect children, the elderly, the weak, and the poor.

She also speaks to large and sweeping collectivities, encompassing all the foregoing. She calls upon Germany to be honestly critical about its past atrocities; to democratize, demilitarize, and neutralize itself; to liberate itself from racism; and to assume responsibility for domestic and global democratic and ecological well-being. She appeals to all humanity to speak up against abuses of power on behalf of its victims. To all she cries out, "Save the planet!"

Ultimately she speaks to the self—the essence of the reflective, moral individual. "If we want to transform society in an ecological way, we must transform ourselves profoundly first" (Kelly 1991, p. 2). Abruptly she reminds us that if we want nonviolent global change, "we must first point the finger at ourselves" (p. 51). This is completely in the spirit of nonviolent politics, which may be the world's first political movement that does not divide the "good" self from the "bad" enemy, king, or class, but rather sees in each of us the potential for rectifying wrong. It recognizes also that mass acquiescence by individuals permits the perpetuation of direct and structural violence (Sharp 1973, 1979; Galtung 1969).

IN WHAT DIRECTIONS SHOULD WE MOVE?

The essence of political leadership is to point the way (Tucker 1981) and the highest form of it is morally transforming for both

leaders and those who respond to or call for their action (Burns 1978). Petra Kelly’s leadership exemplifies both of these qualities.

For *global peace and disarmament* she calls for the rejection of war as a political instrument; radical disarmament; removal of foreign military bases; replacement of military defense with civilian-based social defense; dismantling of military alliances; abolition of production, testing, sale, and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; abolition of the world arms trade; and transformation of military industries and budgets to serve social and economic needs.

For *global economic justice*, she appeals to the affluent industrialized countries to limit their consumption of global resources; to stop exporting dangerous technologies; and to stop using superior economic power to subordinate and exploit less favored peoples. To these ends, she urges economic decentralization of “monolithic modes” of production and technology as represented by the “military-industrial complex” (p. 63).

For *global human rights*, she demands adherence to universal standards—not just condemning violations by enemies, while overlooking those of allies; freedom of dissent for all; an end to male domination and an assertion of feminine power; cessation of suppression of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities; termination of invasions and occupations (e.g., Tibet); and care for children, the aged, and the sick.

To *protect the biosphere* and its inhabitants, she calls for an end to nuclear technology (“No more Chernobyls!”); the prohibition of the dumping of toxic wastes (“Garbage Imperialism”); an end to commercial destruction of the rain forests; and the prohibition of all other practices and technologies that threaten to destroy the planetary life-supporting capacity. Instead, she calls for the creation of “soft” energy and other technologies as well as for cleanup, restoration, recycling, and respectful preservation. She urges creation of “a global culture of ecological responsibility” and establishment of “binding principles governing ecological relations among all countries” (p. 76).

For *global problem-solving cooperation*, she calls for the combination of demands from below and responsiveness from above that will bring about the well-being of all. She appeals for solidarity and participation of peoples across national boundaries

and across all of the foregoing problem areas. In this way people can urge governments to adopt policies that are responsive to global needs and insist upon change.

Furthermore, viewing global life from a holistic perspective, she reminds us of the interconnectedness of all these issues. She explains, "Green politics is different from all other forms of politics because it acknowledges the complexity of that web of life" (Kelly n.d., "Greens . . . ," p. 10). Firm commitment to life-respecting principles is the basis of problem-solving action: "Living our values is what Green politics is all about" (p. 28). "Complete demilitarization and complete democratization" are imperative for saving the planet and its inhabitants from destruction. "An ecological society is a truly free society" (p. 22). Furthermore, "environmental problems cannot be solved without understanding the economic issues of which they are a part" (Kelly n.d., "Greens . . . ," p. 8). And, the converse of this is also true. "Over and over again," she insists, "we must stress that a healthy ecology is the basis for a healthy economy" (Kelly n. d., "Introduction...," p. 8). Finally, to solve global problems and their local manifestations universal human cooperation is necessary: "Green politics means that, on a global scale, we must act responsibly for each other and practice solidarity across boundaries and ideologies" (p. 62).

In sum, Petra Kelly's message to all who have power is simply this: respect life; be truthful about threats to its existence; and work nonviolently to remove them. Of special interest is what she has learned as a political leader about putting this message into practice.

Neither Tolstoy, nor Gandhi, nor King created a nonviolent political party, stood in electoral competition as its candidate, and served as an exponent of its values in a national legislature. Many nonviolent figures in history have deliberately separated themselves from direct participation in formal political institutions (parties, legislatures, executives) as violent instruments of the state. In this tradition, some participants in Germany's Green ecological movement opposed the formation of a political party. They favored seeking nonviolent social transformation by working outside formal political institutions. This debate continues as the Green movement and parties spread throughout the world.

Nevertheless, Petra Kelly and her German Green colleagues, coming out of an anti-leader subculture in a country with a

spectacularly violent history, chose the enormously difficult path of direct nonviolent political leadership. Her objective was to create an "anti-party party" based upon a new form of "shared power" from the bottom up rather than upon dominating power from the top down—this being "the power of nonviolent change" (pp. 21, 41). Such a party would act simultaneously with "courage and conviction" in the streets and in legislatures at all levels as a "conscience and moral force" to control executive governments. Such a party would seek to strengthen democratic processes from below.

She recognizes that "the question of nonviolence is the biggest challenge to all Green parties." One reason for this is that all members do not accept nonviolence as an uncompromisable principle rather than merely as a useful political tactic. Another problem is that the more successful Green parties become, sometimes in coalitions with other parties, the more responsible they are for the direct and structural violence of the state. With characteristic frankness she observes, "I do not believe we have yet found the answer, but we all know that we must try to transform these violent institutions into nonviolent institutions" (p. 67). This is precisely the challenge of nonviolent politics, combining nonviolent movements for social change with direct nonviolent political participation for nonviolent global transformation.

WHAT ARE THE LESSONS FROM HER EXPERIENCE?

These are reflected mainly in her essays on "Morality and Human Dignity" and an "Open Letter to the German Green Party." First, as she admits, "The Greens, originally intent on transforming power from below, have meanwhile become victims of power from above" (p. 127). This might well have been foreseen on the basis of the classic study of *Political Parties* by Robert Michels (1915) in which he posits an "iron law of oligarchy." This is a process by which the politics of the many becomes the politics of the few cut off from their popular base and engaged in factional and personal struggle for power. This text is an indispensable challenge for all who seek to disprove such a "law." In Petra Kelly's analysis the co-optation of the German Greens in power struggles from the top, combined with failure to adhere uncompromisingly to their

principles, contributed to their foreseeable failure to gain 5 percent of the votes in the December 1990 national election, with consequent loss of all their seats in the Bundestag.

But the difficulties encountered by Petra Kelly and other nonviolent leaders reflect also the inadequacy of preparation and support that societies are prepared to give political leaders in general. In contrast, compare the great social investment in education and training for military leaders, businessmen, lawyers, and civil servants. On the contrary, political leaders are supposed to emerge spontaneously out of a struggle for power, relatively unaided—except that in violence-accepting societies they are apt to be recruited from the forenamed professions. This is accompanied by virtually universal criticism of the quality and behavior of political leaders in every type of society.

These conventional problems of political leadership are compounded for nonviolent leaders who seek to question, challenge, and change the policies and institutions of violence-prone societies—political, military, economic, social, cultural, and ecological—not only locally but also globally. The lonely paths to martyrdom of Gandhi and King provide prototypical examples.

Therefore Petra Kelly's analysis of the personal, organizational, and structural factors that contribute to "self-defeating" electoral, legislative, and executive politics is especially important. The problem of egotistical, jealous, and aggressive personalities—more self-oriented than issue-oriented, compassionate, and constructive—is a fundamental one. It results in an atmosphere of mutual distrust that Petra Kelly characterizes as "Kill the Leaders!" (p. 18). To create nonviolent politics with personalities produced and scarred by violent societies is indeed difficult because nonviolence means noninjury in thought, word, and deed. Since nonviolence applies to friends as well as to enemies, it should be assiduously practiced in a nonviolent political party or movement. But given global resources for spiritual and organizational change, given the will and means, this problem is no more insoluble than to take relatively peaceful citizens and to train them to lead, kill, and die in military combat. The scientific combination of meditation and nutrition offers one nonsectarian point of departure (e.g., Yuvacharya Mahapragya 1986, 1988).

Humans are capable of both violence and nonviolence. How we act depends upon which qualities we wish to develop in ourselves, our leaders, and others for the well-being of all. Better human relations are possible among nonviolent leaders, parties, and all who support them. It will take research, education, training, and hard work to accomplish this. But nonviolent movements should take the improvement of organizational performance no less seriously than do military establishments and corporations.

Although Petra Kelly does not mention it, nonviolent political leaders, both inside and outside formal institutions, need opportunities for rest, recreation, and reflection—for spiritual, psychological, and physical revitalization. They need this no less than soldiers in combat or professors who take sabbatical leave. Gandhi's periodic withdrawals from campaigns into ashram life provide an illustration. Driven by events, under attack from both inside and outside the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King, Jr., had virtually no chance for this. Therefore the provision of completely supportive havens for spiritual and physical revitalization is a service to nonviolent leaders in which visionary benefactors and life-uplifting institutions should cooperate.

Petra Kelly's emphasis upon the acquisition, study, and use of "counterinformation" for effective nonviolent political action is of central importance. Such information is needed to counter governmental ignorance, secrecy, deception, and inaction. The stress of information overload experienced by the conscientious nonviolent political figure who seeks to respond to human needs on a wide range of local and global issues is readily understandable. This can be made more manageable by skilful combination of technologies and highly competent staff assistance. Both of these are apt to be in short supply for nonviolent leaders. It is not that they do not exist, or cannot be created. Their absence results from two reluctances: the reluctance of dominant, violence-accepting institutions to provide them; and the reluctance of nonviolent political figures who are nurtured in principles of self-reliance and frugality to insist upon them. Supporters of nonviolent political leadership must help to remove these obstacles.

Another lesson can be learned from the fact that although Petra Kelly speaks for the victims of dominant power, she works amidst elite institutions: parties, governments, bureaucracies, the

media, and universities. On behalf of power from the bottom up she works primarily from the top down. For comparison, consider the elite person who goes to work for nonviolent change among the poor. Both are essential for nonviolent global transformation—as are poor who work among the poor and elites who work among elites.

But working at the top entails two dangers—isolation and co-optation—for which Petra Kelly suggests corresponding remedies. The first is to try in every way not to lose touch with the various social movements that challenge governmental failure to respond to people's needs. For increasing responsiveness to them is the heart of the nonviolent political process (Burton 1979). She insists, "We cannot stop our ecological consciousness-raising in the streets, even while we are in Parliament. We cannot forget our commitments to the social movements outside!" (p. 67) The other recommended remedy is to engage in civil disobedience within the dominant institutions. This means not to lose contact with those at the top, contact characterized by principled dissent against misuse of power. She explains, "All of us in Germany would benefit if we were to learn at last the liberating and constructive art of civil disobedience—not just in the extraparliamentary movement, but also within parliament and political parties. Civil disobedience has to be practiced in parliament or even within our own party if we become too dogmatic, powerful, or arrogant" (p. 148).

Still another lesson for nonviolent political leadership to be learned from her experience is her sense of constituency that differs radically from conventional representational politics. Petra Kelly's constituency is the planet. Imagine it yours as seen from outer space—an increasingly dirty, white-smudged, blue-green spinning ball. From this perspective violent divisions melt away and the nonviolent unity of life is evident. Her constituency includes all the human beings on earth. One expression of their interests is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Her constituency also includes all nonhuman forms of life and everything that supports them. These basic ideas of constituency help to explain why she refuses to be confined within national boundaries, why she works locally for global good, and why she works globally for local well-being. Nonviolent political leaders of the future and their supporters have much to learn from this.

Comparison of Petra Kelly with Gandhi and King, whose nonviolent tradition she continues, is appropriate. Although all three share these qualities to some degree it is nevertheless fair to say that she is more ecologically and globally oriented, more expressive of feminist concerns, more clearly opposed to militarization in all its forms, more experienced in electoral and parliamentary politics, and more informed by global travel. She is a pioneer in carrying nonviolent politics directly into the heart of formal political institutions from a global perspective.

She is at one with Gandhi and King, as with the earlier Tolstoy, in possessing a keen sense of the spiritual roots and strength of nonviolence. "We cannot solve any political problems without also addressing our spiritual ones!" (p. 17) For her this means developing "respect for all living things" and understanding their "interrelatedness" and "inter-connectedness." This for her is the core of Green ethics and politics. "I believe," she declares, "that unarmed truth and unconditional love will have the final word in reality" (Kelly 1987b, p. 32).

Petra Kelly deserves to be seen now and will in the future be recognized with Tolstoy, Gandhi, and King as a preeminent contributor to nonviolent global change in the twentieth century.

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7

Gandhi's Contribution to Global Nonviolent Awakening

The honorable Vice-President of India Dr. S. D. Sharma, the honorable Member of Parliament and Vice-Chairman of the Gandhi Smriti and Darshan Samiti Shri B. N. Pande, the devoted Director of the Gandhi Smriti and Darshan Samiti Prof. N. Radhakrishnan, honored guests, dear brothers and sisters—all—who have gathered here to honor the memory of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, revered as Mahatma, respected as Gandhiji, lovingly called Bapu, and affectionately known to some as Mohan.

It is an honor beyond words to be asked to appear before you as the third contributor to the Gandhi Memorial Lecture series. Only the example of Gandhiji himself encourages me to do so. For it was he who showed us that by accepting challenges seemingly beyond our grasp—basing ourselves on a living faith in nonviolence—we can all contribute something to ever widening circles of truth and love that will join us together in nonviolent global community.

In gathering here to honor him we join our hearts and minds in pondering anew the great task he set before himself and before us all. "My mission," he explained, "is to convert every Indian, even Englishmen, and finally the world to nonviolence for regulating mutual relations, whether political, economic, social, or religious." (Tendulkar, Vol. 2, p. 221)

Therefore in the present talk I wish to begin to explore with you the subject of "Gandhi's Contribution to Global Nonviolent Awakening." This is of immediate importance and will be of

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Third Gandhi Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the Gandhi Smriti and Darshan Samiti, New Delhi, India, October 26, 1990.

perennial interest in the future development of world civilization. In the course of this exploration we will touch upon many subjects only lightly. Also these subjects may not be presented in as orderly a fashion as you might prefer. Furthermore the variation of the English language that is my native tongue—and that must be used because of my inability to communicate in Hindi or other Indian languages—may not be easily understandable. Nevertheless it is hoped that you will find this talk to be simple in structure and practical in content. We will begin with the fingers of the left hand, then proceed to the fingers of the right, and finally bring both hands together.

It is said that when Gandhiji spoke to villagers he frequently pointed to the fingers of his left hand to represent five great calls for problem-solving action that confronted India in the struggle for independence: spinning, removal of untouchability, improvement of the status of women, abstinence from drugs and alcohol, and achievement of Hindu-Muslim harmony. Then it is said he would point to his wrist and say something like, "This is nonviolence." (Ashe, p. 243)

If we had the joy of his presence today, Gandhiji might summarize the pressing problems confronting our global village in a similar way. Pointing to the fingers of his left hand, he might say, "Here are the problems we must solve: peace and disarmament, economic justice, human rights, preservation of the environment, and realization of problem-solving cooperation among all the peoples of the earth." Then, pointing to his wrist, he might add, "This is nonviolence, the way we must go about solving these problems."

I do not intend to belabor you with yet another detailed recitation of these crucial threats to the survival and well-being of humankind: the threat of war with weapons of increasingly suicidal lethality—and the need for disarmament; the unspeakable impoverishment of vast masses of our fellow human beings contrasted with the opulence of others—and the need to ensure the welfare of all; the massive violations of human dignity deriving from discrimination on the basis of religion, color, gender, class, caste, nationality, ideology, and other pretexts for oppression—and the need for

mutual recognition of common humanity; the threats to the life-sustaining capacity of the biosphere (land, sea, and air) posed by ignorance, greed, and noxious technologies—and the need for all to respect the life of the planet; and finally, the divisiveness among nations and classes, rich and poor, strong and weak, exploiter and exploited—and the need for cooperation among all to realize global *sarvodaya* (well-being of all).

Gradually an awareness of these problems, both individually and collectively, is beginning to enter the consciousness of humankind. This is coming about as the result of dedicated actions by many individuals, voluntary organizations, some governments, and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, as well as by performing artists and the mass media.

From one perspective, these threats are being perceived as global problems requiring global solutions. From another, they are problems that we confront in our daily lives—individually; in our families; in our villages, towns, and cities; in our nations; and in our regions. That is, we are faced with violence, economic needs, violations of dignity, deteriorating environments, and divisiveness in each circle of our lives from the individual to the global.

As we confront these problems, many of us are gradually becoming aware that our continued acceptance of violence—our willingness to kill—while not the only causal factor, is nevertheless a major cause of these increasing threats to human survival and well-being. Our historic readiness to kill for security and revolutionary change has brought us to a mental and technological state in which no one on earth is safe from destruction. We are now able to kill more people, more quickly, in more ways, and with more far reaching consequences than in any other age. As ancient wisdom warned us, and as Gandhiji taught, violence begets violence, and we are faced with prospects of infinite ingenuity in discovering new ways to destroy each other.

Our willingness to kill contributes to economic deprivation in many ways. It directly diverts morality, intellect, science, labor, capital, resources, and technology from service to human needs. Our gigantic global military establishment and its deadly opponents also contribute to economic death and destruction by preventing the need-responsive structural changes among nations and classes that will be required to realize the material well-being of all. The gun in

service to power, greed, hatred, and ignorance—as well as to more lofty aims such as peace, freedom, and justice—kills by impoverishment as well as by force.

Our commitment to violence in pursuit of human rights places them in eternal jeopardy. The violent freedom and justice fighter of today becomes tomorrow's deadly threat. One righteous atrocity evokes another and hate-filled grievances echo across the centuries. No individual, family, group, organization, community, religion, culture, or nation can be safe in freedom and justice as long as right depends on might.

And the more human needs such as for cultural identity, material adequacy, and freedom of expression are suppressed by violence, the more the counterviolence that can be expected. Because such needs are common to all, the poor and rich, the strong and weak, the use of violence to assert human rights leaves each and all in perpetual fearfulness.

Furthermore, our continued commitment to violence threatens to kill the life-sustaining capabilities of Mother Earth. We kill directly by employment and testing of nuclear, biochemical, and other weapons of mass destruction that threaten the land, sea and air upon which all things depend for life. The vast military consumption of fossil fuels and the wastes produced by nuclear power contributes to present and long-range environmental contamination. The resource depletion and toxic wastes produced by industries that are deemed necessary to produce weapons and services for modern warfare further contribute to environmental devastation. So great is the environmental destructiveness of global militarization and associated disrespect for ecological vitality, that environmentalist Barry Commoner has recently warned us that we are in a suicidal "war with the planet" and that the planet inevitably will win. He warns that "survival depends equally on ending the war with nature and on ending wars among ourselves. . . . To make peace with the planet we must make peace with the peoples who live in it." (Commoner, p. 243)

Finally our commitment to violence divides us into armored states that resist cooperation to solve problems in the interest of all. Militarized nationalism absolves us of responsibility for the welfare of others. With soldiers, ships, and aircraft we subdivide planetary space—forgetting that sun, wind, earth, and oceans, as well as

plants and animals—have no citizenship. Every expert on global hunger tells us that the basic obstacle is not capability to produce food but the politics of inequitable distribution within and among nation-states.

Furthermore, the problems of war, human rights, and environmental pollution cannot be solved solely within national boundaries. Like economic justice, they require the life-respecting cooperation of humanity.

Increasingly we are coming to understand that these five problems are both interrelated as well as derivative from cultural acceptance of violence. Militarization, for example, increases insecurity, exacerbates poverty, depresses human rights, harms the environment, and divides humankind. Fearfully selfish divisiveness in turn leads to economic deprivation, lack of respect for human rights, inability to cooperate for environmental protection, and to agressive militarization. Economic injustice incites to violence, violates human rights, despoils the environment, divides communities, and so on. . . .

As we awaken to the threat to global survival posed by customary violence-accepting cultures, we simultaneously search for sources of nonviolent inspiration and problem-solving alternatives. This leads inevitably to the discovery of Gandhiji, his life and message, of India, the society that nurtured and tested him, and of his successors in India and elsewhere as they seek to carry forward the spirit and substance of his work. Without any doubt, Gandhiji, as supported by those who made his work possible, is the principal contributor to global nonviolent awakening in the 20th century. Of course, when we turn to Gandhiji, we discover not him alone but also Kasturbai Gandhi, Kamala Nehru, Sarojini Naidu, Sucheta Kripalani, Sushila Nayar, Ganga Behn, and other courageous women; as well as Jawaharlal Nehru, Vinoba Bhave, J. P. Narayan, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Maulana Azad, C. F. Andrews, Horace Alexander, G. Rama-chandran and many others. Additionally, when we turn to India we discover not only Gandhian nonviolence but the principled nonviolence of other great spiritual and practical leaders such as that of Acharya Tulsi of the Terapanth Jains, his *anuvrat* [small vow] movement, and its associated institutions like the Anuvrat Vishva Bharat (Anuvrat Global

Organization), and the Jain Vishva Bharati Institute (Deemed University)

Without doubt, Gandhiji's nonviolent influence can be expected to increase in world affairs as we enter the 21st century. Despite the darkness of the past and of the present moment, the lights of nonviolence being lit throughout the world provide signs of great hope.

So let us turn from the violent problems of the fingers of the left hand to the nonviolent promise of the fingers of the right. What are the key elements of the nonviolent legacy that Gandhiji has bequeathed to all who seek guidance in contributing to nonviolent global transformation? There are, of course, many—but to continue the imagery of the hand, let us emphasize five.

First is Gandhiji's insistence that nonviolence is profoundly *spiritual*. The word is spiritual, not sectarian. In insisting that nonviolence must be based on a living faith in God—defined as truth and love—Gandhiji calls upon us to root our work for nonviolence solidly in the principal teaching of all the spiritual faiths, great and small, that have inspired the development of human civilization. Surely the voice of God, the Creator, or the divine presence in life, however conceived, has not been calling upon humankind to go out and kill our fellow human beings and to destroy our planetary home. Rather this voice has been calling upon us to love one another, respect life, and care for the gift of nature into which we are born.

The proof of this assertion is that there are now and have been nonviolent adherents of every faith drawing inspiration from deep within the wellsprings of their tradition. This includes nonviolent adherents of indigenous spiritual traditions (such as Hawaiians), nonviolent Baha'is, nonviolent Buddhists, nonviolent Christians (Catholic and Protestant), nonviolent Hindus, nonviolent Jews, nonviolent Muslims, nonviolent Quakers, nonviolent Sikhs, and nonviolent believers in many other traditions. It includes also those nonviolent humanists who disavow adherence to any religious faith but who express profound respect for life in all its forms.

In thus rooting himself deeply in nonviolent spiritual ground, Gandhiji makes it possible for adherents of all spiritual, religious, and humanist faiths to share that ground as a basis from which to work for nonviolent global change—however much they may differ

in other matters. Gandhi's first legacy is undoubtedly tolerant spiritual commitment.

A second legacy is respect for *science.* By this is meant an experimental attitude, as illustrated by his autobiography and subsequent campaigns, in which the validity of nonviolent approaches to problem-solving is open to lessons to be gained from practical experience. By extension this opens up the possibility of pursuing nonviolent global transformation as a subject for interdisciplinary scientific investigation—engaging the natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities.

Undoubtedly Gandhiji would have been among the first to appreciate and to recognize the importance of carrying on the scientific work set forth in the May 16, 1986 Seville "Statement on Violence." In this statement twenty distinguished scientists in fields such as anthropology, ethology, and psychology with support of "the representatives of the Spanish UNESCO" met in Seville, Spain to declare the following:

> First, "IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors. . . ."
>
> Second, "IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war or any other violent behavior is genetically programmed into our human nature. . . ."
>
> Third, "IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behavior more than for other kinds of behavior. . . ."
>
> Fourth, "IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that humans have a 'violent brain.' . . ."
>
> Fifth, "IT IS SCIENTIFICALLY INCORRECT to say that war is caused by 'instinct' or any single motivation. . . ."

"We conclude," they explain,

> that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake the transformative tasks needed in this International Year of Peace and in the years to come. Although these tasks are mainly institutional and collective, they also rest upon the consciousness of individual participants for whom optimism and pessimism are crucial factors.

> Just as "wars begin in the minds of men," peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us. ("Statement on Violence," 1986)

In sum, these scientists have declared that war and violence are not made inevitable by our animal nature, by our genes, by aggressive natural selection, by our brains, or by our instincts.

Therefore to spiritual faith in nonviolence as the law of life can be added the vast resources of scientific imagination and discovery that can contribute to a nonviolent world. As Albert Einstein has reminded us, "Science itself is not a liberator. It creates means, not goals. . . . We should remember that the fate of mankind [humankind] hinges entirely on man's [human] moral development." (Nathan and Norden, p. 312) In short, Gandhiji's nonviolent spiritual vision combined with commitment to discovery to perfect a science of *satyagraha* provides both moral and scientific direction toward the nonviolent transformation of global civilization. (See Gandhi, *The Science of Satyagraha,* 1970)

But spirit and science alone are not enough. This leads to the third important legacy of Gandhiji that is contributing to nonviolent global awakening. This is his insistence upon the importance of both individual and mass action. This is illustrated by his view that even a single individual, if perfectly nonviolent, could free India from the British Empire. But this must be combined with his assertion that several tens of thousands of Englishmen could not rule India if 300 million Indians nonviolently refused their cooperation. These keen insights into the importance of individual and mass action help to explain why individual dissenters are considered such threats by authoritarian regimes. They explain why large-scale peaceful withdrawal of obedience can lead to the collapse of seemingly unassailable regimes, as we have recently witnessed in several countries around the world, including the Soviet Union, the Baltic Republics, and Eastern Europe. Two scholars who merit enormous credit for extending the theoretical and practical relevance of these Gandhian insights are Krishnalal Shridharani, for his book *War Without Violence* (1962) and Professor Gene Sharp, for his classic work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973), which continues to diffuse throughout the world among

nonviolent activists seeking to liberate humankind from suffering and oppression.

This leads to a fourth component of the Gandhian legacy, which can be termed compassionate constructiveness. Gandhiji's advice that whenever we are in doubt or preoccupied with self, we should always hold in mind's eye "the face of the poorest and weakest" human being we have ever seen and judge all our actions as to how they will benefit and empower that person—will forever stir action to remove economic and other injustices wherever they occur. Gandhiji's personal example of identification with the oppressed combined with positive action to improve their condition remains to challenge the apathy of the comfortable and the inertness of the comfortless.

A regrettably little known but highly significant example of Gandhiji's contribution to awakening humankind for nonviolent action to remove economic suffering is provided by the manifesto on the global "holocaust" of hunger and underdevelopment that was issued by fifty-three Nobel Prize recipients in 1981. ("Manifesto of Nobel Prize Recipients")

They first declare, "All of those who denounce and combat this holocaust are unanimous in maintaining that the causes of this tragedy are political." They next call upon all the established authorities, national and international, including politicians, voters, parliaments, and governments to enact the laws and carry out the policies that will end this holocaust.

Finally, and most significantly, they appeal to the Gandhian legacy of nonviolent transformative action:

> Although the powerful of this earth bear the greatest responsibility, they are not alone. If the helpless take their fate into their own hands, if increasing numbers refuse to obey any law other than the fundamental human rights, the most basic of which is the right to life, if the weak organize themselves and use the few but powerful weapons [means] available to them; *nonviolent actions exemplified by Gandhi,* adopting and imposing objectives which are limited and suitable: if these things happen it is certain that an end could be put to this catastrophe in our time. [Emphasis added]

The Nobel Prize recipients' manifesto illustrates yet another aspect of the Gandhian legacy of compassionate constructiveness.

It encompasses the powerful and the weak, the rich and the poor, the oppressors and the oppressed, men and women, within the same circle of humanity. Whereas violence divides for the well-being of some, nonviolence unites for the well-being of all.

A fifth aspect of Gandhiji's nonviolent legacy is *creative courage*. Gandhiji recognized that it requires a lot of creativity to be violent. As evidence, witness the creative investment of intellect that has produced the incredible killing capability of modern military forces on land, sea, and in the air. But Gandhiji clearly recognized that it will take even more creativity to be nonviolent. This is clearly recognized by all who seek to discover and implement nonviolent alternatives in every aspect of life. These range from efforts to provide nonviolent personal, national, and international security—through provision of nonviolent alternatives to violence-based economies—to evocation of nonviolent expressions in science, language, art, and culture. In this regard, the midwife-inspired *maieutic* educational work of Danilo Dolci in Sicily to bring forth latent creativity in children is a direct contribution to a fundamental global need.

Courage is connected to creativity. It takes courage to stand alone or with others, sometimes at risk of life itself, to make needed changes. Gandhiji calls upon us to be "truthful, gentle, and fearless." Many in India and throughout the world have responded to that call and will continue to do so. Those deserving of honor are numberless. To mention only one by way of illustration: Brian Willson in California, who refused to move from a nonviolent action on railroad tracks to block a train carrying United States weapons for use in El Salvador—and had both legs cut off as a result.

In his honor, and in honor or all those who like Gandhiji have sacrificed and even given their lives in *satyagraha,* let us pause in reverential meditation. . . .

If we now bring the hand of the Gandhian legacy (spirit, science, individual and mass action, compassionate constructiveness, and creative courage) to bear upon the hand of global problems (peace and disarmament, economic justice, human rights, environmental preservation, and achievement of human cooperation)—what are the grounds for confidence that nonviolent transformative action eventually can prevail?

The first is recognition that nonviolence is the fundamental condition in which all the great spiritual teachers have called upon humanity to live. The second is the fact, noted by Gandhiji, that nonviolence is the law of human life. Of the more than five billion humans living now, and of all those who have ever lived, only a small minority have ever directly killed anyone. And since roughly half of humankind are women, since women traditionally have not been warriors, and since usually only a minority of men have served as soldiers, we can have confidence that a nonviolent world is not beyond human attainment.

Further evidence of global nonviolent human capability is shown by the fact that 39 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 31 countries legally or in practice accept some form of conscientious objection to military service, while another 25 countries have no armies at all (listed in the Appendix).

Since we have these important general indicators of nonviolent human potential, what we need is to develop and extend nonviolent capabilities into those areas of life now dominated or plagued by violence.

Let us now briefly examine the five problem areas for signs of nonviolent problem-solving actions, institutions and resources. Although we are honoring Gandhiji and will recognize his contributions, we must avoid placing responsibility for nonviolent global transformation exclusively upon his shoulders. In all world areas there are nonviolent cultural resources and traditions that have their own contributions to make. Gandhiji's example can serve as a powerful stimulus to evoke them, as illustrated by his influence upon the African American nonviolent civil rights movement in the United States. There Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., served as a main focus for inspired leadership by many other men and women, young and old, that reached out to all Americans. But that movement also had its own roots in Christianity and in the African American experience. Similarly Tolstoy provided a source of inspiration and example in Russia that contributed to Gandhiji's work, which in turn was creatively rooted in Gandhiji's understanding of both Indian and British cultures. (Parekh, 1989)

Among nonviolent world leaders of distinction, although Gandhiji himself incredibly never received Nobel Peace Prize recognition, several Nobel peace laureates since his assassination

clearly have drawn nonviolent inspiration from him. Among them are: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (1964), Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams (1976), Amnesty International (1977), Mother Teresa of Calcutta (1979), Adolfo Perez Esquivel (1980), Bishop Desmond Tutu (1984), and the Dalai Lama (1989). Other peace laureates, although not so clearly expressive of principled nonviolence nevertheless have shown great respect for nonviolence as a compass to guide development of world civilization. One of these is Mikhail S. Gorbachev (1990), whose participation with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the Delhi Declaration of Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World on November 27, 1986, constituted a very significant symbolic act to encourage emergence of nonviolent global political leadership.

In addition to these outstanding individuals and countless others who remain unknown, many dedicated institutions are working toward nonviolent solutions for global problems. Each in its own way resonates to and reflects the teaching and example of Gandhiji. Each also tends to work not solely on one kind of problem, but to extend its work to make changes that will bring about a nonviolent society as a whole in which people can live happy, creative, and productive lives.

We will mention here only a few examples of beautiful and dedicated nonviolent global problem-solving resources. For *peace and disarmament,* we note the War Resisters International and Peace Brigades International, to which the distinguished Gandhian worker Narayan Desai has made such an important contribution. We note also the courageous resistance to nuclear weapons sustained since 1981 by the Women's Peace Camp at Greenham Common air base in England. We note too the new movement to abolish armies that is beginning to spread internationally after initiation in Switzerland by the Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee [Switzerland Without Army]. It succeeded in gaining the support of some one million voters in a spring 1990 referendum to abolish the Swiss Army.

For *economic justice,* we note the Sarvodaya movement in India and the Bhoodan-Gramdan legacy of Vinoba Bhave and J. P. Narayan; the Buddhist-based Sarvodaya movement in the villages of Sri Lanka under the dedicated guidance of A. T. Ariyaratne; as well as the nonviolent United Farm Workers union in California

guided by Cesar Chavez; the efforts in the United States (Jobs With Peace) and in England (Lucas Aerospace workers) to shift skills and resources from military to civilian needs; and institutions that provide nonmilitary, need-responsive capital investment services, such as the Calvert Social Fund and the Pax World Fund.

For *human rights,* we note the universally respected Amnesty International, working since 1961 to abolish the death penalty, to end torture, and to gain freedom for all nonviolent prisoners of conscience throughout the world. We note also the complementary work of Humanitas International, founded by the nonviolent folk singer Joan Baez to support victims of political, economic, social, and cultural oppression in many countries. In Latin America we note the work of the major international political, social, and economic human rights organization Servicio Paz y Justicia, guided by Nobel laureate, Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, that grew out of the courageous protests of Argentinian women against the violent "disappearance" of their children under a military regime.

For *environmental protection,* we note the nonviolent direct action efforts of Greenpeace International, not only in defense of dolphins and whales but to remove all threats to a life-supporting environment on land, sea, and in the air. A source of worldwide inspiration for such actions has been the Chipko ("Hug the trees") movement in India to which a senior village woman, Gauri Devi, contributed so much: "This forest is like our mother. You will have to shoot me before you can cut it down." (Shepard, 1987, p. 75).

For development of peaceful relations and *problem-solving cooperation* among peoples based upon nonviolent principles, we note such institutions as the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Jewish Peace Fellowship, the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, guided by Sulak Sivaraksa of Thailand, the Soka Gakkai International, inspired by Daisaku Ikeda ("life is the most precious thing"), the American Friends Service Committee, and the venerable Friends World Committee for Consultation. The work of all these, resonating with the Gandhian legacy as well as being rooted in their own spiritual and historical traditions, refuses to accept power-striving, greed, hatred, and ignorance as eternal obstacles to prevent worldwide cooperation for the well-being and happiness of all.

As further evidence of resources for overall nonviolent global problem-solving that spring at least in part from Gandhian inspiration, four can be mentioned briefly. They stand out in the fields of political leadership, nonviolent training, nonviolent research, and nonviolent education.

Since 1980 the fastest growing political party movement in the world has been the creation, electoral competition, and electoral success of Green parties, the original example of which arose in West Germany. In just ten years these parties have spread over Western, Eastern, and Southern Europe, and they are well represented in the European Parliament. They have emerged also in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, the United States, and other countries. Green parties show every sign of continued diffusion throughout the world. According to one of the five founders of the original German Green Party, Petra Kelly, whom history will recognize as one of the twentieth century's most significant nonviolent political figures, the original Greens very explicitly drew inspiration from both Gandhiji and Martin Luther King, Jr. (Kelly 1989) Although members of Green parties and movements differ in their degree of acceptance of the principle of "nonviolence" as a way to cope with all instances of violence, it is customarily included with other Green values such as ecology, feminism, and grass-roots (rice roots) democracy as goals of Green political action. Even if somewhat qualified, the emergence of electoral parties at the end of the twentieth century prepared to espouse "nonviolence" as among their basic political values is of great historical significance. One reason for this is that it shifts the burden of advocacy of nonviolent change from the shoulders of the victimized who are outside the chambers of established power so that it can be voiced by representatives within them.

Another significant institutional sign of nonviolent change is the New York State Martin Luther King, Jr., Institute for Nonviolence unanimously approved by the Assembly (legislature) of the State of New York and signed into law by Governor Mario M. Cuomo on August 1, 1988. The first of its kind in the United States, the purposes of this Institute are to carry out training, research, and public outreach to help the citizens of New York State find nonviolent means to change the very serious conditions of violence that threaten their lives. The unanimity of its approval and

the substantial tax-derived support given to it testify to the seriousness of that threat as perceived by New York's political leaders of every persuasion.

The chief training advisor to the New York State Institute for Nonviolence is the inspired former King associate Dr. Bernard Lafayette, Jr., who has developed a very effective seven-point summary of Dr. King's methods: (1) define the problem, (2) conduct research, (3) educate all involved, (4) negotiate until untruthfulness becomes apparent, (5) withdraw to engage in self-purification, (6) conduct nonviolent direct action and (7) unite in reconciliation—the constant objective throughout every one of the preceding stages.

Internationally, of course, tribute is richly merited by the devotedly effective training for nonviolent action that has been given by Jean and Hildegard Goss-Mayr under the auspices of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. They made an important contribution to nonviolent political change in the Philippines in 1986 and continue to train nonviolent problem-solvers for other areas plagued by violence, such as Cambodia.

In the field of research to understand causes of success and failure in nonviolent political action, a principal locus of innovation is the Albert Einstein Institution in Cambridge, Massachusetts, directed by Dr. Gene Sharp, whose seminal book *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* has already been mentioned. The main emphasis of this Institute is to promote "research, policy studies, and education concerning the nature and potential of nonviolent sanctions, in comparison with violent ones, for solving the problems of aggression, dictatorship, genocide, and oppression." The importance of this research program is that until it is conclusively shown that effective nonviolent alternatives are available for coping with the most serious cases of political violence, both governments and citizens are unlikely to relinquish their attachment to violence.

A fourth major global resource in the field of nonviolence is Gandhigram Rural Institute (Deemed University) which, as you know, is located in the Madurai district of Tamil Nadu State, India. Founded by the inspired, brilliant, and dedicated Gandhian educator Dr. G. Ramachandran—himself a devoted student both of Gandhiji and of Rabindranath Tagore, whose qualities he combines—the history of Gandhigram Rural University is of global significance for

at least two reasons. First, it offers us the example of an effort to base a whole university (natural sciences, social sciences, arts, humanities and professions) on principles of nonviolence. That includes the effort to have the entire University respond to the needs of all who live in its surrounding area through cooperative planning and implementation of constructive service programs. Second, the Shanti Sena [Peace Brigade] of Gandhigram Rural University provides an alternative to violent military training that gradually should be adopted creatively by every college and university in the world as an important source of leadership to assist transition to a nonviolent global community. Some important features of the training are instruction in the spirit and principles of nonviolence, tolerance, discipline, fearlessness, conflict resolution, selfless work with those in need to improve their condition, and joyful recreational and artistic expression. The first pledge of the Gandhigram Shanti Sainik stands before us all as a challenging living memorial to Gandhiji's life and message: "I shall work for peace and if need be to lay down my life for it."

The world will always be indebted to Dr. G. Ramachandran, the founder of Gandhigram University and of its Shanti Sena, and to Professor N. Radhakrishnan, beloved of students, who joyfully and creatively served as its chief organizer for twenty-five years, drawing upon the wisdom of senior colleagues who were veterans of Gandhian campaigns.

In thus calling attention to a few nonviolent problem-solvers and to these four special contributors to global awakening in the fields of political leadership, training, research, and education—I equally wish to celebrate the existence of all institutions in India and throughout the world that are dedicated to nonviolence. These include the Gujarat Vidyapith, the Gandhian Institute of Studies, the Center for Gandhian Studies and Peace Research, the Gandhi Peace Foundation, the Kasturba Gandhi Trust, the Harijan Sevak Sangh, the Self-Employed Women's Association, the Jamnalal Bajaj Foundation, the Navajivan Trust, the Gandhian publication projects of the Government of India, *Gandhi Marg,* the faithful journal for the stimulation of nonviolent thought throughout the world, and others. Some of these institutions are known to me but of many I am ignorant. Globally my impression is that the number of nonviolent individuals, projects, and institutions is increasing

virtually everywhere. It will take a major research effort to identify all of them as a basis for worldwide supportive action.

This brings me to the final observation to be offered for your consideration. If we are to bring the hand of Gandhiji's nonviolent legacy to bear upon the hand of violent global problems—in the process of global nonviolent awakening—we need the assistance of an institution with global vision. Just as there are maps of world military deployments or of world energy and food resources, we need a map of global violence overlaid with a map of nonviolent resources for global problem-solving.

I believe that it is within human capability to bring about a nonviolent global community. Such a community will have no killing and no threats to kill, no weapons specifically designed to kill, and no ideological justifications for killing, and no conditions of society that depend for maintenance or change upon the threat or use of killing force.

But to realize such a community we must identify, bring together, and advance the nonviolent spiritual, scientific, leadership-followership, compassionately constructive, and creatively courageous resources that are needed to bring it about. An analogy is provided by the contemporary achievement of placing a human being on the moon. Long considered an impossible dream, it rapidly became a reality when vision, will, skill, science, technology, human organization, training, resources, and public support were combined to make it possible. Something similar can happen in nonviolent global transformation as the historical preconditions for it begin to converge and to interact with future vision.

I believe, as our brief survey has shown, that there is already in existence substantial nonviolent knowledge and experience which, if acted upon by individuals and translated into policy by private and public institutions, can assist significant nonviolent change throughout the world. Furthermore, I believe that an institution to accomplish this is not a luxury but a necessity, as illustrated partly by the New York State Assembly's unanimous response to violence within their society—the creation of an institute to promote nonviolence. The same logic is applicable on a global scale.

A nonviolent global institution should be interspiritual, interdisciplinary, and international in composition. Its purpose should be to advance and to combine vision, knowledge, education-training, and action to assist humankind to replace conditions of violence with life-respecting conditions of nonviolence. In structure the nonviolent global institution should be patterned somewhat after the United Nations University, which has its Centre in Tokyo. That is, with an international guiding council, based upon substantial endowment resources, the institution should carry out its work by assisting individuals and organizations throughout the world to advance knowledge, education, and action for nonviolence. It should devise means to be responsive to the needs of nonviolent workers everywhere. At the same time it should help to encourage and support research at the highest reaches of spiritual, poetic, and scientific imagination. Like many previous scourges that have afflicted suffering humanity, the ancient terror of violence is not likely to subside by prayer and common sense alone, although both are indispensable for its removal.

A ten-year startup program for a global nonviolence institution can readily be envisioned. For one thing we need a series of exploratory seminars to begin discovery of past roots, present manifestations, and future prospects of nonviolence in every country and region of the world. For another we need a series of advanced research seminars to explore what we know and what we need to know on subjects such as the following: (1) nonviolence in religious and philosophical traditions, (2) brain studies and nonviolence, (3) nonviolent gender relationships, (4) nonviolent economics, (5) the role of the military in nonviolent global transformation, (6) high technologies for nonviolence, (7) nonviolence and the environment, (8) problems of leadership in nonviolent movements, (9) nonviolence in the arts, (10) nonviolent training and education, (11) nonviolent communi-cations, (12) nonviolence in the professions, and (13) the formulation and evaluation of nonviolent public policies.

The results of such explorations, research inventories, and discoveries should be brought together in forms suitable for informing humankind of its nonviolent heritage as we enter the twenty-first century. From this basis, research, education, and policy development can be raised to higher levels of consciousness

and effectiveness on a global scale. With such awareness nonviolent knowledge, leadership, and skills can be focused more precisely and diffused more widely to solve specific problems of violence.

Some will say that a nonviolent world is impossible, and that therefore a nonviolent global institution is unnecessary. But for those of us who have witnessed the incredible changes taking place throughout the world over the past two years, the wisdom of Gandhiji's insight into possibilities for human change shines anew: "We are daily witnessing the phenomenon of the impossible of yesterday becoming the possible of today." (*Collected Works,* Vol. 26, p. 68)

Therefore let us be confident that the seemingly impossible dream of establishing a Center for Global Nonviolence to help bring the legacy of Gandhiji and other nonviolent resources to bear in global *satyagraha* [nonviolent action based on truth and love] for global *sarvodaya* [nonviolent well-being of all] may yet become a reality. And let us also be confident that with or without such a Center, Gandhiji's contribution to global nonviolent awakening will continue to resonate throughout the world—forever.

Appendix

Some Indicators of Nonviolent Human Capabiliy

I. Countries Without the Death Penalty

1. Australia
2. Austria
3. Cambodia
4. Cape Verde
5. Columbia
6. Costa Rica
7. Czechoslovakia
8. Denmark
9. Dominican Republic
10. Equador
11. Finland
12. France
14. Haiti
15. Honduras
16. Iceland
17. Kiribati
18. Lichtenstein
19. Luxembourg
20. Marshall Islands
21. Federated States of Micronesia
22. Monaco
23. Namibia
24. The Netherlands
26. Nicaragua
27. Norway
28. Panama
29. Philippines
30. Portugal
31. Romania
32. San Marino
33. Solomon Islands
34. Sweden
35. Tuvalu
36. Uruguay
37. Vanuatu

13. Germany	25. New Zealand	38. Vatican City
		39. Venezuala

Source: Amnesty International, telephone inquiry, International Secretariat, London, 1990.

II. Countries That Recognize Conscientious Objection to Military Service

1. Austria	11. Greece	21. Paraguay
2. Australia	12. Guyana	22. Portugal
3. Belgium	13. Hungary	23. South Africa
4. Bolivia	14. Israel	24. Spain
5. Brazil	15. Italy	25. Sweden
6. Canada	16. Lebanon	26. Switzerland
7. Denmark	17. Mexico	27. Trinidad and Tobago
8. Finland	18. The Netherlands	28. United Kingdom
9. France	19. New Zealand	29. United States
10. Germany	20. Norway	30. Uruguay
		31. Zaire

Source: Kidron and Segal, 1981, Map 30, and Amnesty International, 1988.

III. Countries Without Armies

No Army	No Army (But Defense Treaty with Another Country)
1. Costa Rica	1. Andorra (France)
2. Dominica	2. Cook Islands (New Zealand)
3. Kiribati	3. Gambia (Senegal)
4. Lichtenstein	4. Iceland (U.S.A.)
5. Mauritius	5. Luxembourg (NATO)
6. Maldives	6. Northern Marianas (U.S.A.)
7. Monaco	7. Marshall Islands (U.S.A.)
8. St. Kitts and Nevis	8. Federated States of Micronesia (U.S.A.)
9. St. Lucia	
10. San Marino	9. Niue (New Zealand)
11. St. Vincent and the Grenadines	10. Palau (U.S.A.)
12. Solomon Islands	11. Tuvalu (U.K.)
13. Western Samoa	12. Vanuatu (Papua New Guinea)

Source: Gruppe Schweiz ohne Armee International, 1990.

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FALL

Autumn reflections follow the awakening of spring and the journeys of summer discovery. To strengthen nonviolent political science for service beyond the dispersed efforts of individuals, institutional capabilities need to be developed. These range from new ways to train scholars, new course offerings, new departmental structures, and new inter-disciplinary relationships to new nonviolent public and private organizations to serve human needs.

If we are truly determined to eliminate violence and to encourage nonviolent celebration of life by individuals, families, local communities, nations, regions, and ultimately by the global polity, we need to give it institutional expression. This means finding ways to combine the spirit, science, and skills of nonviolence that are appropriate within each context. As long as we believe that human killing is ineradicable, we are unlikely to devote the intellect, effort, and resources to eliminate it. But once we realize that a nonkilling world is not beyond human capability, then we need to take it as seriously as we have taken the voyages of global discovery of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Manhattan atomic bomb project, and the Apollo project to land a man on the moon. All were previously considered to be impossible, but by combining vision, intellect, and resources—through trial and error—they achieved their violence-era objectives. Visionary institution-alization in the era of nonviolent global transition is no less important.

Skill in institution-building is not usually part of the training of the scholar-teacher in political science. But as discoveries lead to needs that go beyond individual capabilities and resources, the cooperation and support of others is vital. Sometimes only the general vision can be set forth; perhaps others with the necessary skills and means will be able to carry it forward.

At the present time some significant nonviolent institu-tional innovations are emerging in various parts of the world. They join ancient predecessors such as the Jains of India and the modern

Quakers. Some of these have been noted with great respect in the foregoing Gandhi memorial lecture. A significant scholarly example is the interdisciplinary Nonviolence Study Group (Commission) founded by Theodore L. Herman and presently coordinated by Chaiwat Satha-Anand within the UNESCO-affiliated International Peace Research Association.

The following essay "The Idea of a Center for Global Nonviolence" sets forth a proposal to establish an institutional capability for scanning the globe for nonviolent knowledge and for assisting its application in everyday life. The present idea is not to create a gigantic institution akin to the Pentagon, although an international, nonviolent institution on that scale would be entirely appropriate given the magnitude of global violence. Rather what is envisioned is more like the organizational model of the United Nations University, whose Centre is in Tokyo. There a substantial endowment enables a coordinating core group to establish cooperative relationships with individuals and institutions throughout the world to advance research, education, and service that will promote the survival and well-being of humankind.

Furthermore it is not assumed that only one Center for Global Nonviolence is appropriate. The establishment of regional, national, and local centers combining global and local perspectives will be necessary for nonviolent global change. Underlying the Center proposal is the assumption that every person in the world should be a "center" for global nonviolence.

Between late 1988 and 1993, some small exploratory projects have been undertaken at the University of Hawai'i on very limited local resources to illustrate the promise of the Center idea. These include the books *Nonviolence in Hawaii's Spiritual Traditions* (1991), *Buddhism and Nonviolent Problem-Solving: Ulan Bator Explorations* (1991), Petra K. Kelly, *Nonviolence Speaks to Power* (1992), *Islam and Nonviolence* (1993), and the present volume. Funds were inadequate to engage in any of the major projects envisioned in the proposal.

A recent president of the University of Hawai'i, while generally supportive, commented that the idea of a nonkilling society is "a hundred years ahead of its time." As of 1993 the future of the Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project at the University of Hawai'i is uncertain, a vision seeking visionary

implementational resources. But what is certain is that eventually such an institute will come into being somewhere in the world.

8

The Idea of a Center for Global Nonviolence

As we look forward to the 21st century there is a need for a scholarly research, educational, and service institution to take up seriously the study of nonviolence as a contribution to global well-being. Such an institution can help to liberate humankind from the self-fulfilling pessimism that violence from the family to the international community is inescapable. It can help to empower all with the knowledge, skill, and confidence needed for creative discovery of nonviolent alternatives to overcome threats to human survival in the areas of peace and security, economic justice, human rights, preservation of the biosphere, and global problem-solving cooperation. It can assist humanity on a voyage of nonviolent self-discovery.

The idea of creating an institution to explore global nonviolence is akin to the visions that led to the 15th century Portuguese voyages of discovery and to the 20th century Apollo project that first enabled humans to journey to the moon. In each case the formerly impossible, and even unthinkable, was transformed into globally significant reality. This was accomplished by a combination of faith and commitment, assemblage of available knowledge and skills, creation of new knowledge, invention of new technologies, training, and institutional development—all made possible by providers of moral and material support with vision and courage to share the failures and successes of discovery.

From *Perspectives on Nonviolence,* ed. V. K. Kool (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990), pp. 226-230. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

The goals of a Center for Global Nonviolence will be to discover and combine spiritual, scientific, skill, organizational, and material resources that will assist nonviolent global transformation. It will seek to advance human understanding of how to express aspirations and to solve problems without the threat or use of killing force. To do this it will need new knowledge of the causes of violence, the causes of nonviolence, the processes of transition from one to the other, and requisites for a nonviolent global society that will be creatively free and materially just. It will seek practical inspiration from exploring the possibility of realizing a nonkilling society; i.e., a society in which there is no killing and no threats to kill, no weapons and no cultural justifications for killing, and no societal conditions that rely for maintenance or change upon the threat or use of lethal force.

To achieve these goals the Center must facilitate the identification and cooperation of individuals, institutions, and movements that are contributing to nonviolent global change. Its interests will be in learning from, sharing, and assisting nonviolent inquiry, education, and action wherever they appear. A small core staff will reach out across cultural and disciplinary boundaries to cooperate with all who are contributing to the progress of nonviolent world civilization through research, teaching, direct action, and daily life.

At an early stage of Center development, a stocktaking conference on nonviolent global resources should be convened to establish cooperative relationships and to identify paths for future advancement. Such a conference would bring together principled articulators of nonviolent values in spiritual and philosophical traditions (e.g., Baha‘i, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, Jain, Jewish, Quaker, and humanist), teacher-researchers exemplified by scholars who completed at least 50 doctoral dissertations on nonviolence in 10 disciplines between 1963-1987 in the United States alone, leaders of nonviolent movements (e.g., Amnesty International, the Greens of Europe, Greenpeace, Sarvodaya of Sri Lanka, and the War Resisters International), scholarly institution-builders (e.g., India’s Gandhi Rural University and Harvard’s Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense), and philanthropic leaders with global vision.

This conference should set forth plans for a decade of nonviolent global exploration to establish the bases for a major world conference on nonviolence and the 21st century, to be held in 2001. At that future convocation scholars, leaders, and the global public would be invited to consider serious grounds for confidence in human ability to make the new century far less violent than its predecessor.

During the preparatory decade the Center should facilitate two kinds of interdisciplinary research seminars. The first would inventory nonviolent cultural resources in various world regions. The second would stimulate creativity in nonviolent theory and practice.

Thus the series of regional seminars organized locally by scholarly experts in language and culture would study nonviolence in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, North America, the Pacific, Scandinavia, and the [former] Soviet Union, with sensitivity to subcultures and variations within each region. In addition, attention should be given to nonviolence in the Arctic, Antarctica, the oceans, atmosphere, and outer space. In each region studies would bring to awareness ideas, individuals, events, institutions, movements, and policies—past and present—that promise future contributions to nonviolent global life. Even now persons who seek further progress toward a nonviolent world can be encouraged by abolition of the death penalty in 39 nations and acceptance of some form of conscientious objection to military service in 31 nations. On the other hand these promising signs are noticeably absent in certain nations, regions, and cultures where inquiry into factors inhibiting and favoring them will be helpful.

The Center should also sponsor a series of interdisci-plinary transnational research seminars focused upon important problems of nonviolent theory and practice, such as the following.

Nonviolence in Religious and Philosophical Traditions: This seminar would explore religious and philosophical views on the causes of violence, the causes of nonviolence, the causes of transition from one to the other, and the possibility of achieving a nonviolent world. Through comparison and interaction, insight into the spiritual core and cooperative capabilities of principled nonviolence would be sought.

Brain Studies and Nonviolence: This seminar would seek to contribute theory and findings of pioneering brain research bearing upon the human capacity for realizing a nonviolent society.

Nonviolent Gender Relationships: This seminar would explore new concepts of nonviolent manhood and womanhood and their relations as a contribution to finding ways out of violence-conditioned gender relationships.

Nonviolent Economics: Since contemporary economic systems to varying degrees are engaged in and supported by the threat or use of lethal force, there is a need to examine nonviolent alternatives for enhancing productivity and responding to material needs.

Nonviolent leadership: By study of critical incidents of success and failure of leadership in nonviolent movements, combined with other nonviolent research findings, this seminar would seek new knowledge for practical application. Nonviolent leadership merits no less attention than that devoted to improvement of business or military leadership.

Role of the Military in Nonviolent Transition: The role of the global military establishment (with 23 million persons under arms and more than $1,000 billion in annual expenditures) in bringing about nonviolent global transformation would be creatively and constructively examined. A related seminar would study the transitional role of police.

Nonviolence and the Professions: This seminar would inquire into problems of violence in various professions (as both contributors and victims) and seek nonviolent alternatives in professional training and practice. This would include such fields as law, medicine, business, communication, education, engineering, public administration, social work, and theology.

Nonviolence and Education: This seminar would explore nonviolent alternatives at all levels from preschool through higher learning to continuing adult education. The educational challenge is to confront violence realistically and yet develop knowledge and skills that will contribute to nonviolent societal processes and outcomes.

Nonviolence and the Arts: This seminar would celebrate and evoke nonviolent creativity in the arts, ranging from painting, poetry, and literature, through music, dance, and drama, to film and

beyond. In this as in other areas, discoveries of new nonviolent creative potentials are to be expected.

High Technologies for Nonviolence: The need to develop and apply appropriate technologies to assist nonviolent solutions to problems ranging from personal security to global peace deserves to be set forth for consideration by the world's most inventive minds.

Nonviolence In Communications: This seminar would explore the contributions to nonviolent change that can be made by such media as newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and other forms of telecommunication as well as by ancient means of person-to-person communication. Solutions would be sought to the contemporary tendency to employ violent metaphors for essentially peaceful processes while camouflaging lethality with euphemisms.

Images of Future Nonviolent Societies: Creativity in evoking images of nonviolent future societies from different cultural perspectives would be the goal of this seminar. Through sharing and comparison, clearer understanding of the diversity and commonality of a nonviolent global community would be sought.

Among other research goals of the Center would be stocktaking seminars to review interdisciplinary research findings on nonviolence at the beginning and end of the decade of exploration, a series of biographical profiles of nonviolent figures throughout the world, and case studies of nonviolent efforts to solve problems in the areas of security, economy, human rights, ecology, and community.

In education and training activities, the Center would encourage local workshops to encourage incorporation of nonviolent research findings in teaching and learning. It would facilitate local and transnational training workshops to share experiences of the world's most skilled participants in nonviolent problem-solving action.

An overall developmental goal of the Center would be to become capable of serving as a global resource for research, teaching, and service to assist nonviolent global change. For example, on request it would seek to organize transnational groups or consulting specialists on matters of nonviolent concern. Through telecommunication linkages it could assist transnational learning at a distance among teachers and students of nonviolence. At best the Center could provide consulting teams to advise in the preventive,

coping, and recuperative stages of violent tragedies so as to strengthen future nonviolent human capabilities.

The publications goals of the Center would be to contribute to global distribution of nonviolent knowledge. This would include an annual survey of nonviolent global resources, reports of the series of exploratory seminars (regional and theoretical-practical), reports on stocktaking conferences, biographical profiles of nonviolent figures, research reports, and other materials to support inquiry, teaching, and public service.

The creativity and contributions of the Center and its global associates will be related to the vision and creativity of providers of moral, administrative, and material support for its activities. Basic operating costs, including global communications, must be assured. Far-sighted endowments must ensure sustained innovative significance, as in the exploratory seminar series, endowed professorships, student fellowships, and travelling leadership development fellowships. Imaginative support for specific projects will be essential, such as publications, conferences, educational innovations, and consultancies.

The idea of a Center for Global Nonviolence does not imply that other nonviolent activities are in any sense peripheral or that only one center will suffice for nonviolent global change. There should be many centers for global nonviolence, responsive to diverse intellectual and cultural traditions but linked by global concern for the well-being of all and by principled commitment to life-respecting values. In principle each citizen of the 21st century should become his or her own center for global nonviolence, creatively developing its potentials in everyday life.

A start needs to be made somewhere in establishing a new nonviolent outlook in world scholarship, learning from and cooperating with existing innovations such as the Gujarat Vidyapith founded by M. K. Gandhi in 1920. In the fall of 1988 University of Hawaii Academic Vice-President Anthony J. Marsella gave permission to plan for a Center for Global Nonviolence as an activity of the new University of Hawaii Institute for Peace.

If a Center for Global Nonviolence is successful, even in a small way, it can make a contribution to ensuring common security, lifting the economic burdens of armaments, liberating the oppressed, respecting the life of the planet, and promoting peaceful

cooperation to meet human needs, while reaching out toward fulfillment of new and age-old aspirations.

The wisdom of all throughout the world who can envision the usefulness of such a Center is needed to transform the idea into reality.

Glenn D. Paige: Selected Writings on Nonviolence

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About the Author

Glenn D. Paige was born on June 28, 1929, in Brockton, Massachusetts. He spent his early years in Rochester, New Hampshire, with summers in North Truro and Provincetown on Cape Cod. He was educated at Rochester's Spaulding High School (1943-1946), Phillips Exeter Academy (1947), Princeton (1947-1948, 1952-1955, B.A. in politics, 1955), Harvard University (M.A. in East Asian Studies [Korea], 1957), and Northwestern University (Ph.D. in political science, 1959). He served in the United States Army (1948-1952) as recruit, private, corporal, sergeant, second lieutenant, and finally as first lieutenant of antiaircraft artillery. He ended his service as a reserve captain in 1960. In the early stages (September-December 1950) of service in the Korean War (1950-1952), he was attached as an antiaircraft communications officer to the First Republic of Korea Infantry Division. Subsequently he served as research adviser in the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, under an appointment as assistant professor of public administration, University of Minnesota (1959-1961). In Seoul he observed the April 19, 1960, student demonstrations that led to the resignation of President Syngman Rhee and the May 16, 1961, military coup d'état that arrested democratic development.

He awakened to nonviolence in 1973-1974 and made his first journey of discovery to India in 1975. In 1987 he first visited Pyongyang for discussions on nonviolence as a guest of the Korean Association of Social Scientists (KASS). In 1989 he assisted the first visit of KASS scholars to Hawai'i and a reciprocal first visit to North Korea by an American university president, University of Hawai'i President Albert J. Simone.

He taught as assistant and associate professor of politics with continuing tenure at Princeton University (1961-1967), and as professor of political science at the University of Hawai'i from 1967

until transition to professor emeritus in 1992. He is engaged in writing a book on nonkilling political science and in planning a global institution dedicated to advancing knowledge and practice of nonviolence.

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